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to China: The history DOI: 10.1177/1748048518802915
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of state regulation of
Korean dramas in China
Ji Hoon Park
Korea University, School of Media and Communication,
Seoul, Korea

Yong Suk Lee

SBS 161, Mokdongseo-ro, Yangcheon-gu, Seoul, Korea

Hogeun Seo
Radio-Television-Film, University of Texas at Austin, Austin,
TX, USA

Abstract
In October 2016, approximately 3 months after the Korean government agreed to host
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, TV stations and online streaming platforms in
China stopped airing Korean dramas, movies, TV shows and commercials that featured
Korean celebrities. While the post-Terminal High Altitude Area Defense blockade of
Korean cultural products received much attention, the restriction should not be taken
as an idiosyncratic case of cultural retaliation over the deployment of Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense in the Korean peninsula. Chinese government regulation of
Korean TV shows should be understood in the larger context of restricting the
inflow of capitalist culture, which is viewed as a threat to socialist ideology and national
security. We discuss the historical trajectory of the rise and fall of Korean drama export
to China (1996–2018) to discuss the continuing role of the state in transnational cul-
tural flows.

Keywords
China, cultural flow, Korean Wave, State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio,
Film and Television, transnational

Corresponding author:
Yong Suk Lee, SBS 161, Mokdongseo-ro, Yangcheon-gu, Seoul 07996, Korea.
Email: dragrock@gmail.com
2 the International Communication Gazette 0(0)

The unprecedented success of two Korean dramas in China, My Love from the Star
(2013–2014) and Descendants of the Sun (2015), led Chinese businesses to recognize
Korean dramas as profit-making opportunities. Chinese online platforms and cor-
porations began to supply a sizable amount of production budget for Korean
dramas to acquire the lion’s share of distribution rights. While the Korean TV
industry was hopeful about the new opportunity to combine Korean creativity and
Chinese capital, the U.S.–South Korea joint announcement in July 2016 to deploy
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) instantly extinguished the
industry’s hopes of cooperation. The Chinese government took retaliatory action
by blocking streaming services that had provided access to Korean dramas online.
As a result, the inflow of Chinese capital and the collaboration of two countries in
the production of Korean dramas came to a halt. Since China had become one of
the most lucrative markets for Korean dramas, as well as a major supplier of
production costs in recent years (Qin, 2015), the Korean TV industry was severely
hit by the sudden stop in capital inflow.
While much attention has been paid to post-THAAD restrictions on Korean
popular culture, Chinese government regulation of Korean dramas is not new. The
stringent regulations imposed on Korean TV programs after THAAD should be
understood in the broader context of Chinese policies on overseas-produced TV
programs. Foreign contents have long been perceived as carriers of capitalist ideol-
ogy, and hence a threat to Chinese traditional culture and socialist ideology.
The term ‘the Korean Wave’ was coined in China in the late 1990s to refer
to the emerging popularity of Korean culture in China (Kang, 2016).
Noteworthy is that its Chinese term Hanliu means both the wave of Korean culture
( ) and the cold wave ( ), meaning vigilance against foreign capitalist cul-
ture. As the homonym suggests, the history of the Korean Wave in China is
characterized by a constant interplay between the popularity of Korean dramas
and the regulation of these contents led by the Chinese government’s all-powerful
regulator, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and
Television (SAPPRFT).
In the study of the Korean Wave, scholars have largely celebrated the trans-
national flow of what used to be a fringe culture, and have actively discussed the
underlying factors that have enabled its spread (Nam, 2013; Ryoo, 2009).
Relatively few studies have investigated the critical role of the state in restricting
Korean popular culture, especially the role of China, a country regarded as an
important consumer and influencer of the Korean Wave. We discuss the historical
trajectory of the rise and fall of Korean drama export to China (1996–2018), to
discuss the continuing role of the state in transnational cultural flows.

Factors affecting the transnational flows of culture

A variety of factors intervene in transnational cultural flows. First, many countries
have for cultural and economic reasons restricted the inflow of foreign media.
Park et al. 3

