Topic

"How has nationalism shaped the sociopolitical landscape in Pakistan, with a

focus on its impact on minority communities, A historical and contemporary
analysis."
Overview:
Pakistan is an immensely plural country characterized by religious, sectarian and
ethno-linguistic diversities. It is an overwhelmingly Muslim community with more
than 90 per cent of its 142 million1 inhabitants adhering to Islam, yet they belong to
several doctrinal groups. Sunni Muslims are in the ascendant, with Shia Muslims and
Zikris facing discrimination. In 1974, the Pakistani National Assembly declared
Ahmadis – also called Qadianis – a non-Muslim minority. There are several Christian
denominations, Bahais, Buddhists, Hindus, Jains, Kalasha, Parsis and Sikhs who
identify themselves as as non-Muslim Pakistanis. While most Pakistanis converse in
or understand Urdu – the national language – it is the first language of only c. 10 per
cent of the population, while others speak regional languages such as Balochi,
Punjabi, Pushto and Sindhi, among others. The Urdu-speakers are mainly immigrants
from India or their descendants who, at the time of partition in 1947, opted for this
predominantly Muslim homeland and left the Hindu-majority India. Partition and
more recent migrations have greatly contributed to Pakistan’s socio-cultural and
ethnic plurality.

Nationalism in Pakistan Context

The ideology of nationalism has been defined as a feeling of belonging among the
individuals of a nation and it is based on the religion, language, and ethnic origins. In
Pakistan, the ideology of nationalism was first initiated with Islam as single religion.
The Muslims of India were unified on the basis of religion to create a single national
identity (Hussain, 2005). Nationalism in most general terms is all about identity,
culture, traditions, political powers, and the state possessing most powerful container
of politics. Alternatively, nationalism is the strong identification of individuals in a
group with a political entity defined in national terms, that is, a nation.
However, nationalism can also be defined as feeling among group that is reawakened
by modernity (Khan, 2005), thus nationalism in Pakistan is a result of struggle to have
separate identification from the Hindus in the region of sub-continent Asia. Since the
creation of Pakistan, nationalism is related to expression of historical, cultural,
religious, linguistic and political values which is further elaborated as showing pride
in the historical culture, heritage and identity of Pakistan that also helps to formulate
future vision of Pakistan. Pakistan was result of single ideology but its creation has
born new ideologies that flourished inside the country throughout the years. Regional
and religious ideologies are important part of Pakistani politics and influence the
authority by individual interest.
Therefore, nationalism of Pakistan basically refers to the expressions of political,
cultural, linguistic, historical and religious by the individuals of Pakistan. It also
illustrates various underlying forces which transformed the movement of Pakistan and
influence the politics of Pakistan very strongly. Pakistan came into existence as a
result of increasing democratization and Indianization of Indian government
specifically in terms of geographic distribution of the Muslim population, its cohesion
and fear of dominating Hindus. The three political significant aspects of geographical
distribution of Muslim population of India include, concentrated Muslim majority
population in two areas as a result of which partition was feasible, the two area were
about thousand miles of Indian territory which was supposed to make their union in a
single state almost impossible, and the both areas were least developed areas in India
(Binder, 1961). A strong desire and sense of Islamic nationalism came over the
ambitions and desires of Muslims of India.
 Definition of nationalism within the Pakistani context
Rourke and Boyer (2008) defined certain attributes of Nationalism, one of which is to
establish values that indicate the difference between good and bad. Therefore, in
terms of Pakistan, it meant to achieve accord and agreement on the role played by
Islam in national politics. In order to accommodate and reconcile the idea of modern
nation state in terms of religious state, Muslim League attempted to provoke the
support initially for sovereign state as conceived by Jinnah which was based on the
result of elections in India conducted by the British. For expanding the basis of
support, Jinnah appealed to orthodox religious leaders with assurances that laws of
Pakistan would be based on mandates of Islam. Such assurances sabotaged the efforts
to establish the sovereign state conceived by Jinnah because various Muslims realize
the sovereignty of Allah as supreme over the national sovereignty (Hamed, 2008).
Another attribute of nationalism defined by Rourke and Boyer (2008) was the
demonstration of patriotism by the citizens which they gained as nations. For
Pakistan, nationalism and the present sense of patriotism contains within a small
minority which sets out to enforce the concept of nation state on every individual. The
exclusive class of Punjabi and Mohajir minorities was initially called for an Islamic
state of Pakistan as they desired an Islamic nation as long as control of Pakistan was
not handed over to philosophers or scholars (Hamed, 2008).
The third attribute of nationalism by Rourke and Boyer (2008) was related to the
attempt for bringing the nation together under a single ideology. It is not easy and
convenient to bring all ethnic nationalities of Pakistan under one ideology. For
instance, it can be seen that Suuni and Shi’a possess different doctrinal beliefs. The
assembling and uniting cry of Islamic nation initially worked for the short time period
only. The core and origin of the nation was planted in the decades before 1947
followed by the attempts to create bonds between various religious and political
groups and it was fulfilled with very limited success along with the possibility of it
working against Pakistan. During 1990s, a great tension and collusions between Shi’a
and Sunni Muslims were evidenced which made Pakistan instable in terms of politics
for most of the period of 1990s (Sinkler, 2005).
The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, wished to construct a strong nation
