Gilligan's Theory of
Moral Development as
Applied to Social Work
IEthical
N MAKING casework decisions, a
social worker faces many conflicts.
conflicts are frequently por-
trayed as forced choices or necessary
tensions between incompatible but
desirable goals-for example, chang-
ing society versus helping the indi-
vidual or protecting an individual's
rights versus meeting his or her
needs. The importance of these con-
flicts is evident in the development
of the National Association of Social
Workers' (NASW) Code of Ethtcs,'
Although different values have been
named in the code of ethics, they
have not been justifled with respect
to their underlying ethical basis. The
values are not tied to one or more
general positions on the nature of
rtght action and of a good society.
GILLIGAN'S THEORY
In this article, the author uses two
modes of thinking about ethics devel-
oped by the theorist of stages of moral
development, Carol Gtlltgan.? The
author argues that Gilligan's modes
of thought-the responsibility mode
and the rights mode-correspond to
two ideals of social work practice.
These ideals, in turn, are based on
two underlying partially defined views
of society and morality-that espoused
by the U.S. reltgtous communities of
the nineteenth century (which corre-
sponds to the responsibility mode) and
that of liberal individualism (which
corresponds to the rtghts mode). Ft-
nally, the author argues that under-
standing these ideals with respect to
underlying conceptions of society is
crucial to making informed social
decisions and that this process of un-
derstanding ethical choices can lead
to alternative views of social work
ethics.
CCC Code: 0037-8046/85 $1.00 © 1985. National Association of Social Workers. Inc.
Margaret L. Rhodes
ences in perception and development. 5
These postulated modes of thought
have generated a great deal of discus-
sion and excitement, even though
their psychological and philosophical
Gilliganjormulated two modes status is not clear. Their importance
oj moral development-rights resides in the provocative questions
and responsibiiities. These they raise for different disciplines and
in the possibilities they suggest. In
two modes correspond to two psychology, for example, the two
moral traditions in social work: modes have forced the reconsidera-
a rights perspective, based on tion of existing theories of develop-
liberal individualism, and a ment of moral thinking, and they
have heightened discussion between
needs perspectioe, based on psychologtsts and philosophers about
nineteenth century visions of moral development and its relation to
Christian virtue. The conjlict ethical theory," In philosophy, they
between the two modesillumi- have been used to suggest inadequa-
nates the conjlict between the cies in current formulations of ethical
two social work ideals. Recog- theory and ontology and to suggest
reformulations of these areas.?
nitioti oj the conflict can result
in the exploration of alterna- Responsibility
tive social oisions. The "responsibility mode" of thought
embodies many of the basic ideals of
social work practice. Although Gilli-
gan refers to this mode as the female
voice and suggests that it typically
characterizes women, she assumes,
Gilligan, in her book In a Different as the author does, that the mode
Voice, has formulated two general can and should apply to all persons,
modes of reasoning about ethical male or female. As developed by Gilli-
choices and about the world." Her for- gan, this mode bases the highest
mulations draw heavily on the stages stage of decision making on care for
of moral reasoning developed by and sensitivity to the needs of others,
Kohlberg." Briefly, one mode (respon- on responsibility for others, and on
sibility) focuses on caring, responsi- nurturance. As Gilligan states:
bility, and nurturance in accordance
with people's needs. The other mode The moral imperative that emerges
(rtghts) stresses reasoning based on repeatedly in interviews with wom-
moral principles, particularly prtnci- en is an injunction to care, a
ples of justice, equality, and individ- responsibility to discern and alle-
ual rtghts, The development of these viate the "real and recognizable
two modes should be viewed as the trouble" of this world."
result of the work of many theorists,
most of whom (except Kohlberg) have Moral choice is viewed in terms of a
been examining male-female differ- web of complex relationships in all
101
their particularity and Interdepen-
dence.
The proclivity of women to recon-
struct hypothetical dilemmas in
terms of the real, to request or to
supply missing information about
the nature of the people and the
places where they live, shifts their
judgment away from the hierarchi-
cal ordering of principles and the
formal procedures of decision
making. This insistence on the
particular signlfles an orientation
to the dilemma and to moral prob-
lems in general that differs from
any current developmental stage
descrtpttons.?
This view focuses on feelings of com-
passion and concern, rather than on
a rational consideration of abstract
principles, and on actual specific con-
sequences of adecision on the lives
of the people involved. Particular
needs take precedence over considera-
tions of fairness.
