JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA

2022, VOL. 52, NO. 2, 247–266

https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2020.1865432

The Vernacularisation of Human Rights Discourse in

Myanmar: Rejection, Hybridisation and Strategic Avoidance
Amy Doffegniesa and Tamas Wells b

a
Independent Scholar, Oxford, UK; bSchool of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Australia

ABSTRACT KEY WORDS

Violence against Muslim minority communities in Myanmar has Myanmar; Burma; human
brought the issue of human rights to international and domestic rights; vernacularisation;
attention. Burmese democratic leaders, activists and Buddhist Buddhists; Muslims
monks have attracted sharp international criticism for their see­
mingly neglectful responses to widespread human rights violations.
Yet little attention has been directed towards understanding how
these leaders make sense of “human rights.” This article argues that
the shift in international attention from the problem of military
authoritarianism to the marginalisation of religious minorities pre­
cipitated new ways in which human rights has been given meaning
by Burmese Buddhist political and religious leaders. Examining their
use of human rights language through interviews conducted
between 2016 and 2017, we highlight contrasting responses to
“human rights.” Some respondents rejected human rights language
outright, while others imparted the phrase with their own meaning,
presenting a variety of hybridised visions of human rights that
sometimes supported, rather than opposed, the exclusion of
Muslim minorities. Finally, others strategically avoided human
rights language as they sought to promote human rights aims
amidst popular rejection of the discourse. These findings highlight
the importance, for actors seeking to promote human rights in
Myanmar, of sensitivity towards divergent meanings of human
rights.

Over the last three decades, Burmese political activists, including members of the
Buddhist sangha have been involved in one of the world’s most prominent democratic
struggles. In the midst of this struggle, leaders such as Aung San Suu Kyi and activists,
including Buddhist monks, have frequently drawn on the terms “democracy” and
“human rights” to communicate their vision. It is a few short years since the historic
2015 election victory of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD).
Yet scathing international criticism has been directed not only at the Burmese military
but also at political leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, Burmese activists, and some
Buddhist leaders – people who were at the heart of the movement for democracy. This
international criticism has been driven by a perception of callous neglect by these
political and religious leaders in the face of extraordinary levels of Burmese military
and police violence against Muslim minority groups. From the communal violence of

CONTACT Amy Doffegnies amydoffegnies@gmail.com Oxford, UK

© 2021 Journal of Contemporary Asia
248 A. DOFFEGNIES AND T. WELLS

2012–2014 to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya from Rakhine

state in 2017, Buddhist political and religious elites have been accused of condoning
gross violations of human rights. How can these political and religious leaders, who
demonstrated so much commitment to the cause of democracy and human rights in the
struggle against dictatorship, seemingly abandon those commitments?
In answering this question, which has dominated recent popular and scholarly atten­
tion on the country, we argue that it is important to ask: What meanings “human rights”
has taken on for these actors and how they have changed over time? We suggest that a
more diverse picture is created through attention to the various ways that meanings of
human rights (lu akwint aye in the dominant Burmese translation) have shifted and
splintered amongst political and religious elites. While some political leaders, activists
and Buddhist monks have clearly rejected the language of human rights, others have put
forward various hybridised meanings of human rights, which have come into being where
human rights as a transnational referent has interacted with context-specific ideologies,
cultures and politics, and new meanings of human rights have been produced (Levitt and
Merry 2009). It is argued that this hybridisation is not uniform, even amongst Burman
political and religious leaders. We describe how some hybrid visions of human rights
have emerged that support, rather than oppose, the exclusion of Muslim minorities. In
this context, other political leaders and activists have strategically avoided the language of
human rights altogether, while at the same time seeking to forward the universal aims of
the global referent. This article seeks to unsettle dichotomous understandings of either
rejection or open endorsement of human rights discourse and pave the way for more
understanding of the variety of powerful hybrid visions of human rights that are in
existence in the Myanmar context.
Interpretations of Buddhist-Muslim violence in Myanmar and narratives of Muslim
threat have been well documented in the scholarship (Cheesman 2017a; Walton and
Hayward 2014). However, there has been less attention to how the notion of human
rights is understood and communicated within networks of Burmese political and
religious leaders and with their international interlocutors. In this article we first intro­
duce the concept of vernacularisation, examining both the potential and limits of this
notion of how global ideas such as human rights “travel” and give a brief account of how
this research was conducted. In a second section the ways in which Burmese, and more
specifically Burman (or Bamar) political leaders, activists and Buddhist leaders integrated
human rights language into the struggle against military authoritarianism during the
1990s and 2000s is highlighted.1 A third section describes the growing focus from
international human rights groups on Muslim minorities in Myanmar and the dramatic
shift that this has precipitated in the way the language of human rights is responded to,
namely its rejection, hybridisation and strategic avoidance by political and religious
leaders. This analysis is informed by 53 interviews conducted over an 11-month period
between 2016 and 2017 with religious leaders and individuals involved with human rights
activism in Myanmar, as well as analysis of selected written texts on human rights.
We conclude that what “human rights” means can shift unexpectedly over time as
political coalitions and goals realign. Making sense of these processes of rejection,
hybridisation and strategic avoidance is vital for international agencies hoping to pro­
mote global norms of human rights in Myanmar. Some individuals may align themselves
with “human rights” and yet at the same time deny their universality or applicability to
 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 249

Muslim populations. While other local activists may align themselves with universal
goals of minority rights and protection, and yet avoid the language of human rights as
they remain aware of its politically loaded connotations for many in contemporary
Myanmar. For international advocates of human rights in Myanmar, strategic engage­
ment with local intermediaries is vital, along with sensitivity towards divergent meanings
of human rights.