Driven by objectives to protect their film industry and national culture, many
countries, including the U.K., Korea, Brazil, Italy, and France, have adopted the
screen quota system. For example, the U.K. introduced quotas for British films
under the Cinematograph Films Act 1927 as early as the 1920s, and a range of
policy instruments (e.g., loans, grants, and tax incentives) were employed in the
1990s for British film production, to assist the competitiveness of the domestic film
industry in the face of Hollywood’s global dominance (Hill, 2016). Korea also
implemented the screen quota system in 1967, to shield its burgeoning film industry
from foreign competition. While the minimum number of screen days of Korean
films in the theatre was reduced from 143 days in 1967 to 73 days in 2006, Korea
has consistently upheld the law to achieve both economic and cultural objectives of
protecting Korean film (Ryoo, 2009).
While the development of digital online technologies appears to weaken national
barriers, many countries have actively regulated the cultural flow by filtering out
politically sensitive contents (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Syria, Malaysia, Thailand,
Vietnam, Singapore), or pornographic materials online (e.g., Japan, Canada,
Australia, France, England, New Zealand) (Lee and Liu, 2012). Most notably,
the Chinese government has used Internet filtering and censorship, widely known
as the Great Firewall of China, to maintain political and ideological sovereignty,
and to advance the competitiveness of China’s homegrown media enterprises
(Zhang, 2006). Besides, the Chinese government has restricted the entrance of
global media companies (e.g., Facebook and YouTube) into the domestic market
to help develop local services, such as Tudou and Ren Ren (Peichi, 2013).
The Chinese regulation of cultural products can be situated in the larger context
of post-socialist state intervention in the neoliberal market. Post-socialist states
have accommodated the principles of neoliberalism for economic development.
However, political elites continue to use socialist principles to justify state inter-
vention to control economic and political activities within the national system
(Chelcea and Druţ , 2016; Thiem, 2015). Therefore, what Thiem calls the ‘‘amor-
phous and ambivalent situation of a double movement of accommodating and
resisting neoliberalism’’ (p. 80) helps achieve both the political and economic
objectives of the post-socialist states.
Second, political and diplomatic relations can exert a huge influence on transna-
tional cultural flows. Most notably, the Cold War is an example of how the poli-
tical environment of a country can limit the transnational flow of culture. During
World War II, the Soviet Union, due to its wartime alliance with the U.S., did not
prohibit jazz music, but during postwar decades, the Communist Party began to
oppress young jazz listeners, condemning the genre as music of the foreign bour-
geois (Tsipursky, 2016). When Japan cut off diplomatic relations with Taiwan in
1972 to strengthen ties with Mainland China, Taiwan reacted by banning Japanese
TV shows on terrestrial TV (Ishii et al., 1999). Although the ban on Japanese TV
shows could not stop Taiwanese people from enjoying the shows via uncensored
platforms, which included pirated videos and cable TV, Taiwan remained steadfast,
and did not lift the ban until 1993. In the 1980s, when China maintained amicable
4 the International Communication Gazette 0(0)

relations with the U.S. and Japan, many American and Japanese TV shows were
imported to China, and became immensely popular. However in the 1990s, the
number of imported American and Japanese TV programs decreased sharply, when
China strengthened its ideological and political control over the media, and wea-
kened its diplomatic ties with Western countries (Chen, 2017).
Third, the sociohistorical context can result in governmental intervention in
transnational cultural flows. Until 1998, Korea prohibited the import of
Japanese cultural products, including dramas, films, and music. The ban was jus-
tified by Korea’s past colonial experiences under Japanese rule (1910–1945)
(Provine et al., 2000). Since the Arab Spring, many Arab authoritarian regimes,
such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain, have strength-
ened the level of Internet censorship, to restrict access to outside information, and
to suppress political dissent (Wagner, 2011).

Studies on the Korean Wave

As Korean popular culture gained global popularity, scholars have conducted
numerous studies to identify the driving forces behind the global popularity of
Korean popular culture and its transnational appeal. These studies regard the
Korean Wave as a contraflow, which refers to media flows originating from the
peripheries of global media industries, rather than from a dominant center, like
the U.S. (Jin and Yoon, 2016; Kim, 2007; Thussu, 2016). Around the early
2000s, when the Korean Wave was largely an Asian phenomenon, many scho-
lars relied on the notion of cultural proximity to explain the popularity of
Korean dramas (Park, 2006; Peichi, 2013). Their studies shed light on cultural
similarities found in Asian countries, such as Confucianism (as the cultural basis
for social life), and the Asian mode of modernity, both of which are thought to
facilitate cultural exchange among Asian countries (Leung, 2008; Sung, 2013).
While some regard the shared cultural heritage as the basis for the pan-Asian
popularity of Korean dramas, others claim that the very consumption of
Korean dramas helps construct a sense of Asian identity, by enabling Asian
fans to imagine their belonging to an East Asian community (Cho, 2005; Lee
and Ju, 2010).
Recent scholarship of the Korean Wave draws upon the concept of cultural
hybridity to explain the roles and characteristics of Korean popular culture.
Borrowing Bhabha’s (2004) notion of ‘in-between’ spaces, Ryoo (2009) claimed
that Korean popular culture plays the role of a cultural mediator that reinterprets
and mediates Western popular culture, and transmits it to neighboring countries.
Korea’s ‘in-between’ position (neither too advanced nor too behind in terms of
economic development, political power, and cultural development) facilitates the
acceptance of Korean pop culture by Asian neighbors. In the case of K-pop, the
Korean music industry further expedites the process of hybridization by hiring
Western musicians to compose K-pop, and by utilizing English mixing in its
lyrics (Jin and Ryoo, 2014; Oh, 2013).
Park et al. 5

