Benign Neglect?

The Politics and Practise of

Controlling
Police Corruption in South Africa

David Bruce
Centre for the Study of Violence and
Reconciliation, South Africa

Cape Town, South Africa June 9-11, 2008

Special session at the 2008 ABCDE: Crime, poverty and police corruption

Title: Benign Neglect? The politics and practice of police oversight and controlling
police corruption in South Africa

By: David Bruce, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation

Abstract: During the transition to democracy in South Africa in the early and mid-1990s
considerable emphasis was placed on the creation of external oversight bodies, including
committees of the national parliament and provincial legislatures, ‘secretariats’ linked to
national and provincial executives, a complaints monitoring body with investigative
powers called the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), and local structures
composed of community members, called community police forums (CPFs) intended to
perform an oversight function at police station level. At the same time, particularly since
2000, the political and institutional environment has been hostile to agencies orientated
towards tackling police corruption. The South African Police Service (SAPS) Anti-
Corruption unit was disbanded in 2002. Moreover, moves are currently taken to disband
the Directorate of Special Operations or ‘Scorpions’, the agency recently responsible for
bringing the national commissioner of the SAPS to court on corruption charges. Despite a
considerable array of oversight bodies, the overall trend in the recent period has been
towards a weakening of the capacity to investigate police corruption. This paper looks at
these developments, discussing the role of external oversight agencies in dealing with
police corruption, and the reasons for the weakening of the main anti-corruption
investigative agencies in South Africa. This discussion provides the basis for a general
reflection of the political and institutional factors which support or hinder efforts to tackle
police corruption in South Africa.

David Bruce, Senior Researcher

Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
P O Box 30778, Braamfontein, 2017, South Africa
Tel: (011) 403-5650. Cell: 082-784-8616.
Fax: (011) 388-0819.
Email: dbruce@csvr.org.za
CSVR website: http://www.csvr.org.za.
 Benign Neglect?
The politics and practise of controlling
police corruption in South Africa

Paper for workshop: Crime, Poverty and Police Corruption

Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics
Cape Town, June 9-11, 2008.

David Bruce
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
Johannesburg

David Bruce, Senior Researcher

Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
P O Box 30778, Braamfontein, 2017, South Africa
Tel: (011) 403-5650. Cell: 082-784-8616.
Fax: (011) 388-0819.
Email: dbruce@csvr.org.za
CSVR website: http://www.csvr.org.za.

1
 ‘The SAPS argued that it had subsequently rid itself of the corrupt elements
within its structures.’ Khampepe Commission Report, (2006: 22)

‘Surely, a wrong by an individual or a few individuals cannot realistically be

interpreted as a general phenomenon or practise in the entire 173 161 employees
of the SAPS. The perception should therefore not be created in the media that the
SAPS is the most corrupt or brutal police service in the world, simply because this
is not true’ - SAPS Assistant Commissioner Joseph Ngobeni (Ngobeni, 2008)

Introduction – some reports of alleged police corruption

The charges against National Commissioner Selebi

On the 1st of February 2008 the National Commissioner of the South African Police
Service1, Jackie Selebi appeared in court to face charges of corruption and defeating the
ends of justice.2 The charges against Selebi relate partly to allegations that he was
involved in a protracted corrupt relationship with an alleged drug dealer and crime boss
Glenn Agliotti. Selebi is alleged to have received in excess of R1.2 million as well as
other gifts from Agliotti including medical expenses for his son, and items such as
handbags and clothing for his wife, his girlfriend, his children and himself. Agliotti is
said to have been linked to a drug smuggling case in which police seized Mandrax worth
R105 million and arrested five people. Selebi’s alleged assistance to Agliotti included
ensuring that nothing happened to Agliotti or those who were arrested, in this matter.
Amongst other assistance to Agliotti, Selebi allegedly tipped him off about a British
police investigation into his drug smuggling activities.

The evidence appears to indicate that the money allegedly provided to Selebi mostly did
not come from Agliotti himself. Agliotti is said to have acted as a conduit for money to
Selebi from murdered mining magnate Brett Kebble. This was channelled through an
account known as ‘Spring Lights’ and paid to Selebi by Agliotti in cash for the purpose
of buying influence with Selebi. The last known alleged payment from the account to
Selebi, an amount of R30 000, occurred within a few days of Kebble’s death on 27
September 2005.

It is also alleged that Selebi, motivated by a US $30 000 bribe delivered by Agliotti, tried
to persuade National Director of Public Prosecutions, Vusi Pikoli, to withdraw a warrant

1
As discussed below (see footnote 4) there are different policing agencies in South Africa including most
notably the South African Police Service (SAPS) as well as a number of metropolitan police agencies and
one municipal police service. This paper focuses on the SAPS which is the main role player in policing in
the country.
2
The case was postponed to June 26. The charges were not formally put to Selebi and he was not asked to
plead at this appearance (Sunday Independent, 3 February 2008). Selebi is variously described in press
reports as ‘suspended’ or on ‘extended leave’ or having ‘stepped down’ but has not formally resigned as
National Commissioner.

2
of arrest for mining entrepreneur and fugitive from justice Billy Rautenbach, wanted on
numerous counts of fraud, bribery and money laundering.

There are a number of other allegations against Selebi some of which have not been
formulated as charges presumably on the basis that the evidence is insufficient for
prosecutorial purposes.

Other press reports of corruption

The charges against Commissioner Selebi are probably the most sensational reports of
alleged police corruption which have been reported in the South African media for some

̇ An edition of the television programme Special Assignment in September 2004

time but are not by any means the only ones. A selection of other examples:

depicted police officers soliciting bribes from the clients of prostitutes working in
Rosebank, Johannesburg, after threatening to arrest them and inform their wives.
Other prostitutes reported being raped by police (Star, 29 September 2004). A
report issued by the sex workers rights group Sweat in May 2006 also referred to
numerous allegations of rape and the extortion of bribes, made by a number of

̇ Two July 2005 reports refers to various incidents in which Durban SAPS or
prostitutes in Cape Town (Fick, 2006)

metro police allegedly used the threat of traffic fines to extort bribes or attempt to
extort bribes from motorists. One report refers to patrol units from the Durban
Metro Police and the SAPS ‘targeting white and Indian men leaving clubs and
pubs at night after drinking liquor. The police allegedly threaten their victims
with going to jail for the weekend if they do not pay ‘spot fines’ from R1000 to

̇ A September 2005 press report refers to the arrest of six policemen at the
R2000. (Independent on Saturday, 9 July and 23 July 2005).

