McNamara AAR 2021 1

Daniel McNamara
AAR 2021
19 November 2021, 3pm EST

Original Title: “Un-stacking the Deck: Taking Seriously the Critiques by Non-Mādhyamikas of
Madhyamaka”
Amended title: “The Two Truths are not Enough: Ratnākaraśānti on the Two Truths and the
impossibility of Pramāṇa for Mādhyamikas.”

Introduction

The early 11th century scholar-saint Ratnākaraśānti (c. 970-1045 CE), a prominent

monastic from Vikramaśīla, was an outspoken critic of Mādhyamikas—or, as he calls them,

“pseudo-Mādhyamikas” (dbu ma’i ltar snang, *madhyamakābhāsa). This is evident throughout

the text I will focus on here, a mixed verse/prose composition entitled Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti-

Madhyamāpratipad-siddhi—Proving the Middle Path: A Commentary that Ornaments

Madhyamaka (hereafter MAV).1 Ratnākaraśānti uses the label “pseudo-Mādhyamikas” because,

according to him, this group misunderstands Nāgārjuna’s true intentions. Specifically, where

Mādhyamikas regard the MMK and the doctrine of the two truths as representative of Nāgārjuna’s

final view, Ratnākaraśānti argues the following: (1) Nāgārjuna’s intentions are most clearly

expressed in the Yuktiṣāṣṭika rather than the MMK; (2) Nāgārjuna accepts the doctrine of the three

natures (trisvabhāva); and (3) Nāgārjuna’s teachings should be understood as consistent with

Maitreya’s Madhyāntavibhāga and Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika.

In this manner, Ratnākaraśānti lays out his vision of a single, unified Mahāyāna—a vision

from which pseudo-Mādhyamikas deviate because they are mistaken about Nāgārjuna’s intent.

While this message is relayed throughout Ratnākaraśānti’s MAV, it is also concisely described in

the title: he has composed a commentary (vṛtti) that “ornaments” (alaṃkāra)—i.e., draws out the

1
Śāntarakṣita is not explicitly cited—but is discussed—in the similarly-titled Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa.
 McNamara AAR 2021 2

intended meaning—of Nāgarjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (madhyamaka). This intended

meaning is demonstrated (siddhi) to be the middle path (madhyamā pratipad) articulated in

Maitreya’s Madhyāntavibhāga.

While this is Ratnākaraśānti’s overall orientation in the MAV, here I engage another

persistent theme in the text: responding to critiques of Yogācāra views rendered in Śāntarakṣita’s

own Madhyamakālaṃkāra. Ratnākaraśānti’s engagements with Śāntarakṣita (along with his

predecessor Jñānagarbha and his successor Kamalaśīla) in the MAV have been discussed in

previous studies, the most important of which for my discussion today are a pair of articles by

Shinya Moriyama (2013 and 2014, building on work published in Japanese by Matsumoto and

Umino) and a recent (2018) AAR presentation by Davey Tomlinson. Here I hope to build on that

work by further clarifying the substance and stakes of Ratnākaraśānti’s criticisms of “pseudo-

Mādhyamikas” as well as Ratnākara’s presentation of his own view: awareness exists but images

(ākāra), the stuff of our ordinary subjectivity and the phenomenal content we apprehend, are false.

In doing this, I present passages from the MAV that have not, to my knowledge, been previously

circulated in English translation. Before turning to these passages, I would like to briefly

contextualize it as a response to Śāntarakṣita.

In the MAV—and throughout Ratnākara’s writings, so far as I’m aware—the only direct

citation of an opponent is Śāntarakṣita’s MĀ verse 64, discussed below, which defines the

conventional truth (saṃvṭisatya). That said, Ratnākara’s project can be understood as a response

to Śāntarakṣita’s text as a whole, or more precisely to its criticisms of Yogācāra. Here I would

highlight verse 45:

Although their view is virtuous, we should think about whether such

things [as images, propounded by yogācāra] actually exist or if they
are acceptable only when left unanalyzed.
(MĀ 45, trans Blumenthal 2004, 49, slightly emended)
 McNamara AAR 2021 3

Here Śāntarakṣita admits the value of the Yogācāra system—noting in his commentary (vṛtti) that

the Yogācāra view can purify obscurations to at least some extent (Blumenthal 2004, 49). Indeed,

