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Evidence Good Notes
Evidence Good Notes
Evidence Good Notes
1. What is Evidence?
S.3 of the TEA provides that evidence denotes the means by which an alleged matter of
fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is proved or disproved; and includes
statements and admissions by the accused person.
Phipson on Evidence defines evidence as (a) the means, apart from argument and
inference, whereby the court is informed as to the issues of fact as ascertained by the
pleadings; (b) the subject matter of such means (at 2)
Black’s Law dictionary defines Evidence as something (including testimony, documents
and tangible objects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact (at
595)
Murphy on Evidence defines evidence as any material which tends to persuade the court
of the truth or probability of some fact asserted before it (at 1)
Summary of the definition:
Evidence is mainly concerned with facts and not the law
It is a means of proving that a certain fact is either truthful or not/ in existence or not
Note that some material may satisfy the definition, i.e. they may persuade the court of
the truth of a fact before it, but they are excluded by some laws or rules, e.g. a sale
agreement for which stamp duty hasn’t been paid as required by the law
It is not the truth of the matter that counts but the evidence.
2. Historical Background
The Tanzanian Evidence Act, together with the evidence Acts in the other two East
African countries, Kenya and Uganda, are based on the Indian Evidence Act of 1872,
which in turn is based on the English common law of Evidence. There are however a few
differences between the English Common Law of Evidence and the Indian Act, as well as
the Indian Act and the East African countries’ Acts. This discussion however focuses on
the TEA.
In 1897, the East African Order in Council and the Zanzibar Order in Council
were promulgated (announced officially), and they provided that the High Court
in those countries should exercise jurisdiction in conformity with certain Indian
enactments, one of which was the Indian Evidence Act
In 1907, the East African Protectorate Applied Acts Ordinance was passed,
providing that any amendments or substitution to the Indian enactments
applicable in the Protectorate should only apply to the Protectorate of they were
passed before the passing of the East African Protectorate Applied Acts
Ordinance
In 1917, a Zanzibar Evidence Decree was enacted, replacing the Indian Evidence
Act
In 1920, the Tanganyika Indian Acts (Application) Ordinance was passed, which
applied the Indian Evidence Act as it stood at that date to the territory.
In 1967, the Tanganyika Evidence Act no. 6 of 1967 was enacted, replacing the
application of the Indian Evidence Act in Tanganyika. (Note: In Zanzibar they
still use the Evidence Decree.
The 1967 TEA applies to all judicial proceedings before the Magistrate’s Courts
and High Courts in Tanganyika, but does not apply to Primary Courts or to
affidavits presented to any court or officer of the court, or to proceedings before
an arbitrator.
3. Terminology and Definitions
i. Commonly used terms
Tender/ adduce/introduce evidence: to put evidence before the court. The
Party who tenders evidence may also be referred to as the proponent of the
evidence. Note that this may be any party; prosecution or accused;
plaintiff or defendant.
The party who is adverse to the proponent of the evidence is known as the
opponent. Again this may be any party.
When a court permits a party to put evidence before it, the court is said to
“admit” or “receive” the evidence. From this we have the terms admissible
or inadmissible, admitted, not admitted
FACT: S. 3 of the TEA defines a fact to include: (a) any thing, state of
things, or relation of thins, capable of being perceived by the senses and
(b) any mental condition of which any person is conscious.
Black’s law dictionary defines a fact as follows “(a) something that
actually exists: an aspect of reality. Facts include not just tangible things,
actual occurrences and relationships, but also states of mind such as
intentions and opinions; (b) an actual or alleged event or circumstance as
opposed to its legal effect, consequence, or interpretation.
Facts which a party in a case is permitted to prove are (a) facts in issue (b)
relevant facts and (c) facts forming part of the res gestae [rays jestee/
jesti]
Fact in Issue
Also refereed to as material fact S. 3 of the TEA defines this as “any fact
from which, either by itself, or in connection with other facts, the
existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right, liability of
disability, asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding, necessarily
follows” . In simple words, it is the fact that one party alleges and the
other party controverts. It is a fact that is significant or essential to the
issue at hand. A fact in issue is determined by:
(a) Pleadings: a party must plead a fact in issue and ask for relief.
(b) Substantive law: this is the law that determines rights and obligations
Relevant facts
This is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence. These facts may also
be described as facts from the existence or non existence of which a fact in
issue may be inferred. This is also known as circumstantial evidence. In
Woolf vs. Woolf, (CA) [1931] 134, it was held that proof of the fact that a
couple, who were not married to each other, occupied the same bedroom
was clearly probative (relating to proof) of an allegation that they had
S.3 of TEA defines this as all documents produced as evidence before the
court. It may also be referred to as evidence afforded by any document
produced for the inspection of the court.
c. Real Evidence
Physical evidence. Denotes any material from which the court may draw
its own conclusions or inferences using its own senses. Includes material
objects, animate or inanimate, produced in a court of law as evidence.
