Harbans Mukhia

According to Harbans Mukhia, the primary problem with the Indian feudalism debate is the fact that
previous historiography borrows too heavily on the concept of European feudalism. The connection made
by Sharma over the matter of feudalism and trade-urbanisation are a matter of great dispute between
historians since the days of Henri Pirenne, however, recent history has shown the two concepts to be
incompatible. However, D. C. Sircar and B. D. Chattopadhyay have effectively been able to question this
characterisation.
There have been significant differences between the idea of feudalism in India and Europe which have
been overlooked by Sharma. For one, European Feudalism came into being “as a result of a crisis of the
production relations on slavery on the one hand and changes resulting from the growing stratification
among the German tribes.”33 Thus European F began at the base of society while granting land rights to
an individual by the state first resulted in feudalism.
Second off, it’s the concept of peasant dependence. Sharma and Yadav believe that at this time there was
increasing exploitation of the peasantry. However, Mukhia argues that the nature of forced labour in India
is different from the European example because it is “rarely used for purposes of production.” To Mukhia
thus, forced labour in India remained “an incidental manifestation of the ruling class’ political and
administrative 34 power rather than a part of the process.” To prove this point Mukhia cites two reasons.
First off, India had high soil fertility unlike Europe and secondly, India has always been characterised by
a free peasantry. India has always had a high fertility of soil, though there have been regional variations
of the same. The cultivation of two or more crops is suggested in the Amarakosa and other post-Vedic
texts. There is negligible evidence of the system of fallow, amd as William Tennant puts it, “the Indian
allows it (his field) a lea, but never a fallow.”35 On top of this, the system of manuring was also prevalent
in India. Sheep, goat droppings, cow dung, green manure was meant for the treatment of seeds and better
germination.
There was also a technological progression at this time in India and the implements used were not
outdated. The plough, which was first uncovered at Kalibangan and later the Vedic age varied regionally,
yet had a significant impact on agriculture. The sickle and the sieve mentioned in Vedic literature and the
spade in the Ramanyana, and hoe, harrow, mortar, pestle, along with the use of iron after 600 BC had
significantly improved Indian cultivation. Ploughing used to regularly take place along with weeding and
transplantation. Irrigation was also a significant technological advancement at this time- however, it was
the spread of the Persian Wheel from the Delhi Sultanate which significantly extended agriculture,
especially in Panjab.
Mukhia argues that the subsistence level of the Indian peasant was very low. The size of landholdings
was smaller in India primarily to avoid the wastage of land which had occurred
Coming to revenue, the Arthashastra recommends ploughing the land all through the year and fines could
be imposed if this was violated. One could only sell or mortgage his brahmadeya only to tax-payers. This
means that even during earlier times, the peasants ownership of land was recognised, which was further
upheld by the Aurangzeb’s firman to Muhammad Hashim. Mukhia speaks of a developed labour, hired
through the market, and this would have been primarily economic than legal. There would have to be
some uniform restrictions to disallow them from making them tied to their land. Thus, the peasant was not
a bourgeois proprietary, but he did have control over his labour.
Free peasant production was consolidated in post-Maurya times, where sudras were transformed into
peasants. Land was getting reclaimed also, acc to Mukhia because of the noria and the Persian wheel.
There are countless sources talking of high revenue demands and Mukhia cites Yadava and Sircar who
say that “formidable rates of taxes” left the peasants unable to meet their basic subsistence. Thus, there
seems to have existed a kind of equilibrium which facilitated that state’s appropriation of peasant surplus.
The conflicts that characterised pre-British India, thus were primarily conflicts related to the distribution
and redistribution of surplus. Mukhia ends his argument resonating Irfan Habib who is sceptical of the
idea of feudalism and suggests that the phrase “Indian medieval economy” replaces it. in Europe. Hence,
far less labour was required in India, and therefore there was also less demand for the same. Thus,
Mukhia argues that there was an absence of serfdom in India, and even if it did arise, it did so rarely, and
for short periods of time. Thus, in Mukhia’s understanding, a serf is called so because of the legal
restrictions of alienation of his land and mobility and his subject to forced labour.

