What Makes Anthropomorphism Natural: Intuitive Ontology and Cultural Representations

Author(s): Pascal Boyer

Source: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 83-
97
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
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 WHAT MAKES ANTHROPOMORPHISM NATURAL:
INTUITIVE ONTOLOGY
AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS

PASCALBOYER
Nationaldela Recherche
Centre Scienttflque

The projectionof human attributesonto non-humandomains is oftenexplainedin anthro-

pologyas the consequence of a tendencyto animismand anthropomorphism presentfromthe
earliest stages of cognitivedevelopment. However, the experimentalevidence suggeststhat
intuitiveontologicalprinciplesexclude such projections.So anthropomorphism, thoughwide-
spread,is counter-intuitive.This apparentparadoxcan be solved by means of a cognitivetheory
of culturalrepresentations,in which representationsare likelyto become stableand widespread
iftheyhave bothsalienceand inferential potential.Anthropomorphic projectionshave inferential
potentialbecause theyactivatea powerfulmodularcapacityformentalisticaccountsof behaviour.
They are salientbecause theyare counter-intuitive,and thereforeattention-grabbing.

Introduction
In mostculturalenvironments, one findsrepresentations concerning thelife-
likeand human-like featuresof non-living or non-humanobjects:treesthat
protect peopleinexchange forsacrifices,animalsthathavemarriage ceremonies
or funerary rituals,mountains thatbreathe, riversthattalk,statuesthatlistenor
divining wandsthatpredictfuture occurrences, notto mentiongodswho have
meals and fallin love or spiritsthatlive in invisiblevillages.Such repre-
sentations are centralto religiousontologies, althoughtheyare certainly not
limitedto the religiousdomain.The problem,then,is to providea precise
description ofthecognitive processes thatmakeanimistic andanthropomorphic
assumptions so 'natural'.Thereis no clear,psychologically plausibleanswerto
thisquestionin anthropology, despitea longtradition ofreflectionon animism
as a coreprocessin religion.
In thisarticleI discussthewidespread theorythatpeoplehavea spontaneous
tendency to extendhumanattributes to non-human domains,a tendency that
can be observedin an especially clearwayin children's thought processes.The
Piagetiantradition in particular
described thechildas applying an overwhelm-
ingly'animistic'conceptofcausation evento mechanical effects.Childrenwere
also describedas interpreting manyeventsin clearlyanthropomorphic ways.
Four-year-olds, forinstance,seemto use an intentional vocabulary to account
forthecourseof thecloudsin thesky:theclouds'wantto go' somewhere or
'wantto stayput' (Laurendau& Pinard1962).All thiswouldindicatethatthe
childmakesextensiveuse of a defaultassumption thatthingsare aliveand
Inst.(N.S.) 2, 83-97
J. Roy.anthrop.

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84 PASCAL BOYER

intentionalunlessthereis directevidencethattheyarenot.Ifthisis thecase,it

would seemthatthewidespread occurrence of suchrepresentationsis hardly
surprising.It isjust theexpressionofa 'modeofthought' pervasive
inchildren's
thinking.1According to this'continuity'
hypothesis,anthropomorphismis wide-
because
spread itisintuitive.
As we willsee,however, theexperimentalevidenceseemsto go againstthis
hypothesis. Indeed,developmental studiesshow thatspontaneousontologies
clearly
exclude, froman earlyage,theanimistic andanthropomorphicprojections
we are considering here. So we need to describethe cognitiveprocesses
whereby representations whicharenotpartofourintuitive ontology,andin fact
the
go against grain of intuitive become
ontology, culturally
widespread.The solu-
tionto thisapparent paradoxwillillustrate
therelevanceofa generalframework
presentedelsewhere(Boyer1994),according to whichuniversalcognitive dis-
positionsaccount for the cross-cultural recurrenceof certainkinds of
representations.

Theevidence: as counter-intuitive
anthropomorphism
In orderto understand whatis impliedby 'childhoodanimism'or anthropo-
morphism, it is necessary to havea broaderpictureof the child'sontology,
oftheintuitive
particularly ontologicalcategories andprincipleswithwhichchil-
drenand adultsconstruetheirexperienceand makeinferences. In the last
twenty years,thetopichasseenconsiderable advances,bothin termsofexperi-
mentaltechniques and of theoretical
frameworks. On thewhole,theevidence
seemsto cast doubton severalimportant assumptions of the Piagetianap-
proach.In particular, thereis now considerable evidencethat(i) ontological
categoriesareclearly representedfromtheearliest stagesofconceptualdevelop-
ment,and (ii) even young childrenacquire knowledgeon the basis of
quasi-theoretical understandings ofthevariousontological domains.
Let me firstconsiderontologicaldistinctions betweensuch domainsas
PERSONS,ARTEFACTS, ANIMATEBEINGS,EVENTS andABSTRACTOBJECTS.Beyond
thecleardistinctions betweencon-specifics and othertypesof beings,and be-
tweendifferent con-specifics (Morton& Johnson1991),infants seemto make
a distinctionbetweenANIMATE and INANIMATE objects(Bullock1985;Gelman
etat. 1983;Richards& Siegler1986).This abilityis probably groundedin an
earlysensitivity to theperceptual differencebetweenself-and non-self-gener-
atedmovement in physicalobjects(Massey& Gelman1988).Also,Mandler
and hercolleagueshavedemonstrated theexistence of a variety
of ontological
categoriessuch as PLANTS and ARTEFACTS in eighteenth-month-old children
(Mandler& Bauer1989;Mandleretal. 1991).Ata laterstageofdevelopment,
Keil'sexperiments haveshownthatpre-schoolers makeuse ofa complexhier-
archyoftacitontological distinctions(Keil 1979;1986;1989).This is manifest,
forinstance, in 'predicate-spanning'; if theapplicationof a givenpredicateis
relevantto a certainobject,it allowsus to predictthepossibility of applying
otherpredicates to thatobject.As Keil's studieshave shown,pre-schoolers
spontaneously use such predicaterestrictions to makeinferences concerning
imaginary objectstheyknownothingabout.Experiments, forinstance,show
thatyoungchildren areconfident thatan imaginary item,describedas 'sleepy'
maywellbe 'furious', butthatitcertainly cannotbe 'madeofmetal'.