Admissible evidence is evidence which a court of law will receive for purposes of
determining the existence or non existence of a fact in issue. Black’s Law dictionary
defines admissible as “capable of being legally admitted; allowable, permissible”
Key points:
Admissible evidence must be
Relevant
Must NOT be excluded by any of the rules of evidence
It therefore follows that certain evidence may be logically relevant, but may be
excluded from admissibility by a certain provision of the Act. For instance,
hearsay
Relevancy is defined in S.3 of the Act in the following manner: “One fact is said to be
relevant to another when the one is connected with the other in any of the ways referred
to in the provisions of this Act relating to the relevancy of facts”. S. 7 of the Act further
provides that “subject to the provisions of any other law, evidence may be given in any
suit or proceeding of the existence or non- existence of every fact in issue, and of such
other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant and of no others.
Key points:
Evidence of facts in issue: so long as the fact in issue is clearly laid out in the
pleadings, any evidence on the existence of the same is admissible. This is the
kind of evidence known as direct evidence
Evidence of relevant facts, also known as circumstantial evidence, can only be
admitted if falls under one or more of the categories specified by the TEA. These
categories are covered by ss. 8-18
However as we shall see later on, relevancy is determined by human
logic/common sense and experience. The Act provides broad categories, the
specifics of which have to be determined on a case to case basis.
These are facts forming part of the same transaction/facts surrounding an event.
Sometimes, facts are so connected to the fact in issue that they form part and
parcel of the same transaction. E.g. A beats his son B over a period of 2 years.
After the last beating, B dies, not just because of the last beating, but because of
the problems caused by the accumulative beatings. Fact in issue: Did A’s beating
of B cause B’s death? The fact that A had beaten B over a period of time is so
connected to the fact in issue; it forms part of the same transaction.
S.8 provides that facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in
issue as to form part of the same transaction are relevant, whether they occurred at
the same time and place or at different times and place.
Ss. 9 – 11, further specify facts that form part of the same transactions as
hereunder:
o S.9 Facts which are the occasion (reason of), cause or effect of facts in
issue
o S.10 Facts relating to motive, preparation, and previous or subsequent
conduct
o S. 11 Facts necessary to explain or introduce facts in issue or relevant facts
See the need for Logic/common sense and experience?
See how the above sections relate to the same transaction?
Under the English common law, any act, declaration or circumstance which constitute,
accompany or explain a fact or transaction in issue are said to be admissible in evidence.
Gilmer’s law dictionary defines res gestae as “all of things done including words spoken
in the course of a transaction or event”. Osborne’s dictionary defines the same as “the
facts surrounding or accompanying a transaction which is the subject of legal proceedings
or all the facts so connected with the fact in issue as to introduce it, explain its nature or
form in connection with it one continuous transaction.
Although the phrase res gestae is not found in the TEA, the principle underlying the
English law relating to the phrase is incorporated in sections 8 – 11 of the Act.
Analysis of ss. 8 – 11
S. 8: Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form
part of the same transaction are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and
place or at different times and place.
S.8 lays down the general principle of res gestae, and sections 9 – 11 expound and
illustrate this principle.
Facts which may be proved as part of res gestae must be facts other than those in
issue.
Illustration:
(a) The question is whether certain goods ordered from Ben were delivered to Benjamin.
The fact that the goods were delivered to several middle persons successively are relevant
facts. Each delivery to a middle person is a relevant fact, which may be proved through
evidence, although the fact in issue is whether the goods were delivered from Ben to
Benji.
(b) The fact in issue is whether Patience murdered her boss Priscilla. The fact that shortly
before the murder Patience was seen by the neighbour running after Priscilla with a knife
in hand is a relevant fact which may be proved in evidence (e.g. foot prints). The fact in
issue is not whether Patience ran after Priscilla with a knife, but whether she killed
Priscilla. The chase is only a relevant fact.
In R vs. Premji Kurji (1940) 7 EACA 58, the deceased had been killed with a sword.
Evidence at the trial was that immediately prior to his death, the accused had assaulted
the deceased’s brother with the sword and said threatening things to the deceased. The
accused was convicted and he appealed, one of the grounds of appeal being that the
evidence of the assault on the deceased’s brother should not have been admitted under the
principle of res gestae.
It was held that the evidence was properly admitted because: -
1. The two occurrences were so closely interconnected that the wounding of
deceased’s brother must be regarded as part of res gestae on the trial of the
accused on the murder of the deceased.
2. The fact that the accused had a sword and had used it immediately before the
killing must be admissible as strong evidence of the opportunity to commit
offence charged.
Although the facts which constitute the transaction may occur at different times, time is a
crucial factor. The incident claimed to be part of the res gestae must have occurred when
the transaction is ongoing, and not when it is complete.
In Ramadhan Ismail v. The Crown (1950) 7 ZLR Page 36, the accused was charged with
rape. The victim was a young girl, who rushed home in tears and informed her parents.
She took her father to the house, found R and pointed out and said that the man was the
one that had raped her. It was held that these utterances could not be considered as
forming part of the res gestae because “when it comes to a matter concerning res gestae,
minutes are of the utmost importance.” This decision followed the decision in the case of
R vs. Bedingfield.
