The Origins of Napoleonic Warfare: A Survey of Interpretations

Author(s): A. M. J. Hyatt
Source: Military Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Winter, 1966-1967), pp. 177-185
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1985398
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 THE ORIGINS OF NAPOLEONIC WARFARE:
A SURVEY OF INTERPRETATIONS
BY A. M. J.HYATT*
T HE mass of historicalliterature on providing one recognizes
Napoleonis so greatthatone hardly on's geniuscould make it perform
thatonlyNapole-
in the
needapologizeforfailingto havesur- mannerwhichit did. Nineteenth century
veyedit all. Nor is it necessaryto seek scholarship paid littleattention to theinheri-
exoneration foraddingto thisvastbodyof tanceandsoughtinsteadto findthesecretof
literature. As Douglas SouthallFreemanis Napoleon'ssuccessbyminuteanalysisof his
reported to havesaid in regardto RobertE. campaigns. This approachmissednot only
Lee, spendingone's timein companywith thegenuineand legitimate debtof Napoleon
geniusis justification enough.Whatis essen- to the Frenchtheorists of the eighteenth
tial,however, is theestablishment of a stand- century, but also failedto appreciatethe
ard againstwhichchanginginterpretations insightwhichrecognized and made use of
of theorigins of Napoleonicwarfare can be existing ideasand innovations.
evaluated. Probably themostimportant earlywriters
Probably themostconvenient gaugewould on Napoleonwerehis contemporaries, the
be a description of the salientfeaturesof PrussianCarl vonClausewitz and theSwiss
Napoleonicwarfare, forit is impossible to AntoineHenri Jomini.The literature on
discussthe originsof a particular kind of thesetwomenis perhapsas voluminous as
warfarewithout a fairlyconcrete notionof thaton Napoleonand thedifference between
itsparts.Although agreement on theseparts theirtheoriesof war is verygreat.Any
is by no meansuniversal, it is possibleto attemptto summarize theirwritingsin a
describethemin generalterms.Essentiallyshortessayinevitably willbe incomplete, but
thereare twocomponents: the personalge- the continuing influence of both men on
nLus of Napoleon, and an inheritanceof subsequentNapoleonic scholarshipmakes
military innovations and theoriesfromthe some effortmandatory. Because Napoleon
eighteenth century. Much of the controversy left no personal written record,excepthis
overtheoriginsof Napoleonicwarfarede- and
letters a collection of tritemaxims, the
velopsfromtheemphasis placed on each of writings of Clausewitz and Jomini have as-
these.Frequently writers haveacknowledged,sumedadditional importance. In certain re-
almostin passing,that Napoleon was a moreover,
spects, there is a similarity between
military genius,but insistthatthe typeof Clausewitzand Jomini, whichin regardto
warfarewhichmadehimmasterof Europe Napoleonichistoriography, is perhapsas sig-
was a perfectly straightforward combinationnificant as theirdifferences.
of ideasandinnovations outlined in detailby Clausewitz'writingfairlybristleswith
hispredecessors. Thereis nothing objection-references to Napoleon,whileJominipro-
able in such an argument. Indeed thereis ducedwhatwas probably thefirstfull-scale,
nothingwrongwithan analysisof the so- scholarly history of Bonaparte'swars.' Yet
called "Napoleonicinheritance" by itself- neitherman is remembered as a military
historian.Neitherwasprimarily interested in
of thisarticle,was the processof changewhichhad produced
* The authorat timeof preparation
on the staff of Loyola College, Montreal Canada.
He is now withthe HistoryDepartmentof Middlesex historiesof the warsof Frederickthe Great
1 Jomini's
College, University of Western Ontario, London, and Napoleon were originallyissued in twenty-seven
Ontario. volumes.

