MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY, 23:489–501, 2011

Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 0899-5605 print / 1532-7876 online
DOI: 10.1080/08995605.2011.600143

Military Leadership and the Complexity of

Combat and Culture

Janice H. Laurence
Department of Psychological Studies in Education, College of Education,
Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

This article highlights the leadership challenges in today’s irregular and counterin-
surgency military missions. Sociocultural knowledge gaps in leader development are
highlighted, as are prescriptions of the trait and situational approaches to leadership.
Military leaders’ dual responsibility for their own troops and the local population
requires them to shift interpersonal relationships and leadership styles as the situa-
tion demands. Leaders are called upon to engage socially across cultures—to build
trust, create alliances, read intentions, and influence and understand people and their
motivations. In addition to identifying cultural competency needs and gaps, this
article offers some guidance for building such sociocultural competencies.

Leadership theories abound. Approaches to the study of leadership consist of

the examination of leader characteristics, follower needs and characteristics, the
tenor of the exchange (transactional or transformational), and approaches based
on adapting to the situation at hand. This seemingly chaotic amalgam may fell
some practitioners. However, rather than succumb to hopeless abandon, the var-
ied lenses of leadership all have merit. The task is to peer through the lenses and
focus on those that illuminate the needs at hand.
The military has been a pioneer in the leadership field (Taylor & Rosenbach,
2005). Professional military education (PME) includes heavy doses of instruction
in leadership, from entry into the office corps through capstone training for
general or flag officers. So too, senior enlisted members, or noncommissioned
officers, are schooled in leadership as they assume the most direct, tactical

Correspondence should be addressed to Janice H. Laurence, Department of Psychological Studies

in Education, College of Education, Temple University, 1301 West Cecil B. Moore Avenue, Ritter
Annex 245, Philadelphia, PA 19122. E-mail: Janice.laurence@temple.edu
490 LAURENCE

mantle of leadership. Given the military’s size, complexity, and sobering mis-
sion to fight and win our nation’s wars, leadership in the military is explicit.
Given the “in extremis” (Kolditz, 2007) situations that shape the military, fol-
lowers are indoctrinated into the chain of command and control and there are
no substitutes for leadership—leaders are needed to influence, plan, coordinate,
guide, and decide (Kaiser, Hogan, & Craig, 2008). Although leadership is a
core competency of the military (Bullis, 2003; Wong, Bliese, & McGurk, 2003),
today’s (and likely tomorrow’s) challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight
critical sociocultural knowledge gaps in leader development (McFate, 2007).
The ensuing discussion spotlights key leadership considerations for our mili-
tary as they face irregular, asymmetric warfare and counterinsurgency (COIN)
operations.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE SITUATION

Today’s military leaders, more so than political leaders and corporate executives,
face overwhelming volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. In addition
to the leadership demands posed by the in extremis conditions of warfare, the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan require cultural competencies as well. Irregular war-
fare and COIN demand a focus on people and not just technology. In addition
to “intelligence” or information, the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan call for
cultural understanding and communication and require the active support of the
population to achieve victory (Galula, 2006). Such conditions highlight the core
relational aspects of leadership (Avolio & Gardner, 2005).

Shifting Roles
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) proclaimed that the U.S. was
in for a “long war” that would demand transformation, cooperative relation-
ships or partnerships, and cultural understanding (Department of Defense, 2006).
Military leaders must make sense of overwhelming volumes of information and
rely on and interact with joint service, coalition, interagency, foreign adver-
saries, and local civilian population partners (Allen, 2006; Wong et al., 2003).
Furthermore, soldiers are required to shift roles with agility (McFate, 2007). In
addition to demonstrating proficiency in a battle or firefight, soldiers routinely
render humanitarian assistance (Wong et al., 2003). They fight insurgents, patrol,
conduct raids to locate and neutralize weapons caches and safe houses, pro-
vide security, and launch information and psychological operations. But beyond
these core or even secondary missions are new and perhaps competing duties and
responsibilities.
 COMBAT AND CULTURE 491