In R vs Bedingfield (1879) 14 COX C.C Page 341, Bedingfield was charged with the
murder of a woman. The lady, who had been inside with Bedingfield, rushed out of the
house, with her throat was slit open, and bleeding, and exclaimed, “Oh dear Auntie, see
what Bedingfield has done to me.” In the trial of Bedingfield for the murder of the
woman, it was held that although statements made while the act is being done are
admissible, the victim’s statement could not be received as evidence because “it was
something stated by her after it was all over and after the act was completed.”
In Ratten v. R, (1972) AC 378, Ratten was charged and convicted of murder of his wife
by shooting her. His defence was that his gun had accidentally gone off while cleaning it,
and that she died because she was in the bullet’s path. During the hearing, evidence was
given that the shooting took place between 1.12 pm and 1.20 pm. Further evidence was
given by a telephone operator to the effect that at about 1.15 pm, she received a telephone
call from Ratten’s house which was being made by a hysterical woman in fear saying
“Get me the police”. One issue at the trial was whether this evidence was admissible
under the doctrine of res gestae.
It was held that the evidence was admissible as part of res gestae because not only was
there a close association in place and time between the statement and the shooting, but
also the way in which the statement was made (hysterically) and the tone of voice used
showed that the statement was being forced from the wife by an overwhelming pressure
of contemporary (current) events.
In R vs. Andrews 1987 IAE Page 113, the accused was convicted of manslaughter in a
burglary and he appealed. The allegation was that the accused and another man with
blankets covering his head knocked on the victim’s door. When the victim opened, the
accused stabbed him and assuming death removed the blanket and proceeded to steal.
The victim however got up, went to the flat below for help. The police were called and
arrived momentarily. When asked by police who the wound inflictor was, he said it was
“Donald”. Another police constable said he heard the man say “Donaldson”
The House of Lords held that the victim’s statement had been properly admitted under
res gestae because:
the primary question which the court must ask is, can the possibility of distortion
be disregarded?
In order to answer the question, the court must consider the circumstances in
which the particular statement was made to ensure that the utterance was made
purely in reaction to the event thereby giving no opportunity for a reflectional
answer.
In order for the statement to be sufficiently spontaneous, it must be so closely
associated with the events exciting it that it can be fairly be stated that the mind of
the statement maker was still dominated by the event.
The court must be satisfied that all the circumstances of the case are such that
there was no possibility of any distortion to the advantage of the maker or to the
disadvantage of the accused.
S. 9 Facts which are the occasion, cause or effect, immediate or otherwise, of relevant
facts, or facts in issue, or which constitute the state of things under which they
happened, or which afforded an opportunity for their occurrence or transactions, are
relevant.
No case law on the subject.
The section may be summarized as follows: All facts and events leading up to (before),
accompanying (during), and following (after) the transaction in issue, which are so
inseparably connected with each other as to throw light to the matter in issue and help its
proper understanding, are relevant.
Illustrations:
(a) The fact in issue is whether Jack robbed Jill.
The fact that shortly before the robbery, Jill went to a pub with money in his possession
and showed other people the Tshs. I million in cash, which he had won in a lottery is a
relevant fact. It does not matter whether Jack was among the people being shown the
money. This fulfills the “occasion” (chance, opportunity, opening,) part of s. 9.
While opportunity is always relevant, the Court must guard against jumping to the
conclusion that a person committed a crime just because he/she had the opportunity to.
E.g. A female servant was charged the murder of her employer. No person was in the
house during the commission of the offence, and doors and windows were locked and
secured. The accused was convicted and executed on the assumption that no one else had
access to the house. Afterwards, the real murderers confessed that they had gained
entrance into the house, by means of a board thrust across the street from the upper
window of the neighbouring house to the upper window of the house in which the
deceased lived, murder the woman and retreated the same way, leaving no traces behind
them.
NOTE: in all situations, this evidence must be supported by other evidence and an
accused cannot be convicted from this type of evidence alone.
S. 10
(i) Any fact which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue
or relevant fact is relevant
Motive:
In R vs. Makindi 1961 E.A 32, the accused threatened to beat a young boy in
revenge, as the boy had previously caused him to be imprisoned. “As you have
made me imprisoned, I will beat you till you die.” It was held that the evidence
was admissible to explain and substantiate the cause of death of the boy.
(iv) When the conduct of a person is relevant, any statements made by him or in his
presence and hearing, which affects such conduct, is relevant
Illustration (d): the fact in issue is whether Anthony robbed Andy
The fact that after Andy was robbed, Angela said in Anthony’s presence that “the
police are coming to look for the person who robbed Andy”, and immediately
afterwards Anthony ran away, are relevant. (This does not necessarily mean that
Anthony committed the crime. He could be one of those people that the police
always suspect of crimes
(v) The word conduct does not include statements, unless those statements
accompany and explain acts other than statements.
E.g. illustration (c), if all that Ben did was say that he had been assaulted, without
making a complaint, such a statement would not be relevant as “conduct” under
this section.
(vi) The above exception does not affect relevancy of statements under any other
sections of the Act.
S. 11
(i) Facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or a relevant fact
are relevant
Introductory:
Illus (a) : The question is whether a document is Peter’s will. The state of Peter’s
property at the date of the alleged will are relevant facts.
