ISRAEL'S SECRET WARS

A History of Israel's Intelligence Services.By Ian Black and Benny Morris.603 pp. New York: Grove
Weidenfeld. $24.95.

If sheer volume of fascinating information and entertaining anecdote are enough to provide a complete
understanding of Israel's three intelligence services, then Ian Black and Benny Morris's thoroughly
researched and documented history can be said to remove all the mystery about the workings of
Mossad (foreign intelligence), Shin Bet (domestic intelligence) and Aman (military intelligence).

Mr. Black, the Jerusalem correspondent for The Guardian of London, and Mr. Morris, a historian and the
author of the acclaimed "Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949," are the most serious
and comprehensive chroniclers of the Israeli intelligence community to date. "Israel's Secret Wars"
details as thoroughly as it is possible to do not only the spectacular successes of the three intelligence
services, but also their blunders -- blunders that have created political storms within Israel and
sometimes strained relations with Israel's most important ally, the United States.

Some of the most interesting and original chapters of the book recount the birth and evolution of
Mossad and Shin Bet from their origins in the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine that was the
prototype for the future state of Israel. The early volunteers and amateurs in these services would later
be transformed by David Ben-Gurion and the almost fanatical first chief of Israeli intelligence, Isser
Harel, into universally admired professionals. Nonetheless, certain qualities of Israeli intelligence have
remained constant from the beginning. Even at the earliest stage, as Mr. Black and Mr. Morris show,
Israeli intelligence was characterized by the strength of the most fundamental, most effective and
"oldest form of spycraft," human intelligence. Modern Israeli spying, while well acquainted with the use
of sophisticated hardware, still believes in and depends on human talents and abilities.

The most controversial arm of Israeli intelligence has been Mossad, and its history is representative of
Israeli intelligence as a whole. Its actions have been dramatic, the stuff of popular spy novels. The
abduction of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina in 1960, the 1976 Entebbe raid that rescued 103 hostages
in Uganda, the assassinations of Palestine Liberation Organization leaders in Beirut -- all are exploits that
have made headlines. Less well known are the stories Mr. Black and Mr. Morris tell of Wolfgang Lotz,
the Israeli spy who posed as a Nazi in Egypt; of Eli Cohen, the Israeli agent who almost became Prime
Minister of Syria; of Mossad's relentless pursuit and execution of the terrorists responsible for the
murder of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics; and of its assassination of Abu Jihad, Yasir
Arafat's chief deputy, in 1989.

But there have also been fiascoes, failures of intelligence, a willingness to engage in questionable
operations, and these, too, are a part of "Israel's Secret Wars." As early as the 1948 Arab invasion, Israeli
intelligence failed to provide reliable information, resulting in a "massive shake-up" of the intelligence
services of the newly independent Jewish state. In 1953-54, Israeli agents provocateurs

blew up American buildings in Egypt; the facts came to light as the Lavon Affair in 1960-61, and
culminated in the resignation of Ben-Gurion as Prime Minister in the spring of 1963. Mr. Black and Mr.
Morris relate, as well, the full story of the dispute between Ben-Gurion and Isser Harel, the Iron Man of
Mossad, that led to Mr. Harel's resignation only weeks before Ben-Gurion left office.
Mr. Harel had informed the Prime Minister that the West German Government of Konrad Adenauer and
the West German Embassy in Cairo were involved in a deal to provide scientific assistance to Gamal
Abdel Nasser for an Egyptian missile program. But since Ben-Gurion was seeking to improve diplomatic
relations with what he termed a "new" Germany, he told Mr. Harel to avoid "any action that might
disrupt the steadily evolving cooperation between the two countries." Ben-Gurion even refused to bail
out a Mossad spy and his West German collaborator after they were arrested in Switzerland for
threatening the daughter of one of the German scientists in Egypt. When Ben-Gurion declined to back
Mr. Harel in the growing controversy, a decade of close relations between the two men came to an end.

