HCCS v.

Sto Tomas

Facts:

Respondent Union filed a petition for certification election with Med-

Arbiter Daquigan alleging that respondent is a legitimate labor organization
registered with DOLE and that there is no collective bargaining agreement
with petitioner for a bargaining agent.

In its comment, petitioner School contends that respondent is an

illegitimate labor organization because it is allegedly composed of both
rank-and-file employees and supervisory employees consisting of: (3) vice
principals, (1) department head, and (11) coordinators which is prohibited
following the ruling in Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation Labor Union.

The Med-Arbiter denied respondent’s petition but SOLE set this decision
aside and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals holding that there were no
supervisory employees in respondent’s union. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether respondent’s certification election should be allowed.

Ruling:

Yes. The Toyota Ruling that “a labor organization composed of both

rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all.” is
no longer applicable in the instant case due to its abandonment by the
Supreme Court in the case of Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v.
Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PTGWO.

In said case, the Court abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlop and
reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition
against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one
labor organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof.
Thus, the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it
may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization.
 Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its
membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds
for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about
by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the
Labor Code.

In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper

procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for
cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended.

To reiterate, private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of

registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality
which may not be attacked collaterally. Thus, respondent’s certification
election should be allowed.
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF
EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF LETRAN and ELEONOR
AMBAS, respondents.

FACTS:

On December 1992, Abtria, then President of respondent union initiated the

renegotiation of its CBA with petitioner for the last two years of the CBA's
five year lifetime from 1989-1994. On the same year, the union elected a
new set of officers wherein Ambas emerged as the newly elected
President. Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but
petitioner claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the
parties. The parties submitted the disputed CBA to a referendum by the
union members, who eventually rejected the said CBA. Petitioner accused
the union officers of bargaining in bad faith.

On January 1996, the union notified the National Conciliation and

Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to strike on the ground of
petitioner's refusal to bargain.

The parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start. On

February 1996, the union submitted its proposals to petitioner, which
notified the union six days later that the same had been submitted to its
Board of Trustees. In the meantime, Ambas was informed through a letter
that her work schedule was changed.

Due to petitioner's inaction, the union filed a notice of strike. The parties
met before the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for the negotiation. The
union received petitioner's letter dismissing Ambas for alleged
insubordination. Hence, the union amended its notice of strike to include
Ambas' dismissal.

Both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation,
on March 1996. However, petitioner stopped the negotiations after it
purportedly received information that a new group of employees had filed a
petition for certification election.

The union finally struck. The public respondent assumed jurisdiction and
ordered all striking employees including the union president to return to
work and for petitioner to accept them back. Petitioner readmitted the
striking members except Ambas.
Public respondent issued an order declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor
practice on two counts and directing the reinstatement of private
respondent Ambas with backwages. Petitioner’s MOR was denied.
Petitioner sought a review of the before the CA. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and affirmed the findings of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain

with the union when it unilaterally suspended the on-going negotiations for
a new CBA upon mere information that a petition for certification has been
filed by another legitimate labor organization.

2. Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an

interference of the employees' right to self-organization.

RULING:

1. YES. Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is

obvious in its failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by
the latter. More than a month after the proposals were submitted by the
union, petitioner still had not made any counter-proposals. This is a clear
violation of Article 250 of the Labor Code governing the procedure in
collective bargaining, to wit:

Art. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. - The following procedures

shall be observed in collective bargaining:

(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written

notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other
party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such notice.

xxx

Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain

collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and
convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all
other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting
any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a
contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but
such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any
concession.

Respondent union lived up to this requisite when it presented its proposals

for the CBA to petitioner on February 1996. On the other hand, petitioner
devised ways and means in order to prevent the negotiation: the union
president was informed by her superior that her work schedule was being
changed; denial of the request to submit the issue to grievance machinery;
petitioner dismissed the union president for alleged insubordination; and
petitioner suspended the negotiation on the ground that it allegedly
received information that a new group of employees called the Association
of Concerned Employees of Colegio (ACEC) had filed a petition for
certification election. Clearly, petitioner tried to evade its duty to bargain
collectively.

2. YES. The dismissal was effected in violation of the employees' right to

self-organization. Ms. Ambas' unflinching position in faithfully and truthfully
carrying out her duties and responsibilities to her Union and its members in
getting a fair share of the fruits of their collective endeavors was the
proximate cause for her dismissal, the charge of insubordination being
merely a ploy to give a color of legality to the contemplated management
action to dismiss her.

Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for

insubordination. But when the exercise of such management right tends to
interfere with the employees' right to self-organization, it amounts to union-
busting and is therefore a prohibited act. When management refused to
treat the charge of insubordination as a grievance within the scope of the
Grievance Machinery, the action of the College in finally dismissing her
from the service became arbitrary, capricious and whimsical, and therefore
violated Ms. Ambas' right to due process.

Petitioner asserts that in view of the pendency of the petition for

certification election, it had no duty to bargain collectively with the union.
(additional*)
In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process
there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate
representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification
election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the
employer. No petition for certification election for any representation issue
may be filed after the lapse of the sixty-day freedom period or the Contract
Bar Rule. The old CBA is extended until a new one is signed.

In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from 1989-1994.
The petition for certification election by ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor
organization, was filed with the DOLE only on May 26, 1996. Clearly, the
petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing
thereof was barred by the existence of a valid and existing collective
bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no legitimate representation
issue and, as such, the filing of the petition for certification election did not
constitute a bar to the on-going negotiation.
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF
THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP)-TUCP vs. TRAJANO (G.R. No. L-67485
April 10, 1992)

FACTS:

Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the

Philippines (NACUSIP)-TUCP is the certified exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file workers of Calinog Refinery Corporation.

Private respondent Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR)-TUCP is a labor

organization duly registered with DOLE, while private respondent Calinog
Refineries Employees Union (CREU)-NACUSIP is the certified exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank and file workers of the private
respondent, Calinog Refinery Corporation by virtue of the certification
election held on March 30, 1981.

On June 21, 1982, petitioner union filed a petition for deadlock in collective
bargaining with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (now DOLE) In order
to obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed to submit the petition for
deadlock to compulsory arbitration.

On July 21, 1982, private respondent FUR-TUCP filed with the Regional
Office No. VI, MOLE (now DOLE), Iloilo City a petition for certification
election among the rank and file employees of private respondent
company. Petitioner union filed a motion to intervene in the petition for
certification election filed by private respondent union.