Sometimes those hierarchies [of
principles) are good, so long as
you look at them by themselves,
but they fall apart when you try
to impose them on your decisions.
They are not organized somehow
to deal with real life decisions, and
it doesn't allow much room for re-
sponsibiltty.'?
In addition, this approach includes a
reluctance to judge, a focus on mercy
rather than justice.
Moral judgment is renounced in
an awareness of the psychologtcal
and social determination of human
behavior, at the same time that
moral concern is reaffirmed in rec-
ognition of the reality of human
pain and suffertng.'!
These are the characteristics tradi-
tionally assigned to casework practice.
Caring about others is considered the
foundation of all social work. Case-
work in particular is characterized by
"Its direct concern for the well-being
of the individual."12 It is "a process
used by certain human welfare agen-
cies to help individuals to cope more
effectively with their problems in
social functiontng," 13
Caring-that is, the protective,
parental, tender aspects of loving
-is apart of relationship among
102
tion. Nurturance may be distorted
"Caring about others is into coercive control, as when the
"best interests" of the client are in
considered the joundation fact the interests of an agency or
society. Nursing hornes have often
oj all social work. provided an example of such abuse.
" The patient may desire the free-
dom to come and go, to soctalize,
peers, child to parent, friend to to have visitors and activities, to
friend, lover to lover, person to retain privacy, while the home's in-
animal. The parent-chlld aspect of terests may run more to adminis-
caring is only the essential para- trative convenience and order.
digm whose presence is necessary When such conflicts of interest
for the diffusion of this human arise, the nearly parental powers
quality into the other relational of the nursing horne can quickly
aspects of life.14 suffocate the basic rtghts of indi-
vidual patients.
Relationship is the key to success- As a result, many nursing horne
ful casework. Hollis, like many others, patients find themselves in a des-
focuses on the "innate worth" of the perate position, stripped of power
individual: and desolate of dignity.18
It is the ingredient that makes it
A second problem is that decisions
possible to establish the relation- made on a case-by-case basis can
ship of trust that is so essential for lead to arbitrary and unfair treat-
effective treatment.l" ment, to preference for one dient over
another because of needs, values, or
And Perlman emphasizes the cen- whatever.
trality of relationship to casework:
Rights
To the question again: What is the The second ideal of social work
common element, the red thread, practice can be viewed as a response
that seems to run through every to the responsibility mode of think-
successful effort by one person to ing and to the problems it presents
influence another in benign and in social work. The ideal implies a
enabling ways? The answer seems different mode of thinking about
to be "relationship."16 ethical questions-a focus on the in-
dividual rtghts of all parties and on
Casework itself reflects a particular- the use of rules and principles in
istic approach in which a person's making casework decisions. The
history and circumstances are cen- focus on individual rights has a com-
tral to decision making and in which plicated history, but within social
generalization is difficult. The reluc- work, particularly begtnntng in the
tance to judge that Gilligan describes 1960s, it has been important precisely
corresponds to casework's emphasis as an answer to the paternalistic and
on acceptance of the dient-what is coercive aspects of traditional case-
sometimes referred to as a nonjudg- work.
mental or nondirective attitude: "the The second ideal of social work
fiction of non-directiveness is, to practice corresponds to the rtghts
some extent, a necessary fiction, a voice of "rational" decision making
necessary guide" to social work prac- described by Gilligan. The highest
ttce.'" stage of ethical decision making con-
Ethical Problems. The ethical sists of the rational consideration of
problerns that emerge from applying a universal ethical principle of jus-
Gilligan's mode of thought are also tice. This view corresponds to several
the ethical problems of casework. normative philosophical theories that
Gilligan briefly touches on some of appeal to utilitarian and deontological
these problems, but practitioners of principles. The ethical theories of
social work have articulated them Rawls and Frankena, for example, ex-
more fully. 1\\70 central problems are emplify this way of thinking.!" This
the following: First, a caseworker's view focuses on the autonomous and
care, responsibility, and "doing for atomistic individual, separate from
others" may be at the expense of the others, whose rights are not to be
client's autonomy and self-determina- interfered with. Equality and fairness
Social Work I March-April 1985
take precedence over equtty and need.
