Spence, 1999: The search for

modern China
Spence, J. D. (1999) The search for modern China. 2nd ed. New York ; Norton.

Summary
The Korean War
The first part of the text discusses Mao Zedong's venture into international diplomacy
immediately after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Mao
traveled to the Soviet Union to meet with Stalin, which was his first trip outside of China.
Arriving in Moscow in December 1949, Mao experienced a tense and somewhat
dismissive reception from Stalin, who was skeptical of Mao's theories. The meeting
resulted in a security treaty to protect China against Japanese attack, a credit
agreement of $300 million over five years, and the promise of the return of Liushun and
Dalian to Chinese sovereignty. Mao was also compelled to recognize the independence
of the Mongolian People's Republic, a concession that forced him to give up ambitions
of reclaiming extensive territories once under Qing control.
Back in China, the new PRC's focus was on internal matters like administration, inflation
control, and industrial rebuilding. With the capture of Hainan Island and the pending
conquests of Tibet and Taiwan, military efforts were ongoing. The invasion of Tibet in
October 1950 was swift, as the UN, India, and Britain did not intervene despite Tibetan
protests. The assault on Taiwan, however, was complicated by strong Guomindang
defenses and logistical challenges.
The American stance shifted dramatically with the outbreak of the Korean War in June
1950, when North Korean forces invaded South Korea. The U.S., responding to a UN
Security Council resolution passed in the absence of a Soviet veto, intervened militarily.
President Truman also deployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait,
preventing China from taking Taiwan and causing Chinese leaders to reevaluate their
military focus.

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 China's reaction to the Korean War was initially ambiguous, but as U.S. involvement
intensified and UN forces began to advance, China's rhetoric against the U.S. grew
stronger. China refrained from promising aid to North Korea, yet domestically, it rallied
against U.S. actions. The PLA troops initially poised for an assault on Taiwan were
redirected north in anticipation of potential conflict.
American disengagement from China was clear in a statement by Truman, who had no
intention of involving the U.S. military in the Chinese civil conflict. The U.S. State
Department prepared for a post-Communist takeover of Taiwan, which was disrupted by
the Korean War. China's ambiguity persisted throughout the UN's diplomatic efforts and
MacArthur's discussions with Chiang Kai-shek, who was now firmly positioned in
Taiwan, bolstered by MacArthur's support.
As UN forces gained ground in Korea, China's statements became increasingly
belligerent, and by late August, China was hinting at intervention if North Korea was
invaded. When U.S. forces crossed into North Korea in October and advanced towards
the Chinese border, China began covertly sending troops into North Korea. By late
November, a significant Chinese military presence in North Korea launched a major
offensive against South Korean and UN forces, marking China's full-scale entry into the
Korean War.
The text recounts the events surrounding China's involvement in the Korean War,
focusing on the experiences and reactions of Chinese leaders, particularly the military
commander Peng Dehuai. Peng was troubled by the decision to send Chinese troops
into Korea, which led to intense and costly battles. Despite the difficulties, Chinese
forces managed to push back UN troops to the thirty-eighth parallel. The conflict saw
significant losses on both sides, with Chinese casualties estimated between 700,000
and 900,000. The war also saw the first jet fighter dogfights and innovative use of
helicopters by American forces.

Mao Zedong's eldest son, born to his first wife Yang Kaihui, was among the Chinese
casualties, killed in the conflict and buried in Korea. Domestically, the war bolstered a
sense of Chinese heroism and endurance, reinforced by a surge in cultural works
glorifying the soldiers' sacrifices. The war also drew China closer to the Soviet Union,
from which it received substantial military aid, albeit paid for by China.

Additionally, the Korean War hardened Chinese attitudes against Western imperialism
and particularly against the United States, which was now seen as China's principal
adversary. The war also led to a crackdown on foreigners within China, including

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 missionaries and businesspeople, some of whom were arrested and accused of
espionage.
The war's outcome prevented the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China, as the
island remained a stronghold of anti-Communist sentiment with American support. In
the United States, the war reinforced negative stereotypes of the Chinese and led to a
reassessment of American policy and the role of communism in Asia. The period of
McCarthyism that followed stifled American understanding of China, as leading China
experts were sidelined and access to the country was restricted.

Ultimately, the Korean War solidified the Communist regime in China but at great cost,
and it marked the beginning of a prolonged period of hostility between China and the
United States. The hopes for a 'new democracy' in China faded as the country became
entrenched in a rigid Communist dictatorship. The text suggests that if the Soviet Union
did indeed instigate the Korean conflict, China was drawn into a war that was far from
the "painless diversion" it had anticipated, significantly altering its international stance
and domestic policies.

The First Five Year Plan

The text describes a period of significant economic planning and industrial development
in China following the completion of land reform, the breakdown of the bourgeoisie's
economic base, and the end of the Korean War. Around 1953, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) began to implement an integrated plan for economic development modeled
after the Soviet Union’s approach. The choice of the Soviet model may have been
influenced by the failure of previous reforms along Western lines, China's isolation from
Western powers after the Korean War, and a desire to emphasize the anti-capitalist
nature of the new Chinese state.

