CAT Forklift V40D SA Service Manual

CAT Forklift V40D SA Service Manual

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**CAT Forklift V40D SA Service Manual** Size: 99.9 MB Format: PDF Language:
English Brand: CAT Caterpillar Type of Machine: Forklift Type of Manual: Service
Manual Model: CAT V40D SA Forklift Date: 2010 Content: SENB8080-05-00
Engine 1404 T & A: Foreword SENB8080-05-01 Engine 1404 T & A: Specifications
SENB8080-05-02 Engine 1404 T & A: Systems Operation SENB8080-05-03
Engine 1404 T & A: Testing and Adjusting SENB8108-02-00 Engine 1404 D & A
SENB8109-05-00 Engine: 3.3 Liter (4.2032) Diesel: Foreword SENB8109-05-01
Engine: 3.3 Liter (4.2032) Diesel: Specifications SENB8109-05-02 Engine: 3.3

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Liter (4.2032) Diesel: Systems Operation SENB8109-05-03 Engine: 3.3 Liter
(4.2032) Diesel: Testing and Adjusting SENB8128-00 Engine: 3.3 Liter (4.2032)
Diesel: Foreword SENB8128-01 Engine: 3.3 Liter (4.2032) Diesel: Disassembly
and Assembly SENB8237-04-01 Engine 2.0 Liter (XN1P) T & A: Systems
Operation SENB8237-04-02 Engine 2.0 Liter (XN1P) T & A: Testing and Adjusting
SENB8237-04-03 Engine 2.0 Liter (XN1P) T & A: Specifications SENB8238-03-00
Engine XD3P T & A: Foreword SENB8301-03-00 Power Train T & A: T40D, T50D,
TC60D, V40D, V50D, VC60D, T40E, T50E, TC60E, V40E, V50E, VC60E:
Foreword SENB8301-03-01 Power Train T & A: T40D, T50D, TC60D, V40D,
V50D, VC60D, T40E, T50E, TC60E, V40E, V50E, VC60E: Specifications
SENB8301-03-02 Power Train T & A: T40D, T50D, TC60D, V40D, V50D, VC60D,
T40E, T50E, TC60E, V40E, V50E, VC60E: Systems Operation SENB8301-03-03
Power Train T & A: T40D, T50D, TC60D, V40D, V50D, VC60D, T40E, T50E,
TC60E, V40E, V50E, VC60E: Testing and Adjusting SENB8302-02-00 Power
Train D & A: T40D, T50D, TC60D, V40D, V50D, VC60D, T40E, T50E, TC60E,
V40E, V50E, VC60E SENB8303-01-00 Vehicle Systems T & A: T40D, T50D,
TC60D, V40D, V50D, VC60D, T40E, T50E, TC60E, V40E, V50E, VC60E:
Foreword SENB8303-01-01 Vehicle Systems T & A: T40D, T50D, TC60D, V40D,
V50D, VC60D, T40E, T50E, TC60E, V40E, V50E, VC60E: Specifications
SENB8303-01-02 Vehicle Systems T & A: T40D, T50D, TC60D, V40D, V50D,
VC60D, T40E, T50E, TC60E, V40E, V50E, VC60E: Systems Operation
SENB8303-01-03 Vehicle Systems T & A: T40D, T50D, TC60D, V40D, V50D,
VC60D, T40E, T50E, TC60E, V40E, V50E, VC60E: Testing and Adjusting
SENB8304-01-00 Vehicle Systems D & A: T40D, T50D, TC60D, V40D, V50D,
VC60D, T40E, T50E, TC60E, V40E, V50E, VC60E SENB8509-01-00 Hydraulic
System Schematics Cat Pub List Publication List (Service, Operator, & Parts
Manuals) Mast Tilting Angles Mast Tilting Angles REF-18-0001C How To
Determine Correct Mast Rails Lift Cylinders And Mast Hosing REF-18-0001C How
To Determine Correct Mast Rails Lift Cylinders And Mast Hosing (Spanish)
REF-18-0002C How To Locate Fluid Capacities REF-18-0002C How To Locate
Fluid Capacities (Spanish) REF-18-0003C How To Use A Pick List REF-18-0003C
How To Use A Pick List (Spanish) REF-18-0007C Abbreviations And Acronyms
List REF-18-0008C Diagnostic Trouble (Error) Codes This part manual inlcude all
spare parts number you need inside this model, for you easier in fixing your forklift
replace new spare part hight performance. This service manual is a guide for
servicing Cat Lift Trucks. For your convenience the instructions are grouped by
systems as an easy reference. This Original Instructions (Operator's) Manual
describes operating procedures, daily checks and simple maintenance for safe
usage of your Cat lift truck. SERVICE MANUAL CHAPTER 1 GENERAL
INFORMATION 1.1 Model View 1.2 Models Covered 1.2.1 Lift Truck
Nomenclatures and Definitions 1.3 Serial Number Locations 1.4 Dimensions 1.5
Technical Data 1.6 Performance CHAPTER 2 COOLING SYSTEM 2.1
Specifications 2.2 Structure 2.3 Removal and Installation 2.3.1 Fan Belt Removal
2.3.2 Suggestions for Removal 2.3.3 Installation 2.4 Inspection and Adjustment
2.4.1 Fan Belt Inspection 2.4.2 Fan Belt Tension 2.4.3 Connecting Hoses 2.4.4
Coolant 2.4.5 Radiator Cap CHAPTER 3 ELECTRIC SYSTEM 3.1 Chassis
Electrical Devices Wiring Outline 3.1.1 Harnesses Layout 3.1.2 Components
Layout 3.2 Structure 3.2.1 Console Box 3.2.2 Major Electrical Components 3.2.3
Table of Lamps 3.3 Console Box 3.3.1 Disassembly 3.4 Battery Maintenance 3.4.1
State of Charge and Electrolyte Specific Gravity (S.G.) Adjustment 3.4.2 Specific
Gravity Reading and State of Charge 3.4.3 Charging Precautions 3.5 Instrument
Panel 3.5.1 Instrument Panel Screen Element 3.5.2 Basic Screen Display 3.5.3
Basic Operation 3.5.4 When An Error Occurs 3.5.5 Warning Lamps 3.5.6 Optional
Functions 3.5.7 Hour Meters 3.5.8 Troubleshooting 3.6 Wire Color 3.6.2 List of
Wire Colors 3.7 Troubleshooting 3.7.1 Starter System 3.7.2 Gauges 3.7.3 Lighting
System 3.8 Electrical Schematic CHAPTER 4 CONTROLLERS 4.1 Outline 4.2
Main Functions 4.2.2 Instrument Panel 4.2.3 VCM (Vehicle Control Module)1-M
4.2.4 ECM (Gasoline Engine Control Module) 4.2.5 Remote Input/Output Units
4.2.6 GSE Connector 4.3 Service Tool Functions 4.3.1 Service Tool Menus 4.3.2
Service Tool Box 4.4 Mast Interlock System 4.4.1 Function 4.4.2 VCM1-M
Controller, Mast Interlock System Checking Procedure 4.4.3 Active Test Inspection
Procedure 4.5 Driving Interlock System 4.5.1 Function 4.5.2 Driving Interlock
System Checking Procedure for Powershift T/M Lift Trucks 4.5.3 Active Test
Inspection Procedure 4.6 Seat Belt Warning Lamp 4.6.1 Function 4.6.2 Seat Belt
Warning Lamp Checking Procedure 4.7 Parking Brake Warning Buzzer and Lamp
4.7.1 Function 4.7.2 Parking Brake Warning Buzzer/Lamp Checking Procedure
4.7.3 Parking Brake Warning Buzzer/Lamp Checking Procedure with Key in OFF