“Human Rights” and “Vernacularisation”

Human Rights as Discourse
First it is necessary to distinguish how we are making use of the term “human rights,” and
why examining the vernacularisation of human rights is important in Myanmar. “Human
rights” can of course refer to a discrete body of international law, and its application, the
meaning most employed in legal scholarship. However, anthropologists of human rights
have tended to define human rights more expansively. Beyond a set of legal principles,
human rights can be understood as a fluid discourse that different actors may adopt and
transform. For example, social movements and activists have drawn on “human rights” in
their work to build public consciousness against injustice and confront governments
“beyond the control of legal institutions” (Levitt and Merry 2009, 459). Goodale (2006b,
490) has argued that “human rights” as discourse is a set of “concepts, practices, and
experiences through which human rights have meaning at different levels, levels which are
prior to and go beyond the merely instrumental or legal.” It is this more expansive sense of
human rights as discourse that is used in this article. This definition of “human rights” –
which moves beyond the important yet narrower understanding of human rights as
positive international law – is significant in allowing for our consideration of the ways
in which the discourse of human rights circulates and changes in a specific context.
Scholarly critiques of the global human rights project have made invaluable contribu­
tions to furthering debates about human rights in recent years (Mutua 2002; Rajagopal
2003; Moyn 2018). Building upon this, attention to the diverse ways in which human
rights can be taken on in different contexts has demonstrated how human rights
discourse can be mobilised in ways that both align with emancipatory aims and,
conversely, be deployed in ways that undermine these aims. The approach to human
rights in this article takes inspiration from Goodale (2006a) and others who maintain that
attention to the diversity of local human rights practice allows for the definition of
human rights as multiple, contingent on circumstances and neither entirely oppressive
nor entirely unproblematic. Goodale (2006a, 4) defines his approach as one that is
critical, while maintaining the possibility of the emancipatory nature of human rights,
that he terms an “emancipatory cultural politics” approach. This approach allows us to
highlight how human rights has taken on diverse meanings in Myanmar, some which
have justified the exclusion of minorities, while exploring the views of other activists in
the country, who have sought to salvage hope for human rights and its potential. We
argue that analysis of diverse local meanings attached to human rights does not under­
mine the role of human rights as a body of international law, but may enhance the work
of rights advocates who must remain attuned to the situated realities of how human
rights discourse is responded to and deployed.
250 A. DOFFEGNIES AND T. WELLS

Vernacularisation: How Concepts Travel

Various scholars have conceptualised the ways in which global concepts change as they
travel through the processes of “localisation” (Acharya 2004), “translation” (Gregg 2008), or
“diffusion” (Prantl and Nakano 2011). Merry’s (2006) “vernacularisation,” uses the analogy
of language and the differences between a lingua franca and its “vernacular” versions to
describe the way in which global norms are altered and take on diverse meanings amongst
different groups which may differ manifestly with each other, and from the global referent.
Merry and Levitt (2017) suggest that wherever concepts cross into new cultures and
geographies, “ideas and strategies connect with the ideologies already in place”
(Braithwaite 2015). As an aspect of the vernacularisation process, Levitt and Merry (2009,
442) describe the hybridisation of concepts, whereby transnational referents interact with
these ideologies “in place” and “new dimensions and perspectives” are added. Rather than
being replicated or even rejected in the local context, the global concept is transformed.
Dismantling the binary between “international” and “local” actors, Merry (2006, 39)
highlights the role of intermediaries in this translation of concepts, such as political and
religious leaders. Intermediaries draw on the concept of human rights both to frame
their struggles and also sometimes to enlist the support of international human rights
agencies (see, for example, Mujica and Meza 2009; Rajaram and Zararia 2009; Chua
2015). These “people in the middle” – who move between global discourses and
particular local contexts (Merry 2006, 39) – take ideas from one place and then
adapt or redefine them in another. As well as having significant influence in shaping
meanings of human rights for local communities, intermediaries can play a central role
in implementing the programmes of international human rights agencies. In her work
examining donor-funded rule of law programmes in Myanmar, Simion (2018) high­
lights the power and influence of Burmese intermediaries in steering the implementa­
tion of programmes. Examining meanings of human rights amongst networks of
Burmese political leaders, activists and Buddhist monks therefore has significance
given their role as intermediaries.
The process of vernacularisation of political concepts has been identified not only
in relation to human rights but also in relation to conceptions of democracy. For
example, Michelutti (2007) examines processes of vernacularisation of democracy
amongst the powerful Yadav caste in north India. Several works have also described
how global concepts work in Myanmar. In his work Buddhism Politics and Political
Thought in Myanmar, Walton (2016) examines how meanings of democracy amongst
Buddhist monks and politicians are guided by a Buddhist “moral universe.” The
importance of this is brought out in McCarthy’s (2019) ethnographic study high­
lighting how Buddhist politicians and citizens in central Myanmar enact an, at times
illiberal, concept of “democratic deservingness” where distinctions are made between
individuals and communities who do, and do not, demonstrate or perform self-
reliance. We return to this notion of deservingness in the final section of this article.

The Limits of the Concept of Vernacularisation

The notion of vernacularisation is a compelling way to understand how concepts travel
and circulate, yet we also acknowledge its limits in examining meaning making around
 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 251