I think it is fair to say that Śāntarakṣita adopts the Yogācāra account of experience wholesale, with

the significant amendment that it falls within the conventional truth. So long as the Yogācāra

opponent insists that there is an other-dependent nature—so long as they do not accept that the

conventional truth is enough—they have not fully grasped the correct view. This point is

emphasized again in Śāntarakṣita’s elaboration on the conventional truth, at MĀ verse 66:

Therefore, it is also correct to say that it would be impossible for

conventional truth to be causeless. But if (you claim that) its
substratum (upādāna) is real, you have to explain what it is.
//Madhyamakālaṃkāra 66// (Ichigō 1985, CXLII).

Śāntarakṣita acknowledges that Mādhyamikas must provide an account of causality, some

explanation of why certain seed give rise to certain kinds of sprouts, and why everyday phenomena

do not simply blink in and out of existence. He explains that the conventional truth can be

understood as awareness—specifically, awareness of a seeming-subject (grāhaka) cognizing

phenomenal content (grāhya)—that does not ultimately exist. Śāntarakṣita thinks his opponent

cannot appeal to the other-dependent nature because she would have to explain how it exists but

is neither unitary nor manifold in nature, which is impossible.

Ratnākaraśānti offers what we might call a Yogācāra response to these issues in the MAV

(though how precisely to label Ratnākaraśānti remains a somewhat open question). Ratnākara

argues that the three natures are not “acceptable only when not analyzed,” that there must be a sub-

stratum—the other-dependent nature—and that this does indeed survive the neither-one-nor-many

argument. The MAV goes on to allege that that Śāntarakṣita’s insistence on the two truths as a

replacement for the three natures is the source of significant philosophical and doctrinal problems.
 McNamara AAR 2021 4

Ratnākaraśānti makes this case, citing MĀ 64 in the process, in his commentary on verse

10 of the MAV. In this same passage, he also cites Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika in order to

highlight the tensions between Śāntarakṣita’s account and the logician he claims to follow:

Now, some do not accept that the imagination of the unreal exists; they posit that
everything is false. To them, we respond:

If [everything] were just false, there would be no cause and no

regularity (re ’ga’). There would be no causal capacity, only error.
Every kind of pramāṇa would be impossible. //10//

If everything were false, in that case there would be no causes, so [everything]

would arise causelessly. They would also not arise only on particular occasions (re
’ga’). [As Dharmakīrti states,]

Since that which is causeless does not depend on anything else, it

would be either permanently existent or permanently nonexistent.
//PV 1.35ab// (Dunne 2004, 336)

There would be no causal capacity because capacity is defined in terms of

existence; it is not possible for something non-existent to have causal capacity.2
The [view that] everything is only error would be attained, because what is manifest
is non-existent. It would then absurdly follow that the āryas, who do not [see]
delusory things, would not see [anything]. Moreover, if everything were error, there
would be no valid direct perception or inference, and so everything without
exception would be non-pramāṇa.

When Ratnākara’s verse 10 is set alongside Śāntarakṣita’s verse 66, it may appear that the two are

simply talking past each other. They agree that causal regularity must be accounted for—there

must be a reason that certain seeds produce certain sprouts; there must be a way to explain the

difference between water (which can quench one’s thirst) and a mirage (which cannot).

Śāntarakṣita acknowledges this but considers the conventional truth to be an adequate

explanation—more precisely, in this verse at least, he insists that it must be adequate because it’s

all we have. Any appeal to a third category of existence is illogical.

2
nus pa med par yang mi ’gyur ba yod par nus pa’i mtshan nyid yin pa’i phyir. Moriyama suggests emending mi
’gyur ba to ’gyur te; I have not accepted this emendation.
 McNamara AAR 2021 5

Here, Ratnākaraśānti cites Dharmakīrti in order to illustrate his own consistency with the

logician and, more importantly, highlight Śāntarakṣita’s incompatibility with Dharmakīrti and with

pramāṇa in general. I submit that this is a genuine tension in Śāntarakṣita’s system, and a tension

for any Mādhyamika who wishes to integrate pramāṇa theory into their thought: according to

Dharmakīrti, to be real (sat) and to have causal efficacy (arthakriyā) are co-extensive. Since what

is non-existent or causeless could not have this kind of efficacy, Śāntarakṣita’s account of the

conventional could only describe a world of pure fancy, in which conventionally real things (ie,

unreal thing) either permanently exist or never existed.