Position 4.8 Harness Codes 4.9 Controller Details 4.9.1 VCM1-M Controller 4.9.2
Seat Switch/Seat Belt Switch 4.9.3 Parking Brake Switch 4.9.4 Direction Lever
4.9.5 Speed Sensor 4.9.6 T/M Solenoid 4.9.7 Unload Solenoid 4.9.8 Lift Lock
Solenoid 4.9.9 Warning Buzzer 4.9.10 Warning Buzzer Relay 4.9.11 Warning
Buzzer Circuit 4.9.12 Instrument Panel 4.10 Error Codes and Troubleshootings
4.10.1 Error Code Display 4.10.2 Diagnosis Table (F Code) 4.10.3 Error Codes
and Troubleshooting 4.11 Locations of Sensors and Switches CHAPTER 5
POWER TRAIN 5.1 Removal and Installation (MC Models) 5.1.1 Removal of
Engine and Transmission Assembly 5.1.2 Removal of Engine and Transmission
Assembly (for Gasoline-Engine Lift Trucks) 5.2 Removal and Installation (FC
Models) 5.2.1 Removal of Engine and Transmission Assembly CHAPTER 6
POWERSHIFT TRANSMISSION 6.1 Structure and Functions 6.1.1 Transmission
6.1.2 Torque Converter 6.1.3 Control Valve 6.1.4 Hydraulic System Schematic of
Powershift Transmission 6.2 Removal and Installation 6.2.1 Removal 6.2.2
Installation 6.3 Control Valve 6.3.1 Disassembly 6.3.2 Reassembly 6.4 Input Shaft
Assembly 6.4.1 Disassembly 6.5 Oil Pump Assembly 6.5.1 Disassembly 6.5.2
Reassembly 6.6 Inspection and Adjustment 6.6.1 Oil Pressure Measurement 6.6.2
Clutch (Inching) Pedal Adjustment 6.6.3 Inching Cable, Adjustment 6.7
Troubleshooting 6.8 Tightening Torque 6.9 Service Data CHAPTER 7 FRONT
AXLE AND REDUCTION DIFFERENTIAL 7.1 Structure 7.1.1 Front Axle 7.1.2
Reduction Differential 7.2 Removal and Installation 7.2.1 Front Wheels 7.3 Front
Axle 7.3.2 Reduction Differential 7.4 Disassembly and Reassembly 7.4.1 Front
Axle 7.4.2 Reduction Differential 7.5 Troubleshooting 7.6 Service Data CHAPTER
8 REAR AXLE 8.1 Structure and Functions 8.1.1 Rear Axle in General 8.1.2
Structure of Each Component 8.1.3 Steering Cylinder 8.2 Removal and Installation
8.2.1 Rear Wheel and Rear Axle Assembly 8.3 Disassembly and Reassembly
8.3.1 Wheel Hub, Disassembly and Reassembly 8.3.2 Knuckle (King Pin),
Disassembly and Reassembly 8.3.3 Steering Cylinder, Disassembly and
Reassembly 8.3.4 Tie Rod, Disassembly and Reassembly CHAPTER 9 BRAKE
SYSTEM 9.1 Structure 9.1.1 Brake System 9.2 Disassembly and Reassembly
9.2.1 Master Cylinder 9.2.2 Wheel Brakes 9.2.3 Wheel Cylinder 9.3 Inspection and
Adjustment 9.3.1 Automatic Adjuster Test 9.3.2 Manual Adjustment 9.3.3 Parking
Brake Cable Adjustment 9.3.4 Brake Pedal Adjustment 9.3.5 Brake Lines Bleeding
9.3.6 Braking Performance Test 9.3.7 Parking Brake Lever 9.4 Troubleshooting 9.5
Service Data CHAPTER 10 STEERING SYSTEM 10.1 Structure and Functions
10.1.1 Steering System 10.1.2 Steering Valve 10.1.3 Steering Column 10.2
Disassembly and Reassembly 10.2.2 Steering Wheel and Steering Valve,
Removal and Installation 10.2.3 Steering Wheel 10.2.4 Steering Valve 10.2.5 Tilt
Lock Lever 10.3 Steering Valve 10.3.1 Disassembly 10.3.2 Reassembly 10.4
Troubleshooting 10.5 Service Data CHAPTER 11 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 11.1
Structure and Functions 11.1.1 Outline 11.2 Hydraulic Circuit Diagram (For Models
With MC Control Valve) 11.3 Hydraulic Circuit Diagram (For Models With FC
Control Valve) 11.4 Hydraulic Tank 11.5 Hydraulic Pump (Gear Pump) 11.6
Control Valve 11.7 Flow Regulator Valve (for Models with FC Control Valve Only)
11.8 Down Safety Valve 11.9 Lift Cylinder 11.10 Tilt Cylinder 11.11 Disassembly
and Reassembly 11.11.1 Hydraulic Pump 11.11.2 Lift Cylinder 11.11.3 Tilt Cylinder
11.11.4 Flow Regulator Valve 11.11.5 Piping 11.11.6 Suction Strainer and Return
Filter 11.12 Inspection and Adjustment 11.12.1 Hydraulic Tank 11.12.2 Control
Valve 11.12.3 Descent Test 11.12.4 Forward Tilt Test 11.13 Troubleshooting
11.13.2 Hydraulic System Cleaning After a Component Failure 11.14 Service Data
11.15 MC Control Valve 11.15.1 Structure and Operation 11.15.2 Control Valve,
Removal and Installation 11.15.3 Disassembly and Assembly 11.16 FC Control
Valve 11.16.1 Structure and Operation 11.16.2 Disassembly and Assembly
CHAPTER 12 MAST AND FORKS 12.1 Simplex Mast 12.1.1 Mast System 12.2
Structure and Functions 12.2.1 Simplex Mast (5A15C to 5A33C) 12.2.2 Mast
Operation 12.3 Removal and Installation 12.3.1 Mast and Lift Bracket Assembly
12.4 Disassembly and Reassembly 12.4.1 Simplex Mast Disassembly 12.4.2
Simplex Mast Reassembly 12.5 Removal and Installation of Mast Rollers and
Strips without Removing 12.5.1 Simplex Mast 12.6 Inspection and Adjustment
(Simplex Mast) 12.6.2 Forks 12.6.3 Chain Tension Inspection and Adjustment
12.6.4 Checking Chain Elongation 12.6.5 Adjusting Clearance Between Lift
Bracket Roller and Inner Mast 12.6.6 Mast Roller Clearance Adjustment 12.6.7
Mast Strip Clearance Inspection and Adjustment 12.6.8 Tilt Angle Adjustment
12.6.9 Right and Left Lift Cylinder Stroke Inspection and Adjustment 12.7
Troubleshooting (Simplex Mast) 12.8 Service Data (Simplex Mast) 12.9 Duplex
Mast 12.9.1 Mast System 12.10 Structure and Functions 12.10.1 Duplex (Dual
Full-Free Panoramic) Mast (5B15C to 5B33C) 12.10.2 Mast Operation 12.11
Removal and Installation 12.11.1 Mast and Lift Bracket Assembly 12.12
Disassembly and Reassembly 12.12.1 Duplex Mast Disassembly 12.12.2 Duplex
Mast Reassembly 12.13 Removal and Installation of Mast Rollers and Strips
without Removing 12.13.1 Duplex Mast 12.14 Inspection and Adjustment (Duplex
Mast) 12.14.1 Inspection and Adjustment (Duplex Mast) 12.14.2 Forks 12.14.3
Chain Tension Inspection and Adjustment 12.14.4 Checking Chain Elongation
12.14.5 Adjusting Clearance Between Lift Bracket Roller and Inner Mast 12.14.6
Mast Roller Clearance Adjustment 12.14.7 Mast Strip Clearance Inspection and
Adjustment 12.14.8 Tilt Angle Adjustment 12.14.9 Right and Left Lift Cylinder
