2023

REMEDIAL LAW
PRINCIPLES &
JURISPRUDENCE
MA. SOLEDAD DERIQUITO-MAWIS
Dean
Lyceum of the Philippines University
College of Law
Mawis Law Office
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 EXPEDITED RULES OF PROCEDURE:
SUMMARY PROCEDURE
(a) Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases,
regardless of the amount of damages or
unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where
attorney’s fees are awarded, the same shall not
exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱100,000.00).
(b) All civil actions, except probate
proceedings, admiralty and maritime actions,
and small claims cases falling under Rule IV
hereof, where the total amount of the plaintiff’s
claim does not exceed Two Million Pesos
(₱2,000,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs.
(c) Complaints for damages where the claim does not
exceed Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00), exclusive of
interest and costs.
(d) Cases for enforcement of barangay amicable settlement
agreements and arbitration awards where the money claim
exceeds One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00), provided that
no execution has been enforced by the barangay within six
(6) months from the date of the settlement or date of receipt
of the award or from the date the obligation stipulated or
adjudged in the arbitration award becomes due and
demandable, pursuant to Section 417, Chapter VII of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code of 1991.
(e) Cases solely for the revival of judgment of any
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
pursuant to Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

(f) The civil aspect of a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.

22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), if no criminal action has
been instituted therefor. Should a criminal action be later
instituted for the same violation, the civil aspect shall be
consolidated with the criminal action and shall be tried and
decided jointly under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
All other cases not included herein shall be governed by the
regular rules of procedure.
 Small Claims
Small Claims Cases, as defined hereunder, where the claim
does not exceed One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00),
exclusive of interest and costs.
A “small claim” is an action that is purely civil in nature
where the claim or relief raised by the plaintiff is solely for
the payment or reimbursement of a sum of money. It
excludes actions seeking other claims or reliefs aside from
payment or reimbursement of a sum of money and those
coupled with provisional remedies.
The claim or demand may be:
(a) For money owed under any of the following:
1. Contract of Lease;
2. Contract of Loan and other credit
accommodations;
3. Contract of Services; or
4. Contract of Sale of personal property,
excluding the recovery of the personal property,
unless it is made the subject of a compromise
agreement between the parties.
(b) The enforcement of barangay amicable settlement
agreements and arbitration awards, where the money claim
does not exceed One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00),
provided that no execution has been enforced by the
barangay within six (6) months from the date of the
settlement or date of receipt of the award or from the date
the obligation stipulated or adjudged in the arbitration
award becomes due and demandable, pursuant to Section
417, Chapter VII of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as The Local Government Code of 1991.
 GENERAL COMMON PROVISIONS

Sec. 2. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following pleadings,

motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in cases governed by these
Rules:
1. (a) In civil cases, a motion to dismiss the complaint or the statement
of claim, and in criminal cases, a motion to quash the complaint or
information, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter or failure to comply with the requirement of barangay
conciliation, pursuant to Chapter VII, Title I, Book III of Republic Act
No. 7160;
2. (b) Motion to hear and/or resolve affirmative defenses;
3. (c) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(d) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a
judgment on the merits, or for reopening of proceedings;
(e) Petition for relief from judgment;
(f) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other paper;
(g) Memoranda;
(h) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(i) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(j) Dilatory motions for postponement. Any motion for
postponement shall be presumed dilatory unless grounded on
acts of God, force majeure, or physical inability of a counsel
or witness to personally appear in court, as supported by the
requisite affidavit and medical proof;
(k) Rejoinder;
(l) Third-party complaints;
(m) Motion for and Complaint in Intervention;
(n) Motion to admit late judicial affidavit/s, position papers,
or other evidence, except on the ground of force majeure or
acts of God;
(o) Motion for judicial determination of probable cause in
criminal cases.
THE RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

 Sec. 3. Complaint. – The complaint shall state the following:

1. (a) The names of the affiants whose judicial affidavits will be presented
to prove the plaintiff’s claim. The judicial affidavits shall be attached to
the complaint and form an integral part thereof. Judicial affidavits not
attached to the complaint shall not be considered;
2. (b) The summary of the statements in the judicial affidavits;
3. (c) The documentary and other object evidence in support of the
allegations in the complaint; and
4. (d) Whether the plaintiff consents to service by electronic means or
facsimile and, if so, the plaintiff’s e-mail addresses or facsimile
numbers for such purpose
Sec. 6. Answer. – Within thirty (30) calendar days from
service of summons, the defendant shall file an answer to the
complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff.
The answer shall state the following:
(a) The names of the affiants whose judicial affidavits will be
presented to prove the defendant’s allegations. The judicial
affidavits shall be attached to the answer and form an integral
part thereof. Judicial affidavits not attached to the answer
shall not be considered;
(b) The summary of the statements in the judicial affidavits;
(c) The documentary and other object evidence in support of
the allegations in the answer; and
(d) Whether the defendant consents to service by
electronic means or facsimile and, if so, the defendant’s
e-mail addresses or facsimile numbers for such purpose.
Affirmative defenses not pleaded in the answer shall be
deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and
prescription.
Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted
in the answer shall be considered barred.
Sec. 7. Counterclaims within the coverage of this Rule. – If
at the time the action is commenced, the defendant
possesses a claim against the plaintiff that (a) is within the
coverage of this Rule, exclusive of interest and costs; (b)
arises out of the same transaction or event that is the subject
matter of the plaintiff’s claim; (c) does not require for its
adjudication the joinder of third parties; and (d) is not the
subject of another pending action, the claim shall be filed as
a counterclaim in the answer; otherwise, the defendant shall
be barred from suing on such counterclaim.
The defendant may also elect to file a counterclaim against
the plaintiff that does not arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence, provided that the amount and nature thereof are
within the coverage of this Rule and the prescribed docket
and other legal fees are paid.
Any amount pleaded in a counterclaim in
excess of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00),
excluding interests and costs, shall be deemed
waived.
Sec. 8. Reply. – All new matters alleged in the answer
shall be deemed controverted.
The plaintiff may file a reply to a counterclaim only
when an actionable document is attached
to the answer. The reply shall be filed within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the answer.
Sec. 9. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant
fail to answer the complaint within the period provided, the
court, on its own initiative, or upon manifestation by the
plaintiff that the period for filing an answer has already
lapsed, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments, limited
to what is prayed for therein.
The court may reduce the amount of damages and
attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable.
Sec. 12. Appearance at Preliminary Conference. – It shall be the
duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the Preliminary
Conference, Court-Annexed Mediation, and Judicial Dispute
Resolution, if the latter is ordered by the court. The non-appearance
of a party and/or counsel may be excused only for acts of God,
force majeure, or duly substantiated physical inability.
A representative may appear on behalf of a party, but must be fully
authorized through a Special Power of Attorney or a board
resolution, as the case may be, to: (1) enter into an amicable
settlement, (2) to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution,
and (3) to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and
documents. An authority which fails to include all these acts shall
be ineffective and the party represented shall be deemed absent.
The failure despite notice of the plaintiff and/or his or her
counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference shall be a
cause for the dismissal of the complaint. The defendant
who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled
to judgment on the counterclaim, in accordance with
Section 9 of this Rule. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant and/or his or her counsel fail to appear
at the Preliminary Conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled
to judgment in accordance with Section 9 of this Rule. This
Rule shall not apply, however, where one of two or more
defendants sued under a common cause of action and who
had pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the
Preliminary Conference.
Sec. 13. Preliminary Conference Order. – Immediately after
the preliminary conference and the issues having been joined,
the court shall issue a Preliminary Conference Order referring
the parties to the mandatory Court-Annexed Mediation, and
Judicial Dispute Resolution, which shall be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC or
the 2020 Guidelines for the Conduct of the Court-Annexed
Mediation (CAM) and Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) in
Civil Cases.
The court may, in the same Preliminary Conference Order,
declare the case submitted for judgment if, on the basis of
the pleadings and their attachments, as well as the
stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment
may be rendered without the need of submission of
position papers. In this event, the court shall render
judgment within thirty (30) calendar days from issuance of
the order. The court’s order shall not be the subject of a
motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus, but may be among the matters
raised on appeal after a judgment on the merits.
If the court, however, deems the submission of position
papers still necessary, it shall require the parties, in the
Preliminary Conference Order, to submit their respective
position papers within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such order. No other judicial affidavits or
evidence will be admitted even if filed with the position
papers.
C. APPEALS IN SUMMARY PROCEDURE
Section 1. Ordinary appeal. – Any judgment, final order, or
final resolution in a Summary Procedure case may be appealed
to the appropriate Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territory under Rule 40 for civil cases and Rule 122
for criminal cases, of the Rules of Court. The appeal shall be
taken by filing a notice of appeal, together with proof of
payment of the appeal fees, with the court that rendered the
judgment, order or resolution appealed from, within fifteen
(15) calendar days from receipt of the same.
Sec. 2. Remedy from judgment on appeal. – The judgment of
the Regional Trial Court on the appeal shall be final,
executory, and unappealable.
THE RULE ON SMALL CLAIMS

Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the

procedure in actions before the Metropolitan Trial
Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts in Cities
(MTCCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs)for
payment or reimbursement of a sum of money
where the value of the claim does not exceed One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
A2. Small Claims Cases, as defined hereunder, where the
claim does not exceed One Million Pesos
(P1,OOO,OOO.OO)t exclusive of interest and costs.
A "small clailn" is an action that is purely civil in nature
where the claim or relief raised by the plaintiff is solely for
the payment or reimbursement of a sum of luoney. It
excludes actions seeking other claims or reliefs aside from
payment or reimbursement of a sum of money and those
coupled with provisional remedies.
The claim or demand may be:
(a) For money owed under any of the following:
1.Contract of Lease;
2.Contract of Loan and other credit accommodations;
3.Contract of Services; or
4.Contract of Sale of personal property, excluding the
recovery of
5.the personal property, unless it is made the subject of a
compromise agreement between the parties.
(b) The enforcement of barangay amicable settlement agreements and
arbitration awards, where the money claim does not exceed One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), provided that no execution has been
enforced by the barangay within six (6) months from the date of the
settlement or date of receipt of the award or from the date the
obligation stipulated or adjudged in the arbitration award becomes due
and demandable, pursuant to Section 417, Chapter VIJ of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known a_s The Local Governnlent Code of
1991.
Sec. 5. Venue f or Small Claims Cases. - The regular rules on
venue shall apply.
However, if the plaintiff is engaged in the business of
lending, banking and similar activities, and has a branch
within the municipality or city where the defendant resides
or is holding business, the Statement of Claim/ s shall be
filed in the court of the city or nlunicipality where the
defendant resides or is holding business. If there are two (2)
or Inore defendantst it shall be filed in the court of the city or
municipality where any of them resides or is holding
businesst at the option of the plaintiff.
Sec. 6. Joinder of Claims. - Plaintiff may join in a single
statement of claim one or more separate small claims
against a defendant provided that the total amount claimed,
exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed One Million
Pesos (1,000,000.00)
Sec. 2. Dismissal of the Claim. - After the court determines
that the case falls under this Rule, it may, from an examination
of the allegations of the Statement of Claim/sand such
evidence attached thereto, on its own initiative, dismiss the
case outright on any of the following_grounds:
a. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
b. There is another action pending between the same parties for
the same
cause;
c. The action is barred by prior judgment;
d. The claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
e. The court has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant;
f. Venue is improperly laid;
g.Plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
h. The Statement of Claim/s states no cause of action;
i. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied
with; and
j. Plaintiff failed to submit the reguired affidavits, as provided in Section
of this Rule.

The order of dismissal shall state if it is with or without prejudice.

If, during the hearing, the court is able to determine that there exists a
ground for dismissal of the Statement of Claim/ s, the court on its own
initiative, dismiss the case even if such ground is not pleaded in the defendant's
Response (Forn 3-SCC).
If plaintiff misrepresents that he/ she/ it is not engaged in the business of
lending, banking, or similar activities when in fact he/ she/ it is so engaged, the
Statement of Claim/ s shall be dism.issed with prejudice and plaintiff shall be
meted the appropriate sanctions, including citation for direct contempt.
However, if the case does not fall under this Rule, but falls under summary or
regular procedure, or if the case is filed under summary or regular procedure but
falls under this Rule, the case shall not be dismissed. Instead, the case shall be
re-docketed under the appropriate procedure, and returned to the court where it
was assigned, subject to payment of any deficiency in the applicable regular rate
of filing fees.
CIVIL
PROCEDURE
General Principles in Remedial Law
 Palafox, Jr. v. Mendiola, G.R. No. 209551,
February 15, 2021

Doctrine:
Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper
because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in
order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it
to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and
preventing the overcrowding of its docket. Nonetheless, the invocation of this
Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain
instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the
petition, such as,
(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public
policy;

(2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice;

(3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or

(4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for

and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.
Facts:
- Sen. Angara, while holding office in Pasay City, filed a Complaint for
Damages against Palafox, Jr.
- In his Answer, Palafox, Jr. argued that venue was improperly laid
since the Complaint was filed in the RTC of Pasay City instead of
Makati City where both parties reside.
- Sen. Angara opposed this motion and pointed out that Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code allows the filing of the civil action where the
public officer holds office.
- In response, Palafox, Jr. argued that Article 360 is inapplicable
because the action involved is a civil action for damages and not a
criminal action for libel.
- Meanwhile, Sen. Angara served Palafox, Jr. with a notice to take
deposition upon oral examination. Palafox, Jr. opposed such notice on
the ground that deposition was premature as pre-trial had not yet
been terminated.
- In an Order, the trial court held that the venue was proper since the
filing of a separate civil action for damages where the public officer
holds office is allowed under Article 360. It also denied Palafox, Jr.'s
motion to dismiss for improper venue. The trial court likewise granted
Sen. Angara's motion to take oral deposition pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, 20 which does not
expressly require the termination of pre-trial before the taking of
deposition.
- Palafox, Jr. filed a Petition for Certiorari after the trial court denied his
motion for reconsideration.
Issue:

- Whether the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the
venue as provided under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code is
applicable in a civil case for Moral and Exemplary Damages arising
from alleged defamatory statements where no criminal case is
commenced or filed [Yes]
Ratio:

SC dismissed the Petition for violation of the

rule on hierarchy of courts.
In Pemberton v. De Lima, the Court said that it
may only act when absolutely necessary or when
serious and important reasons exist to justify an
exception.
 Further, serious and important reasons must be "clearly stated in the
petition."

Here, Palafox, Jr. filed his Petition directly to this Court despite the
concurrent jurisdiction of the appellate court. Significantly, he did not
bother to provide any reason or explanation to justify his noncompliance
to the rule on hierarchy of courts. Further, when he was required to reply
to Sen. Angara's Comment containing the latter's argument on the
violation of hierarchy of courts, he simply manifested his adoption of his
previous arguments in the Petition. This constitutes a clear disregard of
the hierarchy of courts and merits the dismissal of the Petition.
Heirs of Marquez v. Heirs of Hernandez, G.R. No. 236826,
March 23 2022.

Doctrine:
● The nature of an action is determined by the material

allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief

sought by plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action
was filed irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or
only some of such relief.
● An action for quieting of title which involves a challenge

to the validity of TCT No. T-81516 is collateral attack to a

certificate of title and not against the title itself. Therefore,
it is not prohibited by law.
Facts: Respondents Heirs of Hernandez filed a
complaint for specific performance with damages
against Herminio Marquez (Herminio). In their
amended complaint, respondents impleaded
petitioner Marquez. Respondents are the children
and legal heirs of Epifania Hernandez (Epifania).
Since 1955, respondents and Epifania have been occupying the
subject property. The subject property forms part of a 1,417-
square meter property previously owned by the spouses Sakay,
and Spouses Cruz. Epifania and respondents had built their house
on the subject property with the consent and tolerance of its
previous owners.

In 1967, both spouses sold the 1,417-square meter property to

Herminio. In 1985, Herminio sold to Epifania the 200-square
meter portion of the land or which her house was built for P400.00
per square meter. In view of this sale agreement, Epifania
supposedly undertook to pay Herminio the total price of the
subject property within the year of its purchase, or sometime
before the end of 1985
Epifania then made payment by way of installment
to Herminio by depositing certain amounts of money
in a joint account between them. Epifania also paid
Herminio through various Metrobank Checks all of
which were in the amounts of P500.00
each. According to respondents, Epifania was able
to pay in full the agreed purchase for the subject
property before her death on July 28, 1995.
Subsequently, the Rural Bank of Del Pilar, Inc. ceased operations. After
processing the deposit insurance claim with the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC), a check in the amount of P61,429.87 was
released by PDIC, which was received by Herminio on June 2000.
Meanwhile, on December 15, 1999 and July 17, 2000, respondents received
from Marquez demand letters to vacate the premises of the subject
property. It appears that on August 4, 1994, Marquez and Herminio
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights
whereby Herminio waived all his rights, interest and participation over
the 1,417-square meter property in favor of Marquez.
Despite respondents' demands, Herminio allegedly refused to execute a
deed of absolute sale over the subject property in favor of Epifania. Thus,
respondents' complaint for specific performance against Herminio.
Marquez, being the registered owner of the 1,417-square meter property.
Respondents filed an amended complaint impleading Marquez as a
defendant. In the said amended complaint, respondents prayed that
judgment be rendered directing Herminio and Marquez to cause the
execution of a deed of absolute sale for the subject property in favor of
respondents and that title over the subject property be transferred to their
names.

In his answer, Herminio argued: (a) Epifania reneged on her obligation

complete payment of the purchase price in 1985, their initial agreement
became one of lease, and not a contract of sale; and (b). he is not the real
party-in-interest as the title over the entire property was already transferred
to Marquez as early as 1996.
Marquez for her part, on the other hand, averred (a) Epifania did not make any
subsequent payments after her initial payment of P2,000.00 to Herminio; (b) all
amounts accepted by Herminio from Epifania are considered as rental payments
for the use and occupancy of the subject property; and (c) respondents are guilty of
laches and estoppel, or that the action already prescribed.

The RTC held that since the amended complaint is one for quieting of title, the
same does not prescribe against Epifania and her heirs who were in possession
of the subject property.

The CA denied the appeal for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the findings of the
RTC that the complaint filed by respondents is not for specific performance but
one for quieting of title. The CA held that the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Waiver of Rights executed by Herminio in favor of Marquez had the effect of
casting a cloud on respondents' equitable title over the subject property.
Issues:

1. Whether the respondent’s complaint is not only for specific

performance but also for quieting of title, [Yes];

2. Whether an action for quieting of title which involves a challenge to

the validity of TCT No. T-81516 is a collateral attack to a certificate of
title, which is prohibited by law, [No]; and

3. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC had no jurisdiction to

order the partition of the 1,417-square meter property because
partition of real property is a special proceeding which cannot be a
subject of an ordinary civil action for quieting of title, [Yes].
1. Whetheror not the respondent’s complaint is not only for specific
performance but also for quieting of title, [Yes].

The nature of an action is determined by the material allegations of the

complaint and the character of the relief sought by plaintiff, and the law in
effect when the action was filed irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or
only some of such relief. Accordingly, the allegations in the amended
complaint of respondents readily show that the complaint was not only for
specific performance, but also for quieting of title.

In this regard, for an action to quiet to prosper, two indispensable requisites

must concur, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2)
the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on
his[/her] title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy."
In the instant case, ownership over the subject property was transferred to Epifania
as early as 1985 by virtue of its delivery by Herminio. Respondents, as heirs of
Epifania, thus acquired an equitable title to the subject property. However, the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights presented by Marquez,
which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. T-81516 in the latter's name, was casting a
cloud on the said equitable title of respondents over the said property. It is for this
reason that respondents filed the present action against petitioner to, once and for
all, remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

Accordingly, respondents are guilty of laches since their continuous actual

possession of the subject property has rendered their right to bring an action for
quieting of title imprescriptible. Moreover, it bears noting that Marquez's demand
letters to respondents to vacate the subject property were dated December 15, 1999
and July 17, 2000. Thus, it was only during these instances that respondents came to
know that Marquez was claiming ownership over the property. Respondents then
filed their complaint on November 21, 2000, while their amended complaint was
filed on December 14, 2001. Clearly, laches has not yet set in against respondents.
2. Whether an action for quieting of title which involves a challenge to
the validity of TCT No. T-81516 is a collateral attack to a certificate of
title, which is prohibited by law, [No].

To be clear, what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of

title, and not the title itself. The Certificate referred to is the document
issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of
Title or TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership,
which is represented by that document. Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title evidencing such
ownership. In this case, what respondents are assailing is Marquez's
claim of ownership over the subject property. In any event, placing a
land under the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof
can no longer be attacked or disputed. A certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.
Even on the premise that respondents seek to invalidate TCT No. T-
81516 in an action for quieting of title, said action is, in fact, not a
collateral attack but a direct attack thereto since it is essential in such
action that respondents show the invalidity of the deed which casts a
cloud on their title over the subject property. In other words, a
complaint for quieting of title does not amount to a collateral attack
because at the heart of the action for quieting of title is the adjudication
of the ownership of the disputed property and the consequent
nullification of the questioned certificates of title, if so warranted by the
circumstances of the case.
3. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order
the partition of the 1,417-square meter property because partition of real
property is a special proceeding which cannot be a subject of an ordinary
civil action for quieting of title, [Yes].

It bears noting that in its January 28, 2016 Decision, the RTC ordered the
Register of Deeds to cause the cancellation of TCT No. T-81516 and issue
separate titles in the name of Epifania and Marquez, each reflecting their
respective shares in the 1,417-square meter property. In this regard, this
Court is aware that it is improper for the RTC to order a partition of an
estate in an action for quieting of title. This holds true when the co-owned
property itself has not been judicially or extrajudicially partitioned by its co-
owners.
However, in the instant case, as discussed move, there was
already a prior partial partition of the 1,417-square meter
property when at the time of the sale, Herminio pointed out
the area and location of the 200 square meters portion sold by
him to Epifania on which her house stands. This partition of
the co-owned property, although partial, was created and later
embodied in the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Heirs of
Epifania Hernandez. The RTC, therefore, did not err in issuing
the above-mentioned directives to the Register of Deeds as it
merely upheld contract of sale between Herminio and Epifania,
and reiterated the constituted partial partition of the 1,417-
square meter property embodied in the Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Heirs of Epifania Hernandez.
Moreover, it bears emphasizing that the essential facts of the case for the
determination of ownership and the title's validity are new before this
Court. Thus, to require the parties in this case to institute separate
partition and/or cancellation proceedings would be unnecessarily
circuitous and against the interest of justice.

Accordingly, well-settled is the rule that “one of the purposes for which
courts are organized is to put an end to controversy in the determination
of the respective rights of the contending parties. With the full
knowledge that courts are not infallible, the litigants submit their
respective claims for judgment, and they have a right at some time or
another to have final judgment on which they can rely over a final
disposition of the issue or issues submitted, and to know that there is an
end to the litigation; otherwise, there would be no end to legal
processes.”
 Ngo v. Gabelo, G.R. No. 207707, August 24,
2020
Doctrine: A party's failure to comply with the requirement of prior
barangay conciliation before filing a case in court would render his
complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with a
condition precedent, pursuant to Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court [now Sec. 13, Rule 15 of the 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure].

Facts: Ngo filed before the RTC of Manila, a complainant for

recovery of possession of a parcel of land against herein respondents
Gabelo, et al.
In his complaint, Ngo alleged that he is the lawful and absolute owner of the subject
property by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale between himself and Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC) and pursuant to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 111743. He averred that
despite several demands, Gabelo, et al., refused to vacate the subject property.

Gabelo, et al., in their Answer maintained that Ngo has no legal personality to sue.
Moreover, the SC did not declare him in G.R. No. 111743 as the absolute owner of the
subject property but merely identified him as one of those who could buy the lot from PRC.
They insisted that Ngo failed to comply with the condition precedent for filing the action
since he failed to bring the matter to the barangay for conciliation. Additionally, they
averred that the validity of the alleged TCT No. 250439 under the name of Ngo is already
being assailed before RTC of Manila Branch 37 and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-98807.
After pre-trial, the RTC issued an Order dated April 17, 2009 directing the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action for the plaintiff's
failure to comply with the barangay law requirements.

CA found the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the

assailed Orders.

The CA ratiocinated Ngo's failure to comply with the condition precedent

of barangay conciliation did not warrant the dismissal of his complaint,
but merely should have suspended the proceedings pending the referral
of the case to barangay conciliation.
Issue: Whether failure to comply with the requirement of
prior barangay conciliation before filing a case in court would
render his complaint dismissible, [Yes].

Ratio:

Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), or the Local Government

Code of 1991, provides that barangay conciliation
proceedings is a pre-condition to filing a complaint in court
between persons actually residing in the same barangay to
explore possible amicable settlement.
A party's failure to comply with the requirement of prior
barangay conciliation before filing a case in court would
render his complaint dismissible on the ground of failure
to comply with a condition precedent, pursuant to Section
1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court [now Sec. 13, Rule 15 of
the 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure].
 Mega Fishing Corp. v. Estate of Gonzales,
G.R. No. 214781, March 9, 2022.
Doctrine: Generally, the rules of procedure must be strictly followed
because “the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it
is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks to avail of the
right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing
which the right to appeal is invariably lost
Facts: In May 2000, the estate of Francisco (respondent), through Teresita,
filed a case against Esperanza, Mercedita, MFC, Vicente Garcia (Garcia), and
Sarah Principe, seeking to annul and cancel TCT 21297, 21299, and 21926,
and the reinstatement of TCT No. 280406.
The RTC decided in favor of the respondent. It found that the new owner's duplicate
copy of TCT 280406 in the name of Francisco Felipe Gonzales was null and void for
being fraudulently obtained. The RTC further ruled that TCTs 21297 and 21299 were
both invalidly issued, and therefore null and void.

On appeal, CA required MFC to file its appellant's brief.

On December 20, 2013, MFC filed a motion to be given the opportunity to file its file
appeal brief. It alleged that it received the notice dated August 15, 2013 sometime in
September and had until October 15, 2013 within which to file its brief. However,
MFC only discovered the said notice which was apparently filed in another case
folder during their year-end inventory in December 2013. Thus, MFC asked for an
additional period of 30 days from December 19, 2013, or until January 19, 2014,
within which to file its brief, which the CA later granted.
On February 6, 2014, MFC filed its motion to admit appellant's brief
(with attached copy of the appellant's brief).

The CA denied MFC's motion. It held that MFC failed to file its brief
within the reglementary period. It noted that despite the grant of an
extension of time to file, it only filed its brief on February 6, 2014 or 18
days after the last day of extension granted by the CA.

On July 22, 2014, the CA issued a Resolution closing and terminating the
case in view of the fact that no motion for reconsideration and/or
petition to the Court was filed by MFC.
MFC’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The CA noted that MFC
received the March 28, 2014 Resolution on April 14, 2014 but only filed its
motion for reconsideration on August 22, 2014 or more than three months
after the lapse of the 15-day period within which to submit a motion for
reconsideration.

On November 3, 2014, MFC filed a motion for extension of time to file

petition for review on certiorari which was granted by this Court in its
February 4, 2015 Resolution. In its petition for review on certiorari, MFC
argues that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it did not allow MFC's
appeal brief and ordered the case closed and terminated.
Issue: Whether MFC should be afforded the amplest opportunity for its
case to be decided on the merits and not on mere technicalities, [Yes].

Ratio: Generally, the rules of procedure must be strictly followed because

“the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks to avail of the
right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing
which the right to appeal is invariably lost.” Acting on such appeals, the
CA has the authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant's
brief in the exercise of its judicial discretion. However, the CA must still
adhere to the fundamentals of justice and fairness, bearing in mind the
peculiar circumstances and deciding matters on a case by case basis.
We find the present case similar to CMTC International Marketing Corp. v.
Bhagis International Trading Corp., where this Court has allowed the late
filing of the appellant's brief due to its counsel's negligence, to wit:
In the instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to file
an appellant's brief on petitioner's part.

When petitioner filed its motion attaching therewith its

appellant's brief, there was a clear intention on the part of petitioner
not to abandon his appeal. As a matter of fact, were it not for its
counsel's act of inadvertently misplacing the Notice to File Brief in
another file, petitioner could have seasonably filed its appellant's
brief as its counsel had already prepared the same even way before
the receipt of the Notice to File Brief.
 It bears stressing at this point then that the rule, which states
that the mistakes of counsel binds (sic) the client, may not be
strictly followed where observance of it would result in
outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where
the interest of justice so requires. In rendering justice,
procedural infirmities take a backseat against substantive rights
of litigants. Corollarily, if the strict application of the rules would
tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, this Court is not
without power to exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the
rules of procedure.
 Also, it must be stressed that petitioner had no participatory
negligence in the dismissal of its appeal. Hence, the ensuing
dismissal of its appeal was completely attributable to the gross
negligence of its counsel. For said reason, the Court is not averse to
suspending its own rules in the pursuit of justice. Where reckless or
gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law,
or when the interests of justice so require, relief is accorded to the
client who suffered by reason of the lawyer's gross or palpable
mistake or negligence.

All told, petitioner should be afforded the amplest opportunity

for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In the same vein, We find that MFC should be afforded the amplest opportunity for
its case to be decided on the merits and not on mere technicalities. When MFC filed
its motion with the attached appellant's brief, it was a clear indication that it did not
abandon its appeal. We have previously allowed the relaxation of these rigid rules of
procedure in order to serve substantial justice in considering (1) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property; (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (6) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

This Court notes that MFC stands to lose its property rights due to a technicality for
the belated filing of its appellant's brief attributed to its former counsel's negligence.
We are of the view that the belated filing of its brief was an honest mistake and not
an attempt to delay the proceedings of the case. Considering the foregoing, We find
that the disposition of this case on the merits will best serve the ends of justice. Thus,
this Court deems it appropriate to remand the case to the CA for further proceedings.
Rule 2 | Cause of Action
Delmolin-Paloma v. Delmolin-Magno, G.R. No. 237767, November
10, 2021.

Facts:
Ester, Justina and Cristobal are the legitimate children of Sps. Santiago
and Delmolin. Cristobal died and was survived by his wife and children.

In 1967, Santiago, before the issuance of OCT P-1539 sold a portion of

the lot to Justina. After more three decades, Justina registered the same.
Meanwhile, Ester constructed a house on the lot. Justina then showed the
deed of sale to Ester and demanded the partition of the property. A dispute
among heirs ensued.
Eventually, the land dispute among the heirs was brought to the Sangguniang
Barangay of Brgy. Concepcion, San Pablo City. During the conference held
before the Sangguniang Barangay, the parties agreed to partition the .

The Certificate of Agreement 22 dated June 28, 1999 was signed by Ester,
Michael, Brgy. Chairperson Ronelo Carandang, and Barangay Agrarian Reform
Council (BARC) Chairperson Elias A. Ciar. However, Justina refused to sign the
agreement and opted to consult her lawyer first.

Nonetheless, an agreement of partition was prepared and submitted to the Land

Management Bureau, which the latter approved. The agreement of partition bore
the same contents as the Certificate of Agreement executed before the
Sangguniang Barangay.
By virtue of the agreement of partition, Michael constructed a fence
surrounding the lot allotted to them, with the full knowledge and
consent of Justina. Justina hired a geodetic engineer who undertook the
subdivision survey, and shared in the expenses incurred for the survey
of the land.

However, despite Ester and Abigail's (respondents) request to partition

the disputed land, Justina· refused to implement the partition
agreement. Thus, the dispute was again referred to the Sangguniang
Barangay in 2008.Due to their failure to reach a settlement, the office
of the Punong Barangay issued a Certification to file action.
Respondents filed a petition for annulment of TCT No. T-52423 and barangay
partition and judicial partition of the intestate estate of the late Santiago
Delmolin33 before the RTC of San Pablo City. The RTC ruled in favor of the p
The issue of misjoinder of actions was brought up in the appeal. CA
affirmed the RTC decision and held that misjoinder of actions is not a
ground for dismissal.

Issue: Whether misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for the

dismissal of an action and that a misjoined cause of action may, on
motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and
proceeded with separately, [Yes].
Ratio: Petitioners argue that the court a quo erroneously ruled upon the
misjoined causes of action for annulment of title and partition, since the
former is an ordinary civil action and the latter is a special civil action
under the Rules of Court.

Petitioners are mistaken. Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court explicitly

states that a misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action and that a misjoined cause of action may, on
motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and
proceeded with separately. While the court a quo may have overlooked
the misjoined actions, such fact is not a ground to assail the validity of
the decision or a ground for the dismissal of the case. Absent any
objection on the part of the petitioner or a directive from the court a quo
for the annulment of title and partition to proceed separately, both causes
of action were validly adjudicated upon, considering that the court has
jurisdiction over both causes of action.
The case of Ada v. Baylon is instructive:

Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts
have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the
severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately. However, if there
is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance,
then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes
of action.

xxx xxx xxx

It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has
jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the
same. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then
such misjoined cause of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so
severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity.
(Citations omitted)
Furthermore, this Court has previously allowed the annulment of titles in an action
for partition. The case of Sps. Villafria v. Plazo provides:

Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the annulment of title
and recovery of possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could
very well be achieved in an action for partition, as can be seen in cases where
courts determine the parties' rights arising from complaints asking not only for the
partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles and recovery of ownership
and possession of property. (Emphasis supplied)
SC also found no merit in petitioners' contention that the court a quo erroneously ruled
upon the validity of the sale dated August 28, 1967 in favor of Justina, even if it was
not one of the reliefs prayed for by the respondents.