completely based on the principle of one nation, one culture and one language. All
successors of Jinnah adopted the same inspiration as the heads of the state and in a
less formal manner from the Urdu culture. The prelude to the first Constitution of
1956 postulated that the citizens of Pakistan should organize their lives according to
the principles of Islam as depicted in Qur’an and Sunna (Jaffrelot, A History of
Pakistan and its origin, 2004). Since its establishment, Pakistan has faced different
difficulties and nationalism with concern to identity has been the most problematic
national issue for Pakistan. Pakistan, being born from the old division of Indian
civilization, has been struggling to construct its culture which gives it different
identity, not much different from Indian culture but at the same time must be
recognized as different by the world (Jaffrelot, Pakistan: nationalism without a
nation?, 2002).
After more than half century, nationalism in Pakistan has two faces or in other words
there are two levels of values of nationalism exist. At first, there is nationalism which
forms all Pakistani as one nation and according to that all Pakistanis possess one
nationality and are citizen of Pakistan; similarly it is observed that government and
media in Pakistan continuously attempts to prevail the value for nationalism among
the citizen by showing threaten from India (Jaffrelot, Pakistan: nationalism without a
nation?, 2002). Conversely, for more than five decades, it has been observed that
nationalism in Pakistan is disintegrated on the basis of linguistic, ethnicity and region.
To Jaffrelot (2002), nationalism is an ideology which combines the people into a
group and this formation occurs as a result of territorial, ethnic and social construction
rather than on the basis of religion or language. Thus this definition excludes the
linguistic group and religious communities. Pakistan, on the other hand, appears to be
an unachieved nation on account of ethnic identities they have. Pakistan with
disintegrated nation has been going through different problems. No matter what the
nature of the problems is, media has long been playing its role in the creation of
values of nationalism in Pakistan.
Basically, Pakistan is multi-ethnic state as each of its provinces is associated with
specific linguistic groups such as Punjab is associated with Punjabis, Sindh is
associated with Sindhis, Balochistan is associated with Balochs, and NWFP is
associated with Pashtuns. There are, however, various divisions of ethnic and
linguistic within every unit. Sindh is the most diverse province of Pakistan in terms of
enthnicity as Mohajirs form the majority in urban Sindh, and Sindhis dominate the
rural Sindh and moreover, Punjabis, Pashtuns and Balochs also resides in Sindh.
Siraikis and Sindhis are in a considerable amount residing in Balochistan as this
province is home based province for Balochs and Pashtuns. Moreover, Punjab and
NWFP are also not homogenous provinces any more (Mushtaq, 2009)
Partition and Impact on Minorities
In 1947, Pakistan’s independence led to c. 14 million people moving across the
borders, with Pakistan receiving more than 8 million Muslims from all over India.
Most came to West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan) with l.2 million moving into East
Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). Most of West Pakistan’s Hindus and Sikhs left for
India, while several Hindu communities in East Bengal stayed until subsequent events
forced their migration. Balochistan, East Bengal and Sindh were less affected by the
communal riots accompanying partition and therefore there were fewer incentives for
non-Muslim Pakistanis to migrate. The Indo-Pakistan discord over the former
princely state of Kashmir not only brought Kashmiri refugees into Pakistan but also
made it difficult for many non-Muslims to stay on in Pakistan. The emigrations of
individual Hindu families from East Pakistan to India continued into the 1950s. By
the late 1950s, some South Asians had begun to emigrate to the United Kingdom
(UK), but this did not lead to any major decrease in the population. Partition had left
Muslims divided between India, and East and West Pakistan – although Hindus and
Sikhs largely remained in India. Christians were also seriously affected. They were
mainly concentrated in Punjab, in northern India, which, religiously, was the most
plural of all the British provinces. Partition left Punjabis divided by the Indo-Pakistani
border. Muslims had generally fled east Punjab after killings and mass expulsions;
similarly Hindus and Sikhs fled killings in west Punjab. The migrations and the
concurrent communal killings involving mainly Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs –
especially in Punjab – have seriously impacted on the regional politics of Pakistan and
India. The smaller minority communities, such as Buddhists, Jains and Parsis –
accounting for a few hundred or thousand people in each case – were far less affected
by partition. Buddhists and Jains had traditionally been concentrated in the regions
that became part of India and Parsis, despite a small presence in Karachi and Lahore,
generally remained outside the main communal divide. As far as the 565 princely
states were concerned, their plural societies were initially protected, but with India
and Pakistan’s desire for their integration (they had had domestic autonomy under
British rule), an enormous amount of voluntary as well as forced population transfers
took place across the sub-continent. For example, many Muslims from the princely
states of Jammu and Kashmir, Junagardh and Hyderabad moved to Pakistan, whereas
Bahawalpur and other such predominantly Muslim states saw an outflow of Hindus to
India. Following the civil war between East and West Pakistan, and India’s
intervention in 1971, East Pakistan became the new state of Bangladesh, which led to
more trans-regional migration. While East Bengalis left West Pakistan for
Bangladesh, Pakistan accepted the repatriation of several thousand Urdu-speaking
East Pakistanis, also called Biharis. Most of these new immigrants settled in Karachi,
increasing the number of Urdu-speakers in urban Sindh. Following friction over the
language issue between Sindhis and Urdu-speakers in 1972 (both these communities