Increasingly, military missions extend beyond conventional warfare and kinetic

courses of action. For example, COIN oftentimes requires protecting the pop-
ulation, establishing or reinforcing political institutions, infrastructure project
management, and negotiating with local population leaders. And even aggres-
sive combat operations must be conducted with humanity and compassion toward
the local people. Behavior by soldiers that is deemed disrespectful by the local
population and their legitimate leaders can impede cooperation and even provoke
attack, either directly or through cooperation with insurgents and/or terrorists.
Military leaders’ dual responsibility for their own troops and the local population
requires them to be pragmatic and shift interpersonal relationships and leader-
ship styles as the situation demands (Yammarino, Mumford, Connelly, & Dionne,
2010). Role clarity is tenuous; leaders must orchestrate these segues quickly and
smoothly and “be, know, and do just about everything” (Wong et al., 2003, p. 669).

Increased Demand for Relationship Skills

Today’s leaders are called upon to engage socially across cultures—to build trust,
create alliances, read intentions, and influence and understand people and their
motivations (McFate, 2007). In dangerous contexts, subordinates—soldiers—
monitor and reevaluate trust in formal leadership (Sweeney, 2010). If such
reconsideration of trust occurs even within established and cohesive units or
teams, the establishment of trust outside of organizational and cultural boundaries
is deserving of attention, as trust, respect, and value congruence enhance lead-
ership and hence organizational effectiveness (Glover & Hannum, 2008; Jung,
Yammarino, & Lee, 2009). The combat environment together with cultural dif-
ferences hinders the development of trust and thus may compromise leadership
effectiveness. Securing, stabilizing, and promoting governance and development
in Iraq and Afghanistan requires that our leaders influence not only their tradi-
tional followers, but also local tribal leaders with whom shared history, goals, and
perspectives are lacking. This calls for developmental relationships and attention
to relationship quality with such “out-group” members (Gerstner & Day, 1997;
Popper, 2004).
In addition to stellar tactical skills, leaders need strong communication and
diplomatic skills. Underlying such skills are social, emotional, and cultural
literacy or intelligence. These elusive constructs address the capacity to per-
ceive, monitor, manage, understand, and employ social, emotional, and cultural
information to guide reasoning and action (Goleman, 1998; Mayer, Salovey, &
Caruso, 2008). To be sure, war requires awareness and management of affect—
fear, rage, anger, hatred, grief, joy, and love (Allen, 2006; Kolditz, 2007). The
social demands of COIN are undeniably key (Kilcullen, 2006; U.S. Army and
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007). And as if the emotional
and social demands weren’t complex enough, they must be met within the context
492 LAURENCE

of cultural challenges. There are very fundamental cultural differences and misun-
derstandings between Americans and Iraqis and Afghanis, and these differences
and misunderstandings are exaggerated and can have grave consequences when
lethal weapons and tactics abound. Predictability and uniformity of action are
stymied by differences in language, religion, behavior, values, beliefs, social orga-
nizations, political systems, economic systems, education, history, law, customs,
and social controls (Earley & Ang, 2003).
Cross-cultural success requires such traits and skills as empathy, respect,
interest in other people, behavioral flexibility, tolerance for ambiguity, initiative,
open-mindedness, and sociability (Earley & Ang, 2003). With increasing global-
ization, multinational enterprises are adapting to cross-cultural settings to enhance
competitive advantage. In addition to technical or task competencies, global man-
agers are selected for and trained in relationship skills (Earley & Ang, 2003). It is
important to understand one’s own culture, values, and assumptions and in turn to
avoid cultural mistakes by behaving in a manner that demonstrates knowledge of
and respect for other countries. “If management is not culturally sensitive, it may
not become aware of the cultural basis of the problem in time to create an effective
solution” (Carey, 2001, p. 202). If cultural intelligence is a key to multinational
business success, there should be no doubt as to its importance for the military.
The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan require nondomineering, respectful
structures and processes (Francis, 2004). “Help” from the U.S. in the form of
reconstruction, training, economic development, and the like should be offered
sensitively and convey respect for the local culture (Francis, 2004; Senghaas,
2004). Our leaders are seen as legitimate in commanding their units, be they
brigades, battalions, companies, platoons, or squads. Such legitimacy cannot be
expected or demanded cross-culturally. U.S. leaders cannot simply wield their
power and expect to usurp the role of local authority figures and impose their U.S.
military “solutions.” Rather, our leaders must learn to identify and influence tra-
ditional authority figures. To forge productive relationships with these authority
figures, U.S. military leaders must not be critical of but rather interested in, or at
least solicitous of, their views. Power impedes communication and collaboration,
and power equalization improves interaction (Tjosvold, 1985).
The cultivation of relationship skills is necessary not only for external sit-
uations but for internal dynamics as well. COIN requires the coordination of
leadership at strategic, operational, and direct (tactical) levels. Subordinate lead-
ers must make crucial decisions without the direct supervision of higher command
(Allen, 2006). Network-centric operations have put leadership at a distance that is
disadvantageous in current areas of operations. Higher leaders must depend on the
situational awareness of subordinates, and they must “press the flesh” themselves
when the situation so calls. Thus, small unit leaders need to understand social
norms in the area of engagement and how to communicate—how to drink tea and
smoke—with the local population (McFate, 2007).
 COMBAT AND CULTURE 493