Explanatory:
Illus (b): Paul is accused of a crime. The fact that immediately after the
commission of a crime, Paul left his house in Mwanza, is relevant under S. 10, as
conduct subsequent to a fact in issue. The fact that at the time he left home, he
had been informed that his father had passed away in Mbeya and was to be buried
the next day is relevant to explain the reason why he left home suddenly.
(iii) Facts which establish the identity of any thing or person whose identity is
relevant are relevant. See Stanislasi alias Kanyambo s/o Kitambo, (1942) I TLR
258
The Court of Appeal held that:
The test when a question of identity is involved should not only be the
similarity of the collateral facts to the facts in issue but also their
proximity in point of time; and we hold that evidence should not be
admitted except where the similarity and the proximity of the two … acts
is such that it is unreasonable to draw any other conclusion than that the
accused was the person who was concerned in each…
(iv) Facts which fix the time or place at which any fact in issue or relevant
fact happened are relevant
(v) Facts which show the relation of parties by whom any such fact
transacted are relevant
S: 16: Facts showing the existence of state of mind, or of body or of bodily feeling
S. 17: Facts bearing on the question whether an act was accidental or intentional
This refers to evidence of either previous or subsequent acts similar to fact in issue or a
relevant fact.
Similar fact evidence is only admissible where it is sought to prove that an act forms part
of a series of similar occurrences. A question must be raised whether an act by the
accused person was intentional or accidental or was done on particular knowledge or
intention. Similar fact evidence is admissible to rebut the defence of an accident, mistake
or another innocent state of mind
Such evidence may be used to prove an offence where it can be shown to form part of a
series of occurrences where the accused was concerned. The accused is however
protected by law from being victimized being known to commit similar offences.
Evidence of previous similar facts has high degree of being prejudiced. In certain
circumstances, it is fair for such evidence to be inadmissible
Makin and Makin vs. The Attorney General of South Wales 1894 AC 57
The body of a baby was discovered in the backyard of the house of the accused persons,
who were a married couple. Evidence showed that they had adopted a baby. Evidence
showed that the bodies of other babies, similarly adopted by the defendants were found
buried in other locations where they had lived.
The evidence of the previously buried babies was found to be admissible and they were
convicted
On appeal, it was held that the evidence of the similar previous occurrences was properly
admitted as evidence relevant to the fact in issue
Summary
(i) As a general rule, you do not convict a person simply on the basis that he would
likely have committed an offence because of his previous character.
(ii) Evidence of previous character may be relevant if the accused raises defence that the
fact in issue was an accident, or any other defence open to the accused.
It was held that the prosecution may adduce all proper evidence which tends to prove the
charge without withholding any evidence until the accused person has set out specific
defence which calls for rebuttal. In other words, the prosecution in a given case need not
await to know the direction the case will take in order to adduce similar facts evidence.
A court of aw should look for that striking similarity between fact in issue and the
previous criminal records alleged against the accused before deciding whether or not
to admit the evidence.
Striking Similarity
DEFENCES
(i) Absence of connection between the accused and the offence
R vs. Smith (1914 –
1915) ALL ER 262
Mrs. Smith was found drowned in the bathtub. There was no evidence to tell of how she
found her way into it and drowned. Evidence available was that a few months prior to her
death, Mr. Smith had taken out life insurance for her and named himself beneficiary. Mr.
Smith has also informed a medical practitioner that Mrs. Smith suffered from epileptic
fits. Prior evidence showed that Mr. Smith had married twice, taken out insurance in
favour of the wives and named himself the beneficiary, informed a medical practitioner
that the wife suffered from epileptic fits, after which the wives were found dead in the
bathtub. He was convicted and he appealed, arguing that there was nothing to connect
him to the murder of Mrs. Smith apart from previous acts which were similar.
The court of appeal held that the test of the relevance of similar facts evidence in cases
like this, is whether or not the extraneous (unrelated) acts are so strikingly similar to the
offence charged in terms of method of commission or surrounding circumstances, that
they identify the instant offence (one in question) as the hallmark of the particular
accused, or undermine a defence such as accident or innocent association. The court was
therefore of the opinion that the devastating degree of similarity in this case was relevant
to the circumstances of the offence charged.
The evidence of the previous similar acts was held to be admissible show that he had
used the instruments with intent to procure an abortion.
R Vs. Straffen
The accused was charged with the murder of a young woman. The victim was found
strangled and naked by the roadside, with no evidence of sexual molestation.
Furthermore, the accused had been seen in the vicinity of the locus of the offence/crime.
Evidence showed that the accused had previously caused the death of 3 other girls by
strangulation and dumped their naked bodies by the roadside without having sexually
molesting them.
It was held that evidence of previous similar offences by the accused was admissible to
prove that the accused had committed the offence charged because he was shown to be a
person with a certain distinct propensity towards the commission of the offence. The
court was further of the opinion that one cannot distinguish abnormal propensity from
identification, and that abnormal propensity is a means of identification.
When two or more people are suspected of conspiracy, anything said, done or written by
one of the conspirators, in reference to the common intention, are admissible against the
co-conspirator himself and the other conspirators. This means that each conspirator is
regarded as an agent of the other.