To prepare for economic restructuring, the CCP standardized bureaucratic recruitment

and pay, introduced regular administrative procedures, and organized the population
into work units (danwei) to increase social control and efficiency. Political reorganization
was undertaken, including reorganizing the government to eliminate the six military-
political bureaus and placing the army under a new Ministry of Defense, which was
subordinate to the State Council in Beijing. A centralized system was established for the
implementation of party decisions, and the country was divided administratively into 21
provinces, 5 autonomous regions, and 2 municipalities.

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 During this time, the first major purge occurred within the CCP, targeting Gao Gang and
Rao Shushi, who had been powerful figures in the State Planning Commission. The
vague charges against them included attempts to form "independent kingdoms" and
follow "erroneous" economic policies. Gao Gang reportedly committed suicide, and Rao
Shushi's fate was not disclosed.
The First Five-Year Plan focused on increasing industrial production and was largely
successful, meeting most of its targets by 1956. This period marked the closest
collaboration between China and the Soviet Union, with thousands of Soviet advisers
assisting in various sectors. The Chinese approach to industrial growth included a focus
on heavy industry, high rates of saving and investment, transformations in agriculture,
and a preference for capital-intensive methods. A policy of "primitive accumulation"
forced the peasantry to sell a significant portion of their grain production to the state at
low prices, keeping urban wages down.

Inflation was curbed, a balanced budget was maintained, and government bonds were
sold to finance deficits. The population expanded rapidly, with the first comprehensive
census in 1953 showing a population of over 582 million. The government also fostered
economic confidence by controlling interest rates and pegging wages and savings to the
cost of a standard package of goods.

Despite the successes, there were issues with the industrial workforce's lack of
preparation, equipment damage due to improper use, a focus on quantity over quality,
and a lack of coordination among industries. The nationalization of private industry by
the end of 1955 left only state-controlled and mixed public-private enterprises, marking
a significant shift in China's industrial organization.

The transition to cooperative organization was complex, involving decisions about class
status, farming methods, and administrative authority. By late 1955, the government
began favoring higher-stage cooperatives, and by 1956, this shift was significant, with a
decrease in lower-stage cooperatives. Peasants retained ownership of the land they
contributed to cooperatives and were allowed to keep private plots, which they used to
supplement their income by selling vegetables and raising livestock.

However, the success of these private plots and the resulting increase in private
production raised concerns among government officials, including Mao Zedong, about
the potential for a resurgence of a class system in the countryside and the enrichment
of a new class of peasantry. This private production was paradoxically also contributing

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 to the improved diets of industrial workers. The government's response to the success
of private production would be critical to the future of the People's Republic.

Foreign Policy and the National Minorities

During the early to mid-Qing dynasty, China endeavored to maintain its image as the
cultural epicenter for neighboring nations and those in the southern seas, with the
power of the emperor radiating outward through cultural exports like Confucian works,
the Chinese calendar, and the writing system. Tributary gifts from other nations
acknowledged this centrality, though the effectiveness of this system was limited by the
difficulties in controlling the nomadic and Muslim groups to the north and west, and it
was disrupted by European incursions.

In the 1950s, re-establishing international prestige, which had diminished during the late
Qing dynasty and under subsequent Chinese leaderships, became a primary goal for
the leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Despite complications arising from
the Korean War, which positioned the U.S. against China and ensured Taiwan's
detachment from PRC control and PRC's exclusion from the United Nations, China's
global standing improved significantly during this period.

Zhou Enlai, the PRC's premier and foreign minister, was pivotal in crafting a new foreign
policy, leveraging his diplomatic skills to enhance relations with neighboring countries
like India, accepting China's control over Tibet, and navigating the complexities of the
Korean War. The death of Stalin in 1953 led to an easing of Soviet Union's aggressive
foreign policy, eventually contributing to the resolution of the Korean War.

Zhou attended Stalin's funeral and later established economic and cultural ties with
Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam, supporting Ho Chi Minh against the French with
supplies that matched U.S. support for the French. As the Soviet Union adopted a more
flexible approach to neutralist countries, Zhou advanced relations with India, Burma,
and others under the principle of "Peaceful Coexistence."

Zhou's international diplomacy came to the fore at the Geneva Conference in 1954,
where his deft negotiation helped settle the Franco-Vietnamese War, and at the
Bandung Conference in 1955, which marked a significant increase in China's diplomatic
visibility. At Bandung, Zhou's conduct, including a notable snub by U.S. Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles, positioned China as a neutralist force and a new, responsible
member of the international community. The conference also addressed concerns about

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 overseas Chinese communities and China's dual-nationality policy, which allowed
overseas Chinese to choose their nationality.

Zhou's foreign policy successes were somewhat marred by the ongoing crisis over
Taiwan, but he managed to ease tensions by advocating for Taiwan's peaceful
liberation, a stance that ultimately led to the PRC backing down from a potential military
confrontation over the offshore islands, allowing Chiang Kai-shek to retain control of
Quemoy and Matsu. This diplomatic maneuvering by Zhou and the PRC during the
1950s was a significant step towards restoring China's lost international prestige.