177

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178 MILITARY AFFAIRS Winter

Napoleonic warfare.LiddellHartputsthis "ttheprophetnot of Napoleonbut of him-

morepositively: "Jomini was essentially a self."8Althoughit is an over-simplification
scientific whileClausewitz
technician, wasa of theworkof bothmen,it is notaltogether
philosopher ofwar."2 incorrect to arguethatwhereJominifailed,
It is probably truethatJomini wasnever Clausewitz succeeded mostbrilliantly,forthe
"so overcome by Napoleon's greatnessand Prussiandealtdirectly withthatwhichthe
originality as to lose sightof a perfectly Swissmostdeplored. In callingNapoleonthe
natural relationto hispredecessors."3Butit 'God of War' Clausewitzis reallypaying
isalsotruethathisinterest inthisconnection tribute to Bonaparte's military geniuswhich
was secondary to his searchfora logical was almosteffacedin Jomini'sgeometric
pattern in warfare, which couldbe scientifi- simplification. As a historianrecentlyob-
callyexpressed bygeometrical His served:
principles.
interestin thegeniuswhich geometry could Jomini'sgreatestweaknesswas his tendency to
notanalyze-"the romantic, themonstrous, formulate hisideasby
. . . rulesand to illustrate
theunearthly and impossible in Napoleon'slinesanddiagrams. Clausewitz' on personali-
stress
ty, will,and the otherintangibles of war rep-
)-was evenless.Jomini's
career"4 aimwasto resented theRomantic-oran historically minded
produce a "closedand perfect system" of participant's-reaction againsttheseeffortsto rep-
warfare basedonimmutable princi-resentcomplexsocialphenomena
scientific by chartsand
pleswhich wouldalways applytowarfare in formulas.9
anyage.5His work, appearing as itdidin an In short,neitherJomininor Clausewitz
agewhen"scientific" historywasincreasingly were historians;rathertheywere commenta-
popular, hada very powerful appeal. torsor,at best,interpreters of Napoleon,and
Clausewitz was lessinterested in under-theirworkdominatedand eclipsedthatof all
standing Napoleonic warfare thanhewasin otherearlywriterson Napoleon. During the
framing hisownphilosophy ofwar,which he greaterpart of the nineteenthcenturyJomi-
illustrated byreference to Napoleonic cam- ni's theorieswereextremely popular.Towards
paigns.A distinction shouldat once be the turn of the centuryClausewitz became
recognized betweenwhat Clausewitzat- morecelebratedand increasingly his writings
tempted to do and whathis interpreters wereanalyzed.This meanttwo things:early
thought he had done.LiddellHart'scom- historicalinterpretation of Napoleonic war-
plaintthatClausewitz wastoometaphysical' farewas shaped by the thoughtsof theorists
might wellhavebeenaimedat hisinterpret- ratherthan historiansand historicalwriting
ers,whowerenotsufficiently metaphysical to on Napoleonic warfarewas not based on an
understand him.'EvenLiddellHart recog-historicalanalysisof the originsof Napole-
nizesthiswhenhewrites thatClausewitz was onic warfare.10 Both tendencies, plus the fact
2 B. H. Liddell Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon (New 8Ghost of Napoleon, p. 120.
Haven, 1934), p. 105. 9TheodoreRopp, War in the Modern World (New
8 Crane Brinton,Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, York, rev. ed., 1962), p. 158.
"Jomini,"E. M. Earle, ed., Makersof Modern Strategy 10 This is not to suggestthat therewas no awareness
(Princeton,1943), p. 91. of the Napoleonic inheritance, for Jomini,as already
4 Ibid. mentioned,certainlywas. G. F. R. Henderson, the
5 Dallas D. Irvine,"The FrenchDiscoveryof Clause. greatestEnglishcommentator on militaryaffairsin the
witz and Napoleon," Journalof the AmericanMilitary nineteenthcentury,also implicitlyshows some appreci-
Institute,IV (1940), p. 145. ation of Napoleon's predecessors.See, Neil Malcolm,
6 Ghost of Ndpoleon,p. 105. ed., The Science of War (London, 1906), pp. 7, 49,
7 H. Rothfels,"Clausewitz,"Makers of Modern Stra. 174. Accordingto Liddell Hart, the firstFrenchwriter
tegy,pp. 93-113 points up some of the discrepancies to notethisconnection was Pierron,Comments'est forme
betweenClausewitz'writingsand those of his later in- le genid militairele Napoleon ler? (Paris, 1889).
terpreters. Ghost of Napoleon,p. 192.

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1966-67 THE ORIGINS OF NAPOLEONIC WARFARE 179