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, their right to due process was not violated. While the
complaint filed by the respondents did not include the nullity of the deed of sale as one
of the specific reliefs sought for, it did contain a general prayer "for other relief and
remedies under the premises as may be deemed just and equitable by the Honorable
Court."

This general prayer is construed to include the nullity of the deed of sale since it is also
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and evidence adduced in trial. The
prayer in the complaint for other reliefs equitable and just under the premises justifies
the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for. Besides, the alleged deed of
sale was the basis for petitioners' claim of ownership over the subject lot. Verily, the
court a quo could rule upon its validity.
 Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation Inc v.
Mabalacat Institute Inc., G.R. No. 211563,
September 29, 2021.
Facts:
SVHFI claimed that it is absolute owner of a parcel of land. Mabalacat
Institute, Inc. (MII), which is now known as Don Teodoro V. Santos
Institute, occupied said lot without paying rent and only through its
tolerance since the year 1983 until March 14, 2002.
Nevertheless, through SVHFI, in a letter, informed MII that beginning
April 1, 2002, it will be charged a rental fee for its use and occupancy of
the subject lot at the monthly rate of P50.00 per sq.m. which is payable
on or before the 5th day of each month. However, MII's refused to
comply with SVHFI's demand.
In view of MII's refusal, SVHFI wrote another letter demanding the rental
payment for the months of April to July 2002 in the total amount of
P2,519,220.00 within 15 days from receipt thereof. Otherwise, it must vacate the
subject lot. However, MII still failed to comply therewith.

SVHFI filed a Complaint for collection of a sum of money against MII. The case
was raffled to the RTC of Makati City (the Collection Case).

Instead of filing an answer, MII filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the court a quo had not validly acquired jurisdiction because it was
not properly served with summons.

The court a quo denied MII's Motion to Dismiss. MII moved for reconsideration
which was likewise denied.

MII then sought to nullify the RTC’s orders through a Petition for Certiorari. the
Petitioner was denied.
Unfazed, MII filed with the SC. However, it was dismissed through
this Court's July 4, 2005 Resolution on the following grounds:

(i) the petition was considered as unsigned pleading for failure to

verify the same in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 in
relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and
(ii) (ii) the petition lacks sufficient showing that the assailed
judgement was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

MII filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim with the

court a quo in the Collection Case.
Prior to the scheduled pre-trial, MII filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum shopping. It
argued that the failure of SVHFI to report to the court a
quo that it filed the Ejectment Case despite the explicit
requirement of Section. 5(c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court was
a willful and deliberate act of forum shopping on account of
which its complaint should be dismissed.

MII likewise charged SVHFI with violating the rule on splitting

of a single cause of action as set forth in Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 2 of the same Rules.

The court a quo this time dismissed the collection case.

Issue: Whether an action for collection of sum of money may not be
joined with an ejectment suit, otherwise a misjoinder of causes of action
would ensue, [Yes].

Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court prohibits the joinder of an

ordinary action, such as an action for collection of sum of money and a
special civil action, such as an ejectment suit. Said provision reads:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading
assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he
may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
(a)The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules
on joinder of parties;
(b)The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions
governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but
pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be
allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies
therein; and
(d)Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for
recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the
test of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
An action for collection of sum of money may not be properly joined with
the action for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a
full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful detainer is a special civil action
which requires a summary procedure.”
Insofar as the complaint for collection of sum of money is concerned, it is not
a simple case of recovering the unpaid balance of rentals. It must be pointed
out that there are several factors to consider if and when the collection of
sum of money will prosper, i.e., the determination if indeed recovery of the
alleged balance is proper, the correct amount of rental to be paid or
recovered, the intention and/or agreement of the parties as to the terms of
payment of rental in order to arrive at a correct amount, among others.
Indeed, as correctly observed by the appellate court, the resolution of
whether Lajave paid the correct rental fees and if there is a deficiency in the
payment of rentals requires a full-blown trial through the submission of
documentary and testimonial evidence by the parties which cannot be
passed upon in a summary proceeding. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the Collection Case requires a full-blown trial for the
parties to show evidence on the propriety of paying rent and its rightful
amount. These may not be accomplished in an ejectment proceeding which
is summary in nature.

Therefore, this Court finds SVHFI not guilty of forum shopping when it
filed the Ejectment Case subsequent to the Collection Case, while the latter
is still pending. In both cases, there is no identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, and that any judgement on any of these cases would not
amount to res judicata on the other.

In the Ejectment Case, the cause of action stemmed from the prejudice that
SVHFI allegedly suffered due to the loss of possession of the subject lot. On
the other hand, the Collection Case was founded on the appropriate amount
of rental fees that are allegedly due and the damages that SVHFI allegedly
suffered but which have no direct relation to its loss of material possession
 Professional Regulation Commission v. Alo,
G.R. No. 214435, February 14, 2022.
Facts: On July 5, 2011, Alo was formally charged with unprofessional
conduct and/or dishonorable conduct before the Board for Professional
Teachers (Board), which operates under petitioner Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC), for using fraud or deceit in obtaining a
certificate of registration and professional license when he did a falsified
a Board Resolution making it appear that he is registered as a
professional teacher on September 14, 2007.

For her defense, Alo alleged in her counter-affidavit that she is a holder
of a degree in Bachelor of Science in Elementary Education and had been
a public elementary school teacher from 1995 to 2006 before she secured
her certificate of registration and professional license. She is currently a
public school teacher in a school in Lanao del Norte.
Sometime in September 2007, Alo allegedly went to the PRC Head Office
in Manila to apply for a Professional Teacher's License based on Section
26 (C) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7836.

RA 7836, under certain conditions, grants a certificate of registration and

professional license to qualified applicants without need for examination.
Alo, who was not a passer of the board examination for professional
teachers, claimed that she knew of some professional teachers who were
granted permanent appointments under the said law and believed that
she was qualified to be extended the same privilege since she has been
teaching in the public school from 1995 to 2006. She averred that when
she went to the PRC, she was given forms to fill out and was made to pay
various fees. A few days later, she was issued a professional identification
card, followed by a certificate of good standing and a certificate of
membership in the National Organization of Professional Teachers, Inc.
Alo maintained that there was no iota of proof that she used the
alleged falsified Board Resolution No. 671 in obtaining her
certificate of registration and professional license. She claimed
that she never knew of the existence of such board resolution, and
that it was the first time she heard about it.

Also, she never attached the said board resolution to her

application for registration, and noted that the accusation against
her belittled the efficiency of the PRC personnel, wondering how
the latter could have been easily defrauded into issuing a
professional license based on an alleged falsified board resolution
when they could have easily checked or verified with their own
record or office the authenticity of the said document.
The Board rendered a Decision against Alo. Dissatisfied, Alo filed a
motion for reconsideration which the Board denied.

Without elevating the case to the PRC, Alo directly filed a petition for
review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

The CA issued a Minute Resolution requiring the Board and the PRC,
which was impleaded in the petition, to file their comment on Alo's
petition for review. However, since the Board and the PRC failed to file
their comment within the reglementary period, the CA deemed that they
waived the filing of their comment and submitted the instant case for
decision without comment. On February 12, 2014, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision, granting Alo's petition for review and reversing the
ruling of the Board.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA has jurisdiction to directly review the Board’s decision,
considering that the same belongs to the PRC, [Yes]; and

2. Whether respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies, and

thus, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, her
case must be dismissed for lack of cause of action, [Yes].

Ratio:
1. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to directly review the Board’s
decision. Preliminarily, it must be reiterated that jurisdiction is defined
as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In
order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose
of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
This Court has long held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the
power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings
in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court
that it exists.

The above-cited provisions by the PRC, while showing that they may
have appellate jurisdiction over decisions or orders of the Board, does not
divest the CA of its own appellate jurisdiction. To put it simply, there is
no law granting the PRC exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases
decided by the Board, nor is there any law excluding such cases from
being taken cognizance by the CA through a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as will be discussed further below.
A cursory reading of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 58 (BP 129) or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, would show the
extent of the CA's jurisdiction. Section 9 of BP 129, as amended by RA
7902 provides:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,

prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of

judgment of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities boards or commissions, including
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the
Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is consistent with the aforequoted provision, particularly Section 9 (3) of BP 129, which
grants the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 43
Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals

Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory
Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act
No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural
Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

Section 2. Cases not covered. — This Rule shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the
Labor Code of the Philippines. xxx xxx xxx (Underscoring supplied)
It is clear from the above provisions that a Rule 43 petition to the CA
includes all awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized
by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions,
except those under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Pertinently, this Court
has ruled that the list of quasi-judicial entities found in Section 1, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court is not exclusive.

Tthe question now is whether the Board is considered a quasi-judicial

agency that exercised quasi-judicial powers when it issued its Decision dated
September 11, 2012. Jurisprudence provides a guide on what may be
considered as a quasi-judicial entity and what it means to exercise quasi-
judicial functions, to wit:
A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government other
than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. The very
definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with
quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and
functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for
the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling
for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which
cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. A "quasi-judicial
function" is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of
public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Underscoring
supplied)
As applied in this case, the Board is clearly vested with quasi-judicial power. Section 9 (c) of RA 8981 provides:

Section 9. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities of the Various Professional Regulatory Boards. — The various,
professional regulatory boards shall retain the following powers, functions and responsibilities:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) To hear and investigate cases arising from violations of their respective laws, the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder and their Codes of Ethics and, for this purpose, may issue summons, subpoena
and subpoena duces tecum to alleged violators and/or witnesses to compel their attendance in such
investigations or hearings: Provided, That, the decision of the Professional Regulatory Board shall, unless
appealed to the Commission, become final and executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of
judgment or decision; (Underscoring supplied)

The Board, by virtue of the power vested in it by the provision above, clearly exercised its quasi-judicial functions
when it investigated the case, held a hearing, and issued a decision that affected the rights of a private party, herein
respondent Alo.

Given this, there is no question that the September 11, 2012 Decision of the Board is covered by the jurisdiction of the
CA and can be subject of a Rule 43 petition.
2. Whether respondent failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies, and thus, under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, her case must be dismissed for lack
of cause of action, [Yes].
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
grounded on practical reasons, including allowing the
administrative agencies concerned to take every opportunity
to correct its own errors, as well as affording the litigants the
opportunity to avail of speedy relief through the
administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious
and costly resort to courts.
The general rule is that before a party may
seek the intervention of the court, he should
first avail of all the means afforded him by
administrative processes. The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from
them and submitted to a court without first
giving such administrative agency the
opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation.
True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies are subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a)
where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention
is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great
and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due
process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is
involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
However, the records would show that none of these exceptions are
present in this case. Alo filed the petition for review with the CA on
May 2, 2013 without any justification or reason on why she did not file
an appeal with the PRC instead, considering that the latter is the
proper procedure and it was still within the 15-day reglementary
period. Not only is this a blatant disregard of procedural rules, but also
a denial of an opportunity for the PRC to review the Board's decision
and if necessary, correct or modify the same, without resorting to the
judiciary and unnecessarily adding to the courts' already clogged
dockets. This is definitely contrary to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and thus, the CA should have dismissed the
petition for lack of cause of action.
Rule 3 | Parties to Civil Actions
Republic v. Castillo, G.R. No. 190453, February 26, 2020
Facts:
On September 5, 1980, the Solicitor General, acting in behalf of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (RP), filed a Complaint for Expropriation
before the RTC of Dagupan City against respondents who are co-owners
of the subject property. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case
before the trial court, respondent Alipio died and was substituted by his
spouse Fredesvinda F. Vda. De Fernandez and his eleven (11) children.
On March 31, 1981, Civil Case No. D-5217 was archived to give petitioner
RP ample time to verify the identity of the heirs of the deceased
respondent.
Respondent Benjamin filed an Ex Parte Motion to Dismissclaiming
that for almost six years, petitioner RP had not taken any step to
further prosecute the case and had not deposited the requisite
amount representing the fair market value in accordance with P.D.
Nos. 76 and 1533. Hence, on April 10, 1986, the case was ordered
dismissed by the RTC for lack of interest to prosecute pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.

Thereafter, petitioner RP filed a Motion to Revive and Set Case for

Hearing since it had already identified the heirs of respondents Jorge
and Cornelia Caguioa, the Spouses Juana Galvan and Venancio
Manaois.

It prayed for the substitution by their heirs and the revival and setting
of the case for hearing.
Respondents Benjamin and Estela filed a Motion to Set
Aside the Order. It was denied for lack of merit.

The parties were ordered to file their respective pre-trial

briefs. However, only petitioner RP filed a pre-trial brief on
January 18, 1989. Also, on February 2, 1989, petitioner
RP filed an Amended Complaint alleging that the
Dagupan City National High School (School) has been in
continuous possession of the subject property since 1947
and that the market value of the said properties during
that time was fifty (50) centavos per sqm.
RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the
Amended Complaint and ordering petitioner RP to
restore the possession of the subject property with
a total area of 2,000 sqm to the respondents.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC

Decision dated May 26, 1992. The case was
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and
to compute just compensation in accordance with
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence.
 Issues

1. What is the reckoning date of the computation of just

compensation: (a) date of taking in 1947; (b) date of
the filing of the original Complaint in 1980; or (c) date
of filing of the Amended Complaint in 1989?

2. Whether or not the Solicitor General had the authority

to file expropriation case in behalf of the RP.
Petitioner RP argues that “taking” occurs when the
expropriator enters a private property not only for a
momentary period but for a more permanent
duration, or for the purpose of devoting the property
to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
It claims that it had actual possession of the subject
property since 1947 as the School constructed a
building and planted crops therein.
Thus, contrary to respondents' claim that they were in
possession of the subject property, petitioner RP
actually had beneficial enjoyment thereof. Moreover,
petitioner RP avers that respondents failed to
specifically deny in their Answer petitioner RP's
material averment that it has been in possession of the
subject property since 1947. Thus, respondents are
deemed to have admitted that petitioner RP has
indeed the possession of the subject property since
1947.
Also, respondents waived their right to disprove and rebut the
said material averment when they did not present any witness
during the trial. Furthermore, petitioner RP contends that even
if the taking is not reckoned from its actual taking in 1947, the
just compensation should be computed based on the filing of
the original Complaint in 1980 and not from the date of the
filing of the Amended Complaint in 1989. It avers that the
Amended Complaint did not raise any new issue that would
have warranted using the date of the filing of said Amended
Complaint as the reckoning date in the determination of just
compensation for the taking of the subject property.
On the other hand, respondent Benjamin, in his Comment, assails
the authority of the Solicitor General to file the Complaint for
expropriation in behalf of petitioner RP. He argues that the
Solicitor General filed the instant Complaint for expropriation
without presenting any law or authorization. In fact, during trial,
the principal of the School, Perla, admitted that it was only upon
her initiative that the Solicitor General filed the said complaint.
Benjamin claims that the authority should emanate from either the
national government or the Department of Education through an
executive order or department order.
Issue: Whether or not the Solicitor General had the authority to file
expropriation case in behalf of the RP, [Yes].

Ratio: As to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the complaint for
expropriation, we hold that, at the time of the institution of this case in 1980,
Section 1 (a) of P.D. No. 478, otherwise known as “Defining the Powers
and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General” provides that the
Solicitor General has the power to represent the government and its
officers before this Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in
all civil actions and special proceedings in which the government or any
officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. Moreover, Section 1 (k) of
P.D. No. 478 likewise provides that the Solicitor General can act and
represent the RP and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or
commission in any matter, action or proceedings which, in his opinion,
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.
With the foregoing in mind, we rule that the Solicitor
General has the authority to initiate the present
expropriation case against the respondents. Contrary
to the respondents' arguments, the Solicitor
General's authority to file the instant complaint for
expropriation on September 5, 1980 emanates from
the authority provided under P.D. No. 478.
Rule 7 | Parts and Contens of a Pleading
 Evangeline Engao Asis, et al. v. Heirs of
Rosello Calignawan
G.R. No. 242127, September 15, 2021
Facts:
Petitioners aver that Rosello, respondents' predecessor,
committed forum-shopping by splitting his cause of action when
he filed separate complaints, namely Civil Case No. 89-01-005 for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Partition and Damages with
Preliminary Injunction (Complaint for Declaration of Nullity)
before the RTC of Palo, Leyte, which was then decided by the RTC
of Tacloban City, and Civil Case No. B-92-10-461 for Ownership
and Possession of Property with Accounting and Damages
(Complaint for Recovery of Ownership) before the RTC of
Burauen, Leyte (RTC of Burauen).
Petitioners argue that these cases involved a similar
cause of action, centered on the same issue (validity
of the Deed of Donation), and required the
presentation of the same evidence, i.e., (the Deed of
Donation).

Respondents counter that Rosello did not split his

cause of action since the said complaints were
distinct from each other. One was for declaration of
nullity of documents while the other was for
recovery of ownership and possession.
There was also variance in the reliefs prayed for in the
complaints. What is more, petitioners raised the issue
of forum-shopping for the first time on appeal before
the CA. Respondents argue that this issue should have
been raised at the earliest opportunity such as in a
motion to dismiss before the trial court, yet,
petitioners actively submitted and participated in the
proceedings before the RTC of Burauen.
Petitioners reply that the Complaint for Recovery of
Ownership falls under the exception wherein an action
may be dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping
even if the same was invoked for the first time on
appeal. According to petitioners, dismissal may be
allowed when the pendency of another action involving
the same parties for the same cause would result.
Despite the fact that said issue was not raised in the
Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, the same may
still be assigned in the instant case.
Issue: Whether or not the commission of forum shopping was
properly raised, [No].

Ratio: We rule for the respondents. While the observation of

petitioners as to Rosello's commission of forum-shopping is
correct, raising said issue on appeal is already too late in the
day. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements as to the
elements of forum-shopping.

First, there must be identity of parties. Both petitioners and

respondents or their predecessors were the contending parties
in the Complaints for Declaration of Nullity and Recovery of
Ownership.
Second, there must be similarity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, where the relief is anchored on the
same facts. While the caption of both complaints are
evidently distinct, the allegations contained in their
respective bodies seek a similar relief, that is, the
entitlement to the properties and reconveyance thereof
in favor of Rosello and eventually to the respondents
who are the latter's heirs. It is a hornbook doctrine that
the cause of action is determined by the allegations of
the complaint and not the caption or designation by the
parties, considering that the latter is not even
indispensable to the complaint.
Third, the judgment rendered in any of the actions would
amount to res judicata as to the other. The finality of the
Decision rendered by the RTC of Burauen, as affirmed by the
appellate court and which subsequently reached this Court in
G.R. No. 188676 entitled Heirs of Felipe Engao, Namely: Erma
E. Trocino, Felicitacion E. Bausita, Cesar Engao and Evangeline
E. Asis vs. Rosello Calignawan, operated as res judicata on the
matter of the Deed of Donation's validity.
Since the three elements are attendant in this case, Rosello indeed
committed forum-shopping.

The argument that the properties are located outside Tacloban

City and are thus outside the jurisdiction of the RTC of Tacloban
City cannot be appreciated. Venue is the geographical location
where suits are brought while jurisdiction is conferred by law.
Despite the variance in the wordings of the reliefs, both
complaints actually sought for reconveyance. In such a case, the
properties situated in a certain location may be part of the suit
involving properties located in another place. Otherwise, it would
result in the splitting of the cause of action and forum-shopping,
as it did in this case
The fact that Rosello may have committed forum-shopping should not have
escaped petitioners' attention in order for them to take appropriate action.
However, petitioners opted to actively participate in the proceedings before
the RTC of Burauen instead of raising the issue of forum-shopping in their
answer or in a motion to dismiss.

This issue was only raised on appeal. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court, defenses and objections are deemed waived when they are
not pleaded in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. Even more, reason
dictates that dismissing this case on the basis of forum-shopping would only
leave contrasting decisions of the RTC of Tacloban and the RTC of Burauen
which had already attained finality. Hence, it is high time to finally resolve
the controversy in this long-standing saga since the 1980s.
On another point, petitioners contend that the appellate
court exercised unwarranted liberality in the application
of procedural rules in favor of respondents when it
admitted the belated filing of the Appellant's Brief
despite several motions for extension of time and absent
any compelling reason to grant the same. Conversely,
respondents emphasized that their previous counsel was
reckless and grossly negligent in the handling of the case,
even though Rosello religiously sought update and
follow-ups from said counsel. Nonetheless, petitioners
reiterate that the text messages which showed that
Rosello conducted follow-ups were made after the lapse
of several motions of extension of time.
Section 12, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court expressly provides:

SECTION 12. Extension of Time for Filing Briefs. — Extension of time

for the filing of briefs will not be allowed, except for good and
sufficient cause, and only if the motion for extension is filed before
the expiration of the time sought to be extended.

Motions for extension of time are not granted as a matter of right but are
left to the sound discretion of the court. For one, there must be a good
and sufficient cause as required by said provision, or a compelling reason
as case laws explain, in order that a request for time may be granted.
Following Blancaflor, the determination of whether or not the reason
forwarded by the movant is compelling enough should be left to the
sound discretion of the court.
The Court is well aware that the appellate court issued a
Resolution dated July 19, 2017 which extensively discussed
its reasons for granting and admitting the belatedly filed
appellant's brief. The CA essentially found that the counsel
for respondents was grossly negligent in handling the affairs
of the latter who should not be prejudiced by the same. The
appellate court further stressed the necessity to finally
resolve this aged case on the merits rather than be governed
by the strict technicalities of the law and deny the admission
of the Appellant's Brief.
SC upheld the findings of the appellate court. SC regard the
discretion exercised by the appellate court with respect. The
reasons proffered for the several motions for extension, in
particular, the withdrawal of respondents' counsel due to his
gross negligence, were satisfactory as to justify the relaxation of
the rules of procedure. In civil cases, courts may be inclined to
observe liberality in applying the technical rules if only to
afford a complete resolution of the case. What is important is to
serve the interests of justice, fair play and equity, and not just to
merely bow down to the procedural aspects of law. Hence, the
appellate court's liberality was not uncalled for considering that
there was a justifiable reason for it.
 Olivia D. Leones v. Hon Carlito Corpuz
G.R. No. 204106, November 17, 2021

Facts: Olivia Leones was appointed municipal treasurer

of the Municipality of Bacnotan, La Union. Leones sued
the Municipality of Bacnotan alleging that she was not
paid for RATA (Representation and Time Allowance). The
case was dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The decision was affirmed by CA and became
final and executory.
Leones sought the opinion of Department of Budget
and Management on her entitlement to RATA. She
was advised that her RATA entitlement will only cover
the fiscal year 1999. Unsatisfied Leones filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA. She sought to
compel Boncodin and Mayor Fontanilla to pay her
RATA. The CA ordered the respondents to pay the
RATA. Despite the CA decision becoming final and
executory, Leones’ RATA remained unpaid.
Leones filed a petition for mandamus against the
LGU. The case ended in a compromise agreement
where it was agreed upon, among others, that (a) the
RATA amounting to over a million pesos shall be paid
in installments until June 2011 (b) Leones shall
obligate herself to retire on 31 May 2012, and (c)
upon full payment of RATA, Leones shall move for the
dismissal of the case.
The Municipality was able to pay the RATA as
scheduled. In June 2012, Leones learned that she
was dropped from the payroll and asserted that it
was tantamount to illegal dismissal. The office of the
Mayor emphasized the provisions of the
compromise agreement. Meanwhile, the
Municipality, through its mayor, Rufino Fontanilla,
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
compromise agreement. RTC issued the writ and
the sheriff proceeded to enforce the compromise
agreement, but Leones refused to comply.
Leones opposed the execution of the compromise
agreement and claimed that the compromise
judgment was null and void for being contrary to
public policy and writ for execution was against
property and rights exempted from execution.
Further, Leones stated that compromise judgment
compelled her to voluntarily retire from employment.
Mayor Fontanilla opposed the motion and moved
that Leones be cited for contempt of court for her
stubborn refusal to comply and abide by terms of the
compromise agreement where Leones knowingly
affixed her conformity.
RTC upheld the compromise judgment and declared
that decision on GR 16726 did not constitute res
judicata in the mandamus case filed by Leones
against Mayor Fontanilla. Further, RTC held that no
public policy was violated when Leones agreed to
retire per the compromise agreement. Aggrieved,
Leones sought direct recourse to SC via petition for
certiorari and Prohibition.
Issue: Whether the Court’s Decision in G.R. No.
169726 did constitute SCA No. 007-11 as res
judicata, [No].

Ratio: Leones claims that the trial court's assailed

Order in SCA No. 007-11 is barred by the Court's
prior judgment in G.R. No. 169726. The Court
disagrees.
Bar by prior judgment is one of the two facets of res judicata. This is
embodied in Section 47 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. —

The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the

Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been [missed] in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; x x x
For res judicata to bar a subsequent action, the following elements must
be present:

(1) The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) The decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits;
and

(4) There must be as between the first and second action, identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

The first three requisites are established with the finality of the Court's
Decision that disposed G.R. No. 169726 on the merits in 2010.
The fourth and the most important element, however, is lacking.

Contrary to the conclusions of the trial court, the parties in G.R.

No. 169726 and SCA No. 007-11 are identical. While the
respondents in both cases, Minda Fontanilla and Rufino
Fontanilla, are not the same persons, both however were sued in
their official capacity as mayor of the Municipality of Bacnotan.
Both suits also sprouted from one and same event — the non-
payment of the RATA pertaining to Leones' employment in the
Municipality of Bacnotan.
But the similarities of the two cases end there. G.R. No.
169726 determined the factual and legal bases of Leones'
entitlement to payment of her RATA, whereas SCA No.
007-11 is concerned with the manner of execution of the
actual payment of the RATA judicially awarded to
Leones. With these marked differences in subject matters,
the bone of contention in SCA No. 007-11 cannot be
deemed to have been already resolved by the final
dispositions of the Court in G.R. No. 169726. To consider
SCA No. 007-11 as barred by the prior judgment in G.R.
No. 169726 will run counter to the very meaning of res
judicata: "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment."
Since all the requisites of res judicata are not obtaining, the
same will not deter the proceedings and resolution of SCA
No. 007-11 as claimed by Leones.

Incidentally, estoppel has no application here. Leones

asserts that she is not estopped to raise jurisdictional issues
by the mere fact that she instituted the mandamus case
that culminated in the compromise judgment. This
assertion is legally sound, but factually and practically
groundless. There is no more issue on jurisdiction as it has
been established that the RTC properly assumed and
exercised jurisdiction over the case in dispute.
 Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation Inc v.
Mabalacat Institute Inc., G.R. No. 211563,
September 29, 2021.
Issue: Whether or not SVHFI was guilty of forum shopping, [No].

Ratio:

1. The determinative factor in violations of the rule against forum shopping is

whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.

In Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development Co.

(Intramuros), We explained that "[f]orum shopping is the practice of resorting
to multiple fora for the same relief, to increase the chances of obtaining a
favorable judgment."
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court prohibits forum shopping by requiring
the plaintiff or principal party to certify under oath that he or she has not
commenced any action involving the same issues in any court. In Orix Metro
Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Cardline, Inc., We pointed out that the "rule against
forum shopping seeks to address the great evil of two competent tribunals
rendering two separate and contradictory decisions. Forum shopping exists
when a party initiates two or more actions, other than appeal or certiorari,
grounded on the same cause to obtain a more favorable decision from any
tribunal."

The elements of forum shopping are: (i) identity of parties, or at least such
parties representing the same interest; (ii) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the latter founded on the same facts; and (iii) any judgment
rendered in one action will amount to res judicata in the other action.
In Spouses Reyes v. Spouses Chung, We explained the test to determine
whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, to wit:

It has been jurisprudentially established that forum shopping exists when a

party avails himself of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved
adversely by some other courts.

The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another. Simply put, when litis pendentia or res judicata does not exist,
neither can forum shopping exist.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at
least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such
that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other.

On the other hand, the elements of res judicata, also known as bar by
prior judgment, are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the
court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there
must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.
In the instant case, SC found that the second and third
elements of forum shopping and litis pendentia are lacking.
Thus, SC was of the firm view that there is no identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for between a suit for
collection of sum of money and an unlawful detainer case,
and that any judgment rendered in one of these actions
would not amount to res judicata in the other action.

Firstly, there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs

prayed for between both actions.
The only issue that must be settled in an ejectment proceeding is
physical possession of the property involved.
Thus, in actions for unlawful detainer, a complaint sufficiently
alleges said cause of action if it states the following elements, to
wit: (1) initially, the possession of the property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually,
such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (4) within one
year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
On one hand, the purpose of the Collection Case was to
compel MII to pay its rent in view of its occupancy on the
subject lot from the time of SVHFI's initial demand to vacate
the subject lot. Thus, inPro-Guard Security Services Corp. v.
Tormil Realty and Development Corp., this Court pointed out
that the party adjudged to be the lawful possessor in an
ejectment suit is entitled to compensation, reckoned from the
time he demanded the adverse party to vacate the disputed
property.
On the other hand, in the Ejectment Case, SVHFI's
cause of action stemmed from the prejudice it
suffered due to the loss of possession of its property.
Nonetheless, its claims in the Collection Case do not
have a direct relation to its loss of material
possession of the subject lot. Thus, We emphasized
Our pronouncement in Araos v. Court of Appeals,
which We likewise reiterated in Lajave Agricultural
Management and Development Enterprises, Inc. v.
Spouses Javellana (Lajave) to wit:
The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful
detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered
is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the leased property. The
reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue
raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession;
hence, the damages which could be recovered are
those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a
mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use
and occupation of the property, and not the damages
which he may have suffered but which have no direct
relation to his loss of material possession.
Secondly, any judgment rendered in ejectment cases of forcible entry
or unlawful detainer will not amount to res judicata in a civil case of
collection of sum of money for unpaid rent of the same property and
vice versa.

Settled is the rule that the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of
physical possession of the property. Thus, in forcible entry or unlawful
detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental
value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
leased property. Hence, the damages which could be recovered are
those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or
those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property. On
the other hand, in a civil suit for collection of sum of money, what is
sought to be recovered is the payment of rentals only without regard to
the unlawfulness of the occupancy.
 Rule 13
Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgment
and Other Papers
 Edda V. Henson v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 230185, July 07, 2020

Facts: Under the administration of petitioner Intramuros

Administration (IA) held a public bidding for the construction of three
(3) houses. All their bids, however, exceeded the Approved Estimate
(AAE) of the project. But because of time constraints and to avoid
the possible reversion of the funds Bidding and Awards Committee
(BAC) of IA opted not to conduct a second bidding, and instead,
negotiated with the lowest bidder Argus to reduce its bid to the
project fund. Argus agreed on the condition that IA would supply
construction material. Argus completed the project and was paid a
total of P18,001,977.77.13.
Incoming Administrator of IA, Atty. Butiong, requested a COA audit
team to conduct a post-inspection of the project and a re-examination of
related documents in view of the inherent and hidden defects in the
construction of the project. Notice of Disallowance (ND) was issued
disallowing the amount of P2,328,186.00, Henson was held liable for
approving the payment. The ND was upheld by National Government
Audit Office (NGAO). Petitioner appealed arguing among others that the
disallowance was not supported by evidence and was denied due
process as the audit team failed to disclose its findings within a
reasonable time.
COA-CP, partially granted the appeal as it found that petitioner and
Alcantara were not afforded due process while the source of the
reference values or base prices were disclosed to petitioner and
Alcantara, the audit team failed to furnish them with authenticated copies
of the source documents for them to compare the price quotations and to
refute the disallowances. The auditor failed to conduct actual canvass of
the prices of but relied on data supplied by Price evaluation division.
The CO-AP also found that provisions of the law on public bidding were
not complied with. Thus, aside from petitioner and Alcantara, it also held
liable for the disallowance. A corresponding notice of Settlement of
Suspension/Disallowance/Charge for the reconsidered disallowance
amounting to P720,305.34 and the Supplemental ND in the amount of
P1,607,880.66 to the aforementioned persons liable. Petitioner sought
for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the petition.
Henson v. COA, G.R. No. 230185, July 07 2020.

Issue: Whether the counting of the period should commence

on March 13, 2017 in the absence of proof that service was
made on January 17 and 26, 2017, [No].
Ratio:

Petitioner contends that the counting of the period should commence on

March 13, 2017 in the absence of proof that service was made on January
17 and 26, 2017. Petitioner, however, fails to realize that the burden of
proving the timeliness of the instant Petition lies with her, not respondent
COA-CP. It is incumbent upon her to prove, first, that the service made
on her counsel's former address was ineffectual because her counsel was
able to promptly inform respondent COA-CP of her change of address,
and second, that her counsel received the December 27, 2016 Resolution
only on March 13, 2017. These she failed to do.
 It bears stressing that "in the absence of a proper and
adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the
service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties
must be made at the last address of their counsel of record."
Hence, in case there is a change in address, it is the duty of
the lawyer to promptly inform the court and the parties of
such change to ensure that all official and judicial
communications sent by mail will reach him.
 Rule 14
Summons
 Ramos-Yeo v. Spouses Chua, G.R. No. 236075
& 236076 (Resolution), 18 April 2022.

Issue: Whether or not the substituted service of summons to the

Gos was proper, [No].

