Rosario and Untalan vs. Carangdang, et al.

Facts:
On October 16, 1952, plaintiffs Eriberto P. Rosario and Paz Untalan de
Rosario filed a complaint against defendants Filomeno Carangdang, et al.,
specifically alleging therein that plaintiffs-appellants are the owners and
possessors of a parcel of land situated in Labrador, Pangasinan; that
defendants illegally entered into the premises, destroyed the nipa and plants
thereon, and made dikes to convert the place into a fishpond; that in spite of
warnings and notices from plaintiffs-appellants, defendants continued to
possess and occupy the premises; and that as a result of defendants' entry
into and possession of the land in question, plaintiffs have suffered damages
in the amount of P2,000.
On November 3, 1952, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint.
The lower Court found the motion to dismiss meritorious, and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiffs moved for the reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, and prayed as well for the admission of an amended
complaint, wherein they make specific allegation for the first time that the
defendants are claiming ownership of the land in question in the two
registration cases previously mentioned.
Defendants opposed the motion for reconsideration and the admission of an
amended complaint, upon the ground that the amended complaint would
convert plaintiffs' action from one of forcible entry and detainer to one of
recovery of ownership and possession.
Defendants' position was sustained by the Court below; and later, it denied
a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal. Hence, this appeal
by the plaintiffs to this Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court err in refusing to admit the amended complaint of
the plaintiffs.
Ruling:
No, the refusal to admit the amended complaint is proper.
While it is true that under the liberal provisions of our Rules of Court,
amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed in the
furtherance of justice, it is obvious that when it appears from the very face of
the complaint that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
case, an amendment of the complaint cannot be allowed so as to confer
jurisdiction upon the Court.
Appellants' original complaint, as we have already determined, is one for
forcible entry and detainer, over which the Court below has no jurisdiction.
Not having acquired jurisdiction' over the case by the filing of the original
complaint, the lower court has neither the power nor the jurisdiction to act on
the motion for the admission of the amended complaint, much less to allow
such amendment, since it is elementary that the court must first acquire
jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly therein.
Wherefore, the Court below did not err in refusing to admit plaintiffs-
appellants' amended complaint.
The case might be different had the amendment been made before an
answer or a motion to dismiss had been filed, since the original complaint
was then amendable, and the amendment could supersede the original
pleading, as of right, without leave of court being required, and without the
Court taking cognizance at all of the original complaint.
BONIFACIO GOTICO vs. LEYTE CHINESE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
FACTS:
The controversy revolves around the ownership of a portion of Lot
situated in Tacloban City. The Disputed Portion consists of approximately
872 square meters. In 1961, plaintiff-appellant obtained an OCT (Original
Certificate of Title) covering the entirety of the said Lot. This prompted the
plaintiff-appellant to file an Ejectment Case against defendant-appellee, the
Leyte Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1962 alleging in the Complaint that
plaintiff-appellant was the owner and possessor since time immemorial
tacked by purchase to his predecessors-in-interest of the said lot; that
defendant-appellee, without any color of right, had occupied the Disputed
Portion and utilized the same as a private cemetery and that plaintiff
demands a monthly rental of the above portion of land of P500.00 to be
computed from date of defendant’s occupancy in 1928.
He then prayed for judgment ordering defendant-appellee to vacate
the Disputed Portion and to declare him the lawful owner and possessor
thereof and ordering defendant to pay the amount of P200,000.00 in rentals
of the premises in question, to be computed from 1928 to the filing of the
complaint.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand denied the Complaint by
claiming that it had been in possession of the Disputed Portion since 1928
when it built a public cemetery thereon with the approval of the Bureau of
Health; that plaintiff-appellant had obtained title to Lot by means of fraud and
false statements of fact; and that in 1962, or prior to the institution of the
Ejectment Case, it had already petitioned the Bureau of Lands for the
cancellation of plaintiff-appellant’s title over the Lot. It then prayed for the
dismissal of the Complaint and for the declaration of plaintiff-appellant’s title
as null and void.
Consequently in 1965, the Bureau of Lands filed a Civil Case entitled
for the reversion of the disputed Lot to the Government and the cancellation
of plaintiff-appellant’s title (Reversion Case). A joint Pre-trial was held
wherein both parties agreed that stipulations and admissions in the Civil
Case shall be taken into consideration.
 In the same Pre-trial hearing, the parties stipulated on the following
facts: the admission of the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the
complaint; that the cemetery owned by the Leyte Chinese Chamber of
Commerce is within Lot 4875 and is occupying an area of 872 square meters;
that the defendant had been occupying and using the said land in question
since 1928; that Lot 4875, where the cemetery in question is also included,
is covered by an OCT and that after the issuance of OCT, there was issued
Tax Declaration in the name of BONIFACIO GOTICO.
Realizing that the admissions and averments were fatal to his cause,
plaintiff-appellant, assisted by a new counsel, filed an “Omnibus Motion to
Amend Complaint and Recall or Correct some Pre-trial Admissions.” The
thrust was to amend the year “1928” to 1961 not only in paragraph 4 and in
the Prayer of the Complaint but also in the aforementioned Pre-trial
Agreement.
The Trial Court denied the Motion for amendment and/or correction for
being unmeritorious. Two Motions for Reconsideration were also denied.
In the meantime, the Reversion Case was decided in favor of the
Government and plaintiff-appellant’s title was ordered cancelled upon the
finding that he had, in collusion with the Land Investigator, committed fraud
that vitiated the grant of his Free Patent.
On the basis of said judgment, defendant-appellee filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment in the Reversion Case alleging that there is “no genuine
issue between the parties and the defendant is entitled as a matter of law to
the dismissal of the case.” Summary judgment was rendered therein
ordering reversion of Lot 4875 to the State.
Subsequently, in the Ejectment Case, the trial Court rendered
judgment dismissing the suit by holding that the defendant had been
occupying the land in question since 1928. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial Court correctly exercised its discretion in
denying plaintiff-appellant’s Motion to Amend the complaint.
RULING:
Yes. Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court.—After the case is set for
hearing, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of
court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the
motion was made with intent to delay the action or that the cause of
action or defense is substantially altered. Orders of the court upon the
matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in
court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be
heard.”
In the case at bar, the amendment sought is a substantial one. A
claim of possession by either or both parties involving a span of 33
years is surely a substantial element of the cause of action. Besides,
even if the amendment were allowed, there is preponderant evidence
proving possession by defendant-appellee since 1928. It had filed the
application for the conversion of the Disputed Portion into a cemetery on
February 20, 1928. Its application was approved on May 17, 1928 by the
Bureau of Health. Since then, that portion had remained part of a Chinese
cemetery. Its possession since 1928 was also recognized in the Reversion
Case.
SPOUSES MATIAS B. AZNAR III and ELEONOR S. AZNAR, petitioners,
vs. HON. JUANITO A. BERNAD, In His Capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch XXI, RTC, Cebu, and the SPOUSES NICOLAS L. KINTANAR and
REDEMPTA C. KIN-TANAR, respondents.