Booysens (Johannesburg) police station on charges of corruption and assault. The

arrest followed another exposé on the television programme Special Assignment
which caught policemen on camera accepting bribes from illegal immigrants

̇ A 2006 press report refers to tow truck companies in Ekurhuleni bribing corrupt
(Sowetan, 22 September 2005).

policemen to ensure that they are the first at the scene of an accident (Star, 24
May 2006a).3
̇ A September 2006 report refers to the arrest of a Maitland (Cape Town) detective
as he allegedly attempted to buy a case docket containing corruption charges
against him. In the original charge he had allegedly instructed two subordinates
to make false statements under oath in order to obtain the withdrawal of a vehicle

̇ Another press report from the same month refers to claims that two policemen
theft case (Cape Argus, 4 September 2006).

illegally detained a Durban man and extorted R1500 and his cell phone from him
for his release (Daily News, 20 September, 2006).

3
It is possible that this report primarily implicates the Ekurhuleni metro police rather than the SAPS.
Another Ekurhuleni metro matter concerns various charges against the chief of police, Robert McBride.
These have not been listed here due to the focus on the SAPS.

3
̇ An October 2006 press report tells of a policeman at Johannesburg Central police
station who had been questioned after being linked to a cell-phone stolen in a
robbery from the house of a well-known television presenter. The policeman
allegedly started using the phone the day after the robbery. He is reported to have
said that he had bought the cell-phone from a street dealer but maintained that he
could not recall where, despite indicating that he had returned the phone to the

̇
very same dealer (Sowetan, 12 October 2006).
A May 2007 press report refers to the arrest of a policeman in Mpumalanga who
was alleged to be involved in supplying police uniforms to criminals for use in

̇
cash-in-transit heists (Sowetan, 14 May 2007)
A press report in January 2008 refers to allegations that a number of SAPS and
metro police members own minibus taxis despite an order forbidding this. The
general secretary of the Gauteng Taxi Council is quoted as saying that this was
the reason why ‘police had failed to make arrests in many taxi shootings’

̇
(Business Day, 22 January 2008).
A press report in February 2008 refers to 1070 policemen who were arrested by
the Special Investigations Unit during an investigation into social grant fraud.
Many of them have pleaded guilty and paid R1000 admission of guilt fines. The
SAPS members are said to be still at work pending internal disciplinary
procedures. Senior officers are said to be hoping that the officers will be given
final written warnings allowing them to keep their jobs ‘as a result of the

̇
shortages of policemen in the country. (Sunday Times, 24 February 2008)
In March 2008 a SAPS inspector based at the Johannesburg Central Police
station appeared in court charged with soliciting a bribe of R5000 from the wife
of a man who was in custody. The inspector and another inspector from
Booysens police station were also facing fraud, theft, extortion, defeating the
ends of justice and further corruption charges. A key witness in one of the cases,
Lindiwe Mthembu, was shot dead at her Johannesburg flat earlier in the year

̇
(Sowetan, 17 March 2008).
Another press report tells of 13 reserve police constables who allegedly helped
26 illegal Mozambicans return to South Africa minutes after they were deported.
The immigrants told border police that they had paid sums ranging from R200 to
R300 to the police. Border police found the immigrants hiding under the seats of
a bus that had supposedly off-loaded them in Mozambique. (Sowetan, 17 April

̇
2008)
Another report tells of a group of police reservists in the Free State arrested on

̇
suspicion that they assisted car thieves (Independent Online, 16 April 2008).
Another press report published in April tells of a Lydenburg (in Mpumalanga)
policeman who was assigned to a case after a man was arrested for allegedly
stealing cables from his employer. The policeman then contacted the employer
offering to give him back the expensive cables for a fee. He also offered to make

̇
the case against the employee disappear (Independent Online, 17 April 2007).
Another report published in April indicates that three policemen, two from the
Mogwase SAPS and one from the Klerksdorp (in North West) detective division,
are amongst a group of five men appearing in court after being arrested following

4
 a shootout with police following a bomb blast at an ATM in Jouberton (Sowetan,
22 April 2008).

The report of the Policy Advisory Council

A further report which draws attention to the problem of corruption in the SAPS is the
report of the Policy Advisory Council appointed by National Commissioner Selebi in
2006 ‘to advise him on the state of the SAPS and the country’s crime fighting
capabilities’. Fifteen retired former commissioners of the SAPS were appointed to serve
on the council and the report of the council is therefore effectively an internal report on
the service. The report of the council for the period November 2006 to October 2007
states that ‘the Council identified corruption as a serious problem’ (2007:35). Examples

̇ ‘illegal immigrants - bribes paid to evade arrest

of forms of corruption identified by the council in their report are:

̇ bribery by suspects not to arrest / to close case / file false withdrawal statement / lose”

̇ member demanding money to attend to complaint/investigate case

a docket / tamper with evidence

̇ involvement in taxi industry (Investigations of taxi related crimes given to members

̇ theft / abuse of Government property

whose family members are involved)

̇ bribery of recruiting officers to recruit applicants who do not conform to enlistment

̇ burglary whilst on duty’.

requirements (bribery of doctors to declare unfit applicants medically fit)

The report is particularly interesting as SAPS officials usually see it as their

responsibility to downplay the extent of corruption in the SAPS as part of a general
obligation to promote positive attitudes towards the SAPS.

The prevalence of police corruption in South Africa

The 2007 National Victims of Crime Survey

The television exposés and press and other reports referred to above may be useful in
helping to form a picture of the nature of police corruption but do not answer questions
about its prevalence. According to the 2007 National Victims of Crime Survey (NVCS)
2.9% of respondents indicated that they had been victims of corruption. Amongst those
who indicated that they had been victims of corruption, 32% said that this was in relation
to traffic fines (mostly implicating municipal and metro police and other traffic agencies)
and 18% said that this was related to ‘policing’ (mostly implicating the SAPS). (Louw,
2008:7-8)4 In other words the evidence from the 2007 NVCS indicates that roughly 0.522

4
It is important also to clarify the significance of the figures on ‘traffic fines’ and ‘policing’ in terms of the
different policing agencies in South Africa. The SAPS is an organisation of 173 161 employees. As the
national police service of South Africa it has a mandate for dealing with crime in all areas. There are also
five metropolitan or municipal police services in South Africa with in total maybe 10 000 employees.
These fall under local governments and were originally created out of local government controlled traffic

