Systems Research and Behavioral Science Syst. Res.

17, 6572 (2000)

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Research Paper

Quantitative Relationships between Collective Action and Prisoners' Dilemma

Miklos N. Szilagyi*
Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

Quantitative relationships are established between the production function of collective action and the payoff functions of the n-person Prisoners' Dilemma game. It is shown that the latter have more degrees of freedom than the former; therefore, it is desirable to investigate collective actions in terms of the Prisoners' Dilemma game. The special cases of S-shaped, decelerating (concave), accelerating (convex), and linear production functions are investigated. Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords collective action; Prisoners' Dilemma; production function; payoff functions;

PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND PAYOFF FUNCTIONS As is well known (Oliver, 1993), the problem of collective action can be analyzed as a Prisoners' Dilemma game. Hardin (1971) showed that any analysis that prescribes a solution for multiperson Prisoners' Dilemma must prescribe a similar solution for the problem of collective action. In this paper, a quantitative relationship will be established between the two problems. In case of collective action, a production function is used to describe the relationship between the resources contributed by the collective and the amount of the collective good that is realized at the given level of contribution (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). On the other hand, the multiperson Prisoners' Dilemma game can be characterized by two payoff functions that specify the reward/ penalty for a cooperator and a defector, respectively, as functions of the ratio of cooperators to
* Correspondence to: Miklos N. Szilagyi, Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA.

the total number of participants. The freedom of using any functions for the determination of the reward/penalty system makes it possible to simulate a wide range of social dilemmas and other social situations, including those where the two curves intersect each other (Schelling, 1973). It is easy to see that if every cooperator contributes an equal amount of resources to the collective while the defectors contribute nothing, then the ratio of cooperators is proportional to the resources contributed by the collective. Similarly, the total payoff received by the collective in the Prisoners' Dilemma game is the same as the collective good realized by the given level of contribution. Therefore, the Prisoners' Dilemma total payoff function will be a scaled version of the production function for collective action. Let us consider a collective of n persons where each participant has two choices: to cooperate with the others or to defect. The payoff to each participant depends on his choice, and on the distribution of other players among cooperators and defectors. If there are x contributors
Received 5 January 1998 Accepted 3 August 1998

CCC 10927026/2000/01006508 $17.50 Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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(cooperators) and (n x) free-riders (defectors), let y1(x) be the payoff function for the cooperators, and y2(x) the payoff function for the defectors. A Prisoners' Dilemma exists if y2(x) 4 y1(x) for all values of x (regardless of what the other participants do, there is always a temptation to defect) but y1(n) 4 y2(0), i.e., the participants receive a lower payoff if all defect than if all cooperate (Dawes, 1980). The actual forms of the payoff functions depend on the given social situation but quadratic functions can adequately describe most practical cases. Therefore, we will assume that y1x a1x b1x c1 and y2x a2x b2x c2
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of y2k K at this point. The values of k and K may provide the additional information needed for the determination of the payoff functions (Figure 1). The result is as follows: a1 n kSH kR nPaknn k b1 n k S k R n Paknn k c1 S
H H 2 2 H 2 2

3 4 5 6 7 8

a2 kT n kP nKaknn k b2 k2 T H n2 k2 P n2 Kaknn k c2 P

To be consistent with the usual notations for the two-person Prisoners' Dilemma game (Axelrod, 1984), we will denote y11 S (sucker's payoff to the lonely cooperator), y1n R (reward for the cooperation when all participants cooperate), y20 P ( punishment for defection when no one cooperates), and y2n 1 T (temptation to be the only defector). In the two-person game these values simply determine the payoff matrix of the game. Note that the values y1(0) and y2(n) can never be realized because of the definitions of the two functions. It is convenient, however, to extend both functions to the entire range of 0 5 x 5 n by assigning the fictitious values of y10 SH and y2n T H . As these values will only be used for the definition of the payoff curves, they will not affect the quantitative results of our calculations. The extreme values R, P, SH and TH alone, however, do not provide enough information for the determination of the six coefficients of the payoff functions. The curvatures of the functions may be determined by the critical number of cooperators k that corresponds to the point beyond which the cooperators start receiving some reward (n 4 k). Note that y1k P and in case of collective action usually P 0 (if no one contributes anything, no collective good is produced). The defectors will receive a reward
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If y1(x) and y2(x) are linear functions (a1 a2 0), then k and K are no longer free parameters and the values of R, P, SH and TH uniquely determine the two functions. The total payoff received by the collective of players is given by xy1x n xy2x. For convenience, we will use y(x) as the average payoff to each member of the collective, i.e., yx xy1x n xy2xan 9

