 Pakistan-India Disputes and Crises

 Despite the Shimla Agreement, little progress was made towards

settling disputes by peaceful means after 1972.
 Sir Creek
 The line in Sir Creek, at the western terminus of the Pakistan-
India boundary in the Rann of Kutch, has remained unresolved since
1969 when the main dispute was settled by an arbitration tribunal.
India claimed that the boundary should run in the middle of the
creek.
 Pakistan sought to resolve the difference between the two
countries, but India said it first wanted to complete an air survey
of the area. The stalemate persisted, to the detriment of poor
fishermen on both sides.
 Siachen: A Dispute within a Dispute
 The Siachen Glacier descends from the lofty Karakorum Range and
traverses part of Baltistan in the Northern Areas, which was so
difficult to access and inhospitable that no fighting took place
here in any of the three wars between the two countries.
 Pakistan exercised control over the glaciated area up to the
Karakorum Pass, and the terminus of the line of control between
Xinjiang and the Northern Areas of the disputed state of Jammu and
Kashmir remained the same as that of the 1948 ceasefire line.
 In the early 1980s, India sent a brigade-strength force to the
Siachen area, which Pakistan protested against, and the two
countries fought intermittent duels, losing even more men to
frostbite.
 The two countries arrived at an agreement in 1989 to redeploy
forces to positions conforming to the Shimla Agreement, but it has
not been implemented.
 Differences arose over interpretation of the Shimla Agreement, and
the Indian side demanded 'authentication' of the existing positions
and the right to establish a 'civil post'.
 Salal, Wullar, Baglihar, and Kishenganga Projects
 Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 allows construction of run-of-the-river
power plants, but forbids the construction of dams on the western
rivers in excess of prescribed limits. Pakistan can raise the issue
of dams in the permanent Indus Commission.
 In the 1970s, India decided to build a dam on the Chenab River, but
agreed to reduce the height to relieve Pakistan's concerns.
 Pakistan asked India to discontinue construction of a barrage on
the Jhelum River at the mouth of the Wullar Lake, but India refused
to acknowledge that the project was inconsistent with the treaty
and offered to change the design and operating procedures to
eliminate any harmful effects on Pakistan.
 A dispute arose when India decided to build a hydroelectric power
project on the Chenab River with a dam at Baglihar upstream from
the Salal dam. Pakistan complained to the World Bank, which reduced
the height of the dam and reduced the pondage by 14 percent.
 Consular Missions
 After the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1976, India offered
to lease Jinnah House in Mumbai for the Pakistan consulate.
 Pakistan accepted the Indian promise, but Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi refused to lease the house to Pakistan.
 In 1980, the Pakistan Embassy in New Delhi requested permission
from the Indian government to build a consular office in Mumbai.
 The Pakistani government sent consular staff to open an office in
Mumbai, but had to close it down in March 1994 after discovering
evidence of subversive activities by the Indian personnel.
 Diplomats of the two countries agreed in 1992 on a bilateral code
of conduct, but the governments have repeatedly accused each other
of using their diplomatic staff for activities incompatible with
their legitimate functions.
 Indian Plan for Attack on Kahuta, 1984
 Pakistan received several intelligence reports during 1983-85 that
India was preparing an air attack on its uranium enrichment plant
at Kahuta. Islamabad informed New Delhi through friendly
intermediaries that any such attack would be treated as an act of
aggression.
 The Brasstacks Crisis, 1986-87
 Another crisis erupted when India decided to hold the largest
combined military exercise in South Asian history, code-named
Brasstacks, in western Rajasthan, hardly 50 kilometers from the
Pakistan border.
 The Indian army chief did not inform his Pakistani counterpart of
the location, schedule and scale of the exercise, which was
resisted by Pakistani diplomats and the Prime Minister.
 As a precaution, the Pakistani army extended its own winter
exercises and later moved some formations to forward areas north of
the Sutlej river opposite the Indian town of Fazilka and west of
the Ravi in Sialkot district.
 The crisis peaked in January 1987 when India demanded a pullback of
Pakistani forces 'within 24 hours'. The Pakistani government took
initiative to try to defuse the dangerous situation and a deal was
struck on 4 February to withdraw forces to peacetime locations.
 The Brasstacks crisis brought Pakistan and India closer to the
brink of war than any other crisis since 1971. Its basic and direct
cause was the 'mammoth war games' planned by an ambitious Indian
army chief.
 To prevent unintentional crises, the two sides concluded agreements
in 1991 that required advance notification of exercises and troop
movements.
 Re-entry to the Commonwealth
 Britain's partisan role in the 1971 crisis was disappointing for
Pakistan, and Z.A. Bhutto decided to pull out of the Commonwealth
in anger because it would not entail any great loss except
inconvenience to Pakistani settlers in Britain.
 The precipitate decision to quit the Commonwealth was largely
Bhutto's, but the decision to rejoin was no less personal. Indira
Gandhi frustrated the proposal to return to the Commonwealth, and
Rajiv Gandhi followed her mother's line, justifying the opposition
to Pakistan's return on the ground that Pakistan was ruled by a
dictator.
 War Averted, 1990
 In spring 1990, the situation in Kashmir continued to deteriorate,
and India was reported to have recommended air strikes on targets
in Pakistan. The United States sent Robert Gates to Islamabad and
New Delhi to prevent war.
 Disarmament Issues
 Pakistan welcomed the Chemical Weapons Convention when it was
concluded in 1993, but did not ratify it until four years later
because of concerns that the verification provision might be
exploited for intrusion into Pakistan's sensitive nuclear
facilities.
 India ratified the CWC, which relieved Pakistan's concerns about
the use of chemical weapons against its security. India had to
disclose that it had actually produced chemical weapons, which
undermined the credibility of India's pledges in a bilateral
framework.
 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was conceived to restrict
qualitative improvement of weapons technology. India was one of the
sponsors.
 Pakistan supported the treaty from the day it was proposed, but
only on the condition that it be non-discriminatory.
 Pakistan's stance on the CTBT followed the standard line, and it
sought to plug any loopholes India might later exploit to change
its mind about the treaty.
 India opposed the CTBT at the UN General Assembly, and declared it
would not sign it. The United States Senate decided against
ratification, and India's refusal sealed its fate.
 In early 2000, a suggestion was floated that Pakistan should
consider signing the CTBT. However, the government did not pursue
the idea because of opposition from political parties and a
religious party that warned of mass agitation if the government
wavered in its resolve.
 Although the idea had to be abandoned, public discussion about it
yielded some benefits, including better informed public opinion and
a softer impression of trigger-happy people.
 FMCT, which would have frozen the production of enriched uranium
and plutonium, was proposed in the 1980s but has suffered
relegation because of the collapse of the CTBT. Smaller nuclear-
weapons states are now more reluctant to embark on another similar
endeavor.
 The United States and Russia have entered into bilateral agreements
to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles.
 Chapter 17 Nuclear Tests
 India conducted multiple nuclear explosion tests on 11 and 13 May
1998, and Pakistan was suddenly confronted with this surprise
development. The government was impaled on the horns of a dilemma,
as testing would jeopardize military security and entail the threat
of economic sanctions.