The Hundred Flowers

A divide emerged within the CCP leadership on how to handle intellectuals. Some
favored cooperation, citing the need for their skills, while others emphasized party unity
and discipline. The Hundred Flowers Movement, launched partly in response to
Khrushchev's secret denunciations of Stalin, was an attempt to allow greater intellectual
freedom and criticism of the CCP. However, the movement led to intense scrutiny and
persecution of individuals like Hu Feng, who challenged the party's control over culture.
The text also touches on international affairs, describing how China's leaders aimed to
rebuild international prestige. Zhou Enlai played a key role in establishing diplomatic
relations, particularly with India. China also strengthened ties with neighboring
Communist states and supported insurgent movements in Vietnam against French
colonial forces. China's participation in the Geneva Conference in 1954 and the
Bandung Conference in 1955 showcased its diplomatic skill and increased its
international standing.

The problem of China's minority nationalities and overseas Chinese was addressed
through cautious integration efforts and dual nationality agreements with host countries,
respectively. Despite the initial success, tensions and distrust persisted among minority
populations, and problems with overseas Chinese would arise in later years.

The text describes the intellectual and political climate in China during 1957, particularly
focusing on the Hundred Flowers Campaign and its aftermath. Initially, the campaign,
backed by Mao Zedong, encouraged open expression and criticism, aiming to rectify the
Communist Party of China (CCP). Mao's speeches suggested a need for diversity in
thought and welcomed constructive criticism from intellectuals, which led to a surge of
open dialogue and public debate.

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 However, party hardliners, including Mayor Peng Zhen, resisted the campaign and
maintained control over major publications, making it difficult for Mao's views to be
widely disseminated. It took significant effort from Mao to promote the campaign, which
finally gained full momentum in April 1957. Intellectuals eagerly seized the opportunity
to voice their grievances about CCP control, past mass campaigns, and the party's rigid
adherence to Soviet models, among other issues.
Criticism quickly escalated beyond what the party anticipated, ranging from
denouncements of CCP's treatment of intellectuals to accusations of economic
corruption within the party. The public discourse also touched upon sensitive subjects
like the lack of genuine electoral systems and the forced nature of agricultural
collectivization.
The initial enthusiasm for reform soon faced backlash from conservative party elements.
By June 1957, with increasing criticism and protests, particularly at Peking University,
Mao shifted his stance and aligned with the hardliners, revising his earlier speech to
emphasize strengthening socialism. This marked the beginning of a crackdown on
critics, with the CCP launching an anti-rightist campaign that branded over 300,000
intellectuals as "rightists," leading to career ruin, imprisonment, labor camps, or exile.
Prominent figures like Fei Xiaotong, who had published critical accounts of rural
conditions, were forced into public self-criticism and confession. The campaign's
harshness led to suicides among professors and students, and some student protestors
were executed in public as a warning. The Hundred Flowers movement's brief period of
openness ended with a return to strict party control and repression, setting the stage for
more intense revolutionary campaigns to come.

The Great Leap Forward

The text delves into the intricate backdrop and the unfolding of the Hundred Flowers
Campaign in China, clarifying that it was not a premeditated trap by Mao Zedong to
expose dissidents but rather a byproduct of inner CCP discord. This discord was rooted
in debates over China's development pace and strategy, which ultimately led to the
Great Leap Forward.
By 1957, it was apparent that the First Five-Year Plan, while successful in some
respects, had led to economic imbalances, with industrial output outpacing agricultural
growth. This disparity was problematic as the agricultural sector was essential for
sustaining industrial advancement. Some planners, like Chen Yun and Zhou Enlai,

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 believed that incentivizing peasants and improving agricultural technology was the
answer, whereas Mao advocated for mass mobilization and moral incentives to boost
production.
During this time, Sino-Soviet relations were complex. The Soviets were charging China
heavily for industrial aid, yet their technological advancements, like the launch of
Sputnik, impressed Mao. However, Mao was discontent with the growing emulation of
Soviet methods in China, preferring an approach that emphasized continuous revolution
and the active engagement of the masses.

Mao's vision for continuous revolution recalled his early revolutionary ideology, stressing
the potential of the human will and mass mobilization. He saw China's "poorness and
blankness" as an opportunity for radical transformation, drawing inspiration from Marx's
vision of a society free from rigid roles.

Experimentation with social organization began in late 1957 with large-scale

mobilization for water control and irrigation projects, involving a vast number of
peasants. This led to practical issues, such as men being away from their homes, which
prompted a push for women to participate more in agricultural labor. The CCP started to
centralize domestic tasks like childcare and meal preparation to free up women's labor.
This period saw the emergence of "people's communes," massive agricultural
collectives that aimed to increase rural productivity and support industrial growth, while
also exploring new forms of human potential. The term "people's commune" appeared
in party literature by mid-1958, and trials for abolishing private plots and merging
cooperatives into larger units were already underway by April of that year. These efforts
represented a significant shift in the CCP's approach to rural organization and
productivity.
The summer of 1958 in China was a time of great ambition, marked by the official
beginning of the campaign to abolish private plots and establish people's communes
across rural China. The CCP's Central Committee, inspired by successful harvests and
radical leadership, saw the communes as a product of inevitable progress and surging
political consciousness among peasants. The committee's rhetoric was filled with
optimism, suggesting that the communes would bring about not only increased
agricultural production but also a richer collective life for the peasants, leading China
towards socialism and eventually communism.

