POLITICAL AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW
Bill of Rights
Part 2
 G. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL
The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law (CONST.,
Art. III, Sec. 6, Article III, 198).
The Constitution provides that urban
or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor
their dwelling demolished, except in
accordance with law and in a just and
humane manner. RA 7279 allows summary
evictions and demolition in cases where
persons or entities occupy danger areas and
when persons occupy areas where
government infrastructure projects with
available funding are about to be
implemented. To ensure that evictions and
demolitions are conducted in a just and
humane manner, RA 7279 commands
requires compliance with a prescribed
procedure in executing eviction and/or
demolition orders, including prior 30-day
notice and adequate consultation. Evictions
and demolitions without any court order
under RA 7279 are valid (Kalipunan Ang
Damay Ang Mahihirap v. Robredo, G.R. No.
200903, July 22, 2014).
The right to travel is part of the
guarantee of freedom of movement that the
Constitution affords its citizen. However, the
right to travel is not absolute. There are
constitutional, statutory and inherent
limitations regulating the right to travel. The
liberty of travel may be impaired even
without Court Order, but the appropriate
executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary
discretion to impose limitations. They can
1
impose limits only on the basis of "national
security, public safety, or public health" and
"as may be provided by law" (Genuino v. De
Lima, April 17, 2018, G.R. No. 197930)
Limitations
1. Interest of national security;
2. Public safety;
3. Public health;
4. Any person on bail; or
5. Under watch-list and hold departure
order (see Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
Political Law, 2009 Ed., p. 164-165;
Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution:
A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011 Ed.,
p.95-96)).
Watch-list and Hold-departure order
Watch-list Order
1. Grounds – The Secretary of Justice may
issue an HDO, under any of the following
in WLO, under any of the following
instances:
a. Against the accused, irrespective of
nationality, in criminal cases pending
trial before the Regional Trial Court or
before courts below the Regional Trial
Courts:
The application under oath of an
interested party must be supported by
(a) certified true copy of the
Information filed with the court; (b) a
certified true copy of the prosecutor’s
resolution; and (c) a Certification from
Clerk of Court concerned that criminal
case is still pending.
 b. Against the respondent, irrespective of
nationality, including criminal cases
pending preliminary investigation,
1. Grounds – The Secretary of Justice may
petition for review, or motion for
reconsideration before the Department
of Justice or city prosecution offices.
The application under oath of an
interested party must be supported by
(a) certified true copy of the complaint
filed; and (b) a Certification from the
appropriate prosecution office
concerned that the case is pending
preliminary investigation, petition for
review, or motion for reconsideration,
as the case may be.
c. The Secretary of Justice may likewise
issue WLO against any person, either
motu proprio, or upon the request of
any government agency, including
commissions, task forces or similar
entities created by the Office of the
President, pursuant to the “Anti-
Trafficking in the Persons Act of 2003”
(R.A. No. 9208) and/or in connection
with any investigation being
conducted by it, or in the interest of
national security, public safety or
public health (Sec. 2, Department of
Justice Circular 41, June 7, 2010).
2. Period of Validity of HDO/WLO Validity. The
validity period of any HDO/WLO issued
pursuant to this Circular shall be reckoned
from the date of its issuance. The HDO
shall valid for five (5) years unless sooner
terminated. On the other hand, the WLO
shall be valid for sixty (60) days unless
sooner terminated or extended, for a non-
extendible period of not more than sixty
(60) days (Sec. 4, Department of Justice
Circular 41, June 7, 2010).
2
Hold Departure Order
issue an HDO, under any of the following
in HDO, under any of the following
instances:
a. Against the accused, irrespective
nationality, in criminal cases falling
with jurisdiction of courts below the
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs).
If the case against the accused is
pending trial, the application under
oath of an interested party must be
supported by (a) a certified true copy
of the complaint or information; and
(b) a Certification from Clerk of Court
concerned that criminal case in still
pending.
If the accused has jumped bail or has
become a fugitive from justice, the
application under oath of an interested
party must be supported by (a) a
certified true copy of the complaint or
information; (b) a certified true copy of
the warrant/order of arrest; and (c) a
Certification from the Clerk of Court
concerned that the warrant/order of
arrest was returned unserved by the
peace officer to whom the same was
delivered for service.
b. Against the alien whose presence is
required either as a defendant,
respondent or witness in a civil or
labor case pending ligation, or any case
before a quasi-judicial or an
administrative agency of the
government.
The application under oath of an
interested party must be supported by
 (a) a certified true copy of the
subpoena or summons issued against
the alien; and (b) a certified true copy
complaint in civil, labor or
administrative case where the presence
of the alien is required.
c. The Secretary of Justice may likewise
issue an HDO against any person,
either motu proprio, or upon the request
by the Head of a Department of the
Government; the head of a
constitutional body or commission; the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for
the Judiciary; the Senate President or
the House Speaker for the Legislature;
when the adverse party is the
Government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, or in the interest of
national security, public safety or
public health (Sec. 1, Department of
Justice Circular 41, June 7, 2010).
Return to one’s country
The right to return to one’s country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
Nevertheless, the right to return may be
considered as a generally accepted principle
of International law, and under the
Constitution, is part of the law of the land.
However, it is distinct and separate from the
right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the Intl. Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights (Marcos v. Manglapus,
G.R. No. 88211, Sept. 15, 1989 & Oct. 27, 1989).
3
H. RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO
INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF
PUBLIC CONCERN
The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 7).
Limitations
1. National security matters and
intelligence information (Chavez v. PEA
and Amari, GR 133250, July 2002)
2. Investigation of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused (Id.);
3. Privileged communication rooted in the
separation of powers (Id.);
4. Information on military and diplomatic
secrets (Id.);
5. Trade or industrial secrets (Garcia v.
Board of Investments, 177 SCRA 374);
6. Offers exchanged during diplomatic
negotiations (Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No.
170516. July 16, 2008); and
7. Other confidential information.
Publications of Laws and Regulations
1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided. (Art. 2, Civil
Code)
2. Full publication is a condition for law’s
effectivity (Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA
27).
3. All statutes (includes those of local
application and private laws),
presidential decrees and executive
orders by President acting under power
either directly conferred by the
Constitution or validly delegated by the
legislature, and administrative rules and
b. Under the Constitution, access is subject to
regulations for implanting existing laws,
charter of a city, circulars by Monetary
Board Internal regulations and letter of
instructions concerning guidelines for
subordinates and not the public are not
included (Id.).
4. Effectivity: Fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature (Id.).
Access to Court Records
a. Court personnel shall not disclose to any
unauthorized person any confidential
information acquired by them while
employed in the judiciary, whether such
information came from authorized or
unauthorized sources.
Confidential information means
information not yet made a matter of
public record relating to pending cases, as
4
well as information not yet made public
concerning the work of any justice or
judge relating to pending cases, including
notes, drafts, research papers, internal
discussions, internal memoranda, records
of internal deliberations and similar
papers.
The notes, drafts, research papers, internal
discussions, internal memoranda, records
of internal deliberations and similar
papers that a justice or judge uses in
preparing a decision, resolution or order
shall remain confidential even after the
decision, resolution or order is made
public. (Sec. 1, Canon II Confidentiality Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel [AM No. 03-
06-13-SC]).
limitations as may be provided by law.
Therefore, a law may exempt certain types
of information from public scrutiny such
as national security. The privilege against
disclosure is recognized with respect to
state secrets bearing on the military,
diplomatic and similar matter. Since
intestate proceedings do not contain any
military or diplomatic secrets which will
be disclosed by its production, it is an
error on the part of the judge to deny
Ramon’s motion (Hidalgo v. Reyes, AM No.
RTJ‐05‐1910, Apr. 15, 2005).