Ratnākaraśānti’s appeal to Dharmakīrti also gives him an opportunity to highlight his

unified vision of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and pseudo-Mādhyamikas’ incompatibility with it.

Ratnākaraśānti’s point, however, is not limited to an accusation that the opponent is not being

faithful to Dharmakīrti. Rather, the manner in which Śāntarakṣita and other pseudo-Mādhyamikas

fall astray of Dharmakīrti—specifically, the denial of the other-dependent nature—leads them to

deny the possibility of realization and the possibility of pramāṇa. If everything is false, then there

can be no non-deceptive cognition, but to deny the possibility of non-deceptive cognition is,

according to Ratnākaraśānti, to deny the possibility of realization or enlightenment.

Having argued that it is incoherent to hold that something false or non-existence could have

causal capacity, Ratnākaraśānti next cites Śāntarakṣita as an example of someone who holds

precisely such a problematic view:

What is agreeable only when not analyzed, dharmas that arise and
cease, and real things3 that possess causal capacity: these are
asserted to be conventional.
(Madhyamakālaṃkāra 64 as cited in MAV ad v. 10)

The first [of these definitions] contradicts the others. Something that is “agreeable
only when not analyzed” is found to be inconsistent when it is analyzed, so it should
3
Note that the MAV reads dngos po where Ichigō attests rang bzhin.
 McNamara AAR 2021 6

be deemed non-existent. How could causal capacity or arising-and-cessation come

about through that [non-existence]?4

Ratnākaraśānti is blunt: Śāntarakṣita’s definition of the conventional is internally inconsistent.

Tomlinson sums this up succinctly: “something that is satisfactory only so long as it is not

analyzed… is precisely the definition of non-existence” (2018, 8). Thus, Śāntarakṣita’s

explanations of causality and regularity—which appeal only to conventional existence (which is

to say, nonexistence)—are doomed to fail.

In the following two verses—MAV 11 and 12—Ratnākaraśānti elaborates further on the

inconsistency he sees in Śāntarakṣita’s account of the conventional. I have included these in the

handout and am happy to discuss them but, for the sake of time, will not elaborate on them here.

Instead, we turn to Ratnākaraśānti’s declaration at verse 13 of the Middle Path (dbu ma’i lam),

which is the first piece of his explain of how phenomena do appear:

The Middle Path is as follows:

Those dharmas—which do not exist—appear

Not from matter, nor from what is other,
Nor from non-existence, because of two faults.
Therefore, their identity is awareness. //13//

Dharmas are the aggregates and so forth. These are not existent: because they are
characterized as non-dual, they lack a nature which is singular or multiple. In this
manner, it is established that these5 appear. When analyzing these, one asks: “from
what do these appear?” First of all, not from matter, because appearances are
established through awareness alone. They are also not from something other than
awareness, because phenomena could not manifest in a field of experience from
which they are separate…

Therefore, they have the identity of awareness since they are not [produced] from
something material, nor from something other, nor from what is non-existent.
Therefore, although there is only the true nature of awareness itself, that is falsely
apprehended as appearances.

4
Note: this passage is also translated by Moriyama (2013, 60).
5
de dag is in the verse, ’di dag is in the commentary.
 McNamara AAR 2021 7

The first three-quarters of this verse are markedly similar to Śāntarakṣita’s position. Appearances

lack a singular or multiple nature; that being the case, although they appear, it is not correct to say

that they exist. To that extent, Ratnākaraśānti agrees with Śāntarakṣita. The two are also in

agreement that appearances could not be produced from anything non-mental—or, as rendered

above, anything “material” or inanimate (bem po, *jaḍa); this is consistent with Śāntarakṣita’s

definition of awareness at MĀ 16. Appearances also could not be separate from awareness and yet

still appear within it; Śāntarakṣita agrees. Both also accept that it is impossible that appearances

arise causelessly, as that would mean they arise randomly; our experience of the world would be

pure chaos. Ratnākara adds, in a passage omitted for the sake of space, that causeless appearances

would contradict the doctrine of interdependent origination (rten cing ‘brel par ’byung ba yang

spangs par ’gyur ro).