5
% of South Africans over the age of 16 years (roughly 159 600 individuals) would
identify themselves as victims of corruption related to policing, with .928% (roughly 283
829) indicating that they had been victims of corruption in relation to ‘traffic fines’.5

While the figures still suggest that public servants, and specifically police and traffic
police, are significantly involved in soliciting bribes, the overall figures for corruption in
the 2007 NVCS are substantially lower than those for the 2003 NVCS (Burton et al,
2004) where 5.6% of respondents indicated that they had been victims of corruption. This
might be taken to imply that there has been an overall strengthening of integrity within
the public service in the last few years. Whether this is true or not it should be noted that
within this figure the proportions involving different agencies of government have
remained relatively constant. Thus the policing figures of 18% in 2007 may be compared
to that of 20% for 2003. The traffic policing figures are also similar having risen slightly
from 27% in 2003 to 32% in 2007. This may be taken to suggest that the overall decline
in levels of corruption, if there is indeed such a decline, is related to general trends in
government or in South Africa society rather than to trends within specific agencies.6
This is consistent with the evidence below that there has been no focused anti-corruption
activity during the last few years within the SAPS.

Whatever the trends suggested by NVCS figures there is also good reason to believe that
these do not present the full picture. For instance the 2003 NVCS notes

‘many incidents of corruption or attempted corruption were probably not reported

to the survey. Some victims may be aware of their perceived ‘complicity’ as the
bribe payer … and would worry that by answering the question they might
implicate themselves. Others may not be aware that being asked for a bribe in
return for a service is a crime, and may instead see this as a ‘normal’ transaction
fee required to ensure the delivery of services. Similarly requests for ‘favours’
and ‘gifts’ may be overlooked as a form of corruption. These acts typically

police, by law enforcement and security agencies. While their ‘core’ mandate remains that of traffic
policing they also have a legal mandate to conduct crime prevention (but not investigation) and by law
enforcement. Therefore in areas where these agencies are operational crime prevention is both the
responsibility of the SAPS and the MPS. In areas where there are no MPS there are usually agencies with a
specific traffic policing mandate falling either under local or provincial governments. This means that the
total number of police involved in a traffic policing role includes members of MPSs and a large number of
other ‘traffic police’ with the SAPS also playing a more limited role in this regard. Though traffic is not
formally part of the mandate of the SAPS, SAPS personnel may carry out forms of traffic enforcement, for
instance checking that people have valid driver’s licences and are driving licensed vehicles when doing
roadblocks or other vehicle stops, and also playing a role in the policing of drunk driving. As illustrated in
one of the examples from press reports quoted above, this contributes to the fact that SAPS corruption also
extends to the traffic policing arena, while the MPSs in particular may also contribute to the overall
‘policing’ corruption problem.
5
Calculated using 2007 population figures indicating a population over the age of 16 years of roughly 30
585 100 (Statistics South Africa, 2007). The figure of 2.9% multiplied by 18% provides a figure of roughly
0.522% and by 32% a figure of roughly .928%.
6
Though there are slight variations in the level of fluctuation in the ‘share’ of corruption of different
government departments with, for example ‘employment/jobs’ having dropped from 18% to 13%, ‘ID or
passport’ having increased from 12% to 16% and ‘pension/social welfare’ having dropped from 13 to 9%
(Louw, 2009:8).

6
 involve the purchase of a cold drink, alcohol or a meal in return for speeding up a
service or the efficient delivery of a service. Some members of the public may
regard this as simply an accepted form of gratitude’ (Burton, et al, 2004:111-2).

Surveys like the NVCS which are based on visits to ‘households’ may also systematically
under-represent the kind of more marginalised groups who are most exposed to police
corruption. Corrupt interactions with the police are most concentrated amongst specific
‘groups’ including immigrants, sex workers, criminals, and others who tend to be the
subject of police attention (notably young men, particularly young black men) or who the
police identify as safe targets for the soliciting of bribes when they approach police for
service. Members of some of these groups may tend to occupy residential settings which
are more difficult to access, and may also tend to have less stable residential patterns,
factors which might tend to contribute to their being under-represented in these types of
surveys. Unlike ‘traffic fines’ which impact on a constituency which would be well
represented by the victim survey, the victims (or accomplices) of other police corruption
are probably not as well represented. Because it is targeted at these groups police
corruption also receives little publicity and remains mostly ‘below the radar’ of media
organisations and therefore receives relatively limited media attention.

Consistent with the definitions of corruption in anti-corruption legislation, the NCVS

defines corruption very strictly in relation to forms of bribery.7 However police
corruption is understood by analysts to involve the abuse of police powers for personal
gain (See Syed and Bruce, 1998; Faull, 2007; Newburne, 1999 for discussions of this
issue) and is not always related to the payment of bribes. As reflected in the media
reports quoted above, police corruption is not restricted to the taking of bribes but may
involve other activities ranging from theft from victims or at the premises of a shop
which has been broken into, to overt collusion with other criminals in perpetrating thefts,
robberies or other crimes. Irish-Quobosheane’s analysis of organised crime indicates that
police corruption is an important contributor to the viability of cash in transit heists
(2007; 43-45), criminal gangs on the Cape Flats (ibid: 80-81), Nigerian groups involved
in drug trafficking (109-110), and vehicle hijacking syndicates (131-132). Where, for
instance, a shop has been broken into and police respond to a report about the incident
and visit the scene it is likely that no one will even identify the fact that the police have
also stolen goods from the shop premises. In some cases the only person aware that a
corrupt act has been committed would be the perpetrators themselves. If police are
involved in such crimes this will not be known by the victims unless police are arrested
for this and the victim subsequently informed. Such police corruption is therefore
unlikely to be picked up by victim surveys.8

7
Respondents were asked ‘Has any government official asked or indicated to you that they would be
receptive to money, a favour, a present in return for service? (Louw, ibid. See also Burton et al, 2004:113).
In 2003, 4.6% of the 5.6% reported corruption involving money, 0.6% a favour, and 0.4% a present (such
as purchasing a cold drink or a meal for an official) (Burton, et al, 112).
8
It may also be asked whether a crime suspect who has paid the police to lose a docket would be likely to
identify himself as a victim of corruption in the event of being interviewed for a victim survey.

7
Factors feeding into the prevalence of corruption

Policing is a high risk occupation in terms of exposure to opportunities for corruption.