Other studies attributed the emergence of Korean Wave to the success of the
state’s top-down project (Huang, 2011; Ryoo, 2008). In the early 1990s, the export-
oriented Korean government recognized the media and popular culture as key
engines for the nation’s economic development. While adopting the competition-
grounded deregulatory scheme, the government began to provide various types of
assistance (Nam, 2008). For example, the Cultural Industry Bureau was established
in 1994, and the Motion Picture Promotion Law was instituted in 1995 to promote
corporate investment in the media industry (Shim, 2006). Government organiza-
tions, including the Korea Creative Content Agency and Korean Film Council,
have provided subsidies and funding for creative industries.
However, the spread of Korean popular culture often results in rejection or
animosity toward Korean cultural products. Anti-Korean Wave phenomena
have occurred due to various factors, such as historical conflicts, ideological con-
cerns, and uneven trade balance between Korea and the recipient countries (Ainslie
et al., 2017; Ryoo, 2009). In Japan, the popularity of Korean dramas triggered
deep-rooted anti-Korean and nationalist sentiments among conservatives, which
often manifest themselves on various websites. The negative responses toward
Korean popular culture are not limited to belligerent online responses. In 2011,
approximately 6,000 demonstrators protested against Fuji TV, and called for a
boycott of the channel for airing many Korean TV shows, without investing in
Japanese contents (Jin and Yoon, 2016).
Among the many countries that have displayed antagonism towards the Korean
Wave, China in particular has a long history of the anti-Korean Wave movement.
The Chinese media have voiced harsh criticism on trade imbalance in TV dramas,
accusing Korea of not increasing the import of Chinese dramas, while economically
benefiting from exporting an increasing number of Korean dramas to China (Jang,
2012). In the mid-2000s, Chinese workers in the drama industry expressed antip-
athy toward the Korean Wave, stating that the Chinese drama industry has dete-
riorated, due to its increasing dependence on Korean dramas (Heo et al., 2013; Liu,
2014). In addition, Korean dramas were criticized for their alleged lower quality
(e.g., stereotypical stories, lack of diversity, and narrative inconsistency), the atti-
tudes of Korean stars (e.g., arrogance or bad manners), and their potentially
negative effects on Chinese audiences (Jang, 2012). Chen (2017) considers
China’s sense of cultural superiority as the root to the anti-Korean Wave move-
ment, because the popularity of Korean popular culture poses a threat to this deep-
rooted belief.

Method
The purpose of the study is to identify the role of the Chinese government in the
restriction of the inflow of Korean dramas into China. This study drew upon
various information sources to construct the historical narrative of Korean
dramas in China, and its regulation on the part of the Chinese regulator,
SAPPRFT. Not only did we find information in academic journals and newspaper
6 the International Communication Gazette 0(0)

Table 1. Interviewee information.

Interviewee Position Company type Broadcasting experience

A Producer Production company Over 15 years

B Producer Production company Over 20 years
C Producer Terrestrial TV Over 15 years
D Producer Terrestrial TV Over 15 years
E Producer Production company Over 20 years
F Vice President Production company Over 15 years
G Producer Production company Over 5 years
H Program Sales Terrestrial TV Over 20 years
I Program Sales Program sales agent in China Over 15 years
J Vice Chairman Production company Over 20 years
K Researcher Terrestrial TV Over 3 years
L President Production company Over 20 years

articles, but we also conducted 12 semi-structured interviews with the sales experts
of Korean drama and creators working in Korean TV stations and production
companies. Based on the available sources, we mapped out the shift and changes in
Korean drama exports to China through outlining four different periods. We will
discuss the reception of Korean dramas in each period, and the ways in which
SAPPRFT intervened to contain the influence of Korean dramas.
The interviewees helped us construct the characteristics of what we call the third
and fourth periods of the Korean Wave when Chinese direct investment altered the
mode of Korean drama production. While the interviewees offered a wide range of
information concerning the past, present, and future of Korean dramas in the
Chinese market, we probed into recent issues in particular: the changes that the
inflow of Chinese capital brought about to Korean film production, and the after-
math of THAAD. We asked questions such as: How has the Chinese investment
impacted the Korean drama industry in terms of financing? Are there any concerns
about the inflow of Chinese capital? How does the regulation of SAPPRFT influ-
ence the Korean drama production? Each interview was conducted at the inter-
viewee’s office or at a coffee shop, and lasted approximately 60 minutes.