Ratio: We have already thoroughly discussed in our assailed

Decision that Deputy Sheriff Liboro did not exert serious
efforts to personally serve the summons to the Gos before
resorting to substituted service. Neither did he prove that he
tried to personally serve the summons to them on, at least, three
separate instances, nor did he offer any justification why
personal service was ineffectual
Moreover, it must be stressed that Sheriff Liboro did not even validate
that “Patricio Alampay [Alampay] is a person of suitable age with full
legal capacity x x x, and is considered to have enough discernment to
comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to
deliver the same to the Gos at the earliest possible time for the person to
take appropriate action.” Clearly, the substituted service of summons on
the persons of the Gos is improper; hence, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons.
The Spouses Chua also argue that the rule on substituted service
should not be strictly applied as the Gos were guilty of evident
avoidance. Their contention is misplaced. Contrary to the findings of
the CA, Alampay's receipt of the Spouses Chua's Motion for
Reconsideration that was filed on November 23, 1990 does not
conclude that the Gos flagrantly refused or avoided to receive the
service of summons. At most, it only showed that Alampay received a
copy of the motion of the Chuas. This alone does not validate the
presence of the requisites prescribed by law so as to effect a valid
substituted service. Thus, the impossibility of personal service of
summons is clearly wanting in this case to warrant a substituted
service.
 Parayday et. al. v. Shogun Shipping Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 204555, July 06, 2020.
 Facts:
Parayday and Reboso filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
regularization, underpayment of wages, overtime pay,
rest day pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, service
incentive leave (SIL), thirteenth (13th) month pay, and
night shift differential pay, and claims for moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against respondent
Shogun Shipping Co., Inc. (Shogun Ships), and Vicente R. Cordero
(Cordero) and Antonio "Nonie" C. Raymundo (Raymundo), President
and Vice-President, respectively, of Shogun Ships.
On procedural matter:
Petitioners impute fault on the CA for serving to Atty. Napoleon Banzuela,
petitioners' former counsel, its May 11, 2012 Decision, and not to petitioners'
counsel on record, The Law Firm of Velandrez and Associates, despite receipt of
the Notice of Change in the Composition of the Law Office on January 26,
2012.
On this point, this Court finds that the CA committed no error when it served to
Atty. Banzuela its May 11, 2012 Decision since it was only on July 17, 2012 that
the Court of Appeals received Atty. Banzuela's Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel of petitioners.
In the matter of petitioners' motion to cite respondent
for direct contempt of court for supposedly
misrepresenting facts and using insulting language
against petitioners, SC found the same unmeritorious.
While it is well-established that contemptuous
statements made in pleadings filed with the court
constitute direct contempt, a perusal of respondent's
Comment (to petitioners' Petition) would show that no
such contemptuous language was utilized. Moreover,
this Court finds that respondent has not employed
deceitful acts which would serve as basis for the charge
of direct contempt.
 Henson v. COA, G.R. No. 230185, July 07
2020.
Facts:

In December 1991, under the administration of petitioner Henson),

Intramuros Administration held a public bidding for the construction of
three (3) houses in Plaza San Luis Cultural Commercial Complex. Three
bidders participated in the bidding. All their bids, however, exceeded the
Agency Approved Estimate (AAE) of the project in the amount of P13M.
But because of time constraints and to avoid the possible reversion of the
funds intended for the project, the Bidding and Awards Committee (BAC)
of IA opted not to conduct a second bidding, and instead, negotiated with
the lowest bidder, Argus Development Corporation (Argus), to reduce its
bid. Argus agreed on the condition that IA would supply construction
materials in the amount of not less than P3,391,000.00 and that the
architectural details would be downgraded.
On March 23, 1993, Argus completed the project and was paid a total of
P18,001,977.77.

In 1996, as requested by the then incoming Administrator of IA, Atty.

Karlo Q. Butiong, a COA audit team was created to conduct a post-
inspection of the project and a re-examination of related documents in
view of the inherent and hidden defects in the construction of the project.

On June 5, 1997, Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 97-0001-101 (92-93) was

issued disallowing the amount of P2,328,186.00.
Held liable were petitioner for approving the payment and Pelagio R.
Alcantara (Alcantara), Chief of Urban Planning and Community
Development Office, for certifying the legality of the expenses which were
incurred under his supervision. On March 31, 1998, the Director of the
National Government Audit Office (NGAO) II rendered a Decision
upholding the disallowance.

Although it found that the appeal was indeed belatedly filed, respondent
COA-CP, nevertheless, took cognizance of the appeal in the interest of
substantial justice. Respondent COA-CP partially granted the appeal as it
found that petitioner and Alcantara were not afforded due process in
accordance with COA Memorandum No. 97-012 dated March 31, 1997.
Respondent COA-CP contends that the instant Petition should be
dismissed outright for late filing. Respondent COA-CP alleges
that the instant Petition was belatedly filed because as per
records, a copy of the December 27, 2016 Resolution was earlier
served at the address of record of petitioner's counsel by personal
service on January 17, 2017, and again, by registered mail on
January 26, 2017; that said copy was not received by petitioner's
counsel because she had already moved out; and that a certified
true copy of the Decision was resent to petitioner's counsel at her
new address only because of her letter belatedly informing
respondent COA-CP of the change of address.
Petitioner, on the other hand, counters that in the absence
of proof, such as an affidavit attesting that a copy of the
December 27, 2016 Resolution was indeed served on her
counsel on January 17, 2017 through personal service,
and again, on January 26, 2017 through registered mail,
the reckoning of the period to file the instant Petition
should be March 13, 2017, the actual date of receipt of
her counsel. She also claims that a mere photocopy of the
logbook of respondent COA-CP indicating that service
was made on her counsel on January 17, 2017, and
again, on January 26, 2017 will not suffice.

The Court sides with respondent COA-CP.

Issue: Whether the counting of the period should commence on March 13, 2017 in
the absence of proof that service was made on January 17 and 26, 2017, [No].

Ratio: In the case of Gatmaytan v. Sps. Dolor, the Court gave no credence to the
allegation of the petitioner that her counsel received a copy of the decision on a
later date for lack of evidentiary basis. In that case, the petitioner claimed that the
Court of Appeals erroneously reckoned the date of service on an earlier date as
the service on that date was ineffectual having been made on her counsel's former
address.

Though the Court, in that case, found that the service earlier made to petitioner's
counsel was indeed ineffectual, it nevertheless affirmed the dismissal of the
appeal due to the failure of the petitioner to discharge the burden of proving the
actual date of receipt of her counsel. The Court emphasized that the burden of
proving a fact lies on the party who alleges it and that mere allegation does not
suffice.
Similarly, in this case, petitioner contends that the
counting of the period should commence on March 13,
2017 in the absence of proof that service was made on
January 17 and 26, 2017. Petitioner, however, fails to
realize that the burden of proving the timeliness of the
instant Petition lies with her, not respondent COA-CP. It is
incumbent upon her to prove, first, that the service made
on her counsel's former address was ineffectual because
her counsel was able to promptly inform respondent COA-
CP of her change of address, and second, that her
counsel received the December 27, 2016 Resolution only
on March 13, 2017. These she failed to do.1â
шphi1
It bears stressing that "in the absence of a proper and adequate
notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the order
or resolution of a court upon the parties must be made at the last
address of their counsel of record.”
Hence, in case there is a change in address, it is the duty of the
lawyer to promptly inform the court and the parties of such
change to ensure that all official and judicial communications sent
by mail will reach him.

Here, based on the letters attached to her Compliance, it appears

that petitioner's counsel belatedly informed respondent COA-CP
of her change of address. Thus, the service made by respondent
COA-CP on January 17 and 26, 2017 at the old address of
petitioner's counsel are deemed valid and effectual.
 Rule 35
Summary Judgments
 Aljem’s Credit Investors Corp. v. Spouses
Bautista, G.R. No. 215175, April 25, 2022.

Facts: Petitioner alleged that a parcel of land owned by

the spouses Bautista was mortgaged to it as security
for a loan. The Bautistas failed to pay the loan; thus,
petitioner foreclosed the mortgage. As the spouses
Bautista did not redeem the property within the
reglementary period, title to the property was
consolidated in petitioner's name.
 z
When petitioner was about to take possession of the property, Catalina
Bautista (Catalina), the wife, offered to repurchase the property. Petitioner
accepted the offer, so they entered into a Contract to Sell on August 29,
2000. The Spouses Bautista, however, failed to comply with the Contract
to Sell resulting to its cancellation. The parties entered into another
Contract to Sell on September 27, 2001; however, despite several demands
to pay or vacate the property, the spouses Bautista still failed to comply
even with a new contract.

Thus, petitioner sent demand letters to Catalina to vacate the property.

The last demand letter to vacate was sent on January 18, 2006. 15 All
demands were to no avail, resulting to petitioner's filing of the complaint.
The spouses Bautista alleged that the mortgage contract is void as it did
not bear the conformity of Porferio Bautista (Porferio), the husband. They
also contended that the contract to sell contains a provision on pactum
commissorium, which is illegal, and that the contract should be considered
as an equitable mortgage. They likewise contested the high interest rates
imposed.

Petitioner filed its Reply. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment, alleging that there is no genuine issue of fact
because: (a) the spouses Bautista admitted that the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) of the property is in petitioner's name; (b) there were no
specific denials of the material allegations of the complaint; (c) the
defense of the spouses Bautista are legal issues, not factual; and, (d) there
is no genuine issue of fact.
The spouses Bautista opposed the motion contending that a full-blown
trial is necessary to determine: (a) whether there is an equitable mortgage;
(b) the propriety of the imposition of the interest rates; (c) presence of
pactum commissorium; and, (d) whether Porferio's signature was forged.

RTC denied petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. It held that there
are genuine issues of facts that should be threshed out in a full-blown
trial, such as whether: (a) the contract to sell is an equitable mortgage; (b)
the contract to sell is in the nature of pactum commissorium; (c) the
imposition of interest is proper; and (d) the signature of Porferio was
forged. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not RC’s denial of petitioner’s Motion for
Summary Judgment was proper, [Yes].
Ratio: Preliminarily, the Court emphasizes that the CA did not
rule that the mortgage contract is void; it merely stated the legal
basis (Family Code) that a contract is void without the consent of
the other spouse. The appellate court found it necessary to
discuss the concept in determining the propriety of the denial of
the Motion for Summary Judgment. Further, contrary to
petitioner's statements in its Petition, the CA Decision did not
touch upon the issues of accion publiciana, rescission of the
contract to sell, pactum commissorium, and equitable mortgage.
This does not mean, however, that the appellate court
held that the instant case does or does not involve
these matters. The CA deemed it not necessary to
discuss these in determining the propriety of the
denial. Because, again, the issue in the certiorari and
the instant appeal pertains to the propriety of the
denial of the motion. Even if petitioner did not
expressly raise in its Petition the issue of the
propriety of the denial of the motion, the Court sees
that this is subsumed in the errors assigned in the
Petition. Thus, the Court shall resolve the question.
The Rules of Court allow for parties to move for a summary judgment of
the case:
RULE 35
Summary Judgements
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. — The motion shall be
served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the
hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the
hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
Summary judgment is a procedural device that allows parties to
avoid long litigation and delays, where the pleadings show that
there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried. A genuine issue of
fact is "such issue of fact which requires the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived[,] or
false claim." As such, an issue of fact is genuine if it requires
presentation of evidence to be resolved.
 Rule 38
Relief from Judgments, Orders,
or Other Proceedings
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Standard
Insurance Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 219340, April 28, 2021
Facts: Respondent received a Final Decision on Disputed Assessment
(FDDA) declaring its liability.
In 2014, Standard Insurance commenced Civil Case No. 14-1330 in the RTC
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI) for the judicial determination of the
constitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC with respect to the
taxes charged against the non-life insurance companies. In its Petition, the
respondent contended that the facts of the case must be appreciated in light
of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 10001 (RA 10001) entitled An Act
Reducing the Taxes on Life Insurance Policies.
RTC issued a TRO enjoining the BIR from implementing the
provisions of the NIRC adverted to with respect to the FDDA.
Thereafter, the RTC issued the WPI on January 14, 2015. On May
8, 2015, the RTC rendered its Decision holding that the exercise of
such right to contest was not considered a breach of the provision
itself as to deter the action for declaratory relief, and decreed thusly.
The CA dismissed for failure of the petitioner to comply with the CA
Resolution to submit copies of pertinent pleadings.
On September 7, 2015, the petitioner filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari before the Supreme Court praying for the reversal and
setting aside of the RTC Decision and RTC Order on the following
grounds, among others:
(a) The RTC erred in taking cognizance of the case because a
Petition for Declaratory Relief is not applicable to contest tax
assessments and the petition is fatally defective for failing to
satisfy the basic requisites under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court;
(d) The RTC erred in granting the relief provided in the RTC
Decision since the resultant remedy falls outside the purview
of an action for declaratory relief and it is violative of the rule
that judicial decisions must finally determine the rights,
obligations, and responsibilities of parties.
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari. The RTC
grossly erred and acted without jurisdiction in giving due course
to the petition for declaratory relief.

Respondent argues that the Court erred in not dismissing the

Petition outright on the ground that the petitioner committed
deliberate and willful commission of forum shopping, and that the
issues raised in the Petition are factual in nature and are barred
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the respondent
alleges that the RTC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
respondent's action for declaratory relief and that the latter has
fully satisfied the essential requisites of a petition for declaratory
relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of the Court
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Standard Insurance
Co., Inc., G.R. No. 219340, April 28, 2021.
Issue: Whether, even assuming arguendo that the RTC had
jurisdiction over the petition, the RTC should have dismissed
respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief for failure to
comply with the requisites for the said action, [Yes].
Ratio: A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a
person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order
or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties
thereunder. The said action must comply with the following
requisites: (1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3)
there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4)
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds"
of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue must
be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
After a review of the records of the instant case, We find no reason to
disturb our finding that the RTC should have dismissed respondent's
Petition for Declaratory Relief for failure to comply with the
abovementioned third, fourth, fifth and sixth requisites.

In connection with the third requisite, the Court in City of Lapu-Lapu v.

Philippine Economic Zone Authority ruled that the trial court should have
dismissed Philippine Economic Zone Authority's Petition for Declaratory
Relief for lack of jurisdiction in view of the City of Lapu-Lapu and
Province of Bataan's demand for payment of real property taxes prior to
the filing of the petition for declaratory relief. The Court explained:
We rule that the [Philippine Economic Zone Authority]
erred in availing itself of a petition for declaratory relief
against the City. The City had already issued demand
letters and real property tax assessment against the
[Philippine Economic Zone Authority], in violation of
the [Philippine Economic Zone Authority's] alleged tax-
exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter of [Philippine
Economic Zone Authority's] petition for declaratory
relief, had already been breached. The trial court,
therefore, had no jurisdiction over the petition for
declaratory relief." (Emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that respondent had already received
assessments from the BIR for deficiency documentary stamp
taxes for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013 and deficiency VAT
for the year 2012, which were imposed pursuant to Sections
184 and 108 of the NIRC respectively, when it filed its
Petition for Declaratory Relief assailing the constitutionality
of the said provisions. In view thereof, the RTC should have
already dismissed respondent's Petition for Declaratory
Relief for lack of jurisdiction.
Anent the fourth and fifth requisites, a justiciable controversy
refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or
merely anticipatory. A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.

In the instant case, respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief

does not present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial
determination. Respondent's petition failed to demonstrate that
respondent's legal rights are subject of an imminent or
threatened violation that should be prevented by the declaratory
relief sought; the apprehension that its business may be
rendered technically insolvent in view of the continued
enforcement of the taxes under Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC
appear to be merely conjectural and anticipatory.
Moreover, respondent's adequate remedy upon receipt of the FDDA
for the DST deficiency for taxable year 2011 was to file an appeal in
due course with the CTA instead of resorting to a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC. Similarly, the respondent's adequate
remedy in the event of the issuance of a FAN in connection with its
assessments for deficiency VAT for taxable year 2012 was to protest
the same with the BIR and if denied, appeal such denial to the CTA
or request for reconsideration with the CIR. Thus, the sixth requisite
is likewise absent. In view of the absence of the aforementioned
requisites, the RTC should have dismissed respondent's Petition for
Declaratory Relief.
 Rule 39
Execution, Satisfaction, and
Effect of Judgments
The Linden Suites, Inc. v. Meridien Far East
Properties, Inc
G.R. No. 211969, October 04, 2021
Facts: In a complaint for damages, the RTC of
Pasig City found the respondent liable for the cost
of the demolition of its concrete retaining wall
which encroached on the Petitioner’s property
line. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC. The SC
affirmed the CA Decision; thus, an Entry of
Judgment was subsequently issued. Considering
that the RTC Decision had already attained
finality, a writ of execution was issued.
Service of the writ of execution to the office address of the
respondent failed due to the information that it was Meridien
Development Group, Inc. (MDGI), not the respondent, which
owned the office. A GIS was shown as proof that the occupant of
the said address was indeed MDGI.
The petitioner observed that the 2006 GIS of the respondent and
2009 GIS of MDGI stated the same officers. Thus, the petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion to Examine the Judgment Obligor praying
that the respondent's officers be directed to appear for an
examination of the income and properties owned by the
respondent for the satisfaction of the RTC Decision.
The RTC denied the motion and ruled that the
respondent's officers cannot be subjected to an
examination as they do not reside in its territorial
jurisdiction. Further, to call upon the officers to
ascertain the properties and income of the respondent
for purposes of satisfying the execution of the final
judgment would be violative of the doctrine of separate
juridical entity.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. It held that under
Section 36, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment obligor
cannot be compelled to appear before a court or commissioner
outside the province or city in which he or she resides or is found.
Since the respondent's principal business address is in Makati
City, it is clearly not within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction.
Hence, the RTC of Pasig City cannot compel its officers to appear
before the said trial court for an examination or before an
appointed commissioner.
Hence, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
before the SC. Petitioner argued that the CA erred in interpreting
the prohibition under Section 36 which refers to any court except
the court which rendered the judgment.
Issues:
1. Whether or not RTC as the judgment court has
supervisory control over the execution of its judgment,
[Yes].
2. Whether or not a judgment obligee is entitled, as a matter
of right, to an order of the court which rendered judgment
if the writ of execution issued against the judgment
obligor was returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part,
[Yes].
 1. Whether or not RTC as the judgment court has supervisory
control over the execution of its judgment, [Yes].

It is settled that the court which rendered the judgment has

supervisory control over the execution of its judgment. It does
not, however, give the court the power to alter or amend a final
and executory decision in the absence of the recognized
exceptions, namely: (a) if there is a need to correct clerical
errors which cause no prejudice to any party, (b) void
judgments, and (c) if circumstances transpire after the finality
of the decision which render its execution unjust and
inequitable.
This Court expounded on the supervisory control of the judgment court
in Kukan International Corporation v. Reyes, to wit:
In Carpio v. Doroja, the Court ruled that the deciding court has supervisory
control over the execution of its judgment:
A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still
pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings
in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the
judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of
execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine
every question of fact and law which may be involved in the
execution.
We reiterated the above holding in Javier v. Court of Appeals in this wise:
"The said branch has a general supervisory control over its processes in
the execution of its judgment with a right to determine every question of
fact and law which may be involved in the execution."
The court's supervisory control does not, however, extend as
to authorize the alteration or amendment of a final and
executory decision, save for certain recognized exceptions,
among which is the correction of clerical errors. Else, the
court violates the principle of finality of judgment and its
immutability, concepts which the Court, in Tan v. Timbal,
defined:
As we held in Industrial Management International Development
Corporation vs. NLRC:

It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution

of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive
part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to
settlement of rights of the parties. Once a decision or order
becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power or
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or
amend it. It thereby becomes immutable and unalterable and
any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a
final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose. An order of execution which varies the tenor of the
judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. (Citations
Omitted.)
The judgment court's supervisory control over the case ensures the
enforcement of a party's rights or claims that it has duly recognized.
Indeed, a court's mandate to resolve disputes ends upon its adjudication
of the litigation. It is only when the party that has secured favorable
judgment finally relishes the fruits of its legal calvary that justice may be
said to have been duly served. This tenet fortifies a judgment court's so-
called supervisory control over decided suits.

Corollarily, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court lays down available remedies

and guidelines for the satisfaction of a judgment, including enforcement
of a writ of execution, which the winning party may avail of before the
judgment court. Among the remedies available to such party to fully
enforce the writ of execution is the examination of a judgment obligor.
2. Whether or not a judgment obligee is entitled, as a matter of
right, to an order of the court which rendered judgment if the
writ of execution issued against the judgment obligor was
returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, [Yes].

Section 5 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides that every

court has the inherent power to "amend and control its process
and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice."
The court, in carrying out its jurisdiction, can thus issue
"auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect" and to adopt any suitable process or mode of
proceeding "which appears conformable to the spirit of the said
law or rules."
In Mejia v. Gabayan, 38 the Court held:

The general rule is that it is the ministerial duty of the court to

order the execution of its final judgment. However, Rule 135,
Section 5(g) of the Rules of Court provides that the trial
court may amend and control its process and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice. It has the
inherent power to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of its ministerial offices, and of all other persons in
any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner
appertaining thereto.
 The inherent power of the court carries with it the right to
determine every question of fact and law which may be
involved in the execution. The court may stay or suspend the
execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher interest of
justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of the
decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice or when supervening events warrant it.

The court is also vested with inherent power to stay the

enforcement of its decision based on antecedent facts which
show fraud in its rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial
court apparent on the record.
In the case at bench, the writ of execution was returned unserved, as
shown in the Sheriff's Return dated June 18, 2010. It was therefore
imperative for the judgment court to issue an order for examination
of respondent after the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied.
Such order would have ensured the satisfaction of its judgment, all
the more so if it has already attained finality. In other words, the
RTC, pursuant to its residual authority, should have issued
auxiliary writs and employed processes and other means necessary
to execute its final judgment.
Moreover, the RTC disregarded the general prayer for
"other reliefs just and equitable" by the petitioner in its
motion. The general prayer appearing on the motion
enables the court to award reliefs supported by the
same or other pleadings, by the facts admitted at the
trial, and by the evidence adduced by the parties, even
if these reliefs are not specifically prayed for in the
same.
The trial court should have proceeded to conduct a permissible
examination of respondent, through its officers, so as to disclose
the properties which can be subjected to execution.

The trial court, in denying petitioner's motion, exclusively

confined itself with the one and only limitation stated in the
provision, thereby ultimately defeating the purpose of the rule,
i.e., to ascertain the properties or earnings of a judgment obligor
that are to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment. The RTC
should have employed other allowable means such as, but not
limited to, the submission of documents consisting of a list of
properties and income of respondent and the affidavits of
concerned officers in relation thereto.
Worse, the RTC's denial to examine respondent
curtailed the execution of its very own final judgment,
respondent's liability against petitioner having been
already duly recognized by this Court. Had the trial
court allowed the examination of respondent through
other permissible means, its judgment, which had
attained finality in 2009, would have long been
executed.
 Heirs of Casiño, Sr. v. Development Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 204052-53, March 11,
2020.

Facts: Spouses Casiño obtained a loan from t DBP.,

secured by a real estate mortgage over three parcels of
land situated within the municipalities of Valencia and
Lantapan, Bukidnon.
DBP caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage for
failure of the Casinos to pay the loan. In the auction sale, DBP
made the winning bid, and was issued a Sheriff Certificate of
Sale. The said certificate of sale was subsequently registered
with the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon on September 16, 1977.

Upon failure of the Spouses Casiño to redeem the properties

within the prescribed redemption period, DBP finally caused
the consolidation of the title of the properties in its name.
Consequently, the titles were cancelled and new ones were
issued.
Baldomero later filed a complaint against DBP for
annulment of real estate mortgage and foreclosure
proceedings, quieting of title, redemption, and
damages before the RTC .

After due proceedings, the RTC Br. 8 rendered a

decision dismissing the complaint.

Baldomero appealed the dismissal. Dismissal

affirmed. Unperturbed, Baldomero went to this
Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari, but it
was denied in a Resolution.
Meanwile, Baldomero executed a document where
he relinquished to his son, Aurio [T. Casiño (Aurio)],
all his rights over the three properties, including the
land at Sitio Kibulay, Barrio Cawayan, Municipality
of Lantapan.

On the other hand, on January 13, 1997, DBP sold the

Kibulay property in favor of Green River Gold, Inc.
(Green River).
Subsequently, DBP and Green River, the latter in its
capacity as intervenor, filed before the RTC Br. 8 an ex-
parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession over
the Kibulay property.

A writ of possession was eventually issued by the RTC

Br. 8 in favor of DBP and Green River, however the
court sheriff was unable to enforce the same due to
alleged threats of several armed men employed by
Aurio.
Thereafter, Aurio filed with the RTC Br. 8 an affidavit
of third-party claim, alleging that he is the owner and
possessor of the Kibulay property parcel of land
subject of the writ of possession earlier issued by the
RTC Br. 8.

The following day, Aurio filed [the instant complaint

for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court
Branch 10 in Bukidnon, alleging, among other things,
that he is the true, lawful, and absolute owner of a
certain property situated in Bukidnon.
In response, DBP filed an answer arguing that Aurio's
complaint is already barred by res judicata, as the
former already has ownership over the subject property
through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale held as valid
in a decision, and affirmed by the CA and even the SC.

Moreover, DBP argued that the complaint is defective

for failure to implead Green River, a real party-in-
interest, to which it later sold the subject property in
litigation.
 Green River filed an answer-in-intervention, adopting
substantially the affirmative defenses raised by [DBP]
in its answer, among others: (a) the complaint states
no cause of action; (b) it is barred by laches and
prescription; (c) the RTC Br. 10 has no jurisdiction to
review the decree of the RTC Br. 8, a co-equal court, in
issuing a writ of possession; and (d) the complaint is
bereft of factual and legal consideration.
In the meantime, DBP and Green River filed
anew, in Civil Case No. 1465, an ex-parte
petition for an alias writ of possession, which
the RTC Br. 8 granted on December 3, 2001.
Aurio, [at] this time already deceased and
represented by his heirs, moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 10 in Civil
Case No. 2685-97, the RTC Br. 10 rendered a
Judgment, which declared that the subject property
being claimed by Aurio is different from that being
claimed by [DBP] and Green River. It also held that
the Decision in the case filed by his father, is not
binding on Aurio or his heirs because they were not
parties to the said case.
 , RTC Br. 10 also directed Green River to vacate the
The
premises of the subject property and not to disturb
Aurio's possession of the same.

DBP and Green River separately filed their own

motions for reconsideration, while Aurio, who died
pending proceedings and was now represented by his
heirs, filed a motion for execution of judgment
pending appeal.
The RTC Br. 10 denied the motions for
reconsideration and granted the motion for execution
pending appeal.

Aggrieved, DBP and Green River filed separate

appeals with the CA, which were eventually
consolidated. DBP also filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the
RTC Br. 10, acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it
issued the Order dated January 4, 2007 granting
Aurio's motion for execution pending appeal.
The CA granted the appeals of respondents, vacated and set
aside the Judgment of the RTC and ruled that Aurio's
complaint lacks merit and is indeed barred by res judicata.

The CA also granted DBP's Petition for Certiorari, holding that

the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted
Aurio's motion for execution pending appeal.

MR of Aurelio denied.
Issues:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the

RTC Br. 10 committed grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the Order for execution pending appeal in favor
of Aurio, [No]; and

2. Whether or not there is res judicata in this case, [Yes].

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the
RTC Br. 10 committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
the motion for execution pending appeal in favor of Aurio,
[No].

2. The records would show that the RTC Br. 10 acted in grave
abuse of discretion. While it may be true that the RTC Br. 10
based its order granting the motion for execution pending
appeal on alleged facts, such extraordinary writ of
execution must still be based on good reasons.
Section 2 (a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. —

a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal.
— On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction
over the case and is in possession of either the original
record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the
time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even
before the expiration of the period to appeal.
 After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion
for execution pending appeal may be filed in the
appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good

reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
In this case, the RTC Br. 10 granted the motion for execution
pending appeal primarily based on the advanced age of
Aurio's spouse, Patricia, who was supposed to be sixty-five
(65) years old at the time.

While there is indeed jurisprudence wherein this Court has

affirmed the granting of a discretionary motion for execution
pending appeal on the reason of advanced age, such
jurisprudence does not apply in the instant case. In fact, the
circumstances in Republic represented by the Department of
National Defense v. Hon. Barroso, Jr. (Saligumba case) which was
cited by the RTC Br. 10 to justify its order, are not similar with
the present case.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the
plaintiffs in the Saligumba case were aged 84 and 81
years old respectively and were both clearly in the
twilight of their lives.
On the other hand, Patricia was around sixty-five (65)
years old at the time the motion for execution pending
appeal was granted and there was even no allegation,
much less proof, that she had any life-threatening
illnesses. It must be also noted that the Saligumba case
was decided via an unsigned Resolution, hence, only
binding on the parties therein.
2. Whether or not there is res judicata in this case, [Yes].

There is identity of subject matter.

CA is correct in its conclusion that while the landholdings

respectively claimed by respondents and petitioners have
different technical particulars, the evidence on record would
clearly reveal that the property subject of the writ of
possession issued by RTC Br. 8 is part and parcel of the
property being claimed by petitioners.
It must be reiterated that at the outset, Aurio himself
alleged in his complaint that the property in litigation
is the same property being subjected to a writ of
possession by the RTC Br. 8 in Civil Case No. 1465.

There would be no sense in Aurio filing a third party

affidavit in Civil Case No. 1465 and subsequently
filing the instant complaint for quieting of title, if he
himself does not believe that the property subject of
the writ of possession and the property subject of the
instant case is not the same.
There is identity of parties

Likewise, the CA did not err in finding that there is substantia

identity of parties in this case. It was correctly held that Aurio
not only an heir of Baldomero, but may also be considered
successor-in-interest by virtue of the Kasabotan dated April 25
1994, to wit:

Although the parties involved in the two cases are not exactl
the same, there is substantially an identity of parties fo
purposes of res judicata. The fundamental rule is that for re
judicata to apply, only substantial, not absolute, identity o
parties is required.
In fact, there is identity of parties not only where the
parties are the same but also those in privity with them,
as between their successor-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action,
litigating for the same thing and in the same capacity,
or where there is substantial identity of parties.

In the present case, Aurio is not only an heir of his

father Baldomero, who instituted the first quieting of
title case; Aurio is also considered a successor-in-
interest by title of Baldomero by virtue of the
conveyance of the subject property through the
Kasabotan dated April 25, 1994.
There is identity of parties not only when the parties in
the cases are the same, but also between those in privity
with them, such as between their successors-in-interest.

Absolute identity of parties is not required, and where a

shared identity of interest is shown by the identity of
relief sought by one person in a prior case and the second
person in a subsequent case, such was deemed sufficient.
 Aurio is not only an heir of Baldomero, but is also the
latter's successor-in-interest by virtue of conveyance of
the subject property through the Kasabotan dated
April 25, 1994.

Therefore, Aurio and his heirs have community of

interest with Baldomero who initiated Civil Case No.
1465, and thus meet the test of identity of parties.
There is identity in the cause of action

For the last requirement, CA is correct in finding that

there is identity in the cause of action. Both Civil Case
No. 1465 and the instant case have causes of action
that inevitably deal with quieting of title over the
subject property.
This Court has previously employed various tests in
determining whether or not there is identity of
causes of action as to warrant the application of the
principle of res judicata. One test of identity is the
“absence of inconsistency test” where it is
determined whether the judgment sought will be
inconsistent with the prior judgment. If no
inconsistency is shown, the prior judgment shall not
constitute a bar to subsequent actions.
As a rule, in an action for quieting of title, the
plaintiff or complainant must demonstrate a legal or
equitable title to, or an interest in the subject
property. He must likewise show that the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that purportedly
casts a cloud on his title is in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
In his complaint, Aurio alleged that he is the true, lawful,
and absolute owner of the property being subjected to a writ
of possession by the RTC Br. 8 in Civil Case No. 1465.

Any affirmative relief that this Court may grant on said

cause of action would necessarily affect the validity of the
real estate mortgage foreclosure proceedings and the
resulting sale of the property subject of Civil Case No. 1465;
issues which could no longer be revived, as the same have
already been settled. Consequently, the rights of ownership
and possession over such property would also be affected.
In Civil Case No. 1465, Baldomero assailed the
validity of the real estate mortgage foreclosure
proceedings dated December 28, 1975, which
resulted to an auction sale that transferred
ownership of the subject land, among other parcels
of land, to DBP as evidenced by the Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale. In fact, Baldomero, in his
complaint, also prayed for quieting of title over the
said land, which is essentially the same relief sought
by Aurio in the instant case.
In dismissing the above complaint filed by Baldomero, the RTC Br. 8
Decision in Civil Case No. 1465 held that Baldomero lost his right to
repurchase the subject land when he failed to assert such right within
the statutory period. The trial court likewise held that the unregistered
parcel of land covered by TD No. 01915 (the same property subject of
the writ of possession issued by RTC Br. 8 that is being claimed by
Aurio in the instant case) was indeed among those properties
mortgaged to and eventually foreclosed upon by DBP. The dispositive
portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, plaintiff's Complaint

and/or Amended Complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
The counter-claim of defendants DBP and spouses Juanito
and Leontina Lavina are also DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
As mentioned earlier, the above Decision was affirmed by the CA and this
Court. Thus, there is no dispute that the Decision of the RTC Br. 8,
categorically dismissing Baldomero's complaint and/or amended
complaint is final and executory.

In the instant case, Aurio is essentially asking for the same relief as
Baldomero in Civil Case No. 1465, and in effect, is collaterally asking for
the nullification of the real estate mortgage of Baldomero with the DBP
and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings.