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 PASCAL BOYER 85

Having an ontologicalcategoryis notjust a matterof selectingthe rightcues

thatsortobjects in different conceptualslots; it also implies havingparticular
assumptionsabout what makesthe objectsdifferent. In thisdomain,a number
of recent studies have emphasized the richness and early development of
domain-specificprinciplesthatare in some importantrespectsunder-determined
by the child's experience(fora generalsurvey,see Hirschfeld& Gelman 1994).
In thedomain ofphysical expectations, developmentalresearchhas shown that
manyof the principlesunderlyingadult intuitiveexpectationsappearveryearly
in cognitivedevelopment.Infants,forinstance,expect solid objects to behave
accordingto continuity(objectsmove in continuouspaths),solidity(objectsdo
not coincide in space) (Baillargeon 1987; Baillargeon & Hanko-Summers
1990), and support(unsupportedobjectsfalldownwards)(Spelke 1990). More-
over, infantsare sensitive to differencesin contiguous events, particularly
betweencausal and non-causalversionsof contiguousphysicalevents;theyalso
hold a principleof 'no actionat a distance'(Leslie 1988).
Similaradvanceshave been made in the descriptionof specializedprinciples
underlyingexpectationsabout the biological featuresof livingkinds. From the
earliestage, as we saw above, thereis a categoricaldistinctionbetweenANIMATE
and INANIMATE objects. This distinctionis then enrichedwith a varietyof
specificintuitiveprincipleswhichdescribebiologicalaspectsof live beings.The
identificationof living kinds activatesan 'essentialistprinciple'according to
which an undefinedinternalprinciple,exclusiveto the species,causes itsexter-
nal featuresas well as certain aspects of its behaviour.2These theoretical
assumptionsare also manifestin children'sresistanceto the possibilityof an
artificial
transformation of one livingkind intoanother(Keil 1986).
Anotherset of intuitiveprinciplesis found in the intentional explanationof
behaviour, Young childrenreadilyinterpretthe behaviour of animate beings,
particularly persons,in termsof the causal role of unobservableentitiessuch as
beliefsand intentions.This requiresa seriesof tacitprinciplesabout the nature
of mentalentitiesand theirconnexionswithobservableaction (see forinstance
Astingtonetal. 1988; Perner1991; Wellmann1990; Whiten 1991). Beliefsand
desiresare representedas immaterialfromthe age of three(Wellmann& Estes
1986). At the same age, childrenhave a rudimentary understanding of thecausal
connexionsbetween statesof affairsand mentalrepresentations. They under-
standthatperceptionsroutinelycause beliefswhich maycause intentionswhich
mayresultin actions,whilstthereversecausal linksare non-standard.They also
understand,around the age of four,the possibilityof mental representations
misrepresenting as well as thebehaviouralimplicationsof
actualstatesof affairs,
false belief (see Wimmer& Perner 1983 for the originalfindings).All these
principlesformthe basis of intentionalexplanations.Of course,childrensub-
sequentlyacquire vastlymore complex notions about mental processes and
behaviour.Yet these never contradictthe fundamentalprinciplesobserved in
five-year-olds.
The combinationof ontological categoriesand domain-specificprinciples
providesthe child (and the adult) withan intuitive and the correspond-
ontology,
ing set of specificexpectationsabout various aspects of the environment.In
most domains,these intuitiveprinciplesare under-determined by experience.
Obviously,knowledgestructurescould not be developed withoutthe trigger