justice and rights in Myanmar. One key limitation of examining human rights through
the lens of vernacularisation is that it assumes a global norm as the lingua franca.
Research that maintains the global norm of human rights as the central referent, and
focuses on human rights discourse in cross-cultural settings, risks overlooking indigen­
ous mechanisms for the pursuit of justice. For those other than a small elite in the
country, the words “human rights” or their common translation lu akwint aye would be
likely to hold little meaning in their struggles for basic needs or for creating just
communities. Prasse-Freeman (2018) argues that in examining farmers’ land struggles
in Myanmar, discourse about “human rights” may be of only peripheral, if any, relevance,
and of little validity as a starting point for understanding what it is that animates
grassroots protesters.
Other studies highlight the way human rights language can be used by social and
religious leaders with little attempt to engage with the global source meaning at all.
Anthropologist Harri Englund (2011) explores the complex twists of meanings of human
rights by a rural community in Malawi as they sought to endorse a new village headman.
He argues that these community members were not simply drawing on international
concepts of rights and then adapting or adopting them into their own context. Rather
they were engaging in a contest over the local Chichewa concept of relational rights, yet
using the same language as that of human rights. The danger for analysts – of processes of
vernacularisation of human rights – is that they can overplay the significance and
predominance of global norms and meanings in local conceptual contests. With
Prasse-Freeman (2018), we argue that use of human rights language by Burmese activists
does not necessarily imply commitment to the universal emancipatory aims of global
discourses. Interaction between intermediaries, local constituencies and international
rights agencies may, but does not necessarily, facilitate a convergence of meanings of
human rights, either at a societal level or even amongst elite actors, and in some cases
may even stimulate divergence in meanings.
While recognising these limits, we argue that the notion of vernacularisation – with its
focus on circulation of discourses and its breaking down of the binary of “international”
and “local” – can still hold value in understanding shifting beliefs of contemporary
Bamar political leaders, activists and Buddhist monks. Over the last three decades,
many Bamar elites engaged in the democracy movement have explicitly linked their
struggles to the notion of “human rights.” While largely irrelevant for rural farming
populations, the vocabulary of “human rights” retains a central place in elite dialogue
between political and religious leaders and with international donor representatives,
diplomats and the media. With significant social standing, these elite intermediaries
have powerful influence over the meanings of human rights and justice that are adopted
by their wider Myanmar constituents. This in turn is crucial in shaping communal
attitudes, for example towards ethnic inclusion, or exclusion. It is therefore vital to
examine the ways in which human rights discourse has been infused with meaning
amongst political and religious leaders, and how this has shifted over time.

Researching Vernacularisation in Myanmar

The dataset underpinning this article resulted from a period of data collection under­
taken by one of the authors between September 2016 and July 2017.2 The primary
252 A. DOFFEGNIES AND T. WELLS

method of data collection used was in-depth, semi-structured, key informant interviews.
Informants were recruited via a method of purposive sampling known as “snowball” or
“respondent-driven” sampling. Interviews ranged in length from 45 minutes to two
hours and were conducted with 53 informants in Yangon, Mandalay and Sagaing region.
Informants were selected from two key groups of people who play a role in the translation
of “human rights” in Myanmar: Buddhist religious leaders, especially those involved with
political activism; and individuals working on human rights issues in civil society. The
first group of 24 individuals included primarily Burman Buddhist leaders and was made
up of 20 monks, one nun and one lay Buddhist leader who is influential in the Buddhist
nationalist movement and two Muslim religious leaders. Interviews with members of this
group took place mostly in the monasteries where religious leaders resided.
The second group of 29 individuals was made up of educated, urban-dwelling
individuals who are active in work that is in some way connected with human rights.
This included members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community groups
and networks who work in areas including human rights documentation, advocacy and
education, and individuals who identify as political activists pursuing human rights or
social justice issues. Notable exceptions to people with this background, but individuals
who provided insightful perspectives and whose work focuses on human rights specifi­
cally were: one member of Myanmar’s National Human Rights Commission, one Foreign
Embassy worker in Yangon and one consultant who works on land rights and women’s
rights. Interviews with this broad constellation of people took place mainly at their offices
or public meeting places.
Interviews were conducted in Burmese or English, or a mixture of both languages,
with the assistance of a translator when in Myanmar language. Where possible, inter­
views were recorded and later transcribed. Where informants preferred not to be
recorded, careful notes were taken. Different interview protocols were used between
each group but were generally centred on a set of open-ended questions which engaged
informants in discussion of their understandings and perceptions of the term “human
rights” (lu akwint aye) and included asking informants their thoughts on its origins,
opinions on human rights work and human rights under the new NLD-led government.
The interviews were supplemented with analyses of primary sources including selected
speeches, writings and journals on human rights, as well as relevant commentary on
social media. To this dataset, the second author brought insight from six years of
experience (2006–2012) working in international aid programmes with Burmese activists
and advocacy or “human rights” organisations in Yangon and subsequent fieldwork from
2013 to 2015 with activists and leaders in the pro-democracy movement.
In the next section, we draw on this data to describe the ways in which “human rights”
became an important reference point for the democracy movement from 1988 to 2012.
Following this, the article describes the rejection, hybridisation and strategic avoidance of
human rights discourse by political and religious leaders amidst growing international
critique of violence against Muslim minorities. Importantly, the meanings of human rights
explored in this article are not an exhaustive account of the meanings of human rights in
Myanmar. Our accounts do not claim to be representative of all political leaders, activists
and religious leaders or of the broader population. We do not claim to describe a
“Buddhist” position, recognising that Burmese Buddhist political thought is neither static
nor unitary. Further, the interviews cited represent just a small part of the overall dataset;
 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 253

the findings that we explore in this article are chosen based on broad patterns that emerged.
While not generalisable, these findings shed crucial light on the beliefs of powerful Burmese
intermediaries regarding human rights discourse, providing a portal into the complex social
reality of human rights and some of the ways in which the discourse is responded to and
deployed by this specific sample of monks, leaders and activists.3

“Human Rights” and Opposition to Military Authoritarianism, 1988–2011

Myanmar has had a turbulent political history since its independence from Britain in
1948. The country initially embarked on a Westminster style of parliamentary
government.4 Yet Burma – as the country was known officially until 1989 – quickly
fell into a protracted series of civil wars against both ethnic minority and communist
armed groups. Amidst the chaos of armed opposition and internal political divisions,
military leader General Ne Win staged a coup in 1962, beginning a period of military
authoritarian leadership that persisted, in various forms, for more than five decades.
From 1988 a new democracy movement emerged in opposition to the leadership of
military elites. The movement was popularly led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter
of independence hero General Aung San. Facing growing pressure, in 1988, Ne Win
resigned and activists and opposition leaders hoped for a new period of democracy.
However, after months of student and monk led protests in 1988, the military
regained control under the new State Law and Order Restoration Council.
Through this period of resistance against ongoing military rule from 1988 to 2011,
human rights language was adopted by many amongst the opposition political
leadership, especially by Aung San Suu Kyi, activist groups, and some Buddhist
leaders.