Stroke Inspection and Adjustment 12.15 Troubleshooting (Duplex Mast) 12.16
Service Data (Duplex Mast) 12.17 Triplex Mast 12.17.1 Mast System 12.18
Structure and Functions 12.18.1 Triplex (Triple Full-Free Panoramic) Mast (5C15C
to 5C33C) 12.18.2 Mast Operation 12.19 Removal and Installation 12.19.1 Mast
and Lift Bracket Assembly 12.20 Disassembly and Reassembly 12.20.1 Triplex
Mast Disassembly 12.20.2 Triplex Mast Reassembly 12.21 Removal and
Installation of Mast Rollers and Strips without Removing 12.21.1 Triplex Mast
12.22 Inspection and Adjustment (Triplex Mast) 12.22.2 Forks 12.22.3 Chain
Tension Inspection and Adjustment 12.22.4 Checking Chain Elongation 12.22.5
Adjusting Clearance between Lift Bracket Roller and Inner Mast 12.22.6 Mast
Roller Clearance Adjustment 12.22.7 Mast Strip Clearance Inspection and
Adjustment 12.22.8 Tilt Angle Adjustment 12.22.9 Right and Left Lift Cylinder
Stroke Inspection and Adjustment 12.23 Troubleshooting (Triplex Mast) 12.23.1
Troubleshooting (Triplex Mast) 12.24 Service Data (Triplex Mast) 12.24.1 Triplex
Mast CHAPTER 13 SERVICE DATA 13.1 Maintenance Schedule 13.2
Maintenance Note 13.2.1 Brake System 13.2.2 Cooling System 13.2.3 Electric
System 13.2.4 Engine System 13.2.5 Frame and Chassis 13.2.6 Fuel System
13.2.7 Hydraulic System 13.2.8 Ignition System 13.2.9 Intake System 13.2.10
Front End Section 13.2.11 Steering and Axle System 13.2.12 T/M and Drive
System 13.2.13 Wheels and Tires 13.2.14 General 13.3 Tightening Torque for
Standard Bolts and Nuts 13.4 Periodic Replacement Parts 13.4.2 Location of
Periodic Replacement Parts 13.5 Lubrication Instructions 13.5.1 Lubrication Chart
13.5.2 Fuel and Lubricant Specifications 13.5.3 Adjustment Value and Oil
Quantities 13.6 Special Service Tools 13.6.1 Special Service Tools (Standard
Tools for Both MC and FC LiftTrucks) 13.6.2 Special Service Tools (for FC Lift
Truck Only) 13.6.3 Special Service Tools (for Powershift Transmission)
OPERRATION MANUAL CHAPTER 1 SAFETY RULES AND PRACTICES 1.1
SAFETY SIGNS AND SAFETY MESSAGES 1.2 WARNING SYMBOLS AND
LEVELS 1.3 OPERATOR QUALIFICATIONS 1.4 SAFETY GUARDS 1.5
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR OPERATING LIFT TRUCK 1.6
DAILY INSPECTION 1.7 OPERATOR RESPONSIBILITY 1.8 GENERAL 1.9 NO
RIDERS 1.10 TRAVELING 1.11 LOADING 1.12 DOCKBOARDS (BRIDGE
PLATES), TRUCKS AND RAILROAD CARS 1.13 SURFACE AND CAPACITY
1.14 FUEL HANDLING 1.15 INSTALLATION OF ATTACHMENTS 1.16 IN CASE
OF TIP-OVER 1.17 TRANSPORTING LIFT TRUCK 1.17.2 APPROACH ANGLE,
DEPARTURE ANGLE AND GANGWAY 1.17.3 HOISTING (LIFTING) UP THE
TRUCK 1.18 FUNCTION TESTS 1.19 TRACTION BAR 1.20 POSITION OF DATA
AND CAPACITY PLATES AND DECALS 1.21 DATA AND CAPACITY PLATES
AND DECALS 1.21.2 DATA PLATE 1.21.3 IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS 1.21.4
CAUTION DRIVE DECAL (IN CASE OF TIP-OVER DECAL) 1.21.5 WARNING
DRIVE DECAL (TRAINED AND AUTHORIZED) 1.21.6 PINCH POINT DECAL
1.21.7 CAUTION FORK DECAL 1.21.8 MAST WARNING DECAL 1.21.9
CAUTION DRIVE DECAL (OPERATION) 1.21.10 RADIATOR WARNING DECAL
1.21.11 COOLING FAN WARNING DECAL 1.21.12 ADJ LPG WARNING DECAL
1.21.13 LPG LATCH WARNING DECAL 1.21.14 LPG FUEL WARNING DECAL
CHAPTER 2 OPERATING CONTROLS AND FUNCTIONS 2.1 APPLICATIONS
2.2 APPLICATION FOR CAT LIFT TRUCKS 2.3 PROHIBITED APPLICATIONS
FOR CAT LIFT TRUCKS 2.4 MAIN COMPONENTS 2.5 METERS, INDICATORS
AND WARNING LIGHTS 2.5.2 LCD 2.5.3 OPERATION BUTTONS 2.5.4 !
MULTIPURPOSE WARNING LIGHT 2.5.5 MALFUNCTION INDICATOR
LIGHT-ENGINE CHECK WARNING 2.5.6 OIL PRESSURE WARNING LIGHT
2.5.7 CHARGE WARNING LIGHT 2.5.8 PARKING BRAKE WARNING LIGHT
2.5.9 SEAT BELT WARNING LIGHT 2.5.10 METER DISPLAY 2.5.11 WATER
TEMPERATURE GAUGE 2.5.12 FUEL GAUGE 2.5.13 TRANSMISSION
POSITION 2.6 MALFUNCTION AND WARNING INDICATIONS 2.6.2 MAST
INTERLOCK WARNING 2.6.3 LPG LEVEL WARNING/LPG RACK LOCK
WARNING 2.6.4 TORQUE CONVERTER FLUID TEMP WARNING 2.6.5
RADIATOR LEVEL WARNING 2.6.6 AIR CLEANER WARNING 2.6.7 SERVICE
REMINDER DISPLAY 2.6.8 DISPLAYS WHEN MALFUNCTION OCCURS 2.7
DRIVER RECOGNITION MODE 2.8 LPG REMAINING TIME MANAGEMENT 2.9
SWITCHES 2.9.2 HORN BUTTON 2.9.3 REAR RIGHT GRIP WITH HORN
BUTTON 2.9.4 IGNITION SWITCH 2.9.5 LIGHTING AND TURN SIGNAL
SWITCHES 2.9.6 MAXIMUM SPEED CHANGE SWITCH (OPTION) 2.9.7
THROTTLE SENSITIVITY ADJUST SWITCH (OPTION) 2.9.8 BACK-UP
OPERATION LIGHT SWITCH (OPTION) 2.10 OPERATING CONTROLS 2.10.2
SELECTOR LEVER 2.10.3 PARKING BRAKE LEVER 2.10.4 INCHING BRAKE
PEDAL 2.10.5 BRAKE PEDAL 2.10.6 ACCELERATOR PEDAL 2.10.7
CARGO-HANDLING CONTROL LEVERS 2.10.8 ANSI/ITSDF STANDARDS FOR
LIFT TRUCK CLAMP ATTACHMENTS 2.10.9 STEERING CHARACTERISTICS
CHAPTER 3 OPERATING THE LIFT TRUCK 3.1 OPERATION 3.2 INSPECTION
BEFORE OPERATING 3.3 LIFT TRUCK OPERATING PRECAUTIONS 3.4
PRECAUTIONS FOR COLD AND HOT WEATHER 3.5 OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURES 3.6 LPG LIFT TRUCK STARTING 3.7 PROCEDURE FOR JUMP
STARTING EFI ENGINES 3.8 AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION 3.9 LOADING 3.10
TRANSPORTING LOADS 3.11 UNLOADING 3.12 CLIMBING 3.13 STOPPING
AND PARKING THE LIFT TRUCK 3.14 FORKS 3.15 SEAT ADJUSTMENT 3.15.1
SUSPENSION SEAT OPERATOR'S WEIGHT ADJUSTMENT 3.15.2 FORWARD
AND BACKWARD CONTROL LEVER 3.15.3 BACKREST INCLINATION
ADJUSTMENT 3.15.4 LUMBAR ADJUSTMENT 3.15.5 SWIVEL SEAT 3.16 SEAT
BELT 3.17 TOP PANEL 3.18 TILT STEERING WHEEL 3.19 SERVICE RELEASE
LATCH 3.20 RADIATOR COVER 3.21 REARVIEW MIRROR (OPTION) 3.22 LPG
CYLINDER (TANK) HOLDER CHAPTER 4 GENERAL CARE AND
MAINTENANCE 4.1 WET CELL BATTERY CARE AND MAINTENANCE 4.2
BATTERY SPECIFIC GRAVITY 4.3 DAILY INSPECTION 4.4 OPERATOR'S
DAILY CHECKLIST (SAMPLE) 4.5 MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION 4.5.1
CAT Forklift V40D SA Service Manual