Nevertheless levels of corruption vary significantly between different police agencies.
The prevalence of corruption in any policing agency can be understood as a product of
different factors which can be seen as operating at the individual, organisational, and
societal levels (Newham, 2003)). In South Africa all of these factors are likely to play a
powerful role in contributing to the prevalence of corruption.

(i) Individual level

The SAPS was created by the en masse incorporation of police from the South African
Police and ten homeland police agencies of the apartheid era – agencies which were
variously associated with corruption and brutality (Cawthra, 1993) and which did not
have strong traditions of integrity. Since then the major influx of personnel into the SAPS
has been during the recent wave of ‘en masse’ recruitment where the sheer volume of
recruitment9 has contributed to undermining screening and selection procedures. Thus it
is not surprising that the report of the Policy Advisory Council (2007:30) highlights
problems in the recruitment process including allegations that medically unfit recruits
bribe doctors to declare them fit for enlistment, or that falsified drivers licenses are
produced by prospective recruits as a means of satisfying admission criteria. The report
also notes that there have been a ‘lack of proper recruitment drives’ with ‘old data bases’
(of applicants who have previously been rejected) being used ‘with the result that the best
possible candidates are not always selected’. Rigorous selection criteria have therefore
never been consistently applied within the SAPS.

At the same time that the SAPS has been involved in an aggressive programme of
recruitment of permanent employees it has also been involved in dramatically expanding
the number of ‘police reservists’ volunteers (Bruce, Newham and Masuku, 2007:23).
‘Reservists have full policing powers, even though screening and selection processes are
not necessarily very thorough’ (ibid:71).

Many SAPS members have therefore probably not entered the SAPS as people with a
strong orientation towards integrity and to law abiding behaviour. Considering the
weaknesses of the organisational controls, and the powerful ‘societal factors’ contributing
to the risk of corruption which are outlined below, it is likely that many of these members
would be susceptible to corruption.

(ii) Organisational level

Police organisations which take the issue of police corruption seriously ensure that there
are mechanisms in place to promote integrity by their members and to discourage
corruption. In the words of Faull (2008:23), ‘From 2001 to 2007 the SAPS reported the
development (and implied the implementation) of various macro anti-corruption

9
For instance during 2006 the SAPS recruited roughly 11 000 staff members (Bruce, Newham and
Masuku, 2007:23).

8
strategies. In truth, rollout for what is now called the Corruption and Fraud Prevention
Plan (CFPP) only began in September 2007’. As the Policy Advisory Council puts it ‘No
real progress has … been made with the implementation thereof.’ (p. 35). In other words
while the SAPS in its annual reports presented the plan as being implemented no such
implementation has taken place until very recently. The fact that the development of the
plan was allowed to drag out over such an extended period of time itself demonstrates
that the issue was not given priority.10

There has therefore been little that has been done to address corruption within the SAPS
since the closure of the SAPS Anti-Corruption unit in 2002. The relatively small number
of suspensions of police officials for ‘corruption-related activities’ (see Rademeyer, 2008
as well as Bruce, Newham and Masuku, 2007) is therefore not meaningful as an indicator
of levels of corruption, or that the SAPS is ‘taking corruption seriously’ but is merely a
demonstration of the limited vigour with which the SAPS has addressed the issue up to
this point.

But it is not merely the destruction of the Anti-Corruption unit, and absence of a working
integrity strategy, that makes the SAPS highly prone to corruption. The Policy Advisory
Council report for instance states that ‘there is a general lack of command and control
within the Police Service at local level. Resultant poor levels of discipline and high levels
of corruption are of serious concern’ (2007:40). The wave of en masse recruitment of
permanent and reservist members comes in the wake of a whole series of restructuring
initiatives within the SAPS which have continually contributed to destabilising
management systems.

Restructuring has therefore been a source of continuing instability in many key

management structures. At the same time the promotions process — partly as a
result of the focus on employment equity but also as a result of forms of nepotism
and favouritism — has not been consistently orientated towards strengthening the
quality of management and supervision in the SAPS. (Bruce, Newham and
Masuku, 2007:71)

Not only has the SAPS actively undermined its corruption control mechanisms but it has
done so whilst management systems, which constitute the basic mechanism of control,
have been undermined. At the same time the numbers of personnel has dramatically
expanded exacerbating the strain on management systems. These weaknesses contribute
to enhancing the potential and likely of widespread corruption by SAPS members.

(iii) Societal level

As evidenced by the chronically high levels of crime as well as the various senior state
officials who have been charged or convicted for corruption, South African society can
reasonably be said to be characterised by a culture of self-enrichment and by the relative
weakness of the culture of integrity. The social factors which contribute to crime and
corruption in South African society would also impact on SAPS members. Furthermore
10
The CFPP is discussed in more detail below.

9
high levels of crime create an environment which is orientated towards reducing
constraints on the police. Combined with the weakness of both external11 and internal
controls this contributes to an environment which facilitates police corruption. The sheer
volume of crime and cases which police deal with also creates a massive number of
opportunities for corruption.

In one news report Liza Grobler, an independent criminologist whose PhD thesis
examined police corruption, is quoted as believing that ‘at least 10% of police are corrupt
or criminal’ but that even this estimate ‘is probably too fair’ (Rademeyer, 2008). Taking
into account the information from victim surveys and conclusions of the Policy Advisory
Council as well as an analysis of the individual, organisational and societal conditions
which would appear to be highly conducive to corruption it would therefore appear
reasonable to concur with this view and to conclude that there is every reason to believe
that there is a severe problem of corruption in the SAPS.

Limits on police corruption

While the SAPS is affected by a severe problem of corruption there are also factors
limiting the prevalence of corruption. One of these is that many SAPS members are
invested in the crime fighting mission of the SAPS and may therefore tend to be
intolerant of corruption. For some of them this means that they will tolerate certain forms
of corruption but not those forms which overtly undermine efforts to address serious
crime. Therefore while many SAPS members will be willing to turn a blind eye to the
extortion of bribes from immigrants, far fewer will be comfortable about doing so where
colleagues are acting to protect groups or individuals involved in serious crime. While the
SAPS is very bad at detecting police corruption, where certain forms of corruption come
to light, criminal and/or disciplinary measures will often be instituted against the
individuals concerned (discussed in Bruce, Newham and Masuku, 2007: PAGE). This
also serves as a modest deterrent to corruption, as well as ensuring that corrupt SAPS
members generally take care to carry out their corrupt activities in a covert manner.