Facts:
1986, respondents Nicolas and Redempta Kintanar, as plaintiffs, filed in the
RTC of Cebu, a civil action against the defendants-spouses, (petitioners),
praying for the annulment of a Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, damages, and
attorney’s fees with preliminary injunction. The petitioners then timely filed
an answer denying the allegations in the complaint thereof. Seven days later,
the petitioners submitted “Motion For Leave to Amend Answer Or To File
Supplemental Pleading,” alleging in the first five paragraphs thereof,
emphasis on the fifth paragraph which reads:
5. That in order that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily
be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner, defendants respectfully beg
leave to amend their answer.
Attached to the motion was a copy of the amended answer which
contained an additional paragraph alleging, for the first time, the affirmative
defense of prescription. It states that That by way of affirmative defense,
the cause or causes of action
alleged in the complaint have already prescribed. The Real Estate
Mortgage, of the complaint, was executed on July 17, 1978, and was
registered with the Cebu City Registry of Deeds on July 21, 1978. The
complaint for fraud, based on said Real Estate Mortgage, was filed only
in September, 1986, or more than eight (8)years since the date of
registration. Under Article 1391 of the Civil Code, the action for
annulment shall be brought within four (4) years
The RTC Denied said motion of petitioners The respondent Judge
based his order on a strict or literal construction of section 2, Rule 9, of the
Revised Rules of Court which, in essence, provides that defenses or
objections, except the failure to state a cause of action, if not pleaded in a
motion to dismiss or in an answer, are deemed waived.
The CA, since the instant petition involves a pure question of law on
the correct interpretation of section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the case,
as stated at the outset, was certified to the SC.
Issue:
whether or not the affirmative defense of prescription may be
validly set up for the first time in an amended answer
Ruling:
Petition merits. The general rule, it is true, is that the affirmative
defense of prescription when not seasonably raised in either a motion to
dismiss or in the answer, is deemed waived. This case, however, does not
fall under the cited rule. It cannot be said that the petitioners failed to
allege the defense of prescription in their answer. Precisely, the
amended answer is being submitted to take the place of the original
one. Once the amended answer is admitted, the original answer passes
into oblivion and ceases to exist with its former place entirely taken
over by the amended answer.
Further, as differentiated from an amended pleading which, as
afore-stated, takes the place of the original pleading, a supplemental
pleading does not extinguish the existence of the original. As its very
name denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to the
primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original.
here, the petitioners moved to have their amended answer
admitted by the trial court with barely seven days having passed since
the filing of their original answer. Moreover, at the time the petitioners
moved to have their original answer amended, they still had the right
to do so. The records do not show that a responsive pleading, like a
reply, to the original answer, has already been served to the petitioners
by the private respondents. Neither is there any showing that the case
has already been calendared for hearing. On this score, Section 2, Rule
10 of the Revised Rules of Court supports the petitioners’ contention.
 There is, therefore, no procedural impediment for the petitioners to
amend their original answer. This being so, the affirmative defense of
prescription has been validly pleaded for resolution in due course. the rules
of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustate rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be avoided. Even the rules of court envision this liberality.
Lastly, even assuming that the petitioners had indeed failed to raise
the affirmative defense of prescription in a motion to dismiss or in an
appropriate pleading (answer, or amended or supplemental answer) and an
amendment would no longer be feasible, still prescription, if apparent on the
face of the complaint, may be favorably considered.