By December 1958, the transformation seemed complete, with the majority of China's
rural population integrated into communes. This transition was perceived as a victory for

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 Mao Zedong's vision of growth through mass mobilization, bypassing the need for
methodical planning and bureaucracy. Initial reports claimed that production had
skyrocketed, but these figures were soon proven to be grossly inflated. The actual grain
production was significantly lower than reported, and the backyard steel furnaces,
intended to bolster industrial growth, failed to produce quality steel.

Despite the misreporting, the Great Leap Forward led to significant changes in China. It
altered family structures by centralizing domestic tasks, reshaped the landscape with
massive construction projects, and even propelled China towards developing its nuclear
capabilities. Cities were modernized, although sometimes at the cost of historical
aesthetics, and an enormous militia was formed, potentially rivaling the PLA.
However, the euphoria was short-lived as reality began to contradict the vision. Mao
faced criticism for his extreme policies, particularly from Peng Dehuai, who highlighted
the inaccuracies in reporting agricultural conditions. Mao's aggressive response to
Peng's criticism at the Lushan conference of July 1959 effectively silenced internal
dissent, positioning Mao to continue promoting the communes.

But the Great Leap Forward was disastrous. By 1959, people in rural areas were
starving, and malnutrition was widespread. Agricultural output continued to plummet,
and as industry consumed more of the national income and grain was exported to pay
for Soviet machinery, the average grain availability per person in the countryside
dropped catastrophically, leading to a famine that claimed over 20 million lives from
1959 to 1962. The famine disproportionately affected children, with half the deaths in
1963 being under ten years old. The Great Leap Forward, intended to empower and
invigorate the nation, instead resulted in one of the most tragic famines in human
history, consuming the very population it aimed to elevate.

The Sino-Soviet Rift

The Great Leap Forward in China and the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations in the late
1950s were closely intertwined. Mao Zedong's ambitious Great Leap Forward, aimed at
rapid economic development through mass mobilization, contrasted sharply with the
Soviet Union's more cautious approach. Historically, China had depended heavily on
Soviet support for technical assistance and industrial development, but the relationship
was complex, marked by both cooperation and underlying tension.
After Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet influence in China remained strong, yet Mao was
uneasy about China's reliance on the Soviets, particularly for defense against potential

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 nuclear attacks by the United States. Mao's aspiration to develop China's nuclear
capabilities was part of an effort to reduce reliance on the Soviet Union. Nikita
Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956, without prior warning to Mao, further
strained the relationship. Chinese officials, worried about implications for Mao's
leadership, responded cautiously, emphasizing the importance of resolving
contradictions within socialist societies.
Differences in approach between China and the Soviet Union became increasingly
apparent. Mao advocated for a confrontational stance against the West, while
Khrushchev pursued peaceful coexistence, refusing to support China's aggressive
actions against Taiwan and other U.S. allies. In 1957, despite these tensions, the
Soviets promised to assist China in developing nuclear technology. However, the
relationship deteriorated further when Khrushchev withdrew this offer and continued to
criticize China's domestic policies, such as the people's communes.
Global events in 1959, including conflicts in Laos, Tibet, Indonesia, and along the Sino-
Indian border, compounded China's challenges. The Soviet Union's failure to support
China in these disputes, along with Khrushchev's visit to the United States, deepened
the rift. By 1960, the relationship had collapsed, with the Soviet Union withdrawing its
experts and advisers from China, leading to the cancellation of numerous technical
projects.
Throughout 1960 and 1961, China criticized the Soviet Union for its revisionist stance
and sought to assert its influence in European and global politics, notably by supporting
Albania against Soviet criticism. The Chinese government maintained a nominal desire
for unity with the Soviet Union, but the relationship was effectively beyond repair. Zhou
Enlai's walkout from the 1961 Soviet party congress in Moscow, following Khrushchev's
attacks on Albania and Stalin, symbolized the final breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations.

Launching the Cultural Revolution

In the beginning of 1966, two opposing factions within China's political landscape were
shaping the discussions around the Wu Han case, which would set the stage for the
Cultural Revolution. On one side was the conservative Group of Five, led by Peng
Zhen, a high-ranking party official and then-mayor of Peking. This group, which had
significant influence over the cultural and intellectual direction of the country, sought to
approach the case with caution and maintain the status quo, aligning with the policies of
established leaders like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.

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 In contrast, a more radical group in Shanghai, guided by Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong’s
wife, pushed for a complete overhaul of cultural norms. This faction aimed to eradicate
influences from feudal or Westernized traditions in art and literature, which they
believed were counter to socialist ideals. Jiang Qing’s group had the support of the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) and wanted to "storm" the cultural bastions of the old
society, promoting a new cultural policy that aligned with Mao's revolutionary thought.