Thus, the idea of Indian feudalism differed greatly among scholars, who are still sceptical of each other’s
ideas. The primary fact of the matter is that, however, Sharma’s idea of Indian feudalism, though severely
critiqued was a novel concept in Indian historiography, for it was a break from the idea of Oriental
Despotism, and his idea of a feudal state inspired a generation of scholars to research and delve into this
part of history which was considered bleak by the Oriental scholars.

B. D. Chattopadhaya
B. D. Chattopadhyaya (BDC henceforth) argues that there are primarily two strands in the current
understanding of the Indian state in early medieval times- one is the characterised traditional or the
Oriental Despotic state, while the other is the feudal state. In the traditional view of the state, “the king in
all the monarchical states is the source of absolute power and wields control through bureaucracy: there is
thus nothing much to distinguish him from the absolute despot despite his benevolent disposition and yet,
the malaise of polity is generated by feudal tendencies.”24 Primarily what BDC is saying is that though
the views on the mechanical do not change, the majority of works on early medieval political history and
institutions contain generalisations which are mutually contradictory. There is much concern on the
matter of the Indian polity, its structure and reasons for its failure. Earlier historiography like that of B. P.
Mazumdar uses words like ‘constituent state’ and ‘unitary empire’ to describe a “federal-feudal empire”
of early India which has led to continuous instability since ancient times. This becomes problematic
according to Chattopadhyay who believes that early historians depended too much on texts of ancient
Indian political thinkers.
The second manner in which the state is viewed and will take up a substantial part of our discussion is the
feudal polity and it’s important to assess the relation between feudal and polity. Feudalism BDC says has
been primarily used as a political plane and a synonym for “political fragmentation” and the term has
been used to describe any empire which does not suit the idea of a consolidated unitary empire. The
problem with this is the application of the feudal idea on every situation and the gap existing between the
society and polity. Thus, BDC aims to break away from the historiographical equation: “feudal
polity=political fragmentation=dismemberment of a centralised state”25 The explanation of the feudal
polity thus, does not get properly explained simply by the total political configuration of what is called
feudal formation. What one needs to take into consideration is the political geography of the subcontinent.
After the decline of the metropolitan Mauryan state, there was not a trend of decentralisation, but a “fresh
spurt in the emergence of local states in pre-state polity- a phenomenon certainly not to be confused with
the process of decentralisation of a centralised administration.”26 However, all of Sharma’s points cannot
be put off the table either- like the presence of the contractual element in the land grants or how the
system of assignments brought a change in agrarian relations. But, the samanta system which is supposed
to be the hallmark of Indian feudalism evolved after the genesis of the feudal polity, and hence cannot
provide a complete explanation of the process. Also, Sharma was unable to answer the question as to why
exactly the feudal polity was incepted. Why would the state allow its power to be withered away? By
giving away land grants, that too so many in number, Sharma’s argument does not explain the
“liquidation of its own power”.
One reason for the evolution of the political process is the constant validation of power in an established
state society and also in a community passing from a pre-state to a state-society. This is primarily the
separation of the temporal and sacred domain. The priestly validation of temporal power continued
beyond the period of ‘Hindu’ dynasties, the brahamanas continued to prepare the prasastis for the Sultan
and Sanskritise his title to Suratana. Temporal power was needed to guarantee protection of the social
order. Danda or force which was both secular and non-secular was intended to guard the domains of
social order. Chattopadhyay points out that though the ideal social order was defined, the idea of dharma,
which was the root of this maintenance varied in regions, guilds and social groups. However, with the
coming of a state society and the territorial spread of brahamanas and institutions, this dharma got a
“uniform norm” and it became in a certain sense, “transcendental”. Bhakti, which signified the
crystallisation of the Puranic, used the Dharmasastras as an “instrument of integration”27 If there was a
conflict between the Dharmasastras and local norms, local cults and sacred centres were brought within
the expansive Puranic fold through the process of identification. In the Bhakti fold, the temple grew to be
the major institutional melting-pot, while the temple being a symbol in material space could provide a
link to the king who is seeking to be legitimised through the identification power it has (as in the among
the Pallavas and Colas), and by surrendering the temporal power to the divinity, which raises the status of
the central cult and its agent, that is the king.