The Acting Med-Arbiter Pacifico V. Militante dismissed the petition for

certification election for lack of merit since the petition is barred by a
pending bargaining deadlock. Private respondent union then filed an
appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, Manila. The Bureau of Labor
Relations through respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano rendered a
decision, setting aside the order of the Acting Med-Arbiter and remanding
the case to Regional Office VI, Iloilo City for hearing and reception of
evidence.
On May 2, 1983, Honorable Med-Arbiter Demetrio Correa issued an order
giving due course to the petition of private respondent FUR-TUCP and
ordering that an election be held within 20 days from receipt of the order.
From the order of Med-Arbiter Correa, petitioner interposed an appeal to
the Bureau of Labor Relations.

During the pendency of the appeal, a collective bargaining agreement was

entered and executed by the management of the National Sugar Refineries
Co., Inc. and petitioner union and was subsequently ratified by a majority of
the rank and file employees. On the basis of the concluded CBA, the
Honorable Executive Labor Arbiter Celerino Grecia II issued an award
adopting the submitted agreement as the CBA between the parties.

On November 18, 1983, Respondent Director Trajano rendered a decision

affirming with qualification the order of MedArbiter Correa dated May 2,
1983.

From the decision of respondent Director Trajano, petitioner filed a motion

for reconsideration. The respondent Director denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed the Bureau’s decision of
November 18, 1983. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed during

the pendency of a bargaining deadlock submitted to arbitration or
conciliation. (NO)

RULING:

The Court finds the petition meritorious and holds that the respondent
Director gravely abused his discretion when he affirmed the order of Med-
Arbiter Correa calling for a certification election among the rank and file
workers of private respondent company.

The law on the matter is Section 3, Book V, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, to wit:
 Sec. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the
Code, a petition for certification election may be filed at any time.
However, no certification election may be held within one year
from the date of issuance of a final certification election result.
Neither may a representation question be entertained if, before the filing
of a petition for certification election, a bargaining deadlock to which
an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had been submitted
to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of valid notice or
strike or lockout.

If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in

accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election
or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within 60 days prior to
the expiry date of such agreement.

The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that a petition for

certification election may be filed at any time, in the absence of
a collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the
filing of a petition for certification election in the following cases:

1. during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within

the freedom period;

2. within 1 year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final

certification election result; or

3. during the existence of a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or

certified bargaining agent is a party and which had been submitted to
conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of
strike or lockout.

The Deadlock Bar Rule simply provides that a petition for certification
election can only be entertained if there is no pending bargaining deadlock
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid
notice of strike or lockout. The principal purpose is to ensure stability in the
relationship of the workers and the management.
In the case at bar, a bargaining deadlock was already submitted to
arbitration when private respondent FUR-TUCP filed a petition for
certification election. The same petition was dismissed for lack of merit
by the Acting Med-Arbiter in an order dated July 23, 1982 on the sole
ground that the petition is barred by a pending bargaining
deadlock. However, respondent Director set aside the same order and
subsequently affirmed an order giving due course to the petition for
certification election and ordering that an election be held.

The law demands that the petition for certification election should fail in the
presence of a then pending bargaining deadlock.

A director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, by the nature of his functions,

acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. We find no reason why his
decision should be beyond this Court's review. Administrative officials,
like the director of the Bureau of Labor Relations are presumed to act in
accordance with law but this Court will not hesitate to pass upon their work
where there is a showing of abuse of authority or discretion in their official
acts or when their decisions or orders are tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PURA FERRER-
CALLEJA,

FACTS:

In this special civil action of certiorari the University of the Philippines seeks
the nullification of the Order dated October 30, 1990 of Director Pura
Ferrer-Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations holding that professors,
associate professors and assistant professors (of the University of the
Philippines) are rank-and-file employees, that they should, together with the
so-called non-academic, non-teaching, and all other employees of the
University, be represented by only one labor organization. The University is
joined in this undertaking by the Solicitor General who "has taken a position
not contrary to that of petitioner and, in fact, has manifested that he is not
opposing the petition.

The case was initiated in the Bureau of Labor Relations by a petition

filed by a registered labor union, the "Organization of Non-Academic
Personnel of UP" (ONAPUP). Claiming to have a membership of 3,236
members — comprising more than 33% of the 9,617 persons constituting
the non-academic personnel of UP-Diliman, Los Baños, Manila, and
Visayas, it sought the holding of a certification election among all said non-
academic employees of the University of the Philippines. At a conference
thereafter held in the Bureau, the University stated that it had no objection
to the election.

On April 18, 1990, another registered labor union, the "All UP Workers'
Union", filed a comment, as intervener in the certification election
proceeding. Alleging that its membership covers both academic and non-
academic personnel, and that it aims to unite all UP rank-and-file
employees in one union, it declared its assent to the holding of the election
provided the appropriate organizational unit was first clearly defined. It
observed in this connection that the Research, Extension and Professional
Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching personnel, should not be
deemed part of the organizational unit.
 For its part, the University, through its General Counsel, made of record
its view that there should be two (2) unions: one for academic, the
other for non-academic or administrative, personnel considering the
dichotomy of interests, conditions and rules governing these employee
groups.

Director Calleja ruled on the matter and declared that "the appropriate
organizational unit should embrace all the regular rank-and-file employees,
teaching and non-teaching, of the University of the Philippines, including all
its branches" and that there was no sufficient evidence "to justify the
grouping of the non-academic or administrative personnel into an
organization unit apart and distinct from that of the academic or teaching
personnel."

The University would now have this Court declare void the Director's Order
of October 30, 1990 as well as that of November 20, 1990. 11 A temporary
restraining order was issued by the Court, by Resolution dated December
5, 1990 conformably to the University's application therefor.

Issue:

1. Whether or not professors, associate professors and assistant professors

are high-level employees whose functions are normally considered policy
determining, managerial or highly confidential in nature.

2. Whether or not, they, and other employees performing academic

functions, should comprise a collective bargaining unit distinct and different
from that consisting of the non-academic employees of the University,
considering the dichotomy of interests, conditions and rules existing
between them.

Ruling:

1. No.

In light of Executive Order No. 180 and its implementing rules, as well as
the University's charter and relevant regulations, the professors, associate
professors and assistant professors cannot be considered as exercising
such managerial or highly confidential functions as would justify their
being categorized as "high-level employees" of the institution.

Reason:

a. Academic Personnel Committees composed of professors–

created constituted "in order to foster greater involvement of the
faculty and other academic personnel in appointments,
promotions, and other personnel matters that directly affect them."
b. Board of Regents created University Academic Personnel Board
to "assist(ing) in the review of the recommendations initiated by
the Department Chairman with regard to recruitment, selection,
performance evaluation, tenure and staff development, in
accordance with the general guidelines formulated by the
University Academic Personnel Board and the implementing
details laid down by the College Academic Personnel Committee

Hence, they are purely recommendatory in nature, subject to

review and evaluation by the University Academic Personnel
Board. X x x Significantly, the personnel actions that may be
recommended by the departmental and college academic personnel
committees must conform with the general guidelines drawn up by the
university personnel academic committee.