Peng Zhen's Group of Five treated the Wu Han case as an academic matter, releasing
a report that cautiously criticized Wu Han but avoided a full-blown assault on the cultural
system. They advised a measured approach, reflecting their preference for a gradualist
and bureaucratic method. This approach was temporarily sanctioned by the CCP
Central Committee in February 1966.
However, the Shanghai radicals, celebrating their forum's conclusions, saw Mao's
writings on culture as a revolutionary breakthrough and criticized the existing cultural
administration for being anti-socialist. They accused the establishment of harboring
bourgeois and revisionist tendencies, exemplified by the works of Wu Han. The radicals
were keen to see the PLA play a pivotal role in the cultural revolution they envisaged.

The differences between these two groups were irreconcilable, setting the stage for the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This movement was a complex amalgam of
Mao's vision for continuous revolution, factional struggles within the Communist Party,
political ambitions, and the frustrations of China's youth who felt stifled by the existing
class labels and social restrictions. The Cultural Revolution was characterized by mass
mobilization, public humiliations, violence, and the destruction of the "four olds" of
Chinese society.

In May 1966, the conservative approach of the Group of Five was overturned by the
CCP Central Committee, leading to a purge of the cultural bureaucracy and signaling
the start of radical changes. Red Guards, consisting mainly of students, were formed
and became the face of the revolution, targeting intellectuals, party bureaucrats, and
various traditional elements of Chinese society.
Mao, despite his age, remained the symbolic and revered leader of this upheaval. He
was portrayed as the revolutionary hero who stood above the fray, even as the country
descended into chaos and violence. The Red Guards idolized him, and his swim in the
Yangzi River was publicized as a sign of his enduring strength and leadership.
The Cultural Revolution's violence and the radical push for egalitarianism were also
driven by a political agenda that called for extreme measures, such as the complete

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 nationalization of industry, the abolition of private property, and the reinforcement of the
commune system. This purist egalitarianism aimed to erase all traces of private market
economy and create a society entirely shaped by socialist principles.
The "January power seizure" in 1967 marked a tumultuous period in the Cultural
Revolution where radical Red Guard organizations, inspired by fervent editorials,
attempted to usurp the authority of existing party leaders across China. These
campaigns were chaotic, with various uncoordinated radical groups clashing with party
officials and among themselves, leading to a confusing mix of genuine and feigned
power struggles.

In Shanghai, the "power seizure" was initiated by Zhang Chunqiao, an ally of Jiang
Qing, and was essentially a move to prevent workers from obtaining genuine
independent power. Zhang took control of key media and, with the help of the PLA,
repressed the workers' demands for better pay and conditions, branding these demands
as "economism" and accusing Shanghai party leaders of conservatism for yielding to
them.

The workers' demands were initially radical, but were soon condemned by Cultural
Revolution leaders as counterrevolutionary. The massive worker and student Red
Guard factions had caused significant disruption in Shanghai, leading to a paralysis of
essential services. In response, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan utilized the PLA to
regain control, enforcing the message of "Grasping Revolution and Promoting
Production."
However, Zhang and Yao also faced opposition from militant student Red Guards who
supported the workers. In a twist of events, these students held struggle sessions
against Zhang and Yao and detained some of their propagandists. Order was only
restored with considerable military support by early February.

Finally, in a paradoxical turn, the formation of the Shanghai People's Commune was
announced, a title with revolutionary connotations. Yet, under this banner, the new
leaders who had just purged their own party now sought to consolidate their power and
reassert control over the students and workers who had been agitating for change and
freedom.

Party Retrenchment and the Death of Lin Biao

Spence, 1999: The search for modern China 12

 The Wuhan incident in summer 1967 was a significant conflict where PLA troops
clashed with radical groups, resulting in a temporary kidnapping of a central Cultural
Revolution figure by local military supporters. The incident underscored the growing rift
within the revolutionary ranks and led to a more assertive role for the army nationwide.
By September 1967, China's leadership sought to contain the upheaval. Jiang Qing
denounced "ultra-left tendencies," and the PLA called for more disciplined study of
Mao's works rather than unfettered revolutionary action. Workers' organizations were
leveraged to curb student radicalism and restore order in educational institutions.

The subsequent "Campaign to Purify Class Ranks" from late 1967 to 1969 targeted
millions of cadres and intellectuals with suspected ties to "bad" class backgrounds or
counterrevolutionary activities. These individuals underwent intense scrutiny in May
Seventh Cadre Schools, where they faced hard labor combined with constant
indoctrination. These "schools" were essentially reeducation prisons aimed at instilling
revolutionary zeal and loyalty to Mao's vision.
The campaign also enforced a strict vetting process for party membership, with a focus
on one's family history, and often resulted in the exclusion of many from the party and
government positions. This system further entangled individuals in a web of control
based on class labels and party loyalty, exacerbating fear and compliance within
society.
In rural areas like Chen Village, similar struggles unfolded, with locals and "sent down"
educated youth engaging in political debates and criticism, often targeting each other as
representatives of "bad" elements or rightists. This intense political atmosphere
permeated all levels of society, leading to widespread purges and reeducation efforts.
Mao had started to distance himself from Lin, concerned about the PLA's heavy-handed
approach to purges and investigations. He sought to restore the party's strength,
removing the position of state chairman and downplaying revolutionary zeal in favor of
rebuilding the CCP with a focus on experience and competence over ideological purity.
Lin Biao's fall from grace was precipitated by Mao's strategic moves to undermine his
influence within the PLA and the party. Documents released by the CCP claim Lin, in a
state of desperation, plotted to assassinate Mao and then attempted to flee to the Soviet
Union, resulting in his fatal plane crash—a narrative whose details remain unverified.
The events surrounding Lin Biao contributed to a growing disillusionment among the
Chinese people, who had witnessed the rise and fall of leaders hailed as heroes only to