 The security argument was irrefutable: Pakistan had to demonstrate
that it, too, possessed weapons capability. The rumblings of
threats and bluster from across the border drowned out whatever
reservations existed, and Pakistan could not ignore the threats.
 Western states focused efforts on preventing Pakistan from
following suit and sent messages and made diplomatic demarches. But
the one component most important to Pakistan was missing from the
dialogue: assurance on the key issue of security.
 Pakistan conducted nuclear explosion tests in the Chaghi Mountain
in Balochistan on 28 May 1998 as a response to Indian tests.
Pakistan had no grand design, and did not seek recognition or
reward, membership of the nuclear club or a permanent seat on the
Security Council.
 India's policy and pronouncements regarding its nuclear stance were
opaque, contradictory and misleading. Its diplomatic stance of
denunciation of the discrimination in the NPT and its demand for
time-bound elimination of nuclear arsenals was a smokescreen to
camouflage its own nuclear ambitions.
 Vajpayee's letters to Western leaders were propagandistic in
nature, and highlighted the history of India's relations with
China. After China protested, New Delhi back-tracked, assuring
Beijing that it did not regard China as a threat.
 The Indian test was severely criticized by all major powers,
including the US, who announced sanctions on defence sales,
termination or suspension of some assistance programmes, loans, and
opposition to World Bank and IMF lending.
 The focus of US policy immediately shifted to dissuading Pakistan
from conducting its own set of tests. Pakistan's response should
not have surprised him: Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub unleashed a
broadside on India and the United States.
 The world reaction lumped India and Pakistan together, although the
joint communiqué issued by the P-5, permanent members of the UN
Security Council, noted that India was the first to conduct the
tests and Pakistan was obliged to respond. The Security Council
Resolution 1172 failed to make the same distinction.
 The foreign ministers of the P-5 and the G-8 group of
industrialized states issued a communiqué postponing loans to
Sudan and Zimbabwe.
 Saudi Arabia provided Pakistan with 100,000 barrels of oil a day on
a deferred payments basis, and Western countries relaxed their
penalties a year later. The International Monetary Fund provided a
$1.2 billion credit to Pakistan for structural adjustment.
 Nuclear Restraints
 The Security Council resolution 1172 of 12 February 1999 prescribed
an elaborate agenda of restraints. Initiatives to stabilize the
situation would be consistent with Islamabad's past policy.
 Washington abandoned efforts to restrain India from accumulating an
increasing stockpile of fissile material, and arranged for France
to provide enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur power reactor,
violating its own Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978.
 Pakistan announced a moratorium on further nuclear tests and
decided to participate in negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut
off Treaty.
 The prime ministers of Pakistan and India expressed willingness to
sign the CTBT in September 1998, but the plan was derailed when the
 Vajpayee government fell and New Delhi decided to postpone a
decision on signing till after the election in October.
 Impact on Security
 The Pakistani nuclear tests helped silence those in India who
doubted Pakistan's nuclear capability, and perhaps even the Indian
prime minister, who said the tests had created a 'new' situation.
 Even before the May 1998 tests, those familiar with the apocalyptic
power of nuclear weapons expressed the view that acquisition of
nuclear capability would exercise a restraining influence on
jingoism. The two countries' prime ministers recognized the need
for caution.
 The May tests were salutary, but the chief of the Indian army
remarked that if militancy in India-held Kashmir 'grows too much',
India could contemplate a conventional war. The Security Council
urged India and Pakistan to remove tensions by finding solutions
that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir.
 The words were not followed by any purposeful action, and the
optimism generated by Resolution 1172 and the Lahore Declaration
soon evaporated with the outbreak of the Kargil crisis.
 Issues and Non-Issues
 The academic debate on proliferation has focused on Iran and North
Korea, but few participants envisage the spread of nuclear weapons
to many additional states.
 Major nuclear powers and some political scientists oppose nuclear
proliferation because they believe that medium and small powers
lack the resources, mutual learning experience, and technical
safeguards that help the superpowers manage crises.
 Political scientists do not share the above view, however. They
argue that nuclear weapons are a deterrent to war because they make
the cost of war seem frighteningly high, and thus discourage states
from starting any wars that might lead to the use of such weapons.
 A single 20-kiloton bomb, exploded over a densely populated city,
could cause 130,000 instantaneous deaths, over 200,000 people would
suffer blast injuries and radiation burns, and many times more
would be condemned to a life worse than death.
 The awesome potential for destruction invests nuclear weapons with
an unequalled power of deterrence. This is the main rationale for
the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by states that lack the
conventional power to deter aggression, and is also the reason why
Ukraine retained its nuclear weapons.
 Proliferation of nuclear weapons is a serious threat, and measures
must be taken to prevent theft and clandestine diversion of nuclear
materials. In the past, some states were selective in their
vigilance, and neither the USA nor the European community expressed
remorse for their collusion.
 It is desirable to share precautions, procedures, and confidence
building measures to reduce the dangers of miscalculation,
accidents, and theft among the nuclear states, but targeting some
small states cannot be constructive.
 Nuclear weapons are not a panacea in every conflict and a less
powerful state may face dangerous dilemmas if it ends up with an
 unsurvivable nuclear capability as well as a degraded conventional
force.
 The contingencies warranting a summons to the weapon of last resort
should be clearly and carefully defined. The people of a state can
give an answer to the cruel question of whether a victim of
aggression should make a choice between capitulation and
annihilation.
 Nuclear powers have built arsenals of diverse sizes, but deterrence
can be realized with a relatively modest arsenal. Moreover, nuclear
deterrence is not decisively degraded by quantitative or
qualitative disparity, so long as a states strategic arsenal is
sufficient to survive the first strike and still deliver
unacceptable damage.
 Medium nuclear powers have not considered it necessary to build
thousands of warheads. Israel has 510-650 kg of plutonium, enough
for 110-190 nuclear warheads.
 A small nuclear arsenal is sufficient to deter medium states,
provided the weapons can be delivered on targets of high value. If
the adversary develops the capacity for pre-emption and
interception, the arsenal has to be augmented correspondingly.
 The cost of designing, building and testing a plutonium-based
nuclear device was estimated at $100 million in 1968, and $51
million in 1976. If a country already possessed the fissile
material, the cost dropped to $1 million.
 In addition to possible containment of the defence budget, a
nuclear force makes the disparity of conventional forces
irrelevant, and allows Pakistan and India to cut back on
conventional forces and maintain a lower level balance.
 Pakistan viewed nuclear weapons as a means of deterring and
preventing war, not of fighting one. Its nuclear doctrine was based
on the principle of minimum credible deterrence, and the size of
its nuclear arsenal was determined by its own security and economic
circumstances.
 Nuclear deterrence is not dependent on parity or ratio between
arsenals. The Soviet Union possessed deterrent capability during
the Cuban crisis even though its nuclear arsenal was a fraction of
the size of the United States.
 Over-zealous super-patriots misled the United States and the Soviet
Union into a race that rational analysts now consider insane. China
did not commit the blunder.
 Nuclear weapons are not an acceptable idea to strategic thinkers in
the new nuclear-capable states, nor to the nuclear-weapons states.