NOTE: With regard to court hearings and
court records and the right of accused over
right to public information – With the
possibility of losing not only the precious
liberty but also the very life of an accused,
it behooves all to make absolutely certain
that an accused receives a verdict solely
on the basis of a just and dispassionate
judgment, a verdict that would come only
after the presentation of credible evidence
 testified to by unbiased witnesses
unswayed by any kind of pressure,
whether open or subtle, in proceedings
that are devoid of histrionics that might
detract from its basic aim to ferret
veritable facts free from improper
influence, and decreed by a judge with an
unprejudiced mind unbridled by running
emotions or passions (Re: Request for Live
Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, A.M. No. 00-1-4- 03-SC,
June 29, 2001).
Right to Information Relative to
Government Contract Negotiations
It is incumbent upon the PCGG, and its
officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they
have decided to take up with the ostensible
owners and holders of ill‐gotten wealth. Such
information must pertain to definite
propositions of the government. While
evaluation of bids or proposals is on-going,
there are no “official acts, transactions, or
decisions.” However, once the committee
makes an official recommendation, there
arises a definite proposition. From this
moment, the public’s right to information
attaches, and any citizen can assail the non-
proprietary information leading to such
definite proposition (Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No.
130716, December 9, 1998).
Right to Information Relative to
Government Diplomatic Negotiation
Secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries
is not violative of the right to information.
5
Diplomacy has a confidential nature. While
the full text (of the JPEP) may not be kept
perpetually confidential, it is in line with the
public interest that the offers exchanged
during negotiations continue to be privileged
information. Furthermore, the information
sought includes documents produced and
communicated by a party external to the
Philippine government. However, such
privilege is merely presumptive, and will not
apply to all cases. There is a distinction
between the text of the treaty and the offers
and negotiations. They may compel the
government to disclose the text of the treaty
but not the offers between RP and Japan,
because these are negotiations of executive
departments. Diplomatic Communication
negotiation is privileged information
(Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16,
2008).
I. EMINENT DOMAIN
Concept
The power of eminent domain is an inherent
competence of the state. It is essential to a
sovereign. Thus, the Constitution does not
explicitly define this power but subjects it to a
limitation: that it be exercised only for public
use and with payment of just compensation.
Whether the use is public or whether the
compensation is constitutionally just will be
determined finally by the courts (National
Power Corporation vs. Socorro T. Posada, Renato
Bueno, Alice Balin, Adrian Tablizo, Teofilo
Tablizo, and Lydia T. Olivo, substituted by her
heirs, Alfredo M. Olivo, Alicia O. Salazar, Anita
O. Ordono, Angelita O. Lim and Adelfa O.
Espinas. G.R. No. 191945. March 11, 2015).
Two (2) stages in Eminent Domain:
1. The determination of the authority of the
expropriator to exercise the power of
 eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit; and
2. The determination by the court of the just
compensation for the property sought to
be taken (Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 161656,
June 29, 2005).
Requisites of the Exercise of Eminent
Domain
1. Necessity - there must be a necessity
which must be of public character (City of
Manila v. The Arellano Law Colleges, Inc.,
G.R. No. L-2929, February 28, 1950).
If the genuine public necessity disappears,
then there is no more cogent point for the
government’s retention of the
expropriated land (Vda. De Ouano v.
Republic, G.R. No. 168770, February 9, 2011).
2. Private Property - generally, all private
property capable of ownership may be
expropriated; it may include public utility
(Republic v. PLDT, G.R. No. L-18841,
January 27, 1969).
Exceptions:
a. Money
b. Choses in action
3. Public Use
Traditional Concept
It refers to any use directly available to
the general public as a matter of right
and not merely of forbearance or
accommodation. (Cruz and Cruz,
Constitutional Law (2015).
Expanded Concept
a. Public use is a flexible and evolving
concept influenced by changing
conditions. It is accurate to state then
6
that at present, whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use (Estate of Salud Jimenez v.
PEZA, G.R. 137285, January 16, 2001).
b. It has also been broadened to cover
uses which, while not directly
available to the public, redound to
their indirect advantage or benefit
(Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125
SCRA 220).
c. That only a few would actually
benefit from the expropriation of the
property does not necessarily
diminish the essence and character of
public use (Manosca v. Court of
Appeals, 252 SCRA 412).
4. Taking - it is the appropriation of title to
and possession of the expropriated
property; but may me availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title
and possession (Republic v. PLDT, supra).
"Taking" of property takes place when: (1)
the owner is actually deprived or
dispossessed of his property;(2) there is a
practical destruction or a material
impairment of the value of his property;
(3) the owner is deprived of the ordinary
use of the property, or (4) when he is
deprived of the jurisdiction, supervision
and control of his property (Republic of the
Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892,
209917, 209696, 8 September 2015).
There are two different types of taking
that can be identified. A “possessory”
taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies
property. A “regulatory” taking occurs
when the government’s regulation leaves
no reasonable economically viable use of
the property (City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005).
 In Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al.
(G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016), it was
argued that the requirement of
maintaining a buffer zone in all
agricultural entities under Section 6 of an
ordinance of Davao City prohibiting
aerial spraying unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners in that City of
the beneficial use of their property
amounting to taking without just
compensation. The Supreme Court did
not agree. Citing City of Manila v.
Laguio, Jr. (G.R. No. 118127, April 12,
2005), it clarified that taking only
becomes confiscatory if it substantially
divests the owner of the beneficial use of
its property. According to the Court: The
establishment of the buffer zone is
required for the purpose of minimizing
the effects of aerial spraying within and
near the plantations. Although Section
3(e) of the ordinance requires the planting
of diversified trees within the identified
buffer zone, the requirement cannot be
construed and deemed as confiscatory
requiring payment of just compensation.
A landowner may only be entitled to
compensation if the taking amounts to a
permanent denial of all economically
beneficial or productive uses of the land.
The respondents cannot be said to be
permanently and completely deprived of
their landholdings because they can still
cultivate or make other productive uses
of the areas to be identified as the buffer
zones.
5. Just Compensation - it is the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken the fair
market value of the property (NPC v.
Chiong, G.R. No. 152436, June 20, 2003). The
measure is not the taker’s gain, but the
owner’s loss (Republic v. Asia Pacific
7
Integrated Steel Corporation, G.R. No.
192100, March 12, 2014).
6. Due process of law - it requires that the
property owner must be given an
opportunity to be heard in the
determination of the fair market value
(ROC, Rule 67, Sec. 3 (3)).
Determination of Just Compensation
1. The ascertainment of what constitutes just
compensation for property taken in
eminent domain cases is a judicial
prerogative (EPZA v. Dulay, 148 SCRA
305; Panes v. Visayas State College of
Agriculture, 263 SCRA 708; Belen v. Court
of Appeals).
2. A trial before the commissioners is
indispensable, in order to give the parties
the opportunity to present evidence on
the issue of just compensation. Trial with
the aid of commissioners is a substantial
right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all (Manila
Electric Co. v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196).
a. While commissioners are to be
appointed by the court for the
determination of just compensation,
the latter is not bound by the
commissioner’s findings (Republic v.
Santos, 141 SCRA 30);
b. The court may substitute its own
estimate of the value of the property
only for valid reasons, to wit:
i. The commissioners have applied
illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them;
ii. They have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence;
iii. Where the amount allowed is
either grossly inadequate or
excessive (National Power
 Corporation v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No.
156098, February 2, 2007).
3. In agrarian reform cases, trial by
commissioners is not mandatory; Sec. 58
of RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law) provides that the
appointment of a commissioner or
commissioners is discretionary on the
part of the special agrarian court, or upon
the instance on of one of the parties
(Spouses Edmond Lee and Helen Huang v.
Land bank of the Philippines, G.R. 170422,
March 7, 2008).
4. Form of compensation. Deposit of
compensation must be in (a) Cash; or (b)
in Land Bank bonds” and not in any other
form (Association of Small Landowners v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA
343).