Promising Leadership Styles

Today’s battlefield demands adaptable, flexible, situational, and participative lead-
ership styles—a tall order indeed. The extant and developing leadership literatures
offer suggestions for leading in combat and across cultures. For example, crisis
situations have been shown to benefit from transformational and charismatic lead-
ership, characterized by emotional attachment and leader-follower relationship
quality in pursuit of common goals (Sinha & Jackson, 2006; Yammarino et al.,
2010). In addition, pragmatic, individualized, and shared leadership dimensions
or styles show promise in dangerous contexts (Yammarino et al., 2010). Pragmatic
leadership involves developing a plan and taking action based on careful obser-
vation and analysis of the unique situation. Individualized leadership involves a
one-on-one relationship between the leader and individual team members and thus
develops empowerment and interdependence. Shared leadership at the team level
distributes leadership responsibility according to the demands of the situation and
the strengths of the team member. The potential applicability of these leadership
styles to not only in extremis contexts but to in extremis and divergent socio-
cultural contexts seems likely but should be explored. Considering the demands
of culture is consistent with leadership theorists’ prescriptions to consider the
follower and context of leadership (Avolio, 2007).
A multilevel leadership approach and shifts in interpersonal relationships in
accordance with contextual factors may fit the cultural demands of counterin-
surgency. However, in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. military leaders are informal
leaders with questionable legitimacy among the local population. They confront a
collectivistic culture with divergent values and belief structures relative to their
own. Whereas transformational leadership promotes legitimacy and is consis-
tent with collectivist cultures (Sinha & Jackson, 2006), the cultural context may
moderate the applicability of pragmatic, individualized, and shared leadership
styles.
The emerging model of authentic leadership deserves consideration and explo-
ration within the cross-cultural context. With its self-awareness, balanced process-
ing, relational transparency, and authentic behavior elements, authentic leadership
focuses on follower development and outcomes that include trust, engagement,
and attainment of sustainable performance (Avolio & Gardner, 2005). Further con-
ceptual and empirical development are in order, given that value congruence and
legitimacy, which contribute to the success of authentic leadership, are problem-
atic in the military cross-cultural context. This emergent theory is consistent with
and can incorporate these approaches discussed: transformational, charismatic,
pragmatic, individualized, and shared (Avolio & Gardner, 2005). A cross-cultural,
authentic leadership style would offer positive social exchanges and focus on
building society rather than destroying the enemy.
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GAPS AND MISMATCHES