The agreement by both parties that phenomena cannot arise in any of these ways renders

their difference all the more striking. Śāntarakṣita’s conclusion to this was addressed earlier, at

MĀ 45: the yogācāra view is virtuous, but not completely correct insofar as it clings to awareness

as if it intrinsically existed. Śāntarakṣita concludes that yogācāra views should be understood as

describing the conventional truth: they are acceptable so long as they are not analyzed, so long as

one does not cling to the idea that they should possess a nature which is singular or multiple. I

believe that Śāntarakṣita is not only refuting his Yogācāra opponents, but also making an appeal

to them—give up on the idea of a truly existent basis and you will find the right path! I suspect

that Ratnākara is making a similar appeal in response: Śāntarakṣita gets close to the right view, but

his followers should let go of the idea that the two truths can explain ordinary experience or the

possibility of enlightenment and embrace the real (non-pseudo) Madhyamaka that is the

Mahāyāna. Recall that Ratnākara initiated this discussion by highlighting the oppoent’s rejection
 McNamara AAR 2021 8

of the imagination of the unreal, i.e., the impure dependent nature—which he takes to be their

critical mis-step.

Returning to the MAV: it is still incumbent on Ratnākaraśānti to provide a solution to the

problem Śāntarakṣita raises but does not adequately solve. Here he starts to lay this out.

Phenomenal appearances—which include both perceiving subjects and perceived objects—are

neither singular nor multiple because they are non-dual, and because false appearances have the

identity (bdag nyid, *ātman) of awareness. Moriyama has identified this as a variant of the neither-

one-nor-many argument: awareness and phenomena are “neither different nor non-different”

(bhedābheda)(Moriyama 2014, 346-7). While this is certainly correct, I would like to highlight a

few passages in the MAV and from Śākyabuddhi that I take to clarify what this means and why

Ratnākaraśānti views it as a solution.

Later in the text, at verse twenty, Ratnākaraśānti directly engages the central problem

Śāntarakṣita raises for an alīkākāra yogācarin: how could awareness—which exists and could not

be erroneous—apprehend phenomenal content such as the color blue, which does not exist and is

erroneous (’khrul pa, *bhrānta)? Ratnākara’s response gives us more information about his own

position:

[Opponent:] If there is just a singular knowing awareness (rig pa po gcig pu ’di

nyid), are blue and so forth themselves error? Do they arise from something
erroneous? We respond:

Blue and so forth are not separate from their apprehension (blo); we
assert that they are the same. The functioning cognition is direct
perception, [but seeing] the nature as blue and so forth6 is an error.
//20//

The nature of awareness7 is asserted to be singular because blue and so forth and
the awareness of them are not separate. That said, when awareness itself—the

6
Pk and N read sngo sogs (“blue and so forth”), which is consistent with the commentary; I follow it here. P and D
read sngon brton, “[by the force of] previous habits,” which would also make sense.
7
N reads rigs (“reason”) rather than rig (“awareness”).
 McNamara AAR 2021 9

nature (bdag nyid) of cognition—is recognized, that is a direct perception, which is

a pramāṇa. Understanding that nature as blue and so forth is an error because blue
and so forth are false, since they are free of being one or many.

Ratnākaraśānti agrees with Śāntarakṣita that there is something wrong with idea that we are really

seeing the color blue. They agree that “blue” is false, because it should have a nature which is one

or many and it does not. But according to Ratnākaraśānti, we are actually seeing something when

we think we’re seeing blue. Specifically, we are seeing awareness, which does not fall prey to the

one-nor-many argument. He immediately takes up the obvious question: why not?

[The opponent] says: “What refutes blue and so forth also refutes their essence,
which is cognition.” We respond—

Because it is a direct perception, because there is nothing superior,8

and because it is not imputed, self-awareness—which is the nature
of cognition—is not harmed, [but] blue and so forth9 are refuted.10
//21//

There is nothing that refutes the nature (ngo bo) of self-awareness. This is because
(a) it directly perceives itself. Direct perception cannot be refuted by something
else. (b) Nothing superior means that something superior to direct perception,
which could refute it, does not exist. (c) If its nature as cognition were refuted, then
that [cognition] would have to have been an imputation. And that is incorrect,
because it does not have any other nature.