5. Withdrawal of deposit by rejecting
landowner of the money deposited in
trust pending the determination of the
valuation of the property is allowed; by
rejecting and disputing the valuation of
the DAR, the landowner is merely
exercising his right to seek just
compensation (Land Bank v. Court of
Appeals, 249 SCRA 149).
6. Reckoning point of market value of the
property:
Time of filing of Reckoning point
complaint for
expropriation
Before actual Date of filing of
taking the complaint
After actual Date of taking
taking
(National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
264 SCRA 577)
8
NOTE: The value of the property must be
determined either as of the date of taking or
the filing of the complaint, “whichever comes
first” (Eslaban v. De Onorio, supra).
7. Principal criterion in determining the just
compensation is the character of the land
at the time of taking (National Power
Corporation v. Henson, G.R. 129998,
December 29, 1998).
8. Factors to be used for determining just
compensation under RA 6657: The
Congress has thereby required that any
determination of just compensation
should consider the following factors,
namely (Department of Agrarian Reform v.
Spouses Sta. Romana et. al., G.R. No.
183290, July 9, 2014)
a. the cost of the acquisition of the land;
b. the current value of like properties;
c. the nature, actual use and income of
the land;
d. the sworn valuation by the owner;
e. the tax declarations;
f. the assessment made by government
assessors;
g. the social and economic benefits
contributed to the property by the
farmers and farm workers and by the
Government; and
h. the fact of the non-payment of any
taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on
the land.
9. The right to compensation under Article
III, Section 9 of the Constitution was put
in place to protect the individual from
and restrain the State’s sovereign power
of eminent domain, which is the
government’s power to condemn private
properties within its territory for public
use or purpose. This power is inherent
and need not be granted by law. Thus,
 while the government’s power to take for demolition of certain improvement on
public purpose is inherent, immense, and the land and for the value of
broad in scope, itis delimited by the right improvements thereon;
of an individual to be compensated. In a f. The size, shape or location, tax
nutshell, the government may take, but it declaration and zonal valuation of the
must pay. (Republic of the Philippines, land;
represented by the Department of Public g. The price of the land as manifested in
Works and Highways (DPWH) vs. Ortigas the ocular findings, oral as well as
and Company Limited Partnership. G.R. No. documentary evidence presented;
171496. March 3, 2014) and
h. Such facts and events as to enable the
affected property owners to have
10. Taking of private property without just sufficient funds to acquire similarly-
compensation is a violation of a person’s
situated lands of approximate areas
property right. In situations where the
as those required from them by the
government does not take the trouble of
government, and thereby rehabilitate
initiating an expropriation proceeding,
themselves as early as possible.
the private owner has the option to
compel payment of the property taken,
12. Title to property does not pass until after
when justified. The trial court should
payment (Visayan Refining v. Camus, 40
continue to proceed with this case to
Phil. 550), except in agrarian reform cases
determine just compensation in
(Land Bank v. Court of Appeal, 258 SCRA
accordance with law. (Republic of the
404).
Philippines, represented by the Department of
a. The owner of the land subject to
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) vs.
expropriation may still dispose of the
Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership.
same before payment of just
G.R. No. 171496. March 3, 2014)
compensation (Republic v. Salem
Investment Corporation, G.R. 137569,
11. Under RA 8474 (An Act to Facilitate the
June 23, 2000).
Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or
b. Taxes paid by the owner after taking
Location for National Government
by the expropriator are reimbursable
Infrastructure Projects and for other (City of Manila v. Roxas, 60 Phil. 215).
Purposes), in order to facilitate the
determination of just compensation, the
13. Non-payment. As a rule, non-payment of
court may consider, among other well-
the just compensation in an expropriation
established factors, the following relevant
proceeding does not entitle the private
standards:
landowners to recover possession of the
a. The classification and use for which
expropriated lots, but only to demand
the property is suited;
payment of the fair market value of the
b. The developmental costs for
property (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
improving the land;
146587, July 2, 2002; Reyes v. National
c. The value declared by the owners;
Housing Authority, G.R. 147511, January
d. The current selling price of similar
20, 2003).
lands in the vicinity;
e. The reasonable disturbance
compensation for the removal and/or

9
 Exception: Where the government fails to
pay just compensation within five (5)
years from the finality of the judgment in
the expropriation proceedings, the
owners concerned shall have the right to
recover of their property (Republic v. Lim,
G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005).
The full payment of just compensation is
not a prerequisite for the Government's
effective taking of the property, nor is the
transfer of property title from the
property owner to the Government a
condition precedent to the taking of
property. (Republic of the Philippines v.
Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917,
209696, 8 September 2015).
Effect of Delay
1. Section 9, Article III of the 1987
Constitution expresses the
constitutional rule on eminent domain –
“Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.”
While confirming the State’s inherent
power and right to take private
property for public use, this provision
at the same time lays down the
limitation in the exercise of this power.
When it takes property pursuant to its
inherent right and power, the State has
the corresponding obligation to pay the
owner just compensation for the
property taken.
Just compensation does not only refer
to the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken, it also means, equally, if
not more than anything, payment in full
without delay. (Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Sps. Orilla, G.R. No.
194168, February 13, 2013).
10
2. Actions for just compensation not
barred by prescription: An action for
payment of just compensation does not
prescribe. If private property is taken
by the Government for public use
without expropriation proceedings or
negotiated sale, the owner’s action to
recover the land or the value thereof
does not prescribe (Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and
Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No.
179334, July 1, 2013).
3. Entitlement to interest. The award of
12% interest is imposed in the nature
of damages for delay in payment
which in effect makes the obligation on
the part of the government one of
forbearance (Land Bank of the Philippines
v Rivera, et.al., G.R. No. 182431, February
27, 2013).
4. Apart from the requirement that
compensation for expropriated land
must be fair and reasonable,
compensation, to be “just,” must also
be made without delay. In simpler
terms, for the government’s payment
to be considered just compensation,
the landowner must receive it in full
without delay (Id.).
5. The government’s liability for the
payment of interest to the landowner
for any delay attributable to it in
paying just compensation for the
expropriated property is entirely
separate and distinct from the farmers-
beneficiaries’ obligations to pay
regular amortizations for the
properties transferred to them (Id.).
The Court noted the long delay in
payment and was naturally prompted
to strongly condemn “the cavalier
attitude of government officials who
 adopt such a despotic and abandoned the property so
irresponsible stance” Accordingly, [the property shall expropriated.
Court] hereby impose 12% interest per return to its former
annum on the unpaid gross value of owner
P81,331,600.00 for Lot 1406-B (i.e.,
13,118 square meters x If land is Expropriator
P6,200.00/square meter) from August expropriated for a returns to the
23, 1993, the date of the approval of the public street and former owner.
failed Compromise Agreement, until the expropriation is XPN:
the full amount of the just granted upon Unless there is
compensation is paid, as a way of condition that the some statutory
making the compensation just. This city can only use it provision to the
accords with a long line of pertinent for a public street contrary.
jurisprudence, whereby the Court has (Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395
imposed interest at 12% per annum in SCRA 494)
eminent domain whenever the
expropriator has not immediately NOTE: When land has been acquired for
delivered the just compensation public use in fee simple, unconditionally,
(Export Processing Zone Authority vs. either by the exercise of eminent domain or
Pulido, 656 SCRA 315). by purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use may be
Abandonment of Intended Use and Right of abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a
Repurchase different use, without any impairment of the
estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the
Thus, the determination of the rights and former owner (Id.).
obligations of landowners whose properties
were expropriated but the public purpose for Miscellaneous Application
which eminent domain was exercised no
longer subsist, must rest on the character by 1. Expropriation under Section 18, Article XII
which the titles thereof were acquired by the of the 1987 Constitution: The state may, in
government (Mactan Cebu International Airport the interest of national welfare industries
Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 139495, or defense, and upon payment of just
November 2, 2000). compensation, transfer to public
ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the
Rules in abandonment of intended use and
Government.
right of repurchase:

NOTE: Distinguish Section 18 from

Conditions Effects
Section 17, Article 18 of the 1987
If land is When the
Constitution which provides that in times
expropriated for a purpose is
of national emergency, when the public
particular purpose, terminated or
interest so requires, the State may, during
with the condition abandoned the
the emergency and under reasonable
that when that former owner
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take
purpose is ended or reacquires the
over or direct the operation of any

11
 privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.