Limiting nuclear weapons is a practical proposition that can serve
the interests of humankind and the states involved.
 The superpowers have set a good example by cutting their nuclear
inventories by some ninety percent in a decade to 3,000-3,500
warheads. The reduction process is likely to continue.
 Pakistan has supported proposals for a nuclear limitation regime,
globally and regionally. India rejected a proposal to consider
nuclear and security issues in South Asia at a conference of five
states, and the United States gave up and reverted to the Pakistan-
specific policy.
 The argument of an all-out arms race is inapplicable to Pakistan
because its nuclear capability is the smallest of all eight nuclear
weapon states. Pakistan's programme is driven by the need to deter
aggression, not competition.
 Statesmen and scholars worry that other countries may experience
incidents of miscalculation and near-accidents, and may not have
the resources to put fail-safe mechanisms in place.
 States with nuclear weapons have learned to address and contain the
risks of accidents or unauthorized use. They have developed fail-
safe mechanisms, and the US may have provided relevant information
and equipment to Pakistan and India.
 In the United States and Russia, the presidents carry Black Boxes
and can give coded signals that enable nuclear weapons to be armed
for explosion.
 Pakistan set up a National Command Authority in February 2000. The
Strategic Plans Division was assigned responsibilities for research
and development, up-gradation and application of stringent
custodial controls.
 India has trumpeted the no-first-use of nuclear weapons but
reserves the right to use conventional force. China's commitment to
peace is manifest in its policy of peace toward neighbors.
 Over-dependence on strategic deterrence can lead to misperceptions
of local and low-intensity conflicts as commencement of general
hostilities, making the weapon-of-last-resort a weapon-of-first-
resort.
 India's polemical approach to nuclear issues was manifest in its
attribution of Pakistan's nuclear capability to the transfer of
technology from outside, while ignoring the efforts of Pakistani
scientists and engineers to indigenously replicate and develop
nuclear and missile technologies.
 Foreign commentators have tried to stroke atavistic prejudices by
describing the Pakistan programme as a plan to produce an 'Islamic
bomb'. Pakistan has joined the world community in tightening
custodial controls.
 A transnational underworld network of manufactures and suppliers
was accused of transferring nuclear materials and technology to
Iran, Libya and North Korea, including centrifuges and drawings for
a crude explosive device handed over to the United States by Libya.
 Pakistan cooperated in the investigation of allegations against
A.Q. Khan and his subordinates, and obtained relevant information
through the interrogation of accused individuals. The investigation
concluded that the government had not authorized any transfer, and
that the sale was on account of the personal greed of a few
persons.
 Fortunately, the US concerns were anticipated, and the government
took measures to streamline command and control and strengthen
custodial security of strategic assets. However, involvement of
Pakistani scientists in the underground international network of
suppliers and traffickers of nuclear equipment and technology kept
Pakistan in the limelight.
 Although Pakistan took effective measures to prevent any further
leakage of technology, international concerns remained about the
 security of Pakistan's strategic assets, the danger of terrorists
gaining access to nuclear materials, and political stability.
 Senator John F. Kerry expressed concerns about Pakistan's refusal
to allow interrogation of A.Q. Khan, and Secretary of State-
designate Condoleezza Rice acknowledged the danger of Pakistani
nuclear assets falling into the hands of extremists. Pakistan
provided parts of old and discarded centrifuges to IAEA for
comparison.
 Researchers believe the United States has been obsessed with
nuclear weapons and technology falling into the hands of al Qaeda
since 9/11. They believe the US has conceived a plan for a
simultaneous global covert and overt assault on all nuclear
facilities that were regarded as 'either unintentionally unsecure
or intentionally hostile'.
 Ballistic Missiles: The Threat of Destabilization
 As force multipliers, missiles enhance both offensive and defensive
capability, and make the adversary's nuclear deterrent less
credible. They also create new dilemmas connected with threats to
the survivability of a small nuclear force.
 Pakistan is concerned about India's missile programme, which
includes short-range surface-to-air missiles like Trishul and Akash
and the anti-tank Nag, as well as long-range Agni, which is capable
of delivering nuclear warheads as far away as Beijing, Jakarta,
Riyadh, and Tehran.
 Pakistan responded to the situation with missiles of its own, but
the United States raised vociferous objections and did little to
restrain India from inducting missiles into South Asia.
 Pakistan has indigenously produced a variety of ballistic missiles,
including the liquid-fuel Ghauri and solid-fuel Shaheen, as well as
the anti-aircraft Atiza and the anti-tank Baktar Shikan.
 Ballistic missiles can travel long distances in minutes and strike
with little notice. They can be used to spread panic and demoralize
the population, or to knock out punches at airfields and other
targets.
 Tests of missiles are necessary for validating the technology and
improving accuracy, but parity is not necessary for credibility or
affordability.
 Increasing Isolation, 1990-2001
 Pakistan rose to international respect in the 1980s, but lost that
respect at the turn of the decade when the international community
focused on its nuclear programme and imposed sanctions. Poor
governance, reckless international borrowing and rampant corruption
added to Pakistan's economic plight. General Pervez Musharraf's
government began to rescue Pakistan from international isolation by
implementing stringent austerity measures and cooperating with the
United States.
 US Sanctions Again
 In 1989, the nuclear issue began to dominate Pakistan-US relations
once again. The US asked Islamabad to discontinue the weapons
research programme, but Islamabad declined, and the Psssler
Amendment was activated, prohibiting economic and military
assistance to Pakistan. The US immediately cut off $700 million in
 assistance to Pakistan and refused to transfer F-16 aircrafts and
other military equipment for which Pakistan had paid a billion
dollars in cash. This revived the bitter memories of Pakistan's
past grievances of US refusal to honor commitments.
 Fortunately, international financial institutions and bilateral
donors did not follow the US example, but the economy suffered a
severe jolt.
 Support for the Taliban
 Pakistan's recognition of the Taliban government in May 1997
provoked international disapproval and criticism, but the decision
was not without justification. The Taliban proved unreasonable and
rigid and committed one blunder after another, provoking
international outrage.
 Islamabad failed to foresee that the Taliban were internationally
perceived as the creation of Pakistan. The Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara
parties in Afghanistan denounced Pakistan, and the United Nations,
OIC and ECO refused to recognize the Taliban regime.
 Pakistan was blamed for failing to prevent the Taliban from giving
asylum to Osama bin Laden and his followers. The United States
itself did little to influence the Taliban.
 Pakistan, anxious to maintain cooperative relations with
Afghanistan and cognizant of the Taliban's friendly disposition
toward Pakistan, proffered counsel and advice for moderation, but
the Taliban leadership was dismissive of criticism and persisted in
its suicidal course.
 Declining Prestige
 International goodwill for Pakistan was undermined by corruption at
high levels, poor governance, fiscal extravagance, mounting
budgetary deficits and an escalating debt burden.
 Nuclear Tests
 Pakistan alone was not the target of sanctions, but its economy was
more vulnerable to the aid cutoff, and the government resorted to a
freeze of $11 billion in foreign currency deposits, antagonizing
hundreds of thousands of people.