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 be later denounced as traitors. This pattern of elevation and denunciation caused
widespread confusion and a loss of faith in the political system, as the Cultural
Revolution revealed the absence of a clear direction for the nation.

Introduction to next chapter

During the late 1960s, China's Cultural Revolution leaders isolated the country from the
Soviet Union and the West, aiming to forge a society based on self-reliance and Maoist
principles. However, the practical need for technological advancement led China to
open up, culminating in President Nixon's historic 1972 visit and subsequent deals with
various Western nations for advanced technology. This shift sparked internal debate
over Westernization and adherence to Marxist values.
In 1976, a significant protest in Beijing called for government transparency and a return
to Marxism-Leninism, but was suppressed. The government later vindicated the
protesters, leading to the Democracy Wall protests advocating for political and
intellectual freedoms. Amidst these events, Mao Zedong passed away, and China
embarked on a path of economic development, balancing self-reliance with the Four
Modernizations.
The late 1970s saw a shift in economic strategy, with increased local initiative and the
introduction of private plots and market freedoms, boosting productivity. The 1982
census revealed China's population had surpassed 1 billion, highlighting challenges like
controlling population growth and addressing issues like female infanticide due to the
one-child policy.
Post-Mao, China struggled with a lack of unified leadership and a bureaucracy hindered
by favoritism and inefficiency, hampering foreign investments and economic growth. The
Cultural Revolution's end saw a rise in corruption and a fascination with Western
culture, prompting the government to crack down on "spiritual pollution" while
reaffirming new economic rights and legal reforms.
By the late 1980s, frustration over lack of democracy and rampant corruption led to
student protests, which the government suppressed, reinforcing unity and self-sacrifice.
Constitutional protections were granted for new enterprises despite the government's
repressive stance on democratic freedoms.
The leadership transition in the late 1980s failed to resolve societal inconsistencies, and
in 1989, massive protests in Tiananmen Square demanded democracy and an end to

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 corruption. The government's violent crackdown shocked the world, underscoring the
divide between those seeking pluralism and the single-party state's resistance to
change.
China's future appeared uncertain, with the potential for ongoing cycles of protest and
repression if the government could not constructively address its people's grievances.
The single-party state, once a beacon of revolutionary change, risked becoming the
primary barrier to China's progress.

The US and the Nixon visit

In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai tried to maintain some
continuity in China's foreign affairs, despite the revolutionary rhetoric. Lin Biao's
statement in 1965 suggested China's intention to inspire Third World revolutions to
counter the West, which was more rhetoric than action, demonstrating China's limited
capacity to support other nations. Nonetheless, China continued to aid various Third
World and radical groups.
China also campaigned for UN recognition, successfully replacing Taiwan in 1971.
Despite internal chaos, China initiated overtures to the United States, culminating in
Nixon's visit to China in 1972. This rapprochement was driven by Mao's concerns over
Soviet aggression and Lin Biao's political ambitions. China's oil industry experts also
lobbied for Western technology to further oil production.

The initial steps towards Sino-American dialogue were tentative, with China rejecting
early American overtures due to the Cultural Revolution. However, by 1970, discussions
were rekindled, and 'ping-pong diplomacy' in 1971 paved the way for Kissinger's secret
visit and planning for Nixon's trip. Despite Taiwan's close ties with the U.S., Nixon's visit
marked a significant shift in policy, sidelining Taiwan for the prospect of engagement
with mainland China.
The Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 was a diplomatic breakthrough, with both countries
acknowledging their differences on various issues, including Taiwan, and agreeing on
the need for peaceful resolution and normalization of relations. The communiqué called
for increased contact and trade, laying the groundwork for a new phase in international
relations and marking a turning point in China's engagement with the world.
[From ChatGPT: Lin Biao was a prominent Chinese Communist military leader and a
close ally of Mao Zedong during the early years of the People's Republic of China

Spence, 1999: The search for modern China 15

 (PRC). He was instrumental in the founding of the PRC and played a significant role in
the Communist Party of China (CPC), eventually rising to the position of China's
Minister of Defense. Lin was officially designated as Mao's successor in the Chinese
constitution after the Cultural Revolution.