2. Note that the temporary take-over by the
government extends only to operation of
the business and not to the ownership
thereof. As such, the government is not
required to compensate the private entity-
owner of the said business as there is no
transfer of ownership, whether permanent
or temporary. The private entity-owner
affected by the temporary takeover
cannot, likewise, claim just compensation
for the use of said business and its
properties, as the temporary takeover by
the government is in exercise of the police
power and not the power of eminent
domain (Agan, Jr. vs. PIATCO, GR 155001,
January 21, 2004).
3. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. To
the extent that the CARL prescribes
retention limits to the landowners, there is
an exercise of the police power for the
regulation or private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But
where to carry out such regulation, the
owners are deprived of lands they own in
excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is also taking under the power of
eminent domain. The taking contemplated
is not a mere limitation on the use of the
land, but the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favor of the beneficiary (Sta. Rosa Realty
and Development Corp., G.R. 112526,
October 12, 2001).
12
4. Under RA 7279 (Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992). Expropriation
proceedings may, therefore, be resorted to
only when the other modes of acquisition
have been exhausted (Filstream
International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 284
SCRA 716).
5. The acquisition of lands for socialized
housing is governed by several provisions
in the law. Section 9 of R.A. 7279 provides
that lands for socialized housing shall be
acquired in the following order:
a. Those owned by the Government or
any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
b. Alienable lands of the public domain;
c. Unregistered or abandoned and idle
lands;
d. Those within the declared Areas for
Priority Development, Zonal
Improvement Program sites, and Slum
Improvement and Resettlement
Program sites which have not yet been
acquired;
e. Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites
and Services or BLISS Sites which have
not yet been acquired;
f. Privately-owned lands.
NOTE: Where on-site development is
found more practicable and advantageous
to the beneficiaries, the priorities
mentioned in this section shall not apply.
The local government units shall give
budgetary priority to on-site development
of government lands (Sec. 9, RA 7279).
6. Under RA 8489 (An Act to Facilitate the
Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or
Location for National Government d. Upon compliance with the guidelines
Infrastructure Projects and for other abovementioned, the court shall
Purposes), whenever it is necessary to immediately issue to the implementing
acquire real property for the right-of-way agency an order to take possession of
or location for any national government the property and start the
infrastructure project through implementation of the project.
expropriation, the appropriate
implementing agency shall initiate the e. Before the court can issue a Writ of
expropriation proceedings before the Possession, the implementing agency
proper court under the following shall present to the court a certificate of
guidelines: availability of funds from the proper
official concerned.
a. Upon the filing of the complaint, and
after due notice to the defendant, the
f. In the event that the owner of the
implementing agency shall
property contests the implementing
immediately pay the owner of the
agency’s proffered value, the court
property the amount equivalent to the
shall determine the just compensation
sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%)
to be paid the owner within sixty (60)
of the value of the property based on
days from the date of filing of the
the current relevant zonal valuation of
expropriation case. When the decision
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);
of the court becomes final and
and (2) the value of the improvements
executory, the implementing agency
and/or structures as determined under
shall pay the owner the difference
Section 7 hereof;
between the amount already paid and
b. In provinces, cities, municipalities and
the just compensation as determined
other areas where there is no zonal
by the court (Sec. 4, RA 8489).
valuation, the BIR is hereby mandated
within the period of sixty (60) days
The tax credit given to commercial
from the date of the expropriation case,
establishments for the discount enjoyed by
to come up with a zonal valuation for
senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 (Senior
said area; and
Citizens Act) is a form of just compensation
c. In case the completion of a government
for private property taken by the State for
infrastructure project is of utmost
public use, since the privilege enjoyed by
urgency and importance, and there is
senior citizens does not come directly from
no existing valuation of the area
the State, but from the private establishments
concerned, the implementing agency
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central
shall immediately pay the owner of the
Luzon Drug Corporation, GR 148512, June 26,
property its proffered value taking into
2006).
consideration the standards prescribed
in Section 5 (see Standards for the
Assessment of the Value of the Land
Subject of Expropriation Proceedings or J. RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS
Negotiated Sale, supra) hereof.

1. The right of the people, including those

employed in the public and private

13
 sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged (CONST., Art, III,
Sec. 8).
2. To require respondent Basada to
relinquish his post as president of the
homeowners' association for the reason
that he violated the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel, among others, for being
a Legal Researcher II, of Branch 117, RTC
Pasay City, would effectively deprive him
of his freedom of association guaranteed
by Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 8 of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that
"the right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged (Rubio v. Basada,
OCA. 15-4429-P, December 6, 2017, J.
CAGUIOA).
3. The right to self-organization shall not be
denied to government employees (Sec.
2[5], Art. IX—B).
NOTE: Right to association and right to
unionize of government employees do not
include the right to strike (SSS Employees
Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 686)
4. The State shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law. They shall
be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by
law (CONST., Art. XIII, Sec. 3).
14
NOTE: The right to form associations does
not necessarily include the right to be
given legal personality. However, if the
law itself should make possession of legal
personality a precondition for effective
associational action, involved would be
not just the right to have legal personality
but also the right to be an association
(Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
v. Secretary of Labor, GR L-22228, February
27, 1969).
5. Every group has a right to join the
democratic process, association itself
being an act of expression of the member’s
belief, even if the group offends the
sensibilities of the majority. Any
restriction to such requires a compelling
state interest to be proven by the State
(Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC,
supra).
6. The freedom of association presupposes a
freedom not to associate. An organization
may remove a member if:
a. It is engaged in some form of
expression, whether public or private;
b. The forced inclusion of a member
would significantly affect the
organization’s ability to advocate
public or private viewpoints (Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 64).
7. Communist and similar organizations.
The basic guidelines for prosecution under
the Anti- Subversion Act, are the
following elements for the crime to be
established.
 a. In case of subversive organizations
other than the CPP:
i. that the purpose of the organization
is to overthrow the present
Government of the Philippines and
to establish in this country a
totalitarian regime under the
domination of a foreign power;
ii. that the accused joined such
organization; and
iii. that he did so knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts; and
b. In the case of the CPP:
i. that the CPP continues to pursue
the objectives which led Congress
in 1957 to declare it to be an
organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government by
illegal means for the purpose of
placing the country under the
control of a foreign power;
ii. that the accused joined the CPP;
and
iii. that he did so willfully, knowingly
and by overt acts (People v. Ferrer,
101 Phil. 234)
8. Compulsory membership of a lawyer in
the integrated bar of the Philippines does
not violate the constitutional guarantee.
Integration does not make a lawyer a
member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member
of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national
15
organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and in cohesive group of
which every lawyer is a ready a member.
Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free
to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers (In Re: Edillon, 84
SCRA 554).
K. NON – IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS
No law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 10).
Contemporary Application of the Contract
Clause
1. The non-impairment clause is contained in
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution,
which provides that no law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The non-impairment clause is limited in
application to laws that derogate from
prior acts or contracts by enlarging,
abridging or in any manner changing the
intention of the parties (BANAT Party-list
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 595 SCRA 477).
2. There is impairment if a subsequent law
changes the terms of a contract between
the parties, imposes new conditions,
 dispenses with those agreed upon or
withdraws remedies for the enforcement
of the rights of the parties (Clemons v.
Nolting, 42 Phil. 702).