Note:RULE 10 SEC. 2. When amendments allowed as a matter of right.—A

party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before
a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within ten (10) days after
it is served.
Wang Laboratiories vs Judge Mendoza

Jurisprudence:

There are three (3) modes of effecting service of summons upon private
foreign corporations as provided for in Section 14, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, to wit: (1) by serving upon the agent designated in accordance with
law to accept service of summons; (2) if there is no resident agent, by service
on the government official designated by law to that office; and (3) by serving
on any officer or agent of said corporation within the Philippines

Summons intended for petitioner corporation with principal address in the

United States, properly served on its authorized exclusive representative
domiciled in the Philippines, as shown by its various public advertisements
and its admission that it deals exclusively with the representative in the sale
of its products in the Philippines

Facts:

• Petition is a corporation in the United States engaged in the business of

manufacture of sale of computers worldwide. They do business in the
PH through their exclusive distributor known as EXXBYTE.

• Respondent partnership entered into a contract with EXXBYTE wherein

it will be installing an Integrated Information System on the former's
office. Another contract was entered for the development of data
processing software however due to some events, the obligation to do
so was not fulfilled.

• This led the respondent to file a complaint for breach of contract plus
damages against the petitioner in RTC Makati. A motion to dismiss was
filed by the petitioner contending that there was improper service of
summons. Subsequently, a motion for deposition by oral examination for
presenting evidence was also filed wherein it was granted. This was
opposed by the respondent

• A reply to the opposition was filed by the petitioner. This led the
respondent partnership to file an ex-abudante cautela motion for leave
in order to effect the extraterritorial service of summons on petitioner
 which was granted and the motion to dismiss by the petitioner was
dismissed. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
which is a foreign corporation

Ruling:

Yes, the court did when summons were effected on their agent which
was EXXBYTE which is the 3rd way of effecting service of summons on
private corporations.