This being the case, the members of the departmental and college
academic personnel committees are not unlike the chiefs of
divisions and sections of the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority whom this Court considered as rank-and-file employees in
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA Consolidated
Unions, 22 because "given ready policies to execute and standard
practices to observe for their execution, . . . they have little freedom
of action, as their main function is merely to carry out the
company's orders, plans and policies."

The power or prerogative pertaining to a high-level employee "to

effectively recommend such managerial actions, to formulate or execute
management policies or decisions and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-
off, recall, dismiss, assign or discipline employees" 23 is exercised to a
 certain degree by the university academic personnel board/committees
and ultimately by the Board of Regents in accordance with Section 6
of the University Charter.

Even assuming arguendo that UP professors discharge policy-

determining functions through the University Council, still such exercise
would not qualify them as high-level employees within the context of
E.O. 180. As correctly observed by private respondent, "Executive Order
No. 180 is a law concerning public sector unionism. It must therefore be
construed within that context. Within that context, the University of the
Philippines represents the government as an employer. 'Policy-
determining' refers to policy-determination in university mattes that
affect those same matters that may be the subject of negotiation
between public sector management and labor. The reason why
'policy-determining' has been laid down as a test in segregating
rank-and-file from management is to ensure that those who lay
down policies in areas that are still negotiable in public sector
collective bargaining do not themselves become part of those
employees who seek to change these policies for their collective
welfare.

The policy-determining functions of the University Council refer to

academic matters, i.e. those governing the relationship between the
University and its students, and not the University as an employer and
the professors as employees. It is thus evident that no conflict of interest
results in the professors being members of the University Council and
being classified as rank-and-file employees.

2. Yes.

A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees of a

given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent
with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.

Our labor laws do not however provide the criteria for determining the
proper collective bargaining unit. Section 12 of the old law, Republic Act
No. 875 otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act though incorporated
into the Labor Code no guidelines for determination of an appropriate
bargaining unit. Even Executive Order No. 180 already adverted to is not
much help.

In Democratic Labor Association vs. Cebu Stevedoring Company,

Inc., decided on February 28, 1958, 31 the Court observed that "the issue
of how to determine the proper collective bargaining unit and what unit
would be appropriate to be the collective bargaining agency" . . .

. . . Under these precedents, there are various factors which

must be satisfied and considered in determining the proper
constituency of a bargaining unit. No one particular factor is
itself decisive of the determination. The weight accorded to any
particular factor varies in accordance with the particular
question or questions that may arise in a given case. What are
these factors? Rothenberg mentions a good number, but the
most pertinent to our case are: (1) will of the employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unit of employees'
interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties,
or similarity of compensation and working conditions;
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) employment
status, such as temporary, seasonal probationary
employees. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

 the basic test in determining the appropriate bargaining unit is
that a unit, to be appropriate, must affect a grouping of
employees who have substantial, mutual interests in
wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of
collective bargaining (citing Smith on Labor Laws, 316-317;
Francisco, Labor Laws, 162). . . .

"(t)he test of the grouping is community or mutuality of

interests. And this is so because 'the basic test of an
asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it
is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to
all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights' (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, 490)." Hence, in that
case, the Court upheld the trial court's conclusion that two
separate bargaining units should be formed, one consisting of
regular and permanent employees and another consisting of
casual laborers or stevedores.

Since then, the "community or mutuality of interests"

test has provided the standard in determining the proper
constituency of a collective bargaining unit.

In the case at bar, the University employees may, as already

suggested, quite easily be categorized into two general classes:
one, the group composed of employees whose functions are
non-academic, i.e., janitors, messengers, typists, clerks,
receptionists, carpenters, electricians, grounds-keepers, chauffeurs,
mechanics, plumbers; and two, the group made up of those
performing academic functions, i.e., full professors, associate
professors, assistant professors, instructors — who may be judges or
government executives — and research, extension and professorial
staff. Not much reflection is needed to perceive that the community
or mutuality of interests which justifies the formation of a single
collective bargaining unit is wanting between the academic and non-
academic personnel of the university. It would seem obvious that
teachers would find very little in common with the University clerks
and other non-academic employees as regards responsibilities and
functions, working conditions, compensation rates, social life and
interests, skills and intellectual pursuits, cultural activities, etc.

On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in

the nature of the work and duties as well as in the compensation and
working conditions of the academic and non-academic personnel
dictate the separation of these two categories of employees for
purposes of collective bargaining. The formation of two separate
bargaining units, the first consisting of the rank-and-file non-academic
personnel, and the second, of the rank-and-file academic employees,
is the set-up that will best assure to all the employees the exercise of
their collective bargaining rights. These special circumstances, i.e.,
the dichotomy of interests and concerns as well as the dissimilarity in
the nature and conditions of work, wages and compensation between
the academic and non-academic personnel, bring the case at bar
within the exception contemplated in Section 9 of Executive Order
No. 180. It was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Relations Director to have ruled otherwise, ignoring plain and patent
realities.
Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment

G.R. No. 91915. September 11, 1992

FACTS:

Med- Arbiter Bienvenido C. Elorcha certified the Divine Word

University Employees Union (the “Union”) as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the Divine Word University (University). Thereafter,
DWUEU submitted its collective bargaining proposals but the Union’s
resigned vice-president Mr. Urmenita wrote a letter to the University,
unilaterally withdrawing the CBA proposals. After almost three years, the
Union then requested for a conference with the University for the
continuance of the collective bargaining negotiations, however, said
request was unheeded.

With these, the Union filed with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment a notice of
strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice acts,
specifically, refusal to bargain, discrimination and coercion on the
employees. This led to the conclusion of an agreement between the
University and the Union. However, it turned out that an hour before the
agreement was concluded, the University had filed a petition for
certification election. The Union, on the other hand, submitted its collective
bargaining proposals consonant with the agreement which were ignored by
the University.

ISSUE:

WON there was a deadlock or an impasse in the collective bargaining

process

RULING:

YES. Records show that there was no “reasonable effort at good faith
bargaining” especially on the part of the University. Its indifferent attitude
towards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties
to arrive at an agreement. As it was evident that unilateral moves were
being undertaken only by the DWUEU-ALU, there was no “counteraction”
of forces or an impasse to speak of. While collective bargaining should be
initiated by the union, there is a corresponding responsibility on the part of
the employer to respond in some manner to such acts.

However, the Court cannot help but notice that the DWUEU was not
entirely blameless in the matter of the delay in the bargaining process.
While it is true that as early as March 7, 1985, said union had submitted its
collective bargaining proposals and that, its subsequent withdrawal by the
DWUEU Vice President being unauthorized and therefore ineffective, the
same proposals could be considered as subsisting, the fact remains that
said union remained passive for three years. During this 3-year period,
there is no showing that it exerted any effort to pursue collective bargaining
as a means of attaining better terms of employment.