Early period (1997–2005): The flourishing of Korean dramas

Korean dramas were introduced to China in the early 1990s, shortly after Seoul
and Beijing established formal diplomatic relations in 1992. Two dramas galva-
nized the sudden influx of Korean dramas into the Chinese home. Star in My Heart
and What is Love All About, both of which aired on CCTV in 1997, reached an
average viewership of 4.2% and 4.3% respectively. The popularity of Korean
drama reached its peak in 2005, when Dae Jang Geum that aired on Hunan TV
Park et al. 7

achieved overwhelming success, with an average rating of 15.3%. It was estimated

that over 164 million people in China watched Dae Jang Geum (Hwang et al.,
2016). The success of Korean dramas encouraged Chinese broadcasters to
import more and more Korean dramas. The number of Korean dramas imported
to China increased from 67 in 2002 to 150 in 2005 (Han et al., 2007). The total
export revenues of Korean dramas in China also increased from 3.6 to 10.9 million
USD, accordingly (Kim et al., 2012).
Both industrial and cultural factors explain the proliferation of Korean dramas
in China during the early period. With the market reforms, China saw the rapid
development of the broadcasting industry, as seen in the increase in the number of
TV channels, and the size of TV audience (Ahn, 2014). Korean dramas were readily
available to fill in the airtime of Chinese broadcasters. According to Cho (2005),
the lower price of Korean dramas, compared to Japanese dramas, contributed
substantially to the inflow of Korean dramas into Chinese TV. Korean dramas
were also regarded as less objectionable than Japanese dramas, due to China’s
lingering animosity towards Japan over historical events that included the
Nanjing Massacre during the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Diaoyu
Islands dispute (Ahn, 2014; Lee, 2014).
Scholars during this period widely used concepts such as cultural proximity or
cultural affinity to explain the popularity of Korean dramas. The emphasis on
family that characterizes many Korean dramas resonated with cultural sentiments
that were prevalent in China. Furthermore, Korean dramas helped arouse a sense
of nostalgia for Confucian traditions (e.g., filial piety), which have diminished since
the revolution and destruction of the old China led by Mao Zedong in the 1960s
(Lee, 2011; Lee et al., 2016). Chinese viewers were not only drawn to Korean
dramas for their relatable cultural elements, but were also mesmerized by the
contents’ presentation of highly westernized, commercialized culture (e.g., fashion,
modern lifestyles) with sophisticated visual storytelling methods (Lee, 2002, 2011).
As the popularity of Korean drama culminated with Dae Jang Geum, there were
increasing anxieties about the unidirectional influx of Korean TV shows, and the
trade deficit. The popular press, such as the China Youth Daily, described the
Korean Wave as a form of cultural invasion, and demanded a ban on importing
Korean popular culture (Han, 2013). In 2005, SAPPRFT stepped in, and imposed
strict limits on the programming of foreign TV shows. Under the regulation,
Chinese TV stations were permitted to broadcast Korean dramas for only 20
hours a year (Kang, 2006). The regulatory changes ended up pulling most of
Korean dramas off the air, as evidenced by the fact that only seven Korean
dramas were imported to China in 2006 (Han et al., 2007).

Second period (2006–2012): Korean dramas—Stagnated on TV but

widespread online
SAPPRFT continued to constrain Korean dramas in China. The regulation was
justified and supported by anti-Korean sentiments that were expressed explicitly in
8 the International Communication Gazette 0(0)

the press over a number of issues. Although not exported to China, three historical
dramas, Jumong, Yeon Gaesomun, and Dae Jo Young, which aired in Korea in
2007, provoked the Chinese press for their alleged manipulation of Chinese history.
Chinese were also infuriated by the Korean broadcaster SBS’s unauthorized filming
of the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony rehearsal, and the violent clashes
between activists and Chinese residents during the Seoul leg of the torch relay for
the Olympics (Kim and Kim, 2016). Korean dramas were affected further by
SAPPRFT’s enforcement of a tougher regulation in 2012, which dictated that
foreign TV shows could not take up more than 25% of total programming time
each day, and that overseas-produced shows must be banned between 7 p.m. and
10 p.m. (Lee et al., 2016).
While Korean dramas appeared to have lost their popularity on Chinese TV,
they became increasingly available online. Around the time of the 2008 Beijing
Olympics, China witnessed the rapid growth of online video streaming service
platforms, such as LeTV (2004–), Youku (2006–), Mango TV (2006–), Tudou
(2007–), and iQiyi (2010–), which emerged as influential broadcasters that chal-
lenged the power of traditional TV. Just like traditional TV stations in the past,
these streaming platforms purchased distribution licenses of many Korean dramas,
as they recognized the economic value of importing these relatively cheap, yet
profitable contents. Most importantly, the fact that the streaming of overseas-
produced shows online was exempt from the pre-broadcast approval by
SAPPRFT contributed significantly to the proliferation of Korean dramas online
(Lee, 2014).
While there was no megahit like Dae Jang Geum, Korean dramas and TV shows
have gradually expanded their fan base. Compared to the early period, when
Korean drama fans were mainly confined to middle-aged women, Chinese youth
became the main consumers of Korean popular culture in general, as Korean
movies, variety shows, fashion, beauty and K-pop enjoyed popularity in China
(Ahn, 2014). Internet-savvy Chinese young adults’ interest in Korean popular
culture, as well as the wide availability of the broadband Internet during this
period, fostered the dissemination of Korean TV shows. In addition to online
streaming websites, Korean TV shows were just a few clicks away. They were
made available to (unlawfully) download from various Chinese websites, and
were also shared by avid fans, who created Chinese subtitles for Korean shows
only few hours after they had been aired in Korea.