Aung San Suu Kyi

A key theme of Aung San Suu Kyi’s speeches and writings during her six years under
house arrest, from 1989 to 1995, and in publications and speeches following this, was the
restoration of human rights in Myanmar. In these works, Aung San Suu Kyi emphasised
the need for people to stand up for basic human rights rather than living a “quiescent”
existence under a repressive regime (Clements 2008, 8). When released from house arrest
in November 2010, in her first speech (in Burmese) outside the NLD headquarters she
said, “I believe in human rights and I believe in the rule of law. I will always fight for these
things” (The Telegraph, November 14, 2010).
Also prominent in these speeches was Aung San Suu Kyi’s connection of human rights
and democracy with Buddhist concepts (see Gravers 1999; McCarthy 2004). Gravers
(1999, 11, 77) suggests that Aung San Suu Kyi was compelled – given limited exposure to
the language of human rights amongst Myanmar citizens – to communicate her argu­
ments to her majority Buddhist audience through Buddhist concepts. The military was
also highly sensitive to the public use of political language at the time and Aung San Suu
Kyi’s use of religious concepts may well have served to diffuse direct confrontation.
A key example of this connection between democracy and Buddhist concepts comes in
her article “In Quest of Democracy” (Aung San Suu Kyi 1992). Written in the early years
of the opposition movement and having both a Western and domestic audience, she
254 A. DOFFEGNIES AND T. WELLS

refutes the military government’s rejection of human rights and their dismissal of the
concept as “foreign” in state-controlled media. State-controlled newspapers repeatedly
ran articles and cartoons in the 1990s and 2000s associating Aung San Suu Kyi with
Western “neo-colonialists” seeking democracy and human rights. Directly challenging
this narrative of human rights as a “Western artefact alien to traditional values,” Aung
San Suu Kyi argues that human rights align with Burmese culture and Buddhist teachings
and are broadly accepted by Burmese people. She writes:
It is a puzzlement to the Burmese how concepts which recognise the inherent dignity and
the equal and inalienable rights of human beings, which accept that all men are endowed
with reason and conscience and which recommend a universal spirit of brotherhood, can be
inimical to indigenous values (Aung San Suu Kyi 2010, 174–175).

She also describes it as “predictable” that the official media would start dismissing
human rights as soon as the discourse came to be an “integral part of the movement for
democracy” (2010, 174). She goes on to argue that this is “ironic” since the ideas under­
pinning human rights are entirely compatible with Burmese culture and Buddhist
teachings. Specifically, Aung San Suu Kyi cites the preciousness assigned to human life
in Buddhism, as in human rights discourse: “Buddhism, the foundation of traditional
Burmese culture, places the greatest value on man, who alone of all beings can achieve the
supreme state of Buddhahood . . . Human life therefore is infinitely precious” (Kyi 2010,
174). In these writings, Aung San Suu Kyi articulated her support for democracy and
human rights in a way that would resonate amongst the majority Buddhist population.

Burmese Activist Groups

Many Burmese activist groups also took up the language of human rights. The military
crackdown in 1988 led many activists to leave the country and base themselves in Thailand
or in Western countries where many new advocacy groups were started. These groups
could describe their work openly as “human rights.” Working from the Thai-Burma
border and from abroad, groups such as Shan Human Rights Foundation, Assistance
Association for Political Prisoners and Karen Human Rights Group carried out human
rights documentation and international advocacy to bring attention to ongoing abuses
occurring inside the country. As well as being an international language to frame their
struggles and call for the attention of the global community, Brooten (2004, 186) highlights
that working for “human rights” could also open the door for funding for documenting
human rights abuse and for opposition and ethnic nationality media groups. As inter­
mediaries, activist and exile groups were able to absorb human rights discourse and then
project this both back to international organisations and to their local constituencies.

Buddhist Leaders
Members of the Buddhist sangha have also had a central role in Burma’s opposition
movements – most notably in the major protests of 1988, the 1990 monks’ boycott, and
the 2007 protests – and have also used human rights discourses to voice their struggles.
This is shown in a series of Burmese-language journals written by monks and some lay
people associated with the All Burma Monks Alliance who were involved in the 2007
 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 255

protests. In one article, titled “Myanmar and Human Rights,” a monk writing under the
name Ashin Daza (2007) writes that the military regime are responsible for Myanmar
people not being able to exercise their “inborn human rights,” that “no-one can elim­
inate.” The journals also contain some instances where the writers explicitly associate
human rights with Buddhist teachings. Ashin Daza writes that “in the Buddhist sasana
[religion], we are seeing statements about human rights, that’s why we are sure that
Buddha taught about human rights.” Similarly Sanda Shin (2009) writes that the Buddha
spoke about human rights in his dhamma. Lay religious author, Ko Saw Lay (2007)
suggests that human rights laws which relate to freedom, act in the same way as Buddha’s
teachings.
Human rights language was clearly adopted by political leaders, activist groups and
religious leaders. Sometimes presented in terms of existing cultural norms, the global
discourse of human rights was integrated into Myanmar’s democratic struggles. During
this period Aung San Suu Kyi, opposition activists and Buddhist monks were at pains to
express their political struggles in human rights terms. The language of human rights had
particular value as it garnered broader international support and funding for the opposi­
tion to Burmese military elites. As the notion of human rights circulated between
democratic leaders, protesters, international donors and rights organisations, it acted
as a unifying concept. Both Burmese political and religious leaders, and international
human rights groups perpetuated this human rights discourse in the country and
intertwined human rights language in the discourse of struggle. As long as there was a
shared desired outcome – an end to military rule – the use of human rights language by
Myanmar activists and international actors converged, while the degree to which the
values associated with human rights penetrated Myanmar society is questionable, giving
way for differing visions of human rights to emerge as popular political concerns shifted.