ENGINE OIL LEVEL 4.5.2 REFILLING ENGINE OIL 4.5.3 ENGINE COOLANT
LEVEL 4.5.4 REFILLING ENGINE COOLANT 4.5.5 COOLING SYSTEM
BLEEDING INSTRUCTIONS 4.5.6 BRAKE FLUID LEVEL 4.5.7 REFILLING
BRAKE FLUID 4.5.8 AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION FLUID LEVEL 4.5.9
REFILLING AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION FLUID 4.5.10 HYDRAULIC OIL
LEVEL 4.5.11 REFILLING HYDRAULIC OIL 4.5.12 STEERING WHEEL PLAY
4.5.13 WHEEL AND TIRE 4.5.14 TIRE REPLACEMENT 4.5.15 CHECKING MAST
4.5.16 CHECKING LIFT CHAIN 4.5.17 FORK INSPECTION 4.5.18 FORK REPAIR
4.5.19 CHECKING HORN 4.5.20 CHECKING LIGHTS 4.5.21 CHECKING
CARGO-HANDLING CONTROL LEVER(S) 4.5.22 CHECKING BRAKE PEDAL
4.5.23 PEDAL FREE PLAY 4.5.24 CHECKING PARKING BRAKE LEVER 4.5.25
CHECKING TOP PANEL LOCK 4.5.26 FUSES 4.5.27 CHECKING AIR CLEANER
4.5.28 CHECKING FAN BELT 4.5.29 DRAINING OF TAR FROM THE
VAPORIZER 4.5.30 PRECAUTIONS FOR USING LPG 4.5.31 RECOMMENDED
LPG FUEL TYPE 4.5.32 CYLINDER (TANK) SIZE 4.5.33 LPG CYLINDER (TANK)
REPLACEMENT 4.5.34 REFILLING LPG CYLINDERS (TANKS) 4.5.35
PERIODIC MAINTENANCE AND LUBRICATION SCHEDULE 4.5.36 PERIODIC
MAINTENANCE AND LUBRICATION SCHEDULE FOR EMISSION CONTROL
SYSTEM 4.5.37 LUBRICATION CHART 4.5.38 RECOMMENDED LUBRICANTS
4.5.39 RECOMMENDED SAE VISCOSITY CHART 4.5.40 PUTTING LIFT TRUCK
IN STORAGE 4.6 SIDE SHIFT 4.6.1 OVERVIEW OF SIDE SHIFT 4.6.2 MAIN
TERMS USED IN THIS SECTION 4.6.3 SAFETY RULES AND PRACTICES 4.6.4
SIDE SHIFT CONTROL LEVER OPERATION 4.6.5 SIDE SHIFT OPERATION
4.6.6 DAILY CHECKS AND SIMPLE MAINTENANCE CHAPTER 5
SPECIFICATIONS 5.1 MODEL IDENTIFICATION 5.1.1 MODEL VARIATION
(LONG MODEL CODE) BREAKDOWN 5.2 MAIN TRUCK 5.2.1 MAIN TRUCK -
2C7000 AND 2C8000/2C8000-SWB 5.3 MAST 5.3.1 2C7000 AND
2C8000/2C8000-SWB 5.4 FUEL AND OIL CAPACITY 5.5 ENGINE 5.6 ENGINE
OIL CAPACITY 5.7 NOISE LEVEL
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We have endeavoured to ascertain the principles by which the
sufficiency of any proof can be tested, and by which the nature and
amount of evidence needful to prove any given conclusion can be
determined beforehand. If these principles were adhered to, then
although the number and value of the truths ascertained would be
limited by the opportunities, or by the industry, ingenuity, and
patience, of the individual inquirer, at least error would not be
embraced instead of truth. But the general consent of mankind,
founded on their experience, vouches for their being far indeed from
even this negative kind of perfection in the employment of their
reasoning powers.
In the conduct of life—in the practical business of mankind—wrong
inferences, incorrect interpretations of experience, unless after much
culture of the thinking faculty, are absolutely inevitable: and with
most people, after the highest degree of culture they ever attain,
such erroneous inferences, producing corresponding errors in
conduct, are lamentably frequent. Even in the speculations to which
eminent intellects have systematically devoted themselves, and in
reference to which the collective mind of the scientific world is
always at hand to aid the efforts and correct the aberrations of
individuals, it is only from the more perfect sciences, from those of
which the subject-matter is the least complicated, that opinions not
resting on a correct induction have at length, generally speaking,
been expelled. In the departments of inquiry relating to the more
complex phenomena of nature, and especially those of which the
subject is man, whether as a moral and intellectual, a social, or even
as a physical being; the diversity of opinions still prevalent among
instructed persons, and the equal confidence with which those of the
most contrary ways of thinking cling to their respective tenets, are
proof not only that right modes of philosophizing are not yet
generally adopted on those subjects, but that wrong ones are: that
inquirers have not only in general missed the truth, but have often
embraced error; that even the most cultivated portion of our species
have not yet learned to abstain from drawing conclusions which the
evidence does not warrant.
The only complete safeguard against reasoning ill, is the habit of
reasoning well; familiarity with the principles of correct reasoning,
and practice in applying those principles. It is, however, not
unimportant to consider what are the most common modes of bad
reasoning; by what appearances the mind is most likely to be
seduced from the observance of true principles of induction; what, in
short, are the most common and most dangerous varieties of
Apparent Evidence, whereby persons are misled into opinions for
which there does not exist evidence really conclusive.
A catalogue of the varieties of apparent evidence which are not real
evidence, is an enumeration of Fallacies. Without such an
enumeration, therefore, the present work would be wanting in an
essential point. And while writers who included in their theory of
reasoning nothing more than ratiocination, have, in consistency with
this limitation, confined their remarks to the fallacies which have
their seat in that portion of the process of investigation; we, who
profess to treat of the whole process, must add to our directions for
performing it rightly, warnings against performing it wrongly in any
of its parts: whether the ratiocinative or the experimental portion of
it be in fault, or the fault lie in dispensing with ratiocination and
induction altogether.