wanted their language to become the official state language), Pakistan became
reluctant to accept any more ‘stranded Pakistanis’ from Bangladesh. Informally,
however, many Biharis and Bangladeshis entered Pakistan throughout the 1980s and
mostly settled in Karachi adding to its plurality(Sen, 1999). Since the 1980s there has
been tension in Karachi with the MQM, led by Altaf Hussain (now settled in London),
demanding more jobs and urban amenities for Urdu-speakers. He also emerged as the
champion of Muhajir ethnicity, challenged by the Sindhi nationalists as well as by the
government in Islamabad. His intermittent calls for strikes led to clashes with the
security forces. The MQM generally receives most of the Muhajir vote, making it the
third largest party in Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)
and Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML) (Malik, 2002). In 1979,
following the Iranian Revolution led by Khomeini, and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, refugees from these two neighbouring countries added to Pakistan’s
population. While some Iranians moved to the West or elsewhere, more than 3 million
Afghans lived in Pakistan throughout the 1980s (and beyond). This concentration of
refugees has led to a variety of changes in Pakistan in addition to the country’s greater
involvement in Afghanistan, whether in the resistance movement, or as an ally of the
West in its attacks on Afghanistan. Many Afghan refugees have stayed on in Pakistan.
In the 1990s, richer Pakistani youths (particularly young men) sought better prospects
abroad.
Recent Trends of Rising Nationalism
The rising Pakistani nationalism among Pakistanis is very obvious. In the early
decades of Pakistan’s history, some separatist groups and parties focused their
attention on their ethnic identities. However, with the passage of time national interest
of the country came to fore, putting the regional propensities on the back burner. This
state of affairs is evident from the elaborations given in the following paragraphs:
Pukhtoons: There has been a consistent demand for a Pukhtoon homeland –
Pukhtoonkhwa by Awami National Party backed by a quasi-military organization
known as the Red Shirts.10 But in comparison to the nationalists’ struggles in Sindh
and Balochistan, the Pukhtoons’ campaign has been conciliatory and unspectacular.
The comparative quiescence of NWFP is partly a result of the Pukhtoon’s relatively
good representation in Pakistan’s central state institutions, especially the Army.
Whilst Baloch and Sindhis have very little representation in the army, the Pukhtoons
have consistently provided between 30 and 40 per cent of the senior officer corps.
Two of Pakistan’s military leaders, Ayub Khan and Yayha Khan, came from NWFP.
The Pukhtoons’ share of the top bureaucratic jobs – around 10 per cent – has been less
striking but it is more or less in line with NWFP’s share of the total Pakistani
population. In addition, the Pukhtoons have been particularly active migrants within
Pakistan. The large Pukhtoon community in Karachi, for example, means that many
Pukhtoon families receive remittances from Karachi and have a direct interest in the
stability and continued existence of the Pakistani state. Pukhtoon business interests
extend throughout the country and give their owners and employees a stake in the
success of Pakistan as a whole. In fact, for those at the centre of power in Pakistan,
N.W.F.P (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) has shown the way. Despite the fact that it had
the strongest national movement in 1947, the Pukhtoons have never presented a
significant challenge to Pakistan’s central institutions. The reasons are clear. The
Pukhtoons have been given a considerable share in the country (Aḥmad, 1967; Jones
Bennett Owen, 2002, pp.139-40) In the past, the National Awami Party (ANP) has
been raising slogans for the right of Pukhtoons only. But now it is observed that
Awami National Party has adopted a national posture and plays significant role in the
national politics, setting aside its tendency of provincialism. This trend gives an
inkling that emerging nationalism in Pakistan is more pro-Pakistani, shunning the
regional/separatist manifestos.
• Baloch: The Baloch tribes are settled on bleak lands that straddle Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Iran. One of their historic claims to fame is that their ancestors
decimated the army of Alexander the Great as he tried to make his way back to
Greece from India. Baloch separatism was the brainchild of a few tribal chiefs (the
sardars) and a student movement. The problem in Balochistan was potentially serious
in that it sought to generate separatist and nationalist sentiment within a culturally
distinct ethno linguistic group that had its own autonomous history and had not
changed much under British rule. Since partition, there have been four encounters
between the Baloch and Pakistani forces. The first two occurred in 1948 and 1958 and
lasted a few months each, ending in a Baloch surrender, the imprisonment of the then
Khan of Kalat for fifteen years, and the execution of other rebels. The third and fourth
encounters sparked by separatism took place in 1962 and 1973 which were suppressed
by the Pakistan paramilitary forces. No doubt, the Balochs have genuine grievances
concerning step mother treatment meted out to them by consecutive military and civil
regimes in the country’s history. No sincere efforts have been made by the successive
governments, at the central and provincial level, for ameliorating the deteriorating
condition of the poor masses of Balochistan. But despite these grievances in tact,
today the priorities and political philosophy of Baloch political mind has changed
rather tilted in favour of Pakistan. The people of Balochistan, like other Pakistanis, are
more devoted and faithful citizens of Pakistan and the strong sentiments of
provincialism are subsiding in favor of proPakistani nationalism. The Baloch political
leadership has merged in the main stream parties like PPP and PML-Q, and is playing
active role in resolving the national issues. Baloch youth are joining Pak Army and
other security forces to play a role in defense of Pakistan. Some disturbance being
carried out in Balochistan is due to foreign (India) hand and is failing to have any
meaningful effect.