Our military leaders possess impressive cognitive abilities, technical skills, per-
sonality traits, values, and a host of other fine characteristics. Their warrior
spirit is integral for combat operations. Furthermore, our forces have superior
technology and information dominance. Despite their many strengths, our lead-
ers are vulnerable in the areas of relationship skills and understanding people
(Williams, 2003; Wong et al., 2003). According to Army Major General (Retired)
Robert Scales (2009), our failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have been human not
technological.
Capabilities for engaging in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterror-
ism operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have been enhanced through
changes to personnel management policies and practices, as well as through
professional military education and training programs. However, defense pol-
icy makers recognize that further enhancements, including the maintenance and
institutionalization of successful and promising personnel and training prac-
tices, are needed (Department of Defense, 2010). Cultural competence remains
a major deficiency from the strategic leader level down to the direct leader level
(Blascovich & Hartel, 2008). We cannot simply apply our cultural lenses in
another society. Cultural ignorance can have serious consequences. We must adapt
to different cultures; we must be able to interpret the behavior of others and act
accordingly.
The cornerstone of the Defense Department’s efforts to enhance regional and
cultural expertise is language training (Department of Defense, 2010). However,
the gap in cultural competence cannot be closed with language training alone.
Language is less complex than culture and is not necessary for successful interac-
tions (Earley & Ang, 2003). We need to improve cultural intelligence, “a person’s
capability for successful adaptation to new cultural settings” (Early & Ang, 2003,
p. 9). We must go beyond concrete details or fact sheets; we must know more than
how to shake hands and how to say ah salamalaikum. We need decoding skills
for understanding that display rules emotions; for recognizing anger, happiness,
disgust, or when a smile is a cover.
Misunderstanding abounds because of different rules for the same behavior
or situation. How something is said may be as or more important than what is
said. Communication consists of facial expressions, tone of voice, and the per-
sonal distance people maintain. More so than spoken language, it is important to
attend to emotion and convey rapport, mutual attentiveness, positivity, and coordi-
nation (Beatty, 2001; Early & Ang, 2003; Yrizarry, Matsumoto, Imai, Kooken, &
Takeuchi, 2001).
Conflicting communication styles pose problems for understanding others’
priorities. Collisions between the individualistic orientation of the U.S. and the
collectivistic orientation of the Middle East and Asia challenge intercultural
 COMBAT AND CULTURE 495

negotiations and task achievement. We must be cognizant of individual versus

group incentives; of appeals to religion rather than “rationality,” of direct con-
frontation versus indirect influence, and of short- versus long-term perspectives.
Engaging the local population, establishing rapport, and building relationships
and trust with legitimate power holders takes time and resources that a kinetic
operations-oriented military is ill prepared to allocate. Without such deliberate
sociocultural efforts, understanding and influencing the population are severely
hampered (Galula, 2006). Trust and relationship development are thwarted not
only by lack of cultural exposure, experience, and discourse—cultural illiteracy—
but by the rotation schedule of our Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). Just as the BCT
is making headway in getting to know the people, understanding why and how
they support the insurgency, and conducting nonkinetic engagements, RIP/TOA
(Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority) occurs. BCT rotation reduces continuity
and oftentimes results in inconsistencies because of a change in priorities from
the outgoing and incoming BCTs (Allen, 2006). Such turbulence likely retards
trust (Sweeney, 2010) and is an important contextual factor to take into consider-
ation as a moderator of leadership approaches across cultures (Yammarino et al.,
2010). Leadership style changes that may accompany BCT rotation may be prob-
lematic. The accumulating studies on authentic leadership, for example, warn that
inauthentic leader behavior can undermine the prior positive effects of authentic
leadership (Avolio & Gardner, 2005).