 Pakistan-India Dialogue, 1997-99
 The dialogue between Pakistan and India was reopened in February
1997 at the level of foreign secretaries, but the gap between the
two positions was not bridged when prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and
I.K. Gujral met in May 1997.
 The All Parties Hurriyat Conference in Kashmir called a hartal for
the first time since the Kashmir dispute arose, and appealed to the
world community to promote an initiative toward settlement of the
Kashmir dispute.
 The foreign secretaries of Pakistan and India agreed to recommence
dialogue and set up working groups. The prime ministers expressed
determination to renew efforts for durable peace.
 Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan from 20-21 February 1999 and
concluded a summit with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The two sides
agreed to intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including
the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, and to reduce the risks of
accidental nuclear use.
 The Lahore Summit was a grand if ephemeral success, but was greeted
with vociferous protests against India's brutal repression in
Kashmir, and the Indian leaders downplayed the importance of the
commitment to resolve the outstanding issues.
 The reference to the 'sanctity' of the Line of Control was
particularly insensitive and departed from Pakistan's view that the
line was a temporary arrangement.
 The Kargil Crisis, 1999
 A grave crisis erupted in May 1999 following intrusion of armed
personnel from Pakistan into the Kargil heights in Kashmir.
Pakistan denied the facts and attributed the fighting to Kashmiri
freedom fighters, but foreign countries implicitly blamed Pakistan
for the 'intruders'.
 Armed men penetrated the Kargil-Dras sector and seized high ground
threatening the Srinagar-Leh road, so India retaliated with a
massive air and army operation to dislodge the guerrillas. The
Pakistani foreign minister was accorded a frigid and hostile
reception in New Delhi.
 Concern mounted internationally that the fighting in Kargil might
escalate and lead to a general war between Pakistan and India. Only
the OIC backed Pakistan's position and called for de-escalation and
dialogue.
 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sued for the US President's
intercession to defuse the crisis. Clinton persuaded Sharif to
agree to a joint statement that provided for an immediate cessation
of hostilities and a resumption of a Pakistan-India dialogue.
 Reading into the Washington joint statement a US pledge to promote
settlement of the Kashmir question was not only a spin aimed at
misleading public opinion but a self-deception. The president had
promised only his 'personal interest' in promoting the 'Lahore
process'.
 Most commentators blamed the Pakistan government for losing sight
of strategy and approving a misconceived operation that could
escalate to the nuclear level. The APHC leader described the
Pakistan government's policy as unpredictable.
 Inconsistent and contradictory statements undermined Pakistan's
credibility, and shallow thinking was manifest in pendulum swings
from naive bus diplomacy to the Kargil gamble. Politics of
corruption was diagnosed as the main reason for the shallow and
myopic policies.
 Autopsies of the Kargil crisis by Pakistani commentators underlined
the agonizing dilemmas that Pakistan faced in regard to the Kashmir
issue. Misconceived policies and actions isolated Pakistan
internationally and gravely damaged the heroic freedom struggle of
the Kashmiri people.
 After the Kargil episode, Nawaz Sharif blamed the army for keeping
him ignorant of the plan for the Kargil operation, and dismissed
Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf while he was on his
way back from Sri Lanka.
 Coping with Isolation
 General Pervez Musharraf focused efforts on improving governance
and rectification of Pakistan's fiscal predicament, and the debt
 burden was stabilized. Austerity and belt-tightening were
implemented, and by the end of June 2001, exports increased by 10
percent growth.
 Friend countries maintained solidarity with Pakistan. Saudi Arabia
was generous in economic assistance, China and Kuwait provided
balance of payments support, Oman extended substantial assistance
for economic development, and the US used its influence to contain
Pakistan-India tension.
 Bound by its rules, the Commonwealth suspended Pakistan's
membership but maintained contacts with the new leadership. The
Pakistan delegation urged the UK to join in efforts to reform bank
secrecy laws which encouraged corruption, undermined good
governance and siphoned off scarce capital.
 The Agra Summit
 On New Year's Day, 2001, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee
suggested a meeting with the Pakistani president to resolve the
Kashmir dispute. The two leaders held several exclusive meetings
and reached an understanding to resume dialogue.
 The Pakistani and Indian foreign ministers agreed on a declaration
text to be recommended to the leaders. The Indian cabinet committee
considered the draft for over two hours, after which the Indian
minister sought a meeting with his Pakistani counterpart to discuss
an amendment to the one-line paragraph on Kashmir.
 The Pakistani president was told by the Indian prime minister that
the cabinet committee had not reached agreement, but that he would
visit Pakistan later to finalize the proposed agreement. Both sides
tried to relieve the gloom by stating that the summit was not a
failure.
 The Indian side soon started backtracking on the agreed draft, and
Vajpayee said that India would have to find place in any document
that future negotiations endeavor to conclude.
 Observers speculated that President Musharraf's breakfast meeting
with Indian media luminaries had offended the Indian leaders, but
there was little new in what he said, and the Indian side agreed to
finalize the draft of the declaration.
 The Pakistani president's reference to Kashmir as the principal
obstacle to normalization of Pakistan-Indian relations was no more
than a statement of the obvious.
 Vajpayee's explanation that Pakistan insisted on the settlement of
the Jammu and Kashmir issue as a pre-condition for normalization of
relations was factually incorrect.
 The Indian cabinet committee objected to the draft, and months
later the Indian press attributed responsibility for obstructing
agreement to the deputy prime minister, L.K. Advani. Advani later
admitted he had torpedoed the summit, now giving a new explanation,
namely that General Musharraf had blasted India's position on
cross-border terrorism.
 Vajpayee had conceived and canvassed the initiative for dialogue
with Pakistan on Kashmir, but the agreement fell victim to internal
political battles. Three months later, terrorist attacks changed
the global situation.
 Chapter 19 Post-9/11 Policy
 The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on
11 September 2001 triggered a transformation of world politics, and
left the American nation traumatized and seething with rage and
urge for revenge. The president of Pakistan expressed condolences
and solidarity with the American people.
 The US media immediately pointed a finger of accusation at Osama
bin Laden and implicated the Taliban, and Pakistan was bound to
face painful choices.
 Policy Planning by Pakistan
 President Musharraf attended a high-level meeting in Islamabad on
12 September and surmised that the United States would take
military action against the Taliban. He considered Pakistan's
options, keeping in mind the national interest and the need for a
realistic assessment of the obtaining environment.
 The United States was likely to mount an attack against the Taliban
with the cooperation of major powers, and no proof of Taliban
complicity with bin Laden would be asked or considered necessary.
 The Security Council resolution of December 2000 had imposed
sanctions against the Taliban, and Pakistan had cooperated. Now, a
defiant policy course was out of the question, as Pakistan's vital
interests were at stake.
 Pakistan had to pursue a strategy that would reduce risks to its
own security and strategic interests, avoid offence to the United
States, and maintain cultural and geographical ties with
Afghanistan.
 A cautious cooperation in a UN-approved action against the Taliban
emerged as the only feasible alternative. Pakistan should join the
global consensus, not oppose US attacks on targets in Afghanistan,
and indicate a generally positive disposition and negotiate details
later.