“Human Rights” and Violence Against Muslims, 2011–2018

As a process of top-down political liberalisation began from 2011, many Burmese
advocacy and human rights organisations that had been operating in exile moved to
base their activities inside Myanmar. New human rights organisations and networks
emerged, able to operate openly in the changed political environment. Yet through the
political transition from direct military rule, the focus of international attention began to
shift from the plight of the population more generally under the military, to specific
concerns regarding the repression of Muslim minorities (see Clapp 2012). Major events
that generated international attention to the human rights situation for Muslims in
Myanmar included the 2012 communal violence in Rakhine state and around the country
in 2013, and an attendant increase in repression of Muslim minorities in Rakhine state. In
August 2017, armed attacks on police outposts in northern Rakhine state by Rohingya
militants resulted in a brutal army crackdown backed by Buddhist vigilante groups,
targeting Rohingya communities in Rakhine state. The military “clearance operations” in
the weeks following August 25, 2017 included the burning of Rohingya villages and the
killing of civilians and culminated in the movement of hundreds of thousands of
minorities, most of whom identify as Rohingya, into neighbouring Bangladesh in late
2017 (International Crisis Group 2019). The military offensive leading to the exodus was
256 A. DOFFEGNIES AND T. WELLS

termed by the United Nations as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (United

Nations 2017).
International outcry targeted not only the Burmese military but also Aung San Suu
Kyi. Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD government, which assumed office in 2016, was criticised
as being largely silent on human rights (Khin Zaw Win 2017). In August and September
2018, the findings of a United Nations fact-finding mission were released, detailing
massive human rights violations by the military (United Nations Human Rights
Council 2019). For violence in Rakhine state, the report stated that Myanmar’s top
military leaders must be investigated for genocide and Myanmar referred to the
International Criminal Court. Aung San Suu Kyi was also criticised in the report for
her passive stance and she has been stripped of several international human rights awards
(United Nations Human Rights Council 2019).
With international human rights attention to abuses against Muslim minorities by the
military, including, for example, Human Rights Watch (2017), discourses around human
rights in Myanmar emerged in response to these politics. This section describes and
compares how contemporary human rights language came to be rejected, hybridised and
strategically avoided. Most obviously, international human rights discourse has been
rejected by some Burmese Buddhist political and religious leaders, yet the analysis that
follows also describes the multiple complex ways in which intermediaries have also re-
shaped notions of human rights, developing hybrid meanings that diverge in important
ways from global assumptions about the universality of human rights. It also describes
ways in which other Buddhist political leaders and activists strategically avoid human
rights language yet at the same time seek to promote the universal emancipatory ideals
underpinning its global referent.5

Rejection of Human Rights

There has been a clear rejection of the notion of human rights amongst some political
and religious leaders. Human rights have come to be associated with Western support for
Muslim populations, seen by some Burmese political leaders, activists and Buddhist
monks as a threat to the Burmese Buddhist sasana. McCarthy and Menager (2017) link
this fear of Buddhism under threat – in the face of modernity, globalism and Islam – to a
growth in popular Buddhist nationalism in recent years (see, for example, Schissler,
Walton, and Thi 2015; 2017). While Buddhist informants did not see threats to the
sasana as coming solely from Islam, much of the fear regarding the supposed decline of
Buddhism in recent years has been related to the perceived threat posed by the Muslim
“other.” During several 2017 anti-Muslim demonstrations, protesters held placards
condemning human rights. After Aung San Suu Kyi’s widely publicised September
2017 speech – where she conspicuously refused to “apportion blame” in the face of
violence in Rakhine state – crowds in downtown Yangon waved signs saying “we stand
together with Mother Suu” (Washington Post, September 19, 2017). Cartoons portraying
human rights as pro-Muslim have also been shared widely on Facebook and Twitter in
Myanmar, with “human rights” – alongside the United Nations and Western govern­
ments – presented as supporting Muslim minorities and terrorism. These placards and
cartoons reject human rights as a Western artefact. This rejection and ridicule of human
rights as “foreign” is ironic as it is the very thing that Aung San Suu Kyi and her pro-
 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 257

democracy supporters were arguing against in the 1990s and 2000s. This rejection also
shows some continuity, between the former Burmese military leaders and contemporary
democratic leaders, in the performance of opposition to human rights. The depiction of
opponents as influenced by “foreigners” or “foreign” concepts, is a powerful tool for
political elites, whether in the NLD or in the military.
This rejection of human rights was echoed in interviews with several participants.
During an interview, a leading lay figure in the Buddhist nationalist MaBaTha group
cited one of the most powerful figures to refute the language of human rights, popular
religious leader Sitagu Sayadaw. This influential nationalist lay figure cited Sitagu
Sayadaw declaring that “human rights is not the law and is without the power to control
any country.” The interviewee shared a copy of this statement in Burmese, stating that
while “they” – implicating international actors – can shout as much as they like regarding
human rights, “we” must look after the interests of the Burmese nationalities and hold
tightly to nationalism. After referring to Sitagu Sayadaw’s statement, the participant
explained the widespread influence of these views: “In the nationalist movement,” he
said, “whoever would like to attack human rights uses that quote” (Interview, May 2017,
in Burmese).6
The interviews revealed a prevalent impression that support for the human rights of
Muslims is associated with an attendant threat to Buddhists. While Aung San Suu Kyi’s
earlier writings had suggested that human rights are in harmony with Buddhist teach­
ings, in the context of contemporary politics and fears regarding Islam, human rights has
come to be seen by some political and religious leaders as associated with a potential
threat to Buddhists. An activist working for a Yangon-based civil society organisation
that conducts human rights documentation, highlighted this perceived threat. He
explained a widespread perception that if there is more room for tolerance and respect
for the human rights of Muslims in Myanmar, Islam is more likely to thrive, feeding into
fears that Buddhism is in danger of fading out. Meanwhile, a sayadaw [senior monk] in a
northern Myanmar town concluded: “Right now the military doesn’t like human rights,
I’m not sure if the NLD likes human rights, and none of the religious groups like human
rights” (Interview, Jun 2017, in Burmese).
In this context, some informants suggested that human rights groups were biased
and that they placed undue blame on Buddhists, demonising the (Buddhist) Rakhine
population and sympathising with the Rohingya Muslim community.7 A prominent
sayadaw in Mandalay said: “Instead of speaking equally for both sides, [for both]
Buddhists and Muslims, human rights organisations in Rakhine are biased, talking
only about the Muslims, not talking about Buddhists” (Interview, November 2016, in
Burmese).8 In examining MaBaTha’s founding text, Brac de la Perriere (2015)
emphasises that MaBaTha supporters often see human rights groups as antagonistic
to their cause, arguing that the text itself can be read as a defensive reaction against
the values of democracy and human rights. In contrast to the period of military
authoritarian government when prominent political and religious leaders were visibly
supportive of human rights, some powerful political and religious leaders have now
distanced their own political projects from the human rights discourse.
258 A. DOFFEGNIES AND T. WELLS