• MQM: The Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) or Mohajir National Movement as it

is also known, has its roots in Karachi University. In 1978 Altaf Hussain and a group
of like-minded students founded the All Pakistan Mohajir Student Organization
(APMSO). It was, in large part, a reaction to the existence of other student groups
such as the Punjab Students Organisation, the Pukhtoon Students Federation, the
Baloch Students Organisation and the Sindhis’ hard line Jiye Sindh Students
Federation. MQM claimed to speak for and represent the “poor people” (gharib log),
the “common people” (aam log), or, simply, “the people” (awam), and to strive for
social justice and equality (musawat). Moreover, the party portrayed itself as a party
of the humble lower-middle class. Like the PPP had done earlier, the MQM
condemned “feudalism” and the vested interests of a small number of rich clans - “the
22 families who rule Pakistan as if it were their own landed property (jagir) (Malik,
2002). By the turn of the century, Altaf Hussain had no vision of the future
whatsoever; his speeches and media interviews simply contained a long series of
complaints about how partition had been a mistake. The scope of his ambition, it
seemed, had been reduced: he looked far less like an energetic campaigner for
Mohajir rights and far more like a would-be mafia boss determined to hang on to
control of Karachi. MQM never refuted the allegation of working for Jinnahpur few
years back, but now they refute very strongly and are extending themselves into other
provinces giving it a colour of Pakistani Nationalist Party.
• Seraikis: The Seraiki national movement is a relatively recent phenomenon with
demands first appearing in the 1960s. Like the Sindhis and the Baloch, the Seraikis
argue that their cultural rights are being suppressed and that they are being
economically exploited by Punjab. Zia ul Haq’s strong centralist regime forced the
fledgling Seraiki movement to hide into the background. But as soon as democracy
was restored in the country, it re-emerged. Their demands like, official documents to
be written in Seraiki, more Seraiki language programs on radio and television,
increased employment quotas for Seraikis, and the formation of a Seraiki regiment in
the army show no signs of separatism.
• Sindhi Separatists: Sindhi separatist Parties like Jeay Sinsh have almost disappeared
from the scene. Some politicians talking of Sindh card also seem to be misplaced.
Murders of Murtaza Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto, in which no Punjabi hand seems to
be involved has further strengthened the Pakistani nationalistic feelings among
Sindhis.