However, Mao began to suspect Lin of having political ambitions that could threaten his
own power and the direction in which he wanted to take China. By 1970, Mao's
confidence in Lin had diminished due to various factors, including Lin's handling of the
Cultural Revolution and the military's excessive role in politics and governance, which
Mao believed was creating an imbalance in the party's structure. There were also
concerns that Lin was aligning himself with elements within the party that were opposed
to Mao's policies.

The final straw came when, according to official PRC accounts, Lin Biao was implicated
in an alleged coup plot to assassinate Mao. In 1971, after what was said to be a failed
attempt or the realization that his plot had been uncovered, Lin Biao supposedly fled
China in a plane, which later crashed in Mongolia, leading to his death. This event
marked a significant political upheaval and the elimination of a potential rival to Mao's
leadership. However, the exact circumstances of Lin's death remain a subject of
speculation and controversy.]

1976: The Old Guard Dies

In 1976, as China's revolutionary leaders aged, Premier Zhou Enlai died from cancer at
the age of seventy-eight. Surprisingly, Chairman Mao Zedong did not publicly
acknowledge Zhou's death nor did he attend the funeral, which led to widespread
mourning across the country. At Zhou's state funeral, it was Vice-Premier Deng
Xiaoping who delivered the eulogy, subtly critiquing Mao and the Cultural Revolution
leaders by praising Zhou’s open and unifying leadership style.
In February, following Zhou's death, Deng was removed from all posts after a
resurgence of criticism against him, which was seen as a power move by the radical
faction within the Communist Party. The campaign against Deng blamed him for
promoting elitism, opposing revolutionary principles, and advocating for the re-
introduction of bourgeois elements into Chinese society. This political struggle was
unfolding when an unprecedented public mourning for Zhou occurred on April 5th,
leading to a large protest at Tiananmen Square. This was met with a harsh crackdown,
and the subsequent arrest of many participants.

Spence, 1999: The search for modern China 16

 The year also witnessed the death of Mao Zedong in September, followed by national
mourning. The Central Committee's eulogy of Mao included a denunciation of past
political opponents, including Deng Xiaoping. Despite the presence of the Cultural
Revolution's radical leaders at Mao's funeral, in a sudden and dramatic turn, the 'Gang
of Four', which included Mao's wife Jiang Qing, were arrested by orders from Hua
Guofeng, Mao's successor, accused of perpetuating harmful policies despite Mao's
warnings. This arrest marked a significant political shift and the beginning of the end for
the radical movement that had dominated Chinese politics during the Cultural
Revolution.
With the arrest of the Gang of Four, Hua Guofeng rose to power, assuming Mao's
former positions as chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP and chairman of the
Military Affairs Commission, effectively taking control of the army, state, and party.
Rallies in major cities marked the beginning of Hua's era, and he initiated the
construction of Mao Zedong's mausoleum in Tiananmen Square, symbolically altering
the historic central axis of Beijing.

The Four Modernisations

The power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intensified after Mao
Zedong was embalmed. Deng Xiaoping, who had been vilified and retreated to Canton,
was under the protection of the military governor General Xu Shiyou. Xu, who had
significant military influence in both southern and eastern China, supported Deng's
political comeback. By July 1977, Deng was reinstated to his positions in the vice-
premiership, Politburo, and Military Affairs Commission, despite Hua Guofeng holding
the highest positions he acquired during the previous year.
Throughout 1977 and 1978, China's domestic and foreign policy directions were unclear
due to differing philosophies between Deng and Hua. However, China achieved notable
technological advancements and maintained an active international presence, including
developing its airline systems, launching satellites, and starting its own ICBM program.
Tensions with the Soviet Union were high, with China backing Pol Pot in Cambodia
despite his regime's atrocities.
Relations with the United States, which had shown promise after the 1972 Shanghai
communiqué, were progressing, culminating in full diplomatic relations being
established in 1979 after negotiations with President Jimmy Carter's administration.

Spence, 1999: The search for modern China 17

 Domestically, while Hua championed radical agricultural and industrial programs, Deng
was working to bring back cadres dismissed during the Cultural Revolution and to
implement modernization plans that embraced foreign investment and overseas training
for Chinese students. Policies were enacted to develop China's scientific and
educational infrastructure, and the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in
December 1978 formally endorsed policies aimed at modernizing China, recognizing
the need for foreign technology and expertise.
The plenum emphasized the importance of agrarian side-occupations, market fairs, and
adjusted pricing policies to incentivize grain production, and proposed subsidies to
balance urban workers' food costs. It also highlighted the need to delegate authority,
support judicial independence, and combine centralism with democracy to ensure the
success of modernization. While the plenum noted Mao's thought as foundational, it
acknowledged his shortcomings and the need to adapt his ideas to new circumstances.
In foreign affairs, China was actively involved in international agreements and economic
partnerships, including ordering Boeing jets and setting up a Coca-Cola bottling plant in
Shanghai. Deng's visit to the United States in January 1979 further solidified China's
commitment to international engagement and economic development.
Shortly after emphasizing domestic economic expansion and international engagement,
China unexpectedly launched a military incursion into northern Vietnam on February 17.
This action was claimed to be in response to border provocations and Vietnam's
increasing alignment with the Soviet Union and its actions in Cambodia. The incursion
also served to demonstrate China's commitment to maintaining its national defense,
which was one of the key areas of modernization discussed at the Third Plenum.