“The process of legitimisation thus cannot be viewed simply in terms of a newly emerged local polity
seeking validation through linkage with a respectable Ksatriya ancestry (like the Rajputs) or by
underlying the local roots (like in Orissa); the constant validation of temporal authority really related to
this complex of ideological apparatus through which temporal power was reaching out to its temporal
domain.”28 Thus, the shelling out of brahmadeyas and devadanas were not an administrative but a socio-
religious necessity for the temporal power. This relationship between the temporal and the sacred changes
and thus the regional perceptions become significant.
The temporal domain thus is also concerned with the territorial limitation. Kingdoms cannot be
determined in concrete territorial terms, since the state is not a static unit a dynamic one. Thus, this, BDC
argues is typified in the mandala system, where it is the core areas where the true Cakravarti status of the
king can truly be exercised.
Coming to political processes, BDC says that the political could only be studied in parallels to the
economic and special and religious processes. According to Sharma, the “essence of the economic
process lay in the horizontal spread of the rural agrarian settlements”29 and this was primarily based on
the varna division and this process allowed them to retain their original character, which was now defined
by the structure adopted by the state. This mechanism of integration was given cult status and assumed a
“supra-local significance.” Thus, the political process would be affected in three ways- the presence of
established norms and nuclei of the state society, the horizontal spread of state society, i.e., change from a
pre-state to a state structure and lastly, the integration of local cults to these structures. The process is a
range of interaction, and is hence, valid. BDC brings to notice how in the post-Gupta polity, the state
actually progressed to the peripheral areas after covering all the nuclear regions, the mythical genealogies
had become a pan-state phenomenon and there was a shift from yajna to vamsa, by aligning with local
roots or mythical heroic lineages. Thus, this shows the proliferation of actual ruling class in the domains
of political power. Territorial limitations are further illustrated by how say the Kalacuris originating in
western Deccan had established several nuclei of power in Tripuri and Ratnapur and even north-eastern
India where it’s segment came to be known as Sarayapura.
Thus, to analyse the political processes of this period, it becomes imperative to understand the formation
of ruling lineages. The agrarian and state interest developed simultaneously and in terms of each other.
Polities were “interactive and interlocking” and this also led to formation of power relationships wherein
lineage took a backseat. Also, administrative units merged in these state societies by integrating pre-
existing lineage areas, however, this cannot be applied to ever context, like Bengal does not have details
of lineage geography. Formation of ruling lineages can also form a breeding ground for social mobility,
and through processes likes Ksatriyaization any lineage or segment could come tgoethr to become a
ruling elite, like the Hoysala state or the Rajputs.
Terms: The primary debate of Indian feudalism according to BDC is the characterisation of the
substratum components in which historians differ in their characterisation. The area where a polity
emerges is called the ‘nuclear’ region which can provide a resource base and is easy to integrate. The
Ganges basin or the Kaveri basin are such examples. There are two facets to nuclear regions- first,
resource base is not the sole criteria. It is also dependent on the historical-chronological significance
attached to the place, like how Warangal was the base for the nuclear Krishna-Godavari doab in the
Kakatiya state. Secondly, it is not necessary for the inception of the state to begin from the nuclear areas-
often military mobilisation can also lead to a formation of a nuclear region, like how Kanauj became
important once the Pratiharas moved there. Thus, this disparity leads to the formation of ‘feudal
tendencies’, and thus the study of early medieval india should focus on the dispersed foci of power within
structures.
Segmentary state: The debate with regard to parcellized sovereignty goes deeper and it thus becomes
important to discuss the Segmentary state. There is limited territorial sovereignty which weakens when
one moves to the periphery, and “often shades into ritual hegemony”. The existence of the centralised
core and quasi-autonomous foci of administration, the pyramidal repetition of the administrative structure
and functions in the peripheral foci, the absence of absolute monopoly of legitimisation force at the centre
and shifting allegiances of the periphery system.30 However, there are two facets overlooked in this- the
stability in the political stricture and the resource mobilisation which is actually provided by the state and
part of integrative forces. The core’s definition needs to be seen as more functional and the idea of the
state needs to move beyond the ‘politics of plunder.’