 Pakistan's strategy was decided on 12 September, before any
specific requests from the United States, and before public
statements from President Bush.
 Pakistan's analysis was borne out by events, and world consensus
solidified in favor of the United States. NATO invoked the treaty
provision for joint defence, and China, Japan and Russia expressed
solidarity with the coalition.
 US Policy
 Soon the contours of US policy began to emerge. President Bush
spoke of a monumental struggle of good versus evil, Secretary of
State Powell announced that the US expected 'the fullest
cooperation' of Pakistan, and the US warned that Pakistan would be
at risk if it did not cooperate.
 On 13 September, US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage
summoned the ambassador of Pakistan to Washington to convey a list
of seven steps the US wanted Pakistan to take.
 The United States is asking for blanket overflight and landing
rights, intelligence information, and territorial access to conduct
operations against al Qaeda.
 Islamabad was in a position to give a prompt and positive response
to the US request for assistance when it was received, with details
on some points to be worked out later. Pakistan made substantial
 concessions, but did not participate in US military action in
Afghanistan.
 Consultation with Opinion Leaders
 The president held lengthy and interactive discussions with a dozen
groups of prominent people from various walks of national life.
They were realistic in their assessment of the gravity of the
situation.
 The ulema (religious scholars) disagreed with the US policy towards
Pakistan, arguing that religious duty required Pakistan to support
the Taliban, regardless of costs and consequences. However, other
religious scholars put forward convincing refutation, citing
instances from early Islamic history.
 After the US-led coalition attacked Afghanistan on 6 October,
Pakistani religious parties called for demonstrations. The public
doubted the wisdom of protesting, and participation was limited to
a narrow section of opinion.
 The US and the West applauded the Pakistan government for
enlightened leadership, and manifested their solidarity by visiting
Pakistan. Many leaders came to Pakistan, including the heads of
government of the UK, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
 Economic Cooperation and Assistance
 Islamabad did not bargain for a quid pro quo, but was aware of the
value of its contribution to the fight against terrorism. The US
and other Western countries responded to this by increasing their
support and assistance.
 Pakistan's key role in the war on terrorism led to improved
relations with major countries, including the dismantling of
nuclear and democracy sanctions and the rescheduling of the debt.
 The US waived Pakistan's democracy sanctions and nuclear sanctions
in 2002 and 2003 and agreed to provide $3 billion in economic and
military assistance over five years. The US also agreed to sell F-
16 aircrafts to Pakistan.
 Over the period 2001-07, the United States transferred $7,135
million to Pakistan, including $2,335 million in military
assistance, budgetary support, development assistance, earthquake
relief, and $4,800 million in reimbursement of expenditures on
logistic support to US forces in Afghanistan.
 Japan had not misled by false assumptions and considered resumption
of development assistance, if Pakistan signed the CTBT.
 After 9/11, Japan provided $300 million as grant assistance to
Pakistan and supported Pakistan's case in the IMF and the Paris
Club. Japan also rescheduled $12 billion in bilateral debt at lower
interest rates and extended maturities, effectively reducing the
burden by 30 percent.
 China's 'all weather friendship' with Pakistan and its
understanding of Islamabad's motivations ensured continuity of
cooperation between the two countries, despite Beijing's
reservations over Islamabad's support for the Taliban. China also
supported the UN-led Bonn process in Afghanistan.
 Pakistan and China have established friendly relations and have
signed several agreements to expand trade and invest in
 infrastructure. China has also given $500 million to support
Pakistan's balance of payments.
 Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pakistan on 5-6 April 2005 and signed 21
agreements to promote closer trade and economic ties, as well as
mutually beneficial cooperation across the board.
 Pakistan has grievances against the United States for going back on
its commitments to Pakistan after achieving its immediate
objectives. Pakistan was left without resources to cope with
millions of Afghan refugees.
 Pakistan wanted durable commitment from Washington too, but
officials in high places in the Bush administration entertained
doubts about Pakistan's reliability for sustained support to the
United States. This was welcome news to people in Pakistan who
place great emphasis on sincerity.
 The US's sudden termination of support for Pakistan in 1990, and
neglect of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, was a flawed
policy, and Washington's limited capacity to influence the Taliban
was undermined as a result of US sanctions and aid cut off.
 After 9/11, US spokespersons repeatedly assured the nations in the
region of the durability of their country's new policy, emphasizing
especially the continuity of US cooperation with Pakistan. The US
Congress passed an act in December 2004 with provisions assuring
continued assistance to Pakistan after the expiry of the five-year
package in 2009.
 The fall of the Taliban lifted the shadow on Pakistan's relations
with Iran, and after the coalition forces took control of
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran lost their rivalry for influence in
Afghanistan.
 Pakistan's measures to extradite or expel militants and extremists
were appreciated by Arab, Central Asian and other foreign
countries.
 New Afghanistan
 The US-led coalition's military intervention in Afghanistan
resulted in much suffering, including thousands of innocent
civilians.
 Pakistan cooperated with the world community for an end to civil
war, promotion of peace and reconciliation among the different
ethnic communities, and political stability in Afghanistan.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia prepared a joint working paper, which was
presented to the leaders of the United States and Britain.
 The UN-chaired Bonn conference of prominent Afghans endorsed a
multi-phase formula that provided for an interim administration, a
loya jirga, a general election, and the return of former King Zahir
Shah to his country.
 Chairman-designate Hamid Karzai and members of the interim
administration welcomed a delegation led by the foreign minister to
participate in the installation ceremony. They expressed lasting
gratitude for Pakistan's role in the liberation of their country.
 President Hamid Karzai's decision to visit Pakistan soon after
assuming office and the president of Pakistan's return visit to
Kabul illustrated the desire of both sides to reconstruct close
friendly relations between the two countries.
 Chairman Hamid Karzai was elected president of Afghanistan in 2004
with 55.4 percent of the vote, with solid support in the Pashtun
east and south, as well as a comfortable majority in the multi-
ethnic west and urban centers, including Kabul.
 Elections held in September 2005 provided political representation
to all Afghan ethnic and sectarian components of the population,
and bilateral trade increased to a record $500 million in 2004.
 Political stability, the establishment of law and order, and
continued economic progress in Afghanistan will help resolve
problems of narcotics production and trafficking.
 Pakistan-US Strategic Partnership
 Pakistan was thrust to a frontline role in dealing with a crisis in
Afghanistan after 9/11 and decided to cooperate with the United
States to facilitate its foreseeable attack on the base of the
perpetrators.
 Washington made demands of Islamabad on 13 September, and Islamabad
accepted them. This was consistent with the principles of
international law, and the policy was maintained even after
political parties formed the government in 2008.
 The long and rugged mountainous border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan with hundreds of mountains and thousands of tracks and
trails is difficult to seal, and smugglers and outlaws exploit the
absence of law enforcement administration to evade arrest.
 After the US and allied forces invaded Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and a
large number of the Taliban fled to the Pushtoon border region.
 After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan moved a substantial
number of troops to the border and killed or captured thousands of
terrorists.