Hybridisation
The cartoons circulating on social media and placards rejecting human rights have been
visible to outside observers. Yet amongst participants in this study, meanings attached to
the words “human rights” were diverse and, crucially, some participants put forward
various hybridised meanings that ultimately justified the exclusion, rather than protec­
tion, of Muslims. The two hybrid visions of human rights presented in this article
represent the most common responses to human rights discourse that emerged in the
interviews and were corroborated in secondary sources. These two visions of human
rights demonstrate that hybridisation of meanings may splinter and lead to conclusions –
such as rejection of Muslim claims to rights – that are seemingly counterintuitive. Other
scholars have shown how human rights discourse is merging with contemporary political
contests. For example, Frydenlund (2018) has explored how rights language was adopted
by the Buddhist nationalist movement to argue for controversial religious laws and their
role in protecting women’s rights, which have been strongly opposed by human rights
groups within and outside of the country. The analysis below intends to illuminate
emerging ways in which human rights is being vernacularised in the contemporary
political context.
First, some participants emphasised that the granting of human rights was based on the
fulfilment of responsibilities. Human rights, in this sense, were not universal but must be
earned. Being granted human rights was conditional on the performance of worthiness
from groups or individuals. For example, a MaBaTha sayadaw in Mandalay stressed the
need for effort on the part of individuals in order for them to be granted rights:
“opportunities are not freely given, if you try more you will get more, what you put in,
you get out. [People] don’t freely have rights” (Interview, October 2016, in Burmese).9 The
sense that rights are contingent on the fulfilment of responsibilities was also apparent in a
discussion about women’s rights with a Buddhist nun. “Asking for rights alone is not
okay,” she suggested, “because people might consider that these women are only asking for
rights, but women also need to take responsibility” (Interview, June 2017, in Burmese).
The hybridised understanding of human rights as needing to be earned is also
reflected in state media publications and in public pronouncements by Aung San Suu
Kyi. In a 2017 article, “Responsibility and Accountability Go Together with Human
Rights,” in the Global New Light of Myanmar, the notion that people must earn their
rights is clear:
At a time when we are demanding for human rights or civil rights, we have a tendency to
forget our potential contributions. As our State Counsellor frequently says, we need to
ponder as to what we can give for our children, for our community and for our nation,
instead of just demanding for our rights. If we aspire to have a brighter future for our
children, we need to be ready to forgo our excessive demands.

In Aung San Suu Kyi’s speeches, her qualified idea of rights and freedom similarly
distinguish her understanding of human rights from dominant Western conceptions.
Callahan (2017) has highlighted the leader’s conduct at a March 2017 forum on women
in business, where her emphasis was on the need for women to take on responsibilities
“with their increasing demand for rights.” Aung San Suu Kyi went on to say, “Only
demanding rights without assuming responsibility and accountability, which are wholly
left to the government, does not comply with democracy standards.” This resonates with
 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 259

McCarthy’s (2019, 342–344) arguments that “rights” and “democracy” discourse used by
many local-level actors is strongly imbued with worthiness criteria. Similarly, Cheesman
(2015, 109) describes a dynamic where leaders’ efforts are “not aimed at protecting rights
generally, but only certain rights for certain people who deserve them because they
conform with the sovereign’s vision for the community.”
Some participants extended this to suggest that human rights apply only to those
groups demonstrating “worthiness.” In this understanding, Muslim groups were con­
sidered unworthy of being granted human rights. Unlike the wholesale rejection of
human rights explored above, in this hybridised vernacular version, human rights were
supported as long as they were not applied to the Rohingya community, who were
presented as a threat. In one instance, an influential MaBaTha lay leader immediately
brought up the Rohingya upon the first mention of human rights. Referring to the 1982
citizenship law that denies Burmese citizenship to children of those not considered to be
citizens, he stated:

Illegal Bengali migrants, they call themselves Rohingya, a term we do not agree with, they
ask for human rights. We can accept everything about human rights except things that
conflict with the 82 citizenship law, which is the biggest problem . . . intruders cannot attain
citizenship. I am very concerned that some people might use human rights in disguise; they
could do some bad things to our country (Interview, May 2017, in Burmese).

Related to this, a human rights organisation leader in Mandalay suggested that while it is
common for those working in civil society to embrace human rights discourse in general,
many take issue when it is specifically associated with the protection of Muslim mino­
rities. He explained: “civil society somehow accepts human rights but not religious
freedom or the citizenship thing, this is another challenge . . . It is the most common
thing we see” (Interview, October 2016, in English). In his research, Mullen (2016, 204)
reports similar responses, citing an individual in Mandalay: “You cannot talk about
human rights in the case of the Rohingyas. If you pity them, they will step on your head
and eat your whole country with their generations and religion.” Again, in this hybridised
version of human rights, not all rights are acceptable and not all individuals worthy of
human rights. As such, the meaning of human rights is imbued with exclusionary ideas
relating to the protection of Buddhists (see Cheesman 2015).
These examples demonstrate how the process of vernacularisation is not straightfor­
ward. Rather than simple convergence between Western and Burmese understandings of
human rights, human rights can be vernacularised such that its meaning diverges in
sometimes problematic ways from a universal, emancipatory vision. Crucially, Merry
(2006, 44) notes that the extent to which global concepts are changed in the process of
hybridisation is “a matter of degree.” While some hybrids of human rights sit uneasily
with aspects of the global idea, other hybrids are closer to their international referent.
In a second hybrid vision, other respondents understood human rights as sharing
important tenets with Buddhism. For example, a young monk in Mandalay – closely
connected with local human rights networks – suggested that the discourse of human
rights and the ideas contained within it are inherently valuable and important, yet he
emphasised that Buddhist thought goes beyond human rights. He highlighted teachings
about nibbana – and the nature of the relationship between the body and the mind – to
point out that Buddhism is compatible with and yet distinct from human rights:
260 A. DOFFEGNIES AND T. WELLS