The Fifth Modernisation

The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP marked a period of
seemingly increased intellectual freedom in China. This period saw the emergence of
the Democracy Wall in Beijing, where citizens expressed their thoughts through wall
posters and small publications, reminiscent of historical movements for freedom of
expression in China. This movement for democracy was partly inspired by the
government's reversal of verdicts against those who demonstrated in Tiananmen in
1976, signaling a possible opening for greater freedoms.

The most impactful figure in this movement was Wei Jingsheng, who advocated for
"The Fifth Modernization," democracy, as essential for China's progress, challenging the

Spence, 1999: The search for modern China 18

 CCP's four modernizations. Wei argued that true democracy would allow for the
Chinese people's genuine representation and was necessary for the development of
productive forces.
During this period, there were public demonstrations by those sent down to the
countryside, protesting their living conditions and demanding human rights and
democracy. Despite initial tolerance, possibly due to alignment with Deng Xiaoping's
own critiques of radical Maoists, the government began a crackdown in early 1979,
leading up to Deng's visit to the United States.

The crackdown involved arresting individuals who were considered disruptive, including
Fu Yuehua, who was sentenced to two years in prison. The government accused many
activists, including writers and editors of underground journals, of "impairing the state
system" and "aid of foreigners," implying treason. Wei Jingsheng was also arrested and,
after a trial where he was charged with espionage, was sentenced to fifteen years in
prison, with his appeals subsequently rejected.
The Chinese invasion of Vietnam, intended as a brief and forceful lesson for Vietnam's
actions in Cambodia and to showcase China's military modernization, proved costly and
difficult. General Xu Shiyou, who had been Deng Xiaoping's protector, led the operation
but faced demotion due to his poor tactics. After sustaining significant losses, Chinese
forces withdrew by mid-March 1979, shortly before the arrest of Democracy Wall activist
Wei Jingsheng.
In the aftermath, Deng Xiaoping denounced the Democracy movement, leading to the
closure of independent journals and the restriction of wall posters to heavily monitored
areas. By the Qingming festival of April 5, 1979, the Democracy movement had been
effectively quelled, and no significant demonstrations occurred.
The movement's end elicited insightful reflections from participants. One protester
suggested that the government's fear of simple writings indicated the CCP's underlying
vulnerability. Another, using the pseudonym "Icicle," posted a final poem on the
Democracy Wall before restrictions took effect, offering a poignant farewell and a
hopeful glance towards a brighter future.

Taiwan and the Special Economic Zones

The 1979 normalization of relations between China and the United States marked a
significant shift in international relations and posed a challenge to Taiwan's political

Spence, 1999: The search for modern China 19

 status. While the PRC declared Taiwan a part of China and an internal affair, the U.S.
acknowledged the PRC as the sole legal government of China but maintained that
Taiwan's future should be resolved peacefully by the Chinese themselves.
Despite political tensions, Taiwan was experiencing an era of prosperity, with significant
economic growth and industrial advancement. Its per capita GNP was substantially
higher than that of the PRC, and the island had become increasingly independent in
terms of its economic and political structures. The U.S. normalization with China, which
included withdrawing military personnel and terminating the mutual-defense treaty with
Taiwan, raised concerns among Taiwan's supporters.
However, Taiwan's economy continued to thrive, even improving after the loss of U.S.
diplomatic recognition. Trade expanded, and foreign investment increased. Taiwan's
dependence on oil imports remained a challenge, but the development of nuclear power
offered some mitigation.
The disparities in economic prosperity between Taiwan and the PRC were stark, with
Taiwanese workers enjoying greater purchasing power and a higher standard of living
than their counterparts in Shanghai. This economic advantage became a crucial factor
for the PRC to consider in any discussions about reunification.
The PRC aimed to implement the Four Modernizations rapidly to improve its access to
global financial markets. Guangdong officials, potentially at Deng Xiaoping's behest,
proposed "special economic zones" to attract foreign investment. These zones,
established near Hong Kong, Macao, and opposite Taiwan, offered incentives like low-
wage labor, tax breaks, and infrastructure development.
However, the zones grew more slowly than anticipated due to issues like inadequate
worker skills, bureaucracy, and low-quality standards. Shenzhen did boom, mirroring
Hong Kong's less affluent areas, but it also faced social problems like crime and
corruption.
Amidst these developments, some leaders expressed concern over the rapid changes
and urged a renewed focus on agriculture, advocating for a cautious approach to
modernization. China also faced a record foreign-trade deficit of $3.9 billion,
underscoring the costliness of integrating into advanced global trade.
The period also revealed significant corruption within the CCP, exemplified by the case
of Wang Shouxin, who embezzled substantial state property. Investigative reporter Liu
Binyan's exposé on Wang highlighted broader issues of moral decline and systemic

Spence, 1999: The search for modern China 20

 corruption, raising questions about the impact of opening up to the West on China's
social fabric.

Spence, 1999: The search for modern China 21