It bears stressing that the doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two
different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of
judgment.
The second concept which is conclusiveness of judgment
states that a fact or question which was in issue in a
former suit and was judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the
parties to that action and persons in privity with them are
concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future
action between such parties or their privies, in the same
court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on
either the same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second
action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their
privies will be final and conclusive in the second if
that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit. In this case, identity of
cause of action is not required, but merely identity of
issues.
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the validity of the
real estate mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale can
no longer be attacked in a new complaint for quieting of
title, more so because the Decision in Civil Case No. 1465 has
become final and an entry of judgment has already been
entered in our books.
To put it simply, we have already ruled, in effect, that DBP is
the owner of the subject property as it was acquired by it
through a valid foreclosure sale. Granting the reliefs sought by
Aurio and his heirs would be inconsistent with the ruling in
Civil Case No. 1465 and will disturb the final and executory
Decision in the said case.
Moreover, the writ of possession that was issued as a
result of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1465 cannot
be regarded as a cloud upon the alleged title of Aurio,
as the said writ and/or the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 1465 were not shown to be "in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable or unenforceable." It is the
claimant or plaintiff who has the burden of proof as a
general principle of due process, and in this case, Aurio
has fell short in discharging his burden when he failed
to prove neither his alleged title to the subject property
nor anything that could constitute a cloud upon that
title.
 Philippine National Bank v. Alma T.
Placencia Fontanoza
G.R. No. 213673, March 02, 2022
F
Facts:

The Fontanozas obtained a loan from PNB. When the

Fontanozas failed to pay, PNB foreclosed the mortgaged
property. As the sole bidder in the public auction, PNB
acquired the lot and, subsequently, registered the sale.
However, the Fontanozas failed to redeem the property.
More than nine years later, PNB filed an ex-parte
petition for issuance of writ of possession before the
RTC. The RTC granted PNB's petition. More than two
months after the RTC's Resolution became final and
executory, the Fontanozas filed an opposition with
motion to recall writ of possession. They averred that a
suit against PNB was pending before another court.
Likewise, she had a contract with PNB for the
repurchase of the property, and they had already paid
the agreed down payment, which she claimed as
earnest money. In addition, she was not notified of
PNB's petition.
The RTC held that any question regarding the
validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot
be used as a legal ground to refuse the issuance
of a writ of possession. Allowing an opposition
based on any ground to hold in abeyance the
issuance of a writ of possession is tantamount to
an injunction prohibiting the said issuance. Thus,
what cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly.
On appeal, the CA noted that in the case of Barican v. IAC
(Barican) the SC deemed it inequitable to issue a writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser in the auction sale. In
Barican, the mortgagee bank waited five years from the time
of the foreclosure before filing a petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession. Besides, the property involved was
already in the possession of a third person pursuant to a
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, which was
executed even before the purchaser could register the
sheriff’s certificate of sale.
.
The CA held that the instant case is similar to
Barican. Aside from PNB's delay in applying for a
writ, Alma remained in possession of the property.
Although she is not a third person to the mortgage,
Alma is claiming the property as a purchaser and
no longer as a mortgagor. Hence, the issuance of
the writ of possession in favor of PNB is unjust, as
the issue of repurchase has not yet been settled
Issue: Whether RTC erred in issuing the Writ of Possession in favor of
PNB despite Alma’s claim that she is a third party who held the property
adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor, [Yes].

Ratio: Generally, “once title to the property has been consolidated in the
buyer's name upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property
within the one-year redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a
matter of right belonging to the buyer. Consequently, the buyer can
demand possession of the property at any time. Its right of possession has
then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute owner and the
issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial function that does not admit of
the exercise of the court's discretion. The court, acting on an application
for its issuance, should issue the writ as a matter of course and without
any delay.”
In this case, the records showed no proof that PNB has formally
consolidated the title of the property in its name. Additionally, it
took the bank more than nine years before it petitioned for the
issuance of a writ of possession.

Nevertheless, the bank registered itself as the purchaser following

the foreclosure sale, through a Certificate of Sale recorded in the
Registry of Deeds on January 28, 2002.

Moreover, Alma failed to redeem the property during the one-year

redemption period. Thus, she ceased to have rights over the subject
lot either as a mortgagor or redemptioner. These circumstances
suggest that PNB, although it did not consolidate the title in its name
yet, is entitled to possess the property as the registered purchaser
after the foreclosure sale, and because of Alma's failure to redeem it
even if she is in actual possession of the lot.
However, there are exceptions to the rule that the trial court's duty to
issue the writ of possession in favor of the purchaser is ministerial. “In
Nagtalon v. United Coconut Planters Bank, the Court enumerated the
following jurisprudential exceptions: (a) gross inadequacy of the purchase
price; (b) third party claiming right adverse to the mortgagor/debtor,
and; (c) failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to the mortgagor.”
The first and third exceptions cannot apply to this case since there are no
allegations referring to either the purchase price or surplus proceeds of
the sale, if any.
Jurisprudence teaches that when there are third-party possessors of the
property, the RTC should instead conduct a hearing to determine the
nature of the adverse possession. However, for this exception to apply, it is
not enough that the property is in the possession of a third party, it must
also be held by the third party adversely to the judgment debtor or
mortgagor.
To emphasize, a third party should hold possession of the subject
property adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor. Here,
Alma cannot be considered as a third party since she herself was
the mortgagor who failed to redeem the property during the
foreclosure proceeding and the redemption period. In other words,
she had full knowledge that PNB was the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale and that she did not redeem the property during the
one-year period for redemption. Alma can hardly be considered as a
third party holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor
or mortgagor precisely because she herself was the mortgagor. At
least with respect to the foreclosure itself, she already surrendered
any right (as a mortgagor or redemptioner) she had over the
property after she failed to redeem it.
To stress, although Alma is supposedly in possession
of the property, she cannot be considered as a third
party who held the property adversely to the
judgment debtor or mortgagor simply because she
herself was the mortgagor who failed to redeem the
lot. This is notwithstanding PNB's delay, for reasons
only known to it, in filing a petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession.
Alma posits that since she filed a case "For the declaration of the extra-
judicial foreclosure and sale as null and void or for repurchase," the RTC
erroneously issued the writ of possession in PNB's favor. Yet, jurisprudence
teaches that "[n]ot even any question regarding the validity of the mortgage
or its foreclosure is a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of
execution/writ of possession." Hence, she cannot insist on the recall of the
writ of possession solely because she filed a separate case which questioned
the foreclosure and advanced her claim of repurchase.

More importantly, PNB's right to the writ of possession is solidified by the

fact that the RTC's order issuing the said writ has already become final and
executory.
In the case at bench, the aforementioned exceptions are not
present. To stress, the August 17, 2011 Resolution of the RTC
which granted PNB's petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession already became final and executory on September
15, 2011, as evidenced by a Certificate of Finality dated
November 21, 2011. Alma filed an opposition more than two
months after the issuance of the writ became final and
executory. Although this matter was not immediately raised
in the RTC, it is a vital point which must not be overlooked
since it demonstrated that Alma cannot simply object to the
issuance of the writ by filing a mere opposition or motion.
Aromin v. Heirs of Somis, G.R. No. 204447,
May 3, 2021.

 Doctrine: When a decision becomes final and

executory, it becomes valid and binding upon the
parties and their successors in interest. Such decision or
order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may have been.
Facts: The instant case stemmed from a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment 3 assailing the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33,
docketed as Civil Case No. 1782-BG which approved the
Compromise Agreement executed by and between Maria
Magdalena Aromin (Maria) and Leonila Somis (Leonila), as
well as "[o]ther documents and proceedings in connection
thereto." Maria alleged that she and her deceased husband
Rufino 6 owned three (3) parcels of land.
According to Maria, in 2007, she instructed her son, Briccio V.
Aromin (Briccio), to pay the realty tax for the foregoing lots.
Briccio then discovered that Lots A and C were sold to the
spouses Wilfredo and Leonila (spouses Somis), through a Deed
of Sale with the Right to Repurchase dated May 20, 1971,
allegedly signed by Maria and Rufino.

On June 18, 2007, Maria filed a Complaint for Annulment of

Documents with Damages, alleging that she did not sign the
Deed of Sale transferring Lot C to the spouses Somis, hence it is
void.

Subsequently, on November 28, 2007, the parties entered into a

Compromise Agreement, which stated:
In the compromise agreement, in consideration of the withdrawal of the
case filed by Maria Aromin, Leonila Somisagreed that the subject
property shall belong to the Maria and in turn, the Maria agreed that
the property subject at bar located in Baccuit Sur, Bauang, La Union a
shall belong to the SECOND PARTY.

The trial court approved the Compromise Agreement. The compromise

judgment attained finality.

A Writ of Execution was issued. On July 8, 2008, Maria filed a motion to

set aside the Order granting the issuance of the writ of execution. She
claimed that she intended to give Lot C (and not Lot B) to the spouses
Somis. She asserted that the description or PIN of the property given to
the spouses Somis under the Compromise Agreement was erroneous.
The RTC granted the motion. It directed the change of the Lot from Lots B to Lot C).
The spouses Somis moved for reconsideration but they were denied.

Aggrieved, the Somis couple filed a Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court.
In its January 22, 2010 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 109076, the CA granted the
Petition, declaring that "unless the court-approved compromise agreement is set
aside through the available remedies provided under the law, its nature as a final
and executory judgment demands that it be implemented strictly in accordance with
its terms and conditions."

Thus, the RTC's October 20, 2008 Order was set aside. In effect, the RTC's January 17,
2008 Decision was reinstated. Maria moved for reconsideration which the appellate
court denied in its November 12, 2012 Resolution. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether or not when a decision becomes final and
executory, it becomes valid and binding upon the parties and
their successors in interest. Such decision or order can no longer
be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may have
been, [Yes].

Ratio: This Court has repeatedly held that "when a decision

becomes final and executory, it becomes valid and binding upon
the parties and their successors in interest. Such decision or
order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may have been."
A definitive final judgment, however erroneous,
is no longer subject to change or revision.

A decision that has acquired finality becomes

immutable and unalterable. This quality of
immutability precludes the modification of a
final judgment, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.
And this postulate holds true whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered it
or by the highest court in the land.
It is beyond dispute that the Compromise Agreement was approved by the
trial court in its January 17, 2008 Decision which decision became final.
Consequently, a Writ of Execution was issued. The final and executory
nature of the Compromise Agreement was likewise reiterated in the
appellate court's January 22, 2010 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 109076. Thus,
in view of the finality of the trial court's January 17, 2008 Decision which
upheld the Compromise Agreement, the latter is binding between and
among the parties.

Moreover, the appellate court soundly disposed of the instant case in its
twin Resolutions dated February 13, 2012 and November 12, 2012 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 123064. It correctly ruled that the Compromise Agreement was
valid and binding since there was a meeting of the minds between the
parties.
Article 1305 of the Civil Code provides that a contract is a meeting of the
minds between two persons, whereby one is bound to give something or
to render some service to the other. A valid contract requires the
concurrence of the following essential elements pursuant to Article 1318
of the same Code:

Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

(1)Consent of the contracting parties;
(2)Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3)Cause of the obligation which is established.
The Compromise Agreement was clear that the contracting
parties mutually agreed to transfer to each other the
properties indicated therein. Even if it was Maria's counsel
who prepared the written instrument, she or her
representative was expected to exercise due diligence in
reviewing the entries therein before signing the instrument.
Moreover, if indeed there was a mistake on which property
should be transferred to the spouses Somis, Maria should
have availed of her remedies immediately.
.
Rule 43
Professional Regulation Commission v. Alo, G.R. No. 214435, February
14, 2022
Doctrine:
There is no law granting the PRC exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
cases decided by the Board, nor is there any law excluding such cases
from being taken cognizance by the CA through a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
It is clear from the above provisions that a Rule 43 petition to the CA
includes all awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions, except those under the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Pertinently, this Court has ruled that the list of quasi-judicial entities
found in Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is not exclusive.
Facts:
- In September 2007, Alo allegedly went to the PRC Head Office in
Manila to apply for a Professional Teacher's License based on Section
26 (C) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7836. 8 RA 7836, under certain
conditions, grants a certificate of registration and professional license
to qualified applicants without need for examination.
- A few days later, she was issued a professional identification card,
followed by a certificate of good standing and a certificate of
membership in the National Organization of Professional Teachers,
Inc.
- respondent Dayamon Didato Alo (Alo) was formally charged
with unprofessional conduct and/or dishonorable conduct before
the Board for Professional Teachers (Board), which operates under
petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), for using
fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration and
professional license.
- The Board rendered a Decision against Alo and denied Alo’s
motion for reconsideration.
- Without elevating the case to the PRC, Alo directly filed a petition
for Review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
- The CA rendered the assailed Decision, granting Alo's petition for
review and reversing the ruling of the Board.
- Aggrieved, the Board and the PRC filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction to directly review the Board's
decision, considering that the same belongs to the PRC [Yes]
Ratio: The CA has jurisdiction of the case.
The PRC argues that the CA has no jurisdiction to directly review the
September 11, 2012 decision of the Board. To support this contention, the PRC
cites Section 9 (c) of RA 8981, which enumerates the powers of the Board,
including the power to make decisions, and the mode of appeal of an
aggrieved party, to wit:

Section 9. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities of the Various

Professional Regulatory Boards. — The various professional
regulatory boards shall retain the following powers, functions and
responsibilities:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To hear and investigate cases arising from violations of their
respective laws, the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder and
their Codes of Ethics and, for this purpose, may issue summons,
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to alleged violators and/or
witnesses to compel their attendance in such investigations or hearings:
Provided, That, the decision of the Professional Regulatory Board shall,
unless appealed to the Commission, become final and executory after
fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of judgment or decision;
 (c) To hear and investigate cases arising from violations of their respective laws, the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder and their Codes of Ethics and, for this purpose,
may issue summons, subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to alleged violators and/or
witnesses to compel their attendance in such investigations or hearings: Provided, That, the
decision of the Professional Regulatory Board shall, unless appealed to the Commission,
become final and executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of judgment or
decision;

The PRC maintains that it implements the above provision through their own Resolution No.
2013-775. Section 1 thereof states:

Section 1. Appeal, Period Non-Extendible. — The decision or the order of the Board
that completely disposes of the case shall be final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof without an appeal being perfected or taken by either party. The
aggrieved part may file a notice of appeal to the Commission together with appellant's brief
or memorandum on appeal, copy furnished the adverse party, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the decision or order, n and shall pay the appeal and legal research fees.
 The period for perfecting an appeal shall be non-extendible. (Underscoring
supplied)
This argument holds no water.

Preliminarily, it must be reiterated that jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of
a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have
authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction
over the subject matter.

This Court has long held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by
law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous
belief of the court that it exists.
 The above-cited provisions by the PRC, while showing
that they may have appellate jurisdiction over decisions or
orders of the Board, does not divest the CA of its own
appellate jurisdiction. To put it simply, there is no law
granting the PRC exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases
decided by the Board, nor is there any law excluding such
cases from being taken cognizance by the CA through a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as
will be discussed further below.
 A cursory reading of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 58 (BP 129) or
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, would show
the extent of the CA's jurisdiction. Section 9 of BP 129, as amended by
RA 7902 59 provides:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

xxx

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,

decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions
of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948.

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials
or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless
extended by the Chief Justice. (Underscoring supplied)
 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is consistent with the aforequoted
provision, particularly Section 9 (3) of BP 129, which grants the CA
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions. Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court provides:

The Board, by virtue of the power vested in it by the provision

above, clearly exercised its quasi-judicial functions when it
investigated the case, held a hearing, and issued a decision that
affected the rights of a private party, herein respondent Alo.
 Given this, there is no question that the September 11, 2012 Decision of
the Board is covered by the jurisdiction of the CA and can be subject of a Rule
43 petition.

While the CA has jurisdiction, Alo failed to

exhaust all administrative remedies, and
thus, under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, her case must be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.

Despite having established that the CA has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, the question of giving due course to the Rule 43 petition is
a different issue.
 Alo disregarded its procedural rules as quoted earlier,
and that it was not given any chance to review the decision
of the Board. Alo did not exhaust administrative remedies
before going to the CA.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is

grounded on practical reasons, including allowing the
administrative agencies concerned to take every
opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as affording
the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief
through the administrative processes and sparing them of
the laborious and costly resort to courts.
 The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the
court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first
giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after
due deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
 However, this principle is not inflexible, and admits of
several exceptions that include situations where the very
rationale of the doctrine has been defeated, to wit:.

(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party

invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(a)where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (
(b)where judicial intervention is urgent;

(c)where the application of the doctrine may cause great

and irreparable damage;

(d)where the controverted acts violate due process; (

(e)where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative

remedies has been rendered moot;

(f)where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate

remedy;
(g) (k) where strong public interest is involved; and

(h)(l) in quo warranto proceedings.

 However, the records would show that none of these exceptions are
present in this case. Alo filed the petition for review with the CA on
May 2, 2013 without any justification or reason on why she did not file
an appeal with the PRC instead, considering that the latter is the proper
procedure and it was still within the 15-day reglementary period. Not
only is this a blatant disregard of procedural rules, but also a denial of
an opportunity for the PRC to review the Board's decision and if
necessary, correct or modify the same, without resorting to the judiciary
and unnecessarily adding to the courts' already clogged dockets. This is
definitely contrary to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies,
and thus, the CA should have dismissed the petition for lack of cause of
action.
 Edison Prieto And Federico Rondal, Jr. v.
Erlinda Cajimat
G.R. No. 214898, June 08, 2020
 Facts: A head-on collision between a red Yamaha tricycle driven by
Rondal and a black Yamaha "chop-chop" motorcycle resulted in the
death of Cajimat.
 Subsequently, a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence resulting in
Homicide was filed against Rondal before the MCTC. Meanwhile,
Respondent, the mother of the deceased, filed a separate civil
action for damages against Rondal and Prieto, the registered owner
of the red Yamaha tricycle.
The MCTC convicted Rondal, Jr. Meanwhile, the RTC found
Rondal and Prieto negligent and are therefore civilly liable. In
addition, the RTC reasoned that deceased Cajimat
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that Prieto's
vicarious liability is grounded on his failure to exercise due
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage and in the
selection of his employee.
Hence, petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45.
Issue: Whether or not the question whether there were indeed headlights
and blinkers in deceased Cajimat III's motorcycle is a question of fact,
[Yes].

Ratio: Petitioners are raising a question of fact, that is, whether there were
indeed headlights and blinkers in deceased Cajimat III's motorcycle which
would allegedly make him negligent in driving his motorcycle in the
national highway during nighttime and thus absolve the petitioners from
any liability on the injury caused to the deceased. The issue raised by
petitioners is clearly a question of fact which requires a review of the
evidence presented. It is well-settled that this Court is not a trier of facts,
and it is not its function to examine, review, or evaluate the evidence all
over again. As a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers
and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
should cover only questions of law, thus:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring

to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis ours)
For a question to be one of law, it must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by any of the litigants. The
resolution of the issue must solely depend on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
Once it is obvious that the issue invites a review of
the evidence presented, the question posed is one
of fact.
However, the rule admits of exceptions, which includes, but not
limited to: (1) where the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises, and conjectures; (2) where the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) where the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.

Petitioners failed to show that this case falls under any of the
exceptions. Hence, this Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate
from the findings of the RTC and the CA that no sufficient evidence
was presented by petitioners to prove that indeed Cajimat III's
motorcycle had no headlight and blinkers during the mishap.
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, Ninth Division,
G.R. No. 209516, January 17, 2023.
Doctrine: It is basic that the special civil action of
certiorari is a remedy available only when there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. When appeal
is available, the action will not prosper even if the
ascribed error is lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion.
Facts:
- In 1970, petitioner, a lawyer and a certified public accountant, was employed by
private respondent University of the East (UE) as a regular full-time faculty
member in the College of Business Administration. After 23 years of service, she
optionally retired in 1993.
- Immediately following her optional retirement, petitioner was appointed as
College Secretary in the College of Law of the same university, and later on as
Associate Dean.
- In 2005, petitioner compulsorily retired as Associate Dean after reaching 65 years
of age. Accordingly, she sought for the payment of her retirement benefits, which
the university computed on the basis of the current hourly rate of a faculty
member in the College of Business Administration with a teaching load of 24 units
— i.e., PHP224.51.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a Complaint, arguing (1) that her rate as a faculty member in
the College of Law should be used as basis in computing her retirement pay because she
is considered a regular faculty member in the College of Law based on the four-fold test
and based on the Court's ruling in St. Theresita's Academy v. National Labor Relations
Commission (St. Theresita's Academy); (2) that the use of her rate as Associate Dean
contravenes Board Resolution No. 75-8-86 which provides that retirement pay shall be in
accordance with the faculty benefits prevailing at the time of retirement; and (3) that UE
acted in bad faith in requiring her to retire from the College of Business Administration
and in delaying the resolution of her claim for differential retirement benefits.

- Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of the petitioner.

- The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the ruling of the arbiter
and dismissed the Complaint. Petitioner filed for a Motion for Reconsideration but
this was denied by the Commission
 - CA sustained the NLRC. It held that under Board Resolution No. 75-8-86, petitioner's
retirement pay was correctly based on the current hourly rate of a faculty member in
the College of Business Administration because basing it on such rate would yield
higher benefits than basing it on that of an administrative official or Associate Dean;
that petitioner's retirement pay cannot be based on her rate as lecturer in the College of
Law since the same was merely contractual and on a semester-to-semester basis; and
that consequently, the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the Complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the appellate court err in sustaining the NLRC, [No].

Ruling: It is basic that the special civil action of certiorari is a remedy available only when
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. When appeal is available, the action will not prosper even if the ascribed error is lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
Here, petitioner resorted to certiorari by alleging that the appellate court acted in grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the assailed Decision. Yet, a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy was available to her for purposes
of challenging the disposition of the CA, i.e., through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:

Section 1. Filing with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment
or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.
Petitioner's counsel explained that the resort to certiorari was made in view of the lack of time to file the
appeal, in turn caused by the "volume and pressure of work in his law firm, without the assistance of his
associate, who went on an indefinite leave x x x." However, such circumstance does not belong to the
exceptions to the rule, which are (1) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates, (2)
when the broader interest of justice so requires, (3) when the writs issued are void, and (4) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

As it is settled that a party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari for the lost remedy of
ordinary appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one's own neglect or error in the choice of
remedies, the Petition deserves to be dismissed
Land bank of the Philippines v. Quilit, G.R. No. 194167, February 10, 2021.

Doctrine: The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its function to examine, review, or
evaluate the evidence all over again.

Facts: On August 13, 1999, herein respondents Mauricio Laoyan (Laoyan; now deceased) and Magdalena
Quilit (Quilit) filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) a petition for annulment of
sale of an agricultural land and redemption thereof docketed as DARAB Case No. 0347-99-B-CAR. The
case involves two parcels of land located at La Trinidad, Benguet containing areas of 219 square meters
and 3,042 square meters, including improvements thereon, which were formerly owned by the Spouses
Pedro and Erenita Tolding (Spouses Tolding). These lots were mortgaged by the Spouses Tolding and
were later acquired by petitioner through foreclosure, by virtue of which petitioner was issued Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-43270 and T-43271.

Ruling of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator: After the parties submitted their respective position
papers, the RARAD rendered a Decision 10 holding, among others, that respondents may exercise their
right of redemption for both parcels of land.
Ruling of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. On May 4, 2000,
petitioner filed with the DARAB a Petition for Certiorari assailing the December 17, 1999
Decision, April 10, 2000 Order, issuance of the writ of execution and certificate of finality
by the RARAD, in accordance with Section 3, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of
Procedure.

Petitioner, in its Petition for Review filed with the CA, averred, among others, that the
RARAD acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it denied its Notice of Appeal.
LBP likewise claimed that the DARAB committed an error in judgment when it dismissed
its May 2, 2000 Petition for Certiorari for lack of jurisdiction.

The CA explained further that even if the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure permitted
the filing of a petition for certiorari with the DARAB, the DARAB may dismiss the same
considering the petitioner's failure to file the requisite motion for reconsideration with the
RARAD within the five-day reglementary period provided for by the rules. Hence the
instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was able to show that this case is one of the exceptions to the general rule
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, [No].

Ratio: This Court is also not inclined to examine and make a determinative finding on the issues raised by
petitioner, particularly: (1) whether RARAD correctly determined the proper reckoning points for the
period within which petitioner must file its Notice of Appeal; and (2) whether the subject parcels of land
are considered agricultural lands susceptible to agricultural cultivation, which can be redeemed by
respondents in the exercise of their right of redemption. These issues raised by petitioner are clearly
questions of fact which require the Court to review the evidence presented by the parties.

Well-settled is the rule that "this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its function to examine, review,
or evaluate the evidence all over again." Along the same lines, a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. Thus, in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, the Court is generally limited to reviewing only errors of law and not of facts.
Nevertheless, the Court has enumerated several exceptions to this rule, such as when: "(1) the conclusion
is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual
findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case;
and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties."

We find that petitioner failed to show that this case falls under any of the exceptions. Thus, we will not
delve into the factual issues of the case. Moreover, having disposed of the case in the foregoing manner,
there is no need to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioner. At any rate, the disallowance of the
petitioner's February 4, 2000 notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself. Petitioner
should have elevated the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Under Section 4, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari shall be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the
judgment, the order or the resolution sought to be assailed. The February 28, 2000 Order of the RARAD
denying petitioner's notice of appeal was received by it on March 10, 2000.
Thus, petitioner only had sixty 60 days from that date, or from the date it received the April 10, 2000 Order of
the RARAD, to file its petition for certiorari with the CA. For failure of petitioner to timely file its petition for
certiorari with the proper appellate court, the said order remained valid and effective. Accordingly, the
December 17, 1999 of the RARAD remains final and executory and beyond the ambit of judicial review.
Lufthansa Technik Philippines, Inc. v. Cuizon, G.R. No. 184452, February 12, 2020.

Doctrine: Although as a rule this Court may only review questions of law, however, in exceptional cases, it
may review the facts in labor cases where the findings of the CA and of the labor tribunals are contradictory.

Facts:

- Petitioners claim that they validly terminated respondent Cuizon’s employment for loss of trust and
confidence in his ability to perform his duties as MA2 Duty Manager. They point out that such loss of
trust and confidence resulted from Cuizon’s numerous violations were committed in the course of two
separate incidents.
 - On November 7, 2005, Cuizon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners.
- The Labor Arbiter dismissed Cuizon’s complaint for lack of merit. The National Labor Relations
Commission likewise held that there was no illegal dismissal.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and held that Cuizon
was indeed illegally dismissed.
- Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Cuizon was validly terminated on the ground of loss of trust and confidence and gross
negligence, [No].
Ratio:

As a general rule, the Supreme Court may only entertain questions of law. As an exception, the Court may
review factual issues when the factual findings are in conflict.

The Court may review factual issues in a labor case when the factual findings are in conflict. Thus, in Casco v.
National Labor Relations Commission, (Casco) citing Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, We held
that:
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for
jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of
questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view
the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we
have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC
decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA
undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it.
 This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In
question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case? (Citations omitted)

This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question
form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling on the case? (Citations omitted)
Discretionary power to review; appeal not a matter of right but must comply with requirements for
its perfection.

We emphasize at the outset that a Petition for Review on Certiorari is a remedy under the law confined to
settle questions of law and not questions of facts. The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rule 45, Section 1 reads:
 Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth. (1a, 2a)

In Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan, this Court distinguished a question of law from a question of
fact. "A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of [undisputed]
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts."
 It is not this Court's function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed
by the lower court. As it is, the resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings
on these matters are received with respect.

However, this Court may take exceptions when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings
of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are
contrary to those of the trial court;
(9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.

Here, petitioners raise the lone issue that the appellate court committed serious error of law and acted in a
manner not in accord with the applicable decisions of the Court. In support of such issue, they advance the
following allegations: (1) the trial court erred in declaring that they do not have the requisite title to pursue
their claim, notwithstanding their predecessors-in-interests' possession of the property, who even mortgaged
the subject property and declared it under their name for tax purposes; (2) the trial court erred in failing to
appreciate and give weight to the evidence presented, the testimonies of their witnesses, and their
documentary evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in dismissing their case.
Petitioners' core allegations would entail a review of the factual circumstances already determined and
similarly concluded by the lower courts. They are essentially questioning the lower courts' appreciation of
evidence and asking this Court to weigh them all over again, an undertaking that is not allowed in a petition
filed under Rule 45. Moreover, this invocation of factual review is bereft of a full explanation why the
exception to our reviewing power should be exercised.

Thus, the present petition must fail on this ground.

Pryce Properties Corp. v. Nolasco Jr., G.R. No. 203990, August 24, 2020.

Doctrine: Questions of fact have no place in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

Facts: The case stemmed from a complaint for recovery of a sum of money (Complaint) filed by Narciso
R. Nolasco, Jr. (Nolasco) on January 22, 1999 before the RTC against Pryce Corporation, formerly Pryce
Properties Corporation (Pryce). Nolasco alleged the following in his Complaint: in 1995, he purchased
three lots located in Cagayan de Oro City from Pryce; also in 1995, he deposited a total amount of
P393,435.00 through check payments in favor of Pryce; the latter did not deliver to Nolasco the copies of
the lots' certificates of title and their sales agreement; he was surprised, frustrated, and dismayed when he
finally received the sales agreement, as it contained unacceptable conditions to which he conveyed his
objections to Pryce; since he had not yet signed the sales agreement, there was still no meeting of the
minds between him and Pryce; and that despite demands for refund of his deposit payments, Pryce failed
to comply. Nolasco also sought the amounts of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Pryce filed an Answer with Counterclaims. It countered that Nolasco could not yet be issued
certificates of title since their transaction was not a contract of sale but a contract to sell.
Nolasco was allegedly furnished a copy of the Contract to Sell as early as November 8, 1995,
which he signed and even requested for an amended Contract to Sell to reflect a new
amortization schedule. Nolasco, under Republic Act No. 6552 (RA 6552) or the Maceda Law,
was not entitled to a refund of his deposits since he failed to complete the payments within
the grace period provided by Pryce, resulting in their forfeiture and the rescission of the
contract to sell. By way of counterclaims, Pryce held Nolasco liable for P2,000,000.00 as
moral damages, at least P200,000.00 as exemplary damages, at least P100,000.00 as attorney's
fees, and at least P200,000.00 as litigation costs.
The RTC ruled in favor of Nolasco. It found that there had been a perfected contract of sale between Nolasco
and Pryce pursuant to Article 1482 of the Civil Code.It also ruled that under RA 6552 or the Maceda Law,
Pryce can rescind the contract of sale for failure of Nolasco to pay at least two (2) years of installments to
Pryce. The latter, however, did not rescind the contract. As regards the issue of refund of the payments he
made to Pryce, the RTC declared Nolasco as entitled thereto, citing jurisprudence and Article 1191 of the Civil
Code.

The CA affirmed the RTC in part. The CA found that the contract entered into by Pryce and Nolasco was a
contract to sell. The CA nonetheless upheld Nolasco's entitlement to a refund, as Pryce did not exercise the
remedy of cancellation under RA 6552 and under equity considerations. The CA also updated the interest on
the monetary award granted to Nolasco pursuant to the pronouncement in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals.
Petitioner's Arguments:

Petitioner Pryce maintains that respondent Nolasco impliedly agreed to the unsigned Contract to Sell and
harks on the applicability of RA 6552 or the Maceda Law. It posits that Nolasco is not entitled to a refund
of his installment payments because there was a valid rescission of the Contract to Sell when Pryce sent
Nolasco its December 5, 1998 letter and raised the affirmative defense to deny Nolasco's claim for refund
in its Answer with Counterclaims to the Complaint before the RTC. Pryce thus maintains that Nolasco
has forfeited his deposit payments in favor of Pryce.

Respondent's Arguments:

Respondent Nolasco alleges that petitioner Pryce raised questions of fact, failed to interpose any
question of law, and did not claim any of the exceptions favoring a generally-prohibited factual review
under Rule 45. While admitting that he entered into a contract to sell with Pryce, Nolasco asserts that the
CA correctly found that he did not sign a written Contract to Sell and that he is entitled to a refund of the
down payments he made to Pryce.
Issue: Whether or not factual issues are improper in a Rule 45 petition, [Yes].