 After 9/11, US officials praised Pakistan's leadership as a voice
of moderation and reason in the Islamic world and pledged
continuity of support for the strategic partnership between the two
countries. However, neither the US nor Pakistan succeeded to
liquidate the terrorists.
 The US and its allies did not bring adequate forces to Afghanistan,
so they co-opted Afghan warlords to fight the opposition to the US
invasion. These warlords did not diligently pursue Osama Bin Laden.
 The Bush administration's policies continued to alienate the
Pushtoon majority in Afghanistan, and the Taliban staged a
resurgence due to US bombardment. Al Qaeda also recovered influence
because of insensitive US policies that offended the Muslim world.
 US insensitivity towards Muslims led to Islamophobia and the
invasion of Iraq on a trumped up charge. Torture was authorized to
coerce confessions from suspects held at the notorious Guantanamo
Bay, Abu Ghraib and Bagram prisons.
 The Bush administration demonstrated gross indifference to long-
standing grievances of Muslim peoples, allowed Israel to unleash
terrorist gangs for atrocities against Palestinians, and allowed Al
Qaeda to rebuild strength and resume its agenda of terrorism. The
war on terror became unpopular in Pakistan.
 The US and its Afghan ally asked Pakistan to do more, but Pakistan
was already doing more than they were. The US also suspected that
 Pakistan was playing a double game by siding with the US but
secretly colluding with the Taliban.
 The US started using Drone missiles in 2004 to target Al Qaeda
operatives and their allies in their hideouts in FATA, who mounted
attacks across the border. Pakistan objected to the violation of
its sovereignty and opinion leaders became highly critical of the
United States.
 Islamabad was angry at the US for transferring civilian nuclease
technology to India, and for discriminating against Pakistan by
refusing to extend the same concession to Pakistan on the invalid
ground that Pakistan's non-proliferation record was flawed while
India had 'impeccable non-proliferation credentials'.
 Pakistan has a distrust of the United States because of the US'
recurrent record of unilateral cut-offs of cooperation with
Pakistan, which has left Pakistan with a multitude of problems
bequeathed by the Cold War.
 Respected American statesmen have recognized that Pakistan's
grievances are not unfounded, and the 9/11 Commission recommended
that the United States should make a long-term commitment to
Pakistan.
 After 9/11, the US government made efforts to underscore the
durability of its commitment to Pakistan by providing $3 billion in
economic and military aid, and contributing generously to
education, health and poverty reduction programmes.
 President Barack Obama announced a new strategy to deal with the
deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which was
aimed at disrupting, dismantling, defeating and expelling Al Qaeda
and preventing their return to either country.
 President Obama emphasized strengthening Afghanistan and Pakistan
and enhancing their military, economic and governance capacity to
overcome the threat posed by Al Qaeda and militant extremists. He
pledged to respect Pakistan's sovereignty and consult with Pakistan
before attacking high-value targets.
 The Kerry-Lugar Bill, 2009, increased economic assistance from $300
million a year to $1.5 billion a year for the next five years to
support economic growth and development, improve living standards,
and build sustainable relations with Pakistan.
 Twenty countries, including the United States, Japan, Britain,
Germany, China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, pledged $5.7 billion
in aid for Pakistan.
 Pakistan's foreign policy had evidently situated it in the
mainstream of world opinion at a critical time in its history, when
the country was confronted with an existential threat. Terrorists
attacked military convoys, check-posts, police personnel, their
premises and civilian officials, and destroyed valuable assets.
 Chapter 21 Terrorism
 Pakistan has condemned terrorism and supported international
cooperation to eradicate the scourge by eliminating its root
causes, including alien occupation, state oppression and
repression, and gross violations of human rights. It has
intensified its pursuit of foreign militants, including Osama bin
Laden, and has suffered heavy losses in lives.
 Pakistan's president urged world leaders to promote a just
resolution of international issues, but was disappointed at the
lack of a salutary response. Negotiations on a comprehensive
international convention against terrorism stalled because of
disagreements on the definition of terrorism.
 The events of 9/11 marked a seismic shift in international
relations, as some states began to use the label of terrorism to
demonize political opponents and to threaten or justify new
military action on long-running disputes. Ironically, the Indian
government condemned terrorism when others under its yoke took to
militant struggle.
 The Universal Human Rights Declaration, two human rights
conventions, covenants on crimes against humanity, war crimes and
genocide have not restrained states from suppressing popular
protests for freedom and other human rights, and from terrorizing
people by resorting to indiscriminate violence, torture, custodial
killings, destruction of homes and businesses, molestation and
rape.
 Israel has enjoyed the strong support of the Western countries with
influential domestic Zionist lobbies, but the US political elite
has conspicuously ignored this root cause as Zionist lobbies
exploited the popular outrage against terrorism and Ariel Sharon's
government resorted to demonlsation.
 Islam Targeted
 As the Soviet Union collapsed, Zionist political intellectuals and
lobbyists in the United States substituted Islam for communism as
the new threat to the West, and used out-of-context quotations from
the Quran and incorrect translations to whip up hatred against
Muslims.
 The projection of Islam as an enemy of the West was a preposterous
fabrication, and the predominant political thought in the Muslim
world recognizes the desperate need for cooperation with the West
to end centuries of stagnation.
 Politically motivated acts of militancy and violence, by an
extremist fringe among Muslims, unleashed a wave of Islamophobia in
countries with significant Muslim immigrant populations, especially
the United States, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Muslim
citizens, residents and visitors were exposed to economic and
social discrimination.
 Islam teaches the noble precept of human fraternity, and abhors the
killing of even a single innocent person. It also emphasizes
coexistence, and prohibits discrimination on grounds of race,
color, language, national origin, wealth or gender.
 All OIC countries condemned the 9/11 outrage and several of them
provided logistic support for the fight against terrorists in
Afghanistan. Enlightened leaders in the West were also anxious to
avoid besmirching Islam and alienating the large Muslim world.
 Jihad is a fundamental duty for every believer, but an individual
is not permitted to unleash violence. A community is also not
permitted to wage war, and rulers of Muslim states have
historically used the term of jihad in the same sense as states in
Europe used the doctrine of 'just war'.
 Al Qaeda leaders issued declarations of jihad against Jews and
Crusaders, but had no authority to do so. Bin Laden's deputy Ayman
al-Zawahiri issued statements urging people to support the
Pakistani Taliban in 'jihad' against the United States.
 Bin Laden and many of his followers were recruited by the CLA to
join the Afghan Mujahedeen in their liberation struggle against the
Soviet occupation. After the war was won, some of the volunteers
joined bin Laden and Al Qaeda.
 Muslim countries realized the need to project a correct
understanding of their faith and condemned the 11 September
outrage. They also reiterated Islamic teachings that uphold the
sanctity of human life.
 A conference held in Istanbul in February 2002 by the OIC and EU
members to highlight harmony among civilizations rejected the
perverse thesis of 'clash of civilizations' and emphasized instead
the history of mutually beneficial interaction among civilizations.