3. The freedom to contract is not absolute; all
contracts and all rights are subject to the
police power of the State and not only
may regulations which affect them be
established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change
from time to time. The non-impairment
clause must yield to the loftier purposes
targeted by the government (Goldenway
Merchanidising Corporation vs. Equitable PCI
Bank, G.R. No. 19554, March 13, 2013).
4. Limitations:
a. Police Power:
i. A franchise partakes the nature of a
grant, which is beyond the purview
of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution (PAGCOR v. BIR, GR
172087 March 15, 2011).
Franchises, licenses, privileges, etc.,
are not contracts within the
purview of the due process clause
(Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, GR
162243, November 29, 2006).
ii. Municipal zoning ordinances is a
police power measure and prevails
over a restriction contained in the
title of the property (Ortigas v. Feati
Bank, 94 SCRA 533).
iii. BP 22 is not violative of the non-
impairment clause, and even if it
were, the law was a police measure
16
and therefore superior to contracts
(Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).
iv. Pre-existing share tenancy can be
validly converted into leasehold
tenancy contract through valid
exercise of police power (Illusorio v.
CAR, 17 SCRA 25).
v. Regulating the rentals of dwelling
units (Canleon v. Agus Development
Corporation, 207 SCRA 748).
b. Eminent Domain:
The objection raised by petitioners that
P.D. No. 1808 impairs the obligations
of contract is without merit. The
constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is
limited by and subject to the exercise
of the police power of the State in the
interest of public health, safety, morals
and general welfare. Nor can
petitioners claim that their properties
are being expropriated without just
compensation, since Sec. 3 of P.D. No.
1808 provides for just compensation to
lot owners who have fully paid their
obligations to the City of Manila under
their respective contracts before the
issuance of the decree (Kabiling v.
NHA, 156 SCRA 623).
c. Police Power:
Since taxation is the rule and
exemption therefrom the exception, the
exemption may thus be withdrawn at
the pleasure of the taxing authority.
The only exception to this rule is where
the exemption was granted to private
 parties based on material consideration
of a mutual nature, which then
becomes contractual and is thus
covered by the non-impairment claim
of the Constitution (Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority v.
Marcos, 261 SCRA 667).
L. FREE ACCESS TO COURTS AND
ADEQUATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not
be denied to any person by reason of poverty
(CONST., Art. III, Sec. 11).
1. Free Legal Assistance Act of 2010. The
term legal services to be performed by a
lawyer refers to any activity which
requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and
experiences which shall include, among
others, legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of instruments and contracts,
including appearance before the
administrative and quasi-judicial offices,
bodies and tribunals handling cases in
court, and other similar services as may be
defined by the Supreme Court (Sec. 3, RA
9999).
a. For purposes of availing of the benefits
and services as envisioned in this Act,
a lawyer or professional partnership
shall secure a certification from the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the
Department of Justice (DOJ) or
accredited association of the Supreme
Court indicating that the said legal
services to be provided are within the
services defined by the Supreme
Court, and that the agencies cannot
17
provide the legal services to be
provided by the private counsel.
For purpose of determining the
number of hours actually provided by
the lawyer and/or professional firm in
the provision of legal services, the
association and/or organization duly
accredited by the Supreme Court shall
issue the necessary certification that
said legal services were actually
undertaken.
The certification issued by, among
others, the PAO, the DOJ and other
accredited association by the Supreme
Court shall be submitted to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) for purposes
of availing the tax deductions as
provided for in this Act and to the DOJ
for purposes of monitoring (Sec. 4, RA
9999).
b. Incentives to Lawyers. For purposes of
this Act, a lawyer or professional
partnerships rendering actual free
legal services, as defined by the
Supreme Court, shall be entitled to an
allowable deduction from the gross
income, the amount that could have
been collected for the actual free legal
services rendered or up to ten percent
(10%) of the gross income derived
from the actual performance of the
legal profession, whichever is lower:
Provided, That the actual free legal
services herein contemplated shall be
exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-
hour mandatory legal aid services
rendered to indigent litigants as
required under the Rule on Mandatory
Legal Aid Services for Practicing
Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012,
 issued by the Supreme Court (Sec. 5,
RA 9999).
2. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of
legal fees. Indigent litigants:
a. Whose gross income and that of their
immediate family do not exceed an
amount double the monthly minimum
wage of an employee and
b. who do not own real property with a
fair market value as stated in the
current tax declaration of more than
three hundred thousand (Php
300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from
the payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable
to the indigent litigant unless the court
otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein
provided, the litigant shall execute an
affidavit that he and his immediate family
do not earn a gross income
abovementioned, nor they own any real
property with the fair value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit
of a disinterested person attesting to the
truth of the litigant’s affidavit. The current
tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to
the litigant’s affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or
disinterested person shall be sufficient
cause to dismiss the complaint or action or
to strike out the pleading of that party,
without prejudice to whatever criminal
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any
liability may have been incurred.
person under custodial investigation has the
right to remain silent; (b) anything he says
can and will be used against him in a court of
18
3. A party may be authorized to litigate his
action, claim or defense as an indigent if
the court, upon an ex parte application
and hearing, is satisfied that the party is
one who has no money or property
sufficient and available for food, shelter
and basic necessities for himself and his
family.
Such authority shall include an exemption
from payment of docket and other lawful
fees, and of transcripts of stenographic
notes which the court may order to be
furnished him. The amount of the docket
and other lawful fees which the indigent
was exempted from paying shall be a lien
on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent, unless the court
otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant
of such authority at any time before
judgment is rendered by the trial court. If
the court should determine after hearing
that the party declared as an indigent is in
fact a person with sufficient income or
property, the proper docket and other
lawful fees shall be assessed and collected
by the clerk of court. If payment is not
made within the time fixed by the court,
execution shall issue or the payment
thereof, without prejudice to such other
sanctions as the court may impose (ROC,
Rule 21, Sec. 21).
M. RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney
before being questioned and to have his
counsel present when being questioned; and
(d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
provided before any questioning if he so
desires (People v. Cabanada, July 19, 2017, G.R.
No. 221424).
The Miranda rights were incorporated in our
Constitution but were modified to include the
statement that any waiver of the right to
counsel must be made "in writing and in the
presence of counsel" (People v. Chavez, G.R.
No. 207950, September 22, 2014).
Miranda rights apply only during a custodial
investigation, when the police investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements." Custodial investigation shall
include the practice of issuing an "invitation"
to a person who is investigated in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have
committed (Id.; People v. Cabanada, July 19,
2017, G.R. No. 221424).
(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families
(CONST., Art. III, Sec. 12).
Availability
1. They exist only in custodial interrogation
(People v. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216).
Custodial investigation
a. Any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way (Id.).
b. It shall include the practice of issuing
an "invitation" to a person who is
investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have
committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the "inviting" officer for any
violation of law (Sec. 2, RA 7438 [An
Act Defining Certain Rights Of Person
Arrested, Detained Or Under Custodial
Investigation As Well As The Duties Of
The Arresting, Detaining And
Investigating Officers, And Providing
Penalties For Violations Thereof).

19
 c. They are available when the
investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect,
the suspect has been taken into police
custody, and the police carry out a
process of interrogation that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating
statements.
The rule begins to operate at once as
soon as the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime
and direction is then aimed upon a
particular suspect who has been taken
into custody and to whom the police
would then direct interrogatory
question which tend to elicit
incriminating statements (People vs
Dela Cruz, GR 118866-68, September 17,
1997).
2. The constitutional provision on custodial
investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the
suspect orally admits having committed
the crime. Neither can it apply to
admissions or confessions made by a
suspect in the commission of a crime
before he is placed under investigation.
What the Constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating
facts or confessions. The rights under
Section 12 of the Constitution are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of
coercion by the state as would lead the
accused to admit something false, not to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth (People v. Baloloy, G.R. No.