The section strictly requires the presence of a reasonable ground to believe that the two or
more people have conspired to commit an offence. This means that there should exist
prima facie evidence to support the existence of the conspiracy. E.g. Where an accused
person, and the person who shot dead the deceased were seen talking in isolation before
the shooting and avoided questions as to what they were talking about was held to be
sufficient to create a reason to believe that they might have been conspiring about
something. Only a reasonable ground of suspicion is requires because as stated in R vs.
Golkadas Kanji Karia16 EACA 116, “it is rare for the conspirators to meet together and
execute a deed setting out the details of their unlawful purpose. It is common place to say
that an agreement to conspire may be deduced from any acts which raise the presumption
of common plan.”
Even after the termination of the conspiracy, anything written, said or done will still be
relevant to prove the conspiracy. Furthermore, a person who joins a conspiracy will be
responsible for all acts, whether done before or after his participation. See Stanley
Msinga & another v. R (1951) 8 EACA 211
Under S. 13, any fact which either disproves of or contradicts a fact in issue or a relevant
fact is relevant. Similarly, any fact which renders the existence of a fact in issue or a
relevant fact highly probable or improbable is relevant.
Illustration:
The question is whether Jacob assaulted Janet in Iringa on the 28 th of July. The fact that
on that date Jacob was admitted in hospital in Dar is relevant to show that it is highly
improbable that he committed the offence.
Where the existence of any right or custom is in question, the following facts are
relevant:
(a) any transaction by which the right or custom was created, claimed, modified,
recognized, asserted or denied
(b) any fact inconsistent with the existence of the right or custom
(c) particular instances in which the right or custom was claimed, recognized or
exercised, or in which its exercise was disputed, asserted or departed from
A custom may be defined as a practice that by its common adoption and long
unvarying usage has come to have the force of law. In order for a custom to be
recognized under this section, it must be ancient, continuous and uniform, reasonable,
certain, peaceable, and not immoral. This may be proved by oral evidence of a person
likely to know of its existence or having special knowledge (see S. 50 of the TEA)
A right may be defined as a power, privilege or immunity secured to a person by law.
(ii) the second part deals with instances (case in point, particular occasion)
For instance, a judgment of the court in which a certain custom was held to be invalid.
HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Hearsay evidence falls under the category or oral/parole evidence. This is defined under
the American federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) as a statement, other than one made by the
declarant, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Murphy does not directly define hearsay, but he describes the same as follows “Evidence
from any witness which consists of what another person stated (whether verbally, in
writing, or by any other method of assertion such as gesture) on any prior occasion, is
inadmissible, if its only relevant purpose is to prove that any fact so stated by that person
on that prior occasion is true. Such a statement may, however be admitted for any
relevant purpose other than proving the truth of the facts stated in it.
The general rule against hearsay is that a statement made by a person, not called as a
witness, which is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the facts contained in the
statement is hearsay and is not admissible. If the statement is however offered in
evidence to prove that it was in fact made, and not to prove the facts contained therein, it
is admissible.
In the case of Subramaniam v The DPP (1956) WLR 965
The appellant was charged and convicted of being in possession of fire arms without a
lawful excuse. In his defence, he maintained that he was acting under duress occasioned
by threats uttered to him by some terrorist. The trial judge overruled him when he
attempted to state what the terrorists had told him. He was convicted and he appealed.
The appeal court held that: “evidence made of a statement to a witness by a person who is
not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible
when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the
statement. It not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the
evidence, not the truth of the statement.
If X says that he saw Y beat up Z with a stick on his head, that is direct evidence: - X
perceived it. If however, X says that he was told by Z that Y beat him on the head with a
stick, that could be hearsay, if tendered to the court to prove that Y did beat up Z. If
however offered merely to prove that the statement was made, that is not hearsay.
Note that these illustrations relate to the general rule, and there are exceptions to the same
S. 61 and 62 of the TEA contain provisions on oral evidence. S.62 specifically states that
oral evidence must in all cases be direct, that is to say:
(a) if it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says
he saw it
(b) if it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who
says he heard it
(c) if it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense, or in any other
manner, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he so perceived it
(d) if it refers to an opinion, or to the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the
evidence of the person who holds that opinion or as the case may be, who holds it on
those grounds
threatening to burn her house because, as he alleged, she had cause the death of his father
by witchcraft. The Court of Appeal held that this was not a general expression indicating
fear or suspicion, but one directly related to the occasion of death and was therefore
admissible.
(d) The statement must be complete
In Waugh v. r (1950) AC 263, The deceased fell into a terminal coma while making a
dying declaration. The incomplete statement was held to be inadmissible.
In R v. Charles Daki s/o Daki (1960) EA 34, the deceased was admitted into the hospital
suffering from gunshot wounds. When asked who shot him, he said “Charles Daki has
killed me. He shot me with a gun. I saw him with a gun. He was on a motorcycle. A
friend of mine had visited me and I had gone to the garage with him…” At this point, the
doctor interrupted on the ground that the patient was unfit to continue to talking. The
deceased subsequently died. The incomplete statement was held to be inadmissible.