Third period (2013–2016): The inflow of Chinese capital

After nearly 9 year’s lull since the phenomenal success of Dae Jang Geum, China
witnessed an unprecedented success of a Korean drama: My Love from the Star
(2013–2014). As of 2016, the latter garnered a record of nearly 5 billion hits on
eight platforms that had streamed the series (Sim, 2016). The popularity of the
main actor, Kim Soo-Hyun, skyrocketed, as reflected in Xin Jing Bao’s (the third
best-selling daily newspaper in Beijing) story of scalpers who sold tickets for the
Park et al. 9

Table 2. Chinese investment in Korean production/management companies.

Share Year and month

Korean companies Chinese investors Amount invested ratio (%) of investment

SM Alibaba 35.5 million USD 4 2016.02

Signal Spearhead 21.4 million USD 12 2016.01
FNC Suning Universal 33.6 million USD 22 2015.11
Chorokbaem DMG 25.0 million USD 26 2015.11
NEW Huace 53.5 million USD 15 2014.10
KeyEast Sohu 15 million USD 6 2014.08
Note: The table was created based on the information from interviews and newspaper articles.

celebrity’s fan meeting for as high as 3,300 USD. My Love from the Star was indeed
a cultural phenomenon that inspired a wave of consumption of Korean products
related to the drama, such as watches, glasses, bags, shoes, and clothes. Most
famously, the drama sparked the so-called Chimek (the combination of fried
chicken and beer, which is the heroine’s favorite menu on the show) craze in
China. Even high-ranking Chinese politician Wang Qishan commented on the
show at an important legislative meeting, while bemoaning Chinese TV’s lack of
competitiveness (Wan, 2014).
The success story of the online video streaming service platform iQiyi motivated
Chinese corporations to actively invest in Korean dramas; iQiyi obtained the
license of 21 episodes of My Love from the Star for approximately 600,000 USD,
but earned 100 million USD in commercial revenues (Byun, 2014). Not only did
Chinese corporations rush to purchase the distribution license of Korean dramas,
but they also began to buy stakes in major Korean TV/film production companies
with solid production records. China’s DMG Group became the largest share-
holder of the two largest production companies in Korea: Chorokbam Media
and Kim Jong Hak Production. According to interviewees J, F, and G (Table 1),
the motives behind DMG’s venture were the following: a stable supply of Korean
TV shows, transfer of production know-how, and potential remake opportunities,
since production companies normally have the ownership of the intellectual prop-
erty of a drama series (see Table 2).
Sohu invested approximately 15 million USD, and acquired a 6% stake in
KeyEast, which manages superstars, such as Kim Soo-Hyun (Shi, 2014). By acquir-
ing stake in a production company/talent agency that has superstars and good
production records, Chinese investors attempted to create a virtuous cycle; they
could (1) share the return on investment (Korea, China, and globally) with the
Korean companies, (2) acquire the distribution rights of Korean dramas interna-
tionally, and (3) have Korean stars appear on Chinese TV shows and other profit-
able events (Interviewees F and J, Table 1).
The Korean TV industry has always faced low production budgets, due to the
small market size. After Winter Sonata became a big hit in Japan in the early 2000s,
10 the International Communication Gazette 0(0)