Accordingly, y(x) will also represent the production function for the problem of collective action. Substituting Equations (1) and (2) into Equation (9), we obtain yx ax bx cx d where a a1 a2an b a2 b1 b2an c b2 c1 c2an and d c2 14 11 12 13
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10

Note that y0 y20 P and yn y1n R; i.e., the production function connects the lower end of the defectors' curve with the upper end of the cooperators' curve (Figure 1). The production function is uniquely defined by the two payoff curves through the coefficients
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Figure 1. Payoff functions y1(x) and y2(x) that produce an S-shaped production function y(x) for the case of P 0, R 2, SH 3, TH 5, n 10, d 1. y1(x) and y2(x) are the lower and upper dashed curves, respectively; y(x) is the solid curve between them

a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, and c2. It has four degrees of freedom while the two payoff functions have six degrees of freedom. Therefore, additional information is needed if one wishes to reproduce the payoff functions from the production function. In the special case of linear payoff functions we have a1 a2 0Y b1 R S anY b2 T PanY c1 S Y and c2 P Then Equations (11)(14) yield a 0 (the production function is quadratic) and three other simple expressions for b, c, and d from where we obtain P dY R n b nc dY and S T nc 2d 16 As we see, different payoff functions may produce the same production function. TYPICAL PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS As y(x) is generally a cubic function, it may represent any of the commonly used production
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functions as special cases. In particular, it may be an S-shaped function, a decelerating (concave) function, an accelerating (convex) function, or a linear function. Let us now review these special cases. In the relatively general special case of an S-shaped production function there is an inflection point where the production function changes from convex to concave (Figure 1). The location of the inflection point xinfl and the value of the function y at that point yinfl are determined by xinfl ba3a and yinfl d 2b 9abca27a
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These values may provide the additional information necessary to reproduce the payoff functions from the given production function. Figure 1 shows the case when xinfl na2 and yinfl P Ra2 (the production function is symmetric with respect to its inflection point in the middle). The values of the parameters are as follows: P 0, R 2, SH 3, T H 5, n 10. At x 5 the two payoff functions are separated from each other by d 1. The minimum and the maximum of the production function are located approximately at x 1 and x 9, respectively. If
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we choose d 2, then the extrema will exactly coincide with the end points of the production function. The shape of the production function, of course, strongly depends on the payoff functions. If we choose SH 20 and T H 22 and leave the other parameters unchanged, the extrema of the

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production function will move toward the center and will be more prominent (Figure 2). If we reverse the curvatures of both payoff functions, the production function will be reversed, too; its maximum and minimum will appear in the reverse order. Such a case is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 2. Payoff functions y1(x) and y2(x) that produce an S-shaped production function y(x) for the case of P 0, R 2, SH 20, TH 22, n 10, d 1. y1(x) and y2(x) are the lower and upper dashed curves, respectively; y(x) is the solid curve between them

Figure 3. Payoff functions y1(x) and y2(x) that produce an S-shaped production function y(x) for the case of P 0, R 3, SH 3, TH 6, n 10. y1(x) and y2(x) are the lower and upper dashed curves, respectively; y(x) is the solid curve between them
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A concave production function can be produced by two concave payoff functions (Figure 4) or even by two linear payoff functions if the slope of the defectors' payoff function is greater than that of the cooperators' payoff function (Figure 5).

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A convex production function is produced by two convex payoff functions (Figure 6) or by two linear payoff functions if the slope of the defectors' payoff function is smaller than that of the cooperators' payoff function (Figure 7).