The SAPS is certainly not the most corrupt police service in the world and there are a
large number of SAPS members who are not corrupt. However individual members who
attempt to challenge corruption by bringing their bad cop colleagues to book risk
ostracism and worse, including the risk of being killed (see for example the Saturday
Star, 8 April 2006). Police leaders and others who try and downplay the extent of
corruption are playing into the hands of the corrupt by minimising the potential for proper
steps to be taken against corruption. They are therefore not doing any favours to the good
cops.

The Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan

The Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan (CPFP) is the new showpiece of the SAPS’s
anti-corruption efforts.12 Though it has interesting elements and is very good in clearly

11
External oversight mechanisms are also discussed further below.
12
For an outline of an earlier version of the plan see Faull, 2007.

10
setting out the different functions of the different levels of the SAPS, it seems reasonable
to raise a number of issues which may impact on the effectiveness of anti-corruption
efforts.13 During the last few decade the values statements of the SAPS have multiplied
(the SAPS has a code of conduct as well as a statement of values and a code of ethics)
and the plan is therefore unable to put forward a clear and concise statement of the values
of the SAPS which can easily be communicated to SAPS members. It is therefore not
surprising that the plan in many ways obscures the central point of promoting the
integrity of an organisation which is to communicate the core values of the organisation
to its members and hold them accountable for conduct which deviates from it. References
to the Code of Conduct are indeed buried in the document but this is referred to as a set
of rules (‘members must comply with basic ethical principles of the code of conduct’)
rather than in relation to the need for members to invest in the values which it contains.

Another concern is the absence of a consistent approach to defining corruption within the
document. It is never clear whether the term corruption applies largely to forms of
bribery and extortion, whether it includes all crime involving police officers, or
something between these two poles. This will inevitably confuse efforts at
implementation of the plan at every point, from training to monitoring and reporting. A
further concern is that the plan, which follows the closure of the police anti-corruption
unit (ACU), at the height of its effectiveness, in 2002, omits a central platform of
effective anti-corruption strategies in the form of a dedicated anti-corruption unit. Instead
the plan vests responsibility for the investigation of ‘serious’ corruption with ad hoc
investigative teams appointed by the provincial commissioners, and for other corruption,
with ordinary station based detectives. This disregards the likelihood that police who
investigate corruption with any tenacity are likely to face social ostracism from their
peers (if not worse14), militating against proper corruption investigations. The ad-hoc
approach to investigation also militates against the accumulation of specialised
experience on the part of any individual SAPS members in relation to the investigation of
corruption. The implication is that every single detective needs to be trained in corruption
investigations adding to the burden of training in order to implement the plan.

Described by one analyst as ‘extremely complex’ (Faull, 2008:23) the plan has obviously
not been developed with a strong awareness of the organisational realities, of which the
erratic quality of management and general weakness of supervisory systems are the most
significant. The plan for instance places a strong emphasis on ‘risk assessments’ which
are supposed to be conducted annually at all stations but these are presented in an abstract
way and it is not clear what they are intended to achieve. Those least able, (and perhaps
least inclined) to implement these provisions may often be those most affected by
corruption. More basic questions of management practise relevant to promoting police
integrity (see Newham and Maroga, 2004) are neglected by the plan. The plan states that

13
It may also be noted that the document is under the signature of National Commissioner Selebi and
contains messages which are designated as personal messages from him. While he has not been convicted
of the criminal charges against him, it would nevertheless appear that that, in light of the allegations against
him, his signature on the document immediately brings its credibility into question.
14
See for instance the Saturday Star, 8 April 2008 for a story about the risks facing dedicated anti-
corruption investigators.

11
‘The key to combating corruption and fraud in the SAPS is effective supervision of SAPS
employees at all levels, but particularly at station level.’(2008?:41) But this is a facet of
the SAPS which as noted above, is at best highly erratic.

Another concern is that such a plan should form part of a comprehensive framework
which sets out the roles of the various concerned bodies in addressing criminality or
misconduct by the police. The plan for instance mentions the Independent Complaints
Directorate (ICD) as one location where reports of corruption can be lodged but the
policy does not engage with more general questions about the role of the ICD in
implementing the plan. Due to the fact that the ICD is independent of the SAPS the SAPS
would not be able to prescribe to the ICD on such matters, but it would have been
appropriate to develop such provisions in consultation with the ICD.

While the plan has obviously taken some careful work and may look ‘good on paper’
these problems raise questions about what will be achieved by the plan. Alongside
questions about the length of the process, there are basic questions about the
organisations commitment to addressing corruption. As of 2007 the SAPS only had one
full-time member’ working on the development of new anti-corruption measures with a
handful of support staff’ (2007:15-16). Effectively therefore the ‘progress’ made by the
SAPS in tackling corruption over the last decade has been to close an effective anti-
corruption investigation unit and to spend the following five years developing a
problematic anti-corruption plan. At the end of the day the business of tackling corruption
requires leaders who are invested in strengthening the integrity of their organisations.
There has been little evidence of this up to this point, with senior leaders mainly
downplaying the extent of corruption, and doing their best to disband investigation units
with an anti-corruption role.

Sanders and Young provide a typology of legal rules applicable to police. Whilst some
rules have an influence on police behaviour other rules are largely ‘presentational’
serving a public relations function for police organisations (for instance being highlighted
on the website and in the annual reports of the organisation) but having little or no direct
impact on police behaviour. The CFPP is apparently at the early stages of implementation
and, notwithstanding the concerns highlighted above, it is premature to judge what
impact it will have on the SAPS. But considering the record of the SAPS over the last
decade it appears reasonable to ask whether the CFPP, flawed as it is, will be vigorously
implemented backed by a strong leadership commitment, or whether it will primarily
serve a ‘presentational’ function.

The response from oversight bodies

If it is true that there is a serious problem of corruption in the SAPS, and that the SAPS
has done little to address this problem, what then has been the response of the wide range
of oversight bodies that have been established to ensure greater accountability by the
SAPS? During the transition to democracy in South Africa in the early and mid-1990s
considerable emphasis was placed on the creation of a range of external oversight bodies
intended in various ways to promote the accountability of the police. These included

12
committees of the national parliament and provincial legislatures, ‘secretariats’ linked to
national and provincial executives, a complaints monitoring body with investigative
powers called the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), and local structures
composed of community members, called community police forums (CPFs) intended to
perform an oversight function at police station level.