thatNapoleon's ownmemoires, on of hismilitary

dictated system hadprobably reached
St. Helena,enlarged"withinexhaustible its peakwithFoch's Still
publication. the
complacencyonhismilitaryachievements,""1 viewof Napoleon'sgenius
prevailing could
contributedto thegrowth of a legendof notbe complete unlessone couldappreciate
Napoleonic Thisperhaps
infallibility. isillus- hismagnificent
use of thetoolsand theories
bestbylooking
trated Europeanat hand.The firstglimpseof thiscamethe
at post-1815
armieswhich,withthe exception of the yearthatFochlefttheEcolede Guerre.
British,all adoptedNapoleonictactical In 1901 Jean LambertAlphonseColin,
formations."2 by a recentwriteras "one of the
described
Reactionagainst theNapoleoniclegend,as ablestmilitary and criticsof the
historians
PieterGeylhas suggested was closelycon- twentieth published
century,"'5 hisL'tduca-
nectedwithopposition to theSecondEm- tionmilitaire de Napoleon.The following
pire.'3Strangelyenough,however, closehis- yearhe published
La tactiqueet la discipline
torical of theorigins
analysis ofNapoleonicdanslesarmeesde la revolution andL'Infan-
warfare seemstohavebegunjustbefore the terieau XVIIIe siecle.'6Colin began by
legendreached, if we areto believeLiddell declaringhis dissatisfaction
with existing
of Napoleonicwarfare,which,
Hart, its most hideous peak-the First descriptions
WorldWar.And,simultaneously, thereoc- forhim,remained one of the"mostobscure
curreda furtherexaggeration. problems of military history."'7He was,
Between 1895and 1901,Ferdinand Foch, further, withexisting
dissatisfied accountsof
thefuture supreme Alliedcommander during Napoleon's militaryacumen and argued that
theFirstWorld War, served as chiefinstruc- those of
"characteristics in
genius, appearance
torat theEcoleSuperieure de Guerre. Dur- themostspontaneous," weretheproduct of a
ing thisperiod Foch developed his own doctrinesynthesized from theworks of many
philosophy ofwarbasedonClausewitz anda eighteenth century writers.'8Napoleon,ac-
misinformed knowledge of Napoleon. The cording to Colin, was "dominated by the
substanceof hislectures appeared in 1903 ideaswhich had du
inspried Teil and particu-
and1904as Des principes de la guerre and larlyGuibert. . . whichhehadpursuedinhis
De la conduite de la guerre. While these firstartillerystudies."'"Mobilityand con-
do notproperly
treatises formpartof the centrationof effortwerethebasesofNapole-
historiographyof theorigins of Napoleoniconicdoctrine, reasonedColin,and thesewere
warfare,theydo represent possiblytheulti- the principles which engagedthe laborsof
matemisinterpretation of bothClausewitzeighteenth century theorists.20
andNapoleonic warfare.Fochstressed elan, Most previousaccountshad assumedthat
offensiveaction,and thesubordination of thecolumnwastheformation used
habitually
strategyto tactics,whichhe justified by duringtheRevolution and thatit remained
to Napoleoniccampaigns.14Em- the fightingformationof the French
reference
phasisonNapoleon's as thecore
personality 15 RobertS. Quimby,The Backgroundof Napoleonic
Warfare (New York, 1957), p. 123. In 1927 Spencer
11 Pieter Geyl, Napoleon, For and Against (New Wilkinson,a Britishhistoriandedicatedhis The De-
Haven, 1949), p. 24. fenseof Piedmont1742-1748 to Colin, "the masterof
12 JayLuvaas, The MilitaryLegacyof the Civil War: militaryhistory."
The EuropeanInheritance(Chicago, 1959), p. 2. 16 In 1912 Colin's The Transformations of War
13 Geyl,Napoleon,p. 71. (London), trans.,L.R.M. Pope-Henessyappeared.
14 T. M. Hunter,Marshal Foch: A Study in Leader- 17 L'Uducationmilitairede Napoleon, p. v.
ship (Ottawa, 1961), p. 23. Liddell Hart, Foch: Man 18 ibid., p. ix.
of Orleans (Boston, 1932), p. 12. Cyril Falls, Marshal 19 Ibid., p. 141.
Foch (London, 1939), p. 23. 20 Ibid

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180 MILITARY AFFAIRS Winter

throughout theEmpireperiod.In L'Infante- wishtoneutralize thefire-powerofseven-eighthsof