the presale of the official license in Japan has been a source of more than a third of
the costs needed for the production of Korean dramas. The deep chill in diplomatic
relations between Korean–Japan (Ramstad, 2012) and the depreciation of the
Japanese yen severely affected the export of Korean dramas to Japan, resulting
in the bankruptcy of numerous production companies in Korea. Coincidently, the
appearance of Chinese investors substituted for the weakening Japanese market in
2014 (Interviewees G and H, Table 1). Special departments and task force teams
have been organized in most TV stations and production companies in Korea to
seek business opportunities with Chinese TV stations, online streaming platforms,
and other corporations interested in entertainment businesses.
As the immense popularity of Korean dramas swept across China, SAPPRFT
quickly intervened, and announced new requirements for foreign TV shows in
September 2014; all overseas-produced dramas on Chinese online streaming plat-
forms needed to be submitted to SAPPRFT for review and approval. Interviewee B
(Table 1) stated that her production company’s web drama series EXO, Next Door
stopped streaming in China after two episodes, as the regulation went into effect
immediately. Korean broadcasters and production companies were affected by the
new regulation, because the price for Korean dramas plunged instantly.
Interviewee C (Table 1) stated that the official drama licenses became devalued,
because Chinese audiences would watch Korean episodes on unauthorized web-
sites, while Korean shows were waiting for months, and some even for years to
receive SAPPRFT’s approval. Prior to the regulations, the licensed rights of
Korean dramas were sold at high price, peaking up to 280,000 USD for each
episode of Pinocchio. In 2014, the bid price for each episode of Hyde, Jekyll, Me
reached 400,000 USD, but in early 2015, dropped to 100,000 USD (Cho, 2015).
As the new regulation came into effect, both Chinese and Korean broadcasters
who shared the same interests came up with a plan to cope with the regulatory
change (Interviewee D, Table 1). They agreed to air each episode of Korean dramas
simultaneously in Korea and China. In the new media environment set up by
SAPPRFT, different airing time substantially lowered the value of official licenses,
as Chinese viewers turned to fan-subtitled, pirated episodes, before they were
allowed to air on an authorized streaming platform. Hence, the complete produc-
tion of Korean dramas for simultaneous airing became necessary for Korean
broadcasters to sell official licenses of dramas at a high price. The complete pro-
duction of Korean dramas also benefited Chinese investors, who could acquire the
lion’s share of distribution rights in China. Accordingly, the complete production
of Korean dramas was made possible by Chinese investors, who supplied more
than one third of the production costs (Park, 2016). In addition to its financial
benefits, the complete production system undertaken by Chinese and Korean
broadcasters is free from tight-shooting schedules and last-minute script changes,
which have long been notorious features of Korean drama production. This system
could arguably take the Korean drama to a higher level, and enhance the reputa-
tion of Korean dramas.
Park et al. 11

Table 3. Investment and profit—Descendants of the Sun.

Rights Revenues Expenses Net profits

TV stations (KBS) Domestic distribution 7 million USD 3.9 million USD 3.1 million USD
rights
Production Intellectual property 19 million USD 13 million USD 6 million USD
companies (NEW) plus a
Chinese online Distribution rights 100 million USD 4.7 million USD 95.3 million
platform (iQiyi) plus RS USD plus
revenue sharing

Note: The table was created based on the information from interviews and newspaper articles.

Table 4. Lineup of complete produced dramas in 2016.

Production Chinese Official license price

Title company TV station platform (per episode)

Descendants of the Sun NEW KBS iQiyi 250,000 USD

Uncontrollably Fond Samwha/iHQ KBS YKTD 200,000 USD
250,000 USD
Saimdang: The Herstory Group 8 SBS Mango TV
Scarlet Heart: Ryeo The Wind that SBS YKTD 300,000 USD
Carries Wishes
Hwarang: The Beginning Oh Boy Project KBS LeTV 250,000 USD
Note: The table was created based on the information from interviews and newspaper articles.

The outcome of the Korea–China collaborative plan was Descendants of the Sun
(2016). The drama was a huge success, achieving ratings in Korea that were as high
as 38.8%. When the last episode of the series aired in China, the viewership of the
show on iQiyi exceeded 2.6 billion (Cho, 2016). Its popularity exceeded that of My
Love from the Star, and the Ministry of Public Security in China released a nation-
wide warning on its official Weibo page in March 2016 against the harmful effects
of Korean dramas. This stated that, ‘‘watching Korean dramas could be danger-
ous, and even lead to legal troubles’’ (Jung, 2016). Overall, Descendants of the Sun
proved the success of the business model that combines Chinese capital and
Korean creativity (Table 3).
Four other drama series were produced completely to air simultaneously in
Korea and China in 2016 (Table 4). Just as in the case of Descendants of the
Sun, Chinese investors provided a substantial part of the production budget.
During this period, the Chinese production companies actively recruited Korean
creative experts (mostly TV producers) for Chinese TV production (Interviewees A
and K, Table 1), Drama producers Jin Hyuk and Jang Tae Yu took leaves of
12 the International Communication Gazette 0(0)

absence from SBS to direct the drama series Jade Lover and the movie Miss
Partners, respectively. In the realm of variety shows, Kim Young-Hee, godfather
of Korean variety shows, who created I am a Singer and Dad! Where are We Going?
left MBC, and relocated to China in 2015 for new business opportunities. Kim
directed a successful TV show, The Greatest Love, for Hunan TV. Shin Jung-Soo
(MBC), Kang Gung (MBC), Moon Kyung-Tae (MBC), Nam Kyu-Hong (SBS),
and Lim Jeong-Gyu (SM C&C) joined Kim Young-Hee to produce Chinese TV
shows.