Within social work, a similar ap-
proach has arisen. The NASW Code
of Ethics was intended to give sys-
tematic gutdeltnes, the use of which
would lead to coherent and rational
decision making by social workers. In
addition 10 principles of cartng, spe-
cific rtghts are set forth with empha-
sis on the right of self-determination.
General principles are sought to
ground soctal work practice and to
aid in deciding difficult casework
dilemmas.
This concern with principles of fair-
ness is also evident in recent books
on social work ethics. For example,
Reamer-borrowing largely from Ge-
wirth's work in ethlcs, which is based
on a Kantian prtnctple of Generic
Consistency-argues for more explicit
consideration of ethical issues and
suggests guidelines for casework de-
cisions. 20
Ethical Problems. The rtghts ap-
proach is faced, however, with equally
serious problems when applied to
casework decisions. A worker's focus
on general principles can lead to in-
difference 10 particular circumstances
and 10 bureaucratization of the social
work process. Following rules may
take precedence over meeting people's
needs:
Usually this sort of treatment of a
human being is decried as de-
meantng, as not recognizing the
client as a complete human being.
On the whole such criticism of
bureaucracies is just, in that im-
personal treatment is often used
as part of a public degradation
ritual. Nevertheless this should not
blind us to the fact that the ten-
dency has both necessary and de-
strable aspects. . . . For reasons of
equity and practicality, organiza-
ttons cannot deal with each person
uniquely but must deal with peo-
ple as parts of categortes, Only in
this way can bias be eliminated
and only in this way can services
be distributed on a mass basts.s'
GUligan describes the same type
of confltct, although she puts it in
terms of male versus female modes
of thought:
Thus it becomes clear why a mo-
rality of rights and noninterference
may appear frightentng to women
in its potential justification of in-
difference and unconcern. At the
Rhodes I Gnugan'. Theory of Moral Development
same time, it becomes clear why,
from a male perspective, a moral-
ity of responsibility appears tncon-
clusive and diffuse, given its insis-
tent contextual relattvtsm.s-
NASW CODE OF ETHICS
The NASW Code of Ethics appears to
be an attempt to combine the two ap-
proaches of rtghts and responsibili-
ties. In its revisions, rtghts have be-
come more prominent, particularly
the client's rtght to self-determination.
However, the code simply lists rights
and responsibilities. Its underlying
ethical bases are not made clear.
The caseworker, for example, is to
serve clients with devotion and loyal-
ty and is also to maximize a client's
self-determtnation.s" This includes
the client's rtghts to refuse treatment
and to help determine treatment
goals. In practice, these goals are
sometimes in confltct, as when the
client's and caseworker's perception
of what is good for the client differ.
The principles outlined in the code
of ethics do not help to resolve such
a confllct: they are not ordered, jus-
ttfled, or tntegrated with respect to
their underlying ethical basis.
However, two underlying bases of
social work ethics are embedded in
the two modes of thought already de-
scribed. To understand the nature of
these ethical frameworks, one must
understand something about their
historical development. Here, women's
history is particularly relevant.
A WOMAN'S PROFESSION
Social work has always been largely
a woman's profession. From the start,
it contained many of the contradie-
tions with which it still struggles, As
it developed in the nineteenth century
in the United States and England.