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86 PASCAL BOYER

providedby externalstimuli.No child will ever develop an understandingof

intentionalaction unless he or she is in constantinteractionwith intentional
beings; no understanding of biologicalpropertiescould develop in a environ-
ment thatdid not include live beings. However, the child's earlyor intuitive
'theories'go farbeyondthe information given,and are structured,
froman early
age, by complex,quasi-theoretical priorassumptionsabout the different prop-
ertiesof differentontologicaldomains.
Under-determination by experienceentailsunder-determination by cultural
input,which is only a subset of the child's experience.Indeed, the principles
underlyingintuitiveontologycan be foundin a similarformin the mostdiverse
cultural environments.For instance,Walker found a similar developmental
schedule foraspectsof ontologicaldevelopmentin Yoruba and Americanchil-
dren (Walker1985; 1992). Or again,the principlesof taxonomicorderingand
essentialistunderstandingof livingthingsare representedin similarways the
world over (Atran 1990). The understandingof mentalprocesses and inten-
tionalaction,which afterall would seem to depend most on particularfeatures
of social interactions,is seen to undergo the same developmentalphases in
Cameroon Pygmyand Britishchildren(Avis& Harris 1991).
To sum up, the contentand developmentalscheduleof ontologicalcategories
and domain-specificprinciplesseem to be the outcome of maturationalpro-
grammestriggered,but not shaped, by experientialinput. This may explain
theirremarkableconsistencyin vastlydifferent culturalenvironments.There
are good evolutionaryargumentsfor assuming that natural selection would
have equipped human mindswith a varietyof domain-specificconceptualca-
pacities,each carrying strongpriorassumptionsabout itsdomain of application,
ratherthan an all-purpose and unconstrainedform of general intelligence
(Barkow etal. 1992). Human beings are remarkablein theircapacityto learn,
that is, to acquire informationstored in the naturaland social environment.
This is preciselywhy theyneed more complex priorassumptionsthan other
species.The capacityto learnis the capacityto make specificinferenceson the
basis of cues presentin the environment;it requiresa capacityto recognize
relevantcues againsta background,and to constrainthe rangeof possibleinfer-
ences fromthose cues. This is where a rangeof specialized,quasi-theoretical
priorprinciplesis obviouslysuperiorin computationaltermsto unconstrained
formsof generalintelligence,which would compute indefinitely many infer-
ences on the basis of indefinitely
manyirrelevant aspectsof the environment.
Such evolutionaryconsiderationsmay also account for the obvious differ-
ences between the domain-specific'modules' describedabove. There is, for
instance,a strikingcontrastbetweenthe inferentialpotentialof intuitivepsy-
of behaviour)
chological principles(our intuitive'belief-desire'interpretation
and all other domain-specificprinciples.The inferencesand predictionspro-
duced by what psychologistsdescribeas a 'theoryof mind module' are, from
the earlieststagesof development,farmore complexthananyotherconceptual
structure.Also, the 'theoryof mind module' postulatesthe existenceof imma-
terialcausativeentities(beliefsand intentions)fromthe outset,whilst other
conceptualstructuresonly graduallybuild such representations of underlying
causativeprocesses.Some authorshave speculatedon theevolutionarycauses of
this 'hypertrophy' of the theoryof mind module. What is clear is thatsuch a

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 PASCAL BOYER 87

richlystructuredset of assumptionsis necessaryfor verbal communication

(Sperber & Wilson 1986), as well as for cultural acquisition in general
(Tomaselloetal. 1993).
A generalconclusion fromthe studiesI have mentionedis thatthereis no
such thingas a categorical'confusion'or spontaneous over-extensionin the
child's ontology.Live thingsare not artefacts, persons and plantsare not the
same, eventsand abstractobjectsare different. The child applies to ontological
categoriesa set of particularquasi-theoretical principleswhich do not resultin
categorymistakes.For instance,the child's biologicalassumptionsabout physi-
ological processesonly develop gradually;but the centralprincipleson which
theyare based,such as theprincipleof 'essentialism'regardinglivingthings,are
generallynotapplied to non-livingobjects.These studieshave led most devel-
opmentalpsychologists to conclude that'childhoodanimism'is to a largeextent
an illusion (Bullock 1985), based on various experimentalartefacts.For one
thing,many early experiments(Piaget's in particular)focused on children's
explicitcategories;forexample,on theirunderstanding of what can be said to
be 'alive' or not. In thisdomain as in manyothers,the child's knowledgeof the
appropriatelinguisticcategorieslags farbehind his or her intuitivedistinctions.
Also, mostevidenceforanimismor anthropomorphism comes fromthe child's
inferencesabout categoriesfor which he or she has virtuallyno conceptual
knowledgeat all (see Laurendau& Pinard's [1962] experimentson youngchil-
dren's ideas about clouds). A thirdfactorthatmay have createdthe illusion is
the factthatthe imaginaryworld of childrenis fullof animistic,anthropomor-
phic and magicalassumptions.This, however,should not be takenas a direct
expressionof the child's intuitiveexpectations;on the contrary, the evidence
shows thatchildrenhave an earlyappreciationof the non-standardnatureof
such speculations(Rosengrenetal. 1994).

as a paradox
Anthropomorphism
The psychologicalevidencesummarizedherehas consequencesforour anthro-
of animismand anthropomorphism.
pologicalinterpretation In particular,
I will
emphasizetwo importantpoints.First,animismand anthropomorphism cannot
be construedas 'intuitive',as emergingnaturallyfromintuitiveontology.Sec-
ond, anthropomorphismand animism are not based on a unitarycognitive
phenomenon,but on a host of domain-specificprojections.These are not all
cognitivelyequal; thereis a definitehierarchyof psychologicalsalience,with
consequences forculturalrecurrence.
Anthropologicaldescriptionsoftenleave theirpsychologicalaspectsimplicit,
or describethem in termsof common-senseunderstandings of the mind. In
eithercase, a more precise descriptionof the cognitiveprocesses involved is
needed. Consider forinstanceEllen's statement,that
thereis a generaltendency in humanrelationswiththe inanimate worldto attribute and
represent thatworldin organicterms,and to attribute
inanimateobjectswiththeproperties
of livingthings.Thereis nothing mysterious
particularly aboutthis[... .] It happensbecause
we are boundto modelourworlddirectly on thoseexperienceswhichare mostimmediate,
and theseare experiencesof our own body(Ellen 1988:231).
in precisecognitive
mayseem plausible,yetits translation
This interpretation
People in many groups extend a vitalistic
terms is fraughtwith difficulties.