It was only after its affiliation with the ALU that the same union,
through the ALU Director for Operations, requested an “initial conference”
for the purpose of collective bargaining. That the DWUEU abandoned its
collective bargaining proposals prior to its affiliation with ALU is further
confirmed by the fact that in the aforequoted May 10, 1988 agreement with
the University, said Union bound itself to submit a new set of proposals on
May 13, 1988. Under the circumstances, the agreement of May 10, 1988
may as well be considered the written notice to bargain referred to in the
aforequoted Art. 250(a) of the Labor Code, which thereby set into motion
the machinery for collective bargaining, as in fact, on May 19, 1988,
DWUEU-ALU submitted its collective bargaining proposals.

The Court is not inclined to rule that there has been a deadlock or an
impasse in the collective bargaining process. As the Court observed, there
has not been a “reasonable effort at good faith bargaining” on the part of
the University. While DWUEU-ALU was opening all possible avenues for
the conclusion of an agreement, the record is replete with evidence on the
University’s reluctance and thinly disguised refusal to bargain with the duly
certified bargaining agent, such that the inescapable conclusion is that the
University evidently had no intention of bargaining with it. Thus, while the
Court recognizes that technically, the University has the right to file the
petition for certification election as there was no bargaining deadlock to
speak of, to grant its prayer that the herein assailed Orders be annulled
would put an unjustified premium on bad faith bargaining.

Bad faith on the part of the University is further exemplified by the fact
that an hour before the start of the May 10, 1988 conference, it
surreptitiously filed the petition for certification election. And yet during said
conference, it committed itself to “sit down” with the Union.

Obviously, the University tried to preempt the conference which

would have legally foreclosed its right to file the petition for certification
election. In so doing, the University failed to act in accordance with Art. 252
of the Labor Code which defines the meaning of the duty to bargain
collectively as “the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and
convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith.”

Moreover, by filing the petition for certification election while agreeing

to confer with the DWUEU-ALU, the University violated the mandate of Art.
19 of the Civil Code that “(e)very person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.”
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND
ALLIED INDUSTRIES-MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER, petitioner,
vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
G.R. No. 181531 July 31, 2009
CARPIO-MORALES, J.

Facts:
A certification election was conducted among the rank-and-file
employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel)
where petitioner obtained the highest votes, totaling 151, followed by
HIMPHLU with 169 votes. In view of the significant number of segregated
votes, contending unions, petitioner, NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and respondent
Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU), referred the
case back to Med-Arbiter Ma. Simonette Calabocal to decide which among
those votes would be opened and tallied.

Eleven (11) votes were initially segregated because they were cast
by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal was still
pending before the Court of Appeals. Six other votes were segregated
because the employees who cast them were already occupying
supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still five other votes were
segregated on the ground that they were cast by probationary employees
and, pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such
employees cannot vote. It bears noting early on, however, that the vote of
one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton), a probationary employee, was counted.
Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for the opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated
votes, specially those cast by the 11 dismissed employees and those cast
by the six supposedly supervisory employees of the Hotel.

Petitioner, which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the Secretary of

Labor and Employment, arguing that the votes of the probationary
employees should have been opened considering that probationary
employee Gatbonton’s vote was tallied. And petitioner averred that
respondent HIMPHLU, which garnered 169 votes, should not be
immediately certified as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17
segregated ballots would push the number of valid votes cast to 338,
hence, the 169 votes which HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of
the majority which would then become 169. The SOLE affirmed the Med-
Arbiter’s Order. It held that the probationary employees cannot vote, as at
the time the Med-Arbiter the Order the six probationary employees were
not yet hired, hence, they could not vote. With respect to the votes cast by
the 11 dismissed employees, they could be considered since their
dismissal was still pending appeal. In fine, the SOLE concluded that the
certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent was proper.
The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the SOLE. Thus, this present
case.

Issue:

First: Whether or not employees on probationary status at the time of

the certification elections should be allowed to vote

Second: Whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority

for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent

Held:

First: YES.

The inclusion of Gatbonton’s vote was proper not because it was not
questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a
certification election. The votes of the six other probationary employees
should thus also have been counted. As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-
Calleja holds: In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled
to vote.

The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from

voting cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to
self-organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence thereon. A
law is read into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are
valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy.

In light of the immediately-quoted provisions, and prescinding from

the principle that all employees are, from the first day of their employment,
eligible for membership in a labor organization, it is evident that the period
of reckoning in determining who shall be included in the list of eligible
voters is, in cases where a timely appeal has been filed from the Order of
the Med-Arbiter, the date when the Order of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, whether affirming or denying the appeal, becomes final and
executor.

Second: NO.

It is well-settled that under the so-called “double majority rule,” for there to
be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have
voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid
votes cast. Prescinding from the Court’s ruling that all the probationary
employees’ votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the
supervisory employees should be excluded, it follows that the number of
valid votes cast would increase—from 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the
Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the
eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% +
1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.

It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the

number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the
required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections.
The opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material.
To be sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective:
to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority
representation of the bargaining representative, if the employees desire to
be represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the determination of who
between two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively
ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they
want to be represented and which union they want to represent them.
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA, ACTING THROUGH ITS OWNER,
GRAND PLAZA HOTEL CORPORATION vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT; MEDARBITER TOMAS F. FALCONITIN; and
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND
ALLIED INDUSTRIES-HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA SUPERVISORS
CHAPTER (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC)

FACTS:

On October 11, 1995, respondent National Union of Workers in Hotel

Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors
Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC) filed a petition for certification election,
seeking to represent all the supervisory employees of Heritage Hotel
Manila. Petitioner filed its opposition but was denied when Med-Arbiter
Fernando issued his order for the conduct of the certification election.

A preelection conference was scheduled which was suspended due

to the repeated nonappearance of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC. However, on
January 29, 2000, NUWHRAIN-HHMSC moved for the conduct of the
preelection conference, prompting petitioner to file its comment on the list
of employees submitted by NUWHRAIN-HHMSC, seeking the exclusion of
some employees from the list, as they were occupying either confidential or
managerial positions. The petitioner also filed a motion to dismiss, raising
the prolonged lack of interest of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC to pursue its petition
for certification election.

On May 12, 2000, the petitioner filed a petition for the cancellation of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC’s registration as a labor union for failing to submit its
annual financial reports and an updated list of members as required by the
Labor Code. The petitioner filed another petition on June 1, 2000, to seek
either the dismissal or the suspension of the proceedings on the basis of its
pending petition for the cancellation of union registration. However, the
DOLE issued a notice scheduling the certification election on June 23,
2000.
 The petitioner then commenced in the CA a special civil action for
certiorari, alleging that the DOLE gravely abused its discretion in not
suspending the certification election proceedings. The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The
certification election proceeded as scheduled, and NUWHRAIN-HHMSC
obtained the majority vote of the bargaining unit. The petitioner filed a
protest, insisting on the illegitimacy of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC.