rie au XVIIIe siecle.Colin made a thor- theirinfantry,
at the crisis
of an action,
by using
oughstudyof remaining sourcesdealingwith the columnas an attackformation,
and all subscribed
to theprinciple
fortheyone
thatbattlesare
tacticsusedduringthebattlesof theRevolu- wonbyfire.24
tion.His conclusions
werethemselves revolu-
tionary.
Becke
concluded
that"there
cannowbe no
In all cases,thegreatmajority
admitted
theuseof reasonsforus to misread
thepastand its
theformation in line formusketry
combat,and history
anylonger."25
thecolumnof attackor of massforattackson ColinandBeckemadeclearthatthetacti-
posts,villages,entrenchments,
etc.21 cal formations
usedbyNapoleonwerethose
Colinthenturnedto a moreintensivestudy oftheeighteenth century.
Yet,intheprepa-
of theFrenchmilitarywritersof the eigh- ration ofthisessay,
no evidence
wasdiscov-
teenth
century.
He discoveredthatthetactical eredto indicatethattheirworkhad any
formations,
manoeuvers,and theorieswhich influence onFoch.EvenaftertheFirst
World
theyhad advocatedwerepreciselythosepur- War,thenotionthatNapoleonic victories
suedby Bonaparte.The turning movementswere largely
theresults
oftremendous
charges
recommended by Guibertand Bourcet,for by columns of troopsstillprevailed.Sir
example,
werea "constantfeatureofNapole- Charles Omanpublished hisStudiesin the
onicwarfare."22
By comparing thebattlesof Napoleonic Wars in 1929 and, drawinghis
Rossback (1757) and Jemappes(1792), rea- evidenceonlyfromthePeninsulanWar, gave
sonedColin, one can appreciatetheworkof the prestigeof his name to this erroneous
the tacticiansand instructors of the age of idea. Oman began witha sound description
LouisXVI."23 of eighteenthcenturytactics.The object in
Colin's view of the Napoleonic tactical battle,he wrote,was to containthe enemy's
inheritance soon receivedthe endorsement of main body with an equal or inferiorforce,
an English writer.In 1909, Captain Archi- while the main blow was carried out by
bald FrankBecke publishedAn Introduction outflanking the enemy'swingsor overwhelm-
to the Historyof Tactics 1740-1905,which ing them with superior numbers.2"But
substantiallysupportedColin's conclusions. thesetactics,accordingto Oman, ended with
He, too,pointedout thatNapoleonicwarfare the Revolutionary wars. An improvisedsys-
made no significant changein Frenchtactical tem thenemerged,whichconsistedof heavy
formations and theRevolutionary and Napo. columnsscreenedby thicklines of skirmish-
leonic armies did not always attack in ers. The columnswere able, because of the
column.He further suggestedthatthisincor- screen, to reach the enemy line relatively
rectnotionprobablycame fromthePeninsula unharmedand crushit by mereimpetusand
War, where weight.27Oman's conclusionswere,as Colin
an idea was prevalent thatthe'column'was the and Becke demonstrated,mistaken.More-
Frenchattackformation. The evidencenow to over,thefactthathe drewhis examplesfrom
handwouldappearto showthiswasnotthecase. the PeninsularWar alone,confirmed Becke's
NaturallyNapoleonand his Marshalswerenei-
ther 'mules' nor 'dullards' . . . and we cannot, suspicion.
be surprised
therefore, to findthattheydid not BeforeOman producedhis book on Napo-
21 L'lnfanterieau XVIIIe siecle. quoted in Quimby,
p. 328. 24 Becke, Introductionto the History of Tactics,
22 Transformations of War, summaryby Quimby,p. quotedin Quimby,pp. 341-2.
256. 25 Ibid., p. 331.
23 La tactiqueet la discipline,
quoted in Quimby,p. 26 Oman, Studies in the Napoleonic Wars, pp. 82-5.
82. 27 ibid., pp. 85-7.

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1966-67 THE ORIGINS OF NAPOLEONIC WARFARE 181

leonicwar,theFirstWorldWar hadground Hart, was a "perfectsummingup of the

to itsexhausting end,and thegreatcontro- Napoleonicmethod-a generationbefore-
versy overthestrategy of thatwarhadbegun. hand."80 He described thismethodbrilliant-
Thiscontroversy gavea powerful to
impetus lyhimself whenhedealtwiththelastattempt
Napoleonicscholarship. A bittergroup, of byAustrians torelieveMantuain 1797,when
polemicists attackedthestrategy of the Al- Bonaparte's loosegroupformation functioned al.
liedpowers as represented byFochandHaig. mostperfectly. Like a widespread netwhosecor-
What beganas an attackon the so-called nersare weighted withstones,whenone of the
enemy'scolumns impinged on it thenetclosedin
twesterners,' soonbecamea criticalexamina- roundthepointofpressure andthestonescrashed
tion of the roots of theirstrategy.An together on theintruder.31
examination whichled Liddell Hart, from His conclusion in regardto theNapoleonic
Fochto Clausewitzand fromClausewitzto strategic inheritance showedthat:
Napoleon and, finally,to the originsof whileNapoleonaddedlittleto theideashe had
Napoleonicwarfare.28 imbibedhe gavethemfuIflment . . . Becausehis
LiddellHart was appalledat thecarnage education coincided withhisinstincts, andbecause
of the FirstWorld War and becamecon- thesein turnweregivenscope by his circum-
vincedthat it had resultedfroma badly stances, he wasableto exploitthefullpossibilities
of thenew'divisional'system. In developing the
devisedstrategy for whichFoch had been widerrangeof strategic combinations thuspos-
largelyresponsible. Foch basedhis ideas of sible,Napoleonmadehischiefcontribution.82
strategy on NapoleonandClausewitzian doc-
The combinedwritings of Coln, Becke
trine.Forhim,inLiddellHart'swords, "The
and LiddellHart reallyuncovered thebulk
destruction of theenemy's armybecamethe of the Napoleonicinheritance. Afterthe
onlymeansto theend. .. insteadof seeing publications of The Ghostof Napoleon,at
tacticsas one of the toolsof strategy, he
least three avenues of scholarship on the
made strategymerelya conduitpipe to originsof Napoleonicwarfareare discerna.
tactics."29 Less interested in tacticaltheories ble. Some scholarsignoredthe writingof
thanColin and Becke, Liddell Hart combed thesemenand continued to insistthatNapo-
theworks of Guibert, Bourcet, de Saxe and different from
leonicwarfarewas distinctly
others for their thoughtson strategy.thatof theeighteenth century; others, funda-
Guibert,in discussing the strategic deploy- mentally interested in different facetsof the
mentof forces, hadsuggested that"theartis Napoleonicera, acceptedthe basic conclu-
to extendthem without exposing them,to sionsof Colinand LiddellHart,whileadd-
embracetheenemywithout being disunited, or refinements to
ing certainqualifications
to link up the operationsor attacksto theirthesesand,at thesametime,establish-
take [the enemy]in flankwithout exposing whichmay
ingthedetailsof theinheritance
one's own flank."This, explainedLiddell have been missed;finally, someattemptat
28 Spencer Wilkinson, another of the group, was
hasbeenmade.
synthesis
interestedmainly in tactics and endorsed the con-
clusionsof Colin and Becke. The purposeof his work Generally speaking, thosewriters whocon-
was to "lay bare for English readers the roots of tinueto assertthatNapoleonicwarfare was
Napoleon'sgeneralship."(Defense of Piedmont,p. vii.)
Accordingto Wilkinson,Napoleon "was steepedin the sharply different fromthatof theeighteenth
doctrinesset forthby Bourcet. . . he had studiedthe century, haveacknowledged theNapoleonic
campaignsof Conti and Maillebois . . . it is hardly
too much to say that from [thesemen] . . . and from inheritance of strategic and tacticalforma-
Bourcethe inheritedthe keysof Italy." Ibid.
29 Liddell Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon, p. 134. (NewYork,rev.ed.,1960),
81 LiddellHart,Strategy
30Guibert,Defense du systemede guerremoderne, p. 122.
quotedin ibid.,p. 84. 32 Ibid.,p. 115.