Fourth period (2016–): Blockade of Korean drama

On 8 July 2016, the Chief of Staff for the U.S. Forces in Korea and South
Korea’s Deputy Minister of Defense announced the decision to deploy the
THAAD on the Korean peninsula to counter the threats of a nuclear-armed
North Korea. While Korea and the U.S. emphasized Korea’s need for stronger
defense capabilities to intercept incoming missiles from North Korea, China voiced
strong opposition. In February 2016, China’s ambassador to Korea warned that
the deployment of THAAD could instantly destroy the China–South Korea tie
(Tiezzi, 2016). China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the deployment of
THAAD on Korean soil would threaten Chinese national security interests, and
destabilize the regional security balance (Kim, 2016). China’s view of Korea wor-
sened, because Korea’s decision over THAAD was seen as an act of ‘betrayal’ (He,
2017).
The political row over THAAD resulted in economic and cultural blockades.
Korean firms faced boycotts in China, due to Chinese resentment of Korea.
Korean conglomerate Lotte became the target of Chinese retaliation, since it
decided to hand over its golf club in the rural town Seongju as a base for the
THAAD launchers. According to the Economist (2017), 99 Lotte Mart Stores in
China had to be closed, due to the alleged violations of fire-safety rules.
AmorePacific, Korea’s leading cosmetics firm, reported a 58% drop in its
second-quarter operating profits in 2017. The number of Chinese tourists to
Korea plummeted, because China imposed a ban on group tours to Korea, in
retaliation for THAAD.
Interviewee L (Table 1), who had worked in Beijing for over 20 years, asserted that
the THAAD provided the Chinese government a good excuse to impose harsh new
controls on the influx of Korean TV shows and popular culture. In October 2016,
approximately 3 months after the Korean government agreed to host THAAD,
Korean celebrities were almost completely denied permission to appear on Chinese
TV. Although Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang denied post-THAAD
restriction on Korean popular culture (Xinhua, 2016), TV stations and online stream-
ing platforms in China stopped airing Korean dramas, movies, TV shows, and com-
mercials that featured Korean celebrities. Due to anti-Korean sentiments, two drama
series that were slated to air in China and Korea simultaneously—Saimdang: The
Park et al. 13

Herstory, and Hwarang: The Beginning—could not air on Chinese TV, nor be
streamed online; they ended up being broadcast only in Korea.
The regular Korean cast on Chinese shows, such as popular Korean singers Psy
and Hwang Chi-Yeol, were blurred out, or edited out entirely. In the credits,
Korean stars’ names were replaced with Chinese names. Most notoriously,
Korean actress Yoo In-Na stepped down from her role as the female lead in the
Chinese remake of the Korean drama Queen In-Hyun’s Man, once the filming was
complete. Taiwanese actress Guo Xue Fu took over her role, and scenes featuring
Yoo were reshot. Many speculated that Yoo was forced out of the show due to
political tensions surrounding the deployment of THAAD (Son, 2016). Top
Korean celebrities lost major endorsement deals. Jeon Ji-Hyun (the heroine of
My Love from the Star) in the Chinese cellphone brand Oppo adverts was replaced
by Chinese actress Angela Baby. Another Chinese cellphone company VIVA
replaced Song Joong-Ki (the hero of Descendants of the Sun) with Taiwanese
actor Eddie Peng as the endorser of the brand.
Shortly before China’s blockage of Korean TV shows, the Korean romantic
drama Uncontrollably Fond had aired simultaneously in Korea (KBS) and China
(Youku) from July to September 2016, and had achieved huge success, reaching a
milestone with 4.1 billion views on Youku (Yonhap, 2017). However, the Beijing
fan meeting scheduled in August 2016 with lead actors Kim Woo-Bin and Bae Suzy
was canceled 2 days before the event by the Chinese organizers, for ‘reasons beyond
their control’ (Yonhap, 2016). In December 2016, K-pop band EXO had their
concert tour postponed indefinitely, and Korean idols were no longer able to
tour in China, due to the prohibitive measure against them; Korean idol concerts
with over 10,000 people in attendance were banned.
Interviewees E and I (Table 1) stated that the deployment of THAAD ‘‘almost
instantly ended’’ the Korean Wave. Korean TV stations, production companies,
stars and production staff were all damaged by China’s ban on Korean TV shows.
The harsh reality was that most of Korean creative exports production staff work-
ing in China returned to Korea, due to tough restrictions on Korean–Chinese
collaborative projects. Korean TV stations and production companies suffered,
because the flow of Chinese capital stopped, and they were no longer able to sell
distribution rights of Korean dramas to China.
Toward the end of 2017, the dispute over THAAD seems to have been some-
what mitigated. In October 2017, the top economic policymakers of Korea and
China agreed to move past the dispute over THAAD (Yonhap, 2018). However, as
of May 2018, the restriction of Korean TV shows in China continues to remain
solid. It is important to note that a specific political context of China under
President Xi Jingping served as the driving force behind the country’s strict regula-
tion of foreign TV shows. In his inaugural address as president in 2013, Xi called
for a great renaissance of the Chinese nation. The ‘Chinese Dream’, the vision that
he laid out, goes beyond economic development, and includes the renaissance of
Chinese traditional culture and heritage (Lee and Kang, 2015). The censorship of
all forms of media has tightened to ensure that they serve the party (Wong, 2015).
14 the International Communication Gazette 0(0)