§ 2. In considering the sources of unfounded inference, it is

unnecessary to reckon the errors which arise, not from a wrong
method, nor even from ignorance of the right one, but from a casual
lapse, through hurry or inattention, in the application of the true
principles of induction. Such errors, like the accidental mistakes in
casting up a sum, do not call for philosophical analysis or
classification; theoretical considerations can throw no light upon the
means of avoiding them. In the present treatise our attention is
required, not to mere inexpertness in performing the operation in
the right way, (the only remedies for which are increased attention
and more sedulous practice,) but to the modes of performing it in a
way fundamentally wrong; the conditions under which the human
mind persuades itself that it has sufficient grounds for a conclusion
which it has not arrived at by any of the legitimate methods of
induction—which it has not even carelessly or overhastily,
endeavoured to test by those legitimate methods.

§ 3. There is another branch of what may be called the Philosophy

of Error, which must be mentioned here, though only to be excluded
from our subject. The sources of erroneous opinions are twofold,
moral and intellectual. Of these, the moral do not fall within the
compass of this work. They may be classed under two general
heads; Indifference to the attainment of truth, and Bias: of which
last the most common case is that in which we are biassed by our
wishes; but the liability is almost as great to the undue adoption of a
conclusion which is disagreeable to us, as of one which is agreeable,
if it be of a nature to bring into action any of the stronger passions.
Persons of timid character are the more predisposed to believe any
statement, the more it is calculated to alarm them. Indeed it is a
psychological law, deducible from the most general laws of the
mental constitution of man, that any strong passion renders us
credulous as to the existence of objects suitable to excite it.
But the moral causes of opinions, though with most persons the
most powerful of all, are but remote causes: they do not act directly,
but by means of the intellectual causes; to which they bear the
same relation that the circumstances called, in the theory of
medicine, predisposing causes, bear to exciting causes. Indifference
to truth cannot, in and by itself, produce erroneous belief; it
operates by preventing the mind from collecting the proper
evidences, or from applying to them the test of a legitimate and rigid
induction; by which omission it is exposed unprotected to the
influence of any species of apparent evidence which offers itself
spontaneously, or which is elicited by that smaller quantity of trouble
which the mind may be willing to take. As little is Bias a direct
source of wrong conclusions. We cannot believe a proposition only
by wishing, or only by dreading, to believe it. The most violent
inclination to find a set of propositions true, will not enable the
weakest of mankind to believe them without a vestige of intellectual
grounds—without any, even apparent, evidence. It acts indirectly, by
placing the intellectual grounds of belief in an incomplete or
distorted shape before his eyes. It makes him shrink from the
irksome labour of a rigorous induction, when he has a misgiving that
its result may be disagreeable; and in such examination as he does
institute, it makes him exert that which is in a certain measure
voluntary, his attention, unfairly, giving a larger share of it to the
evidence which seems favourable to the desired conclusion, a
smaller to that which seems unfavourable. It operates, too, by
making him look out eagerly for reasons, or apparent reasons, to
support opinions which are conformable, or resist those which are
repugnant, to his interests or feelings; and when the interests or
feelings are common to great numbers of persons, reasons are
accepted and pass current, which would not for a moment be
listened to in that character, if the conclusion had nothing more
powerful than its reasons to speak in its behalf. The natural or
acquired partialities of mankind are continually throwing up
philosophical theories, the sole recommendation of which consists in
the premises they afford for proving cherished doctrines, or
justifying favourite feelings: and when any one of these theories has
been so thoroughly discredited as no longer to serve the purpose,
another is always ready to take its place. This propensity, when
exercised in favour of any widely-spread persuasion or sentiment, is
often decorated with complimentary epithets; and the contrary habit
of keeping the judgment in complete subordination to evidence, is
stigmatized by various hard names, as scepticism, immorality,
coldness, hard-heartedness, and similar expressions according to the
nature of the case. But though the opinions of the generality of
mankind, when not dependent on mere habit and inculcation, have
their root much more in the inclinations than in the intellect, it is a
necessary condition to the triumph of the moral bias that it should
first pervert the understanding. Every erroneous inference, though
originating in moral causes, involves the intellectual operation of
admitting insufficient evidence as sufficient; and whoever was on his
guard against all kinds of inconclusive evidence which can be
mistaken for conclusive, would be in no danger of being led into
error even by the strongest bias. There are minds so strongly
fortified on the intellectual side, that they could not blind themselves
to the light of truth, however really desirous of doing so; they could
not, with all the inclination in the world, pass off upon themselves
bad arguments for good ones. If the sophistry of the intellect could
be rendered impossible, that of the feelings, having no instrument to
work with, would be powerless. A comprehensive classification of all
those things which, not being evidence, are liable to appear such to
the understanding, will, therefore, of itself include all errors of
judgment arising from moral causes, to the exclusion only of errors
of practice committed against better knowledge.
To examine, then, the various kinds of apparent evidence which are
not evidence at all, and of apparently conclusive evidence which do
not really amount to conclusiveness, is the object of that part of our
inquiry into which we are about to enter.
The subject is not beyond the compass of classification and
comprehensive survey. The things, indeed, which are not evidence
of any given conclusion, are manifestly endless, and this negative
property, having no dependence on any positive ones, cannot be
made the groundwork of a real classification. But the things which,
not being evidence, are susceptible of being mistaken for it, are
capable of a classification having reference to the positive property
which they possess, of appearing to be evidence. We may arrange
them, at our choice, on either of two principles; according to the
cause which makes them appear to be evidence, not being so; or
according to the particular kind of evidence which they simulate. The
Classification of Fallacies which will be attempted in the ensuing
chapter, is founded on these considerations jointly.
 CHAPTER II.
CLASSIFICATION OF FALLACIES.

§ 1. In attempting to establish certain general distinctions which

shall mark out from one another the various kinds of Fallacious
Evidence, we propose to ourselves an altogether different aim from
that of several eminent thinkers, who have given, under the name of
Political or other Fallacies, a mere enumeration of a certain number
of erroneous opinions; false general propositions which happen to be
often met with; loci communes of bad arguments on some particular
subject. Logic is not concerned with the false opinions which people
happen to entertain, but with the manner in which they come to
entertain them. The question is not, what facts have at any time
been erroneously supposed to be proof of certain other facts, but
what property in the facts it was which led any one to this mistaken
supposition.
When a fact is supposed, though incorrectly, to be evidentiary of, or
a mark of, some other fact, there must be a cause of the error; the
supposed evidentiary fact must be connected in some particular
manner with the fact of which it is deemed evidentiary,—must stand
in some particular relation to it, without which relation it would not
be regarded in that light. The relation may either be one resulting
from the simple contemplation of the two facts side by side with one
another, or it may depend on some process of mind, by which a
previous association has been established between them. Some
peculiarity of relation, however, there must be; the fact which can,
even by the wildest aberration, be supposed to prove another fact,
must stand in some special position with regard to it; and if we could
ascertain and define that special position, we should perceive the
origin of the error.
We cannot regard one fact as evidentiary of another, unless we
believe that the two are always, or in the majority of cases,
conjoined. If we believe A to be evidentiary of B, if when we see A
we are inclined to infer B from it, the reason is because we believe
that wherever A is, B also either always or for the most part exists,
either as an antecedent, a consequent, or a concomitant. If when
we see A we are inclined not to expect B—if we believe A to be
evidentiary of the absence of B—it is because we believe that where
A is, B either is never, or at least seldom, found. Erroneous
conclusions, in short, no less than correct conclusions, have an
invariable relation to a general formula, either expressed or tacitly
implied. When we infer some fact from some other fact which does
not really prove it, we either have admitted, or, if we maintained
consistency, ought to admit, some groundless general proposition
respecting the conjunction of the two phenomena.
For every property, therefore, in facts, or in our mode of considering
facts, which leads us to believe that they are habitually conjoined
when they are not, or that they are not when in reality they are,
there is a corresponding kind of Fallacy; and an enumeration of
fallacies would consist in a specification of those properties in facts,
and those peculiarities in our mode of considering them, which give
rise to this erroneous opinion.