On January 26, 2001, Med-Arbiter Falconitin in dismissing the

petitioner’s protest, issued an order, ruling that the petition for the
cancellation of union registration was not a bar to the holding of the
certification election. The petitioner appealed to the DOLE Secretary
contending that a labor union of mixed membership of supervisory and
rank-and-file employees had no legal right to petition for the certification
election pursuant to jurisprudence, namely: Toyota Motor and Dunlop
Slazenger cases.

The DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas denied the appeal and

subsequently, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The petitioner
elevated the matter to the CA, who likewise dismissed the petition, citing
the case of Tagaytay Highlands. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in denying the petition?

HELD: No, it did not.

Basic in the realm of labor union rights is that the certification election is
the sole concern of the workers, and the employer is deemed an intruder
as far as the certification election is concerned. Thus, the petitioner lacked
the legal personality to assail the proceedings for the certification election,
and should stand aside as a mere bystander who could not oppose the
petition, or even appeal the Med-Arbiter’s orders relative to the conduct of
the certification election.

Under the long-established rule, the filing of the petition for the
cancellation of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC’s registration should not bar the
conduct of the certification election. In that respect, only a final order for
the cancellation of the registration would have prevented NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC from continuing to enjoy all the rights conferred on it as a
legitimate labor union, including the right to the petition for the certification
election. This rule is now enshrined in Article 238-A of the Labor Code, as
amended by RA 9481, which reads:

Article 238-A. Effect of a Petition for Cancellation of

Registration. — A petition for cancellation of union registration shall
not suspend the proceedings for certification election nor shall it
prevent the filingof a petition for certification election.

On the failure of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC to submit its periodic financial

reports and updated list of its members, pursuant to Arts. 238 and 239 of
the Labor Code, the Court declared that the dismissal of the petition for the
cancellation of the registration of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC was proper when
viewed against the primordial right of the workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining negotiations and peaceful concerted actions:

“It is sufficient to give the Regional Director license to treat the late
filing of required documents as sufficient compliance with the requirements
of the law. x x x The union members and, in fact, all the employees
belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit should not be deprived of a
bargaining agent, merely because of the negligence of the union officers
who were responsible for the submission of the documents to the BLR.”

It should also be noted that the Labor Code’s provisions on

cancellation of union registration and on reportorial requirements have
been recently amended by RA 9481, which sought to strengthen the
workers’ right to self-organization and enhance the Philippines’ compliance
with its international obligations, pertaining to the non-dissolution of
workers’ organizations by administrative authority. It reads:

ART. 239. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration.—The

following may constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:
 (a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with
the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or
amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of
members who took part in the ratification;
(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with
the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the
list of voters;
(c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.

R.A. No. 9481 also inserted in the Labor Code Article 242-A, which
provides:

“x x x Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a

ground for cancellation of union registration but shall subject the
erring officers or members to suspension, expulsion from
membership, or any appropriate penalty.”

*On the issue of which jurisprudence to apply: In Kawashima, [the Court]

has reconciled its rulings in Toyota Motor, Dunlop Slazenger and Tagaytay
Highlands by emphasizing on the laws prevailing at the time of filing of
the petition for the certification election. Presently, then, the mixed
membership does not result in the illegitimacy of the registered labor union
unless the same was done through misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud according to Article 239 of the Labor Code.

In both Toyota Motor and Dunlop Slazenger, the employers were able
to adduce substantial evidence to prove the existence of the mixed
membership. Based on the records herein, however, the petitioner failed in
that respect. Petitioner merely identified the positions that were either
confidential or managerial, but did not present any supporting evidence to
prove or explain the identification.

Worth reiterating is that the actual functions of an employee, not his

job designation, determined whether the employee occupied a managerial,
supervisory or rank-and-file position. As to confidential employees who
were excluded from the right to selforganization, they must (1) assist or act
in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulated,
determined, and effectuated management policies in the field of labor
relations. In that regard, mere allegations sans substance would not be
enough, most especially because the constitutional right of workers
to selforganization would be compromised.

As between the rigid application of Toyota Motors and Dunlop

Slazenger, and the right of the workers to self-organization, [the Court]
prefers the latter. “What is important is that there is an unmistakable intent
of the members of [the] union to exercise their right to organize. [The Court]
cannot impose rigorous restraints on such right if it is to give meaning to
the protection to labor and social justice clauses of the Constitution.”

PETITION DENIED.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO vs.
HON. MA. NIEVES D. CONFESOR, Secretary of Labor, et al

FACTS:

On June 28, 1990, petitioner-union San Miguel Corporation Employees

Union — PTGWO entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
with private respondent San Miguel Corporation (SMC) to take effect upon
the expiration of the previous CBA or on June 30, 1989.

In keeping with their vision and long term strategy for business expansion,
SMC management informed its employees in a letter that the company
which was composed of four operating divisions namely: (1) Beer, (2)
Packaging, (3) Feeds and Livestocks, (4) Magnolia and Agri-business
would undergo a restructuring and that from October 1, 1991, Magnolia and
Feeds and Livestock Division were spun-off and became two separate and
distinct corporations: Magnolia Corporation (Magnolia) and San Miguel
Foods, Inc. (SMFI). Notwithstanding the spin-offs, the CBA remained in
force and effect.

After June 30, 1992, the CBA was renegotiated in accordance with the
terms of the CBA and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. However, during the
negotiations, the petitioner-union insisted that the bargaining unit of SMC
should still include the employees of the spun-off corporations: Magnolia
and SMFI; and that the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective
only for the remaining period of two years or until June 30, 1994.

SMC, on the other hand, contended that the members/employees who had
moved to Magnolia and SMFI, automatically ceased to be part of the
bargaining unit at the SMC. Furthermore, the CBA should be effective for
three years in accordance with Art. 253-A of the Labor Code.

Unable to agree on these issues with respect to the bargaining unit and
duration of the CBA, petitioner-union declared a deadlock and later staged
a strike.
This led private respondents SMC, Magnolia and SMFI to file a petition with
the Secretary of Labor praying that the latter assume jurisdiction over the
labor dispute in a vital industry.

The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
issued the assailed Order that the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be
effective for the period of three (3) years from June 30, 1992; and that such
CBA shall cover only the employees of SMC and not of Magnolia and
SMFI.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA is to be

effective for three years of for only two years; and

2) Whether or not the bargaining unit of SMC includes also the employees
of the Magnolia and SMFI.

HELD:

1) Thee renegotiated terms of the CBA at SMC should run for a period of
three (3) years.