Most recently, to suppress dissent, the government ordered the top three Internet
providers—China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecom—to block access to
VPNs by February 2018 (Hass, 2017). On the other hand, the popularity of foreign
media was perceived to be in conflict with Chinese cultural values. Facebook,
Twitter, and Google services have been banned in China, not only to inhibit the
competitiveness of foreign technology firms in China, but also to protect national
sovereignty. Under this political milieu, in which the protection of Chinese culture
is a national priority, it comes as no surprise that China continues to tighten its grip
over Korean dramas, since their popularity is taken to mean the invasion of
Chinese culture.

Conclusion
Many studies (Kim, 2007; Oh and Park, 2012) suggest that there is a weakening
influence of the state in transnational cultural flow, due to the rise of new media
technologies that enable cultural products to transcend national borders. Relatively
little attention has been paid to the role of the state in the post-Cold War era.
China, in the context of the Korean Wave, provides a good example of state
intervention in transnational cultural flow. The Korean cultural inflow to China
has always experienced ups and downs, depending on the economic, political, and
diplomatic circumstances of the two countries. Although both Chinese and Korean
broadcasters have endeavored to cope with the regulations imposed by SAPPRFT,
the import of Korean dramas has been severely affected by state regulation.
Before the THAAD disputes, many Koreans were rather hopeful about the
inflow of Chinese capital, and its strategic potential to foster the growth of the
Korean TV industry. The fact that the soon-to-be largest entertainment market in
the world was interested in Korean TV shows offered unusual opportunities for
Korea, because Chinese capital could help the Korean TV industry gain a foothold
in the larger market. Korean creators could participate in the production of pre-
viously unthinkable global projects, and China-funded global projects led by
Korean creators were expected to further promote the competitiveness of
Korean TV shows in the global marketplace. However, THAAD has made this
great potential for collaboration only wishful thinking.
While the post-THAAD blockade of Korean cultural products received much
attention, the restriction should not be taken as an idiosyncratic case of cultural
retaliation over the deployment of THAAD in the Korean peninsula. Chinese
government regulation of Korean TV shows should be understood in the larger
context of restricting the inflow of capitalist culture, which is viewed as a threat to
socialist ideology and national security. The Chinese government has consistently
responded to the widespread popularity of Korean dramas in China. Whenever a
certain Korean drama has become a nationwide sensation, China has immediately
restricted the inflow of Korean dramas, as seen in the imposition of harsh sanctions
following the phenomenal successes of Dae Jang Geum, My Love from the Star, and
Descendants of the Sun. The ban is often justified as being based on their alleged
Park et al. 15

negative economic effects on the Chinese media industry, as well as the anti-Korean
sentiments frequently provoked by the Chinese press.
Under Xi Jinping, China has further tightened restriction and censorship on all
types of media—both domestic and foreign—under the slogan of the ‘Chinese
Dream’ that aims to restore the renaissance of Chinese cultural heritage. We can
foresee even tougher censorship of the media in the future, as reflected in China’s
announcement in March 2018; SAPPRFT was to be shut down, and replaced with
a new regulatory body under the direct control of the State Council (Brzeski, 2018).
This implies that media censorship and regulation of both domestic and foreign
media will be under closer control of the ruling Communist Party. Furthermore,
the political tensions and disputes in an age often characterized as the ‘new Cold
War’ (Persio, 2018) could occlude the development of a powerful regional bloc in
cultural production. As Drezner (2004) proclaimed, states are still the primary
actors in the regulation of cultural products. Our study serves as another case
study that supports previous literature that highlights the continuing role of
(post-socialist) states that limit access to foreign cultural contents.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the School of Media and
Communication, Korea University [grant number K1810861].

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