Relying on the decision in the Waugh case, the Court stated that “it is true that [in
Waugh’s Case] the deceased fell unconscious having begun but not completed a
sentence. But I think the principle applies equally well where, although there was
apparently no unfinished sentence, it is not established that the declarant said all he
wished or intended to say before the doctor intervened, telling the police to ‘leave him
alone.’”
(e) While as a matter or law corroboration (confirmation or support by additional
evidence) is not required, it is as a matter of practice required.
If there are circumstances which show that the deceased could not have been mistaken in
her identification, then a conviction arising from an uncorroborated dying declaration
may stand.
In R v Eligu s/o Odel and Epongu s/o Ewunyu (1943) 10 EACA 90, The deceased had
stated in a dying declaration that the two accused had attached him. In the case of Eligu
there was corroboration. In the case of Epongu, the position was as follows: he had
earlier in the day, together with Eligu, arrested the deceased, bound him, taken him some
distance, then unbound him. The court of appeal held that:
it would not be reasonable to assume that a stranger to the earlier events had
identified himself with a later attack on the deceased. Besides, there is the point
that the deceased in his identification of his assailant would be less likely to be
mistaken than if he has been suddenly set upon by persons with whom he was
unacquainted. Here, not only were the accused known to the deceased, but he had
been in their company … earlier in the same evening, this fact making the
deceased’s statement more credible...it may be said that the other evidence
pointed in the same direction as the deceased’s statement.”
Do you agree with the court
Do you think there was corroboration by circumstantial evidence?
The above position however seems to be the exception rather than the rule when it comes
to corroboration of dying declarations. In Pius Jasunga s/o akumu v R, (1954) 21 EACA
331, the EACA stated that:
We have examined the decisions of this court on the subject of dying declarations
since 1935 and we have unable to find a single case where a conviction has been
upheld which was based upon a dying declaration without satisfactory
corroboration, unless as in Epongu’s case where there was evidence of
circumstances going to show that the deceased could not have been mistaken in
his identification of the accused… Although it is not a rule of law that in order to
support a conviction a dying declaration must be corroborated, generally
speaking, it is very unsafe to base a conviction solely on the dying declaration of
the accused.
(b) Statements made in the ordinary course of business(S. 34b)
Remember that the general rule in these situations is that the statements we are talking
about must have been made by a person who is dead, unknown, cannot be found, cannot
be summoned to the court due to diplomatic immunity or other privilege, can be
summoned but refuses to voluntarily appear in court as a witness, has become incapable
of giving evidence, cannot appear in court without unreasonable delay or expense
S. 34(b) requires the following:
That the statement sought to be admitted must relate to a business or profession
The person who made the statement must have had a duty to do so
The statement must have been made during the ordinary course of business.
The statement should not have been made with a view to instituting the case in question.
Thus, where the accused was charged with having stolen certain goods which he should
have delivered to a certain firm, a statement by the firm showing a shortage in the goods
received was held to be inadmissible since it appeared that the special report was written
with a view to present prosecution (See R. v Magandazi and 4 others (1914) 2 ULR 108)
the accused was charged with making false entries during employment. The prosecution
intended to adduce this statement to prove the guilt of the accused.
(d) Statements giving opinion as to public right or custom or a matter of public or general
interest
In order for statements to be admissible under this section, certain criteria must be met:
The statement must be an opinion of a person who cannot be called as a witness
because of any of the reasons stated in S. 34
The statement must have been made before the subject matter of the controversy was
contemplated
The maker of the statement should have had the means of the knowledge of the
existence of the custom or right in question
Where the statement relates to a right, it must be a public as opposed to a private right.
E.g. the statement by a deceased headman to the effect that a certain road is a public road
would be admissible under this section.
(e) Statements relating to the existence of a relationship
Pre conditions:
The statement must be made by a person who cannot be called as a witness
The statement must relate to the existence of a relationship by blood, marriage or
adoption between certain persons
The person making the statement must have had special means of knowledge as to the
existence of the relationship.
The statement should have been made before the controversy arose
Clause (e) relates to declarations by the person who cannot be found while clause (f)
relates to evidence of things such as wills, tombstones, etc.
(g) Statements in documents relating to certain specific transactions
Statements by persons who cannot be called as witnesses, which are contained in any
deed, will or other document, which relate to any transaction by which a right or custom
in question was created, claimed, modified, recognized, asserted or denied are admissible.
This section applies only to written statements.
E.g. Where the question is whether the deceased gave A a certain gift, a statement in the
will of the deceased to the effect that he did so is admissible.
(h) Statements made by several persons and expressing feelings
Statements by persons who cannot be called as witnesses, which were made by a number
of persons, expressing feelings or impressions on their part relevant to the matter in
question are admissible. Such statements are proved by evidence of witnesses to the
expression of feelings by the several persons.
The statement contains a declaration to the effect that it is true to the best of the
maker’s knowledge and belief, and that the statement was made knowing that if it
were tendered in evidence, the maker would be liable to prosecution for perjury if he
willfully lied.
Copies of the statement are served by the party tendering it to all the other parties
before the proceedings
No party objects to its being tendered in evidence within 10 days
If the statement is made by a person who cannot read it, it is read to him before he
signs it and the person who read it so declares.