There are three (3) modes of effecting service of summons upon private
foreign corporations as provided for in Section 14, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, to wit: (1) by serving upon the agent designated in accordance with
law to accept service of summons; (2) if there is no resident agent, by service
on the government official designated by law to that office; and (3) by serving
on any officer or agent of said corporation within the Philippines

Moreover, the argument that they are not doing business in the Philippines
is without merit. Jurisprudence provides that there is no general rule in
determining when is corporation doing or engaging business in the
Philippines. This has been held as a case to case basis wherein
circumstantial evidences are to be used.

In this case, petitioner cannot unilaterally declare that it is not doing business
in the Philippines. In fact, it has installed, at least 26 different products in
several corporations in the Philippines since 1976. It has registered its trade
name with the Philippine Patents Office (ibid) and Mr. Yeoh who is
petitioner's controller in Asia has visited the office of its distributor for at least
four times where he conducted training programs in the Philippines and
made it known that there exists a designated distributor in the Philippines as
published in its advertisements.

Lastly, they have waived the lack of jurisdiction of the court when they
alleged non-jurisdictional grounds in its pleadings (when they filed a motion
for deposition by oral examination for presenting evidence)
Pinlac vs. Court of Appeals
Civil Procedure; Summons; The modes of service of summons should be
strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the
respondents, and failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules
regarding the order of its publication is a fatal defect in the service of
summons.
FACTS
Petitioners herein are World War II veterans, their dependents and
successors-in-interest. Together, they filed a class suit primarily for Quieting
of Title before RTC Quezon City.
In particular, petitioners claimed that the real property, were part of forest
lands belonging to the government; that they and their predecessors-in-
interest have occupied said property continuously, adversely, and
exclusively for more than thirty (30) years.
While petitioners claim that the land in dispute was part of the public domain,
they named as respondents several persons and corporations who are titled
owners of subdivided parcels of land within the subject property. One of
those so impleaded as a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles
Subdivision. The individual lot owners of the said subdivision, however, were
not specifically named. Since personal service of summons could not be
effected on Vil-Ma and some of the other named respondents, petitioners
moved for leave of court to serve summons by publication which was
granted. Accordingly, the summons was published in the “Metropolitan
Newsweek,” a periodical edited and published in the City of Caloocan and
Malolos, Bulacan.
Some of the named respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings,
while the others, including Vil-Ma, failed to answer, and were thus declared
in default. Consequently, petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex
prate against the defaulted respondents.
Resolving the sole issue of whether or not petitioners were entitled to the
land they occupy and possess, even when said land was allegedly part of
unclassified public forest land and yet covered by transfer certificates of title
in the names of the defaulted respondents, the court a quo rendered a Partial
Decision in favor of petitioners.
Exactly one (1) year and fifty-seven (57) days after the above-quoted
judgment by default was rendered, a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was brought before the Court of
Appeals by the titled owners of the subdivided lots within Vil-Ma. They argue
that the Partial Decision was null and void on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud because the summons, as well as the Partial
Decision were not published in a newspaper or periodical of general
circulation. Thus, the defective service of summons to said defendant did not
place the individual lot owners under the trial court’s jurisdiction, nor are they
bound by the adverse judgment
CA annulled the judgement of the lower court based on its finding that the
trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents because the
summons was not published in a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon
City. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgement of the trial court is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
RULING:
AFFIRMATIVE. SC HELD: The Rules strictly require that publication must
be in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time
as the court may order. The modes of service of summons should be strictly
followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents,
and failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules regarding the
order of its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons. It cannot
be overemphasized that the statutory requirements of service of summons,
whether personally, by substituted service, or by publication, must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service other than that
prescribed by the statute is considered ineffective.
In the case at bar, while the service of summons by publication may have
been done with the approval of the trial court, it does not cure the fatal defect
that the “Metropolitan Newsweek” is not a newspaper of general circulation
in Quezon City. Therefore, the judgement of the trial court is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.
HENRY S. OAMINAL vs. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and GUIA S. CASTILLO
Facts:
Petitioner Henry Oaminal filed a complaint for collection against
respondents Pablito and Guia Castillo with the RTC of Ozamis City. The
summons together with the complaint was served upon Ester Fraginal,
secretary of respondent Mrs. Castillo. Respondents filed their 'Urgent Motion
to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective' alleging that
the Sheriff's Return has failed to comply with Section (1), Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court or substituted service of summons. Petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion to Declare respondents in Default and to Render Judgment
because no answer was filed by the latter. Respondents then filed Omnibus
Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with
Compulsory Counter-claim on the premise that petitioner's complaint was
barred by improper venue and litis pendentia.
The judge denied respondents' Motion to Dismiss, but admitted their
