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Talbot-Ethics-04 - Non Cognitivism (Hume)
Talbot-Ethics-04 - Non Cognitivism (Hume)
Marianne
Talbot
Department
for
Con<nuing
Educa<on
University
of
Oxford
21st
February
2011
1
Last
week
we
looked
at
Virtue
Ethics:
• considering
man s
proper
func<on
and
purpose
in
life;
• considering
the
roles
played
by
reason
and
passion
in
the
produc<on
of
ac<on;
• deciding
whether
you
agree
with
Hume
that
reason
is
the
slave
of
the
passions ;
• examining
the
implica<ons
of
Hume s
view
of
mind
for
Aristotle s
ethics;
• learning
about
Hume s
posi<ve
views
on
the
nature
of
morality
Humean
ethics
is
the
view
that
the
right
ac<on…
…
is
that
towards
which
a
true
judge
would
feel
approba<on…
…the
wrong
ac<on
is
that
towards
which…
…
a
true
judge
would
feel
disapproba<on.
Um….does
this
remind
you
of
anything?
You
might
think
that
Hume s
theory
sounds
like
Aristotle s….
…if
feeling
approba<on
is
iden<cal
to
knowing
what
is
right …
…
and
true
judges
are
iden<cal
to
virtuous
persons …
…
these
theories
could
be
iden<cal.
But
feeling
approba<on
is
very
different
from
knowing
what
is
right …
…
and
true
judges
are
not
the
same
as
virtuous
persons …..
There
are
many
modern
forms
of
Humean
ethics….
…they
are
grouped
under
the
<tle
non-‐cogni<vism ….
…they
include
emo<vism,
prescrip<vism,
expressivism,
error
theory
and
quasi-‐realism…
…all
of
these
can
be
looked
up
in
the
Stanford
Encyclopaedia
of
Philosophy:
h`p://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html
Hume s
ethics
was
built
on
his
philosophy
of
mind…
…
in
par<cular
on
his
account
of
the
nature
of
mental
states…
…such
as
reason
and
passion …
…which
we
might
think
of
as
desire
and
belief
To
understand
Hume s
view
properly
we
need
to
understand:
(a) the
difference
between
reason
and
passion