Ratio: Nolasco is accurate in ascribing technical infirmities upon Pryce's Petition

for Review. It is long-settled that questions of fact have no place in petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By posing issues against
the lower courts’ appreciation of the contract between the parties and the manner
of its rescission, Pryce necessarily invited a misplaced revisit of the factual issues of
the case. As such, the petition at hand easily crumbles upon its faulty procedural
foundation alone. Even if these questions of fact would be entertained, the appeal
remains unmeritorious.
 Rule 47
Annulment of Judgments of Final
Orders and Resolutions
 Arturo C. Calubad v. Billy M. Aceron and
Oliver R. Soriano
G.R. No. 188029, September 2, 2020

 Facts: Aceron and Oliver agreed that they shall enter into a Deed of
Conditional Sale upon the reconstitution of title. When the title was
reconstituted, Aceron demanded from Oliver the execution of a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
 However, Oliver informed Aceron that he would cancel the Deed of
Conditional Sale because Aceron failed to pay the total amount of the
contract. Hence, Aceron filed a Complaint before the Quezon City RTC
praying that Oliver execute a Deed of Absolute Sale
The RTC ordered the execution of the Deed. Unsatisfied,
Aceron filed an appeal before the CA praying for payment of
moral and exemplary damages and additional attorney's fees.
However, the CA denied his appeal. Upon the finality of the
RTC decision, a writ of execution was issued.
Meanwhile, a TCT was issued in Oliver’s name. Hence, Oliver
informed Aceron of the rescission of the Deed of Conditional
Sale and demanded that he vacate the subject property. Oliver
obtained a loan from petitioner Calubad and as security
therefor, he mortgaged the subject property.
Thereafter, Oliver failed to deliver the TCT as ordered by the
RTC. Aceron filed an Omnibus Motion praying that: (a)
Calubad deliver TCT; (b) Oliver and Calubad refrain from
doing acts that would adversely affect the delivery of the
TCT; (c) Oliver execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Aceron; (d) Oliver be divested of his title over the property;
and (e) the ownership over the subject property be
transferred to Aceron free from all liens and encumbrances.
However, Oliver manifested that he could not surrender the
title because it was already mortgaged to Calubad before the
issuance of the RTC's Order.
The trial court granted Aceron's Omnibus Motion.
Calubad filed a Rule 65 petition before the CA on the ground that it did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person as he was not a party to the case and
was not given a day in court. Thus, he could not be the subject of the
assailed Order. The CA dismissed Calubad's petition for being an
improper remedy.
Calubad filed a Petition for Annulment of Final Resolution under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court. Such petition was denied on the ground that he had
been negligent in not pursuing an action or remedy to protect his legal
interest upon knowledge of Aceron and Oliver's pending case as per his
receipt of a copy of Aceron's Manifestation with Prayer to Reset Hearing
on the Omnibus Motion. In addition, the appellate court held that no
extrinsic fraud was committed against petitioner.
Calubad v. Aceron, G.R. No. 188029, September 2, 2020.
Issue: Whether Annulment of judgment is a proper recourse in this
case, [No].
Ratio: Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character,
allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or
other adequate remedy. 34 In addition, it may be invoked only on
two grounds, namely, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. None
of these grounds are present in this case.
 First, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction when it
resolved the motion for execution filed by Aceron
and consequently issued Resolution dated December
13, 2004 which divested Oliver of his ownership over
the subject property and directed the Register of
Deeds to issue a new title in the name of Aceron. It
further declared petitioner Calubad's real estate
mortgage and foreclosure sale as null and void.
Jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision
rendered therein. Evidently, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter and over the persons of Oliver and Aceron.
Moreover, the present case has already become final and
executory when the court a quo issued its assailed Resolution
which justifies its subsequent issuance thereof to put the
judgment into effect. In a petition for annulment of judgment
based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner Calubad must show not
merely abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of
authority to hear and decide the case which he failed to do so.
Neither is there extrinsic fraud in the case at bar which would
deprive petitioner Calubad to intervene and present his case
in Civil Case No. Q-93-18011. The records show that Oliver,
admittedly, mortgaged the subject property to petitioner
Calubad after the decision in Civil Case No. Q-93-18011 had
become final and executory.

Hence, at the time Oliver mortgaged the subject property to

petitioner Calubad, the issue of ownership over the subject
property was already settled in favor of Aceron. On these
reasons, petitioner Calubad failed to convince this Court that
there are valid grounds to grant the petition for annulment of
judgment.
Moreover, a judgment that has become final is immutable
and unalterable and can no longer be modified in any respect
even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous
conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is
made by the court that rendered the decision or by the
highest court of the land.
Nonetheless, Section 47 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides
that a judgment of the court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties
and those who are their successors in interest by title after the
commencement of the action in court, to wit:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment
or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows xxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the
same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; x x x
[Emphases ours.]
While it is true that petitioner Calubad is not a party to Civil
Case No. Q-93-18011, the foregoing provision states that the
Resolution dated December 13, 2004 is conclusive and binding
upon him being the successor-in-interest of Oliver who
acquired title to the subject property after Civil Case No. Q-93-
18011 has become final and executory.

As a general rule, a person not impleaded and given the

opportunity to present his or her case cannot be bound by the
decision. However, having acquired alleged interest over the
subject property only after the finality of Civil Case No. Q-93-
18011, he is bound by the judgment and the determination of
rights of the original parties therein.
Furthermore, petitioner Calubad's resort to the remedy of annulment
of judgment under Rule 47 is unnecessary as the same extends only to
a party in whose favor the remedies of new trial, reconsideration,
appeal, and petition for relief from judgment are no longer available
through no fault of said party. As a non-party in Civil Case No. Q-93-
18011, petitioner Calubad could not bring the action for annulment of
judgment considering that the remedies of new trial, reconsideration,
appeal or setting the judgment aside through a petition for relief are
not available to him in the first instance.

.
Moreover, even assuming that petitioner Calubad
can avail of the relief under Rule 47, such an action
would not finally determine his rights over the
subject property as against the competing rights of
the original parties. Annulment of judgment is an
equitable relief not because a party-litigant thereby
gains another opportunity to reopen the already-
final judgment but because a party-litigant is
enabled to be discharged from the burden of being
bound by a judgment that was an absolute nullity
to begin with
Finally, an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial court.

The issues of whether the subsequent mortgage of the subject property

by Oliver to petitioner Calubad and the indefeasibility of a Torrens title
give petitioner a right of ownership over the subject property superior to
that of Aceron are outside the scope of the present petition for review. To
resolve such issues requires a review of evidence which this Court
obviously cannot do in this petition.

An action for annulment of judgment is an independent action where the

judgment or resolution sought to be annulled is rendered and is not an
appeal of the judgment or resolution therein. Thus, the issue of petitioner
Calubad's alleged interest on or ownership of the subject property cannot
be addressed in this petition for review.
 Heirs of Procopio Borras vs Heirs of Eustaquio
Borras, G.R. No. 213888. April 25, 2022
 F:

 Procopio was the owner of several parcels of land, one of which was Lot No. 5275,
and covered by (OCT) No. [NA] 2097. Upon Procopio's death, the properties were
inherited by his five children namely: Inocencio, Vicente, Aurelia, Severina and
Leonila.
 Upon the death of all the siblings, the properties were inherited by their respective
children, including Eustaquio Borras (Eustaquio), son of Inocencio.
 On April 10, 2004, the Heirs of Eustaquio (respondents) claimed ownership of Lot No.
5275.1 This was contested by petitioners. The dispute was referred to barangay
conciliation which resulted to the discovery of petitioners that Lot No. 5275 is already
registered in the name of Eustaquio Borras.
 It appears that during his lifetime, Eustaquio claimed ownership over Lot No. 5275
when he filed a petition for reconstitution before the then CFI of Albay.

Upon learning of the existence of TCT No. 21502, petitioners filed an
action for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Legazpi City, Branch 2. RTC declared null and void the title of
Eustaquio.

Respondents filed an appeal before the CA, questioning the jurisdiction

of the RTC in declaring TCT No. 21502 null and void. The CA granted
the appeal and ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of TCT No. 21502 in an action for quieting of title. The CA ruled
that while a TCT should not have been issued to Eustaquio in an action
for reconstitution, the declaration of its nullity can only be had either in
an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court before the CA, or in an action for reconveyance before the RTC.
Thus, the CA reversed the RTC Decision, without prejudice to the filing
of the proper action.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for
annulment of judgment. Petitioners sought the annulment of the
July 7, 1980 Order of the CFI insofar as it ordered the cancellation
of OCT No. [NA] 2097 in the name Procopio and the issuance of
a TCT in favor of Eustaquio.

The CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment on the

ground that petitioners failed to prove the existence of extrinsic
fraud or lack of jurisdiction of the CFI when it promulgated its July
7, 1980 Order.
ISSUE:

Whether a petition for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy

given that the then CFI had no jurisdiction in ordering the cancellation
of OCT No. (NA) 2097 and directing the issuance of a new one on
favor of Eustaquio.?
Annulment of judgment may either be based on the ground that a
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was
obtained by extrinsic fraud. It is a remedy in equity so exceptional in
nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting.

Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to

either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over
the subject matter of the claim.

In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction,

petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion
but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence
of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken cognizance
of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject
matter is conferred by law.
The petitioner cannot rely on jurisdictional defect due to grave abuse
of discretion, but on absolute lack of jurisdiction. The concept of lack of
jurisdiction as a ground to annul a judgment does not embrace grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, there is no question that the then CFI had jurisdiction over
the petition for reconstitution at inception. Petitioners argue that the
order of the CFI in cancelling OCT No. [NA] 2097 and directing the
issuance of a new TCT in favor of Eustaquio was in excess and was
beyond the scope of a reconstitution case. The purpose of a
reconstitution action is merely to reproduce a certificate of title, after
proper proceedings, in the same form it was when it was lost or
destroyed. Hence, in such action, a trial court cannot order the
cancellation of the original title nor direct the issuance of a new TCT in
favor of another.
Clearly, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the
original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the
title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of
title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title
reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or
destruction occurred.

A reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of land covered
by the lost or destroyed title but merely determines whether a re-issuance
of such title is proper.

Here, while there is no question that the CFI acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it went beyond ordering the reconstitution of OCT No.
[NA] 2097 by ordering its cancellation, and directing the issuance of a new
TCT in favor of Eustaquio, nevertheless, such order of the CFI was done
in the exercise of its jurisdiction and not the lack thereof.
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the
authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.
Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the
decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.

The lack of jurisdiction envisioned in Rule 47 is the total absence of

jurisdiction over the person of a party or over the subject matter. When
the court has validly acquired its jurisdiction, annulment through lack of
jurisdiction is not available when the court's subsequent grave abuse of
discretion operated to oust it of its jurisdiction.
 Rule 52
Motion for Reconsideration
 Ramirez v. Elomina, G.R. No. 202661, March
17, 2021.

Facts: On May 11, 1994, Ramirez was issued an OCTpursuant to Free

Patent granted on May 2, 1994 over Lot No. 922, with an area of 1,087
square meters.
In 2000, Felomino filed a letter-protest with the Bureau of Lands of Los
Baños, Laguna against the approval of the application and issuance of the
free patent to Ramirez. Felomino claimed that the patent application was
allegedly transferred to Ramirez by one Delfin Torinos (Torinos). Both
Ramirez and Torinos were never in possession of the subject land.
Felomino asserted that he was in possession of the subject land in the
concept of an owner since birth.
Consequently, the City Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) issued an order directing the CENRO to
conduct an investigation.

The Regional Executive Director issued an order cancelling and revoking

the free patent of Ramirez.

The DENR Legal Division was also directed to initiate proceedings

leading to the cancellation of Ramirez's OCT No. P-4884 and the reversion
of the subject land to the public domain.
The DENR pointed out that, upon ocular inspection, it was found that the
members of the Elomina family were in possession of the property, and
that there was nothing to show that the Ramirezes or their predecessor-in-
interest, Torinos, had ever occupied the subject property. Thus, Ramirez's
application for free patent was found as having been tainted with
misrepresentations constituting fraud and rendered void the application
and free patent itself.
On December 12, 2005, Felomino, represented by his attorney-in-fact,
Federico Elomina (Federico), sued for reconveyance of title and damages
before the RTC against Ramirez and the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City,
Laguna.

In an amended complaint, Felomino alleged that: (i) he is the actual

possessor and occupant of the subject land; (ii) the property was first
occupied and possessed by his father, Felix Elomina, since time immemorial;
(iii) they were surprised when they were informed that on May 11, 1994,
Ramirez was able to secure an OCT over the land pursuant to a free patent
which the DENR subsequently cancelled and revoked; (iv) he was
unlawfully deprived of a legitimate right and peaceful possession over the
land when Ramirez was issued an OCT; and (v) he is entitled under the law
to recover the subject property which was erroneously registered in the
name of Ramirez.
Felomino prayed that he be declared the lawful owner of the subject
property. He also asked for compensation of damages and that Ramirez be
ordered to reconvey the subject land to him and for the Register of Deeds to
cancel Ramirez's OCT No. P-4884 and issue a new Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) under his name.

Ramirez filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of forum-shopping

considering that there was also a pending case between the parties before
the Supreme Court involving the same issues. However, the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.

In her Answer, Ramirez interposed the following affirmative defenses —

that the action is barred by prescription, the complaint states no cause of
action and Felomino is not the real party-in-interest.
The trial court dismissed Felomino's complaint for lack of merit. On
appeal, Felomino maintained that he is the real party in interest and that
his cause of action has not yet prescribed. He asserted that an action for
reconveyance of title based on fraud is imprescriptible where the holder
of the title has never been in possession and the land is possessed by the
adverse party in the concept of an owner.

CA reversed the judgment of the trial court.

Ramirez received a copy of the foregoing Decision on
October 17, 2011. After 17 days from receipt thereof, or on
November 3, 2011, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

In a December 21, 2011 Resolution, the appellate court denied

said Motion for late filing and therefore the appellate court's
jurisdiction to act on it had been lost. Thus, in its May 25,
2012 Resolution, the appellate court ordered the issuance of
an Entry of Judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 92374. The court
noted that on January 19, 2012, its October 12, 2011 Decision
had become final and executory.
Undaunted, Ramirez filed the instant Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Issue: Whether or not the rule on prescription of

filing of Motion for Reconsideration should be
relaxed because of Ramirez’ forgetfulness in view of
her old age and frail condition, [No].
Ratio: Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides for the
period to file a Motion for Reconsideration:

Section 1. Period of filing. — A party may file a motion for

reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof, with proof of
service on the adverse party. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule 36, Section 2 of the same Rules also provides that a

judgment or final order shall become final unless a Motion for
Reconsideration is timely filed, to wit:
Section 2. Entry of Judgments and Final Orders. — If
no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration
is filed within the time provided in these Rules,
the judgment or final order shall forthwith be
entered by the clerk in the book of entries of
judgments. The date of finality of the judgment or
final order shall be deemed to be the date of its
entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part
of the judgment or final order and shall be signed by
the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or
final order has become final and executory.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the following are the relevant dates: (i) On
October 12, 2011 the appellate court issued its Decision; (ii)
Ramirez received a copy of the appellate court's Decision on
October 17, 2011; (iii) After 17 days from receipt thereof, or on
November 3, 2011, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration; (iv)
On December 21, 2011, the appellate court issued its
Resolution denying the Motion since it was belatedly filed; and
(v) On May 25, 2012, the appellate court issued a Resolution
directing the issuance of an entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CV
No. 92374.
The 15th day of the allowable period for Ramirez to file her Motion
for Reconsideration fell on a holiday, November 1, 2011. Thus,
Ramirez had until November 2, 2011 to file the same, reckoned from
the date of her receipt of the appellate court's Decision. However, she
filed the Motion the following day, or November 3, 2011. She
explained that:

x x x [She] entrusted the filing thereof to her son [Herdy

Ramirez] who stayed at Antipolo City while she lived in
Marikina City.

And because of [Leticia Ramirez's] old age and forgetfulness,

the said decision was handed over by her to Herdy only on
October 27, 2011 or five days prior to its expiration to file a
Motion for Reconsideration.
Herdy had to look for a lawyer during those times that can render
services to them . . . in submitting the Motion for Reconsideration
before the deadline — November 2, 2011[,] in lieu of November 1,
2011 because the latter date is an official holiday.

xxx xxx xxx

Nonetheless, the said Motion for Reconsideration was finished

exactly on the deadline period (November 2, 2012).

xxx xxx xxx

Yet, despite the copies of the said Motion for
Reconsideration being timely sent by registered mail on
November 2, 2011 by Herdy himself at the Marikina Post
Office to the addresses and parties in said case, Herdy
who travelled immediately to the Court of Appeals to
personally file the said Motion for Reconsideration (MR)
arrived therein before the closing hours that afternoon but
was not immediately accommodated because he was
required by the Court of Appeals personnel to photocopy
certain requirements for the filing of the subject Motion.
 But after finishing all the photocopies of the required documents at the Court
of Appeals during that afternoon, the office where the motion is to be filed had
already closed business transactions for that day, nonetheless, a court
personnel advised Herdy to file the said Motion on the next day (November 3,
2011).

Believing in good faith that the Motion for Reconsideration can still be filed on
the next day (November 3, 2012), Herdy immediately filed the said Motion on
November 3, 2012.

Time and again, the Court has declared that "the right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules.
Failure to do so . . . leads to the loss of the right to appeal," such as the instant case.
This Court finds no compelling reason to justify the
relaxation of the rules. Settled is the rule that "[a]nyone
seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary
period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the
existence of exceptionally meritorious instances warranting
such deviation." However, this Court finds that Ramirez
failed to discharge the same, thus warranting the appellate
court's denial of her Motion for Reconsideration.
This Court further notes that the instant Petition challenges the appellate
court's May 25, 2012 Resolution which ordered the issuance of an Entry of
Judgment. However, said Resolution was a necessary consequence of the
appellate court's December 21, 2011 Resolution which denied the November
3, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration due to late filing.

Thus, the appropriate recourse would have been for Ramirez to timely file
an appeal of the December 21, 2011 Resolution, which she received on
January 5, 2012. 50 She had until January 20, 2012 to file an appeal, reckoned
from the date of her receipt. However, the instant Petition was only filed on
August 10, 2012, and thus likewise filed beyond the reglementary period to
file an appeal.
 Rule 58
Preliminary Injunction
 Bureau of Customs v. Court of Appeals and Rodolfo C. Reta
G.R. No. 192809, April 26, 2021

Facts: Reta entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the BOC for the free use of his
Acquarius Container Yard, located in Davao City as the designated examination area for the
container vans in the Port of Davao for a period of 25 years. The MOA also provided that the parties
may revoke it for cause at any time.
BOC claimed that Reta closed the container yard and barred customs examiners from entering the
premises. On the same date, Reta, through a letter from Atty. Castigador of the BOC, was informed of
the conduct of the examination of the container vans and to reexamine the MOA as its purpose no
longer exists.
Reta filed Complaint with an Application for Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for a TRO against BOC.
The RTC issued a TRO prohibiting the BOC from removing the container vans in ACY and directing
the BOC to resume its operations inside ACY. Subsequently, the BOC revoked the MOA and informed
Reta that it will continue to conduct examinations at the PPA premises, citing strained relations
between the parties. In this connection, BOC filed with the RTC Manila a petition for judicial
confirmation of the existence of just cause to terminate the MOA.
The RTC issued a WPI against BOC, prohibiting them from closing the designated examination area
in ACY and from revoking the MOA with Reta. The said Order also directed the BOC to resume
operations inside Reta's container yard.

The CA denied BOC's Petition for Certiorari and application for injunctive relief since there was no
urgent need to issue the WPI. Likewise, it directed the BOC to continue with the conduct of its
operations inside the ACY premises. The SC dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the BOC.
Thereafter, it granted the BOC's Motion for Reconsideration and reinstated the Petition. On the same
date, the Court also issued a status quo ante order requiring the parties to observe the status quo
prevailing before the issuance of the RTC Order and the conduct of the examination. The CA agreed
with the RTC that the status quo should be maintained until the issue of the propriety of the
cancellation of the MOA is finally determined after the trial.
Bureau of Customs v. Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro Station, G.R. Nos. 192809, 193588, 193590-91 &
201650.

Issue: Whether or not whether the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Reta, [Yes].

Ratio: Upon review of the records, we hold that the appellate court committed reversible error. Contrary
to its findings, the trial court actually acted with grave abuse of discretion as Reta was not entitled to a
writ of preliminary injunction.

A writ of preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantial rights and
interests. It is not a cause of action itself, but a mere provisional remedy adjunct to a main suit. It is
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts; it may also require the performance of a
particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. It may be
granted by the court where the action or proceeding is pending. The purpose of injunction is to prevent
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied,
and its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully heard. The issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction is governed by Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
Jurisprudence laid down the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as follows: (a) the
applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (b) there is a material
and substantial invasion of such right; (c) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and, (d) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable
injury.

Sumifru (Philippines) Corp. v. Spouses Cereño (Sumifru) discussed the concept of a clear and unmistakable right that
may be protected by a writ of preliminary injunction, to wit:

A writ of preliminary injunction, being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a strong arm of equity or
a transcendent remedy, must be granted only in the face of injury to actual and existing substantial
rights. A right to be protected by injunction means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is
enforceable as a matter of law. An injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract,
or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse, and which may never arise, or to restrain
an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. When the complainant's right is doubtful or
disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, injunction is not proper. While it is not
required that the right claimed by the applicant, as basis for seeking injunctive relief, be conclusively
established, it is still necessary to show, at least tentatively, that the right exists and is not vitiated by any
substantial challenge or contradiction. (Citations omitted)
Before the courts may issue a writ of preliminary injunction, it is essential that the party seeking its issuance be
able to establish the existence of a right to be protected. It must be a right that is actual, clear, and existing; not a
mere contingent, abstract, or future right. Further, the invasion of that clear and unmistakable right must be
material and substantial.

There must also be a showing of urgency to prevent irreparable injury on the part of the party seeking injunction.
Injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which its amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office v. TMA Group of Companies Pty Ltd. (Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office) discussed the unquantifiable nature of damages or injury for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction:

Here, any damage petitioner may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is
fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. As previously held in
Golding v. Balatbat, the writ of injunction —

should never issue when an action for damages would adequately compensate the
injuries caused. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the
probability of irreparable injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the
prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within
these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.
To satisfy the requisites for the issuance of the writ, mere prima facie evidence is needed to
establish the clear and unmistakable right, and the substantial and material invasion thereof;
complete and conclusive proof is not needed. Injunction should therefore not be issued "if
there is no clear legal right materially and substantially breached from a prima facie
evaluation of the evidence of the complainant."

It is well settled that the aggrieved party may challenge the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction only on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the issuing court. Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs
of preliminary injunction implies "a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of [a]
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law."
In the instant case, the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, as laid down, were
not met.

First, Reta has no clear and unmistakable right on the conduct of examination in ACY. The conduct of
examination in ACY premises is governed by the MOA between Reta and the BOC. It is undisputed that
the parties consented to the MOA which stipulated that any of the parties may revoke it for cause at any
time before the end of its term. On March 5, 2010, BOC has already revoked the MOA on the ground of
strained relations due to Reta's closure of the ACY premises. The revocation was made before the
issuance of the assailed RTC Order.

Revocation is clearly within the BOC's right as it is empowered to do so by the MOA. In fact, it filed a
petition before the RTC Manila to confirm the existence of just cause in revoking the MOA. To stress
though, the existence of just cause is outside the issues of the instant case and the Court should allow that
petition before the RTC Manila to take its course. In addition, the legality of the revocation of the MOA
may be addressed in the trial proper in RTC Davao. The subject of the instant case is just one of the
incidents in the trial proper in the RTC that unfortunately reached this Court.
Therefore, as the BOC is empowered to revoke the MOA, Reta has no clear and
unmistakable right on the continuation of customs operations in ACY premises. To reiterate
the case of Sumifru, the right, to be clear and unmistakable, shall not be vitiated by
substantial challenge or contradiction. In this instance, the substantial challenge or
contradiction to Reta's claimed right is the BOC's own right to revoke the MOA.

Second, it follows that there is no substantial or material invasion of Reta's right. As the right
does not exist, there can be no substantial or material invasion thereof.

Third, the damage or injury allegedly sustained by Reta is not irreparable. As set out, the
damages or injury suffered by the party applying for injunction must be unquantifiable. The
Petition correctly pointed out that Reta was able to state in his Complaint an amount (i.e.,
P100,000.00) pertaining to the loss of earnings he suffers for each day the BOC is not
conducting examinations in ACY. Therefore, the requisite of irreparable injury is not met.
The BOC and Atty. Castigador argued in the CA that it should defer resolution of the case
pursuant to this Court's Status Quo Ante Order in G.R. No. 192809. The appellate court
resolved the case nonetheless (hence, G.R. No. 201650). Petitioners reiterate in the instant
Petition that the CA should have deferred resolution of the case. In this regard, the Court
agrees with the appellate court that the Status Quo Ante Order did not restrain the CA from
resolving the case. The Status Quo Ante Order pertains to the conduct of customs operations
in the PPA premises, not on the courts' resolution of the case. The order in fact allowed the
BOC to conduct operations in the PPA premises while the case was pending.

Finally, the Court deems it necessary to note that there was no need for Reta to point out
Atty. Castigador's administrative case in the Office of the Ombudsman and his possible
criminal liability for graft and corruption. These are matters completely irrelevant to the
issue in the instant case.
 Rule 60
Replevin
Jorgenetics Swine Improvement Corp. v. Thick & Thin Agri-Products, Inc., G.R. Nos. 201044 & 222691,
May 5, 2021.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the instant Petitions have been mooted because of the issuance of a decision on the
merits in the main case, [No];
2. Whether or not the chairperson and president of a corporation may sign the verification and
certification without need of board resolution. Moreover, lack of authority of a corporate officer to
undertake an action on behalf of the corporation may be cured by ratification through the
subsequent issuance of a board resolution, [Yes];
3. Whether or not a variance in the date of the verification with the date of the Petition is fatal to
petitioner's case, [No];
4. Whether or not an order dismissing an action for lack of jurisdiction over the parties to the case is
cognizable under a special civil action for certiorari, [Yes];
5. Whether or not Jorgenetics, in seeking to recover damages in the main action on the bond of the
writ of replevin, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, [Yes]; and
6. Whether or not the issue on the validity and efficacy of the writ of replevin is mooted in view of the
final and executory decision on the merits in the main case, [Yes].
 Rule 63
Declaratory Relief and
Similar Remedies
 Commission On Audit v. Hon. Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr.
G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020

Facts: Private respondent Social Justice Society (SJS), a political party duly registered with the
Commission of Elections, filed with the RTC of Manila, a Petition for Declaratory Relief against Shell,
Caltex, and Petron, collectively referred to as the "Big 3." SJS raised an issue as to the practice of
increasing the prices of their petroleum products whenever the price of crude oil increases in the
world market despite their purchase at a lower price.

RTC denied the motions to dismiss and directed the parties to refer the matter to the Joint Task Force
of the Department of Energy (DOE) and DOJ pursuant to Section 11 of RA 8479. The DOE-DOJ Joint
Task Force found no violation of Article 186 of the RPC or Section 11 (a) of RA 8479. RTC denied the
Motion to dismiss is denied. Accordingly, the [COA], [BIR], and [BOC] are ordered to open and
examine documents on the purchases of the petroleum products
Though not parties to the case, the COA, the BIR, and the BOC, through the OSG were constrained
to file a MR on the ground that the order of examination is unwarranted and beyond their respective
jurisdictions. The RTC directed the COA, the BIR, and the BOC to explain within 72 hours from notice
why they should not be cited in contempt for failure to comply. After the lapse of the 72-hour period,
private respondents moved for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

The COA, represented by its Chairman, the BIR and the BOC, represented by their respective
Commissioners, through the OSG, filed before the Supreme Court, a Petition for Certiorari with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Direct resort
to this Court was made because the issues raised were purely legal, which is an exception to the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Issue: Whether or not the action for
declaratory relief is the proper remedy ,
[No].
Ratio: A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument,
executive order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. It must be filed before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers; otherwise, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over
the action. Thus, “[t]he only issue that may be raised in such [an action] is the question of construction or validity of provisions
in an instrument or statute.”

In the instant case, private respondents, in their Amended Petition, alleged that "[the Big 3] now and then increase the price of
their petroleum products" and that "an increase in prices declared by one of them is inevitably followed by increases by the
others."

A) WHETHER X X X THE ACT OF OIL COMPANIES, INCLUDING [THE BIG 3], IN INCREASING THE PRICE OF THEIR OIL
PRODUCTS WHENEVER THE PRICE OF CRUDE OIL IN THE WORLD MARKET INCREASES, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY
HAD PURCHASED THEIR INVENTORY OF CRUDE OIL LONG BEFORE SUCH INCREASE IN WORLD MARKET PRICE AND AT A
MUCH LOWER PRICE, IS VIOLATIVE OF THE FOREGOING LEGAL PROVISIONS.

(B) WHETHER X X X THE ACT OF AN OIL COMPANY IN INCREASING THE PRICES OF ITS OIL PRODUCTS WHENEVER ITS
PROPOSED COMPETITORS INCREASE THEIR PRICES FALLS UNDER THE TERM 'COMBINATION OR CONCERTED ACTIONS'
USED IN SECTION 11 (A) OF [RA] 8479.

Based on the foregoing, the core issue involved in the Amended Petition is whether the business practice of the Big 3 violates
the RPC and RA 8479. This, however, cannot be made the subject matter of a declaratory relief.
Private respondents filed their Amended Petition based on acts already committed or being committed
by the Big 3, which they believe are in violation of the RPC and RA 8479. It appears therefore that the
filing of the Amended Petition was done on the assumption that there was already a breach or violation
on the part of the Big 3, which cannot be the subject of a declaratory relief. It must be stressed that an
action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach as such action is filed only
for the purpose of securing an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
contract, deed or statute. It cannot be availed of if the statute, deed or contract has been breached or
violated because, in such a case, the remedy is for the aggrieved party to file the appropriate ordinary
civil action in court. Thus, the Court has consistently ruled that "[i]f adequate relief is available through
another form or action or proceeding, the other action must be preferred over an action for declaratory
relief."

Similarly, in this case, an action for declaratory relief may no longer be allowed considering that private
respondents are not merely asking for a declaration of their rights but are actually asking public
respondent RTC to determine whether there was a violation of Section 11 of RA 8479, for which the Big 3
may be prosecuted and found criminally liable. And since there is already an alleged breach, it cannot be
the subject of a declaratory relief. Public respondent RTC therefore committed grave abuse of discretion
in not dismissing the Amended Petition.
 Rule 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
 Ildefonso Patdu v. Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales
G.R. No. 2301711, September 27, 2021

Facts: The OMB Field Investigation Office (FIO) filed a complaint against Iloilo 2nd District
Representative Syjuco et, al. for Estafa, Falsification of Public Documents, and violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019. Representative Syjuco informed Secretary Mendoza that the Department of Budget
Management (DBM) issued special allotment release orders (SARO) for the purchase of
communications equipment for Region VI. Ng submitted his quotation for 1,582 units of Nokia 1100
cellphone model. It was claimed, however, that Ng received payment without delivering the cellphone
units.

The OMB found that these individuals, conspired with each other through seemingly separate but
collaborative acts to defraud the government.

The CA dismissed the petition outright for having been filed with the wrong court. It reasoned that the
remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause is by filing an original action for certiorari with
the SC. It ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of a case elevated from the OMB.
The CA explained that it has jurisdiction over decisions in administrative disciplinary cases only,
which can be assailed via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The second paragraph of Section 14 of RA
6770, which states that "No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision
or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law," has been
declared unconstitutional for increasing this Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence.
Patdu, Jr. v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 230171, September 27, 2021.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction,
[Yes].

Ratio: The question to be resolved in this case is not novel. Indeed, in Carpio-Morales, the Court struck down as
unconstitutional the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770. However, it is settled that the doctrine laid down
in Carpio-Morales has no application in criminal cases before the OMB.

In Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman (Gatchalian), the Court examined previous case law and clarified that
Carpio-Morales has limited application to administrative cases before the OMB. The antecedents of Gatchalian are
similar with the instant case. The OMB found probable cause to indict petitioner Gatchalian and other individuals
for violation of RA 3019, Malversation, and violation of the Manual of Regulations for Banks in relation to the
New Central Bank Act. Petitioner therein also filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the OMB ruling
and reasoned that he elevated the case to the CA by virtue of the ruling in Carpio-Morales. The appellate court
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and opined that Carpio-Morales "should be understood in its proper
context, i.e.,that what was assailed therein was the preventive suspension order arising from an administrative
case filed against a public official."
On further appeal, this Court agreed with the CA's disposition — the relevant portions of the Decision state:

A thorough reading of the [Carpio-]Morales decision, therefore, would reveal that it was limited in its application —
that it was meant to cover only decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. The Court never
intimated, much less categorically stated, that it was abandoning its rulings in Kuizon and Estrada and the distinction
made therein between the appellate recourse for decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative and non-
administrative cases. Bearing in mind that Morales dealt with an interlocutory order in an administrative case, it cannot
thus be read to apply to decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in non-administrative or criminal cases.

xxx xxx xxx

It is thus clear that the [Carpio-]Morales decision never intended to disturb the well-established distinction between the
appellate remedies for orders, directives, and decisions arising from administrative cases and those arising from non-
administrative or criminal cases.

Gatchalian's contention that the unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 declared in [Carpio-]Morales equally
applies to both administrative and criminal cases — and thus the CA from then on had jurisdiction to entertain petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65 to question orders and decisions arising from criminal cases — is simply misplaced. Section
14 of R.A. 6770 was declared unconstitutional because it trampled on the rule-making powers of the Court by: 1)
prescribing the mode of appeal, which was by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for all cases whether final or not; and 2)
rendering nugatory the certiorari jurisdiction of the CA over incidents arising from administrative cases.
The unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770, therefore, did not necessarily have an effect over the appellate
procedure for orders and decisions arising from criminal cases precisely because the said procedure was not
prescribed by the aforementioned section. To recall, the rule that decisions or orders of the Ombudsman finding the
existence of probable cause (or the lack thereof) should be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed
with the Supreme Court was laid down by the Court itself in the cases of Kuizon, Tirol Jr.,Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudsman,
Estrada, and subsequent cases affirming the said rule. The rule was, therefore, not anchored on Section 14 of R.A. 6770,
but was instead a rule prescribed by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers. The declaration of
unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was therefore immaterial insofar as the appellate procedure for orders and
decisions by the Ombudsman in criminal cases is concerned.