Each of these police accountability and oversight role-players could potentially have
played a significant role in ensuring that corruption was being better addressed by the
SAPS. However if we examine the work of these bodies there is little evidence that most
of them have engaged with the issue or made any significant effort to ensure that the
issue is addressed by the SAPS.

Thus if we look at the work of the National Minister, the Provincial Executive Members
(MECs) and the various secretariats which fall under them there is, with one or two
exceptions,15 little evidence of any effort towards ensuring that corruption is prioritised
by the SAPS as a policy-matter or indeed of any input from these bodies in relation to the
type of policy that would be appropriate in ensuring that the issue is addressed. Similarly
though individual members of the parliamentary committee on safety and security may
have asked the odd question about police corruption there is no evidence on their part of
substantial or sustained engagement with the issue. Though CPFs would sometimes be in
a position to put pressure on local police commanders to engage with corruption, and
may have done so in some cases, they have definitely not done so consistently and so any
benefits which might have been achieved by this has been at best quite modest.

The point is well illustrated in relation to both the closure over 2001 and 2002 of the
SAPS internal anti-corruption unit (ACU), and current moves towards the disbandment of
the Directorate of Special Operations (the DSO), an investigative unit based in the
National Prosecution Authority which is popularly known as the Scorpions. The available
evidence is that the ACU was a reasonably effective unit in addressing police corruption
(Faull, 2007). The Scorpions are the unit which has been involved in the investigation
against the SAPS National Commissioner and effectively the only means of subjecting
high level police officials to the operation of the law. During both processes there has
been little evidence of engagement by these structures with the motivations for the
disbandment of these units.16 They have also not interrogated any of the claims by the
SAPS that it will be adequate to lodge responsibility for investigation of police corruption
with existing police units.

The one component of the accountability architecture which has made some effort to
engage with police corruption has been the Independent Complaints Directorate, an
investigative body which operates independently of the police but also falls under the
Minister of Safety and Security. The ICD for instance established an anti-Corruption
Command in 2004 (Faull, 2007:12) though the somewhat grandiose title belies its very

15
The Gauteng Provincial Government for instance released a safety strategy in May 2007 which provides
measures to address police misconduct including corruption (see Cachalia, 2007).
16
It seems that the Secretariat for Safety and Security did at least submit a legal opinion disputing the
interpretation which was being given to the Constitution by those in favour of disbanding the Scorpions.

13
limited capacity. This reflects the general limitations of the ICD as an investigative body,
partly related to a shortage of resources. In addition the mandate of the ICD places an
obligation on the ICD to investigate deaths in police custody or as a result of police
action of which there have been a significant number each year. This burden limits the
capacity of the ICD to invest time and resources in other investigative activities. This is
reflected in the fact that well over 80% of the criminal convictions which have been
obtained by the ICD in recent years have been for murder or culpable homicide or other
police assaults and very few are for offences which are likely to be linked to corruption
(Bruce, Newham and Masuku, 2007:122).

In addition the ICD receives most of its cases in the form of complaints from members of
the public.17 But while complaints might provide some evidence of corruption, corruption
is to some extent a consensual crime, or, as highlighted above, is otherwise invisible to all
but the police members who are themselves involved in it. Most civilians who are
involved in corrupt transactions with police members will therefore not be inclined to
report corruption as a ‘complaint’ to the ICD and corruption therefore requires other
mechanisms in order to be detected.18 As a result the ICD’s investigations represent a tiny
drop of investigation in the ocean of corruption.

The existence of the ICD unfortunately also feeds into the tendency by the SAPS to
rationalise its own neglect of the need to have proper internal mechanisms of
investigation. An ‘independent’ mechanism such as the ICD can only function effectively
if there is a comprehensive policy regarding the lodging and investigation of complaints
against the police that binds police services and the oversight body (Bruce, 2006). As
highlighted above there is currently no such framework, a factor which is also one of the
limitations of the CFPP.

Discussion

The failure of oversight bodies to engage with the problem of police corruption may
partly be seen as a reflection of their own limited understanding of the phenomenon
symptom of the overall weakness of their engagement with the SAPS as an institution.
This might in part be seen as related to the fact that civilians (whether in state or civilian
structures) tend to have a limited understanding of policing. In parliamentary oversight
committees and CPFs people are mostly only involved in policing oversight on a part-
time basis. The experience thus far indicates that the type of inputs which they are able to
make tend to have serious limitations. Particularly when engaging with an organisation of
the size and complexity of the SAPS, civilians are in general largely out of their depth. In

17
The ICD receives most cases of deaths by direct reports from the police who are required to notify them,
rather than as ‘complaints’.
18
Faull (2007: 12-13) provides statistics indicating that between 1997/98 and 2005/06 corruption related
complaints fluctuated between roughly 1% and 5% of complaints received by the ICD though he notes
some of the difficulties in analyzing the categories of complaints provided by the ICD in relation to
whether they pertain to corruption or not.

14
relation to corruption these difficulties are accentuated by the tendency on the part of the
SAPS to downplay the problem.

The difficulties which oversight bodies have had in South African may have been
accentuated by confusion about the policing role. In South Africa academic and policy
communities are strongly influenced by new trends in thinking from elsewhere. During
the 1990s South Africa became ‘saturated’ with international (Western) public
administration and criminological and policing discourse. Concepts of ‘community
policing’, ‘crime prevention’, or ‘problem solving’ were introduced in environment
where there was a weak concept of police and of basic police organisational practise.
More broadly there may also have been an absence of attention to the basics of
bureaucratic practise while this was already weak in many of the component
organisations which became the SAPS. Within the SAPS, more elaborate ideas about
developing more sophisticated policing techniques have also tended to take the place of a
concern with basic organisational issues such as those concerning systems of
management and supervision. Any orientation towards engaging with fundamental issues,
such as developing a police service which conducts itself in terms of standards of
integrity, has been displaced by a myriad other concerns

In South Africa the Minister is the kingpin of the policy making architecture as s/he is
authorised by the Constitution to determine national policing policy ‘taking into account
the policing needs and priorities of the provinces as determined by the provincial
executives’ (Constitution, Section 206(1)). The Minister has a small staff in the Ministry
but is also supposed to be supported by a National Secretariat for Safety and Security.
The Secretariat was established in the mid-1990s under a ‘Secretary of Safety and
Security’ with a personnel complement which incorporated some fairly skilled
researchers and analysts (though inexperienced in the policing field). However there was
an ongoing contest of authority between the Secretary and National Commissioner. In
1999 the government ‘resolved this’ by downgrading (virtually neutralising) the
Secretariat and appointing a senior and highly trusted member of the ANC, Jackie Selebi,
as National Commissioner of the SAPS.