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88 PASCAL BOYER

conceptionof lifeto mountainsor rivers.What theyextendis not an 'immedi-

ate' or privateexperienceof having (or ratherbeing) a body,but the mental
representations thatdescribeand explainthatprivateexperience.They project
domain-specific biologicalprincipleswhich specify,
forinstance,thatlive things
are born and grow,thattheyhave physiologicalprocesses,that theyhave an
enduringidentitydespiteexternalchanges,and so on. Now, thereis no precise
empiricalsense in which these principlesof intuitivebiology should be de-
scribed as more 'immediate' than principlesof intuitivephysicsor intuitive
psychology.On the contrary, the psychologicalevidence suggeststhatsophisti-
cated understandingsof biological processes are constructed later than
mechanicalor intentionalprinciples,and partlyon the basis of the latter(Carey
1985). The plausibilityof an explanationin termsof immediacyor familiarity
disappearsifwe takeintoaccounttheactualfunctioning of intuitiveontological
principles.
Against this common explanationin terms of 'immediacy' or familiarity,
Guthrie(1993) has put forwarda sophisticatedexplanationof anthropomorphic
projectionsbased on precisepsychologicalassumptions.VWhilst common sense
would suggestthatanthropomorphicprojectionsaim for a simpltfted or more
familiarway of representingthe world, Guthriecontendsthattheyare wide-
spreadbecause theyimpose a morecomplex organizationon the availablestimuli.
The aim of Guthrie'stheoryis to givea generalcharacterization of thecognitive
underpinningsof religiousrepresentations throughan account of what is con-
ceived as their central feature,namely anthropomorphicprojections. The
argumentproceedsin threesteps.First,Guthriearguesthatall perceptionand
identification is inferential,
thatis, theyproduce interpretationsby addinginfor-
mation to a perceptualinput, by way of non-demonstrative inferences;this
applies all the way fromlow-level perceptionsuch as recognizingshapes and
volumes in the environment, to higher-levelorganization(forinstance,ascrib-
ing a conceptual identificationto objects perceived,and making inferences
about theirunobservableproperties).Second, perceptualand conceptualinfer-
ences tend to ascribeto a givenset of stimulithe highestlevel of organization
compatiblewith the stimuliconsidered.Third, thereis a specifichierarchyof
complexityor organizationamong the intuitivetheoriesor assumptionswe
have about different ontologicaldomains.All physicalobjects are perceivedas
constrainedby intuitiveprinciplesthatgoverntheirpositionin space, and their
reactionsto pushingand pulling (see below). Some objects are conceived as
more complexor more organized,in thattheyare alive; some of theirfeatures
cannot be interpreted only in physicaltermsbut requirean additionallevel of
conceptual structureto do with such processes as reproduction,growthor
decay. Some of these live objects are conceived as intentionaland therefore
require yet anotherset of concepts to interprettheirbehaviour in termsof
perceptions,beliefsand intentions.These hypothesesimplythat people will
ascribeas much livingorganization(and as much intentionality) to the objects
perceivedas is compatiblewith the stimuli.This accounts for our 'standard'
perceptionof animalsas alive,or people as intentional.For Guthrie,the process
also applies to all sortsof objectswhose featuresdo not directlyexclude such
interpretations. This is whywe may in some circumstancessee lifein a car or
intentionalityin plantsand computers.

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 PASCAL BOYER 89

Guthrie's model is certainlymore sophisticatedthan explanationsgiven in

termsof 'immediacy'or familiarity. There are, however,some uncertaintiesin
thisargument.In particular, Guthrie'suse of such notionsas 'complexity'and
'significance'is not entirelyclear.Significancein representationsis describedas
a functionof the complexityof the object represented:'an organismtypicallyis
more significant thanis inorganicmatter'(1993: 61). Now it may be truethat
livingthingsdisplay,froma certainpoint of view,a higherdegreeof organiza-
tionthanotherobjects,but thisdoes not entailthatthoughtsabout livingthings
are more complex than thoughtsabout inanimateobjects. It may be the case,
but in the absence of independentevidence, the notion of 'complexity'as a
major factorin directingpeople's inferencesmaybe entirelyad hoc.3
More importantly, Guthrie'saccount,as with common anthropologicalhy-
pothesesabout the phenomenon,is foundedon a 'continuity'hypothesisthat
just does not fitthe psychologicalevidence.Experimentalstudiesdemonstrate
the stabilityand clear boundaries of, and definiteinferentialdifferencesbe-
tween,such categoriesas PERSON and ARTEFACT, or ANIMATE and INANIMATE.
From the earlieststagesof conceptualdevelopment,the projectionof animate
characteristics onto inanimateobjects is counter-intuitive (in the precisesense
of the term);inasmuchas children(and adults) entertainsuch representations,
they entertainthem as salient counterfactualspeculations.This simple and
clearlydemonstratedresultshould put an end to primitivist speculationsac-
cording to which various featuresof religiousor, more generally,symbolic,
thoughtconsistin a returnto some earlystageof cognitivedevelopment.There
is no such thingas earlyanimismand anthropomorphism, and thereforenoth-
ing to 'return'to.
These resultslead to an apparentparadox.Animisticand anthropomorphic
assumptionsare pervasivein culturalrepresentations. It makessense to assume
thatthisis at leastpartlydue to universalcognitivedispositions.As it happens,
however,intuitiveontologyis notpervadedby animisticor anthropomorphic
assumptions.It may,therefore, seem thatthe whole projectof explainingan-
thropomorphism in termsof earlycognitiveconstraintsis doomed. In fact,this
paradoxstemsfroman inadequatedescriptionof the culturalrepresentations in
question. There is an alternative
explanationwhich is consistentwith the psy-
chologicalevidenceand will be describedbelow.

Thecentrality
ofintentional
projections
Before turningto a cognitiveaccount of 'anthropomorphism' and 'animism',
we must establishpreciselywhat projectionsare culturallyrecurrent.This is
why we must returnbrieflyto the questionof domain-specificity. From a cog-
nitiveviewpoint,manycommon anthropologicalnotionsarejust too vague or
general to be empiricallysignificant.This is the case, for instance,with the
common descriptionof anthropomorphism as 'projectingthe human onto the
non-human'. There are indefinitely many aspects under which humans are
construedas differentfrom non-humans,and thereare equally manypossible
projections.Consider the following:
(i) anatomical There are examplesthe world over of featuresof the
structure:
landscapedescribedin termsof theirresemblancewith partsor aspectsof the
human body.