The argument therefore that the promulgation of the [Carpio-]Morales decision — a case which involved an interlocutory
order arising from an administrative case, and which did not categorically abandon the cases of Kuizon, Tirol,
Jr.,Mendoza-Arce,and Estrada — gave the CA certiorari jurisdiction over final orders and decisions arising from non-
administrative or criminal cases is clearly untenable.

To stress, it is the better practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts,
it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. Following the
principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere — or follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled —
the Court therefore upholds the abovementioned established rules on appellate procedure, and so holds that the CA did
not err in dismissing the case filed by petitioner Gatchalian for lack of jurisdiction.
Therefore, the remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal or non-administrative cases is
still by filing a petition for certiorari with this Court, and not with the CA. This doctrine has never been struck
down or abandoned by Carpio-Morales.

This is supported by a more recent case, Yatco v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (Yatco). Yatco also
assailed the OMB's ruling in a criminal case for lack of probable cause before the CA, which the latter likewise
dismissed. As that case was also further appealed, the Court, in its disposition, reiterated Gatchalian,and stated:

Meanwhile, with respect to criminal charges, the Court has settled that the remedy of an aggrieved
party from a resolution of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence of probable cause is to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and the petition should be filed not
before the CA, but before the Supreme Court. In the fairly recent case of Gatchalian v. Office of the
Ombudsman, (decided on August 1, 2018), the Court traced the genesis of the foregoing procedure and
cited a wealth of jurisprudence recognizing the same:

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, it is evident from the foregoing that the remedy to assail the ruling of the Ombudsman in non-
administrative/criminal cases (i.e.,file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the Supreme Court) is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it remains that OMB resolutions on probable cause in
criminal cases are assailable by filing a petition for certiorari with this Court. This has always
been and is still the prevailing rule. To repeat, Carpio-Morales did not invalidate this remedy
as it covers administrative cases only. The CA has no jurisdiction over findings of probable
cause in criminal cases.

In the instant case, the CA, therefore, did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari for
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners have erroneously filed their petition for certiorari with the
appellate court, when it should have been filed before this Court.

It follows then that petitioners have lost their right to assail the OMB's finding of probable
cause against them when they elevated the case before the wrong forum. Similar with how the
Court proceeded in Gatchalian and Yatco, it is not proper for this Court to just assume
jurisdiction and rule on the merits of the instant case given petitioners' availment of the wrong
remedy.
Philam Homeowners Association, Inc. v. De Luna, G.R. No. 209437, March 17, 2021.

Facts: PHAI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of the homeowners at Philam Homes, Quezon
City; Caguiat was its President and Chief Executive Officer at the time of the termination of
employment of respondents De Luna and Bundoc.

De Luna's job as PHAI's Office Supervisor consisted of managing the reservations for rental
facilities and accepting payments from clients, among others. Bundoc, as Cashier, performed the
following duties and responsibilities: (a) receiving membership dues and other incomes; (b)
preparing daily abstract of collections; (c) being in charge of petty cash fund; (d) making daily
deposits of collections; and (e) preparing checks and other disbursements.

During an audit of PHAI's books of accounts sometime in September 2008, several irregularities
were discovered such as issuance of unauthorized official and provisional receipts, unrecorded
and undeposited collections, and encashment of personal checks. The Investigating Committee
disclosed that De Luna and Bundoc were involved in said fraudulent activities.
After submission of the final audit report by Baquiran, PHAI required De Luna and Bundoc
to appear before the investigating committee and to explain the irregularities and anomalies
as well as to account for the total amount misappropriated. PHAI asserted that despite said
opportunity given to De Luna and Bundoc, they still failed to participate and attend in the
investigation. Accordingly, on May 23, 2009, PHAI's Board of Directors issued a
Memorandum addressed to De Luna demanding payment for the amount of P757,315.00,
and informing her of her dismissal from service by reason of dishonesty, misappropriation
and malversation of funds.

This prompted De Luna and Bundoc to initiate separate complaints for illegal dismissal,
underpayment and non-payment of wages, underpayment of retirement benefits, illegal
suspension, attorney's fees and damages. Both contended that they were subjected to an
investigation and were made to answer questions without the documents supporting the
alleged irregularities they committed.
The Arbiter, in an April 30, 2010 Decision, found that the termination of both De Luna and Bundoc
was legal since it was based on a just cause, and that due process was observed. In its Resolution
24 dated July 26, 2010, the NLRC affirmed in toto the findings of the Arbiter that De Luna and
Bundoc held positions of trust and confidence, hence, they are expected to exercise greater fidelity,
honesty and integrity in the performance of their duties.

The appellate court dismissed respondents' Petition in the challenged Decision. It affirmed the
ruling of the NLRC with modification as to the monetary award. PHAI and Caguiat filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration. However, it was denied
by the appellate court in its October 3, 2013 Resolution. Aggrieved by the appellate court's
judgment, PHAI and Caguiat filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not factual findings of the NLRC are accorded great respect, but the appellate
court is not precluded from reviewing evidence alleged to be arbitrarily considered or otherwise
disregarded by the former, [Yes].
Ratio: PHAI's contention that the appellate court went beyond its jurisdiction when it
reviewed evidentiary matters and the factual findings of the NLRC must fail.

We recognize the expertise and authority of quasi-judicial bodies such as the NLRC in
ascertaining matters specifically delegated to their jurisdiction. Similar to this Court's
appreciation of a trial court's factual findings, the latter being in the best position to observe
the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses, We regard and value the competence of the
Labor Arbiters and the NLRC in resolving labor disputes. The NLRC's conclusions relating
to questions of fact set forth in the case are accorded great weight and respect, and even
clothed with finality and binding on this Court especially if they are supported by sufficient
and substantial evidence.
The CA, in its judicial review pursuant to Rules 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,is nonetheless empowered to
examine the records and evaluate the pieces of evidence in order to confirm their materiality and significance, and
to disregard the labor tribunal's factual findings whenever its conclusions were not substantiated by the evidence
on record. Contrary to PHAI's assertion that the CA may only inquire into the factual findings whenever there is a
variance between the findings of the LA and the NLRC, the CA may review evidence alleged to have been
capriciously, whimsically and arbitrarily relied upon or disregarded in the following instances, viz.:

It is settled that in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the issues are limited to errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. x x x. x x x when the factual findings complained of are not
supported by the evidence on record; when it is necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice; when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the LA; and when necessary to arrive
at a just decision of the case. To make this finding, the CA necessarily has to view the evidence if only to
determine if the NLRC ruling had basis in evidence.

The appellate court, in order to arrive at a just decision of the case, modified the NLRC's award of nominal
damages in favor of Bundoc whose termination was tainted with procedural lapses on the part of PHAI, and
ordered the payment of De Luna's 10-day salary, which corresponded to the number of days her preventive
suspension exceeded the mandated 30 days. Hence, the CA was justified and acted well within its appellate
jurisdiction in reviewing the facts, records and evidence of the case.
Republic v. Heirs of Borja, G.R. No. 207647, January 11, 2021.

Facts: On September 17, 2003, respondent heirs of Spouses Mauro Borja and Demetria Bajao filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 3, a Petition for Issuance of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) over Lot No. 798 covered
by Decree No. 347660 issued on March 25, 1926 with an area of approximately 22 hectares situated in Ata-atahon, Nasipit,
Agusan del Norte. Respondents alleged that they are the lawful owners of the subject property by virtue of succession.

On July 28, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, 5 the pertinent portions of which state:

Despite the order of the Court dated May 29, 2003 for Provincial Prosecutor Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. to
comment within 15 days from receipt of the formal offer of exhibits, he did not give any comment to the
same.

JUDGMENT

Finding the petition to have been fully substantiated by [respondents] evidence, the Court finds the petition
to be meritorious and, therefore, the said petition must be GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, [respondents] petition dated September 13, 2002 is hereby GRANTED and let the Original
Certificate of Title to be issued by the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City, upon payment of the
required legal fees. SO ORDERED.

The OSG did not pursue its appeal. 7 Hence, in a Resolution 8 dated October 13, 2004, the CA declared the case closed and
terminated. On November 14, 2004, an Entry of Judgment was issued.
Acting on a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution, the trial court to in an Order dated June 20, 2006
directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding OCT. Despite said Order, the LRA
refused to comply, prompting the trial court to issue on June 8, 2007 a show cause Order against the chief of
the Docket Division of the LRA. This Order was reiterated on October 9, 2009.

On January 18, 2011, the trial court issued a Resolution, cancelling the decree and directing the issuance of the
OCT. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 21 averring that respondents failed to comply with the
trial court's order considering that all that the Registry of Deeds of Agusan del Norte certified was that it did
not have any record showing that a title pursuant to the subject decree has been issued. The OSG insisted that
there must be a categorical statement that "no OCT was ever issued."
On March 5, 2012, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the execution of its July
28, 2003 Decision directing the LRA to issue a new decree and OCT covering the subject land.

Considering that the OSG received a copy of the March 5, 2012 Resolution on March 19, 2012, it had had 60
days or until May 18, 2012 within which to file a Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court. Instead of
filing the petition on May 18, 2012, the OSG filed, on even date, a Motion for Extension, 24 praying for an
additional 15 days within which to file the Petition. On June 4, 2012, the OSG filed the Petition for Certiorari
25 before the CA.
On July 31, 2012, the appellate court issued a Resolution, dismissing the Petition for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period. The appellate court explained that pursuant to
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC as interpreted in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals (Laguna
Metts), there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a
Petition for Certiorari. The appellate court did not find any justification in the case to warrant
a relaxation of the rule.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration. However, it was denied by the CA in a Resolution 28

dated May 24, 2013. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the appellate court committed a reversible error in dismissing
outright petitioner's Petition for Certiorari for having been filed late, [No].
Ratio: We are not persuaded by petitioner's asseverations. It has been settled that the 60-day period
within which a petition for certiorari should be filed is non-extendible, except in meritorious cases. in
Adtel v. Valdez, this Court elucidated:

A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the
motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an
officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court's appellate jurisdiction. If the petition
involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules,
the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the
petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC states that in cases where a motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the
filing of a petition for certiorari questioning the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
must be made not later than sixty (60) days from the notice of the denial of the motion. In Laguna
Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from the notice of judgment or from the
order denying a motion for reconsideration. In Laguna Metts Corporation, this Court stated the
rationale for the strict observance of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari, to wit:

The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over to
prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was
specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional
rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
In Laguna Metts Corporation, this Court ruled that the 60-day period was non-extendible and the CA no longer had
the authority to grant the motion for extension in view of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Section 4 of Rule
65.

However, in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, this Court held that the strict observance of
the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is not absolute. This Court ruled that absent any express
prohibition under Rule 65, a motion for extension is still permitted, subject to the Court's sound discretion.
Similarly, in Labao v. Flores, this Court recognized that the extension of the 60-day period may be granted by the
Court in the presence of special or compelling circumstances provided that there should be an effort on the part
of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his or her failure to comply
with the rules. Likewise, in Mid-Islands Power Generation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a motion for
extension was allowed in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 subject to the Court's sound discretion and only
under exceptional or meritorious cases.

The exception to the 60-day rule to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was also applied by this Court in a
more recent case in Republic of the Philippines v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., to wit: "[u]nder exceptional
circumstances, however, and subject to the sound discretion of the Court, [the] said period may be extended
pursuant to [the] Domdom and Mid-Islands Power cases."
Therefore, the rule is that in filing petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, a motion for extension is a prohibited
pleading. However in exceptional or meritorious cases, the Court may grant an extension anchored on special or
compelling reason.

To recapitulate, the recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the aforementioned rule are encapsulated in
the case of Labao v. Flores, viz.:

x x x (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with [their] failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the
defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake[,] or excusable negligence without appellant's
fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound
discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort, on the
part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for [their] failure
to comply with the rules.
The circumstances in this case do not fall under any of the exceptions to warrant a relaxation of the rule.
Petitioner invokes an understaffed office to justify the extension of the 60-day period. We find petitioner's
explanation unacceptable. It bears emphasizing that petitioner is represented by the OSG, which
commands a battery of lawyers at its beck and call. While the handling counsel resigned on April 27,
2012, the CSC had until May 18, 2012 within which to file the Petition. The OSG thus had a good number
of days to file the Petition. Therefore, we find its excuse that it was understaffed untenable.

It must be further stressed that this case has dragged on for 17 years to date. This case has in fact reached
the execution stage, where the trial court had directed the LRA to issue the OCT in numerous occasions
for several years. The LRA stubbornly refused to abide by the court order. On March 5, 2010, the LRA had
succeeded in persuading respondents to enter into a settlement, where it was agreed that the LRA would
issue the OCT on the condition that respondents produce a certification that "no OCT has ever been
issued" on the subject property. When respondents produced the certification, the LRA found another
reason not to issue the OCT. This very judgment is the subject of appeal by petitioners before the
appellate court. Instead of timely filing its appeal to a then 10-year old case, petitioners filed a Motion for
Extension, which is prohibited under the rule. If, indeed, petitioner considered the importance of this
case, it should have diligently and timely pursued its appeal.
It bears stressing that "the right appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege, and it may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. The party who seeks to
avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to
appeal is lost."

Petitioner also touched on the merits of the case when it cited that the certification provided by
respondents was insufficient end did not comply with what was agreed upon by the parties. We
cannot tackle this issue. At the outset, the appellate court dismissed the Petition solely on a
procedural technicality. The only issue raised before us is whether the appellate court committed
reversible error when it denied petitioner's motion for an additional period of 15 days to file the
Petition for Certiorari and subsequently dismissed the latter's petition. Moreover, the substantial
issue raised relates to the factual findings of the RTC, which is beyond the purview of a Petition for
Review.
Dormido v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 198241, February 24, 2020

Doctrine:

Whimsicality in the issuance of a decision, not accuracy, is the core of certiorari proceedings. An unfavorable
evaluation of the evidence presented by a party will not be inquired into via certiorari unless it is shown that
it was done in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal enmity.
Facts:
- Dormido and the spouses Manahan had brought their respective disputing claims over Lot
823 before the Lands Management Bureau (LMB).
- Upon Adobo’s request, De la Peña, then Undersecretary for Legal Affairs of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), issued a Memorandum
stating that the Office of the DENR Undersecretary was not in a position to question
Adobo's factual conclusions as to the validity of Felicitas Manahan's claims of ownership
over Lot 823 and that the title to the said property supposedly held by Dormido's family,
the Manotoks, was void ab initio.
- On October 30, 2000, Adobo, the LMB’s OIC-Director of Lands at that time, issued Deed of
Conveyance No. V-200022 conveying Lot 823 in favor of the spouses Manahan.
- Dormido filed a Complaint before the Ombudsman charging the respondents with
conspiracy and violation of RA 3019.
- Ombudsman dismissed Dormido’s Complaint. It held that the regional trial courts and not
the Ombudsman had jurisdiction over such civil actions involving the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing Dormido's criminal complaint against respondents for alleged violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019 [No]

Ratio:
We dismiss the Petition.
Dormido aims to overturn the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Ombudsman. She sums up
the arguments presented in her Petition for Certiorari as follows:
The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing [Dormido]'s complaint.

a. The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on the Ventura case in
dismissing the Complaint.

b. The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in not finding that a prima facie case
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 has been established in this case.
 c. The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that the issue of ownership
over Lot 823 is crucial to a finding of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and not finding that
independent of the issue of ownership, the mere issuance of Deed of Conveyance No. V-2000-22
in favor of the Manahans despite the existence of a [T]orrens title in the name of the Manotoks
gave an unwarranted benefit or advantage to the former, considering that: [(i)] it violated the
proscription on collateral attack against [T]orrens titles; [(ii)] it was an ultra vires act; and [(iii)] it
was based on a stale sale certificate. (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing does not allege errors of jurisdiction but errors of judgment. In gist, Dormido complains that
Adobo and De la Peña, in the exercise of their official duties, gave the spouses Manahan an unwarranted
benefit, and that despite prima facie showing of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the Ombudsman
dismissed her Complaint. Such accusations against respondents, without more, cannot be seen as grave abuse
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty. At most, these only express mere disagreement with
the Ombudsman's judgment that do not proceed from grave abuse of discretion. Plainly, the Petition contained
no allegations of the Ombudsman's supposed acts of grave abuse of discretion adequate to reverse the latter's
pronouncements and indict respondents instead for the charges of graft and corruption.
 Even if so alleged, there is no clear showing of arbitrariness on the part of the Ombudsman in dismissing
Dormido's Complaint. We quote the relevant portions of the Ombudsman's October 15, 2010 Order claimed by
Dormido to have been tainted by grave abuse of discretion:
This Office resolves to dismiss the present complaint as the complainant has an adequate
remedy in another judicial body and [her] complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction
of this Office.
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770, also known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, reads:
"Section 20. Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it
believes that:
(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-
judicial body;
(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman[.]"
Although the complainant charged the respondents with violation of RA 3019, as amended
for issuing a new deed of conveyance to the Manahans despite the existence of the Manotok's
titles, the main issue in this case, however, is who between the Manotoks (including the
complainant) and the Manahans has a valid title on Lot 823. Evidently, this Office has no
jurisdiction over such matter or issue. Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, the
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
 Evidently, this Office has no jurisdiction over such matter or issue. Under Section 19 of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein. Thus, the present complaint must be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied)
It also bears quoting the pertinent disquisitions of the Ombudsman on Dormido's Motion for
Reconsideration:
xxx
The complainant insisted that this is a case for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as amended
and not a civil case which involves the title to a real property. The question however remains,
how will this Office [arrive] at the conclusion that the complainant suffered undue injury or
the public respondents gave unwarranted benefits to the Manahans when it cannot determine
who among the Manotoks and the Manahans are the real owners of the questioned property?
The resolution of the issue of ownership of the property involved is crucial in determining
whether the public respondents indeed [violated] [S]ection 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended. And
since, this Office has no authority or jurisdiction to adjudicate who between the Manotoks or the
Manahans have a valid title over the property, then the present complaint must be dismissed.

In Office of the Ombudsman vs. Vda. De Ventura, the Supreme Court sustained this Office's
resolution provisionally dismissing a case against a Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
officer x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
 In dismissing the Complaint and denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the Ombudsman relied on
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, cited relevant jurisprudence, and squarely applied the foregoing to the facts of
the case at hand. This negates Dormido's allegation that grave abuse of discretion might have attended the
Ombudsman's conclusions. Whether these determinations by the Ombudsman were correct or wrong is not
remediable by certiorari. Whimsicality in the issuance of a decision, not accuracy, is the core of certiorari
proceedings. An unfavorable evaluation of the evidence presented by a party will not be inquired into via
certiorari unless it is shown that it was done in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal enmity.
Also, the Ombudsman's reliance on Office of the Ombudsman v. Heirs of Vda. de Ventura (Vda. de Ventura)
is not misplaced. While the factual circumstances in Vda. de Ventura are not entirely parallel to that of the
instant case, both required a prima facie finding of an unwarranted benefit given to the party complained of.
Here, records show that Adobo, as OIC-Director of Lands, granted the spouses Manahan Deed of Conveyance
No. V-200022 upon formal investigation, hearings, and appreciation of the testimonies and evidence of the
parties. With this, there were substantial legal and factual grounds to award the subject property to the
spouses Manahan, and any allegation of unwarranted benefit against them appears premature at that point.
As with Vda. de Ventura, the Ombudsman must await a reversal of the spouses Manahan's claims to the same
before it may be established whether the benefit granted by the respondent public officers to the spouses
Manahan was indeed unwarranted. Such determination rests now upon the trial courts and is not within the
jurisdiction and competence of the Ombudsman. This is to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious
litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts, and ensuring economy of time and
 Such determination rests now upon the trial courts and is not within the jurisdiction and competence of
the Ombudsman. This is to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting
judgments, confusion between litigants and courts, and ensuring economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.
The 2010 case of Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque put to rest the long-standing questions of
ownership over Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, which is the very same piece of real property contemplated in
the instant case. Manotok IV nullified all titles and claims to Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, including TCT No.
RT-22481 (372302) in the names of the Manotoks, a certain TCT No. 210177 in the name of one Homer L.
Barque, and Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 issued to Felicitas Manahan. Ultimately, Manotok declared
the said land as part of the patrimonial property of the National Government.
This ruling, however, was issued almost 10 years after the issuance of Deed of Conveyance No. V-
200022. Thus, the legal and factual bases for any unwarranted benefit have not yet accrued when Adobo
issued Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 in the Manahans' favor on October 30, 2000. Respondents'
exoneration from the graft and corruption charges was only apt. Adobo only granted the Deed of Conveyance
No. V-200022 upon prior and thorough evaluation of the facts at hand and the laws and jurisprudence
presently applicable thereto. Grave abuse of discretion could have been held against the Ombudsman had it
declared in its assailed Order that there was reasonable ground to indict respondents for violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019 as so desired by Dormido, when facts and jurisprudence prevailing at the time of the issuance
of Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 clearly instructed otherwise.
 The term grave abuse of discretion has, ironically, fallen victim to procedural abuse.
As a last-ditch remedy to turn the odds to their favor, vengeful litigants resort to
indiscriminate imputation of the term to the public officer that issued a verdict adverse to
them, in manifest indifference to the soundness of its exercise or the frailty of their cause.
Rules must not be stretched for personal retribution, or even if such purpose be pursued, it
must have a solid grounding in fact and law. Such situation is not the case at hand.
People v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), G.R. No. 239878, February 28. 2022

Doctrine:

First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for
both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts
of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding
for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a
preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set
reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each
case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding
investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of
whether there has been inordinate delay.

Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within
the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time
periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving
that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is
invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or
clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense
did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the
prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that
the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice
was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the
case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by
malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of
evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If
malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed
without need of further analysis of the delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to
speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be
invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed
by the relevant court.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and
discussed by the relevant court.

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The
respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural
periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.
Facts:
- On July 4, 2011, Task Force Abono, Field Investigation Office (Task Force) of the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) filed a complaint against respondents of local government officials of
Surigao City for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019, Sections 10, 18, and 21 of RA 9184, 18
otherwise known as the "Government Procurement Reform Act," and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, as well as administrative charges.
- The OMB issued a resolution dated October 5, 2016 finding probable cause for the filing of an
Information for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. 20 This was approved by the Ombudsman
on March 22, 2017.
- On September 11, 2017, an Information dated May 2, 2017 was filed before the Sandiganbayan
charging respondents with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
- Then on September 22, 2017, respondent Monteros filed a motion to quash information/dismiss
the case and a motion (A) to quash/hold in abeyance the release of the warrant of arrest; and (B)
to defer arraignment and other proceedings.
- On September 25, 2017, respondents Casurra, Edera, Geotina, and Elumba filed their omnibus
motion to quash information and to defer arraignment. Respondent Lozada subsequently
manifested that he adopts this motion. Like Monteros, respondents claimed that there was
inordinate delay from the fact-finding phase up to the filing of the Information.
Facts:
- On October 19, 2017, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its consolidated
comment/opposition 29 to the motions filed by accused.
- In its November 27, 2017 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted the motions of
respondents and dismissed the criminal case against them. The anti-graft court
confirmed that more than 11 years have passed from the COA's issuance of the NOD
until the filing of the Information. 33 It held that the delay is not reasonable. The
prosecution's excuse that the many layers of review and the meticulous scrutiny that
the case necessitates time, failed to convince.
- Hence, this petition for certiorari. 42 The prosecution ascribes grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting respondents' motions and dismissing the
criminal case.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting the motions filed by respondents, which resulted to the dismissal of the
criminal case and their acquittal [No]

Ratio:
The petition has no merit. The Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the criminal cases.
At the outset, the Court emphasizes that the dismissal of the instant criminal case against
respondents constitutes acquittal. Thus, it may only be assailed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as done here by the prosecution. Grave abuse of discretion must be alleged
in order for the petition to prosper. It must be shown that respondent court or tribunal "acted in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction"; it must be "so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."
In contention here is the Sandiganbayan's dismissal of the criminal cases against respondents by
reason of inordinate delay.
The Constitution guarantees every person's right to speedy disposition of cases. Article III, Section 16 states:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

The Court, in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, laid down the guidelines for determining if there is a violation of
the right to speedy disposition of cases:
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the
rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions
against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the
proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a
preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable
periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays
beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations
prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has
been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the
given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that
will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right
was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the
prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or
clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did
not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the
prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second,
that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no
prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire
context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues
raised.
An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated
by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter
lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the
proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would
automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.
 Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the
right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can
no longer be invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and
discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The
respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural
periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.
Applying the guidelines in Cagang, the Court finds that there is a violation of respondents' right to
speedy disposition of cases.

Period for fact-finding

investigation not included in the
determination of inordinate
delay.
 Initially, it is very clear in Cagang that the period taken for fact-finding investigations shall not be
included in the determination of whether there is inordinate delay; the period shall be reckoned from
the filing of a formal complaint. In other words, inordinate delay on cases filed with the OMB primarily
pertains to the period taken for preliminary investigation.

In this regard, the Sandiganbayan erred in including the period for fact-finding in its
determination of the period relevant to inordinate delay.

In fine, the OMB's preliminary investigation of the case started from the filing of the complaint on
July 4, 2011 and ended on the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan on September 11, 2017.
Again, the period for fact-finding investigations shall not be included in the determination of inordinate
delay. Thus, it took six years, two months, and seven days for the OMB to conduct its preliminary
investigation. The question now is whether this amount of time constitutes inordinate delay.
Prosecution bears the burden of
proof; it failed to show that the
delay was reasonable.
Cagang states that the burden of proof to justify the delay shifts depending on when the right was
invoked. The defense bears the burden if the right was invoked within the periods prescribed by this Court,
the Rules of Court, or the OMB for the conduct of preliminary investigation; the prosecution bears the burden
if the right was invoked beyond the set periods, and it must show that the delay was justifiable under the
factors provided in Cagang.
As the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman then in effect do not provide for the period
within which the preliminary investigation shall be concluded, the periods provided for in Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court shall have suppletory application. Applying Sections 3 (f) and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
the graft investigation officer shall have 10 days after the investigation to determine probable cause; then, he
has five days from resolution to forward the records of the case to the Ombudsman, who shall act upon the
resolution within 10 days from receipt.
Here, it is clear that the prescribed periods were not observed. As can be gleaned, the case was
submitted for resolution on November 4, 2013. But looking closely, records show that the last pleading was
submitted on June 14, 2012, when respondents submitted their position papers. As there were no further
submissions or orders for parties to submit further pleadings as well as hearings, the case should have been
submitted for resolution as early as June 14, 2012.
 It was only on October 5, 2016 when the OMB issued a resolution finding probable cause, which is
almost three years after the case was submitted for resolution, or more than four years from the date the last
pleadings were submitted — clearly way beyond the 10-day period. Further, the Ombudsman herself
approved the resolution only on March 22, 2017, which is almost six months after the issuance of the
resolution — again way beyond the five-day and 10-day period respectively prescribed for the transmittal of
the records to her office and for her to act upon the resolution.

The next step is the determination of when respondents invoked their right to speedy disposition of
cases. The timing of invocation affects which side bears the burden of proof to justify the delay. Records show
that the earliest time respondents invoked the right was when respondent Monteros filed a motion for
reconsideration of the OMB October 5, 2016 Resolution. The right was invoked after the lapse of the periods
prescribed, resulting to the burden shifting to the prosecution.

As the prosecution bears the burden, it shall prove that the delay was reasonable. Following the
parameters in Cagang, the prosecution failed to do so. It merely made allegations that the OMB is deluged
with cases and that the instant case is complex. These excuses fail to convince the Court.
 While the Court recognizes the reality of institutional delay in government agencies, including the OMB,
this solely does not justify the office's failure to promptly resolve cases before it. The OMB cannot just claim
institutional delay or the "steady stream" of cases reaching its office as an excuse for not resolving cases timely.
After all, the Constitution itself, as enforced and bolstered by The Ombudsman Act of 1989, requires the OMB
to promptly act on complaints filed before it against public officials and government employees. As further
stated in jurisprudence, the allegation of heavy case load of a particular government agency should "still be
subject to proof as to its effects on a particular case, bearing in mind the importance of the right to speedy
disposition of cases as a fundamental right." The OMB should clearly show that delay is inevitable because of
the peculiar circumstances of each specific case, which it failed to do so in this case. The OMB here failed to
show that this specific procurement of fertilizer had peculiar circumstances to make delay inevitable.

The Court understands that the instant case is part of the so called "Fertilizer Fund Scam" cases.
However, this does not mean that the case is highly complex that requires a serious amount of time. Records
show that the instant case involves only one transaction: the procurement of fertilizer that was paid in two
tranches. There is also no allegation that respondents here conspired with other government officials involved
in the other Fertilizer Fund Scam cases elsewhere in the country. Further, there are only seven respondents. To
add, the OMB was in effect assisted by the COA in the latter's issuance of the NOD. In fact, it was the primary
basis of the Task Force's filing of the complaint. Likewise, there was no showing that the records of this case
were voluminous that would necessitate a number of years for the conduct of review.
 In the cases of Javier v. Sandiganbayan and Catamco v. Sandiganbayan 81 (Catamco), which also involve
the "Fertilizer Fund Scam," the OMB also posited the same arguments of complexity and voluminous records.
The Court, in ruling that there was inordinate delay, disregarded the OMB's arguments absent proof as
regards the assertions. Similarly in the instant case, the OMB did not show proof of complexity and volume
that would make the delay inevitable and justified.
For the Court, the delay was unreasonable. Six years, two months, and seven days for the preliminary
investigation of a case involving a single transaction and seven respondents is too long a period for this Court
to accommodate.

Respondents suffered prejudice.

In addition to the discussion, the prosecution must show that respondents did not suffer prejudice as a
result of the delay. In this regard, the prosecution failed to show that respondents did not suffer prejudice. The
Court recognizes that the inordinate delay places the accused in a protracted period of uncertainty which may
cause "anxiety, suspicion, or even hostility." The Court also recognizes that the lengthy delay would result to
the accused's inability to adequately prepare for the case which would result to the deterioration or loss of
evidence, leading to impairment of the accused's defense.
Thus, it is inevitable that respondents in this case suffer the same predicament. Surely, they suffered
anxiety due to the long period of uncertainty while waiting for the resolution of the case. The delay affected
their ability to prepare for their defense. As found by the Sandiganbayan, respondents suffered public
humiliation and embarrassment as a result of the case dragging on for so long. These circumstances constitute
 Thus, it is inevitable that respondents in this case suffer the same predicament. Surely, they suffered
anxiety due to the long period of uncertainty while waiting for the resolution of the case. The delay affected
their ability to prepare for their defense. As found by the Sandiganbayan, respondents suffered public
humiliation and embarrassment as a result of the case dragging on for so long. These circumstances constitute
the actual prejudice that respondents have suffered as a result of the delay.

Right was timely invoked.

Cagang requires that the right to speedy disposition of cases must be timely raised. In Catamco and
Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, the Court, applying Cagang, considered the filing of a motion for reconsideration of
the OMB resolution finding probable cause as a timely invocation of the right.

Here, the Court considers the motion for reconsideration filed by Monteros before the OMB sufficient for
purposes of determining whether the respondents' right to speedy disposition had been violated. Her
invocation of the right in the motion is deemed to cover the other respondents as they are co-respondents in a
single case and it assails a single resolution that applies to all of them. In any event, worthy of great
consideration is respondents' immediate filing of the motions to quash before the Sandiganbayan after the
filing of the Information. These circumstances show that respondents did not in any way sleep or waive their
right to speedy disposition of cases.
 Considering all the foregoing, respondents' right to speedy disposition of cases was
undoubtedly infringed. The Sandiganbayan therefore did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the criminal case against them.

As for respondent Palacio, the Court notes that the instant petition did not assail the
Sandiganbayan September 7, 2018 Resolution 89 that dismissed the criminal case as against
her. The instant petition assails only the Sandiganbayan Resolutions that dismissed the
criminal case as against the rest of the respondents. Thus, Palacio's acquittal still stands.
 Rule 70
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Tiña v. Sta. Clara Estate, Inc., G.R. No. 239979, February 17, 2020.

Doctrine: For a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but must rely solely on what the law provides on the given
set of facts. If the facts are disputed or if the issues require an examination of the evidence, the question posed
is one of fact. The test, therefore, is not the appellation given to a question by the party raising it, but whether
the appellate court can resolve the issue without examining or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
Facts:

- The instant controversy involves a 231-square-meter lot along Creek I, denominated as the Ogumod
Creek, situated in Bacolod City.
- The petitioner claimed that she and her husband had been occupying said property for more than 55
years openly, publicly, adversely, and continuously in the concept of an owner.
- On the other hand, respondent Sta. Clara Estate, Inc. alleged that the contested property is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-28629 of the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City registered under
its name.
- On March 3, 1999, respondent filed a Complaint 12 for ejectment before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 7. Meanwhile, on April 28, 2000, petitioner filed a Complaint for
cancellation of title with damages and other reliefs before the RTC of Bacolod City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 00-11133, over the contested property.
- The ejectment case proceeded ahead of Civil Case No. 00-11133. On May 9, 2002, the MTCC
rendered a Decision 15 in favor of the respondent. The MTCC found that respondent is the
registered owner of Creek I having introduced the improvement into the property, which is the
man-made creek, when the said property was being developed into the Sta. Clara Subdivision.
- On July 23, 2003, the RTC of Bacolod City affirmed the Decision of the MTCC.
- The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the RTC.
- Petitioner files a direct appeal to this Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is the proper party to file the suit for cancellation of title should be raised in
the main case, [Yes].