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 182 MUIITARY AFFAIRS Winter

tionsandideas,butinsist thatothercondi- fencingoverfortresses, magazines,

roadsor prov-
tionsweremoreimportant. J. F. C. Fuller, inces.
Resolutelyconcentrating
thegigantic
masses
underhiscommand, he soughtthecompleteanni-
forexample, remarksthat"Napoleon's suc- hilationof theenemyarmyas hissupreme objec-
cessas a planner
ofcampaigns deriveddirect-tive. . . [seeking]to concentrate
theattackon a
ly fromhisposition as autocrat,
whichem- decisivepointof theenemyfront. . . [and] to
powered himto combine in hisownperson attackin echelonedcolumnswhichsuppliedever
thepoliticaland strategical
conduct of the freshreserves.35
war."33
ThoughFuller'spoliticalpronounce-It was the same kind of misconceptionby
mentsare oftensuspect, his argument has Foch which had promptedLiddell Hart's
somevalidity. Butthefactremains thatthe study.
pattern ofNapoleonic warfare wassetbefore Mere size of armies does not, of itself,
Napoleonhad becomeEmperor. It is pos- indicatea fundamentalmilitarychange.Re-
sible,also,toarguethatthepolitical positioncentscholarshavepointedout thatin thelate
which Napoleon ultimately
occupied operatedeighteenth centurytherewere"moremen [as
as muchtohisdisadvantage as a commander well as] more food and more metals . . .
of armies as it did to hisadvantage. Even [and France's] population equalled the
duringperiodsof imminent military crisis,combinedpopulationsof England, Austria
whenNapoleonwascampaigning faraway and Prussia." Also as Napoleon's empire
from France hehadto increasedin size so did thenumberof foreign
perform hispartin theendlessroutine of Empire troopswhichhe impressedinto his armies-
fromwhichhe was seldomfree-hehad to read when he invaded Russia in 1812, about
thereports, glanceat thedocuments, and framea one-halfof the Prussianand one-fifth of the
reply-perhaps dictatea comment, ask a question,
startan inquiry,administera reprimand,communi. Austrianarmiesweretakenalong.36
catea decision,givea command.34 Much of the writingin the second group
has concentratedon technologicaldevelop-
The increase insizeof Revolutionary and
Napoleonic armiesoverthoseof theeigh- ment. Though France had by no means
teenth century continental armies isa strikingreachedthe peak of the industrialrevolution
factwhich hastempted somehistorians to a when Napoleon came to power, important
morerigidlineofargument. Professor Dorn, inventionswhichhad profoundeffectson the
for example,declaresthat "Napoleonicarmyhad alreadyappeared. Gribeauval,for
intro-
strategy implied a sharp breakwiththeentireexample, "revolutionizedartilleryby
ducingthe of interchangeable
principle parts,
system of eighteenth century warfare." Un-
fortunately (forMr.Dorn'sbookdoescon- improvingthe accuracyof fireand heighten-
tainmuchthatis valuable)this is error ing the mobility of guns by reducing
magnified todistinguish
bya failure between 85 Walter L. Dorn, Competitionfor Empire 1740-
Napoleonic andtactics.
strategy to 1763
According (New York, 1940), pp. 329-30.
36 Ropp, War in theModernWorld,p. 102. Napoleon
Dorn,Napoleon frequentlyboasted that losses of men meant nothing
threwinto discardthe traditional
practicesof to him,but, as ProfessorLefebvrehas pointedout, even
during the crucial years of 1812 and 1813, he was
hismainarmybysendingout detach-
weakening unable to obtain more than half of the Frenchmales
mentsand observation
corpsto engagein petty eligiblefor militaryservice.Napoleon neverabandoned
the systemwherebyconscription could be avoided by
83 J.F.C.Fuller,
The Conductof War 1789-1961:
A paymentof a money substitute-thisprice rose from
Studyof the Impactof the French,Industrial and 1500 francs in 1805 to 15,000 in 1815. Lefebvre,
RussianRevolutions On War and its Conduct(New Napoleon. quoted in Ropp, p. 116.
Brunswick,N.J.,1961),p. 47. 37 R.R. Palmer,"Frederickthe Great,Guibert,Bulow:
84 Harold T. Parker,Three NapoleonicBattles (Dur- From Dynastic to National War," Earle, Makers of
ham,1944),p. 30. ModernStrategy, p. 62.