Answer. Respondents filed an 'Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
with the Accompanying Plea to Reset' on the ground of improper venue.
Judge [Zapatos] ruled that [respondents'] 'Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to
Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim' was filed outside
the period to file answer, and further rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner. respondents filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order. The CA ruled that the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over respondents, because the summons had been improperly
served on them. It based its finding on the Sheriff's Return, which did not
contain any averment that effort had been exerted to personally serve the
summons on them before substituted service was resorted to. Hence, this
present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondents.
Held:
YES. In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter’s voluntary
appearance and submission to the authority of the former. Where the action
is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of
summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the
manner provided for by Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service.
Resort to the latter is permitted when the summons cannot be promptly
served on the defendant in person and after stringent formal and substantive
requirements have been complied with. For substituted service of summons
to be valid, it is necessary to establish the following circumstances: (a)
personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b)
efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served
upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s office or
regular place of business. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts
proving these circumstances are stated in the proof of service or officer’s
return.
That the defendants’ actual receipt of the summons satisfied the
requirements of procedural due process had previously been upheld by the
Court thus: “x x x [T]here is no question that summons was timely issued and
received by private respondent. In fact, he never denied actual receipt of
such summons but confined himself to the argument that the Sheriff should
prove that personal service was first made before resorting to substituted
service. “This brings to the fore the question of procedural due process. In
Montalban v. Maximo the Court ruled that ‘The constitutional requirement of
due process exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably expected
to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably
accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional
notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served.’”
Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such
flaw was cured and respondents are deemed to have submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an Omnibus Motion to
Admit the Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim, an Answer with
Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration and Plea
to Reset Pre-trial. The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief—to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration—are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Having
invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief, respondents
cannot—after failing to obtain the relief prayed for—repudiate the very same
authority they have invoked.
HSBC v. Catalan
FACTS:
Respondent filed before the RTC, a complaint for a sum of money with
damages against petitioner HSBANK, due to the latter refusing to pay the
value of the former’s checks. Summons was served on HSBANK at its office
in Makati City, who filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer or
Motion to Dismiss. It then filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the person of HSBANK, did
not acquire such jurisdiction, there is no cause of action, and there is forum
shopping.
Catalan filed an Amended Complaint impleading petitioner HSBC
TRUSTEE as co-defendant and invoking Article 19 of the Civil Code as basis
for her cause of action. HSBANK filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint on the grounds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the person of HSBANK, on the basis of improper service of
summons and that HSBANK did not submit to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Summons for HSBC TRUSTEE was tendered to the In House Counsel
of HSBANK in its Makati branch. HSBC TRUSTEE filed a Special
Appearance for Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC over it, as HSBANK Makati is a corporation separate
and distinct, and therefore not authorized to receive on behalf of the former.
The RTC denied both motions to dismiss, stating that it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action because it is an action for damages
under Article 19 of the Civil Code. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petitions
and held that the filing of petitioners’ answers before the RTC rendered moot
and academic the issue of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC did acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK?
HELD:
Yes, it did. Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that “the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed
a voluntary appearance.” However, this does not apply to HSBANK.
 HSBANK already invoked the RTC’s jurisdiction over it by praying that
its motion for extension of time to file answer or a motion to dismiss be
granted. The Court has held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative
relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
In contrast, the filing by HSBC TRUSTEE of a motion to dismiss cannot
be considered a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a
conditional appearance, entered precisely to question the regularity of the
service of summons. It is settled that a party who makes a special
appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court, e.g.,
invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be considered to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
For proper service of summons on foreign corporations, Section 12 of
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
“SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity.—When the
defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted
business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or if there be no
such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect,
or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.”
HSBANK’s petition before the SC is denied and the CA’s dismissal of
its petition is affirmed. HSBC TRUSTEE’s petition before the SC is granted
annd the CA’s dismissal of its petition is reversed and set aside.
ERLINDA R. VELAYO-FONG vs.SPOUSES RAYMOND and MARIA HEDY
VELAYO