§ 2. To begin, then; the supposed connexion, or repugnance,

between the two facts, may either be a conclusion from evidence
(that is, from some other proposition or propositions) or may be
admitted without any such ground; admitted, as the phrase is, on its
own evidence; embraced as self-evident, as an axiomatic truth. This
gives rise to the first great distinction, that between Fallacies of
Inference, and Fallacies of Simple Inspection. In the latter division
must be included not only all cases in which a proposition is believed
and held for true, literally without any extrinsic evidence, either of
specific experience or general reasoning; but those more frequent
cases in which simple inspection creates a presumption in favour of
a proposition; not sufficient for belief, but sufficient to cause the
strict principles of a regular induction to be dispensed with, and
creating a predisposition to believe it on evidence which would be
seen to be insufficient if no such presumption existed. This class,
comprehending the whole of what may be termed Natural
Prejudices, and which I shall call indiscriminately Fallacies of Simple
Inspection or Fallacies à priori, shall be placed at the head of our list.
Fallacies of Inference, or erroneous conclusions from supposed
evidence, must be subdivided according to the nature of the
apparent evidence from which the conclusions are drawn; or (what
is the same thing) according to the particular kind of sound
argument which the fallacy in question simulates. But there is a
distinction to be first drawn, which does not answer to any of the
divisions of sound arguments, but arises out of the nature of bad
ones. We may know exactly what our evidence is, and yet draw a
false conclusion from it; we may conceive precisely what our
premises are, what alleged matters of fact, or general principles, are
the foundation of our inference; and yet, because the premises are
false, or because we have inferred from them what they will not
support, our conclusion may be erroneous. But a case, perhaps even
more frequent, is that in which the error arises from not conceiving
our premises with due clearness, that is, (as shown in the preceding
Book,[1]) with due fixity: forming one conception of our evidence
when we collect or receive it, and another when we make use of it;
or unadvisedly, and in general unconsciously, substituting, as we
proceed, different premises in the place of those with which we set
out, or a different conclusion for that which we undertook to prove.
This gives existence to a class of fallacies which may be justly
termed (in a phrase borrowed from Bentham) Fallacies of Confusion;
comprehending, among others, all those which have their source in
language, whether arising from the vagueness or ambiguity of our
terms, or from casual associations with them.
When the fallacy is not one of Confusion, that is, when the
proposition believed, and the evidence on which it is believed, are
steadily apprehended and unambiguously expressed, there remain to
be made two cross divisions. The Apparent Evidence may be either
particular facts, or foregone generalizations; that is, the process may
simulate either simple Induction, or Deduction; and again, the
evidence, whether consisting of supposed facts or of general
propositions, may be false in itself, or, being true, may fail to bear
out the conclusion attempted to be founded on it. This gives us first,
Fallacies of Induction and Fallacies of Deduction, and then a
subdivision of each of these, according as the supposed evidence is
false, or true but inconclusive.
Fallacies of Induction, where the facts on which the induction
proceeds are erroneous, may be termed Fallacies of Observation.
The term is not strictly accurate, or rather, not accurately
coextensive with the class of fallacies which I propose to designate
by it. Induction is not always grounded on facts immediately
observed, but sometimes on facts inferred: and when these last are
erroneous, the error may not be, in the literal sense of the term, an
instance of bad observation, but of bad inference. It will be
convenient, however, to make only one class of all the inductions of
which the error lies in not sufficiently ascertaining the facts on which
the theory is grounded; whether the cause of failure be mal-
observation, or simple non-observation, and whether the mal-
observation be direct, or by means of intermediate marks which do
not prove what they are supposed to prove. And in the absence of
any comprehensive term to denote the ascertainment, by whatever
means, of the facts on which an induction is grounded, I will venture
to retain for this class of fallacies, under the explanation now given,
the title of Fallacies of Observation.
The other class of inductive fallacies, in which the facts are correct,
but the conclusion not warranted by them, are properly denominated
Fallacies of Generalization: and these, again, fall into various
subordinate classes or natural groups, some of which will be
enumerated in their proper place.
When we now turn to Fallacies of Deduction, namely those modes of
incorrect argumentation in which the premises, or some of them, are
general propositions, and the argument a ratiocination; we may of
course subdivide these also into two species similar to the two
preceding, namely, those which proceed on false premises, and
those of which the premises, though true, do not support the
conclusion. But of these species, the first must necessarily fall under
some one of the heads already enumerated. For the error must be
either in those premises which are general propositions, or in those
which assert individual facts. In the former case it is an Inductive
Fallacy, of one or the other class; in the latter it is a Fallacy of
Observation: unless, in either case, the erroneous premise has been
assumed on simple inspection, in which case the fallacy is à priori.
Or finally, the premises, of whichever kind they are, may never have
been conceived in so distinct a manner as to produce any clear
consciousness by what means they were arrived at; as in the case of
what is called reasoning in a circle: and then the fallacy is one of
Confusion.
There remain, therefore, as the only class of fallacies having
properly their seat in deduction, those in which the premises of the
ratiocination do not bear out its conclusion; the various cases, in
short, of vicious argumentation, provided against by the rules of the
syllogism. We shall call these, Fallacies of Ratiocination.
We have thus five distinguishable classes of fallacy, which may be
expressed in the following synoptic table:—