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90 PASCAL BOYER

(ii) physiological
processes:
The Aymaraof Bolivia, for instance,say that the
mountainwhere theylive is a livingorganism,which breathesand must be fed
(Bastien 1978). Consider also the countlesscases of gods or spiritssaid to take
meals,have children,and so forth.
Compare, for instance,religioussystemsin which 'the
(iii) personalidentity:
spirits'or 'the ancestors'are treatedas a collectiveagency,with those systems
that recognizea number of identifiedagencies,each with his or her specific
powers,likesand dislikes,and personalhistory.
In many culturalenvironments,spiritsor animals are
(iv) socialorganization:
said to live in villages,to have social hierarchiesand otherfeaturesof human
social life.
(v) intentional
psychology:This is themostcommon projection.Intentionality is
routinelyprojectedonto all sortsof ontologicalcategories,and notjust catego-
ries of quasi-humanagents.See, forinstance,James'sdescriptionof 'listening
ebony' divinationamong the Uduk of Sudan. Here, certaintreesare said to
overhearand recordconversationsbetweenpeople James 1988).
The list is farfromexhaustive,but shows thatsuch termsas animismand
anthropomorphism(and one may add 'vitalism','personification'and other
similarconcepts) are not of much use in a psychologicaldescriptionof these
culturalrepresentations. The termsare misleadingin thattheyignorethe po-
tentialcognitive diversityof projections,that is, the fact that projections of
different featuresare based on significantly differentcognitivemechanisms.As
I said above, a consistentfindingof developmentalpsychologyis thatdifferent
domains are structuredby functionally principles.It is thereforenot
different
reallyplausible thatprojectinghuman intentionalpsychologyonto a ship re-
quires the same cognitiveprocessesas projectinghuman anatomicalstructure
onto a landscape. So the question should be addressed at a lower level of
abstractionthanis generallythe case in anthropology; the projectionsshould be
describedin a way thatmakes it possible to identifypreciselythe source do-
mains,the typesof representations thatstructurethem,and theireffectson the
targetdomains.
By not payingenough attentionto domain-specificity, we may misconstrue
thedistribution of different
anthropomorphic projections.In particular,
we may
be over-impressed by certain'explicit'projections,and neglectfarmore recur-
rent 'tacit' ones. This is in my view a crucial flaw in Guthrie's otherwise
impressivesurvey Guthrie'sbook gives many examples of anthropomorphic
projectionsfromthe most diverseculturalenvironmentsand in the most di-
versedomainsof culturalrepresentations. The accumulationof examplesmight
give the impressionthatall aspectsof human existenceare equally likelyto be
projectedonto non-humandomains. I want to argue thatthis is not the case.
There is a definitehierarchyof projection.Projectionsof psychologicalproper-
ties are more fundamentalin the sense thattheyare almost invariablyentailed
by otherprojections,whilstthe converseis not alwaysthe case.
To illustratethis,let me give a briefexample taken fromKeesing's (1982)
descriptionof Kwaio religion.Ancestorsare a particularkind of agent in that
theyare invisibleand can be in various places at the same time,two features
which Keesing's informantsmentionas theirmain differencefromhumans.
Ancestorshave exceptionalperceptualcapacities,as well as magicalpowers:they

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 PASCAL BOYER 91

maycauseone to stumblein theforest, or putsnakesin one'spath.Ancestors

can also 'mana-ize'people,thusensuringsuccess(Keesing1982: 43-4). As
Keesingpointsout, thereis littleconsensusabout the processwherebythe
mindor 'life'of livingpeople is turnedintoancestralpresence:hypotheses
about this are 'inconsistent, contradictory and variableamong individuals'
(1982: 105).Anothersetofassumptions, however, is theobjectof a complete
consensus,althoughit remainstacitin Kwaiodiscourseand Keesingonlyde-
scribesitbyimplication. Ancestors andotherkindsofspirits arerepresented as
havingperceptions whicharecausedbyactualstatesofaffairs; as havingbeliefs
thatresultfromthoseperceptions; as havingintentions basedon theirbeliefs,
and so on. They are also describedas havingcomplexplansbased on their
perception ofotherpeople'sbeliefs.Keesinggivesmanyexamplesof 'negotia-
tions'withancestors whichrequiresuchassumptions. Forinstance a pigmaybe
sacrificedto someancestor in orderto curea child'sillness;butthesacrifice is
in vainifthepigis not'given'to theparticular ancestor who causedtheillness
(1982: 115).The situation is represented bytheparticipants as one inwhichan
ancestor knowsthata childhasviolateda prohibition, wantsto geta sacrificed
pig and causesthechild'sillnessbecausehe expects thatthechild'sfamily will
infer thatthisis whathe wants.In otherwords,all intuitive principles of the
intuitive 'theoryofmind'aretacitly projected ontotheancestors.
Obviously, thisis not confinedto Kwaioancestors. It is probablythemost
commonfeature ofall suchconceptions; spirits,gods,ancestors andso forth are
generally described as havingveryspecialphysical or biologicalproperties. Be-
yondtheseexplicitdescriptions, theyare invariably construedas intentional
agents,to whomall intuitive assumptions aboutthought and perception apply
Thisformofanthropomorphism istacit
becausetheprinciples usedareself-evident
to thepeopleconcerned. Forthesamereason,itis rarely ifevercommented on
in anthropological descriptions.
Let us now considerthecontrast betweenprojections of intentional psycho-
logyand projections of humanphysical features.In thislattercategory we can
includeall representations basedon visualcuesofhumanform,suchas moun-
tainsor cloudswithhumanfacesor bodies.In a clicheoftheclassicalWestern
tradition, thegodEole is represented as a cloudwitha humanface,who blows
windstowardstheearth.The samecategory also includesrepresentations of
typically humanactivities or interaction.Thereis a striking asymmetry between
thesetwotypesofanthropomorphic projections. The physical features ofEole's
human-like facedo notjust provideperceptual information aboutthe god's
putative anatomy, butalso indicatethatthegod is looking somewhere, and can
presumably perceivewhathe is lookingat.Theyalsoimplythathe is blowingthe
windsomewhere becauseofhisintention to do so.4Thispointappliesin factto
mostanthropomorphic representations in art,and Guthrie'srichiconography
providesmanyillustrations ofthephenomenon.5
This is particularlystriking ifwe remember thattheconverseprocessis far
less common.That is to say,peoplewho projectintentional psychology most
oftendo notbotherto projectotherfeatures of thehumandomainontothe
targetdomain.Religioussystems theworldoverincludesome projectionof
intentional onto
psychology putative agentssuchas spirits orancestors. Now,in
veryfewof theseculturalenvironments could one find specificassumptions