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1966-67 THE ORIGINS OF NAPOLEONIC WARFARE 183

weight.""7 In 1793, Gaspard Monge had case"forsaying thatNapoleon hadmastered

contributed to making Paris "the largest thetechnology of known weapons.4'
smallarmscentrein the world,producing Alfred Vagtsin A History of Militarism
something like750 muskets a day,"while in advances almostto thelimitin deprecating
1794,theConvention had experimented with theabilitiesof Napoleonandstressing that
a "forceddrafttechnical education"so that "he had themediaof his successes ready
throughout thecountry therewouldbe men made for him."42 Vagts arguedthatby
familiarwiththe"castingof bronzeand iron terming Napoleon a "genius"theinheritance
cannon;theextraction and Ber- which
of saltpeter, wasbasically responsibleforsuccess,
thollet'snew methodof powdermanufac- wasoverlooked foralmost a century. Oppos-
ture."38Possiblythemostimportant techno- ingthislineofreasoning, onemustremember
logicaladvanceforthemilitary wasthegreat thatwhatever elsehemight havebeen, Napo-
improvement of roadsandbridges inWestern leonwasa superb professionalsoldier.
Europe in the late eighteenthcentury.He possessed a largestoreof technical experience
Thoughat firstthismerely resultedin great and knowledge. . . . Havingrisenfrom thelower
militarybaggagetrains,Napoleonwasableto gradesof officership, he wasmasterof everydetail
hisprofession.He couldhandlea musket; work
keephisarmies lightandto usetheimproved of andpointa cannon;givethecorrect command toa
meansof transportation to great advant- company, a battalion, a regiment,a brigade,a
age.39 or an armycorps;orienta map; applya
division
Manyhaveremarked thatNapoleonwas, scaleandreada map.43
indifferent
"'curiously to the opportunity of Vagts'argument carriedtoitslogicalconclu-
introducing newweapons."Othershave in- sion,moreover, is thatNapoleon wasnotan
sistedthatin somewayshe was "an arch original thinker andthatthisworked to his
reactionarytowards newweaponsandtechno- disadvantage. The factis thathe did not
logicalprogressin the materialof war."40 havetobe: theideas,formations, andtechni-
ProfessorPrestonhas suggestedthat the cal developments alreadyestablished were
balloonists,whichhe disbandedin 1799, sufficient fora manof his ability to gain
mighthavebeenusefulafterLignyin 1815 anything hewanted.
andtheshrapnel shellmight wellhavebroken Probably thebestsynthesis of theorigins
the Britishsquares which Ney's cavalry of Napoleonicwarfare was produced by
foundso impregnable. But thisis speculationRobert S. Quimby inhisTheBackground of
and Prestonwiselyturnsto the "strongerNapoleonic Warfare. Quimby carefully sur-
veys the work of the most important
38 Ropp, War, p. 112.
39 Ibid., p. 101. RichardA. Preston,SydneyF. Wise, eighteenthcentury in
and soldiers
theorists
Herman 0. Werner, Man In A rms: A History of France-Folard, Saxe, Mesnil-Durand,
Warfareand its Interrelationshipswith WesternSociety
(New York, 1956), p. 189. In 1920 Hans Delbriick Guibert,Bourcet, Pirchanddu
de Mazeroy,
of potatoesin
pointedout that the increasingcultivation Teil. The moresignificant of the
features
WesternEuropemade it mucheasierfortroopsto forage ofthesemen,Quimbydemonstrates,
and thus live offthe country.He quotes Napoleon as
writings
writingin 1805: Dans une saison,ou il n'y avait point wereoutlined Ordinance
inthemilitary of 1
de pommes de terresdans les champs,ou si l'armte the
eprouvaitquelques revers,le dfaut de magasinsnous August1791,and operatedthroughout
conduiraitaux plus grands maihers." Delbrick, Ge- Revolution The notionthat
and Empire.44
schichteder Kriegskunstim Rahmen der politschen
Geschichte, IV (Berlin,1920, p. 479n). 42 Alfred Vagts, A History of MilitarismCivtlian
40Liddell Hart, Thoughtson Wdr (London, 1944), and Military(New York, rev. ed., 1959), p. 112.
p. 23. Bernard and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbowto 43 Parker,Three NapoleonicBattles,pp. 14-15.
H.Bomb (New York, 1962), p. 108. 44 Quimby,Backgroundof Napoleonic Warfare,pp.
41 Preston,Men in Arms,pp. 185-6. 306-20.