TOWARD CLOSING THE GAP

Closing the gaps and minimizing the competency mismatches will require a
mixture of policy, staffing, education, and training solutions. First and fore-
most, enhancing sociocultural competence requires delving into another cultural
arena—the military’s organizational culture. The military must also accept, value,
and reward cultural knowledge and skills. To date, tactical and technical compe-
tencies rather than social, emotional, and cultural competencies have been valued
and rewarded by the military. That is, leaders are culled disproportionately from
engineering, science, math, and “practical” disciplines, and artillery, infantry, and
armor branches (Laurence, 2007; McFate, 2007; Williams, 2003; Wong et al.,
2003). From the point of organizational entry on, the behavioral and social sci-
ences are eschewed (Laurence, 2007; McFate, 2005), and hence, COIN courses of
action are hampered by deficiencies in such competencies as interaction, negotia-
tion, and communication. Cultural awareness goes beyond situational awareness.
Cultural awareness requires more than a satellite photo. It requires understanding
of culture—interests, habits, intentions, beliefs, social organizations, and political
systems (McFate, 2005).
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Correcting the cultural deficits does not mean that the traditional skills
and leader behaviors are obsolete. However, the military’s varied roles and
missions call for more heterogeneity among leaders. We need warfighters and
technicians/tacticians. But we also need communicators, negotiators, and social
scientists for asymmetric warfare (Williams, 2003). Whereas chemistry, physics,
and information technology were key to past wars, the emerging amplifier for
today’s (and tomorrow’s) irregular warfare is the human and social sciences. The
amplifiers from yesteryear remain valuable, but psychocultural perspectives will
be decisive (Scales, 2009). Winning the peace takes more than “reconstruction” of
physical and concrete realms but must encompass psychological or social dimen-
sions (Fischer, 2004). Kilcullen (2006) describes COIN as armed social work and
asserts that political/cultural advisors are more important to success than one
more rifle squad. Yet, even relevant institutional assets such as civil affairs and
psychological operations are mere (and sparse) attachments rather than central
personnel elements.
Clearly there is a need for sociocultural knowledge, and the military has rec-
ognized this formally through a long overdue update to the counterinsurgency
field manual (U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,
2007). Formulating new policy is an important first step, but implementing it
will require concerted organizational attention and resources. Fortifying and main-
streaming civil affairs, let alone infusing social science into the PME curriculum,
will not correct the deficits in cross-cultural communication, openness to alter-
nate points of view, negotiation, social structure, and identification of our own
biases (McFate, 2007) overnight. Even if we begin to select the right young lead-
ers with high social, emotional, and cultural intelligence and overhaul PME, a
shift in military culture will take time (Wong et al., 2003). Unfortunately, the
war cannot be put on “hold.” In the interim, there is still so much to know,
be, and do, so military leaders must rely on a collective approach to sociocul-
tural literacy. Although leaders are taught that they are expert on all matters
pertaining to the task at hand, they must shed such egocentrism and actively
solicit the advice and input of others—subordinate leaders, combat service support
branch members, interagency and coalition partners, and civilian social scientists
(Allen, 2006).
To mitigate the sociocultural knowledge gap, one creative solution is the
Human Terrain System (HTS)—an Army project that embeds a social science or
human terrain team (HTT) within a BCT to produce, collect, and centralize cul-
tural knowledge. HTS focuses on social interactions and relationships and helps
our military understand the human aspects of the operating environment—the per-
ceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and needs of the local population (Schaner, 2008). HTS
grows the knowledge stock and closes the gap produced by BCT rotation. Even the
criticisms of HTS—that it is insufficient and that it requires professional military
members—highlight its criticality (Schaner, 2008).
 COMBAT AND CULTURE 497

TABLE 1
Job Adaptability Inventory (JAI) Dimensions Validated for HTS Jobs

Dimension Definition

Demonstrating cultural adaptability Performs effectively in different cultures, learning new

Demonstrating interpersonal adaptability
Demonstrating physically oriented
adaptability
Dealing with uncertain or unpredictable
work situations
Handling work stress
Handling emergencies or crisis situations
Learning new tasks, technologies, and
procedures
Solving problems creatively
languages, values, traditions, and politics
Adjusts interpersonal style to achieve goals when
working with new teams, coworkers, or customers
Adjusts to various physical factors, such as heat, noise,
uncomfortable climates, and difficult environments
Adjusts and deals with unpredictable situations, shifts
focus, and takes reasonable action
Remains calm under pressure, handles frustration, and
acts as calming influence
Reacts appropriately and decisively to life-threatening
or dangerous situations
Anticipates, prepares for, and learns skills needed for
future job requirements
Solves atypical, ill-defined, and complex problems

Adapted from Pulakos, Arad, Donovan, & Plamondon, 2000.