 Pakistan and Saudi Arabia adopted policies to denounce the
extremist fringe within Muslim societies. President Musharraf
courageously embarked on an energetic promotion of 'enlightened
moderation' emphasizing the need to replace the institutions of
hate, anger and militancy with a correct projection of Islam that
stands for 'peace, harmony, justice, equality and brotherhood'. The
Muslim leader pledged to focus on concrete solutions to
international issues affecting Muslim people, including a two-
states solution, an end to the war in Iraq, and empowering the
people in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
 Terrorism and religion have long been abused to justify wars and
campaigns of terror. In the first century ad, a Jewish sect
targeted fellow Jews suspected of aiding the Romans, and in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Muslims were liquidated in Spain
and the Inquisition carried out brutal burnings.
 State terrorism has a long history. Alexander burned and razed
Persepolis, Tiberius and Caligua executed people to terrorize the
opposition, the Jacobins proclaimed the 'Reign of Terror', and
Britain, France and Portugal unleashed terror against freedom
movements in their colonies.
 The United States waged war on Iraq, causing colossal destruction
of communications and urban infrastructure, and killing hundreds of
thousands of people. Four million people either emigrated or were
internally dislocated, and the war became so unpopular within the
US that policy change was constraint.
 Israel has persisted in state terrorism and aggression against
Palestine over six decades, subjecting the people of Palestine to
occupation and repression. In 1993, President Bill Clinton mediated
a successful meeting between President Yasser Arafat and Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, laying the foundation for the Oslo
Declaration of Principles.
 Ariel Sharon, Barak's successor, re-embarked on Israel's old
policies of expansion and ethnic cleansing by systematic violence
and terror.
 President Barack Obama called for a halt to Israeli settlements in
occupied Palestine and pledged to support a two-state solution.
 The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy
 The demonization of Islam, Palestinians, Kashmiris and Chechens,
and the war on terrorism, represent uncivilized responses to an
objective problem that calls instead for a comprehensive strategy
combining preventive and deterrence measures with redress of root
causes.
 The High Level Panel emphasized the need to resolve long-standing
disputes, including Palestine, Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula,
and outlined a five-point global strategy for fighting terrorism,
including dissuading disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as
a tactic, denial of means for terrorists to attack, deterring
states from supporting terrorists, and defending human rights.
 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), led by Baitullah Mehsud, attacked
military convoys and check-posts, police personnel and premises and
civilian officials, killing large numbers of citizens and
destroying valuable assets. The death toll mounted from 590 in 2006
to over two thousand in 2008.
 TTP recruited thousands of students of seminaries and other
unemployed men to unleash a campaign of terror, and militant
maulanas did likewise and imitated TTP to take control of parts of
FATA. The Taliban defaulted in laying down arms as required under
an agreement.
 Popular opinion in Pakistan realized that the terrorists posed an
existential threat to the country and the democratic system. The
armed forces fought bravely and succeeded in liquidating the
terrorists and recovering control in Swat within three months.
 Retrospect
 The roots of antagonism between Pakistan and India can be traced to
the history of Hindu-Muslim relations and contention between the
Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. India ignored the
legitimate aspirations of its smaller neighbors for relations based
on the principle of sovereign equality.
 India's imperial attitude is partly inherited from the predecessor
British Raj, but its roots are traceable to great power ambitions
cultivated in the minds of the Indian political elite by leaders of
the Indian National Congress since the late nineteenth century.
Jawaharlal Nehru considered India as a world power and envisioned
an Indian sphere of influence extending from Bab el-Mandeb to the
Straits of Malacca.
 We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power, but
that superiority is not so great that it will produce results in
war or by fear of war. Therefore, we should adopt a peaceful policy
towards Pakistan.
 This ambitious Nehru wants to establish a great empire
unprecedented in India's history, and believes that the small
nation state is doomed.
 India's drive to impose its own preferences on less powerful
neighbors has been manifest in its refusal to utilize the other
peaceful means for settlement of disputes.
 New Delhi tried to paint Pakistan as a terrorist comer after 9/11,
but Pakistan's provident policy made it a frontline ally in the
fight against terrorism.
 After the 13 December 2001 attacks on the Indian parliament, India
escalated pressure on Pakistan, but the danger of war was averted
due to a combination of factors, including Pakistan's capacity for
self-defence and the risk of escalation to the nuclear level.
 New Delhi threatened Pakistan, demanding an end to 'infiltration'
and labeling the Kashmiri freedom struggle as a 'terrorist'
movement. Pakistan responded with restraint and reason.
 Prime Minister Vajpayee met President Musharraf in Islamabad on 6
January 2004 and announced an agreement to recommence the composite
dialogue. The dialogue included peace and cooperation, terrorism,
drug trafficking, and friendly exchanges.
 After their meeting in Islamabad, the Pakistani President and
Indian Prime Minister expressed confidence that the composite
dialogue would lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral
disputes.
 Several agreements were made between Pakistan and India, including
the reduction of risks from nuclear accidents, pre-notification of
ballistic missile tests, operationalisation of Khokhrapar-Munabhao
rail link, release of prisoners, and opening Sialkot-Jammu route.
 In Jammu and Kashmir, both sides agree to respect the line of
control, and agree to refrain from using force in violation of it.
 Joint surveys revealed that 29 of the 67 boundary pillars in the
Rann of Kutch were missing.
 No progress was made on the Wullar Barrage dispute, as Pakistan
argued that the storage of 342,000-acre feet behind the barrage
would violate the Indus Waters Treaty. India did not address that
point.
 Pervez Musharraf suggested a seven regional solution for Jammu and
Kashmir, which was contrary to the recognized position of Pakistan.
The Government of Pakistan did not endorse the irresponsible
statement, and the parliament ignored it.
 Musharraf went ahead to nominate a class-fellow to start a back-
channel dialogue with the Indian prime minister's nominee, but no
agreement was reached.
 After his resignation as President, Gen. Musharraf told an Indian
TV interviewer that the back-channel discussions had come close to
agreements on all three disputes, and that he had the support of
corps commanders for the 'broad principles'.
 The restoration of a democratic government in Pakistan after the
February 2008 elections has left open the question of the impact of
Musharraf's 'personal' ideas and the understandings allegedly
reached in the back-channel talks on Pakistan's position in respect
of Jammu and Kashmir.
 Mumbai Outrage: Pakistani federal authorities initiated a thorough
investigation into the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which were
planned in Pakistan. They requested India for more details, which
India promised to provide, but Pakistani media blamed India for
delay in beginning prosecution.
 The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India agreed in July 2009 to
share information on future terrorist threats.
 The people of Kashmir have made it unmistakably known that they
insist on being heard, and that they do not accept the status quo
 as a solution. The United Nations has a principal responsibility to
seek a solution.
 Korbel's assessment of the Kashmiri people has stood the test of
time, and their heroic struggle and sacrifices have demonstrated
their resolve to win freedom. Relations between Pakistan and India
remain strained, and normalization is distant.
 Although the Security Council implicitly recognized the threat
posed by tension between Pakistan and India, it has not resumed
consideration of the Kashmir question since the early 1960s.
 The people of Kashmir have taken their destiny into their own hands
and their heroic sacrifices are a guarantee that the cause will
endure. India's savage repression has exposed the colonial nature
of its stranglehold over occupied Kashmir.