• Creation of Bangladesh: Creation of Bangladesh was the result of international

conspiracy and incompetence of those at the helm of affairs at that time. However it
has left positive effect on unity of rest of the Nation. Bangladesh is still among
world’s ten poorest nations. The propaganda that West Pakistanis are eating away the
wealth of East Pakistan has proved to be wrong, in fact it was West Pakistan
sustaining the economy of East Pakistan also. Same is the case with Balochistan. An
air of separatist notions has been created by enemies of Pakistan. But it is the thinking
of those who are living in Switzerland and are playing in hands of enemies of
Pakistan. The Baloch people understand that all Pakistanis are brothers and the
brothers share each others reliefs and grieves. The notion that Punjab is eating away
wealth of Balochistan has no appeal now. If Balochistan provides natural gas then
Punjab shares wheat it produces with Balochistan. All Pakistanis are like one body
and have to strengthen each other.

In 2007 and 2008, public opinion polls indicated that Pakistanis supported peace deals
with militants and believed they would help end the fighting. In addition, Pakistanis
were opposed to army combat operations against militants in Pakistan. Public opinion
began to change in the late spring 2009, when the Taliban broke “sharia for- peace”
deal in Swat and overran Buner. Polling results in May 2009 and July 2009 suggested
that the public was opposed to peace deals and was increasingly supportive of military
action (Malik, 2002). The nation stands united against US and Indian sponsored
Tehrik e Taliban. Tribals who are true Pakistanis more than anyone else, are now
standing up against misguided tribals involved in terrorist activities.
Religious Nationalism:
Pakistan’s population is generally estimated to be c. 142 million, although according
to the official census reports it is c. 137 million. According to the census of 1981, out
of a total of 84,253,644, Muslims accounted for 81,450,057; followed by 1,310,426
Christians; and 1,276,116 Hindus. Ahmadis accounted for 104,244; Parsis 7,007;
Buddhists 2,639; Sikhs 2,146; and ‘others’ 101,009. Because of a de-emphasis on
family planning, and the arrival of millions of Afghan and some Iranian refugees,
population growth within the country has been immense. In 1990, it was estimated
that the minorities were 3.1 per cent of the total population. According to these
estimates, there were 1,769,582 Christians in Pakistan; 1,723,251 Hindus; 9,462
Parsis; 3,564 Buddhists; and 2,898 Sikhs, while the ‘others’ collectively were
estimated to be 13,640. The total figure for the minority population was c. 3,663,167.
Two years later, the aggregate figure stood at 4,267,463; with Christians and Hindus
almost equal at 2,061,306 and 2,007,743, respectively. The Ahmadis, Parsis,
Buddhists, Sikhs and others were estimated to be 163,982; 11,021; 4,150; 3,374; and
15,888, respectively. It is interesting to note that even the Parsis, despite some
outward migration, had registered a slight increase (LaPorte,1997). The census of
1998 showed the minorities nearing 11–13 million. Ahmadis, Christians and Hindus
claim to have a population of 4 million each. It is crucial, however, to note that, given
the disadvantages and stigmatization, communities do not like to be identified as
minorities so the above-mentioned figures may be an under-estimate, as some people
may not have chosen to identify their ethnic or religious background. There are
generally no population figures available for Pakistan’s smaller minority
communities. Overall, minorities represent c. 8 per cent of the total population.
Pakistani minorities consist of Ahmadis, Bahais, Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jains,
Kalasha (of Chitral), Parsis and Sikhs. Except for the Ahmadis, they all agree on their
being non-Muslim. Within these communities there are caste-based, class-based and
denominationbased divisions; along with age, ethnic, gender, rural and urban
distinctions. Any superficial categorization open to dispute. For example, among the 4
per cent of the Pakistani population who are Christian, there is an almost 50-50 divide
between the Catholic and the Protestant denominations. Cities like Peshawar, and
areas of Bahawalpur, Hyderabad, Rawalpindi and Quetta, have always had a sizeable
number of Christians engaged in various professions in the service sector. The church