Figure 4. Payoff functions y1(x) and y2(x) that produce a concave production function y(x) for the case of P 0, R 3, SH 3, TH 6, n 10. y1(x) and y2(x) are the lower and upper dashed curves, respectively; y(x) is the solid curve between them

Figure 5. Linear payoff functions y1(x) and y2(x) that produce a concave production function y(x) for the case of P 0, R 4, SH 1, TH 8, n 10. y1(x) and y2(x) are the lower and upper dashed curves, respectively; y(x) is the solid curve between them
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Figure 6. Payoff functions y1(x) and y2(x) that produce a convex production function y(x) for the case of P 0, R 3, SH 3, TH 6, n 10. y1(x) and y2(x) are the lower and upper dashed curves, respectively; y(x) is the solid curve between them

If the payoff functions are both linear and parallel to each other, a linear production function will be produced (Figure 8). CONCLUSION The result of this work is the establishment of quantitative relationships between the production

function of collective action and the payoff functions of the n-person Prisoners' Dilemma game. We also showed that the latter have more degrees of freedom than the former; therefore, it is desirable to investigate collective actions in terms of the Prisoners' Dilemma game. Computer simulation of collective actions can assume the role of costly experiments in complex interconnected social systems. The effects of

Figure 7. Linear payoff functions y1(x) and y2(x) that produce a convex production function y(x) for the case of P 0, R 4, SH 5, TH 5, n 10. y1(x) and y2(x) are the lower and upper dashed curves, respectively; y(x) is the solid curve between them
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Figure 8. Linear payoff functions y1(x) and y2(x) that produce a linear production function y(x) for the case of P 0, R 3, SH 3, TH 6, n 10. y1(x) and y2(x) are the lower and upper dashed curves, respectively; y(x) is the solid line between them

alternative strategies on achieving consensus for action were simulated by Feinberg and Johnson (1990). A stochastic learning model was developed by Macy (1991) to explain critical states where threshold effects may cause shifting the system from a defective equilibrium to a cooperative one. A computer simulation of temporary gatherings was presented by McPhail et al. (1992). Lloyd (1995) wrote a very simple but quite powerful computer program that demonstrates the dynamics of deterministic social behavior based on pair-wise interactions between the participants. We are now in the process of experimenting with a new agent-based simulation tool to model the n-person Prisoners' Dilemma and to investigate collective behavior for the case of a large number of decision-makers operating in the presence of great uncertainty when the players are not necessarily rational and only probabilistic feedback can be expected from the environment. Our simulation tool has two distinctive new features: (1) the participating agents are described as stochastic learning cellular automata, i.e., as combinations of cellular automata and stochastic learning automata; (2) the agents have user-defined various distinct `personalities'. The combination of these personalities with stochastic
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learning makes it possible to simulate humanlike behavior in a social dilemma situation in which each member of a group must choose between maximizing selfish interests or collective interests. Our computational tool is a framework for inquiry to perform various simulated social experiments and assess the propagation of information and human influence in large-scale conflicting environments. It may lead to the discovery of a number of factors influencing human collective behavior. It will also be used for detailed investigations of the link between collective action and Prisoners' Dilemma explicated in this paper. The description of the simulation tool is published separately (Szilagyi and Szilagyi, 1998).

REFERENCES
Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York. Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology 31, 169193. Feinberg, W. E., and Johnson, N. R. (1990). Radical leaders, moderate followers: effects of alternative strategies on achieving consensus for action in simulated crowds. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 15, 91115.
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Hardin, R. (1971). Collective action as an agreeable n-Prisoners' Dilemma. Behavioral Science 16, 472481. Lloyd, A. L. (1995). Computing bouts of the Prisoners' Dilemma. Scientific American 272(6), 110115. Macy, M. W. (1991). Chains of cooperation: threshold effects in collective action. Am. Sociol. Rev. 56, 730747. Marwell, G., and Oliver, P. (1993). The Critical Mass in Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, New York.

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McPhail, C., Powers, W. T., and Tucker, C. W. (1992). Simulating individual and collective action in temporary gatherings. Social Sciences Computer Review 10, 128. Oliver, P. E. (1993). Formal models of collective action. Annual Review of Sociology 19, 271300. Schelling, T. C. (1973). Hockey helmets, concealed weapons, and daylight saving. Journal of Conflict Resolution 17(3), 381428. Szilagyi, M. N., and Szilagyi, Z. C. (1998). Dilemma: a tool for simulated social experiments. Simulation (submitted for publication).

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