Ratio: A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be
one of law, its resolution must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants, but must rely solely on what the law provides on the given set of facts. If the facts are disputed
or if the issues require an examination of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact. The test, therefore, is
not the appellation given to a question by the party raising it, but whether the appellate court can resolve the
issue without examining or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a
question of fact.
An examination of the present petition shows petitioner essentially challenging
the dismissal of the case based solely on the premise that a ruling on ownership
in an ejectment case is merely ancillary to resolve the issue of possession and
should not bind the title or ownership of the land. This is clearly a question of
law which calls for an examination and interpretation of the prevailing law and
jurisprudence.
"[T]he sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the
subject property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties." Section
16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the exception to the rule in that the
issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the
question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the related
ejectment case, the parties were allowed to prove how they came into possession
of the property. Petitioner claims open and continuous possession of the
accreted portion of Creek I for over 67 years and a Miscellaneous Sales
Application for said accreted portion was filed and approved by the DENR.
On the other hand, respondent insists that Creek I is part of a lot owned by it.
Incidentally, the issue of the ownership of Creek I, came into forth. Petitioner
stresses that Creek I is classified as property under public domain, hence,
respondent could not have been validly issued a title, while respondent
maintains that Creek I is man-made.

In the ejectment case, the issue of ownership over Creek I was resolved in favor
of respondent. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that where the
issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the
issue on ownership is not final and binding, but merely for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is
only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving
title to the property. In an ejectment case, questions as to the validity of the title
cannot be resolved definitively.
A separate action to directly attack the validity of the title must be filed, as was
in fact filed by petitioner, to fully thresh out as to who possesses a valid title over
the subject property. Thus, any ruling on ownership that was passed upon in the
ejectment case is not and should not be binding on Civil Case No. 00-11133.

A separate action to directly attack the validity of the title must be filed, as was
in fact filed by petitioner, to fully thresh out as to who possesses a valid title over
the subject property. Thus, any ruling on ownership that was passed upon in the
ejectment case is not and should not be binding on Civil Case No. 00-11133.
 Pedrito R. Parayday and Jaime Reboso v. Shogun Shipping Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 204555, July 06, 2020

Facts: A complaint for illegal dismissal and regularization was filed by petitioners against Shogun
Ships. They alleged that they were employed as fitters/welders by Oceanview. Oceanview changed
its corporate name to "Shogun Ships Inc.," herein respondent. Shogun Ships maintained the same
line of business, and retained in its employ Oceanview employees, such as petitioners.

An explosion occurred which caused petitioners to sustain third degree burns. Although medical
expenses were borne by Shogun Ships, petitioners were not paid their salaries while on hospital
confinement. Thereafter, Shogun Ships discontinued providing financial assistance. Petitioners
alleged that subsequently the management of Shogun Ships verbally dismissed them from service.

The LA ordered Shogun Shops to reinstate Petitioners. The NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the findings of the LA that petitioners were regular employees of Shogun Ships and that they were
illegally dismissed. Aggrieved, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari (with Prayer for the Issuance
of a WPI and/or TRO) before the CA ascribing upon the NLRC grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners
harped on the supposed insufficiency of documentary evidence furnished by the respondent which
merely consisted of a copy of Shogun Ships' Certificate of Incorporation. The CA held that petitioners
failed to prove that Oceanview is same entity as Shogun Ships.
Issue: Whether or not CA erred in serving to Atty.
Napoleon Banzuela, petitioners’ former counsel, its
May 11, 2012 Decision, and not petitioners’ counsel
on record, [Yes].
 Rule 71
Contempt
Ratio: Petitioners impute fault on the CA for serving to Atty. Napoleon Banzuela, petitioners'
former counsel, its May 11, 2012 Decision, and not to petitioners' counsel on record. The Law
Firm of Velandrez and Associates, despite receipt of the Notice of Change in the Composition of
the Law Office on January 26, 2012. On this point, this Court finds that the CA committed no
error when it served to Atty. Banzuela its May 11, 2012 Decision since it was only on July 17,
2012 that the Court of Appeals received Atty. Banzuela's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of
petitioners.

In the matter of petitioners' motion to cite respondent for direct contempt of court for
supposedly misrepresenting facts and using insulting language against petitioners, we find the
same unmeritorious. While it is well-established that contemptuous statements made in
pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt, a perusal of respondent's Comment (to
petitioners' Petition) would show that no such contemptuous language was utilized.

Moreover, this Court finds that respondent has not employed deceitful acts which would serve
as basis for the charge of direct contempt.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
 Rule 18
Pre-Trial
Gemina v. Heirs of Espejo, G.R. No. 232682, September 13, 2021

Doctrine:
Where this Court categorically concluded that the absence of defendants' counsel would not ipso
facto authorize the judge to declare the defendant in default and cause the ex parte presentation of
plaintiff's evidence. [Paredes v. Verano]
Facts:
- The present controversy involved a property located at 156 Session Road, Woodcrest Homes, Talanay,
Area B, Batasan Hills, Quezon City (subject property).
- Gemina and Heirs of Espejo presented their respective evidence to bolster their claim to the subject
property.
- On December 15, 2004, Espejo’s heirs, through their representative, sent Gemina a demand letter
asserting their ownership over the subject property, and demanding him and his family to vacate said
property because they have been unlawfully occupying the lot where the latter's house was built.
- The Espejos filed an action for recovery of possession and prayed for the trial court to order Gemina and
all persons claiming in his behalf to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property, and to pay
reasonable compensation from the time that their possession have become unlawful, among others.
- On the scheduled date of pre-trial, Gemina was present but his counsel failed to attend. As a result, the
trial court reset the pre-trial for the last time and directed him to inform his counsel of the schedule of
hearing. Gemina's counsel still failed to attend the said pre-trial schedule. However, the trial court
allowed the heirs of Espejo to present their evidence ex parte in its November 26, 2012 Order. Soon
thereafter, Gemina's counsel filed a Withdrawal of Counsel with Attached Motion for Reconsideration
citing health reasons as justification for his withdrawal, and invoking the trial court's compassion so as
not to prejudice Gemina's cause due to the heirs of Espejo's ex parte presentation of evidence.
- In an Order dated January 22, 2013, the trial court granted the withdrawal of Gemina's counsel and
directed Gemina to secure the services of a new counsel.
- Through a new counsel, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), Gemina filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Orders dated November 26, 2012 and January 22, 2013 arguing that Gemina learned about the
January 22, 2013 Order only on March 26, 2013 when the latter followed up the case without receiving
any notice.
- The trial court denied Gemina's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated May 22, 2013. Said Order
was subjected to another motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
- The trial court held that as between the TCT 93809 in the hands of the Espejos and the self-serving claim
of Gemina that he purchased the subject property in 1978, the TCT 93809 of the Espejo heirs is superior as
it serves as an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the subject property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein.
- The appellate court, in its Decision dated February 22, 2017, affirmed the ruling of the trial court, with
modification as to the rate of interest and cancellation of the award of attorney's fees.
- Gemina moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's Decision, but it was denied in a Resolution
dated June 30, 2017. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the non-appearance of defendant's counsel, despite the presence of the
party-defendant, during pre-trial could result to the plaintiff's ex parte presentation of evidence
[No]

Ratio:

When the party-defendant is present, the absence of his counsel during pre-trial shall not
ipso facto result in the plaintiff's ex parte presentation of evidence.

Pre-trial serves a significant purpose in court proceedings. It simplifies, abbreviates and

expedites the trial, if not the entire process of administering and dispensing justice. For this
reason, the parties and their counsels cannot take this stage for granted as it is more than just a
part of procedural law or its technicality. Accordingly, Section 4 and Section 5, Rule 18 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandate the appearance of the parties and their counsels, and the
consequences for their failure to appear during the scheduled pre-trial, viz.:
 SECTION 4. Appearance of [P]arties. — It shall be the duty of the parties and their
counsel to appear at the pre-trial, court-annexed mediation, and judicial dispute resolution,
if necessary. The non-appearance of a party and counsel may be excused only for acts of
God, force majeure, or duly substantiated physical inability.

A representative may appear on behalf of a party, but must be fully authorized in

writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and documents.

SECTION 5. Effect of Failure to Appear. — When duly notified, the failure of the plaintiff
and counsel to appear without valid cause when so required[,] pursuant to the next
preceding [S]ection, shall cause the dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with
prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the
defendant and counsel shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his or her evidence ex
parte within ten (10) calendar days from termination of the pre-trial, and the court to render
judgment on the basis of the evidence offered. (Emphasis supplied)
 Prior to the amendments brought about by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC (AM 19-10-20-SC) which
became effective on May 1, 2020, there was an apparent confusion with regard to the effect of a
non-appearance in pre-trial. As in this instant case, the controversy centered on the interpretation
of the then Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which was previously worded in this wise:

SECTION 5. Effect of Failure to Appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action.
The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar
failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)

When read plainly, the then Section 5 gives the impression that only the failure of the
plaintiff or the defendant (and not their counsels) to appear in pre-trial would bring about the
dismissal of the action or the eventual ex parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff,
respectively. Taking the cue from such plain reading, Gemina's counsel argued that his non-
appearance during the pre-trial should not have worked to his client's prejudice as the latter had
been prudent in attending hearings in the proceedings.
 This confusion in the import of Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court was aptly addressed in
Paredes v. Verano (Paredes) where this Court categorically concluded that the absence of defendants'
counsel would not ipso facto authorize the judge to declare the defendant in default and cause the ex parte
presentation of plaintiff's evidence. A stringent construction of the rules in which a court rules based on
technicalities should not be the norm.

Said pronouncement and ratio would be controlling in the present case where Gemina, just like the
defendants in Paredes, attended the scheduled pre-trial yet his counsel failed to appear on even date. We
recognize the significance of the rules which serve as a roadmap for the party-litigants and practitioners in
dealing with the courts. However, their application may be relaxed if and when the rigid application would
subvert substantive justice. Indeed, the procedural rules may be liberally applied in order to relieve the
party-litigant of injustice which is incomparable to the thoughtlessness of non-compliance with the rules.

With the advent of AM 19-10-20-SC, said Section 5 has been clarified by already including the word
counsel and putting the conjunctive word and, to the effect that it is only when both the party-litigant
(plaintiff or defendant) and his counsel fail to appear in pre-trial that there be the concomitant consequence
of either a dismissal (plaintiff and counsel were absent), or presentation of evidence ex parte (defendant and
counsel were absent). The amended provision has been worded, as follows:
 SECTION 5. Effect of Failure to Appear. — When duly notified, the failure of the
plaintiff and counsel to appear without valid cause when so required[,] x x x, shall cause the
dismissal of the action. x x x. A similar failure on the part of the defendant and counsel shall
be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his or her evidence ex parte x x x. (Emphases
supplied)

In this case, the Espejo's ex parte presentation of evidence following the non-appearance of
Gemina's counsel was unwarranted. Paredes is instructive to the extent that it allows resort to
other remedies available instead of ordering the ex parte presentation of plaintiff's evidence
when the defendants' counsel had not appeared during pre-trial, to wit:

Be that as it may, there is no clear demonstration that the acts of the counsel of
petitioners were intended to perpetuate delay in the litigation of the case. Assuming
arguendo that the trial court correctly construed the actions of the counsel of petitioners
to be dilatory, it cannot be said that the court was powerless and virtually without
recourse but to order the ex parte presentation of evidence by therein plaintiffs. We are in
some sympathy with the judge who was obviously aggrieved that the case was dragging
on for an undue length of time. But even so, there were other remedies available to the
court.
 Among the inherent powers of the courts expressly recognized by the Rules include
the authority to enforce order in proceedings before it, to compel obedience to its
judgments, orders and processes, and to amend and control its process and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice. Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct
empowers the courts to judiciously take or initiate disciplinary measures against lawyers for
unprofessional conduct. A show cause order to counsel would have been the more cautious
and reasonable course of action to take under the circumstances then prevailing. In failing
to do so, the trial court impetuously deprived petitioners of the opportunity to
meaningfully present an effective defense and to adequately adduce evidence in support of
their contentions. (Citations omitted)

Simply, Gemina's cause of action should not have been prejudiced by the non-appearance of
his counsel, particularly since on record, the former had been religiously appearing in the course
of the proceedings, including during the pre-trial. Since other recourse may have been resorted to
against Gemina's counsel as precisely laid down in Paredes, the November 26, 2012 Order for the
Espejo's ex parte presentation of evidence cannot be countenanced. Gemina should have been
given the chance to establish the merits of his defense rather than lose the subject property based
on technicalities or upon a stringent application of the rules.
 To briefly settle another procedural issue, We resolve that there is substantial compliance
when the adverse party had the opportunity to file a pleading opposing the motion for
reconsideration despite the latter's lack of a notice of hearing. When Gemina's counsel filed for his
withdrawal as counsel, he attached a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. While the withdrawal
as counsel was granted, said motion was denied for the counsel failed to set the motion for
hearing. As may be gleaned from for records, the Espejo heirs filed a Comment/Opposition to the
said motion.

In Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corp., this Court pronounced that the
lack of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration is cured when the adverse party filed
pleadings opposing said motion and had the opportunity to be heard in compliance with the
requirements of due process. Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration in this case should not have
been denied on the mere basis of lack of notice of hearing.
Final Note.

The rigid application of procedural rules should not result to straight-jacketing the
administration of justice. 64 This Court deems it proper and just that Gemina and all
other persons claiming rights under his name be allowed to present their evidence before
the RTC to give them full opportunity to establish the merits of their defense rather than
lose the subject property which has been in their physical and actual possession for years,
and where they have planted fruit-bearing trees and even built their residence. The ends
of justice, fairness and equity will be best served if both parties are heard with their
evidence and the controversies are settled on the merits and not on mere technicalities of
the law.
 Rule 110
Prosecution of Offenses
Talabis v. People, G.R. No. 214647, March 4, 2020

Doctrine:

As a rule, a criminal action contemplated under Rule 110 is commenced by a complaint or information, both
of which are filed in court. Thus, if a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by those
persons delineated in Sections 3 and 5 of the same rule, such as the offended party. In the case of an
information, the same must be filed by the fiscal or prosecutor. However, a "complaint" filed with the fiscal or
prosecutor from which he/she may initiate a preliminary investigation may be filed by any person.
Facts:
- Leonora Edoc and Rhoda Bay-An filed a joint affidavit-complaint against the petitioner
and Arsebino.
- After preliminary investigation, petitioner and Arsebino were charged with the crime
of violation of Sec 68 of PD 705, that petitioner and Arsebino, together with two other
male companions were seen cutting pine trees without the required permit
- Leonora reported the incident to Kitayan, a forester.
- Leonora and Kitayan then proceeded to the cutting site where they saw several felled
pine trees.
- Arsebino relayed to Leonora that he is the owner of the land where the pine trees were
located.
- Leonora, however, insisted that it belonged to her daughter, Rhoda.
- The RTC found petitioner and Arsebino guilty as charged.
Issue: Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 464-CR-06 even though it
was based on a complaint filed by Leonora and Rhoda, who are private individuals, and not by
a DENR forest officer [Yes]

Ratio:

The RTC acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case.

At the outset, the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. Although this doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (Sibonghanoy), this Court
maintains that the ruling in Sibonghanoy is the exception rather than the general rule.

In Calimlim v. Ramirez, we held that the ruling in Sibonghanoy is an exception to the

general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. The Court stated further that Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the
presence of laches.
Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual
milieu is analogous to that in the cited case, i.e., where the issue of jurisdiction was only raised for the first time
in a motion to dismiss filed almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered by the lower court.
In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in Sibonghanoy, we considered the patent inequity and
unfairness of "having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years." In
such controversy, laches was clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction was raised so belatedly as to warrant
the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. It bears noting that
petitioner, in his Brief and during appeal before the CA, already raised the issue on Leonora's and Rhoda's
authority to file the complaint against him and Arsebino for violating the provisions of PD 705. At that time, no
considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.
Having disposed of the procedural issue, this Court will now proceed with the issue of whether the RTC
acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case based on a complaint filed by private individuals and not by a
forest officer.
To be clear, Section 80 of PD 705 contemplates two instances when a forest officer may commence a
prosecution for violations of PD 705. The first instance, on one hand, contemplates a situation where a forest
officer arrests without a warrant any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the
offenses described in PD 705. On the other hand, the second instance contemplates a situation where an offense
described in PD 705 is not committed in the presence of the forest officer and the commission is brought to his
attention by a report or a complaint.
 In People v. Court of First Instance of Quezon, this Court held that "reports and complaints" cover only
such reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest
officers, or any deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence,
thus:
The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter because the information was filed not pursuant to the complaint of any forest
officer as prescribed in Section 80 of P.D. 705. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor
General that:

x x x [T]he authority given to the forest officer to investigate reports and complaints
regarding the commission of offenses defined in P.D. No. 705 by the said last and
penultimate paragraphs of Section 80 may be considered as covering only such reports and
complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest
officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development, or any of the deputized
officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence. Such
interpretation becomes cogent when we consider that the whole of Section 80 deals
precisely with the authority of forest officers or employees to make arrests and institute
criminal actions involving offenses defined in the Decree. (Citation omitted)
 In both cases, the forest officer shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the
appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary
information in court.
In other words, Section 80 of PD 705 contemplates situations where acts in violation of the law were
committed in the presence of forest officers, or when reports or complaints of violations of PD 705, albeit not
committed in their presence, are brought to the attention of forest officers by other forest officers or any
deputized officers or officials. In such cases, PD 705 specifically recognizes the special authority of forest
officers to file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases after said forest officer has conducted a warrantless arrest, seizure or
confiscation of property, or after his receipt of a complaint of report of violations of PD 705, as the case may be.
The factual milieus of the case readily show that none of the two situations or instances contemplated
under Section 80 of PD 705 are present which would thereby trigger the application of its provisions relating to
commencement of criminal prosecution by a forest officer. In this case, it was not a forest officer who reported
to Kitayan the tree-cutting activities of petitioner and Arsebino in Cotcot, Bangao, Buguias, Benguet, but
Leonora, a private individual, who had a land dispute with Arsebino over the land covering the cutting site.
Hence, Section 80, particularly the second category thereof, will not apply in the instant case.
To further support his argument, petitioner cites Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provides,
among others, for certain crimes that may not be prosecuted unless the complaint has been filed by
specific individuals. Petitioner maintains that cases involving violations of PD 705 fall within the
contemplation of the said rule — that violations of PD 705 may not be prosecuted unless the complaint
 To further support his argument, petitioner cites Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provides, among
others, for certain crimes that may not be prosecuted unless the complaint has been filed by specific
individuals. Petitioner maintains that cases involving violations of PD 705 fall within the contemplation of the
said rule — that violations of PD 705 may not be prosecuted unless the complaint has been filed by the
investigating forest officer. This contention deserves scant consideration.
Whether Section 80 of PD 705 contemplates complaints or reports coming from private individuals or by
other forest officers or deputized officials, Leonora and/or Rhoda were not precluded by law from filing a
complaint with the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court enumerates the persons who are authorized to file a criminal
complaint. The "complaint" mentioned in this provision, however, refers to one filed in court for the
commencement of a criminal prosecution for violation of a crime. This does not refer to a complaint filed with
the Prosecutor's Office.
As a rule, a criminal action contemplated under Rule 110 is commenced by a complaint or information,
both of which are filed in court. Thus, if a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by those
persons delineated in Sections 3 and 5 of the same rule, such as the offended party. In the case of an
information, the same must be filed by the fiscal or prosecutor. However, a "complaint" filed with the fiscal or
prosecutor from which he/she may initiate a preliminary investigation may be filed by any person.
 In this regard, Section 80 of PD 705 clearly shows that a preliminary investigation is commenced after a
complaint for violations of the law is filed with a fiscal or prosecutor. People v. Court of First Instance of
Quezon is instructive:
Likewise, the Solicitor General was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687
of the Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter
of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or
made against persons charged with the commission of the crime.
xxx xxx xxx
With the exception of the so-called "private crimes" and in election offenses, prosecutions in
Courts of First Instance may be commenced by an information signed by a fiscal after conducting
a preliminary investigation. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not divest the fiscals of this general
authority. Neither did the said decree grant forest officers the right of preliminary investigations.
In both cases under said Sec. 80 namely, 1) after a forest officer had made the arrest (for offenses
committed in his presence) or; 2) after conducting an investigation of reports or complaints of
violations of the decree (for violations not committed in his presence) — he is still required to file
the proper complaint with the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary
investigations in court. Said section should not be interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon
forest officers to conduct investigations regarding offenses described in the decree rather, it
should be construed as granting forest officers and employees special authority to arrest and
investigate offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce the exercise of such authority by those
upon whom it is vested by general law.
 Considering the foregoing, the complaint may thus be filed with the Provincial Prosecutor not only by a
forest officer, but also by private individuals such as Leonora and Rhoda.
Petitioner, nonetheless, further argues that PD 705, being a special law, should prevail over the general
rule provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that anyone, whether a private individual or not, may initiate
criminal proceedings through the filing of a complaint before officers authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation.
We disagree. As already held by this Court in Merida:
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be initiated
by a complaint filed by specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of
jurisdiction from trying such cases. However, these cases concern only defamation and other
crimes against chastity and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. x x x
(Citations omitted)
Hence, a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the
offended party. "The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de
oficio [or is private in nature], the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any
competent person." 49 Proceeding from the foregoing discussion, the complaint thus filed by Leonora and
Rhoda with the Provincial Prosecutor was valid.
 While we are not unaware that prosecution for violation of special laws shall be governed by its
provisions, this Court is not inclined to interpret Section 80 of PD 705 as to limit the authority to file criminal
complaints to forest officers.

Admittedly, there are certain instances when an administrative body is vested exclusive authority to determine
when to institute a criminal action for a violation of the law entrusted to it for administration or enforcement to the
exclusion of the regular prosecution service of the government. Thus, in Mead v. Argel (Mead), this Court held that a
prosecutor may only file an information for violations of the Anti-Pollution Law (Republic Act No. 3931) only after the
National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission has determined that the offender indeed caused pollution. The
filing of the information for violation of the law prior to such determination is premature and unauthorized. Thus, the
court is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense charged in the information.

Along the same lines, this Court, in Yao Lit v. Geraldez, upheld the authority of the Commissioner of
Immigration to determine whether to impose an administrative fine or to prosecute criminally the offender
before the court for committing acts in violation of the provisions of the Alien Registration Act of 1950
(Republic Act No. 751). Consequently, we held that the prosecuting fiscal acted in excess of his authority in
immediately prosecuting the offender in court without first affording the Commissioner of Immigration an
opportunity to exercise his discretion over the matter involved in the offense charged.
 Notably, the recognition of such exclusive authority of the officials in these cases is not without
significance. As in Mead, the determination of the existence of "pollution" requires specialized knowledge of
technical and scientific terms — matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of fiscals or of those
sitting in a court of justice, more so on the part of ordinary private individuals. In Yao Lit, the exclusive
authority of the Commissioner was recognized for the reason that said official "has better facilities than the
prosecuting officials to carry out the provisions of said Act, the former official being the keeper of records
pertaining to aliens." Simply put, the determination of whether criminal prosecution should be instituted is
premised on the supposition that specific technical expertise are required to ascertain whether the act
committed constitutes an offense as defined by law, or where there is a need to collect various information
relating to the offense committed which are within the exclusive possession, custody, or care of the
administrative body or agency.

Such is not the case at bar. If the intent of the law was to conform with the principles enunciated in
Mead and Yao Lit, thereby limiting the authority to file criminal complaints against forestry law violators to
forest officers, an amendatory law would not have been enacted which likewise expressly authorized the
National Police to file complaints against violators of PD 705. Moreover, PD 705 was further amended
precisely to "encourage and further expand the participation of the private sector in forest management,
protection and development as well as in wood processing activities within the concept of joint or co-
management of the forest resources."
 All told, Section 89 of PD 705 should not be interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon forest officers
to conduct investigations and file criminal complaints regarding offenses described in PD 705. Rather, said
provision should be construed as a recognition and reinforcement of their special authority to conduct
warrantless arrests, seize and confiscate property, and proceeding therefrom, file the necessary complaints
against forestry law offenders.
 Rule 112
Preliminary Investigation
Ante v. University of the Philippines Student Disciplinary Tribunal, G.R. No. 227911, March 14, 2022.

Doctrine:

SDT will act as the judge that will hear and decide the case filed before it. Given this, if we are to follow
Ante's submissions — that SDT, alone and in itself, conducts the preliminary inquiry preparatory to the filing
of the formal charges — then what will result is an anomalous situation of a judge hearing his/her own case.
Facts:
- UP filed seven disciplinary actions against Ante and others which were prompted by the
death of Mendez allegedly due to hazing activities/initiation rites conducted by Sigma Rho
Fraternity.
- Ante filed his answer. He stated that a valid preliminary inquiry must first be conducted to
determine whether a formal charge against any member or officer of a fraternity, sorority,
or other student organization is warranted.
- Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) denied Ante’s requests.
- On November 20, 2007, Ante filed an omnibus motion seeking for: (a) the quashal of the
formal charges and declaration of all the proceedings as void due to an invalid preliminary
inquiry; and (b) the inhibition of the members of SDT who conducted the invalid
preliminary inquiry on the ground of prejudgment, considering that SDT has concluded
that a prima facie case already existed against Ante and others.
- SDT denied Ante’s omnibus motion. In maintaining that a valid preliminary inquiry was
conducted, SDT declared that under the Rules Governing Fraternities, no member or
officer of a fraternity, sorority, or student organization shall be formally charged in the
absence of such inquiry conducted by the SDT.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the preliminary inquiry conducted by SDT valid [Yes]
2. Whether or not SDT is guilty of prejudging the case against Ante, thereby violating the
latter's right to due process [No]

Ratio:
1. The preliminary inquiry
conducted by SDT was valid.
Ante suggests that the terms "by" and "before" are mutually opposed; that one necessarily
negates the other — they are not and do not. As correctly held by the CA, simply because SDT
stated in the formal charges that the preliminary inquiries were conducted "before" them, does
not mean that they themselves did not conduct nor participate in the same. The term "inquiry,"
which means "to request for information" in its ordinary sense, necessarily implies that SDT took
part in the conduct of such. This alone, satisfies the requirement that the preliminary inquiry be
conducted "by a member of the SDT."
Moreover, we agree with the CA that it would be bordering absurdity if the statement be
interpreted to mean that SDT "merely served as observers of the University Prosecutor, with
themselves physically present thereat but meaning nothing at all." Thus, contrary to Ante's
assertion, to split hairs between the phrases "by the Student Disciplinary Tribunal" and "before
the Student Disciplinary Tribunal" is actually a trifling matter.

Moreover, the interchangeability of the terms "by" and "before," when being used in rules
or in statutes, and provided it would not cause grammatical confusion, is actually not unheard
of. Take for example Section 1 (a), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open
court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint
or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and
asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the
trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. (Emphases
supplied).
 According to the provision, "the arraignment shall be made x x x by the judge or clerk."
Now, following Ante's logic, does this mean that if an accused pleads — and therefore
participates in the arraignment process — before a judge or a clerk, would the arraignment be
in violation of the rule for not having been done by a judge or a clerk? We think not. In
addition, the first sentence of the provision already states that the arraignment shall be done
"before the court." The second sentence repeats this thought, albeit by using the term "by."
Another illustration, although admittedly tangential in similarity, is Section 2, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court on Preliminary Investigation, which states:
Section 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. —
The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(c) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
 By making these examples, the Court aims to highlight the fact that these terms are in fact sometimes being
used interchangeably, either for sense or for style, and should not always be given strict and literal meaning, contrary
to Ante's assertions.

Another reason which militates against Ante's postulate is the fact that, closely analyzing the provision in
question, it is apparent that the charges are to be filed before SDT. Again, the provision states:

SECTION 1. No member or officer of a fraternity, sorority or student organization shall be formally

charged before the SDT unless a preliminary inquiry has been conducted by any member of the SDT,
which must be finished not later than five (5) working days from the date of filing of the complaint; x x x
(Emphasis supplied).

In other words, SDT will act as the judge that will hear and decide the case filed before it. Given this, if we are
to follow Ante's submissions — that SDT, alone and in itself, conducts the preliminary inquiry preparatory to the
filing of the formal charges — then what will result is an anomalous situation of a judge hearing his/her own case.

To illustrate better, let us have a hypothetical scenario where Person X, who was involved in a hazing activity,
is to be charged. Following Ante's interpretation of the subject provision, SDT shall conduct a preliminary inquiry on
Person X's infractions. Satisfied that there is sufficient basis to charge Person X, SDT shall then prepare the formal
charges. Thereafter, following the provision, SDT shall file the formal charges before itself. This will result to a
situation where SDT shall hear the case it prepared and filed in the first place. Clearly, this could not have been the
situation contemplated by the Rules Governing Fraternities.
Akin to this is Section 5 (b) and (d), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states:

Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they
are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they
are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances
where:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) the judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;

xxx xxx xxx

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the
judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;

The rationale behind this provision is illustrated in Lai v. People:

As such, the mere appearance if his name as the public prosecutor in the records of Criminal Case No.
17446 sufficed to disqualify Judge Elumba from sitting on and deciding the case. Having represented the State
in the prosecution of the petitioner, he could not sincerely claim neutrality or impartiality as the trial judge who
would continue to hear the case. Hence, he should have removed himself from being the trial judge in Criminal
Case No. 17446.

Given all the foregoing, the Court holds that the preliminary inquiry conducted by SDT was valid.
2. There was no violation of
Ante's right to due process.
In asserting that his right to due process was violated, Ante claims that SDT is guilty of prejudice when it
found a prima facie case against him, even though what is required by the school regulations is merely the
determination of the sufficiency of a report or complaint. Ante contends:
8.28. Section 8 of the UP Rules and Regulations on Student Council and Discipline state that
the function of a preliminary inquiry is merely to determine the sufficiency of a report or
complaint against a UP student, to wit:
Section 8. Preliminary Inquiry. — Upon receipt of the complaint or report, the
tribunal of the Dean of the College, as the case may be shall determine whether such
complaint or report is sufficient to warrant formal investigation.
8.29. The rule is clear. In the required preliminary inquiry, only the sufficiency of a
complaint or report to warrant a formal investigation should be determined. The (sic) present
case, the UP Prosecutor went further to find not only the sufficiency of the complaint against
Petitioner Ante but to rule, with the acquiescence of the SDT, that there existed a prima facie case
against him. 33 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
 Ante then proceeds to state that the finding of a prima facie case against him amounts to a prejudgment,
since a prima facie case denotes "evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the
proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant
a conviction." 34 Ante likewise stresses that this effectively shifts the burden of proof to him, in violation of the
presumption of innocence in his favor.
We do not agree.
Initially, We wish to point out that Ante's argument of due process violation is premature. In the
landmark case of Guzman v. National University (Guzman), the Court laid down the requisites for the
satisfaction of due process in disciplinary cases involving students. It explained:
But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not,
contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which
must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students
must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of accusation against them; (2) they shall have
the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they
shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. (Emphasis supplied).
 The ruling in Guzman was in fact reiterated in Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military
Academy, where the Court held that "what is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of
fairness to the individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard."
In the present case, and following Guzman, we fail to see how can there be a violation of Ante's right to
due process when formal proceedings are only yet to begin. SDT is in fact asking Ante to participate — the
very essence of due process — but the latter so stubbornly refuses to do so and instead resorts to procedural
devices meant to avoid the proceedings.
Even if we disregard the prematurity of Ante's claim, the same still fails to persuade. As to the argument
that the finding of a prima facie case against him amounts to prejudgment, we find the same lacking in merit.
Neither does it shift the burden of proof to him, nor violate the presumption of innocence in his favor.
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court defines what is burden of proof:
Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on
the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defenses by the amount of evidence required
by law.
Further, it is a basic principle that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
Meanwhile, burden of evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time
during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when created against him."
Similarly, it is elementary that the burden of evidence shifts from party to party depending upon the
exigencies of the case.
 In the present case, and guided by the foregoing, it is clear that the burden of proof is not shifted to
Ante. Contrary to his assertions, only the burden of evidence is shifted, which requires him to present
evidence that weighs in his favor to counteract the findings of SDT. This, nevertheless, does not require him
to prove his innocence; i.e., that he did not do the infractions charged. The distinction between the two lies in
the subtle but important detail that Ante may successfully overthrow SDT's prima facie case against him,
without necessarily proving his innocence. In other words, Ante may adduce defenses or exculpatory
evidence on his behalf; and if sufficient, would defeat the case against him. However, does this automatically
mean that he did not commit the acts and omissions charged against him? Certainly not. Needless to say,
Ante need not prove his innocence, for he has in his favor such presumption.
Instead, the burden of proof logically lies with SDT, since it is the party alleging a fact — that Ante
participated in the hazing activities which led to the death of Mendez. Thus, in conducting its preliminary
inquiry which resulted to a finding of a prima facie evidence against Ante, SDT merely found evidence good
and sufficient on its face, enough to support the filing of the formal charges against Ante. However, we
emphasize that this prima facie evidence is in no way conclusive of the truth or falsity of the allegations
sought to be established — a determination which is best attained after an exhaustive trial.
As a final note, the Court takes this opportunity to remind litigants that, while perfectly within their
rights, resort to procedural devices must be tempered, especially if the same results to unnecessary delays to
the main proceedings where a more exhaustive and conclusive adjudication of the parties' rights and
liabilities may be had.
 Rule 126
Search and Seizure
Diaz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020

Doctrine:
The test of whether the requirement of definiteness or particularity has been met is whether the
description of the place to be searched under the warrant is sufficient and descriptive enough to
prevent a search of other premises located within the surrounding area or community. A "place"
may refer to a single building or structure, or a house or residence, such as in the case at bar.