 Hurriyat leaders wanted to be associated with the dialogue between
Pakistan and India on the question of settlement of Jammu and
Kashmir, but India opposed the suggestion.
 President Musharraf's personal suggestion for a regional solution
was futile, as were previous ideas for a state-wide plebiscite or
one only in the valley. A state-wide plebiscite remained the only
formula bearing the imprimatur of Security Council resolutions.
 The regional alternative was first conceived in 1950 by UN mediator
Owen Dixon. It envisaged regional plebiscites and the allocation of
each section or area according to the results of the vote therein.
 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was prepared to discuss a
plebiscite in the valley alone, but Pakistan was not keen on the
idea because it would be a deviation from the Security Council
resolution.
 Sheikh Abdullah floated the idea of independence after he realized
that Nehru was intent on maintaining Indian occupation. He was
dismissed and jailed for twelve years.
 The only serious Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir took place
after the Sino-Indian border clash in 1962. The Indian side
initially appeared open to the idea of partitioning the state, but
back-tracked as soon as the Chinese forces withdrew.
 India proposed converting the ceasefire line into an international
border at the Shimla Conference in 1972, but Pakistan resisted and
refused to barter away the right of the Kashmiri people to self-
determination.
 Media analysts have long talked about alternatives to a statewide
plebiscite, but the Indian side has ruled out any redrawing of
borders or further division. Pakistan should support the people of
Kashmir by maintaining the bottom line.
 Mirwaiz Umar Farooq endorsed the peace moves between Pakistan and
India, but Syed Ali Shah Geelani expressed disappointment that the
agreements brought no relief to the Kashmiri people.
 UN and Other Organizations
 As wars became too destructive, major European Powers formed a Holy
Alliance, the Concert of Europe, and the League of Nations. The
League failed to prevent the Italian invasion and occupation of
Ethiopia or Germany from annexing Austria and Czechoslovakia.
 The United Nations was established to save the world from the
scourge of war. Its charter requires members to settle disputes by
 peaceful means and in conformity with principles of justice and
international law.
 The United Nations has a General Assembly and a Security Council.
The Security Council was paralyzed from the start because of
discord between the USSR and the US.
 The Millennium Summit, held in New York from 6 to 8 September 2000,
adopted the Millennium Declaration, which called for the
eradication of poverty, primary education for all children,
reduction of maternal mortality by two-thirds, and halting and
reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS.
 The Millennium Development Goals were not achieved in the first
five years, and poverty intensified and HIV/AIDS took an increasing
toll in sub-Sahara Africa. Pakistan's population growth rate posed
a serious obstacle to the reduction of unemployment.
 Development assistance by affluent countries remained inadequate,
and global military expenditure began to gallop in 2002, rising
nearly 40 percent to approach the colossal total of one trillion
dollars. The United Nations was also criticized for its inability
to deal effectively with global problems.
 The Millennium Declaration called for reform of the United Nations,
including a comprehensive reform of the Security Council.
 A 16-member high-level panel was appointed by the Secretary General
to recommend clear and effective measures for ensuring effective
collective action. The panel's recommendations on terrorism, pre-
emptive use of force, and enlargement of the Security Council
attracted special attention.
 The members of the Panel believe that the United Nations cannot
discharge its role effectively if it does not resolve the long-
standing disputes in Palestine, Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula.
 The UN summit meeting in September 2005 had to be content with the
minimum common denominator acceptable to member states due to
controversy over the management of funds accumulated by the UN from
export of oil by Iraq.
 Discussions on the enlargement of the Security Council began in the
General Assembly in 1993. Germany and Japan staked claims to
permanent seats, while others advocated for regional balance and
the addition of non-permanent seats only.
 The Secretary General appointed a high level panel to advise on
enlargement of the Security Council, which suggested two
alternative models for enlargement. The panel suggested that the
General Assembly should take into account Article 23 of the Charter
when electing states to these seats.
 Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India formed a group to support model
A, but the Coffee Club was in favor of periodic elections to ensure
that the Security Council actually acts on behalf of UN members.
 The existing permanent members of the Security Council took
divergent positions on expanding the Security Council. France and
the UK endorsed the G-4, the United States backed only Japan and
was joined by Russia in opposing veto power for new permanent
members, and China preferred to await consensus.
 UN Summit, September 2005. One hundred and fifty heads of state or
government reaffirmed a strong commitment to achieve the Millennium
 Development Goals and pledged an additional $50 billion a year to
fight poverty.
 The leaders pledged to enhance the relevance, effectiveness,
efficiency, accountability and credibility of the United Nations,
and agreed to replace the Commission on Human Rights with the Human
Rights Council.
 No agreement was reached on the enlargement of the Security Council
or on disarmament and nuclear proliferation due to the opposing
approaches of 'dividing for privilege' and 'uniting for consensus'.
 The summit's meager achievements were largely due to disagreement
among big powers and the majority of states, who wanted to
strengthen collective decision making to address issues of
fundamental concern to humanity.
 Human Rights
 Humanity has sought equal rights since the dawn of civilization.
Islam promulgated values and laws protecting civil and political
rights, and the Renaissance movement in Europe built up the
philosophic rationale for civil and political rights.
 The United Nations Charter reaffirmed faith in fundamental human
rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted
unanimously by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948,
codified as well as extended general concepts.
 In 1966, two international covenants were adopted, one on economic,
social and cultural rights and the other on civil and political
rights. Both covenants have monitoring committees that receive
reports from state parties.
 Human rights have been accelerated with the adoption of numerous
covenants and conventions, including those on the rights of
workers.
 The United States and other Western countries criticized the Human
Rights Commission for being politicized. The summit meeting agreed
to replace the Commission with the Human Rights Council.
 Pakistan's constitution requires the state to ensure observance of
fundamental rights, but some laws have been abused, leading to
criticism at home and abroad. The government responded to these
concerns by amending the laws in 2004-05 to protect innocent people
from the excesses resulting from inefficient implementation.
 International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
 The World Bank was established in 1944 to provide financial
assistance to developing countries. In 2003, it provided $18.5
billion in assistance.
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an institution that helps
member states maintain adequate exchange reserves, facilitate
expansion of international trade, and promote international
monetary cooperation. It provides loans under adequate safeguards,
and expects the recipient states to follow agreed programmes and
conditions.
 Pakistan has received substantial amounts in concessional loans
from foreign countries and IFIs over the decades. Most of the high-
interest debt was retired by 2004, while debt rescheduling reduced
the annual debt-servicing burden from over $5 billion to less than
$3 billion. Pakistan's dependence on foreign loans rose in 2007 due
 to a sudden rise in the price of petroleum and food grains, and
increased borrowings in 2008 and 2009, which increased its
international debt burden to $55 billion in 2009.
 The World Trade Organization (WTO) plays an increasingly important
role in the promotion of fair and free trade based on binding
rules, ensuring transparency and predictability, liberalization and
reduction in tariffs on industrial products, and smooth
implementation of existing agreements.
 The latest round of trade negotiations began in 2001 and focused on
concerns regarding the implementation of existing agreements,
technical barriers, and improvement of dispute settlement
mechanisms. The industrialized countries continued to provide
massive support for domestic agriculture.