Fallacies
of Simple Inspection 1. Fallacies à priori.
of Inference
from evidence distinctly
conceived
Inductive Fallacies 2. Fallacies of Observation.
3. Fallacies of
Generalization.
Deductive Fallacies 4. Fallacies of
Ratiocination.
from evidence indistinctly 5. Fallacies of Confusion.
conceived
§ 3. We must not, however, expect to find that men's actual errors
always, or even commonly, fall so unmistakeably under some one of
these classes, as to be incapable of being referred to any other.
Erroneous arguments do not admit of such a sharply cut division as
valid arguments do. An argument fully stated, with all its steps
distinctly set out, in language not susceptible of misunderstanding,
must, if it be erroneous, be so in some one of these five modes
unequivocally: or indeed of the first four, since the fifth, on such a
supposition, would vanish. But it is not in the nature of bad
reasoning to express itself thus unambiguously. When a sophist,
whether he is imposing on himself or attempting to impose on
others, can be constrained to throw his sophistry into so distinct a
form, it needs, in a large proportion of cases, no further exposure.
In all arguments, everywhere but in the schools, some of the links
are suppressed; à fortiori when the arguer either intends to deceive,
or is a lame and inexpert thinker, little accustomed to bring his
reasoning processes to any test: and it is in those steps of the
reasoning which are made in this tacit and half-conscious, or even
wholly unconscious manner, that the error oftenest lurks. In order to
detect the fallacy, the proposition thus silently assumed must be
supplied; but the reasoner, most likely, has never really asked
himself what he was assuming: his confuter, unless permitted to
extort it from him by the Socratic mode of interrogation, must
himself judge what the suppressed premise ought to be in order to
support the conclusion. And hence, in the words of Archbishop
Whately, "it must be often a matter of doubt, or rather, of arbitrary
choice, not only to which genus each kind of fallacy should be
referred, but even to which kind to refer any one individual fallacy;
for since, in any course of argument, one premise is usually
suppressed, it frequently happens in the case of a fallacy, that the
hearers are left to the alternative of supplying either a premise
which is not true, or else, one which does not prove the conclusion:
e. g. if a man expatiates on the distress of the country, and thence
argues that the government is tyrannical, we must suppose him to
assume either that 'every distressed country is under a tyranny,'
which is a manifest falsehood, or merely that 'every country under a
tyranny is distressed,' which, however true, proves nothing, the
middle term being undistributed." The former would be ranked, in
our distribution, among fallacies of generalization, the latter among
those of ratiocination. "Which are we to suppose the speaker meant
us to understand? Surely" (if he understood himself) "just whichever
each of his hearers might happen to prefer: some might assent to
the false premise; others allow the unsound syllogism."
Almost all fallacies, therefore, might in strictness be brought under
our fifth class, Fallacies of Confusion. A fallacy can seldom be
absolutely referred to any of the other classes; we can only say, that
if all the links were filled up which should be capable of being
supplied in a valid argument, it would either stand thus (forming a
fallacy of one class), or thus (a fallacy of another); or at furthest we
may say, that the conclusion is most likely to have originated in a
fallacy of such and such a class. Thus in the illustration just quoted,
the error committed may be traced with most probability to a fallacy
of generalization; that of mistaking an uncertain mark, or piece of
evidence, for a certain one; concluding from an effect to some one
of its possible causes, when there are others which would have been
equally capable of producing it.
Yet, though the five classes run into each other, and a particular
error often seems to be arbitrarily assigned to one of them rather
than to any of the rest, there is considerable use in so distinguishing
them. We shall find it convenient to set apart, as Fallacies of
Confusion, those of which confusion is the most obvious
characteristic; in which no other cause can be assigned for the
mistake committed, than neglect or inability to state the question
properly, and to apprehend the evidence with definiteness and
precision. In the remaining four classes I shall place not only the
cases in which the evidence is clearly seen to be what it is, and yet a
wrong conclusion drawn from it, but also those in which, although
there be confusion, the confusion is not the sole cause of the error,
but there is some shadow of a ground for it in the nature of the
evidence itself. And in distributing these cases of partial confusion
among the four classes, I shall, when there can be any hesitation as
to the precise seat of the fallacy, suppose it to be in that part of the
process in which, from the nature of the case, and the tendencies of
the human mind, an error would in the particular circumstances be
the most probable.
After these observations we shall proceed, without further preamble,
to consider the five classes in their order.

CHAPTER III.
FALLACIES OF SIMPLE INSPECTION; OR À PRIORI
FALLACIES.

§ 1. The tribe of errors of which we are to treat in the first instance,

are those in which no actual inference takes place at all: the
proposition (it cannot in such cases be called a conclusion) being
embraced, not as proved, but as requiring no proof; as a self-evident
truth; or else as having such intrinsic verisimilitude, that external
evidence not in itself amounting to proof, is sufficient in aid of the
antecedent presumption.
An attempt to treat this subject comprehensively would be a
transgression of the bounds prescribed to this work, since it would
necessitate the inquiry which, more than any other, is the grand
question of what is called metaphysics, viz. What are the
propositions which may reasonably be received without proof? That
there must be some such propositions all are agreed, since there
cannot be an infinite series of proof, a chain suspended from
nothing. But to determine what these propositions are, is the opus
magnum of the more recondite mental philosophy. Two principal
divisions of opinion on the subject have divided the schools of
philosophy from its first dawn. The one recognises no ultimate
premises but the facts of our subjective consciousness; our
sensations, emotions, intellectual states of mind, and volitions.
These, and whatever by strict rules of induction can be derived from
these, it is possible, according to this theory, for us to know; of all
else we must remain in ignorance. The opposite school hold that
there are other existences, suggested indeed to our minds by these
subjective phenomena, but not inferrible from them, by any process
either of deduction or of induction; which, however, we must, by the
constitution of our mental nature recognise as realities; and realities,
too, of a higher order than the phenomena of our consciousness,
being the efficient causes and necessary substrata of all Phenomena.
Among these entities they reckon Substances, whether matter or
spirit; from the dust under our feet to the soul, and from that to
Deity. All these, according to them, are preternatural or supernatural
beings, having no likeness in experience, though experience is
entirely a manifestation of their agency. Their existence, together
with more or less of the laws to which they conform in their
operations, are, on this theory, apprehended and recognised as real
by the mind itself intuitively: experience (whether in the form of
sensation or of mental feeling) having no other part in the matter
than as affording facts which are consistent with these necessary
postulates of reason, and which are explained and accounted for by
them.
As it is foreign to the purpose of the present treatise to decide
between these conflicting theories, we are precluded from inquiring
into the existence, or defining the extent and limits, of knowledge à
priori, and from characterizing the kind of correct assumption which
the fallacy of incorrect assumption, now under consideration,
simulates. Yet since it is allowed on both sides that such
assumptions are often made improperly, we may find it practicable,
without entering into the ultimate metaphysical grounds of the
discussion, to state some speculative propositions, and suggest
some practical cautions, respecting the forms in which such
unwarranted assumptions are most likely to be made.
§ 2. In the cases in which, according to the thinkers of the
ontological school, the mind apprehends, by intuition, things, and
the laws of things, not cognizable by our sensitive faculty; those
intuitive, or supposed intuitive, perceptions are undistinguishable
from what the opposite school are accustomed to call ideas of the
mind. When they themselves say that they perceive the things by an
immediate act of a faculty given for that purpose by their Creator, it
would be said of them by their opponents that they find an idea or
conception in their own minds, and from the idea or conception,
infer the existence of a corresponding objective reality. Nor would
this be an unfair statement, but a mere version into other words of
the account given by many of themselves; and one to which the
more clear-sighted of them might, and generally do, without
hesitation, subscribe. Since, therefore, in the cases which lay the
strongest claims to be examples of knowledge à priori, the mind
proceeds from the idea of a thing to the reality of the thing itself, we
cannot be surprised by finding that illicit assumptions à priori consist
in doing the same thing erroneously: in mistaking subjective facts for
objective, laws of the percipient mind for laws of the perceived
object, properties of the ideas or conceptions for properties of the
things conceived.
Accordingly, a large proportion of the erroneous thinking which
exists in the world proceeds on a tacit assumption, that the same
order must obtain among the objects in nature which obtains among
our ideas of them. That if we always think of two things together,
the two things must always exist together. That if one thing makes
us think of another as preceding or following it, that other must
precede it or follow it in actual fact. And conversely, that when we
cannot conceive two things together they cannot exist together, and
that their combination may, without further evidence, be rejected
from the list of possible occurrences.
Few persons, I am inclined to think, have reflected on the great
extent to which this fallacy has prevailed, and prevails, in the actual
beliefs and actions of mankind. For a first illustration of it, we may
refer to a large class of popular superstitions. If any one will
examine in what circumstances most of those things agree, which in
different ages and by different portions of the human race have
been considered as omens or prognostics of some interesting event,
whether calamitous or fortunate; they will be found very generally
characterized by this peculiarity, that they cause the mind to think of
that, of which they are therefore supposed to forebode the actual
occurrence. "Talk of the devil, and he will appear," has passed into a
proverb. Talk of the devil, that is, raise the idea, and the reality will
follow. In times when the appearance of that personage in a visible
form was thought to be no unfrequent occurrence, it has doubtless
often happened to persons of vivid imagination and susceptible
nerves, that talking of the devil has caused them to fancy they saw
him; as, even in our more incredulous days, listening to ghost stories
predisposes us to see ghosts; and thus, as a prop to the à priori
fallacy, there might come to be added an auxiliary fallacy of mal-
observation, with one of false generalization grounded on it. Fallacies
of different orders often herd or cluster together in this fashion, one
smoothing the way for another. But the origin of the superstition is
evidently that which we have assigned. In like manner it has been
universally considered unlucky to speak of misfortune. The day on
which any calamity happened has been considered an unfortunate
day, and there has been a feeling everywhere, and in some nations a
religious obligation, against transacting any important business on
that day. For on such a day our thoughts are likely to be of
misfortune. For a similar reason, any untoward occurrence in
commencing an undertaking has been considered ominous of failure;
and often, doubtless, has really contributed to it, by putting the
persons engaged in the enterprise more or less out of spirits: but the
belief has equally prevailed where the disagreeable circumstance
was, independently of superstition, too insignificant to depress the
spirits by any influence of its own. All know the story of Cæsar's
accidentally stumbling in the act of landing on the African coast; and
the presence of mind with which he converted the direful presage
into a favourable one by exclaiming, "Africa, I embrace thee." Such
omens, it is true, were often conceived as warnings of the future,
given by a friendly or a hostile deity; but this very superstition grew
out of a pre-existing tendency; the god was supposed to send, as an
indication of what was to come, something which people were
already disposed to consider in that light. So in the case of lucky or
unlucky names. Herodotus tells us how the Greeks, on the way to
Mycale, were encouraged in their enterprise by the arrival of a
deputation from Samos, one of the members of which was named
Hegesistratus, the leader of armies.
Cases may be pointed out in which something which could have no
real effect but to make persons think of misfortune, was regarded
not merely as a prognostic, but as something approaching to an
actual cause of it. The εὐφήμει of the Greeks, and favete linguis, or
bona verba quæso, of the Romans, evince the care with which they
endeavoured to repress the utterance of any word expressive or
suggestive of ill fortune; not from notions of delicate politeness, to
which their general mode of conduct and feeling had very little
reference, but from bonâ fide alarm lest the event so suggested to
the imagination should in fact occur. Some vestige of a similar
superstition has been known to exist among uneducated persons
even in our own day: it is thought an unchristian thing to talk of, or
suppose, the death of any person while he is alive. It is known how
careful the Romans were to avoid, by an indirect mode of speech,
the utterance of any word directly expressive of death or other
calamity: how instead of mortuus est they said vixit; and "be the
event fortunate or otherwise" instead of adverse. The name
Maleventum, of which Salmasius so sagaciously detected the
Thessalian origin (Μαλόεις, Μαλοέντος), they changed into the
highly propitious denomination, Beneventum; Egesta into Segesta;
and Epidamnus, a name so interesting in its associations to the
reader of Thucydides, they exchanged for Dyrrhachium, to escape
the perils of a word suggestive of damnum or detriment.