In effect the downgrading of the Secretariat left the Minister unsupported in terms of any
policy making role. Considering the size and complexity of the SAPS as an organisation
and its national structure it seems reasonable to say that the Minister would need to have
the backing of a highly competent policy making agency if the Minister is going make a
meaningful contribution to policy. In addition to weaknesses in support it has often
seemed that there is little investment at the ministerial level in engaging with questions of
policing policy.

The MECs and provincial secretariat have an oversight function but are not supposed to
be able to shape policy other than through the National Minister. In terms of the
architecture of policy making in SA, if the Minister fails to perform the policy role, the
provinces are also potentially neutralised (though they may make use more ‘informally’
of their authority potentially feeding into misuses of the police). More recently some
provincial governments have sought to remedy this by independently developing policing

15
policies,19 a course of action which has been forced on them by the absence of
engagement with policing policy at the national level.

The absence of a firm response to corruption also probably reflects a more generalised
reluctance by the South African state to recognize corruption as a problem. In the words
of one commentator, ‘The strong legislative and regulatory framework that has been
created to contain corruption and to promote high standards of professional ethics is
undermined not by a lack of skill or capabilities but by a willful disregard for its
objectives and sustaining values’ (Butler, 2008) This may partly reflect the resistance of
corrupt elements within the state but also reflects the racialised nature of politics in South
Africa. Thus a concern with corruption is often perceived as motivated by racist
stereotype about African governments or a concern to undermine the credibility of the
institutions of the South African government by labeling them as corrupt. Prevailing
political arrangement which facilitate corruption (see Sole, 2005) also feed into a political
climate which is hostile to recognizing corruption as a priority problem, except as in the
case of the appointment of the Jali Commission of Inquiry into prisons in 2001 into
corruption in prisons, where those involved are politically marginal.

The politics of race, as well as the fact that members of the ruling party have themselves
been implicated in corruption has also fed into the attacks on investigative units
themselves. In the case of the ACU for instance a ‘lack of transformation’ was seen as
one of the reasons for the unit being closed down. In the case of the Scorpions, the fact
that several members of government and the ruling party had been implicated in
corruption, and subjected to investigation by the Scorpions, contributed to the animosity
against them.

Conclusion

Police corruption is in itself generally a form of crime.20 Where police are involved in
robberies and thefts this is also not only police corruption but also a direct part of the
overall problem constituted by these crime types. In so far as there is a severe problem of
police corruption the police may therefore be seen as contributing to the problem of crime
in South Africa.

The soliciting of ‘cold drink’ or other gifts by police when they are approached for
service is one way in which police corruption imposes a burden on people, and especially
the poor. But the more general effects of police corruption are to directly undermine the
effectiveness and credibility of the justice system, thereby aggravating the problem of
crime. It therefore contributes to limiting the potential for greater more law abiding
behaviour based on greater respect for the law, as well as feeding into the vulnerability of
people to crime, something which disproportionately impacts on poor people who cannot

19
See for instance the Gauteng safety strategy referred to in footnote 14.
20
Some practises which might be regarded as corrupt, such as types of favouritism, would not qualify as
crimes (see Syed and Bruce, 2008b:4)

16
afford the additional assistance, which is provided to those who can afford them, by
private security companies and a range of security measures.

Overall several problems have mitigated against meaningful responses to corruption from
within the SAPS. First, the fact that corruption is poorly understood, combined with the
orientation to downplay the extent of the problem, continually undermines the potential
for the nature of the problem to be properly recognised. Dysfunctional, retrogressive and
crudely implemented policy measures have thus far contributing to weakening the
response to corruption. The destruction of the ACU has been a prelude to a long period of
relative inaction on corruption from the SAPS. An effective though imperfect
investigative system has now been replaced with an ambitious but nevertheless far from
perfect document which is not necessarily aligned with the capacities of the SAPS. What
this will lead to can only be a matter of speculation at this point.

Problems of understanding are therefore linked with difficulties within the SAPS as an
organisation in developing policy interventions which are both clearly framed and
aligned with organisational capabilities and realities. But the need is not just for strong
policies but for a leadership which has the commitment and ability to make policies work
within the organisation. The main contribution of Commissioner Selebi for instance in
relation to the issue of police corruption has been to contribute to or motivate for the
closing of units charged with investigating the police. There thus appears to be a
difficulty in finding leaders who have the capacity and insight to engage with problems
such as that of police corruption, and to mobilise organisations to address them. These
problems are symptomatic of broader problems with the policing system suggesting a
need to strengthen mechanism for policy development, and the quality of leadership in
this field

By contrast with the SAPS the contribution of oversight bodies, with one or two
exceptions, has been a generalised neglect and ignorance on the issue of police
corruption. Though on paper South Africa therefore has a sophisticated oversight
architecture, in practise it is affected by the same problems of understanding, of policy
and of leadership, as impact on the police. If these problems to be addressed it will be
necessary at least for the political obstacles, which motivate against recognising and
addressing corruption, to be overcome.

17
References

General – includes press opinion and editorial pieces

Bruce, D (2006). “Staggering under the burden: ICD policies on the receipt of complaints
and on investigations and their negative impact on the ICD, on public confidence, and on
police discipline”. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
Online at <http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papbru10.htm>.

Bruce, D., Newham, G. and Masuku, T. (2007). In service of the people’s democracy –
an assessment of the South African Police Service. Centre for the Study of Violence and
Reconciliation in association with the Open Society Foundation for South Africa.
http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papsaps.htm

Burton, P., Du Plessis, A., Leggett, T., Louw, A., Mistry, D. and Van Vuuren, H. (2004).
“National victims of crime survey: South Africa 2003”. ISS Monograph 101. Pretoria:
Institute for Security Studies.

Butler, A (2008) Talk of state’s’lack of capacity’ ignores very capable cheats. Business
Day, 12 May.