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184 MILITARY AFFAIRS Winter

the Revolutionaryarmiesalwaysused the tacticswhich, embodied finally

intheOrdinance of
column as an attackformationis reviewed 1791,consummated a long periodof tactical
im-
and playedan important partin the
andQuimby showsthat,although Napoleon provement
triumphsof thewarswhichfollowed almostimme-
seemedtohavepreferredtheordremixte,the diately.They evolvedalso doctrines of artillery
tactics
oftheEmpire armies
followed no set employment and of strategywhichwereessential
patternandwere highly
varied. elementsof Napoleon'sart of war. Of these
At Austerlitz,Napoleon prescribed the ordre writersGuibertstandsoutaboveall theothers
...
mixteforthedecisive attackupontheheights of Finally,Napoleonalone clearlytook advantage
Pratzen. . . At Jena,MarshalLannes'corps ofall thatwasthusmadeavailable. Drawingfrom
manoeuvered he weldedthemintoa consis-
bothin lineand column. . . while thesevariedsources,
MarshalSoultmanoeuvered in column.Marshal tentpracticefarsuperior to any previously
em-
Davoutusedverydiverse formationsat Auerstadt. ployed.47
. . .variedformations
wereusedin 1809,includ. These conclusions and the scholarship
ingthemonstrous columnof GeneralMacdonald whichsupportsthemhas prompteda reviewer
at Wagram.45
of eigh-
to remarkthat the "relationship
In short,a variety oftacticalformations for teenth-century ideas to Napoleon's
military
theattack, preceded bya vastbarrage from tacticsand strategyis one of the best
mobileartillery, and followed by a deter-documented caseson recordof theinfluence
minedpursuit usuallybrought theFrenchof theory on practice."48One,therefore, may
decisivevictoryonthebattlefields. justly ask what is the next step in the
QuimbydealswithNapoleon's strategicinvestigation? Two tasksappearto be rele-
inleritanceandshows howthearguments of vant:a newlookat Napoleon,andan answer
GuIbert, Saxe,and othersin favorof in- to recentcriticsof militaryhistorywho
creased mobility combined withinnovations questionits significance as a scholarlydisci-
suchas theintroduction ofthe'quickstep,'48pline.
thedivisional system, and thepractice of Napoleon is probablyone of the most
livingoffthecountry to produce a highlyfrequently analyzedand described characters
variedandsuccessful strategyinNapoleon'sofmodemhistory. Yet insomerespects, more
hands. If Napoleon hada favourite strategyparticularly in regardto Bonaparte'sbrilliant
it wasprobably concentrating hisforces on useof hismilitary inheritance,thebestanaly-
theunprotected linesofcommunication ofhis ses of his geniushave appearedin mono-
enemy; at anyrate,he wasusuallyableto graphs,generalsurveys, or worksnot deal-
concentrate hisforces insucha manner as to ingdirectly withtheNapoleonic rather
period,
givehima superiority of numbers at the thanin full-blown biographies.49Napoleon's
pointofattack. Professor Quimby alsopro- biographers appearto have paid but scant
videsa usefuland thorough survey of the attentionto the heritage,just as general
workof otherswhohavewritten on the military writers haveoccasionally overlooked
origins of Napoleonic warfare.His conclu-thegeniuswhichmadeitwork.It remains the
sions,indeed, are reallythecumulative re- 47 Ibid., p. 344.
sultsof modernscholarship sinceColin: 48 Harold T. Parker, review of Quimby, South
namelythat AtlanticQuarterly,58 (January,1959), p. 307.
49 See, Parker,Three Napoleonic Battles and "Na-
in thecontroversies
of theeighteenth
centurythe poleon and Conquered Territories1805-1807," South
military
writers
of Francedeveloped
a systemof AtlanticQuarterly51 (January,1952), pp. 70-84. Ropp,
War in the Modern World,pp. 98-142. Preston,Wise,
45) Ibid.,p. 334. Werner,Men in Arms,pp. 176-95.AlthoughProfessor
46 According to most writers
this was simply an Ropp claims that "there is a Napoleon, like a Lincoln,
incre-sein the numberof paces marchedby a man for everytaste" and givesa sampleof such biographies,
in cne minutefrom70 to 120, but Quimbydemonstrates none appear to give a good balancebetweengeniusani
that it was not quite that simple.Ibid., p. 310. inheritance.