Notwithstanding the above provisions, the party tendering the statements may call the
person to give evidence, and the court may also do so on its own motion, if the person
can be found.
Before the statement is admitted as evidence, it must be read aloud in court unless the
court otherwise directs, and the court may also direct that an account be given of portions
not read aloud.
Any documents or objects referred to in the statement as exhibits and identifies shall be
treated as an exhibit and identified in court.
There is however a proviso that such a statement cannot corroborate evidence given by
the maker of the statement.
4. Proof of written statements in civil proceedings
S. 34 C admits written evidence instead of the attendance of the maker of the statement,
especially where the maker is dead, cannot be found, is unfit to attend court by reason of
mental or physical condition, is overseas, it is not reasonably practicable to secure his
attendance, or all efforts to find him have failed. It must be proved that such a statement
would be admissible had the maker been available to give evidence in court.
Essentials
1. The maker must have had personal knowledge of the matter dealt with by the
statement
2. if the document forms part of a continuous record, and the subject matter in the
document was not within the maker’s knowledge, it must be shown that the male had
a duty to make such a record and that he was supplied with information by a person
who had/or is reasonably believed to have had personal knowledge of the matter
3. Statement must have been made before the subject matter in dispute arose
4. The original document need not be tendered; a certified copy would suffice
5. A statement in a document shall be regarded as having been made by a certain
person if:
i. She made/prepared the whole document
ii. She wrote, made or reproduced by her own hand some material part of the
document
iii. She initiated some material part of the document, or otherwise made a recognition in
writing that she was responsible for the document/part of it
6. The court reserves the right to determine the admissibility of any document under
this section (considers accuracy, authenticity). The adverse party has the duty of
raising doubts as to the authenticity of the document
7. The court has the discretion to determine whether or not a person if fit to attend trial
What is a public record? Manji Suleimani Ladha v. R.G. Patel (1960) EA 38: The
court laid down the following criteria, that a public record must be intended for the
use of the public or be available for public inspection; and must be intended to be a
permanent record; must be a record of fact not opinion.
The phrase “any other person in performance of a duty especially enjoined by the law
of the country” was interpreted in the case of Dhanji Hirji v. R (1966) EA 246,
whereby the court observed that “any other person means any person, not a public
servant, who finds himself under a specific duty to maintain or make entries in any
record of a public or official nature…we do not think that it includes members of the
general public completing forms necessary for their individual purposes, whether or
not those forms will eventually form part of the archives of any government
department”
Statements in maps, charts and plans
Read Act
Statements of facts contained in laws, gazettes, etc
Read Act
Statements as to law contained in books
Read Act
Such statements on foreign law must be contained in books printed or published
under the authority of the government concerned
This provides the means by which foreign law can be proved. The Court in Hakam v.
Mohamed, (1955) 28 KLR 91, made the decision that bodies of law such as Islamic and
Hindu law are not foreign law.
Admissions are statements of fact, which waive or dispense with the production of
evidence by conceding that the fact asserted by the opponent is true. S. 19 of the TEA
defines an admission as “a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference
as to a fact in issue or a relevant fact. Admissions are therefore against the interest of the
maker. They may be formal or informal.
Formal: made in the pleading, e.g. in a breach of contracts, a party may admit having
breached the contract, but maybe say it was due to fraud.
Informal: made during the proceedings, e.g. a plea of guilty.
A confession on the other hand is an admission made at any time by a person charged
with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime/a statement
made by an accused admitting his guilt. In Swami v. King emperor (1939)ALL ER 396,
the court defined a confessions as “a statement, which admits substantially all the facts
constituting the offence.
The difference between a confession and an admission therefore is that admissions cover
all statements, whether in civil or criminal cases, but confessions only relate to criminal
cases.
ADMISSIONS GENERALLY
S. 23 provides that admissions are relevant and may be proved against the person who
makes them or his representative in interest, but cannot be proved on behalf of the person
who makes them or his representative in interest.
E.g. A is accused of receiving goods knowing them to be stolen. A cannot prove a
statement made by himself to the fact that he did not know that the goods were stolen, but
B can prove a statement made by A to the effect that he suspected that the good were
stolen.
Exceptions to the general rule in S. 23:
Admissions can be proved on behalf of the maker of or his representative in interest if:
The statement is of such a nature that it could be admissible under S. 34 if the person
making it was dead. In other words, if the statements that would be admissible under
S. 34 if the person was dead, then it will be admissible on behalf of the maker. E.g. A
is accused of casting away a ship by taking it off course. A may produce a
memorandum kept by him in the ordinary course of business, indicating that at the
material time, the ship was on course.
Admissions may also be proved on behalf of the maker if they reflected the state of
mind. E.g. A is accused of having counterfeit money. He may proof that he asked a
skilled person to examine the money, and that the person told him that it was genuine.
This would show that his mind was innocent.
rank of the police officer is a ready measure of intelligence, and thus it was relevant
where confessions are concerned.