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92 PASCAL BOYER

about the physicalsimilaritybetweenspiritsand humans.Whetherspiritshave

limbs, or whether their digestionworks in the same way as for humans,
whethertheirbodies have weight,and so on, are all questionsgenerallyleftto
individualspeculation,and in factare rarelyifeverspeculatedupon. To sum up,
projectionsof human physicalfeaturesin generalresultin a projection,tacitor
not,of intentionalpsychology;but a projectionof intentionalpsychologydoes
not generallyentaila projectionof any otherhuman quality.The question of
anthropomorphic projections,then,may be more specificthan is usuallysug-
gested.The problemis to explain,not generalprojectionsof the human onto
the non-human,but projectionsof intuitivebelief-desire psychologyonto non-
intentionalobjects.

Intuitive andreligious
ontology assumptions
We can now returnto the 'paradox' of anthropomorphism. Some projections
are culturallywidespread(mostlyin the tacitformdescribedabove), yet psy-
chologicalevidenceshows thattheyare not partof an intuitiveor spontaneous
way of representing theworld.To show thatthisis not reallyparadoxical,I will
use an explanatory framework I have presentedin more detailelsewhere(Boyer
1994), to account forthe spreador transmission of religiousrepresentations in
general.
The startingpointof thisaccountis the importanceof culturalselection. Cul-
turalrepresentations are constantlycreatedor modifiedin individualmindsby
virtueof a varietyof contingentfactors.There is no reasonto thinkthatsimilar
representations occur forsimilarreasons,and thattheiroccurrenceis amenable
to a single explanation.On the otherhand, not all mentalrepresentations are
equally likelyto be transmitted. Some generalconstraintsor dispositionsmake
certaintypesof representations more likelythan othersto be acquired,stored
and transmitted. All else beingequal, one should expectthe occurrenceof such
representations, over manycyclesof acquisitionand transmission, to constitute
the roughlystable and roughlyshared sets of representations anthropologists
call 'cultural'.
Intuitiveontologicalprinciplesresultin a seriesof stableexpectationsabout the
behaviour,aspect,internalstructuresand processesof such thingsas artefacts,
plants,persons or animals. Now, the centraltenetsof most religioussystems
generallyconsistin claimsthatviolatetheseintuitiveexpectationsand postulate
counter-intuitivepropertiesfor a varietyof agents or entities.Given a certain
ontologicalcategory, counter-intuitiveassumptionscan be produced eitherby
violatingintuitiveexpectationsconcerningthatcategory, a range
or by transferring
of expectationsthatdo not intuitively apply to the category.The firstcase is
illustratedby conceptsof spiritsand othersuch agentswith counter-intuitive
physicalproperties.An exampleof transfer can be found in the Aymarabody-
mountaindescribedabove; here,counter-intuitive assumptionsare producedby
transferring assumptionsfromintuitivebiologicalprinciplesto the domain of
non-livingnaturalobjects. Other examplesof transfercan be observedwhen
statuesare said to have biologicalprocesses (theyfeed on sacrifices)or inten-
tionality(theylistento prayers).
Religiousontologicalassumptionsare counter-intuitive in the precisesense that
theyviolateintuitiveontological deliveredbydomain-specific
expectations principles.

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 PASCAL BOYER 93

I must insiston thispoint,given the ambiguityof the term'counter-intuitive'