social work was chiefly a movement
of middle-class women who began to
develop organizations to combat the
hardships of urbanization and indus-
trialization. The impetus for their
philanthropy was partially from evan-
gelical Protestantism and its belief in
the moral superiority of women. Until
1835, all women's reform associations
in the United States were allied with
the church.w Women's moral supert-
ority and moral duties were preached
in the churches, whose membership
was mostly female. Female moral
superiority was identified with Chris-
tian piety, moral integrity, compas-
sion, self-sacriflce, and matemal con-
cern. Women were to influence society
through influencing their husbands
and children. A New Hampshire pas-
tor in an address on female education
stated:
It is at horne, where man ... seeks
arefuge from the vexations and
embarrassments of business, an
enchanting repose from exertion,
arelaxation from care by the in-
terchange of affection: where some
of his finest sympathies, tastes,
and moral and reltgtous feeltngs
are formed and nourished; where
is the treasury of pure disinter-
ested love, such is seldom found
in the busy walks of a selfish and
calculating world.s"
As another minister speaking to a
group of women in Boston in 1810
put it:
We look to you, ladies, to raise the
standard of character in our own
sex; we look to you, to guard and
fortify those barriers, which still
exist in society, against the en-
croachments of impudence and ll-
centiousness. We look to you for
the continuance of domestick pur-
ity, for the revival of domestick
reltgion, for the increase of our
chartties, and the support of what
remains of reltgton in our private
habits and publick Instttuttons.s"
Public and Private
In this radical division of public
and private, women were made guard-
ians of domestic life-the life of com-
munity, compassion, morality, and
religton. To maintain that life in reali-
ty, however, women had to take part
in the larger society. Industrialization
increasingly threatened domestic life
with new levels of drunkenness, pov-
erty, and so forth, and so women had
the duty to extend their concern from
their immediate families to conditions
in their communities. As one early
moral reformer stated:
Their mission is the establishment
of peace, and love, and unselflsh-
ness, to be achieved by any means,
and at any cost to themselves; in
the cultivation first in themselves,
then in all over whom they have
any influence, of an unselfish and
unworldly spirit: the promotion
even in the most minute particular
of elegance, of happiness, of moral
103
 good. The poor, the ignorant, the
domestic servant, are their chil-
dren. 27
The women in early moral reform
societies were concerned with their
families, and thus also with the pov-
erty of widows and children, with the
sexual double standard, and with
drunkenness.P"
Contradictions
This early history reveals an impor-
tant contradiction. The attempt to
maintain the private realm, the do-
mestic sphere, required public action;
the split between private and public
could not in fact be maintained. To
preserve family ltfe, women had to
venture into the public world-organ-
izing associations, speaking publicly,
raising funds, and so on. Their pri-
vate lives in fact were not separable
from the drunkenness and unemploy-
ment of the public world. However, as
women were attempting to create a
community of care and responsibility
for others, this ethical outlook, like
Gilligan's responsibility mode, con-
flicted with the dominant ethic of
society, which reflected the rtghts
mode.
Some historians have stressed the
importance of the cult of domestic-
ity as an alternative ideology to the
competitive, industrialized market
economy:
Instead of postulating woman as
an atom in competitive society, do-
mestic feminism viewed woman as
a person in the context of relation-
ships with others. By defining the
family as a community, this ide-
ology allowed women to engage in
something of a critique of male,
materialistic, market society and
simultaneously proceed to seize
power within the family.29
One must add that the values of a
competitive market economy were not
usually directly challenged, and the
values of domestic life were often seen
only to complement public life. In ad-
dition, the nature of this alternative
ideology was not altogerher clear.
Community was central, and commu-
nity was based on love of God, the
centrality of the family, and the Chris-
tian virtues of humility, compassion,
purity, and self-sacrifice.
Early attempts at moral reform
were not restricted to the responsl-
104
bility mode and its ethic, however.
There was also a strong movement to
gain economic and political equality
for women-to make them part of the
public world-and this was based on
the rights mode. Thus, the nineteenth
century reform movements often com-
bined the rtghts and responsibilities
modes, without making clear the un-
derlying assumptions and contradic-
tions between the two outlooks.
SOCIAL WORK CONFLICTS
TODAY
This history can help us to under-
stand more fully social work conflicts
today. The struggle by nineteenth
century women to care for others in
the face of the individualistic and
competitive public world parallels
the struggle by social workers today
to balance caring with maintaining
rtghts in a bureaucratized and atom-
istic society.
Caring
Casework (which dominates social
work practice) focuses on the impor-
tance of caring, of altruism, in rela-
tionships. If these values were diffl-
cult to maintain in the nineteenth
century even in the horne, they are
even more difficult to maintain in the
public world today. It is even less
clear what they consist of in the pres-
ent context. Our society has become
increasingly public, atomistic, and
lacking in shared values. Social work
has become subject to the same forces
of bureaucratization and market re-
lations as the rest of the society,"?
The social work ideal of caring suf-
fers from the same problems it con-
fronted in the nineteenth century,
only now in a more extreme form.
The attempt is to humanize the world,
to create a "caring society." However,
asin the 1800s, the social work man-
date to care appears most often to
lead not to changing the larger socie-
ty, but to gtvtng added support to
existing institutions. In the nineteenth
century, the horne was sometimes a
refuge and social reforms were some-
times helpful, although often without
stgnlflcantly changing conditions. In
the twentieth century, casework may
serve the same function. This is par-
ticularly true when casework is dt-
vorced, as it often is, from social
policy.
Many others have pointed out these
problems." The author stresses that
the problems must be viewed in rela-
tion to their underlying ethical basis.