Petitioner-union contends that the duration for the non-representation

provisions of the CBA should be coterminous with the term of the
bargaining agency which in effect shall be for the remaining two years of
the current CBA, citing a previous decision of the Secretary of Labor.

However, the Secretary of Labor, in her questioned Order ruled that the
renegotiated terms of the CBA at SMC should run for a period of three (3)
years, as contained in Art. 23-A of the Labor Code, as amended.

Article 253-A is a new provision. This was incorporated by Section 21 of

Republic Act No. 6715 (the Herrera-Veloso Law) which took effect on
March 21, 1989. This new provision states that the CBA has a term of five
(5) years instead of three years, before the amendment of the law as far as
the representation aspect is concerned. All other provisions of the CBA
shall be negotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. The
"representation aspect" refers to the identity and majority status of the
union that negotiated the CBA as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the appropriate bargaining unit concerned. "All other provisions" simply
refers to the rest of the CBA, economic as well as non-economic
provisions, except representation.

In the instant case, it is not difficult to determine the period of effectivity for
the non-representation provisions of the CBA. Taking it from the history of
their CBAs, SMC intended to have the terms of the CBA effective for three
(3) years reckoned from the expiration of the old or previous CBA which
was on June 30, 1989.

Thus, the Court do not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Secretary of Labor in ruling that the effectivity of the renegotiated terms of
the CBA shall be for three (3) years.

2) There is no merit in petitioner-union's assertion that the employees of

Magnolia and SMFI should still be considered part of the bargaining unit of
SMC.

Magnolia and SMFI were spun-off to operate as distinct companies on

October 1, 1991. Management saw the need for these transformations in
keeping with its vision and long term strategy as it explained in its letter
addressed to the employees dated August 13, 1991.

Undeniably, the transformation of the companies was a management

prerogative and business judgment which the courts cannot look into
unless it is contrary to law, public policy or morals. Neither can we impute
any bad faith on the part of SMC so as to justify the application of the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Ever mindful of the employees'
interests, management has assured the concerned employees that they will
be absorbed by the new corporations without loss of tenure and retaining
their present pay and benefits according to the existing CBAs. They were
advised that upon the expiration of the CBAs, new agreements will be
negotiated between the management of the new corporations and the
bargaining representatives of the employees concerned. As a result of the
spin-offs:

1. Each of the companies are run by, supervised and controlled by

different management teams including separate human
resource/personnel managers.

2. Each Company enforces its own administrative and operational

rules and policies and are not dependent on each other in their
operations.

3. Each entity maintains separate financial statements and are

audited separately from each other.

Indubitably, therefore, Magnolia and SMFI became distinct entities with

separate juridical personalities. Thus, they cannot belong to a single
bargaining unit.
St. Luke's vs Torres and SLMCEA-AFW

Facts:

• The then secretary of labor Torres issued an order in 1991 which

required the parties to execute and finalize their 1990-1993 collective
bargaining agreement as well as instructed the parties to incorporate
the disposition on economic and non-economic issues.

• In the said discussion, the petitioner proposed a maximum across the

board monthly salary increase of 375 per employee but respondent
demanded a 1,500 hike or 50% increase based on the latest salary
rate. Whichever is higher instead. A series of events resulted to a
deadlock on across the board monthly and meal allowances ensued
and in order to prevent a strike, St. Lukes filed a petition wherein the
secretary of labor immediately assumed jurisdiction to which the
parties involved submitted their pleadings.

• The order released on January 28, 1991 contains a disposition as to

economic and non-economic issues and one of the rulings is that
such order would have a retro-active effect to the enforceability of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. This made the petitioner to file a
case against the respondent and contended that the order is in
violation of Art. 253-A of the Labor Code.

• Petitioner argues that since no formal negotiations were conducted, it

could not possibly offer the increases for the first year and the across
the board increases for the 2nd and 3rd year. Furthermore, if the CBA
would have retroactive effect, there would be clear violation of law
since the old CBA has expired already on July 30, 1990 and the
questioned ordered was issued 1 year later which is clearly issued
beyond the six-month period.

• On the other hand, respondent is contending that the Labor Secretary

is correct on his view of Article 253-A that it is inapplicable to arbitral
awards since the said article is only referring to collective bargaining
agreements entered into by management and the certified exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees.
Issue:

Whether or not the Secretary gravely abused his discretion when he issued
the assailed order which gave retroactive effect to the CBA

Ruling:

Negative.

In here, the petitioner assailed the order based on unreasonableness,

prematurity and violation of the law.

As to the contention of unreasonableness, it is without merit. Checking the

order shows that public respondent took into consideration the parties’
respective contentions, a clear indication that he was keenly aware of their
contrary positions. Both sides having been heard, they were allowed to
present their respective evidence. The due process requirement was thus
clearly observed. Considering public respondent’s expertise on the subject
and his observance of the cardinal principles of due process, the assailed
Order deserves to be accorded great respect by this Court.

As to the contention of prematurity, it is likewise without merit. It is

immaterial whether the representation issue within AFW has been resolved
with finality or not. Said squabble could not possibly serve as a bar to any
collective bargaining since AFW is not the real party-in-interest to the talks;
rather, the negotiations were confined to petitioner and the local union
SLMCEA which is affiliated to AFW. Only the collective bargaining agent,
the local union SLMCEA in this case, possesses legal standing to negotiate
with petitioner.

As to the contention of violation of the law as to retroactivity, it is also

without merit. This is because Article 253-A does not apply in this case.

In the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the

effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public
respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to
determine the effectivity thereof.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION INDEPENDENT LABOR
UNION (GMC-ELU), and RITO MANGUBAT, respondents.

Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Unfair Labor

Practices; The crucial question whether or not a party has met his
statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the
individual case—there is no per se test of good faith in bargaining; Where
the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining
proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain
collectively

FACTS:

On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation effective for a
term of three years. The CBA was effective for three years retroactive to
December 1, 1988. Hence, it would expire on November 30, 1991.

On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union
sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counterproposal be
submitted within ten (10) days.

As early as October 1991, however, GMC had received collective and

individual letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from
their union membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and personal
differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a
CBA, GMC did not send any counterproposal.

On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the union’s officers, stating
that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer
existed, but that management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue
with them on matters of common concern.

In answer, the union officers disclaimed any massive disaffiliation or

resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its
members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the union.
In 1992, GMC dismissed Marcia Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground
of incompetence. The union protested and requested GMC to submit the
matter to the grievance procedure provided in the CBA. GMC, however,
advised the union to “refer to our letter dated December 16, 1991.”

Thus, the union filed, a complaint against GMC with the NLRC, alleging
unfair labor practice on the part of GMC for: (1) refusal to bargain
collectively; (2) interference with the right to self-organization; and (3)
discrimination.