In later years, the blunders of Israel's intelligence services have included the failure of Aman, the military
intelligence agency, to warn of the impending Egyptian-Syrian attack in 1973, and Mossad's fatal
misjudgment of the strength of the Christian militia forces in Lebanon in 1982. Among the most recent
missteps that Mr. Black and Mr. Morris document are the recruiting of the Jewish American Jonathan
Pollard as an Israeli spy and Israel's part in the Iran-contra fiasco. These errors, they point out, have
tarnished some of the luster of the earlier achievements and damaged the reputation of the intelligence
services. Still, those achievements have made Israeli intelligence as famous as the Central Intelligence
Agency and the K.G.B. Mossad, for one, has been carefully watched and imitated by other services,
especially the C.I.A., which continues to hold it in high regard and often works with it. By the same
token, Mossad is feared by the less effective intelligence services of the Arab countries and the P.L.O.

Yet if its reputation abroad is romantic and dramatic, its reputation at home is less glowing, because
whatever its successes, its failures are a matter of consequence for the nation. They can result in near-
disaster, as was the case in the early stages of the 1973 war. Acutely aware of Mossad's mixed record,
Mr. Black and Mr. Morris trace the shifting image of its agents, who have gone from being the best of
Israel's heroes to being flawed, imperfect figures. As the authors show, the role of spying, which
includes assassination, is today viewed by the Israeli public with a certain grim pragmatism, without the
awe that is reserved for the men and women in the armed forces.

Mr. Black and Mr. Morris tell their story of the three intelligence services objectively, with a wealth of
detail; it is clear that they are familiar with even the most obscure Israeli sources. The tone of their book
is measured, with no villains (and no heroes, either).

If there is a flaw, it is one of intention. What is missing is an analysis of the political context in which
Israeli intelligence operates. This would explain not only the sources of the intelligence community's
authority, but also the erosion of that authority in recent years. A political study of the services would be
a study of state making, one in which Ben-Gurion would loom large as the founding father both of the
state and of its military and security institutions. Without an analysis of Ben-Gurion's methods, of his
personality and idiosyncrasies, and of his style of authority, no study of Israel's secret wars can be
considered complete. Ben-Gurion managed to institutionalize Mossad, Shin Bet and the defense forces
(including Aman) under his autocratic rule in a way that he was never able to do with other areas, like
the economy and education. He created Israeli intelligence in his own image. Mossad in particular
became an important tool of his Government, especially in his political battles with the left and the right.

But with the passing of Ben-Gurion and his immediate successors, the control and responsibility he
exercised so adroitly tended to evaporate, leaving an entrenched Mossad, operating with great
efficiency but without central control from the Government. The major blunders occurred when
Governmental authority over the intelligence services was weakened, beginning with Menachem Begin
and extending to Yitzhak Shamir, to Shimon Peres and back to Mr. Shamir again.

As a result, something basic has changed in the relationship between the central Government and the
intelligence services. Modernization and bureaucratization have enhanced the effectiveness of Israel's
intelligence agencies, but in the absence of a dominating political figure they have drifted into the realm
of political decision making, and into the most sensitive areas, foreign policy and Israel's relationship
with the United States. A vacuum has been created in which rogue intelligence operations, lPollard affair
and the Iran-contra imbroglio, can occur.

Mr. Black and Mr. Morris have restricted themselves to an account of Israel's secret wars, but
inescapably, their book also evaluates the nature of the relationship between civilian and intelligence
authorities in a democracy. Under loose political leadership, divided in its goals and interests, rogue
operations are almost inevitable. In tracing the successes of Israeli intelligence together with its
mounting record of failure, Mr. Black and Mr. Morris make clear that the central authority cannot allow
its intelligence services to operate free of political domination -- and that to avoid further damage to
everyone from the agents of Mossad to the supporters of Israel in the United States, the Israeli
Government must reassert control over its spies and spy-chasers.

A version of this article appears in print on June 30, 1991, Section 7, Page 12 of the National editi