Today the principle of caring and
compassion in social work lacks the
context of a community of shared
values, which it had in the nineteenth
century in some contexts through
reltgton. For this principle to make
sense today, some context must be
defined. What is one to care about?
What sort of society is one supposed
to be creating? Can Gilligan's mode
of responsibility, or nineteenth cen-
tury models of community, gtve so-
cial workers new visions of the good
society?
Rights
The alternative framework in the
social work code of ethics is one of
individual rtghts, based on an un-
specified principle of justice. However,
this solution gtves social workers an
ethic that accepts society much as it
is-composed of separate, atomistic
individuals who are adversaries com-
peting for the goods of society. That
Is, it assumes a view of society based
on liberal individualism. That view
appears to conflict with the idea, also
basic to casework, of care and rela-
tionship in a community of shared
values. At the least, notions of care
and responsibility are radically altered
in the context of individual rtghts
and a market economy. They need to
be redefined.
The two ideals of social work prac-
tice can be made compatible, and
this has happened to a certain extent
in the NASW Code of Ethics. Caring
can be viewed strictly in individual
terms, and in this way it will fit a
view of society composed of atomistic
individuals who are adversaries in a
market economy. This solution is
counter, however, to the spirit of
moral reform of the nineteenth cen-
tury and, the author thinks, counter
to the kind of caring envisioned in
the social work ideal.
REVISED ETHICS
If the two views are to be made com-
patible, the NASW Code of Ethics
needs (1) to indicate what caring con-
sists of in the context of liberal indi-
vidualism, (2) to justify the sort of
society that such an approach en-
dorses, and (3) to show that the view
that emerges is better than alterna-
tive views of society and ethics. Part
of the problem with the code as it ex-
Social Work I March-April 1985
ists is that it simply assumes, with-
out stating or justifying it, an under-
lying basis of liberal individualism,
mixed with notions of caring that
seem incompatible with that Indl-
vidualism.
If the two views are not compatible,
then new gutdelines, based on other
visions of society and "the good,"
need to be explored. Gilligan's final
suggestion of a model of interdepen-
dence and mutuality corresponds to
some radical mental health structures
(such as some of the shelters for bat-
tered women) and might provide one
such alternative framework. Gilligan's
responsibility mode of thought is
compatible with a number of ethical
frameworks besides nineteenth cen-
tury Christian communtttes.w There
are also ethical frameworks that do
not readily fit either of Gilligan's mod-
els, for example Plato's or Aristotle's
ethical theories.
To return finaHy to Gilligan's two
modes of thought, they can at best
Notes and References
1. Code of Ethics of the National
Association of Social Workers (Silver
Spring, Md.: NASW, 1980).
2. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice:
Psychological Theory and Women's De-
velopment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1982).
3. Ibid.
4. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy
of Moral Development (San Francisco:
Harper & Row, 1981).
5. See, for example, Jean B. Miller,
1bward a New Psychology of Women
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1976); and Nancy
Chodorow, The Reproduetion of Mother-
ing: Psyehoanalysis and the Sociology of
Gender (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978).
6. See, for example, "Symposium on
Moral Developrnent," Ethics (entire issue),
92 (April 1982).
7. 1\vo such critiques are Larry Blum,
"Rights and Responsibilities: The Impor-
tance of Carol Gilligan's Work for Moral
Phtlosophy" paper delivered at Philosophy
Department colloquium, University of
Massachusetts, Boston, April 16, 1983;
and Caroline Whitbeck, "A Different Real-
ity: Feminist Ontology," in Carol Gould,
ed., Beyond Domination: New Perspec-
tioes on Women and Philosophy (Totowa,
N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983).
8. See Gilligan. In a Different Voice,
p. 100.
9. Ibid., pp. 100-101.
10. Ibid., p. 126.
11. Ibid., p. 103.
12. Florence Hollis, Casework: A Psy-
Rhodes I Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development
only describe how people think about
morality, not how they ought to think
about it. In their application to social
work, the two modes of thought ap-
pear to be historically determined,
rather than universal, stages of hu-
man development. In addition, they
reveal a limitation of social work
ethics as now conceived. Social work's
ethical principles are based on only
two visions of society and of right ac-
tion. Social workers need to consider
other frameworks as well and to en-
courage explicit debate about the eth-
ical underpinnings of its practice and
alternatives to them.