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1966-67 THE ORIGINS OF NAPOLEONIC WARFARE 185

taskofsomefuture historian towalkbeside says Millis, the professional militaryman

Bonapartethroughout hisentire career andto today,"cannotreallylearnmuchfromNapo-
thecomplementary
illustrate relationship be- leon,orJackson, orLee orGrant."'"
tweengeniusand inheritance whichso en- The professional historian can,of course,
hanced both. ignoretherelativist implications of thisargu-
The origins of Napoleonic warfare have ment:surelya studyof Napoleonis justified
nowbeenanalyzed, misconstrued, and re- for its own intrinsic merit.The point in
analyzed often
sufficiently thatthehistoriog- regardto the professional soldier,however,
raphythus createdoffersan interesting cannotbe dismissed so lightly,forthemili-
answerto somecritics of military history.tarymanmusthavea doctrine or philosophy
Relativelyfewof theimportant writers on or systemto serveas a framework forhis
Napleonic warfare havebeen,first andfore- profession. PerhapsMillisdoesnotbelieveit
most,academic historians.Proceeding back- possibleto findin historyas, accordingto
wards, we find:Quimby, an academic; Lid- Henderson,Napoleon found,"a complete
dellHart,basically a journalist andmilitarystudyof humannatureundertheconditions
critic;Oman and Wilkinson, academics;thatexistin war; humannatureaffected by
Colin,Becke,Fochand Clausewitz, all sol- discipline, by fear,by theneedof food,by
diers;Jomini a critic,journalist,soldier and thewantofconfidence, byover-confidence,by
Themajority
historian. ofthesemen,howev-weightof responsibility, bypoliticalinterest,
er,have,at onetimeoranother, pleadedfor bypatriotism, bydistrust and bymanyother
thestudy of militaryhistory to be a recog- things."52 Even so, the picture of Napoleon's
nizedacademicdiscipline. Yet today the masterful manipulation of the systemhe
trend
prevailing ofthought seems to be that inherited is an object lesson which shouldbe
suggestedbyMr. Walter Millis: "Contem- carefully considered by every professional
porary militaryhistory as a specialized disci- officer.
pline,findsitselfunhappily adrift,unsure of 50 WalterMillis,MilitaryHistory(Washington,D.C.,
itsdestinationanduncertain as towhether it 1961), p. 17.
51 Ibid., p. 16.
is evencarrying theright cargo."5' In short, 52 Scienceof War, p. 174.

ANNAPOLIS MEETING OF AMI

As thisissuegoes to press,preparations are ship will take place from3:45 to 4:00 p.m. The
afoot for a gala "Fellows Dinner" of the cruisewill last one hour,from4:00 to 5:00 p.m.
AmericanMilitaryInstitute, to be held at An- From 5:30 to 7:00 p.m., a cash bar will be
napolis,Friday31 March 1967. Dr. RussellJ. availableat the Naval AcademyOfficersand Fac-
Parkinson,U. S. Naval Academyfaculty, chair- ulty Club. The InstituteFellows Testimonial
man of thesession,advisesus of the followingDinner will commenceat 7:00 p.m. at the Club.
program: A seafood buffetis to be featured,but turkeyor
Thosearriving in theafternoon are invitedto chicken will be available. Members and their
a simulatedclassroom War- ladies will be welcomedby the Host Committee
sessionon "Guerrilla
offered
farein Literature," by ProfessorWilliam
of Rear Admiral E. M. Eller, USN (Ret), the
H. Russelland Midshipmen, at 2:00 to 3:30
Directorof Naval History.
p.m.,in Room0202,MauryHall.
An orientationcruiseof thewatersaboutthe The totalcostfortheabove is $3.50 perperson:
Naval Academy and Annapolis, on boarda Yard a bargain If possiblesend cash in advance. Dress
PatrolShip,undertheguidanceof Commanderoptional.Send reservations to Asst.ProfessorRus-
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members
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