“[Buddhism] is supportive [of human rights] but it is saying more things, going further”
(Interview, October 2016, in Burmese). Several participants highlighted specific facets of
Buddhist teachings that human rights do not include, for example, concern for animals
(Interviews, October 2016). Along the same lines, a prominent lay Buddhist leader and
MaBaTha supporter suggested that Buddhism is a comprehensive system that deals with
issues beyond the worldly concerns of human rights:
The difference between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Buddhism is that
the Universal Declaration only considers the present life but Buddhism considers past lives
as well as future lives. Human rights only demand for immediate, current needs, for example
the need of clothes and food. Buddhism considers not just immediate needs, for example, if I
practice I could attain Buddahood (Interview, May 2017, in Burmese).

Similarly, a senior monk linked to MaBaTha in Yangon made a connection between

human rights and the Buddhist laws of mettā (loving kindness), karuṇā (compassion),
mudita (appreciative joy) and upekkhā (equanimity). He suggested that Buddhist laws are
more encompassing than human rights, and less political.10 On the one hand, some
participants understood Buddhist teaching as more than human rights. These intervie­
wees considered human rights to be broadly compatible with, and yet inferior to, the
more encompassing system of Buddhist thought. These hybrid visions, where human
rights discourse is seen as part of a larger Buddhist system of thought, which in important
ways is proximate to or is supported by Buddhist teachings highlight the propensity for
hybrid visions of human rights to appear which are closer to or even support emancipa­
tory visions of human rights. On the other hand, other participants went further in
suggesting the preponderance of Buddhism in relation to human rights, explaining that
human rights are limited, unnecessary and inconsequential (Interviews, April 2017).
As explored above, rather than rejecting human rights discourse, some participants
drew on hybrid meanings, which included views of human rights as conditional rather
than universal. Others portrayed human rights as narrower and subordinate to Buddhist
teaching and incorporated as a subset within more comprehensive Buddhist frameworks
rather than being universal and authoritative. As such, hybrid versions of human rights
differed in their degree of compatibility with international visions of human rights, and
Buddhist teachings were deployed in ways that had the potential to both undermine and
support international human rights ideals. This discussion of lived responses to human
rights confirmed Merry’s contention that the distance of the intermediary from the global
“source” is an influential factor in the translation of human rights and how much
translations diverge from the global referent. Translators who were distant from local
and international human rights networks generally produced more “uneasy” and exclu­
sionary hybridisations of human rights. Engagement and discussion between actors with
different viewpoints on human rights may be an important step towards mitigating fears
regarding human rights and questioning influential but problematic ways in which the
discourse is being translated.

Strategic Avoidance
In contrast to the rejection or hybridisation of human rights, several participants had
deep concerns about the way that the discourse of human rights was being rejected or
 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 261

misunderstood by many political and religious leaders. They argued that human rights
should retain a universal emancipatory meaning and that the Myanmar government
should consider human rights to apply to all, including Muslim populations. Yet given
the sensitivities regarding the words “human rights” and the Burmese phrase lu akwint
aye – due to its association with Western intervention – some activists have sought to
strategically avoid human rights language in their public discourse.
In a challenging context, this careful treatment of human rights has opened pathways
for such actors to continue their role as intermediaries and, in some cases, to maintain
their normative commitment to human rights promotion. During interviews in 2016 and
2017, several human rights activists commented on changes in the way that human rights
has been understood. A leading civil society activist in Yangon lamented changes to
popular understandings of human rights and their association with Western influence:
“There is misinterpretation of human rights from the religious fundamental groups [sic],
saying that human rights is a Western idea and especially [that human rights is] against
the Burmese tradition, religion” (Interview, April 2017, in English). Similarly, a
Mandalay-based activist was concerned about the portrayal of human rights as a foreign
concept: “most people, when we say ‘human rights’ think, [we are] trying to Westernise
or Islamise the community” (Interview, October 2017, in English).
In response to human rights being misunderstood by “nationalists,” some activists
described how they were seeking to strategically avoid the use of the words human rights
or lu akwint aye in their training or programme activities. As the language of human
rights is often met with resistance, in their work they sought to pursue an agenda aligned
with the universal aims of human rights, yet without using the term. A prominent ethnic
activist on women’s rights explained: “In many of our works we avoid saying human
rights; we don’t call them human rights projects but put human rights ideas in”
(Interview, May 2017, in English). This strategic avoidance of common human rights
language represents an alternative pathway to challenge injustice. The work of Levitt and
Merry (2009, 448) also identifies similar strategies. They note that “framing human rights
claims in local terms and adapting them to existing ideas of justice may mean abandoning
explicit references to human rights language altogether.”
Some informants expressed particular concern regarding the most common transla­
tion lu akwint aye. They suggested that an alternative translation may carry less negative
connotations and therefore facilitate more mutual understanding. For example, several
respondents referred to the alternative translation put forward by activist and writer, Ma
Thida as lu ya paing kwint (see also Than Toe Aung 2019). While some activists and
organisations support this move, these alternative translations are not widely known and
rather than promoting an alternative translation, other civil society leaders were in favour
of increasing understanding surrounding human rights and combatting hybridised
notions of human rights instead through their advocacy and education work
(Interviews, April 2017, in English). Equality Myanmar, for example, openly runs
human rights education courses in Yangon and uses the language of lu akwint aye on
its official Facebook page.
262 A. DOFFEGNIES AND T. WELLS