Facts:

Raymond Velayo (Raymond) and his wife, Maria Hedy Velayo (respondents)
filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment against Erlinda R. Velayo-Fong (petitioner), Rodolfo R. Velayo,
Jr. (Rodolfo Jr.) and Roberto R. Velayo

In their Complaint, respondents allege that petitioner, a resident of 1860

Alamoana Boulevard, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, and her co-defendants, who
are residents of the Philippines, made it appear that their common father,
Rodolfo Velayo, Sr. (Rodolfo Sr.) and petitioner had filed a complaint against
Raymond before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), accusing
Raymond of the crimes of estafa and kidnapping a minor; that petitioner and
her co-defendants also requested that respondents be included in the Hold
Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) which was
granted, thereby preventing them from leaving the country and resulting in
the cancellation of respondents' trips abroad and caused all of respondents'
business transactions and operations to be paralyzed to their damage and
prejudice; that petitioner and her co-defendants also filed a petition before
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) docketed as Case No.
4422 entitled "Rodolfo Velayo Sr. et al. v. Raymond Velayo et al." which
caused respondents' funds to be frozen and paralyzed the latters' business
transactions and operations to their damage and prejudice. Since petitioner
was a non-resident and not found in the Philippines, respondents prayed for
a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner's properties located in the
Philippines.

Before respondents' application for a writ of preliminary attachment can be

acted upon by the RTC, respondents filed on September 10, 1993 an Urgent
Motion praying that the summons addressed to petitioner be served to her
at Suite 201, Sunset View Towers Condominium, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay
City and at No. 5040 P. Burgos Street, T. Towers Condominium, Makati. In
its Order dated September 13, 1993, the RTC granted the said motion.

After acting on the motion, upon return, and after several failed attempts to
serve the copy of summons on the addresses mentioned, the process
server managed to personally serve a copy of said summons to Erlinda
Velayo on September 13, 1993 at the lobby of the Intercontinental Hotel,
Makati, in the presence of lobby counter personnel by the name of Ms. A.
Zulueta, but said defendant refused to sign in receipt thereof, and also
to Rodolfo Velayo on September 27, 1993 at BF Resort Village, Las Pinas,
Metro Manila, who also refused to sign in receipt thereof.

Upon ex-parte motions of respondents, the RTC in its Order dated

November 23, 1993 and January 5, 1994, declared petitioner and her co-
defendant in default for failure to file an answer and ordered the ex-parte
presentation of respondents' evidence. The RTC then subsequently
rendered its decision in favor of respondents and directed defendants to pay
damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

On September 1, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of

Default claiming that she was prevented from filing a responsive
pleading and defending herself against respondents' complaint because of
fraud, accident or mistake; that contrary to the Officer's Return, no
summons was served upon her; that she has valid and meritorious
defenses to refute respondents' material allegations Respondents opposed
said Motion.

In its Order dated May 29, 1995, the RTC denied petitioner's Motion ruling
that the presumption of regularity in the discharge of the function of the
Process Server was not sufficiently overcome by petitioner's allegation
to the contrary; that there was no evident reason for the Process Server to
make a false narration regarding the service of summons to defaulting
defendant in the Officer's Return.