To summarize the discussion initiated here: Ratnākaraśānti tells us that when we think we are

seeing blue, we are incorrect about “blue” but cannot be incorrect about “seeing,” ie, about the fact

that awareness is taking place. In this way, Ratnākaraśānti feels he is able to address the issues that

Śāntarakṣita raises while also avoiding the problems he adduces with Śāntarakṣita’s solution. He

does this by appealing to the three natures—specifically, to the imagination of the unreal

(abhūtaparikalp), i.e., the impure dependent nature— and to pramāṇa. In terms of the three

natures: according to Ratnākara, what we are seeing is awareness—which is not an imputation or

 McNamara AAR 2021 10

a convention; rather, it belongs to the category his pseudo-Mādhyamika opponent does not accept,

the dependent nature. Due to karmic distortions, the dependent nature manifests in an impure

manner as the imagination of the unreal (abhūtaparikalpa)—specifically, even through we are

seeing awareness, its presentation is distorted by karma such that awareness seems like “blue.” I

submit that this is how we should understand the idea that blue is “neither different nor non-

different” (bhedābheda) from awareness—not as a metaphysical argument but as a perceptual one.

Stated concisely: If it looks like we’re perceiving anything other than awareness itself, then we are

seeing awareness but misconstruing it as something else.

Ratnākaraśānti’s position is prefigured by Śākyabuddhi, one of the earliest commentators

on the Pramāṇavārttika. The following passage is, I think, consistent with Ratnākaraśānti’s

presentation and helpful in contextualizing Ratnākara’s position on the harmony between

Maitreya’s Madhyāntavibhāga and Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavarttika. Dharmakīrti’s source verse

reads:

Awareness is not differentiated, but its appearance is differentiated

into two. That being the case, that dualistic appearance must be
cognitive confusion. (PV 3.212cd, Dunne 406)

Śākyabuddhi comments:

Since the essential nature of awareness is established by reflexive awareness, it is

not the case that one is compelled to admit that all beings would see suchness [if
the object and subject images were unreal]. That is, even though the essential nature
of awareness is apprehended as partless by reflexive awareness, as a result of its
connection with the seeds of error, that reflexive awareness does not produce a
subsequent definitive determination of the nature of cognition as non-dual in the
way it has been perceived. Therefore, even though reflexive awareness has already
apprehended the non-dual nature of cognition, it is as if it has not been apprehended.
(Dunne 407-8).

Ratnākara’s opponent does not accept the three natures, so he cannot grant that an appeal to that

model would demonstrate to pseudo-Mādhyamikas where and how they fail. Instead, this

argument hinges once more on the possibility of pramāṇa, specifically direct perception. Direct
 McNamara AAR 2021 11

perception is, by definition, undistorted (avisaṃvāda). It would be contradictory to maintain that

something false could be undistorted; since his opponent does not admit to non-false phenomena,

they cannot appeal to direct perception. Casting aside direct perception, they would be forced to

abandon pramāṇa entirely.

After further explication of verse 21, at verse 22 Ratnākaraśānti draws out the implications

of this problem by casting his opponent as a pseudo-pramāṇavādin as well as a pseudo-

Mādhyamika:

If everything that appears in our awareness is non-existent, there

could be neither direct perception nor inference. How could
someone who advocates a position in which there is no
causality/evidence (rgyu) and everything is false be speaking in
good faith (smra ba, *vādin)? //22//

This verse highlights once again the tensions that a Mādhyamika such as Śāntarakṣita faces in

trying to integrate pramāṇa with their view of the two truths. While this presentation has focused

on Śāntarakṣita’s attempts to integrate yogācāra, pramāṇa, and madhyamaka together, I believe

that here Ratnākaraśānti is dismissing all pseudo-Mādhyamaka’s attempts to make sense of

pramāṇa while maintaining the two truths. As we have seen, Ratnākaraśānti feels the stakes are

much higher than getting Dharmakīrti right, however—which they must be. Some

Mādhyamikas—including many of whom we are accustomed to calling prāsaṅgikas—would agree

that Madhyamaka is in tension with the pramāṇa tradition; those Mādhyamikas respond by

abandoning pramāṇa. Ratnākaraśānti’s response is perhaps less familiar to us—he argues that

abandoning pseudo-Mādhyamika is the only way to be an authentic Mahāyāna Buddhist—it is

notable that the tension he is responding to would seem to be the same. Thank you.