A confession of an offence other than the one with which the accused is charged is
deemed to be a confession for the purpose of that offence. E.g. A is accused of murder
but he admits to manslaughter. The confession to manslaughter will be admissible to
prove manslaughter. It will however not be admissible to prove murder. In
Bampamiyki s/o Buhile v. R (1957) EA 473, the accused had been charged with
murder, whereby a house had been burnt down and two people died in the fire. The
accused made a confession to a police officer that he had burnt the house. The Court
of Appeal held that the confession was inadmissible in the murder charge.
Statements caused by inducement.
S.29 A confession shall be held to have been made involuntarily if the court believes that
it was induced by threat, promise or other prejudice held out by the police officer to
whom it was made, or any member of the police force, or any other person in authority.
The inducement must however have been of such a nature as likely to cause an untrue
admission of guilt, otherwise the confession will be admissible.
The test here as to whether the statement was voluntary is whether the accused is placed
in such a situation or position that he would rather give an untrue rather than a true
statement.
In the Case of Njuguna S/o Kimani v. R (1954) 21 EACA 3111, the EACA stated that
where an accused is promised pardon as an inducement for a confession of guilt, the
effect of the inducement is to make the freedom which will accompany the false
confession more attractive at the moment than to remain restrained if he were to speak
the truth.” The Court also emphasized that the onus is upon the prosecution to prove that
a confession had been voluntarily made and not obtained by improper questioning.
Threat, Promise or prejudice: In the Case of Commissioner of Customs and Excise v.
Harz (1967) 1 ALL ER 177, In the course of investigating the failure by a company to
pay taxes, customs officers subjected the co. officials to interrogation lasting 3 hours. The
co. officials made incriminating statements during the interrogation. The statute
empowering the interrogation provided that failure to answer questions asked could lead
to prosecution. The co. officials maintained in court that they only answered the
questions because of this provision. Harz was subsequently charged with conspiracy to
cheat and defraud customs, and evidence of the admissions made at the interrogation was
tendered. It was held that the admission was inadmissible because it was made under the
threat of prosecution.
A moral or spiritual exhortation will not vitiate a confession. In the case of R v. Wilde
(1835) 1 Mead. Criminal Cases 45, the following statement was made to Wilde: “I hope
you tell me the truth in the presence of the almighty”, after which he made a confession.
The confession was held not to have been made under a threat. In R v Stantan, the
statement made to the accused was “be a good girl and tell me the truth”. It was held that
moral exaltation could not vitiate a confession.
Where an inducement has been made to an accused person, and a confession is made
after the impression caused by the inducement has in the opinion of the court been fully
removed, the confession will be accepted by the court. (S. 30) (Test: Reasonable person)
Confession made under a promise of secrecy etc
S.32 provides that a confession otherwise relevant does not become irrelevant merely
because it was made under a promise of secrecy or in consequence of a deception
practiced on the accused person for the purpose of obtaining it, or when he was drunk, or
because it was made in answer to questions he need not have answered, or because he
was not warned that he was not bound to make such a confession and that the evidence of
it might not be used against him.
In Deokinan v R (1969) 1 AC 20, The police planted a friend of the accused in the same
cell with the accused, to whom the accused confessed the crime. The friend then
conveyed this to the police. The court held that this confession was admissible as it was
not made after an inducement by a person in authority. In Naginda s/o Batungwa v R
(1959 EA, the Court however held that nothing in the section above negated thje
discretion of the judge to refuse to admit a statement when he thought that it was not
voluntary.
Confession made without a caution being administered
S.32 talks of a confession not becoming irrelevant merely because a caution was not
administered “because he was not warned that he was not bound to make such a
confession and that the evidence of it might not be used against him”. This section
provides an exception to the rule of practice that a caution has to be administered before a
police officer question the accused. A caution in effect informs the accused of the
consequences of his statement. The basis of this is the Judges Rules. These rules of
practice are addressed to police officers and are aimed at ensuring procedural fairness in
taking statements from accused persons. They however do not have the force of law but
have been declared to be a procedural requirement (See for instance, Balbi Sain Joshi v.
R (1951) 18 EACA 228), Anyangu and Others v R, (1968) EA 239, and Paul Ekai v. R.
The rules
1. when a police officer is trying to discover the author of a crime, there is no objection
to his putting questions in respect thereof to any person whether they are suspected of
having committed the crime or not, if he thinks useful information can be obtained
2. Whenever a police officer has made up his mind to charge a person with a crime, he
should first caution the person before asking any further questions
3. Persons in custody should not be questioned without the usual caution being
administered
4. If the prisoner wishes to volunteer any statement, the usual caution has to be
administered and it desirable that the last two words of the caution are omitted. The
caution should end with “be given in evidence”
5. the caution to be administered is as follows:
“do you wish to say anything in answer to the charge? You are not obliged to say
anything unless you wish to do so but whatever you say will be taken down and may
be given in evidence against you” (omit against you)
6. A statement made by a prisoner before there is time to caution him is not rendered
inadmissible in evidence merely because no caution has been given. But in such a
case, he should be cautioned as soon as possible.
7. A prisoner making a voluntary statement must not be cross examined. No question
should be put to such a person about the statement except for removing ambiguity in
what he has said.
8. When two or more persons are charged with the same offence, and their statements
are taken separately, the police should not read these statements to the other person
charged, but these people should be given a copy of the statements.