In addition to high levels of proficiency in applied social science and cul-

tural expertise, an HTT job analysis highlighted additional competencies and
subcompetencies required of embedded social scientists, who represent the cen-
tral component of HTS. Adaptability was shown to be a core competency. Table 1
presents adaptability competency constructs developed and validated through this
recent job analysis of HTT jobs (Pulakos, Arad, Donovan, & Plamondon, 2000;
Vasilopolous & Swartout, 2009).
According to the job analysis results (Vasilopolous & Swartout, 2009), other
critical competencies for HTS included:

● Communication (especially influencing and persuading)

● Critical thinking
● Personal leadership (including coaching, team building)
● Organizational and environmental understanding (e.g. community aware-
ness, exploring alternatives, external awareness, social awareness)

In essence, this job analysis highlights the requirement to blend soldiers and
social scientists. The project was initiated to help the military adapt to socio-
cultural exigencies. However, social science or sociocultural competency alone
will not suffice. The social scientists must have the aptitude for or adapt to
the military combat environment. HTS brings the social, emotional, and cultural
498 LAURENCE

intelligence skills to the BCT. It fills the void within BCTs in less concrete, people-
oriented disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, and psychology. And, of
course, given the complexity and danger of the COIN conditions and military
“control,” the competencies and characteristics required of the social scientists
extend beyond their technical domain.
Programs like the Human Terrain System are vital, but they should not absolve
the military of internal requirements for sociocultural competence. Appropriate
training is necessary. Questions regarding what to train, how to train, when to
train, and who to train must be asked and answered. Incorporating a higher level of
cultural knowledge in predeployment training is a good start. But more advanced
training at this stage will require that sociocultural education and more basic cul-
tural training be covered earlier and periodically in the leader development process
(McFate, 2007).
Many factors influence military success, but the quality of leadership is one
of the most critical elements. Leader development efforts must be informed by
promising leadership research and theory. Are leadership styles, approaches, and
theories transferable cross-culturally? What styles or combinations are suggested
for situations where there are large differences in perspectives, incongruent
goals, and different sets of followers—in-group and out-group? How can military
leaders best lead other leaders? The appropriateness of transformational and/or
authentic leadership for cross-cultural relationships that are demanded in coun-
terinsurgency operations is likely but must be further explored and qualified, if
necessary. It is also important to determine if and how military cross-cultural
interactions and situations affect leadership at different levels. Still another issue
is whether trust can be promoted outside of military teams where nondisclosive
intimacy as a function of role in the group is not activated (Baran & Scott,
2010). Leadership styles appropriate for cross-cultural contact have yet to be
investigated (Javidan et al., 2004).
Leaders must set the tone and be the change agents with regard to cultural
literacy. For social science to be an amplifier for COIN, strategic, operational,
and tactical (or direct) leaders must rely on it and value its contribution. They
must have enough vision to recognize their own shortcomings with regard to
cultural competence and tap appropriate resources and accept coaching from
subordinate/direct leaders and outside expertise. Unconventional warfare requires
unconventional leaders. The unfamiliarity and ambiguity inherent in danger-
ous, cross-cultural interactions may benefit from complexity leadership theory
perspectives and leaders’ facilitation of sensemaking. Selecting in leaders with
socio-cultural aptitude warrants consideration. However, the potential for such
a personnel strategy to reduce the pool of core, critical combat military leaders
must be investigated. Given the coexisting demands for combat and cultural com-
petency, promoting a workable version of shared leadership may offer promise.
Leaders should actively seek the input of and defer to sociocultural experts.
 COMBAT AND CULTURE 499

CONCLUDING NOTE ON CULTURE

Both leadership and culture are complex. Irregular warfare, counterinsurgency in

particular, requires adaptability in our military leaders as they engage in com-
plex and ambiguous activities (Vandergriff, 2006). Culture is not an engineering
problem. Today’s war requires ability to deal with civilian populace. Failing to
improve cultural awareness will prove to be a critical vulnerability for U.S. forces.
We cannot afford inertia that is so common in a bureaucracy. Rather, strate-
gic leaders must advocate for educating, training, and rewarding (e.g., through
career development pathways) sociocultural competence, and they must shape the
organization and allocate necessary resources and trainee time toward this goal.
Understanding and empathy are important weapons; cultural awareness and build-
ing trust may be equally or more effective in saving lives as body armor (Scales,
2009). We must further research and develop approaches to lead our teams under
danger and in cooperation with the population against the enemy. Sociocultural
knowledge is a leadership and warfighting skill (McFate, 2007).

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