On September 4, 1995, Respondents filed a Motion for Execution. To which,

petitioner filed an Opposition to, contending that she had not yet received
the Decision and it is not yet final and executory as against her. Indeed it
was not furnished or served upon petitioner, so the RTC denied the motion
and on March 28, 1995, issued an Order directing the issuance of the writ of
execution against petitioner's co-defendant.

On May 23, 1996, petitioner, through her counsel, finally received the
Decision dated June 15, 1994 and the Order dated May 29, 1995

Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA questioning the propriety and validity
of the service of summons made upon her.
Respondents opposed the appeal, arguing that the petition should be
dismissed since it raised pure questions of law, which is not within the CA's
jurisdiction to resolve. The CA rendered its Decision affirming the
Decision and Order of the RTC ruling that CA has jurisdiction since the
petition raised a question of fact, that is, whether petitioner was properly
served with summons; that the judgment by default was not yet final and
executory against petitioner since the records reveal and the RTC Order
dated January 3, 1996 confirmed that she was not furnished or served a copy
of the decision; that petitioner was validly served with summons since
the complaint for damages is an action in personam and only personal, not
extraterritorial service, of summons, within the forum, is essential for the
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person; that petitioner's allegations that
she did not know what was being served upon her and that somebody just
hurled papers at her were not substantiated by competent evidence and
cannot overcome the presumption of regularity of performance of official
functions in favor of the Officer's Return.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals patently erred in not ruling that the
petitioner was not validly served with summons

Held:

How may service of summons be effected on a non-resident?

Section 17,[28] Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 17. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside
and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status
of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which, is property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the
defendant has been attached in the Philippines, service may, by leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under
section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in
such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy
of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the
last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may
deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable
time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which
the defendant must answer.

In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal

service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave
of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Thus, extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the action is

in rem, that is, an action against the thing itself instead of against the person,
or in an action quasi in rem, where an individual is named as defendant
and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. The rationale for this is that in in
rem and quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res.

Where the action is in personam, that is, one brought against a person on
the basis of her personal liability, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. When the
defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons within the state
is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. Summons on
the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. This cannot be
done, however, if the defendant is not physically present in the country, and
thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore
cannot validly try and decide the case against him.

Was there a valid service of summons on petitioner? The answer is in

the affirmative.

Petitioner's bare allegation that the statement in the "Officer's Return that
she was personally served summons is inaccurate" is not sufficient. A
process server's certificate of service is prima facie evidence of the facts as
set out in the certificate. Between the claim of non-receipt of summons by a
party against the assertion of an official whose duty is to send notices, the
latter assertion is fortified by the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed. To overcome the presumption of regularity of
performance of official functions in favor of such Officer's Return, the
evidence against it must be clear and convincing. Petitioner having been
unable to come forward with the requisite quantum of proof to the
contrary, the presumption of regularity of performance on the part of the
process server stands.

The petition was DENIED

PEDRO SANTOS JR. vs. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION
Corona, J.
DOCTRINE:
• In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown
owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of
court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may
order.
• The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of
summons by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address;
While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders
and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by
registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by
publication.
FACTS:
Petitioner Santos was a member of the Board of Directors of the respondent
Corporation. While he was still a member of the BOD he acquired a car loan
and had a balance of P698,502. The respondent then filed a complaint for a
sum of money against the petitioner before RTC of Pasig City.
Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be
located in his last known address despite earnest effort to do so. Upon
respondent’s motion the trial court granted service of summons by
publication thru Remate a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. It was also attached wwith an affidavit of service of respondent’s
employee to take effect that he sent a copy of the summons through
registered mail to petitioner’s last known address.
Petitioner then failed to file his answer within the prescribed period,
respondent then move for the reception of its evidence ex parte which the
court granted. The respondent then filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer; he also alleged that the
affidavit of service submitted by the respondent failed to comply with Section
19 Rule 14 of ROC as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved the
petitioner appealed the said decision to CA assigning errors such as lack of
jurisdiction due to improper service of summons. He claims that Sec. 14
Rule 14 applies only to actions in rem and not to actions in personam like for
complaint for a sum of money.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner was properly served with summon.
RULING
Yes.
In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown
owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be
effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and
in such places and for such times as the court may order.

Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite

diligent efforts to locate the whereabouts of the petitioner, the respondent
with leave of court sought the service of summons by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with
summons with publication.

The contention raised by petitioner that service of summons by

publication cannot be made to actions in personam is bereft of merit. The
present rule states it applies in any action where defendant’s whereabouts
cannot be located by diligent inquiry. Thus, it applies to any action, whether
in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.

Lastly, the petitioner raised the issue that the affidavit of service of a
copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court an
not by respondents messenger. The SC then ruled that service of summons
by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal
clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper
which published the summons. The service of summons by publication is
complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the defendant’s
last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit
“showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in
the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail
to his last known address.” The rules, however, do not require that the
affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While
the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and
processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail
is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.
Alexander Tam Wong vs. Catherine Factor-Koyama
Facts:
Catherine Factor-Koyoma filed a complaint for specific performance, sum of
money and damages before the RTC against Alexander Tam Wong.
Koyoma alleged that Wong deliberately refused to execute and deliver a
deed of absolute sale and to surrender the condominium certificate of title
covering a condominium unit which she had already bought from him.
The RTC issued summons addressed to Wong at his residence, No. 21 West
Riverside Street, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. However, the
original summons and the accompanying copy of the Complaint and its
Annexes were eventually returned to the RTC by Sheriff IV Renebert B.
Baloloy who indicated in his Sheriff’s Return that the said court process
should already be deemed duly served. According to his Return, Sheriff
Baloloy had repeatedly attempted to serve the summons at Wong’s
residential address on 27 July 2007, 8 August 2007, and 10 August 2007,
but Wong was always not around according to his housemaids. Sheriff
Baloloy then attempted to leave the summons with Wong’s caretaker Mira,
who is of legal age, and residing at the same address for two and a half
years, but Mira refused to acknowledge or receive the same.
After a lapse of the 15 day reglementary period without Wong filing an
answer to the Complaint, the RTC declared him in default upon motion by
Koyama. The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of Koyoma after
presentation of her evidence ex parte. Thereafter, Wong filed with the RTC
a Manifestation, claiming that he did not receive any summons from said
court and that he was only informed unofficially by a tricycle driver regarding
papers from a court in Caloocan City, which the tricycle driver returned to the
court after failing to locate Wong. Therefore, Wong, by special appearance
of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting, among other grounds, that
there was no service of summons upon him, hence, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person; and that he was not given the opportunity to
oppose Koyama’s Motion to have him declared in default.
The RTC denied Wong’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit and declared
that Sheriff Baloloy validly resorted to a substituted service of the summons.
Sheriff Baloloy’s performance of his official duty enjoyed the presumption of
regularity, and Wong failed to rebut the same. On appeal, the CA dismissed
outright Wong’s Petition for Certiorari for being the improper remedy. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid service of summons upon Wong
Ruling:
NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court held that the Sheriff’s Return must clearly
and convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal
service. Proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of
service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted
to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who
is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is
likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be
stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return. The failure to comply
faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted
service renders the service of summons ineffective.
In this case, the Return failed to relay if sufficient efforts were exerted by
Sheriff Baloloy to locate Wong, as well as the impossibility of personal
service of summons upon Wong within a reasonable time. Sheriff Baloloy’s
three visits to Wong’s residence hardly constitute effort on his part to locate
Wong; and Wong’s absence from his residence during Sheriff Baloloy’s
visits, since Wong was at the office or out-of-town, does not connote
impossibility of personal service of summons upon him. It must be stressed
that, before resorting to substituted service, a sheriff is enjoinedto try his best
efforts to accomplish personal service on the defendant. And since the
defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the
sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the
process on the defendant.
Nevertheless, even without valid service of summons, a court may still
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily
appears before it. In this case, the Court held that the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over Wong by virtue of his voluntary appearance when he,
through his counsel, cross-examined Koyoma during the 23 January 2009
hearing despite his knowledge that the RTC had not yet lifted the Order
declaring him in default. Therefore, by actively participating in said hearing,
he is, thus, deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of said trial court.