"If an hare cross the highway," says Sir Thomas Browne,[2] "there
are few above threescore that are not perplexed thereat; which
notwithstanding is but an augurial terror, according to that received
expression, Inauspicatum dat iter oblatus lepus. And the ground of
the conceit was probably no greater than this, that a fearful animal
passing by us portended unto us something to be feared; as upon
the like consideration the meeting of a fox presaged some future
imposture." Such superstitions as these last must be the result of
study; they are too recondite for natural or spontaneous growth. But
when the attempt was once made to construct a science of
predictions, any association, though ever so faint or remote, by
which an object could be connected in however far-fetched a
manner with ideas either of prosperity or of danger and misfortune,
was enough to determine its being classed among good or evil
omens.
An example of rather a different kind from any of these, but falling
under the same principle, is the famous attempt on which so much
labour and ingenuity were expended by the alchemists, to make gold
potable. The motive to this was a conceit that potable gold could be
no other than the universal medicine: and why gold? Because it was
so precious. It must have all marvellous properties as a physical
substance, because the mind was already accustomed to marvel at
it.

From a similar feeling, "every substance," says Dr. Paris,[3] "whose

origin is involved in mystery, has at different times been eagerly
applied to the purposes of medicine. Not long since, one of those
showers which are now known to consist of the excrements of
insects, fell in the north of Italy; the inhabitants regarded it as
manna, or some supernatural panacea, and they swallowed it with
such avidity, that it was only by extreme address that a small
quantity was obtained for a chemical examination." The superstition,
in this instance, though doubtless partly of a religious character,
probably in part also arose from the prejudice that a wonderful thing
must of course have wonderful properties.
§ 3. The instances of à priori fallacy which we have hitherto cited
belong to the class of vulgar errors, and do not now, nor in any but
a rude age ever could, impose upon minds of any considerable
attainments. But those to which we are about to proceed, have
been, and still are, all but universally prevalent among thinkers. The
same disposition to give objectivity to a law of the mind—to suppose
that what is true of our ideas of things must be true of the things
themselves—exhibits itself in many of the most accredited modes of
philosophical investigation, both on physical and on metaphysical
subjects. In one of its most undisguised manifestations, it embodies
itself in two maxims, which lay claim to axiomatic truth: Things
which we cannot think of together, cannot coexist; and Things which
we cannot help thinking of together, must coexist. I am not sure that
the maxims were ever expressed in these precise words, but the
history both of philosophy and of popular opinions abounds with
exemplifications of both forms of the doctrine.
To begin with the latter of them: Things which we cannot think of
except together, must exist together. This is assumed in the
generally received and accredited mode of reasoning which
concludes that A must accompany B in point of fact, because "it is
involved in the idea." Such thinkers do not reflect that the idea,
being a result of abstraction, ought to conform to the facts, and
cannot make the facts conform to it. The argument is at most
admissible as an appeal to authority; a surmise, that what is now
part of the idea, must, before it became so, have been found by
previous inquirers in the facts. Nevertheless, the philosopher who
more than all others made professions of rejecting authority,
Descartes, constructed his system on this very basis. His favourite
device for arriving at truth, even in regard to outward things, was by
looking into his own mind for it. "Credidi me," says his celebrated
maxim, "pro regulâ generali sumere posse, omne id quod valdè
dilucidè et distinctè concipiebam, verum esse;" whatever can be very
clearly conceived, must certainly exist; that is, as he afterwards
explains it, if the idea includes existence. And on this ground he
infers that geometrical figures really exist, because they can be
distinctly conceived. Whenever existence is "involved in an idea," a
thing conformable to the idea must really exist; which is as much as
to say, whatever the idea contains must have its equivalent in the
thing; and what we are not able to leave out of the idea cannot be
absent from the reality.[4] This assumption pervades the philosophy
not only of Descartes, but of all the thinkers who received their
impulse mainly from him, in particular the two most remarkable
among them, Spinoza and Leibnitz, from whom the modern German
metaphysical philosophy is essentially an emanation. I am indeed
disposed to think that the fallacy now under consideration has been
the cause of two-thirds of the bad philosophy, and especially of the
bad metaphysics, which the human mind has never ceased to
produce. Our general ideas contain nothing but what has been put
into them, either by our passive experience, or by our active habits
of thought; and the metaphysicians in all ages, who have attempted
to construct the laws of the universe by reasoning from our
supposed necessities of thought, have always proceeded, and only
could proceed, by laboriously finding in their own minds what they
themselves had formerly put there, and evolving from their ideas of
things what they had first involved in those ideas. In this way all
deeply-rooted opinions and feelings are enabled to create apparent
demonstrations of their truth and reasonableness, as it were out of
their own substance.
The other form of the fallacy; Things which we cannot think of
together cannot exist together,—including as one of its branches,
that what we cannot think of as existing cannot exist at all,—may
thus be briefly expressed: Whatever is inconceivable must be false.
Against this prevalent doctrine I have sufficiently argued in a former
Book,[5] and nothing is required in this place but examples. It was
long held that Antipodes were impossible because of the difficulty
which was found in conceiving persons with their heads in the same
direction as our feet. And it was one of the received arguments
against the Copernican system, that we cannot conceive so great a
void space as that system supposes to exist in the celestial regions.