Thus, there needs to be an understanding of the different foci of power not just in south india but
spanning across all political structures. The ‘diffused foci of quasi-autonomous power’ or the samanta
system is a broad-spectrum category which is a designation used in this period. They developed over time
and there was a political order among them which was not bureaucratic and the bureaucracy, rajapurusas
had a limited part to play. The samanta thus refers to a landed aristocrat of the period who could give
military assistance and hold land.
The samantas led to the integration of the political structure rather than the popular idea od
decentralisation. The political need of this integration from the Gupta period lay in the interrelatedness of
polities caused by what I have called the horizontal spread of the state society and represented
geographically by the lineages at their varied local bases.31 Political relations were regularly expressed as
those between the overlord and his feudatories suggests that the dominant mode of in the formation of the
structure was by encapsulation of the existing bases of power, the spearhead in the structure being the
overlord. The expansion of the lineage was through thus, pooling of military resources and support of
other lineages, besides a circulation of redistribution of resources which are part of an integrative polity.
Ranking also attains a significance at this point wherein there was a correlation between the services
meted and the samanta system. The status of members within individual ruling lineages came to be
expressed in terms of rank and this extended to non-ruling groups as well. Rank implies different access
to the centre. There is a relative positioning of ranks in the Aparajitaporccha built around the Chakravarti
model, like the dandanayaks, mandalesas, mandalikas, mahasamantas, samantas, laghusamantas
causarikas, etc. Rank was also changed with political hold and from generation to generation. There was a
potential for tension between rank holders and the overlord, and this had the potential of creating crisis
and thus, new foci of power. Crisis was thus built into the proves of the formation of the new structures,
but this hypothesis needs research and substantiation according to Chattopadhyaya.
Hermann Kulke
The integrating role of land grants is underlined by Hermann Kulke, particularly with regard to Kalinga,
at social, religious, and ideological levels. In the land grants rulers appear as deputies of divinities. The
land receiving brahamanas were loyal and inculcated loyalty in others. But Kulke also stresses the
‘samantisation’ of the medieval realm and the consequent erosion of the power of its ruler and the ritual
royalisation of local deities32.
Kulke states that the common issue is the emphasis on changes in the political structure though none of
them follow a clear evolutionary paradigm. Historians perceive political changes through centralization
and integration. These changes tended to be restrictive to certain periods and regions and regularly
relapse. Normally they did not fall back into status quo ante. Thus, a certain degree of structural change
survived these dynastic changes.
These changes affected the structure of pre-modern state in two ways. First, the nuclear area came under
bureaucratized direct control political control of central dynasty. Second, politically controlled nuclear
area expanded through a double process of attraction and socio-economic and political integration into its
hinterland, creating an ‘extended core region’ as considerably larger ‘state territory’ than the original
dynastic nuclear region had been.
Kulke mentions a continuous process of integrative state formation which had its origin in the
development of local centres of power. As in the earlier stages, the development to the imperial level was
also characterized by a strong continuity of structural traits. Among these were, a considerable extension
of the directly controlled area by the union of two or several nuclear areas to a new ‘core region’; shifting
of the capital to the centre of the core region; expansion of central administration within this core region;
systematic enlargement of an apparatus of legitimation directed towards the imperial centre; and
increasing integration of the whole system.
A decisive new characteristic was the extension of the directly controlled area far beyond the natural
frontiers of the original nuclear areas of the early kingdoms. Also, there was the unification of at least two
nuclear areas either by overthrow by a tributary prince or a neighbouring king. Important means of
integration were further agrarian expansion, inclusion into trans-local trade networks and the spread of the
state society of the dynastic core region.
The shifting of the capitals after expansion of the state aimed not only at the acquisition of a
geometrically exact central location but was also accompanied by the successive development of the state.
There was mutual dependency linking the centre and the enlarged core area. Thus, the power potential of
the inner circle also increased. Therefore, the structural history of the imperial kingdom was as much the
expression of the continuance of local power groupings as of a stage by stage extension of the organs of
central power.
Hence, we can conclude by saying that the mere study of land grants as given by R.S. Sharma is not
enough to explain the dynamic processes of the early medieval period in India. A broader and more
flexible approach needs to be applied to fully understand these changes. The study of regional and
chronological variations needs to be intensified. As B.D. Chattopadhyay and Hermann Kulke have
shown, the process of state formation in early medieval India is continuous and receptive, and not
fragmentary.