140740. April 12, 2002).
20
Rights of a Person Under Custodial
Investigation
Requisites
The Court, as guardian of the rights of the
people laid down the procedure, guidelines
and duties which the arresting, detaining,
inviting, or investigating officer or his
companions must do and observe at the time
of making an arrest and again at and during
the time of the custodial interrogation in
accordance with the Constitution,
jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438. It is
high-time to educate our law-enforcement
agencies who neglect either by ignorance or
indifference the so-called Miranda rights
which had become insufficient and which the
Court must update in the light of new legal
developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or
under custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to and
understood by him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any; Every other
warning, information or communication
must be in a language known to and
understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent and that any statement he
makes may be used as evidence against
him;
3. He must be informed that he has the
right to be assisted at all times and have
the presence of an independent and
competent lawyer, preferably of his own
choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no
lawyer or cannot afford the services of a
 lawyer, one will be provided for him;
and that a lawyer may also be engaged
by any person in his behalf, or may be
appointed by the court upon petition of
the person arrested or one acting in his
behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested
has a lawyer, he must be informed that
no custodial investigation in any form
shall be conducted except in the
presence of his counsel or after a valid
waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed
that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most
expedient means – telephone, radio,
letter or messenger – with his lawyer
(either retained or appointed), any
member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen
by him or by any one from his
immediate family or by his counsel, or
be visited by/confer with duly accredited
national or international non-
government organization. It shall be the
responsibility of the officer to ensure
that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the
right to waive any of said rights
provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and ensure
that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives
his right to a lawyer, he must be
informed that it must be done in writing
and in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insists on his
waiver and chooses to speak;
21
9. That the person arrested must be
informed that he may indicate in any
manner at any time or stage of the
process that he does not wish to be
questioned with warning that once he
makes such indication, the police may
not interrogate him if the same had not
yet commenced, or the interrogation
must cease if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed
that his initial waiver of his right to
remain silent, the right to counsel or any
of his rights does not bar him from
invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may
have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any
statement or evidence, as the case may
be, obtained in violation of any of the
foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence (People v.
Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455).
Waiver
Any waiver by a person arrested or detained
under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed
by such person in the presence of his counsel;
otherwise the waiver shall be null and void
and of no effect (Sec. 2 [e], RA 7438).
Whenever a protection given by the
Constitution is waived by the person entitled
to that protection, the presumption is always
against the waiver. Consequently, the
prosecution must prove with strongly
convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this
Court that indeed the accused willingly and
voluntarily submitted his confession and
knowingly and deliberately manifested that
he was not interested in having a lawyer
assist him during the taking of that confession
(People v. Jara, G. R. No. L-61356-57, September
30, 1986).
Exclusionary Doctrine
Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of the rights of a person under
custodial investigation shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him (CONST., Art. III, Sec.
12(3)).
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
Evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding
(Gonzales v. People, G.R. No. 205926, July 22,
2015).
N. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused:
Provided, that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable (CONST.,
Art. III, Sec. 14).
22
Criminal Due Process
1. The accused has the opportunity to be
heard in court of competent jurisdiction;
2. The accused must proceed against under
orderly processes of law;
3. The accused must be given notice and
opportunity to be heard; and
4. The judgment rendered was within the
authority of a constitutional law (Mejia v.
Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457).
Bail
1. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required
(CONST., Art. III, Sec. 13)
2. Bail is the security given for the release
of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman,
conditioned upon his appearance before
any court as may be required (ROC, Rule
114, Sec. 1).
3. Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed
innocent. xxx The general rule is,
therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall
be bailable, unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of
 his guilt is strong. xxx Bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused,
regardless of the crime charged, should
be allowed independently of the merits
of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his
life. The objective of bail is to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the
trial. xxx Accordingly, we conclude that
the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored
the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the
trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the
clear showing of the fragile health and
advanced age of Enrile. As such, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To
Fix Bail (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
213847, August 18, 2015).
4. Bail is accorded to a person in custody of
the law who may by reason of the
presumption of innocence he enjoys, be
allowed provisional liberty upon filing a
security to guarantee his appearance
before any court, as required under
specific circumstances (People v.
Fitzgerald, GR 149723, October 27, 2006).
The right to bail can be availed of only
by a person who is in custody of the law
or otherwise deprived of his liberty, and
it would be premature, not to say
incongruous, to file a petition for bail for
someone whose freedom has yet to be
curtailed (Cortes v. Judge Catral, A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1508, December 15, 1999).
Exceptions:
a. Those charged with capital offense
when evidence of guilt is strong.
Since the evidence in this case
(rebellion) is hearsay, the evidence of
23
guilt is not strong, bail is allowed
(Enrile v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780 May
10, 2001).
b. Military men. Military men who
participated in failed coup d’état
because of their threat to national
security (Comendador v. De Villa, 200
SCRA 80). The denial of the right to
bail to military does not violate the
equal protection clause because there
is substantial distinction between
military and civilians (Nachura,
Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2009
Ed., p. 190).
5. Bail as a Matter of Right. All persons in
custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as
prescribed by law:
a. Before or after conviction by the
MTC; and,
b. Before conviction of the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment (ROC, Rule 114, Sec. 4).
6. Bail when Discretionary (ROC, Rule 114,
Sec. 5).
a. Upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused
to bail.
b. The court, in its discretion, may
allow the accused to continue on
provisional liberty after the same bail
 bond during the period to appeal
subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
c. If the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but
not more than 20 years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted shall be
cancelled, upon showing by the
following or other similar
circumstances:
i. That the accused is a recidivist,
quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteracion;
ii. That the accused is found to have
previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or
has violated the conditions of his
bail without valid justification;
iii. That the accused committed the
offense while on probation,
parole, or under conditional
pardon;
iv. That the circumstances of the
accused or his case indicates the
probability of flight if released on
bail; or
v. That there is undue risk that
during the pendency of the
appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.
7. Whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion- reasonable notice of hearing
is required to be given to the prosecutor,
24
or at least he must be asked for his
recommendation, because in fixing the
amount of bail, the judge is required to
take into account a number of factors
(ROC, Rule 114, Sec. 5).
8. Bail in extradition. After the potential
extradite has been arrested and placed
under the custody of the law, bail may
be applied for and granted as an
exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing that:
a. Once granted bail, the applicant will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community, and
b. There exists a special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances
including, as a matter of reciprocity,
those cited by the highest court in the
requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein (Government of US v.
Judge Purganan and Mark Jimenez, GR
148571, December 17, 2002).
NOTE: Extradition proceedings are
separate and distinct from trial for
the offenses for which he is charged.
The extradite should apply before the
courts trying the criminal cases
against him, not before the
extradition court (Id.).
If bail can be granted in deportation
cases, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies
to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases (Government of Hong
Kong v. Hon. Felixberto Olalia, Jr., GR
1533675, April 19, 2007).
9. Waiver of Bail. The right to bail is
another of the constitutional right which
can be waived (People v. Judge Donato,
198 SCRA 130). The failure of the
accused to call the attention of the trial
court to the unresolved petition for bail
is deemed a waiver of the right to bail
(People v. Manes, GR 122737, February 17,
1999).
10. Bail and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. The right to
bail is not impaired by the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
(CONST., Art. III, Sec. 13).
Presumption of Innocence
1. Every circumstance favoring the
innocence of the accused must be taken
into account. The proof against him
must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment (People v.
Austria, 195 SCRA 700).
2. The requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt is a necessary corollary
of the constitutional right to be
presumed innocent (People vs. Dramayo,
G.R. No. L-21325 October 29, 1971).
3. In order that circumstantial evidence
may warrant conviction, the following
requisites may concur:
a. There is more than one circumstance;
b. The facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven;
25
c. The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
4. Equipoise rule. The equipoise rule
invoked by the petitioner is applicable
only where the evidence adduced by the
parties are evenly balanced, in which
case the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor
of the accused (Corpus v. People, 194
SCRA 73).