The labor arbiter dismissed the case. On appeal, the NLRC set aside the
labor arbiter’s decision. Citing Article 253-A of the Labor Code, which fixed
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the NLRC ordered GMC to
abide by the CBA draft that the union proposed for a period of two (2) years
beginning December 1, 1991, the date when the original CBA ended, to
November 30, 1993.

The NLRC pointed out that upon the effectivity of RA 6715, the duration of
a CBA, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, is five (5) years
which, in this case, was from December 1, 1988 to November 30, 1993.

However, on motion for reconsideration by GMC, the NLRC reversed its

previous decision (in favor of GMC). Consequently, the union elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals. The CA reinstated the first decision of the
NLRC (in favor of the union) and imposed the proposed CBA against GMC.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether GMC is guilty of ULP for failing to bargain collectively;

(2) Is it correct to impose the proposed CBA as against GMC?

RULING:

(1) YES, GMC is guilty of ULP. SC HELD: Under Article 252 of the Labor
Code, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet
and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement.
The crucial question whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to
bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case.
There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is
an inference to be drawn from the facts. The effect of an employer’s or a
union’s actions individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the
impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole.

The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new
CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA.
But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a
flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of
its membership to prevent any negotiation.

GMC’s failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the

union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its
excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly
dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless.

Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the
bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to
bargain collectively.

(2) YES, it is correct to impose the proposed CBA. SC HELD: Under

ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor
controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other.
But an erring party should not be allowed to resort with impunity to
schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures.

Thus, by imposing on GMC the provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the
union, the interests of equity and fair play were properly served and both
parties regained equal footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the
negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA.
Ace Navigation Co., Inc. Vela International Marine Ltd., and/or Rodolfo
Pamintuan vs. Teodorico Fernandez, assisted by Glenita Fernandez

Facts:

Respondent Teodorico (seaman), assisted by his wife, Glenita filed with the
NLRC a complaint for disability benefits with prayer for moral and
exemplary damages against petitioners. Petitioners opposed the complaint,
contending that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the dispute as it
should have been settled with the voluntary arbitrator pursuant to POEA-
Standard Employment Contract and their CBA. This was opposed by
respondent arguing that since his complaint involves a money claim,
jurisdiction is vested with the labor arbiter.

The Labor Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss field by petitioners citing the
Migrant Workers Overseas Filipinos Act, it held that the labor arbiters have
jurisdiction over money claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship pr by virtue of any law or contract.

On both appeals to the NLRC and the CA, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter
was affirmed. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over Fernandez’s disability
claim—the labor arbiter under RA 8042, as amended, or the voluntary
arbitration mechanism as prescribed in the parties’ CBA and the POEA-
SEC?

Ruling:

The voluntary arbitration mechanism. The Supreme Court upheld the

jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators over
the present dispute, not only because of the clear language of the parties’
CBA on the matter; more importantly, in recognition of the State’s express
preference for voluntary modes of dispute settlement, such as conciliation
and voluntary arbitration as expressed in the Constitution, the law and the
rules. Hence, there is no need to consider the petitioners’ submission
regarding the IRR of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, as amended by R.A. No. 10022, except to note that the IRR lends
further support to Court’s ruling. Jurisprudence also provides that―It is
settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for
resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then
that procedure should be strictly observed. Further, under Article 261 of the
Labor Code (Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators), on the other hand, reads in part: The Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation
or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies.

This being the case, the petition is granted, respondent should have
referred his claim to the grievance machinery stated under Art. 261 of the
Labor Code.
Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS

Philec is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufucture and

repairs of high voltage transformers. Philec Workers' Union (PWU), on the
otherhand is a legitimate labor organization and the exclusive bargaining
representatives of the ran-and-file employees of Philec.

On May 1997, PWU and Philec by virtue of the CBA agreed to

provide the renak-and-file employee's sallary in case of promotion.
Eleodoro Lipio and Emerlito Ignacio were part of the ran-and-files
employees members of PWU. On August 1997, the two employees were
promoted for the position of Foreman 1 under Pay Grade B.

Philec issued a memorandum to the both employees confirming their

selection on the condition that they shall both undergo training for not more
than 4 months. Philec also provided that the sallary increase of the
employees shall be one step at a time until the allowance for the grade
applied for is attained.

PWU claims that the schedule of training allowancw stated in the

memoranda served on Lipio and Ignacio did not cnform to Article 10,
Section 4 of the June 1997 CBA. Philec and PWU failed to settle the
grievance amicably, hence they submitted the issue before the Voluntary
Arbitrator.

In its defense, Philec emphsized that the promotion of Lipio and

Ignacio Sr. was made while they were still negotiating a new bargaining
agreement with PWU. Hence, they applied the Modified SGV pay grade in
computing Lipio and Ingnacio's training allowance. Philec also disputed
PWU's claim of unfair labor practice.

Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez in its August 1999 decision held that

Philec violatid its collective bargaining agreement and that Philec should
have computed Lipio and Ignacio's training allowance based on Arcticle 10
Section of the June 1997 CBA. On the issue of unfair labor practice VA,
ruled that Philec acts did not constitute a gross violation of the CBA nor a
flagrant or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provision of the
agreement.

Philec filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the VA's decision,

however it was dismissed for lack of merit. Philec recived the copy of the
resolution on August 11, 2000 and on August 29, 2000, it filed a petition for
certiorari before CA alegging the VA Jimenez gravely abuse its discretion in
rendering its decision.

The CA affirmed the decision of the VA and dismissed Philec's

petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

WON VA Jimenez gravely abuse his discretion in directing PHILEC to pay

Lipio and Ignacio's training allowance based on the June 1997 CBA.

RULING:

The SC decided to deny the petition.

According to the SC, Philec's petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of

the ROC against VA Jimenez is not a proper remedy. What Philec should
file is a petiton to reverse or modify a VA's decision or award or decision
before the CA under Rule 43 of the ROC.

Article 261-262 of the Labor COde provides that a Voluntary

Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has the exclusive original
jurisdiction over grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Should the parties
agree, a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall also
resolve the parties other labor disputes, including unfair labor practices and
bargaining deadlocks.

The SC stated that the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of

Voluntary Arbitrators, even assuming that the office is not strictly a quasi-
judicial agency, may be considered an instrumentality. An instrumentality is
anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms governmental
agency or instrumentality are synonymous in the sense that either of them
is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government
act or function is performed.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to

a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the
Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term
instrumentality in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.

Since the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary

Arbitrators is considered a quasi-judicial agency, this court concluded that a
decision or award rendered by a Voluntary Arbitrator is appealable before
the Court of Appeals. Under Section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, the Court of Appeals has the exclusive original jurisdiction over
decisions or awards of quasi-judicial agencies and instrumentalities.