Requirement of particularity as to the things to be seized does not require technical accuracy in the
description of the property to be seized, and that a search warrant may be said to particularly
describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow it to be described.
Facts:
- Apr. 27, 2012: Judge Morga Presiding Judge of San Pablo City, Branch 32, issued a Search Warrant
No. 97 (12) after examination under oath of PO2 Avila.
- Warrant states: There is probable cause for violation of RA 9165 and that there is sufficient reason
to believe that Merly Diaz at Merly Palayok has undetermined amount of shabu which she is
keeping in her “house at Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna.”
- In support of PO2 Avila’s application were 2 sketches from informant Jericho Labrador.
- First sketch Labrador depicted a floor plan of a studio-type apartment with an anteroom where
the entrance gate of the property was located.
- The second sketch depicted three buildings along Gitna, one of which was marked with a large
- "X" enclosed in a square that supposedly identified petitioner's house.
- 9 grams of shabu were found and seized in Diaz’s house. She was arrested and detained for
alleged violation of Sec. 11 of RA 9165.
- Immediately after the search and Diaz’s arrest, the following were uncovered from Diaz:
- (1) that the complete address of her residence is No. 972, Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna;
and (2) that the house was divided into five separate units each occupied by petitioner and her
four siblings and their families.
Issue: Whether Search Warrant No. 97 (12) is a general warrant for failing to describe the place to be searched
with sufficient particularity [No]

Ratio:
We deny the Petition.
The requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
and in Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules Court, viz.: "(1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must
be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the
facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized." The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrant.
There is no question that the search warrant was issued after judicial determination of probable cause.
This Court is thus confined in determining the presence or absence of the fifth requisite element as stated
above, i.e., whether the subject warrant specifically described the place to be searched.
 "A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is proscribed by both
jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution." The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of
search warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion to decide on their own where to
search and whom and what to seize. "Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause
requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will make it
apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the [court] that the described items are to be found in a
particular place."
Notably, it is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a description of a place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the place intended,
and distinguish it from other places in the community. Hence, "[a] designation that points out the place to be
searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness."
Simply put, the test of whether the requirement of definiteness or particularity has been met is whether
the description of the place to be searched under the warrant is sufficient and descriptive enough to prevent a
search of other premises located within the surrounding area or community. A "place" may refer to a single
building or structure, or a house or residence, such as in the case at bar.
 Thus, it has been held that a designation of a place to be searched as "MASAGANA compound located
at Governor's Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City"; "the house of the accused Estela Tuan at
Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City"; or "premises of Felix Gumpal Compound located at Ipil Junction, Echague,
Isabela" is sufficient description of the premises to be searched.
The search warrant in the instant case clearly complied with the foregoing standard since it particularly
described the place to be searched, which is petitioner's "house at Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna." The
subject search warrant sufficiently described the place to be searched with clear indication that the same was
intended to authorize a search of the entire house of petitioner, albeit confined to the area of her house, to the
exclusion of the other two structures or buildings similarly located along the street of Gitna. Simply put, the
constitutional requirement of definiteness has been met. We therefore agree with the CA when it held, viz.:
In this case, although the house number of petitioner's house was not indicated in Search Warrant No. 97
(12), the description of the place to be searched was sufficient as the police officers who served the same were
able, with reasonable effort, to ascertain and identify the house of petitioner at Gitna, Barangay Cuyab, San
Pedro, Laguna, as stated in the search warrant. It bears emphasis that informant Jericho Labrador, when asked
by Executive Judge Morga, also drew sketches where petitioner's house was located as well [as] the floor plan
of her house, which were used by the searching team.
This notwithstanding, petitioner argued that the warrant was issued on a mistaken belief that the house
was a single dwelling unit occupied by petitioner alone. Petitioner thus insisted that the inaccurate depiction
of the house's floor plan, and the consequent search of the entire premises of a supposed multiple-occupancy
structure, invalidated the warrant.
 In this regard, the records would confirm that the house described in the warrant was composed of and
divided into five separate units or rooms each occupied by petitioner, and her four siblings and their families.
Petitioner explained that although the units or rooms were contiguous to each other, each unit was a complete
household independent of the other and may be entered only through their respective front doors.
Considering the foregoing, petitioner stressed that the central issue in the instant case is not whether the police
officers who enforced the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched,
but rather, whether the description of the place to be searched set out in the warrant was sufficient which
would prevent the officers from exercising discretion.
From the foregoing, it would appear that the issue on the requirement of definiteness raised by
petitioner is two-tiered — that of the place to be searched, i.e., her home at No. 972, Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San
Pedro, Laguna, and the interior description thereof. Petitioner persists on the lack of sufficient definiteness of
the latter.
While petitioner did not deny that the place actually searched by the police officers is her home in Gitna,
Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna, she argued, however, that it was incumbent upon PO2 Avila and Labrador
to inform Judge Morga of an accurate description or floor plan of the house so as to confine the scope of the
search within the unit where petitioner actually resided. Considering PO2 Avila's and Labrador's failure to
provide Judge Morga a full and accurate description of the house described in the warrant, i.e., that the same
was partitioned into five separate units, and that there were other families living in the other units of the
house, Judge Morga was led to believe that the area to be searched comprised of the whole house.
 Petitioner thus argued that the coverage of the warrant was broader than appropriate considering that
the search covered the whole house and was not limited to the unit actually occupied by petitioner. To
petitioner's mind, this gave the police officers undue discretion in enforcing the warrant, which they allegedly
did when they searched the units occupied by petitioner's siblings, namely, Leomer and Leonora.
In support of her argument, petitioner cited People v. Estrada 40 (Estrada) and Paper Industries Corp. of
the Philippines v. Asuncion 41 (Asuncion). In Estrada, 42 this Court invalidated the search warrant because it
merely indicated the address of the compound where the place to be searched was located, without, however,
pinpointing the specific house to be searched from the other buildings or structures which were also situated
within the same compound. Along the same lines, this Court, in Asuncion, 43 characterized the search warrant
as a general warrant since it authorized a search of a compound, which, however, was made up of "200
offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick
service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred
fifty-five hectares."
Petitioner's reliance on the said cases, however, was misplaced as the factual milieus therein are not in
all fours with the case at bench. The ruling in these cases were, on one hand, premised on the fact that the
subject warrants gave the police officers unbridled discretion to search several, if not all, structures found
inside the compounds — enclosed areas of land containing clusters of structures and/or buildings — while
probable cause existed in only one of the several structures located in the compounds.
 Clearly, the warrants in these cases gave the police officers unbridled discretion and, therefore, illegal
authority to search all the structures found inside the compounds. On the other hand, the instant case involved
a single structure, and, unlike in the Estrada and Asuncion cases, was readily identifiable to the police officers
serving the warrant from the other structures similarly located along the street where petitioner's house was
located. In other words, the description of petitioner's house was sufficient and descriptive enough to prevent
a search of other structures located within the surrounding area or community.
What is therefore involved in this case is a singular structure containing multiple family dwellings or
units therein — a fact which was discovered only after the search warrant was enforced and the search of
petitioner's house was conducted by the police officers. The pith of the issue therefore lies in the validity of a
warrant which appears to have authorized the search of the entire premises of a supposed multiple-occupancy
structure containing several units occupied by other persons other than petitioner.
This Court finds that the omission of the warrant to (a) indicate that the place to be searched contained
five rooms which were separately occupied by petitioner and her siblings; and (b) confine the search to
petitioner's unit is inconsequential and, therefore, does not affect the warrant's validity for the following
reasons:
First, the units or rooms where petitioner and her siblings lived all form an integral part of the house,
which, as already discussed, was sufficiently described with particularity under the warrant. The rooms inside
the house, which were in fact occupied by family members of petitioner, cannot be treated separately as they
form part of the house where petitioner actually resided.
 Prudente v. Dayrit 44 is instructive on this point, viz.:
Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to particularly
describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms at the ground floor and the
second floor of the PUP.
The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. In the case at bar, the application for
search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more
particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the
Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second
floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional
injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were
several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.

People v. Tuan also teaches that the description of the place to be searched under the warrant described as
the "house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City," which contained several rooms,
was specific enough and, therefore, satisfied the constitutional requirement of definiteness:
 In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant
was specific enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-
appellant's residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.

Second, even assuming that an ambiguity or inaccuracy in the interior description of the place to be
searched may affect the validity of the warrant, such finding, which only emerged after the warrant was
issued, has no bearing on its validity or invalidity.
That the house of petitioner was composed of several units separately occupied by her siblings was
discovered only after the search warrant was enforced and the search of petitioner's house was conducted by
the police officers. Notably, PO2 Avila could not have known or detected the multi-unit character of
petitioner's house prior to the actual search.
On this point, it has been held that the requirement of particularity as to the things to be seized does not
require technical accuracy in the description of the property to be seized, and that a search warrant may be said
to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow it to be described. 48 The same principle should be applied in the case at bench. It would
be unreasonable to expect PO2 Avila, or an outsider such as Labrador for that matter, to have extensive
knowledge of the interior set-up or floor plan of petitioner's house without, however, having apparent
authority or opportunity to access the premises prior to the search.
 In this regard, the Court holds that the validity of the warrant must be assessed on the
basis of the pieces of information made available to Judge Morga at the time PO2 Avila
applied for the issuance of the search warrant which, in this case, were sufficiently
supported by the sketches of Labrador, and the testimonies of PO2 Avila and Labrador, who
were, in fact, personally examined by Judge Morga in the form of searching questions and
answers. Quoting Justice John Paul Stevens' opinion in Maryland v. Garrison:

Those items of evidence that emerge after the warrant is issued have no
bearing on whether or not a warrant was validly issued. Just as a discovery of
the contraband cannot validate a warrant invalid when issued, so is it equally
clear that the discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was
unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant. The validity
of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the information that the officers
disclosed, or had a duty to discover and disclose, to the issuing Magistrate.
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

1. Brual v. Contreras, G.R. No. 205451, March 7. 2022.

Doctrine: The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component

of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Facts: Fausta Brual (Fausta) remained single during her lifetime and was under the care of her nephew, Ireneo Brual,
and his wife Elizabeth Brual (Elizabeth; petitioner). On July 22, 2009 Elizabeth, as instituted heir and co-executor,
filed before the RTC a petition for probate of the last will and testament of the late Fausta.

The special proceedings ensued. However, Jorge Brual Contreras, Lourdes Brual-Nazario, Erlinda Brual-Binay,
Rodolfo Brual, Renato Brual, Violeta Brual, David De Jesus and Antonio De Jesus (respondents, collectively), as
nephews and nieces of Fausta, filed a manifestation and motion for intervention and supplemental allegations (in
support of the manifestation and motion to intervene) before the probate court. The respondents alleged that Fausta's
testamentary act of supposedly leaving all her properties to Elizabeth and her husband was dubious. Elizabeth was a
mere niece by affinity and a de facto guardian of the decedent. Hence, she and her husband should not have been
made heir or executor. Respondents also averred that the petition for probate was defective in form since it did not
contain the names, ages and addresses of decedent's blood relatives.

Elizabeth filed her opposition to the motion and manifestation. The respondents answered it with a reply which
Elizabeth countered with a rejoinder. On November 4, 2010, the RTC issued an Order/Resolution denying the
respondents' motion for intervention and supplemental allegation. The RTC held that Fausta, who died single and
without compulsory heirs, may dispose of her entire estate by will pursuant to Article 842 of the Civil Code.As to the
allegation on the formal defects of the petition, the respondents were not considered as compulsory or testamentary
heirs who were entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings. Assuming that respondents were entitled to such a
notice, the supposed defect was already cured due to the publication of notice. Hence, the RTC did not find any
compelling reason to grant the motion for intervention. Respondents then filed their motion for reconsideration but it
was denied by the RTC in its January 14, 2011 Order. Hence, on February 3, 2011, the respondents filed their notice of
appeal of the November 4, 2010 Resolution/Order and January 14, 2011 Order. The RTC ordered Elizabeth to file a
comment to the motion which the latter complied with.
On April 27, 2011, the RTC issued an Order 17 dismissing respondents’ appeal due to their failure to file a
record on appeal pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

The CA granted respondents' petition and reversed and set aside the RTC's dismissal of respondents'
appeal. It held that an appeal must not be dismissed based on mere procedural technicalities. The CA gave
weight to respondents' admission that they were of the honest belief that the submission of a record of appeal
would only come after the submission of a notice of appeal. The CA opined that the RTC should have instead
required the respondents to complete their record on appeal. The CA also found that the respondents were
not negligent and took into account their subsequent filing of a record on appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in denying respondent’s notice of appeal and the subsequent
omnibus motion for reconsideration, [No].

Ratio: The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law
In Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. v. Villareal, this Court had the occasion to elucidate the
parameters of the right to appeal, thus:

To stress, the right to appeal is statutory and one who seeks to avail of it must comply
with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the
reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional as well, hence failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and
executory. And, just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so also does the prevailing party have the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of a decision in his favor.
Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court enunciates that an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable. Parenthetically, in special proceedings, Section 1 of Rule 109 enumerates orders and judgments from
which appeals may be taken, to wit:

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. — An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a)Allows or disallows a will;
(b)Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which
such person is entitled;
(c)Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d)Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e)Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the
administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the
party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person
appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
Prescinding from the above, the remedy of appeal in special proceedings is not limited to
appealable orders and judgments rendered in the main case, but extends to other orders or
dispositions that completely determine a particular matter in the case. This includes the
denial of a motion for intervention as in the case at bar.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provide for the modes of appeal:
Section 2. Modes of appeal. —
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No
record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where law on these Rules so require. In
such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
Meanwhile, under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special
proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within which to perfect an appeal because he
will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court
with notice to the adverse party, to wit:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of
judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight
(48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
[Emphasis Ours]

Thus, the rules are clear. While it is not necessary that a notice of appeal and a record on appeal be filed
simultaneously, the rule is unequivocal that the notice of appeal and record of appeal shall be filed within 30 days
from notice of the judgment or final order.

Here, considering that the respondents intended to appeal the final order of the denial of their motion for
intervention in the special proceedings case, they should have filed both a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within the period prescribed by the rules.
The period for appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from receipt of the notice of the final order dismissing
the motion for intervention, or from November 15, 2010, the date respondents' counsel received the order of
denial. Respondents had until December 15, 2010 within which to file their notice and record on appeal.

Since they filed their motion for reconsideration on November 26, 2010, the period for filing of the appeal was
duly interrupted. When respondents however received the final order denying their motion for
reconsideration on January 24, 2011, the period to appeal, applying the fresh period rule, resumed and they
had 30 days thereafter or until February 23, 2011 to perfect their appeal in accordance with the rules.
Verily, respondents filed their notice of appeal on February 3, 2011 without a record on appeal. Thus, on
April 27, 2011, the RTC dismissed the notice of appeal due to its non-perfection and failure to file the required
record on appeal. It was only on June 27, 2011 that respondents filed their omnibus motion for
reconsideration with motion to admit record on appeal while claiming inadvertence and lack of knowledge
on the timing of the filing of the record on appeal.
2. In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Consuelo Tanchangco and Ronaldo
Tanchangco v. Santos, G.R. No. 204793, June 08, 2020.

Facts: Consuelo was married to Anastacio Garcia (Anastacio) who passed away on August 14,
1985. They had two daughters, Remedios Garcia Tanchanco (Remedios) and Natividad Garcia
Santos (Natividad). Remedios predeceased Consuelo in 1985 and left behind her children, which
included Catalino Tanchanco (Catalino) and Ronaldo Tanchanco (Ronaldo, collectively
Tanchancos). 5 On April 4, 1997, Consuelo, at 91 years old, passed away 6 leaving behind an estate
consisting of several personal and real properties. 7 On August 11, 1997, Catalino filed a petition 8
before the RTC of Pasay City to settle the intestate estate of Consuelo which was docketed as Spec.
Proc. Case No. 97-4244 and raffled to Branch 113. Catalino alleged that the legal heirs of Consuelo
are: Catalino, Ricardo, Ronaldo and Carmela, all surnamed Tanchanco (children of Remedios), and
Melissa and Gerard Tanchanco (issues of Rodolfo Tanchanco, Remedios' son who predeceased her
and Consuelo), and Natividad, the remaining living daughter of Consuelo.
Catalino additionally alleged that Consuelo's properties are in the possession of Natividad and her
son, Alberto G. Santos (Alberto), who have been dissipating and misappropriating the said
properties. Withal, Catalino prayed

(1) for his appointment as the special administrator of Consuelo's intestate estate and the
issuance of letters of administration in his favor;
(2) for a conduct of an inventory of the estate;
(3) for Natividad and all other heirs who are in possession of the estate's properties to surrender
the same and to account for the proceeds of all the sales of Consuelo's assets made during the
last years of her life;
(4) for all heirs and persons having control of Consuelo's properties be prohibited from
disposing the same without the court's prior approval;
(5) for Natividad to produce Consuelo's alleged will to determine its validity;
(6) for Natividad to desist from disposing the properties of Consuelo's estate; and
(7) for other reliefs and remedies.
Natividad filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that she already filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Consuelo before Branch 115 of the RTC of Pasay City which was docketed as Spec. Proc. Case No. 97-
4243. Natividad asked that Consuelo's Last Will and Testament, entitled Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya ni
Consuelo Santiago Garcia, be allowed and approved. Moreover, as the named executrix in the will, Natividad
prayed that letters testamentary be issued in her favor.

The Tanchancos filed an Opposition to Natividad's petition for probate alleging that:
● the will's attestation clause did not state the number of pages;
● that the will was written in Tagalog, and not the English language usually used by Consuelo in most of her
legal documents;
● Consuelo could not have gone to Makati where the purported will was notarized considering her failing
health and the distance of her residence in Pasay City; and
● Consuelo's signature was forged.

Thus, they prayed for the disallowance of probate and for the proceedings to be converted into an intestate one.
However, Natividad contended that there was substantial compliance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.Although
the attestation clause did not state the number of pages comprising the will, the same was clearly indicated in the
acknowledgment portion. Furthermore, the Tanchancos' allegations were not supported by proof. Conversely, the
Tanchancos rebutted that the number of pages should be found in the body of the will and not just in the
acknowledgment portion.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the will faithfully complied with formalities required
by law, [Yes]; and
2. Whether or not bare allegations without corroborating proof that
Consuelo was under duress in executing the will cannot be
considered, [Yes].
 1. Whether or not the will faithfully complied with formalities required by law, [Yes];

The main issue which the court must determine in a probate proceeding is the due execution or the
extrinsic validity of the will as provided by Section 1, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court. The probate court
cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition of the estate by the testator. Thus, due
execution is "whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law" as mandated by Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and
of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the office of the Clerk of Court.
An examination of Consuelo's will shows that it [will] complied with the formalities required by the
law, except that the attestation clause failed to indicate the total number of pages upon which the will
was written.

In the instant case, the attestation clause indisputably omitted to mention the number of pages
comprising the will. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment portion of the will supplied the omission by
stating that the will has five pages, to wit: "Ang HULING HABILING ito ay binubuo ng lima (5) na dahon,
kasama ang dahong kinaroroonan ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoong ito." Undoubtedly, such substantially
complied with Article 809 of the Civil Code. Mere reading and observation of the will, without resorting
to other extrinsic evidence, yields the conclusion that there are actually five pages even if the said
information was not provided in the attestation clause. In any case, the CA declared that there was
substantial compliance with the directives of Article 805 of the Civil Code.

When the number of pages was provided in the acknowledgment portion instead of the attestation
clause, the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict
compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the
formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken
into account, may only defeat the testator's will.
3. Whether or not bare allegations without corroborating proof that Consuelo was under
duress in executing the will cannot be considered, [Yes].

As similarly found by the CA, the Tanchancos did not adduce evidence to corroborate their
allegation that Consuelo declared that she would not execute a last will and testament, other
than their self-interested statements. In addition, they failed to portray that Consuelo did
not have the testamentary capacity to execute the will or that she was suffering from a
condition which could have definitively prevented her from doing so.

The Tanchancos did not explain how Consuelo could have been forced into executing the
will, as they merely focused on her alleged physical inability to go to the Quasha Law Office
in Makati City. They did not present witnesses who could prove that she was forced into
making the will, or that she signed it against her own wishes and volition.
The Tanchancos insisted that Consuelo intended to divide her properties equally between
her two daughters, Natividad and Remedios. Yet, based on the testimony of Natividad and
the deposition of Atty. Lallana, Consuelo, during her lifetime, already apportioned the
prime properties to her two daughters and retained some properties for her own use and
support. Hence, what properties she had left, Consuelo could dispose of in any way she
desired, as long as the rules on legitime and preterition are observed.

In any case, as earlier stated, inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the will or the manner in
which the properties were apportioned is not within the purview of the probate court. “The
court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic
validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to
be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court — at this stage of the
proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions
of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.”
3. Italkarat 18, Inc. v. Gerasmio, G.R. No. 221411, September 28, 2020.

Doctrine: Final and executory NLRC decisions may be subject of a petition for certiorari. It is
precisely this final and executory nature of NLRC decisions that makes a special civil action of
certiorari applicable to such decisions, considering that appeals from the NLRC to this Court
were eliminated.

Facts: On January 13, 2009, respondent Juraldine N. Gerasmio (Juraldine) filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, reinstatement, backwages, separation pay, declaration of the quitclaim and
release as null and void, 13th month pay, litigation expenses, damages and attorney's fees, against
petitioner Italkarat 18, Inc. (Company). On April 3, 2009, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a
Decision 18 declaring the complainant to have been unlawfully dismissed.

The Company appealed the Decision to the NLRC. Juraldine also interposed a partial appeal to the
NLRC, questioning the non-inclusion of his separation pay in the LA Decision. On August 28,
2009, the NLRC granted the appeal of the Company, set aside and effectively reversed the LA's
Decision dated April 3, 2009. Juraldine filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied
by the NLRC in a Resolution dated October 30, 2009.

Hence, the Company filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the fact that a decision of the NLRC is final and executory means that a special civil action
for certiorari may not be filed with the CA, [No].

Ratio: The Company insists that the CA should have dismissed Juraldine's Petition for Certiorari because the NLRC
Decision had already become final and executory. In fact, according to the Company, an Entry of Judgment was already
issued by the NLRC.

Notwithstanding this, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that final and executory NLRC decisions may be subject of a
petition for certiorari. It is precisely this final and executory nature of NLRC decisions that makes a special civil action of
certiorari applicable to such decisions, considering that appeals from the NLRC to this Court were eliminated.

In St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, we have explained that:

The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were
eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for
judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have
noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes
of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the
Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction
of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship
speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Consequently, we ruled in Panuncillo v. CAP Philippines, Inc. that even if the NLRC decision has become
final and executory, the adverse party is not precluded from availing of the remedy of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

In sum, while under the sixth paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC
becomes final and executory after the lapse of ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties, the
adverse party is not precluded from assailing it via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court
of Appeals and then to this Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45. x x x.

Indeed, the doctrine of immutability of judgment is not violated when a party elevates a matter to the
CA which the latter decided in favor of said party.

Parenthetically, petitions for certiorari to the CA are more often than not filed after the assailed NLRC
decisions have already become final and executory. It must be noted that under Article 229 [223] of the
Labor Code, as amended, a decision of the NLRC already becomes final after ten (10) calendar days from
receipt thereof by the parties; on the other hand, the reglementary period with respect to a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is sixty (60) days. Certainly, given that the special civil
action for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period, the CA committed no error and was acting
in accordance with the law when it took cognizance of Juraldine's petition.
4. Lopez v. Saludo, Jr., G.R. No. 233775, September 15, 2021.

Doctrine: Trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership in property
and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling
him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter.

Facts: Respondent Aniceto G. Saludo (respondent) filed Civil Case No. 70886-PSG, an Action for
Reconveyance and Damages with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction against petitioner. Respondent prayed that he be declared the true owner of two parcels of land
located in Barrio Pineda, Pasig City, and to have said properties reconveyed to him. Respondent further
prayed for the payment of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit. Respondent alleged that
sometime in April or May 1997, petitioner told him that she knows of two parcels of land that were being
offered for sale at a reasonable price. At first, respondent was hesitant to buy the said lands. However, he
was eventually convinced to purchase the subject properties due to the persistent assurances of petitioner
that: (a) the titles thereto were clean; (b) the transfer certificates of title (TCT) would be issued in
respondent's name after the execution of the sale; and (c) that the offered selling price was very reasonable
and even bordering on a bargain sale considering the location of the properties and their proximity to
business centers.
Petitioner then offered to pose as the buyer because the seller, who was her close friend, allegedly wanted to
deal only with her to keep his financial constraints within his close family friends. Respondent then entrusted
to petitioner the purchase price amounting to P15,000,000.00, with the agreement that petitioner would be the
signatory in the Deed of Sale but will hold the properties in trust for, and subsequently reconvey the same to,
respondent.

After the execution of the sale, however, respondent noticed that petitioner started evading him and did not
give any update as to the registration of the sale in his name. When respondent inquired on the status of the
properties, he found out that the properties were already registered in the name of petitioner as evidenced by
TCT Nos. PT-111136 and PT-111137 issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasig City, pursuant to a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1999 executed by Bulalacao Realty Corporation (BRC) in favor of petitioner.

This prompted respondent to immediately assume possession of the properties and introduce major
renovations on the house amounting to a total of P9,000,000.00. He likewise paid the real property taxes
thereon for 13 years. Since then, he has been in actual possession of the properties. As the occupant thereof,
he is also the one paying the homeowner's association dues.
Respondent made several demands, both oral and written, upon petitioner to reconvey the subject properties
to him, but to no avail. Hence, respondent filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on July 31, 2001 against
petitioner over the properties and had it annotated on the TCTs.

On July 19, 2006, respondent filed the instant Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages imputing bad faith
on the part of petitioner. He claimed that he is the true owner of the subject properties and that petitioner
merely holds the same in trust for him. In support thereof, he presented the four checks that he issued in the
name of petitioner for the payment of the purchase price. He also reiterated that he has been in actual
possession of the properties in question from the time he had fully paid them up to the filing of the instant
complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent had sufficiently proved that an implied trust was
created between him and petitioner, [Yes].

Ratio: Trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership in
property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership
of the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain
powers by the latter.

The Civil Code provides that an implied trust is created when a property is sold to one party
but paid for by another for the purpose of having beneficial interest in said property:

Article 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is
granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the
beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the
beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child,
legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied
by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
Moreover, Article 1456 of the Civil Code pertinently provides:

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes.

An implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the parties, but by operation of law in order to
satisfy the demands of justice and equity and to protect against unfair dealing or downright fraud.

The burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear
and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. While implied trusts may be proven by oral
evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be
made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence
can easily be fabricated.

In the case at bar, both the CA and the RTC declared that based on the evidence on record, an implied trust relation
arose between respondent and petitioner. Respondent had actually adduced evidence to prove his intention to
purchase the subject properties by paying the purchase price thereof, through petitioner, with the attendant
expectation that petitioner would later on reconvey the same to him. This Court sees no cogent reason to revisit
these well-supported conclusions of the lower courts
According to the RTC:

Plaintiff was able to prove that he bought the properties with his own money and he was also able
to establish that he issued checks to complete the full payment of the purchase price of the
properties amounting to Fifteen Million (Php15,000,000.00) Pesos. His clear ownership over the
properties is confined by living in or in actual possession of the properties from the very moment
the properties were fully paid. And these pieces of evidence were not rebutted by the defendant
and in fact the latter admitted that it was the plaintiff who gave her the money in purchasing the
subject properties.

Likewise, the CA ratiocinated, viz.:

From what We examined from the record, plaintiff-appellee sat on the witness stand to adduce
testimonial and documentary evidence, i.e., copies of the various checks issued by the plaintiff-
appellee for payment of the realty; receipts issued in the name of plaintiff-appellee for the materials
purchased and used for the renovation of the house on the subject property; payroll of the laborers
showing the amounts plaintiff-appellee paid for the construction and renovation thereof; his
payment of real property taxes; and homeowner's dues.
The preponderance of evidence established positive acts of respondent indicating, without doubt,
that he considered the subject properties as his exclusive properties. First, he entered into actual
possession of the properties in question immediately after his full payment of the purchase price
and remained in possession thereof until the filing of the Complaint before the lower court.
Second, he spent millions for the renovation of the house constructed on the premises. Finally, he
had the tax declarations transferred in his name and faithfully paid the realty taxes thereon.

From the foregoing, this Court is convinced that an implied resulting trust existed between the
parties. The pieces of evidence presented demonstrate respondent's intention to acquire the subject
properties for his own account and benefit. The surrounding circumstances as to its acquisition
speak of the intent that the equitable or beneficial ownership of the properties should belong to
respondent.

Indeed, it is settled that when the factual findings of the trial court are confirmed by the CA, said
facts are final and conclusive on this Court, unless the same are not supported by the evidence on
record.
People of the Philippines v. Arellaga, G.R. No. 231796, August 24, 2020

Doctrine:

It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of proving compliance with the requirements of Section
21. In case of deviation from or non-compliance with the said requirements, the prosecution must provide a
sufficient explanation why Section 21 was not complied with.
Facts:
- In Criminal Case No. 13-297289, appellant was changed with violation of Section 11, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165.
- In Criminal Case No. 13-297290, appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165
- RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC was convinced that the prosecution was able to establish, through the
testimonies of the police officers, the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt for both charges
of illegal sale and possession of shabu.
- CA affirmed the RTC's Decision and held that all the elements of the crimes were present.
According to the CA, the RTC was correct in finding PO2 Reyes' testimony sufficient to prove
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, especially since the chain of custody was unbroken. 9
Further, the CA held that even if the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 were
not strictly complied with, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly
preserved.
- Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.
Issue: Whether or not RTC erroneously convicted the appellant since the arresting officers failed to strictly
comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 [Yes]

Ratio:
The appeal is meritorious. Accordingly, the appellant is acquitted.
After a careful review of the records of the case, we find that the prosecution failed to clearly establish
that the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 have been complied with, particularly
regarding the three-witness rule.
R.A. No. 9165, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 10640 17 on July 15, 2014, is the law applicable as the
alleged crimes in this case were committed on May 23, 2013. The original version of Section 21 requires the
presence of three witnesses during the inventory and photograph taking: (1) media representative; (2)
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and (3) any elected public official.
Section 21 pertinently states:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
 (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof; (Emphasis supplied)
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) further elaborate on the proper procedure to be
followed in Section 21 (a), Article II of R.A. No. 9165. It provides:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items;
 In this case, the Court finds that the buy-bust team failed to establish the presence of the three required
witnesses at the time of the inventory and photograph taking of the drugs. Neither was it shown that there
were justifiable grounds for their absence.
The Court has held that the presence of the required number of witnesses at the time of the apprehension
and inventory, is mandatory, and that their presence serves an essential purpose. In the present case, the
Inventory of Property/Seized [Evidence] shows that there was only one (1) witness, a certain Rene Crisostomo
of the MPD Press Corp.
In People v. Tomawis, the Court held:
xxx
To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs
must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such that they are
required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the
inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and
confiscation."
In this case, there was only one witness during the most crucial stage of the buy-bust operation: the
apprehension and inventory. This clearly falls short of what is required by Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of proving compliance with the requirements of Section
21. In case of deviation from or non-compliance with the said requirements, the prosecution must provide a
sufficient explanation why Section 21 was not complied with. The Court has held in People v. Lim that the
 It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of proving compliance with the requirements of
Section 21. In case of deviation from or non-compliance with the said requirements, the prosecution must
provide a sufficient explanation why Section 21 was not complied with. The Court has held in People v. Lim
that the following are justifiable reasons for not securing three witnesses during the inventory and photograph
taking:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety
during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate
retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected
official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest
efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official
within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no
fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5)
time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential
assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even
before the offenders could escape.
The IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides for a saving clause to ensure that not every non-compliance with the
procedure for the preservation of the chain of custody will prejudice the prosecution's case against the accused.
For the saving clause to apply, however, the following must be present: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds
to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.
 In this case, the prosecution did not explain the absence of the three required witnesses nor did it try to
justify the police's deviation from the mandatory procedure outlined in Section 21. Without the three witnesses,
there is reasonable doubt on the identity of the seized drugs itself. Without the three witnesses, the Court is
unsure whether there had been planting of evidence and/or contamination of the seized drugs. Because of this,
the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. Consequently, appellant must
be acquitted.
All told, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to: (1) overcome appellant's presumption of
innocence; (2) prove that the requirements of securing three witnesses in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
had been complied with; (3) offer any explanation for non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165; and (4) prove the corpus delicti of the crime with moral certainty. For these reasons, the Court is
constrained to acquit the appellant.
End.