in ordinaryusage. First,this counter-intuitive qualityis not necessarilyrelated
to people's explicittheoriesabout such thingsas 'nature'or 'reality'(iftheyhold
any such explicitconceptions).This is because intuitiveontologydeliversex-
pectations,not theoreticaljustificationsfor these expectations.Also, what is
counter-intuitive from a cognitiveviewpoint is not necessarilyperceived as
unfamiliar. The familiarity of particularrepresentations and theircounter-intui-
tive quality are independent properties. Some counter-intuitivereligious
assumptionscan become totallyroutinized;for instanceno-one in the West
would findit terriblysurprisingto be told thatghostscan walk throughwalls.
However banal the assumptionthatghostscan walk throughwalls, it stillvio-
lates intuitiveprinciplesconcerningthe behaviour of solid objects and the
premissthatagentsare solid physicalobjects. Finally,one should not confuse
the counter-intuitive and the unreal.People maybe convincedof the actuality
of some counter-intuitivephenomenon; this does not make it less counter-
intuitivein the precisesense used here. On the contrary, the factthatreligious
assumptionsare perceivedas counter-intuitive and construedas actuallytrueis
probablyan importantfactorin explainingwhytheytriggersignificant cognitive
investment on the partof the people concerned.Counter-intuitive assumptions
are indeed counter-intuitive to the people who hold them,and thisis probably
the main explanationof theirattention-grabbing potential.
My second hypothesisis thatsuch counter-intuitive assumptionsare not the
only characteristic of religiousrepresentations. Indeed, representations consist-
ing onlyof such counter-intuitive assumptionsare unlikelyto 'survive'cyclesof
transmission.What is necessaryis a backgroundof additional assumptions
which are not counter-intuitive and in factare directlyprovidedby intuitive
ontologicalexpectations.The example of 'tacitanthropomorphism'described
above illustratesthisphenomenon.Spiritsand ancestorsare construedin terms
thatmake themclearlycounter-intuitive: theirphysicalpropertiesin particular
make thema special class of agents,whose featuresmarkthemofffromother,
non-counter-intuitive agentssuch as personsand animals.At the same time,as
I said,theseassumptionsare clearlyinsufficient foranyinferencesabout spirits.
In order to understand,explain or predictthe spirits'behaviour,one needs a
number of complex assumptionsabout their psychologicalprocesses. Now,
theseassumptionsarenot'given'byculturaltransmission; theyaredeliveredbythe
tacitoperationof intuitivepsychology, thatis, of the 'theoryof mind' module.
Once described in these cognitiveterms,religious concepts appear to be
constrainedby intuitiveontologiesin two different ways. First,religiousrepre-
sentationswould not be attention-grabbing if they did not include some
counter-intuitive assumptions;but these are counter-intuitive only against a
backgroundof intuitiveexpectations.Second, religiousrepresentations invari-
ablyincludea hostof assumptionsdirectlyprovidedby intuitiveontologies,and
these assumptionsdirectthe inferencesmade about putativereligiousentities.
This double constraintfromintuitiveontologyis necessaryforthe 'survival'of
religiousrepresentations acrosscyclesof transmission. Religiousrepresentations
would probablynotbe acquiredat all iftheircounter-intuitive aspectsdid notmake
them sufficiently salientto be an object of attentionand cognitiveinvestment.

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94 PASCAL BOYER

Conversely,theywould probablynot be acquiredand transmitted iftheirintui-

tivecomponentdid not give themsufficient inferentialpotential.
The numberof such combinationsshould be verylimited.Religiousontolo-
gies do not consistin anyodd combinationof 'somethingcounter-intuitive' and
'somethingintuitive'.I showed elsewherethatthese constraintsfromintuitive
ontologyresultin a verylimited'catalogue' of possible religiousassumptions
which,even includingratherrarecombinations,does not amountto more than
fifteencombinationsof ontologicalcategoryand violation(or counter-intuitive
transfer)of domain specificassumptions(Boyer forthcoming).Despite their
apparentdiversity, religiousbeliefsare in factbased on a very limitedset of
ontologicalassumptions.That is to say,mostrecurrentassumptionsturnout to
be based on one or severalof the combinationspredictedby my descriptionof
intuitiveontologicalexpectations.Moreover,my descriptionpredictsthatnot
all combinationswill have the same potentialfor survival.This is because
counter-intuitiveassumptionshave to be supplementedwith an intuitiveback-
groundwhich makes it possible to deriveinferencesand expectationsfromthe
culturalinput.Now, not all sets of domain-specificinferencesare equally rich
in theirinferentialpotential.All else being equal, one should thereforeexpect
combinationswhich make backgrounduse of rich inferential structures(such
as intuitivepsychology)to have more survivalpotentialthancombinationsthat
make backgrounduse of more limitedinferential structures(such as intuitive
physics).

Thenaturalness
ofanthropomorphism
The cognitiveaccount of religiousontologies presentedhere has one major
consequence for our understandingof culturaltransmission.It implies that
religiousontologiesneed verylittleactual transmissionin order to be repro-
duced fromgenerationto generation.All thatis necessaryfor transmissionis
thatpeople are givenspecificcues thatindicatewhich aspectsof theirintuitive
ontologicalexpectationsare violatedby thereligiousentitiespostulated.Beyond
this,the normaloperationof all otherprinciplesof intuitiveontology(activated
by default,since theyare notviolated)will be powerfulenough to completethe
representation of the religiousentities.Because intuitivedomain-specificprin-
ciples are roughlysimilarin all human subjects,such cues normallyresultin
roughlysimilarinferencesin most of the subjectsexposed to them,and should
thereforeproduce roughlyconsistentversionsof the local 'tradition'.All else
being equal, the most locally stable (and thereforethe cross-culturally most
recurrent)culturalrepresentations should be the ones forwhich thisinferential
processyieldstherichestdomainof inferences, even fromlimitedculturalcues.
This is where the 'hypertrophy' of intentionalinferences,mentionedin my
descriptionof the 'theoryof mind' module, has crucialeffectson the shape of
religiousrepresentations. Cultural representations for which intentionalpsy-
chology is used as tacit backgroundshould be more easily acquired than
representations thatdo not allow thisbackgrounduse; theyshould thereforebe
more recurrent.This predictionis confirmedby two particularaspectsof the
actual distributionof typesof religiousontologies.First,religiousontologies
thatpostulateagencieswithcounter-intuitive physicsor biologytogetherwitha
tacitbackgroundof intuitivepsychology, arewidespreadtheworld over.Indeed,

