llij LIB:RARY .

:Mandatory Revim .
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DOCWl!lent W: I\ . -·
II

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

' . DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
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INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2015-075, document no. 1
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: January 30, 2017
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THE PRESIDENT'S
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DAILY BRIEF
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5 MARCH 1965
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DAILY BRIEF
5 MARCH 1965
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1. North Vietnam A French foreign office official

says that the North Vietnamese in Paris
have told the·French that negotiations
on.South Vietnam .are not a matter for
consideration at this time. The North
Vietnamese reportedly said that previ­
ously Hanoi was r.eady ·to consider nego­
tiations, but "US actions" had changed
the situation. The French official
added that there have been no contacts
with the Chinese Communists since·Couve
de Murvil.le' s Washington visit, but
that the French ambassador in Peiping
is scheduled to see Foreign.Minister
Chen Yi soon.
There have been no significant··: ·
new propaganda or official statements
from Peiping or ·Moscow. .
No new. movements by the AN-12
transports in Irkutsk have been reported,
although it is possible that most or all
of them have returned to the western
USSR undetected. Their failure to move
past Irkutsk could reflect some Soviet
policy indecision following the most re­
cent US - South Vietnamese air strikes
on North Vietnam. It is unlikely that
they could have moved out of the USSR
without notice.

2. Indonesia Djakarta's military reinforcements

in Sumatra--insurance ·ag.ai.nst a. possible
British retaliation for Inqonesian mili­
tary actions against Malaysia--are increas­
ing, One brigade is now deploying near
Medan in the north, and another will be­
gin reaching central Sumatra next week.
Reinforcements eventually will total
7-8,000 men. (See map.)
In response to Indonesian Commu­
nist demands, Sukarno has also ordered
the army commander in Sumatra to arm
workers and peasants. This could be a
dangerous·step toward allowing the Com­ !_'
•)
munists to develop a paramilitary capa­
bility.

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3. USSR Soviet naval activity in the west­

ern Pacific is returning to normal.
Three conventional submarines and a sub­
tender which had been operating in the
Philippine Sea are now approaching home
port. A guided-missile destroyer which
was operating south of Japan with two
other subs is also nearing home. The
latter two submarines will probably
terminate their operations soon.

I 5oxi, E.0.13526

4. South Vietnam There has been no new hard informa­

t ion on the,....s.YlllJ::llL.J:U:..~C~o~u!ll/......:rr~e:ru;o~r~t~sL..!n~oLt~e~d~
yesterday,
I 50Xl, E.0.13526
e security situation continues
to deteriorate in some of the northern
provinces. In Quang Nam and Quang Tin,
US civilian personnel cannot move out­
side the provincial capitals.

I 50Xl, E.0.13526 I
Govern­
men au orities in Kontum fear the Com­
munists may be planning to attack Kontum
town within the next two months. The
government has contingency plans for
complete withdrawal from Kontum to Binh
Dinh Province, which is also under
heavy Viet Cong pressure. (See map.)

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5. Bolivia The Barrientos government appears
to be heading for seriou.s trouble but
the situation is far from clear.

I 50Xl, E.0.13526

The government is aware of this,

but has other problems to cope with,
including the deterioratj,ng economy ·and
union plans for strikes.
The armed forces hold the key to
stability, but their unity and loyalties
are uncertain. Both Barrientos and
Ovando have strong military support.

6. U::lSR Additional single silo ICBM launch-.

ers .have been detected in satellite phe>­
tography, including eight believed to
have been under construction since last
summer at one plder,established ICBM
launch complex. The count is now 106,
and new photos now under study will
probably reveal more. While the diffi.,­
culty in even detecting these dispersed
installations has hindered our assess­
ment of this new ICBM deployment pro­
gram, its outlines are becoming clearer.
A discussion is at Annex.

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E.0.13526

46712 1-65
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ANNEX

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Soviet ICBM Deployment
:·.'.

The Brief for 29 January reported 90 single

silos started since early 1964 in ten complexes-­
seven consisting.wholly of single silos and three
collocated with older operational SS-7 launch.com­
plexes, Since then, 16' additional silos have been
detected, including 8 found at the established SS-7
launch complex at.Perm. (See map.)
. .
The single silos fall into two deployment pa:t-·
terns and are clearly intended for two new and dif­
ferent. missile systems.
The larger single silos, positioned in groups
of three, with two or three groups to a complex, are
probably intended for the .new SS-9 ICBM. Ji'l i gbt
testing of this missile, ·which can carry· a I.._
_ _ _ ____,
warhead, started in December 1963 and could be near­
ing the end of the developmental.stage.
some of these larger silos could be
ma e opera. ional this summer if flight testing is
completed in the :next few months,
We are less certain about Soviet intentions
for the smaller single silos, which are deployed in
groups of ten. They may be intended for the even
newer SS-10 ICBM. Flight tests of this missile,
whose capabilities we have not yet·been.able fully
to assess, began in April of 1964. However, no
firings have been detected since last October, and
the SS-10 probably would not be ready for deploy­
ment until late 1965 at the earliest.
On the other hanq,the smaller silos could be
meant for·some new as yet untested small missile,
possibly with solid fuel. There are signs at the
Tyuratam launch test site that at least one more
new ICBM .system is under.·.development and is about
to be flight tested,
The Soviet inventory of operational ICBM
launchers now stands at 224, in the older complexes.
We are now examining intensively our esti~
mates of .future· Soviet strategic striking power
to.determine how greatly the single silo deployment
program will 1ncrease it.

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