Conclusion
The notion of vernacularisation – as a way of understanding how concepts travel – has
both value and limits in understanding meanings of human rights in Myanmar. On the
one hand, the words “human rights” or lu akwint aye may hold little everyday meaning
for many Myanmar citizens and therefore tracing a process of vernacularisation from a
global origin to local meanings often makes little sense.
Yet, on the other hand, in their roles as intermediaries, certain Burmese political
leaders, activists and Buddhist monks present a case for analysis. Many of the participants
in this study frequently engaged in discourse about human rights and played a translation
role between, for example, international representatives of aid agencies and grassroots
members of their parties, organisations or institutions. This intermediary role did not
mean that leaders, activists and monks gave meaning to human rights in homogenous
ways and nor did sustained relationships with Western human rights actors always lead
to a convergence of meaning around the global referent. Rather the study revealed a
splintering of the ways that participants engaged with and gave meaning to the language
of human rights. Some participants rejected the language of human rights, others drew
on various hybridised meanings in ways that often supported, rather than opposed, the
exclusion of Muslim minorities. Meanwhile, some activists and networks strategically
avoided the language of human rights in order to continue to work for social justice and
what they understood to be the universal and underlying emancipatory aims of human
rights as a global discourse. Through describing this variety of meanings attached to
human rights the article unsettles common portrayals of Myanmar political actors as
either rejecting or endorsing human rights discourse.
This splintering of meanings attached to human rights coincided with a major shift in
donor agency and diplomatic attention from military authoritarianism to the margin­
alisation of religious – and most obviously Muslim – minorities. As the transition
progressed, “human rights” was no longer a concept that could be mobilised in opposi­
tion to a military government. For many activists and Buddhist leaders, “human rights”
came to be seen as a political tool that could be wielded by international agencies in
support of Muslim communities, which in turn brought Myanmar Buddhism “under
threat.” At the same time, other activists – who were more sympathetic to Muslim
populations – began to avoid the words “human rights” while attempting to promote
their universal applicability. For those seeking to use the language of human rights to
promote justice in Myanmar, strategic engagement with intermediaries and sensitivity
towards divergent meanings of rights, are crucial. More analysis of meanings of human
rights could inform local and international considerations on how human rights frame­
works can be best approached and deployed to realise their emancipatory intentions.

Notes
1 In this article the words “Burmese” or “Myanmar” are used to refer to people from the
country of Myanmar. The word “Burman” refers specifically to the dominant bamar ethnic
group, as opposed to ethnic minority groups.
2 This research was undertaken as a part of this author’s PhD research which focused on the
role of Buddhist leaders in the vernacularisation of human rights in the Myanmar context
(see Doffegnies 2018).
 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 263

3 Buddhist arguments and frameworks in support of human rights were seen among monks
involved with the Saffron revolution. Hybrid visions of human rights, which supported
rather than diverged from the emancipatory aims of human rights discourse, also emerged
in interviews and are certainly an important way in which vernacularisation can occur. This
article focuses on three sets of responses to human rights which largely reject or diverge
from the aims of global human rights ideas, as this is what emerged most strongly from our
dataset; however, exploring the ways in which vernacularisation might support or enlarge
human rights in Myanmar is also an important possibility for future research.
4 The 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma adopted many aspects of the Westminster
parliamentary system of democracy, including a bicameral legislature and a prime minister
as head of government.
5 Analysis of recent public use of human rights language in Myanmar is challenging as use of
the words “human rights” (or lu akwint aye) is now infrequent in the speeches of govern­
ment actors.
6 In 2017, Sitagu Sayadaw delivered what is now a well-known sermon to an audience of
military officers in which he discussed a parable of a Sri Lankan Buddhist king who was
absolved by Buddhist monks for his many killings in war given that those who he killed were
not Buddhist (see Walton 2018; Fuller 2017). While he did not discuss human rights
specifically, his arguments, which put the value of the lives of Buddhists above those of
other faiths, conflict with the basic premises of human rights.
7 The understanding of the Rakhine population as being legitimate citizens of the
country, while the Rohingya Muslim population are not, is underpinned by a long
history of an ideology of “national races,” excluding Rohingya Muslims (see Cheesman
2017b).
8 It should also be noted the same sayadaw is well known for the role he played in helping to
subdue inter-religious riots in Mandalay in June 2014, telling rioters to disperse and
discouraging violence and hatred.
9 The use of the word “opportunities” interchangeably with “rights” is demonstrative of the
slippage between the concepts of “rights” and “opportunities” in Burmese language that has
been highlighted by Prasse-Freeman (2013, 2015).
10 The negative connotations of “politics” has been highlighted by Walton (2012, 167), who
identified an anti-politics strain apparent in Myanmar political thought in which the
“political” is associated with “selfish desire.” In relation to this, he refers to “critique of
the lawki [worldly realm] activity of politics as fundamentally oriented towards the
acquisition of power, a process that feeds the false sense of self instead of minimizing
it.” Walton traces this narrative to before 1948 independence as he identifies the negative
implication of politics in U Nu’s speeches. As “human rights” continues to be seen as
political, any negative associations of politics are likely to colour the concept of human
rights for some.

Acknowledgements
For their invaluable feedback on drafts of this article, the authors would like to thank Nick
Cheesman, Nyi Nyi Kyaw, Gerard McCarthy, Morten Pedersen and Elliott Prasse-Freeman. The
views expressed in this article, however, are wholly the authors’ own and should not be attributed
to any of the names listed above. When this article was conceived, researched and written, Amy
Doffegnies was a PhD candidate at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of
New South Wales, Canberra, Australia.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
264 A. DOFFEGNIES AND T. WELLS

ORCID
Tamas Wells http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5604-7081

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