Right to be Heard
It means the accused is amply accorded legal
assistance extended by a counsel who
commits himself to the cause of the defense
and acts accordingly. It is an efficient and
truly decisive legal assistance, and not simply
a perfunctory representation (People v. Bermas,
GR 120420, April 21, 1999).
Elements:
a. The right to be represented at the trial;
b. The right to counsel;
c. The right to an impartial judge;
d. The right to compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses
(Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution:
A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011 Ed., p.
131).
The right may be waived provided that after
arraignment he may be compelled to appear
for the purpose of identification by the
witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he
unqualifiedly admits in open court after his
arraignment that he is the person named as
the defendant in the case on trial. Reasons for
requiring the presence of the accused despite
his waiver, is if allowed to be absent in all the
stages of the proceeding without giving the
People’s witness the opportunity to identify
him in court, he may in his defense say that
he was never identified as the person charged
in the information and, therefore, is entitle for
acquittal (People v. Presiding Judge, GR L-
64731, October 26, 1983).
Assistance of Counsel
1. Any person arrested detained or under
custodial investigation shall at all times
be assisted by counsel (Sec. 2 [a], RA
7438).
2. It means that the accused is amply
accorded legal assistance extended by a
counsel who commits himself to the
cause of the defense and acts
accordingly. Tersely put, it means an
efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance, and not simply a perfunctory
representation (People v. Bermas, supra).
3. A Public Attorney’s Office lawyer s
considered an independent counsel
within the contemplation of the
Constitution since he is not a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor,
and counsel of the police or municipal
attorney whose interest is admittedly
adverse to that of the accused (Estrada v.
Badoy, AM 01-12-01-SC, GR 120420, April
21, 1999).
4. The right to counsel upon being
questioned for the commission of a
crime is part of the Miranda rights, which
require that: . . . (a)any person under
custodial investigation has the right to
26
remain silent; (b) anything he says can
and will be used against him in a court
of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an
attorney before being questioned and to
have his counsel present when being
questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford
an attorney, one will be provided before
any questioning if he so desires. The
Miranda rights were incorporated in our
Constitution but were modified to
include the statement that any waiver of
the right to counsel must be made “in
writing and in the presence of counsel.”
The invocation of these rights applies
during custodial investigation, which
begins “when the police investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect taken into
custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions
to the person to elicit incriminating
statements.” (People of the Philippines vs.
Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor alias “Noy,”.
G.R. No. 207950. September 22, 2014)
5. The right to counsel during trial is not
subject to waiver (Flores v. Ruiz, 90 SCRA
428).
6. Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of
law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and without counsel, he may
be convicted not because he is guilty is
because he does not know how to
establish his innocence (People v.
Holgado, 86 Phil 752).
7. The long-standing rule is that a client is
bound by the mistake of his lawyer
(Andrada v. People, GR 135222, March 4,
2005).
 Exceptions:
a. When the negligence or
incompetence of his counsel is
deemed so gross as to have
prejudiced the constitutional right of
the accused to be heard (Andrada v.
People, supra).
b. The decision was set aside where it
appeared that there was merely a pro
forma appointment of a counsel de
officio who did not exert his efforts
for the protection of the accused
(People v. Magsi, 124 SCRA 64);
c. Where the accused manifested that
he had lost his confidence in his
counsel de officio and wanted to
retain counsel de Partee, but the
court still appointed the same
lawyers as counsel de officio, and
proceeded with the trial, there was
deemed a denial of this constitutional
guarantee (People v. Malunsing, 63
SCRA 493.
Right to be Informed
1. Reason:
a. To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him
as will enable him to make the
defense;
b. To avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same
cause; and
27
c. To inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should
be had (People v. Valdesancho, GR
137051-52, May 30, 2001).
2. Requisites. An information, in order to
ensure that the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of his accusation is not violated
must:
a. state the name of the accused; the
designation given to the offense by
the statute (People v, Quitlong, GR
121502, July 10, 1998);
b. state the acts or omissions so
complained of as constituting the
offense (Id.);
NOTE: The description not the
designation of the offense controls
(Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA
184).
c. the name of the offended party
(People v, Quitlong, supra);
d. the approximate time and date of the
commission of the offense (Id.); and
e. the place where the offense has been
committed (People v, Quitlong, GR
121502, July 10, 1998).
3. While the trial court can hold a joint trial
of two or more criminal cases and can
render a consolidated decision, it cannot
convict the accused of the complex crime
constitutive of the various crimes in the
two information. To do so would violate
 the right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him (People v. De Vera, GR
121462-63, June 9, 1999).
4. Void for vagueness doctrine; right to
information. The accuse is also denied
the right to be informed of the charge
against him, and to due process as well,
where the statute is self is couched in
such indefinite language that is not
possible for men of ordinary intelligence
to determine therefrom what acts or
omissions are punished. In this case, the
law is deemed void (Joseph Ejercito
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560,
November 19, 2001).
Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
1. All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies (CONST., Art. III,
Sec. 16).
2. The right to speedy disposition of cases
is deemed violated when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured; of when
without cause or justifiable motive a
long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried
(People vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First
Division and Third Division, et,al., G.R. No.
188165, December 11, 2013).
3. RA 8493 is a means of enforcing the right
of the accused to a speedy trial (Uy v.
Hon. Adrian, GR 159098, October 27,
2006).
28
“The arraignment of an accused shall be
held within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the information, or from the
date the accused has appeared before the
justice, judge or court in which the
charge is pending, whichever date last
occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not
guilty is entered, the accused shall have
at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for
trial. Trial shall commence within thirty
(30) days from arraignment as fixed by
the court.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the
crime charged, he/she shall state
whether he/she interposes a negative or
affirmative defense. A negative defense
shall require the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, while an affirmative
defense may modify the order of trial
and require the accused to prove such
defense by clear and convincing
evidence” (Sec. 7, RA 8493, [The Speedy
Trial Act]).
4. Impartial trial. The accused is entitled to
the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge
(People v. Opida, 142 SCRA 295).
NOTE: Impartiality of the judge cannot
be assailed on the ground that he
propounded clarificatory questions to
the accuse (People v. Castillo, GR 120282,
April 20 1998).
Pervasive publicity is not per se
prejudicial to the right of the accused to
a fair trial (People v. Sanchez, GR 1201039-
45, January 25, 1999).
5. Public trial. It is public when attendance
is open all irrespective of the defendants.
 However, when the evidence to be
presented may be characterized as
“offensive to decency or public morals,”
the proceeding may be limited to
friends, relatives and counsel (Garcia v.
Domingo, L-30104, July 25, 1973).
6. An accused has a right to a public trial,
but it is a right that belongs to him more
than anyone else, where his life or
liberty can be held critically in balance.
A public trial aims to ensure that he is
fairly dealt with and would not be
unjustly condemned and that his rights
are not compromised in secret conclaves
of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymous with a publicized trial; it
only implies that the court doors must
be open to those who wish to come, sit
in the available sears, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe
trial process (Re: Request for Live TV
Coverage of the Trial of former President
Joseph Estrada, AM 01-4-03-SC, June 29,
2001)
Right of Confrontation
1. The right has two-fold purpose:
a. Primarily, to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of
the witness by cross-examination;
b. Secondarily, to allow the judge to
observe the deportation of the
witness (Bernas, The 1987 Philippine
Constitution: A Comprehensive
Reviewer, 2011, p. 142).
2. Inadmissibility for lack of right to
confrontation:
29
a. Testimony of a witness who has not
submitted himself to cross
examination;
b. Affidavits of witnesses who are not
presented during the trial, hence not
subjected to cross examination–
hearsay, (Cariago v. Court of Appeals,
GR 143561, June 6, 2001)
3. Rule on Examination of a Child Witness.
The judge may exclude any person,
including the accused, whose presence
or conduct causes fear to the child (Sec.