Margaret L. Rhodes, Ph.D., is Asso-
ciate Professor of Philosophy, Col-
lege of Public and Community Ser-
vice, University 01 Massachusetts,
Boston. Parts of an earlier version
of this article were delivered at a
meeting of the Society of Women
in Philosophy, Newburgh, New
York, October 1, 1983.
chosocial Therapy (New York: Random
House, 1972), p. 14.
13. Helen H. Per1man, Social Casework:
A Problem-Solving Process (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 4.
14. Gaylin Willard, "In the Begtnnlng:
Helpless and Dependent," in Gaylin et al.,
Doing Good: The Limits of Benevolence
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 33.
15. Hollis, Casework, p. 12.
16. Helen H. Perlman, Relationship:
The Heart of Helping People (Chicago:
University of Chtcago Press, 1979), p. 14.
17. Paul Halmes, The Faith of the
Counselors: A Study in the Theory and
Practice of Social Casework andPsyeho-
therapy (New York: Schocken Books,
1966), p. 105.
18. Ira Glasser, "Prtsoners of Benevo-
lence: Power Versus Liberty in the Welfare
State," in Gaylin et al., Doing Good, p. 109.
19. Kohlberg explicitly mentions these
theories as well as those of Hare and
Baier. See Lawrence Kohlberg, "A Reply
to Owen Flanagan and Some Comments
on the Puke-Goodpaster Exchange," Sym-
posium on Moral Development, Ethics, 92,
p. 524. For more on these theortes, see
John Rawls, A Theory of Justiee (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
Belknap Press, 1971); William K. Frankena,
Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice
Hall 1963); R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking:
Its Levels, Method, and .A:>int (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1981); and Curt
Bater, The Moral.A:>int of View: A Rational
Basis of Ethics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1958).
20. Frederic G. Reamer, Ethical Dilem-
mas in Social Work (April 1982), (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
See Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1978); and Emanuel Kaut, Foundations of
the Metaphysics of Morals, L. W. Beck,
trans. (New York: Liberal Arts Press,
1959).
21. Jeffrey M. Prottas, People-Process-
ing: The Street-Level Bureaueratic in Pub-
lic Service Bureaueracies (Lexington,
Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., Lexington Books,
1979), p. 143.
22. Gi1ligan, In a Different Voice, p. 22.
23. Code of Ethics of the National
Association of Social Workers, pp. 4-5.
24. See Nancy F. Cott, The Bonds of
Womanhood: "Woman's Sphere" in New
England, 1780-1835 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977), particularly chap-
ter 4.
25. Ibid., p. 64, citing C. Burroughs. An
Address on Female Education, Delivered
at Portstnouth, N.H., Gei. 26, 1827 (Ports-
mouth, N.H., 1827), pp. 18-19.
26. Ibid., p. 148, citing Joseph Buck-
minster, "A Sermon Preached before the
Members of the Boston Female Asylum,"
September 1810, handcopied and bound
with other sermons to the Boston Female
Asylum, Boston Public Library, Rare Book
Room.
27. From Sarah Lewls, Woman's Mis-
sion (1839), in Janet H. Murray, Strong
Minded Women: And Other Lost Voices
from Nineteenth-Century England (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1982), p. 24.
28. See Murray, Strong Minded Wom-
en. See also, for example, Frank R. Breul
and Steven J. Diner, Compassion and
Responsibility: Readings in the History
of Social Welfare .A:>liey in the United
States (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1980).
29. Dantel S. Smith, "Family Limitation,
Sexual Control and Domestic Feminism
in Victorian America," in Nancy Cott and
Elizabeth Pleck, eds., A Herttage of Her
Own: Thward a New Sociai History of
American Women (New York: Touchstone
Books, 1979, pp. 237-238.
30. There is a large body of literature
on this: see, for example, Prottas, People-
Processing. For a good recent history of
these forces in social work in Massachu-
setts, see Ann Withorn, The Circle Game:
Services for the .A:>or in Massachusetts,
1966-1978 (Amherst: University of Mass-
achusetts Press, 1982).
31. See, for example, Ivan Illich et al. ,
Disabling Professions (London, England.
Marion Boyers, 1977); and Jeffry H. Gal-
per, The .A:>litics of Social Services (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975).
32. Larry Blum, Friendship, Altruism
und Morality (London, England. Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1980), presents one such
alternative.
Accepted September 29. 1983
105