organization is very similar to other South Asian countries with a definite Pakistani
cultural and linguistic embodiment, and there are converts, descendants of converts,
Anglo-Indians/-Pakistanis, and Western missionaries. Hindus are equivalent in
number to the Christians, with almost 4 per cent of the population. There are several
castes among the Hindus, besides ethnic diversity. Over 65 per cent of the minority
population are young people, and the average literacy rate in a few cases is higher
than the national average; however, the other facts are not so pleasing.
Shia Muslims (most are called ‘Twelvers’; other Shia communities include Bohras,
Dawoodis, Ismailis and Khojas) are mostly settled in Punjab with a sizeable presence
in Hyderabad, Karachi and Peshawar. In addition, in the tribal areas, Shias are a
dominant majority among the Turis of the Kurram Agency region with a significant
number among the settled Bangash tribe. In Quetta there are Shias of Hazara (central
Afghanistan) and Iranian background.
The post-partition changes in the economy along with the positing of Pakistani
identity on Islamic uniformity have added to an anti-Christian sentiment. For
example, many Christians in Punjab were originally farming communities but after
independence a number of them became landless and had to work as sweepers which
further stigmatized them (Malik, 2002). Some hold the view that the Christians in
particular, and other non-Muslim communities in general, had largely been
responsible for the social betterment of the communities now living in Pakistan
through their educational institutions established during the British era (Malik, 2002).
The nationalization under Bhutto not only removed these prized institutions but
Pakistani society then forgot the Christian (and other) contributions to the country as a
whole. Other than via agriculture and educational institutions, Christians like many
other non-Muslims, have fewer chances to move up the socio-economic ladder. As
shown in various studies by human rights groups and especially by the Christian
Study Centre (CSC) in Rawalpindi, Christians and other non-Muslims are routinely
kept out of higher positions both in the civil and armed forces – which feeds into a
greater sense of inequality. This is happening, despite these groups’ role in the
making, running and defending of Pakistan. This lack of trust only further
disempowers a vast section of competent Pakistanis (Malik,2002). Ironically, most
Muslim Pakistanis know nothing of minorities’ significant contributions towards the
making and defending of Pakistan. Academics and journalists have largely failed to
report this vital information.
State Regulations and Statutes:
Pakistan is a diverse nation with numerous ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups.
While Pakistan’s Constitution guarantees certain rights to all citizens, including
minorities, there have long been concerns about how well these rights are protected in
practice.
The Constitution of Pakistan contains several provisions which are intended to
protect the rights of minorities. These include the following:

 Article 20: This article guarantees freedom of religion to all citizens of

Pakistan and prohibits discrimination based on religion. It also grants
individuals the right to profess, practice and propagate their religion.
 Article 22: This article ensures that all citizens have equal access to public
offices and the civil service, regardless of their religion.
 Article 25: This article guarantees equal citizenship and rights to all citizens
of Pakistan, regardless of their religion, race, caste or sex.
 Article 36: This article ensures that those other than Muslims also have the
right to freely profess and practice their religion and establish and maintain
their places of worship.
 Article 37: This article guarantees that the state shall promote and protect the
rights of minorities, including their culture, language and religion.
 Article 38: This article ensures that the state shall provide special safeguards
to minorities and take measures to protect their legitimate interests.

These provisions have been designed to safeguard the rights of all citizens, including
those belonging to minority groups. In reality, however, there are numerous obstacles
to the effective implementation of these constitutional provisions. The following
discourse will look at some of the major issues experienced by minorities in Pakistan.