Cawthra, G. (1993). Policing South Africa. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Faull, A (2007) corruption and the South African Police Service. A review and its
implications. ISS paper 150. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Faull, A (2008) Bringing them into line – managing corruption in SAPS and metro police
departments. In Crime Quarterly, 23:21-37. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
http://www.issafrica.org/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_link
s/CQ23FAULL.PDF?link_id=3&slink_id=5899&link_type=12&slink_type=
13&tmpl_id=3

Fick, N. (2006). “Enforcing fear: Police abuse of sex workers when making arrests”. In
Crime Quarterly, 16:27-33. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link_id=3&slink_id=3545&link_type
=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3

Grobler, E (2005) A criminological examination of police criminality. Doctoral thesis

submitted to the University of South Africa. http://etd.unisa.ac.za/ETD-
db/theses/available/etd-02272007-
140801/unrestricted/dissertation.pdf

Irish-Qhobosheane, J. (2007). Gentlemen or Villains, Thugs or Heroes? The social

economy of organised crime in South Africa. Johannesburg: South African Institute of
International Affairs.

18
Klockars C.B., Ivkovich, S.K., Harver W., and Haberfeld M.R. (2000). The Measurement
of Police Integrity. National Institute of Justice Research Brief. May 2000. Office of
Justice Programs. U.S. Department of Justice: Washington D.C.

Louw, A (2008) Results of the 2007 victim survey. Presentation at the seminar on the
Findings of the Third National Victims of Crime Survey, Tshwane (Pretoria). Institute for
Security Studies, 8 May 2008

Newham, G (2003) Towards an anti-corruption strategy for the SAPS in Johannesburg’.

Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/policing/towardsanticorruption.pdf

Newham, G and Maroga, M (2004) Good management practices for promoting police
integrity. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/policing/goodmanagement.pdf

Ngobeni, J (2008) Police on the media. Sowetan, 30 April.

Rademeyer, J (2008) Wolwe in skaaps klere. Beeld, 9 May.

Sanders, and Young, R (2000) Criminal Justice (2nd Ed). London: Butterworths

Sole, S (2005) The state of corruption and accountability . In Daniel, J, Southall, R, and
Lutchman, J (eds.) State of the Nation: South Africa 2004-2005. Pretori:Human Sciences
Research Council.
http://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/product.php?productid=2042&freedownload=1
Syed, T. & Bruce, D. (1998a). Police Corruption: Towards a Working Definition. In
African Security Review, Vol. 7, No. 1.
http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/7No1/SayedBruce.html
Syed, T. & Bruce, D. (1998b).Inside and outside the boundaries of police corruption. In
African Security Review, Vol. 7, No. 2.
http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/7No1/SayedBruce.html

Official reports and policy statements

Cachalia, F (2007) Address by MEC Firoz Cachalia on the occasion of the tabling of the
Gauteng Department of Community Safety’s Budget Vote 10 2007/2008.

Khampepe Commission of Inquiry into the Mandate and Location of the Directorate of
Special Operations (“The DSO”). Final Report. February 2006.

Policy Advisory Council (2007?) Report - for the period November 2006 to October
2007. http://www.mg.co.za/ContentImages/338519/SAPSreport.pdf

19
South African Police Service (2008?) Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan

Statistics South Africa (2007) Stats in brief. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.

Press reports (in chronological order)

Star, 29 September 2004. Crooked cops caught on film. (Ndivhuwo Khangale and
Caiphus Kgosana).

Independent on Saturday, 9 July 2005. Durban cops extort ‘drunken’ drivers. (Zukile
Majova).

Independent on Saturday, 23 July 2005. Cops vow to root out ‘rotten apples’. (Zukile
Majova).

Sowetan, 22 September 2005. Six cops held in corruption raid.

Saturday Star, 8 April 2006. Justice for murdered supercop? (Michael Schmidt)

Star, 24 May 2006a. ‘Two truckers bribe cops’. (Lee Rondganger and Anna Louw).

Star, 24 May 2006b. Young prostitutes and their clients forced to pay police bribes.
(Karyn Maughan).

Mail & Guardian, 26 May 2006. “Selebi’s shady Kebble links”.

Cape Argus, 4 September 2006. “Sting lands top cop in court for second time” (Norman
Joseph). Online at <www.iol.co.za>.

Daily News, 20 September 2006. “Cops to be probed for allegedly robbing a man”.
Online at <www.iol.co.za>.

Mail & Guardian, 29 September 2006. “The Palto file” and “Inquest focus on ‘Selebi’s
special group’”.

Sowetan, 12 October 2006. Cop linked to robbery.

Sunday Times, 5 November 2006. “Selebi and the cop mafia”.

Business Day, 7 November 2006. “O’Sullivan admits role in Selebi papers”.

Star, 8 November 2006. “Selebi cleared after Scotland Yard roped in”. Online at
<www.iol.co.za>.

Mail & Guardian, 10 November 2006. “Inside the Selebi dossier”.

Sunday Times, 12 November 2006. “Selebi named in explosive diary”.

20
Sowetan, 17 November 2006. “The great murder mystery”.

Mail & Guardian, 24 November 2006. “Here’s evidence, Minister”; “Case study one:
‘Undercover’ contraband”; and “Case study two: Fake cops”.

Mail & Guardian Online, 1 December 2006. “‘I told Selebi about Agliotti’” and
“Selebi’s Sandton shopping sprees”. At: <www.mg.co.za>.

Mail & Guardian, 8 December 2006. “Brett Kebble: the net widens”.

Sowetan, 14 May 2007. Cops for heists – police mixed up with criminals in robberies.
(Riot Hlatshwayo).

Mail & Guardian, 26 October 2007. ‘How Selebi shielded Agliotti’.

Sunday Times, 13 January 2008. How the big pals did little favours for each other.
(Jessica Bezuidenhout).

Business Day, 22 January 2008. Policemen with taxis ‘must be investigated’.

(Sibongakonke Shoba)

The Star, 30 January 2008. Inside the Selebi case – part one: The main players.

Sunday Independent, 3 February 2008. “Court makes exception for smiling Selebi.
(Jeremy Gordin).

Sunday Times, 24 February 2008. Police shortage given as reason for keeping on crooked
cops. (Subshni Naidoo and Suthentira Govender).

Sowetan, 17 March 2008. Cop’s graft case drags on. (Russel Morena)

Sowetan, 17 April 2008. 13 ‘corrupt’ cops not yet out of the woods. (Riot Hlatshwayo).

Independent Online, 16 April 2008. Charges against reservist dropped.

http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=15&art_id=nw20080416181055250C
372441

Independent Online, 17 April 2008. Wimpy breakfast for ‘corrupt’ cop.

http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=3045&art_id=nw2008041716060099
7C26681 (Accessed 7 May 2008).

Sowetan, 22 April 2008. Cops in court over ATM blast.

Mail & Guardian, 2 May 2008. Shocking state of the SAPS (Adriaan Basson)

21