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 PASCAL BOYER 95

theyare so common thatanthropologists afterTylorhave oftenconsideredsuch

a combinationof assumptionsas a constitutivefeatureof religiousontologies.
Second, whereverthereis an explicithypothesisof entitieswhich directlyvio-
late intuitivepsychology,it is invariablycomplementedby assumptionsthat
conformto the standardcombination.This is the case for 'zombies', for in-
stance.These are livinghuman bodies whose descriptionviolatesexpectations
about intentionalprocesses,since theyare said to have neithervolition nor
self-awareness. But zombies are also construedas controlledby some external
agent (a spiritor a sorcerer)assumed to have intentionalbelief-desirepsycho-
logy.The same holds for possession; a person is representedas acting and
talkingwithoutself-awareness, but under the controlof some externalagency
However vaguelydescribed,thisagencyis alwaysconstruedas havingpsycho-
logical processes thatconformto intuitivepsychology.These are well-known
factsin the anthropologyof religion.They can be easilyinterpreted, once we
take into account the differencein inferential potentialbetweenintuitivepsy-
chologyand otherdomains of intuitiveexpectations.
This articlebeganwitha simple,perhapsnaivequestion:whatmakesanthropo-
morphic assumptionsso 'natural'?Obviously,thinkingtrees,mountainsand
artefacts,as well as putativeintentionalagentssuch as spirits,can be conscripted
to all sortsof intellectual,emotionalor social purposes.But all these ways of
using anthropomorphic assumptionsrequirethatthe assumptionsare made in
the firstplace,and thattheyhave sufficient attention-grabbing powerand infer-
entialpotential.Projectionsof intuitiveintentionalpsychologymake use of the
richestdomain of inferencesavailableto human minds,whilstviolatingcentral
aspectsof intuitiveontology.Anthropomorphism, then,is 'natural'and wide-
spreadmainlybecause it is counter-intuitive.

NOTES
Thanksare due to MichaelHouseman,Carlo Severi,SimonHarrisonand two anonymous
reviewers who werepatientenoughto reada first, ratherawkwardversionof thisarticleand
suggestmanycorrections.
1 This does not implythatpeoplewho hold anthropomorphic beliefsthinklikechildren;it
onlyimpliesthattheymakeuse of cognitiveresources, the entrenchment of whichis made
particularlyclearby the factthattheyappearveryearlyin cognitivedevelopment. Hallpike
(1979) has arguedat lengththat'primitive' mentality, supposedlycharacteristic of cognitive
processesin low-technology groups,is formally similarto pre-operational stagesin childhood.
However,neithertheanthropological evidencenor the psychological dataare consistentwith
thisdescription;see Boyer(1994) on thispoint,anda detaileddiscussionof Hallpike'sassump-
tionsin Shweder(1982).
2 For instance,evenpre-schoolersassumethatmembership of a kindis moreimportant than
observable featuresin predicting
thetypicalbehaviour of an unknownanimal(Becker& Ward
1991; Gelman& Markman1986;Massey& Gelman1988).Also,theyassumethatsuch kind-
based inductivegeneralizationsare more plausibleif the properties projectedare 'inherent'
propertiesof theexemplars,such as waysof breathing and feeding, ratherthanweightor speed
(Gelman& Markman1987;see also Gelman1988).
3 In otherpassagesof Guthrie'sbook,the linkbetweencomplexity and significanceis at
timesleftaside and replacedwiththeverykindof intellectualist assumptions thata cognitive
accountshouldmakeredundant. Guthrieargues,forinstance,that'anthropomorphism may
bestbe explainedas theresultof an attempt to see notwhatwe wantto see or whatis easyto
to see: whatmayaffectus forbetteror forworse' (1993: 82); or
see, but whatis imlportant
again:'I believewe anthropomorphize becausewe perceivetheworldin termsof our interests,

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96 PASCAL BOYER

whichusuallyinvolvehumans'(1993: 185). This,however, is dangerously close to a tautology;

the onlyevidenceforthe 'importance' of particularthoughts is thatwe tendto have them
moreoften.
4 These inferences mayor maynotbe partof theartist's purpose,butthisis irrelevant; they
constituteassumptions whichare likelyto be activated,tacitly
or not,by any humansubject
consideringthepicture.
5 For instance,a posteradvertisingcruisesfromNew York represents two shapeson the
bridgeof a ship;thetallshapesreadilyidentifiable
as theChrysler and EmpireStatebuildings.
But theseshapesare also 'anthropomorphic',
havingsome features of humanbodies,and cues
thatevoketwo formally-dressed persons,a man in a dinner-jacket and a womanin evening
dress.Theirpositionsuggeststhattheyare engagedin a conversation. Again,thevisualcues
hereare likelyto activate
assumptions,
notjust abouttheanatomical structureof theimaginary
but also aboutpsychological
entities, processes:looking,perceiving, talkingto some-
listening,
one,etc.

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Ce qui rend I'anthropomorphisme naturel: ontologie intuitive et

representations culturelles
R6sume
II n'estpasrareque I'anthropologie
expliquelaprojection humainssurdesdomaines
d'attributs
non-humains commela consequenced'une tendance'a 'animismeet d'un typeanthropo-
morphismeque l'on retrouverait des les premiersstagesdu developpement cognitif.Mais
lesresultats experimentauxsuggerentau contraire que la presencede principes ontologiques
intuitifsdevraientexclurede tellesprojections.Dans ce sens,I'antliropomorphisme, bien
que tresrepandu,estcontre-intuitif.La th6oriecognitive des representations culturelles,
qui
postuleque touterepresentation peutse repandreet se stabiliser si elle frappel'imagination
et facilitel'inference,permetd'expliquerce paradoxeapparent.Les projectionsanthropo-
morphiquesont un potentielinferentiel eleve car elles activentune capacitemodulaire
puissantequi permetde se representer mentalement le comportement. Leur saillanceest
due au faitqu'ellessontcontre-intuitives, et parla memedeconcertantes.

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Centre 69363 Lyon,France
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