The SC reiterated the Luzon Development Bank's ruling that under

Article 262-A of the Labor COde provides that the award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator ''shall be final and executory after 10 calendar days
from the receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. ''

In the case at bar, PHILEC received Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs

resolution denying its motion for partial reconsideration on August 11,
2000.PHILEC filed its petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on
August 29, 2000,which was 18 days after its receipt of Voluntary Arbitrator
Jimenezs resolution. The petition for certiorari was filed beyond the 10-day
reglementary period for filing an appeal. We cannot consider PHILECs
petition for certiorari as an appeal.

There being no appeal seasonably filed in this case, Voluntary

Arbitrator Jimenezs decision became final and executory after 10 calendar
days from PHILECs receipt of the resolution denying its motion for partial
reconsideration. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs decision is already beyond
the purview of this Court to act upon.

The Supreme Court in the issue partaining the application of the increase
of training allowance based on the step increases provided in the June
1997 CBA ruled in favor of the respondents. VA Jimenez correctly awarded
both Lipio and Ignacio allowances based on the formula enshrined in the
said CBA.

A collective bargaining agreement is a contract executed upon the

request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with
respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of
employment, including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions
arising under such agreement. A collective bargaining agreement being a
contract, its provisions constitute the law between the parties and must be
complied with in good faith.

Philec as the employer and PWU as the exclusive bargaining

representative entered into a CBA which is effective June 1997 to May
1999. Being the law between the parties, the June 1997 CBA must govern
Philec and its rank-and-file employees within the agreed period.

Thus, training is a condition precedent for promotion. Selection for

training does not mean automatic transfer out of the bargaining unit of rank-
and-file employees. Since Lipio and Ignacio were not transfered out of the
bargaining unit when they were selected for the training for their promotion,
their training allowance must be computed based on Article 9 Section1(f) of
the June 1997 CBA.

Had PHILEC wanted the Modified SGV pay grade scale applied
within its enterprise, it could have requested or demanded that the Modified
SGV scale be incorporated in the [collective bargaining
agreement].PHILEC had the means under the law to compel [PWU] to
incorporate this specific economic proposal in the collective bargaining
agreement. It could have invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code to
incorporate the Modified SGV pay grade scale in its collective bargaining
agreement with PWU. But it did not. Since this Modified SGV pay grade
scale does not appear in PHILECs collective bargaining agreement with
PWU, PHILEC cannot insist on the Modified SGV pay grade scales
application.
GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, GNC FACULTY AND LABOR UNION and GNC
NONTEACHING MAINTENANCE LABOR UNION, respondents, G.R.
No. 188492. August 28, 2018

FACTS:

Under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 6728 (Government Assistance To

Students and Teachers in Private Education Act), 70% of the increase in
tuition fees shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and
other benefits of the teaching and nonteaching personnel. Pursuant to this
provision, the petitioner imposed a 7% increase of its tuition fees for school
year 2006-2007.

In order to save the depleting funds of the petitioner’s Retirement Plan, its
Board of Trustees approved the funding of the retirement program out of
the 70% net incremental proceeds arising from the tuition fee increases.5
Respondents GNCFaculty Labor Union and GNC Nonteaching
Maintenance Labor Union challenged the petitioner’s unilateral decision by
claiming that the increase violated Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728. The
parties referred the matter to voluntary arbitration after failing to settle the
controversy by themselves.

The VA rendered his decision in favor of GNC,7 holding that retirement

benefits fell within the category of “other benefits” that could be charged
against the 70% net incremental proceeds pursuant to Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 6728. After receiving a copy, respondents filed an Urgent Motion for
Extension praying that the CA grant them an extension of 15 days from
July 1, 2008, or until July 16, 2008, within which to file their petition for
review.

The CA issued a resolution granting the Urgent Motion for Extension. The
respondents filed the petition for review on July 16, 2008. The petitioner
filed its Motion to Dismiss, asserting that the decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator had already become final and executory pursuant to Article 276
of the Labor Code and in accordance with the ruling in Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc.

The CA acted on the Motion to Dismiss on December 15, 2008 through the
now assailed resolution denying the Motion to Dismiss. The petitioner
sought reconsideration, but the CA denied. Hence, the petitioner instituted
its petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA gravely abuse its discretion in denying the

petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss despite the finality of the decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator pursuant to Article 276 of the Labor Code.

RULING:

NO.

Accordingly, the decisions and awards of Voluntary Arbitrators,

albeit immediately final and executory, remained subject to judicial
review in appropriate cases through petitions for certiorari. Such was
the state of things until the promulgation in 1995 of the ruling in Luzon
Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees,
249 SCRA 162 (1995). Therein, the Court noted the silence of R.A. No.
6715 on the availability of appeal from the decisions or awards of the
Voluntary Arbitrators. In declaring the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panels of
Voluntary Arbitrators as quasi-judicial instrumentalities, Luzon
Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees
pronounced the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators to be
appealable to the CA

(What should now be the period to be followed in appealing the decisions

or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators?)

The 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be understood as

the period within which the party adversely affected by the ruling of
the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators may file a motion for
reconsideration. Only after the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration may the aggrieved party appeal to the CA by filing the
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15 days
from notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43. The Court notes that
despite the clarification made in Teng v. Pagahac, the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) and the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) have not revised or amended the Revised Procedural
Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings insofar as
its Section 7 of Rule VII is concerned. This inaction has obviously sown
confusion, particularly in regard to the filing of the motion for
reconsideration as a condition precedent to the filing of the petition for
review in the CA. Consequently, we need to direct the DOLE and the
NCMB to cause the revision or amendment of Section 7 of Rule VII of the
Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration
Proceedings in order to allow the filing of motions for reconsideration in line
with Article 276 of the Labor Code.

(Whether the CA had gravely abused its discretion in assuming jurisdiction

over the respondents’ petition.)

Generally, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be assailed by

petition for certiorari. As we indicated in Biñan Rural Bank v. Carlos, 757
SCRA 459 (2015): The denial of a motion to dismiss generally cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, as this remedy is designed
to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can
a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal which is
available only after a judgment or order on the merits has been rendered.
Only when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion can the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be
justified.

In this case, the CA did not act arbitrarily in denying the petitioner’s Motion
to Dismiss. It correctly noted that Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,
Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.
did not make a definitive ruling on the correct reglementary period for the
filing of the petition for review. Given the varying applications of the periods
defined in Article 276 and Section 4 of Rule 43, the CA could not be
objectively held to be guilty of grave abuse of discretion in applying the
equitable rule on construction in favor of labor. To be underscored is that
the underlying aim for the requirement of strict adherence to procedural
rules, particularly on appeals, should always be the prevention of needless
delays that could enable the unscrupulous employers to wear out the
efforts and meager resources of their workers to the point that the latter
would be constrained to settle for less than what were due to them.