Despite constitutional provisions intended to safeguard minority rights in Pakistan,

the minorities continue to experience discrimination, marginalization and persecution.
To share some examples of how these difficulties manifest in various aspects of
living, minority students are frequently subjected to discrimination and harassment in
schools, which can result in poorer educational attainment. Textbooks and curricula
can also be discriminatory in some instances, perpetuating negative stereotypes and
marginalizing minority cultures. Minorities frequently experience job discrimination
which can limit the possibilities of career advancement and economic prosperity.
Discrimination in the workplace can take many forms, including discriminatory hiring
practices, unequal compensation and workplace harassment. Minority communities
are frequently subjected to political marginalization which can limit their ability to
engage in politics and have their opinions heard. Discriminatory election laws,
gerrymandering and the exclusion of minority representatives from government posts
are examples of this. Minority groups in Pakistan are frequently the targets of
violence and persecution perpetrated by both state and non-state actors. Hate crimes,
mob violence, extrajudicial killings and targeted assaults on minority places of
worship are all examples of this.

While Pakistan’s constitutional provisions to safeguard minority rights are

undoubtedly a step in the right direction, there are several reasons why they may be
insufficient in addressing the challenges experienced by the minorities. Despite
constitutional protections for minorities, these clauses are frequently ignored in
practice. This is due to a variety of factors, including corruption, a lack of rule of law
and the lack of political will to defend minority rights. Some critics contend that
the Constitution‘s provisions regarding minority rights are too narrow in scope and
do not adequately safeguard minority communities. For example, while Article 36 of
the Constitution guarantees the right to religious freedom, it only pertains to “non-
Muslims”, leaving the rights of Muslim minorities unprotected. Other laws and
practices in Pakistan also sometimes contradict the constitutional provisions
pertaining to the liberties of minorities. Blasphemy laws, for example, which
criminalize the insult of religion, have often been misused to target religious
minorities, essentially nullifying their constitutional rights to religious freedom.
Despite constitutional guarantees prescribing equal representation, minority groups
are frequently underrepresented in government and other places of power, making it
difficult for them to advocate for their rights and interests.

These are just a few examples of why Pakistan’s constitutional provisions intended to
protect minority rights may be insufficient in addressing the challenges experienced
by the minorities. It is critical to recognize that these challenges are caused not only
by inadequate constitutional safeguards but also by wider societal attitudes and power
dynamics. The following discussion will look at potential solutions to these problems
and make recommendations for how Pakistan can better safeguard the rights of its
minority communities.

There are several potential solutions to the problems that minorities experience in
Pakistan. One of the most serious issues confronting minorities in Pakistan is the
failure to implement existing laws and protections. To address this, the government
could take measures to strengthen the rule of law, such as by increasing the
judiciary’s independence and efficacy, reforming the police and cracking down on
corruption. Pakistan could also implement legal reforms to enhance the protection of
minority rights, for example, by amending the Constitution to expand the scope of
minority community protections, or reforming and streamlining blasphemy laws to
ensure that they are not misused to discriminate against religious minorities.

Several policy changes could also help address the challenges that minorities
experience in Pakistan. Affirmative action programs, for example, could be
implemented by the government to increase minority community participation in
government and other positions of power. Furthermore, the government could invest
in anti-discrimination and anti-tolerance education and awareness initiatives. A
variety of social interventions may also be effective in addressing the underlying
attitudes and beliefs that lead to discrimination against minority groups. Civil society
groups, for example, could work to promote interfaith dialogue and understanding or
conduct community-based interventions to promote tolerance and inclusivity.

All of these solutions would necessitate the government’s and civil society’s
continued political will and commitment as well as the appropriate resources and
investment. If implemented properly, they can make a significant impact in protecting
the rights and promoting the well-being of Pakistan’s minority communities.

Conclusion
Ultimately, it is obvious that the protection of minority rights in
Pakistan’s Constitution is a critical problem which requires more attention and
action. While constitutional provisions exist to protect minority groups, these
safeguards are frequently ineffective in practice and fail to address the systemic
discrimination and marginalization experienced by minorities in Pakistan. Pakistan
must take concrete measures to address these challenges, such as by strengthening the
rule of law, implementing legal and policy changes and investing in social
interventions. The government and civil society must collaborate to ensure that
minority communities are adequately represented and that their rights are upheld in
reality, not just on paper. The protection of minority rights is essential not only for
justice and human rights but also for social stability and economic development. A
society which fails to safeguard its minority groups risks perpetuating violence and
discrimination while also limiting the full potential of all its citizens. It is our
collective responsibility to work towards a more inclusive and equitable society in
Pakistan, where all citizens are treated with dignity and respect and have equal
opportunities to thrive and contribute to their communities, regardless of ethnicity,
religion or other characteristics.

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