25, [d], AM No. 004-07-SC).
4. Failure to present as witness poseur-
buyer in a prosecution for illegal sale of
marijuana, is not fatal to the
prosecution’s case, because what is
required is merely proof of the
consummation of the sale transaction if
there is convincing evidence that the
accused was a marijuana peddler and
not simply the victim of instigation (see
People v. Tapeda, 244 SCRA 339).
5. Preliminary investigation is not a part of
trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of
his rights, such as the right to confront
and cross-examine his accusers to
establish his innocence (Estrada v. Office
of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41,
January 21, 2015).
6. Unlike in the preliminary investigation
proper, an accused is not entitled as a
matter of right to be present, during the
preliminary examination nor to cross-
examine the witnesses presented against
him before his arrest, the purpose of said
examination being merely to determine
 whether or not there is sufficient reason
to issue a warrant of arrest. A
preliminary examination is generally a
proceeding ex-parte in which the person
charged has no right to participate or be
present. The right to confrontation of
witnesses neither applies to a
preliminary hearing (Marinas v. Siochi,
104 SCRA 423).
Right to Compulsory Process
1. The rights include (a) right to Secure
Attendance of Witness and (b) Right to
Production of Other Evidence (Nachura,
Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016 Ed.,
p. 258)
2. Requisites for compelling the attendance
of witnesses and the production of
evidence:
a. The evidence is really material;
b. Accused is not guilty of neglect in
previously obtaining the production
of such evidence;
c. The evidence will be available at the
time desired; and
d. No similar evidence can be obtained
(People v. Chua, GR 128280, April 4,
2001).
3. Subpoena is a process directed to a
person requiring him to attend and to
testify at the hearing or trial of an action
or at any investigation conducted under
the laws of the Philippines, or for the
taking of his deposition (Caamic v.
Galapon, 237 SCRA 390).
30
4. Before a subpoena duces tecum may
issue, the court must first be satisfied
that the following requisites are present:
a. The books, documents or other
things requested must appear prima
facie relevant to the issue subject of
the controversy (test of relevancy),
and
b. Such books must be reasonably
described by the parties to be readily
identified (test of definiteness) (Roco
v. Contreras, GR 158275, June 28,
2005).
Trial in Absentia
Requisites:
a. The accused has already been arraigned;
b. He has been duly notified of the trial;
c. His failure to appear is unjustifiable
(Parada v. Veneracion, AM No. RTJ-96-
1353, March 11, 1996).
NOTE: The reason for allowing trial in
absentia is to speed up the disposition of
criminal cases (People v. Salas, 143 SCRA
163).
O. RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
The right to speedy disposition of cases is
different from the right to speedy trial. While
the rationale for both rights is the same, the
right to speedy trial may only be invoked in
criminal prosecutions against courts of law.
The right to speedy disposition of cases,
however, may be invoked before any
tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial
(Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 231144,
February 19, 2020).
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and
to a speedy disposition of the case against
him was designed to prevent the oppression
of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time,
and to prevent delays in the administration of
justice by mandating the courts to proceed
with reasonable dispatch in the trial of
criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial
and a speedy disposition of a case is violated
only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
The inquiry as to whether or not an accused
has been denied such right is not susceptible
by precise qualification. The concept of a
speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept. x x x the CA
failed to consider the other factors that must
be present before the right to speedy case
determination may be considered to have
been waived. The CA did not consider the
length of delay and the reason for the delay.
The length of delay must be commensurate
with the reason thereof. (People v. Macasaet,
G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720, & 197324, March 5,
2018, J. CAGUIOA)
P. SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 17).
Scope and coverage
1. The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but testimonial compulsion
only (Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279).
31
2. The constitutional right of an accused
against self-incrimination proscribes the
use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from the accused
and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. (Dela
Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23,
2014).
3. The right against self-incrimination is
simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an
admission of his guilt. It does not apply
where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incriminating
statement but an object evidence (People
v. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167).
NOTE: Handwriting in connection with
a prosecution for falsification is not
allowed. Ratio: writing is something
more than moving the body, or the
hands, or the fingers; writing is not a
purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence
and attention; and in the case at bar
writing means that the petitioner herein
is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly
states (Beltran v. Samson 53 Phil 570).
Paraffin test without a lawyer is valid:
The right against self-incrimination
extends only to testimonial compulsion,
and not the use of the body of the
accused is examined (People v. Fieldad,
G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014).
Mandatory drug testing of a person
arrested for a non-drug-related offense
violates a person’s right to privacy
guaranteed under the right against
 unreasonable searches and seizures and
the right against self-incrimination. The
constitutional right against self-
incrimination proscribes the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and
not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. However, a
drug test result is immaterial evidence in
the prosecution for non-drug offenses.
Moreover, to impose mandatory drug
testing for all persons arrested
regardless of the crime or offense for
which the arrest was made is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution. We cannot
condone drug testing of all arrested
persons regardless of the crime or
offense for which the arrest is being
made (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No.
200748, July 23, 2014).
4. The prohibition extends to the
compulsion for the production of
documents, papers and chattels that may
be used as evidence against the witness,
except where that State has a right to
inspect the same such as the books of
accounts of corporations, under the
police or taxing powers (see Regala v.
Sandiganbayan ,262 SCRA 122).
Application
1. It is available not only in criminal
prosecutions but also in all other
government proceedings, including civil
actions and administrative or legislative
investigations. May be claimed not only
by accused but by any witness to whom
an incriminating question is addressed
(Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political
Law, 2009 Ed., p. 216).
32
a. Administrative proceedings with
penal aspect i.e. medical board
investigation (Pascual v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 345);
b. Forfeiture proceeding (Cabal v.
Kapunan, Jr., 6 SCRA 1064).
c. Fact-Finding investigation by an ad
hoc body (Galman vs. Pamaran, G.R.
Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985).
d. The right of the accused against self-
incrimination is extended to
respondents in administrative
investigations that partake of the
nature of or are analogous to
criminal proceedings. The privilege
has consistently been held to extend
to all proceedings sanctioned by law;
and to all cases in which punishment
is sought to be visited upon a
witness, whether a party or not
(Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, 203 SCRA 767). However,
the rights are invocable only when
the accused is under custodial
investigation. A person undergoing a
normal audit examination is not
under custodial investigation and,
hence, the audit examiner may not be
considered the law enforcement
officer contemplated by the rule. De
Castro vs. People, G.R. No. 171672,
February 02, 2015)
NOTE: Petitioners neither stand as
accused in a criminal case nor will
they be subjected by the respondent
to any penalty by reason of their
testimonies. Hence, they cannot
altogether decline appearing before
respondent, although they may
 invoke the privilege when a question Q. RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
calling for an incriminating answer is
propounded (Standard Chartered Bank
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
v... Senate Committee on Banks, G.R.
punishment for the same offense. If an act is
167173, December 27, 2007).
punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall
2. A corporation may be compelled to constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
submit to the visitorial powers of State same act (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 21).
even if this will result in disclosure of
criminal acts of the corporation (Hale v.
Requisites
Henkel 201 US 43).

1. A valid complaint or information;

Immunity Statutes
2. Filed before competent court;

1. Transactional Immunity Statute provides

that the testimony of any person or 3. To which defendant was pleaded;
whose possession of documents or other
evidence necessary or convenient to a. Jeopardy attaches:
determine the truth in any investigation
conducted is immune from criminal
prosecution for an offense to which such i. Upon good indictment;
compelled testimony relates (see Mapa, ii. Before a competent court;
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783); iii. After arraignment;
iv. After plea.
Example: One of the functions of the
Commission on Human Rights is to
4. Defendant was previously acquitted or
grant immunity from prosecution to any
convicted or the case dismissed or
person whose testimony or whose
otherwise terminated without his
possession of documents or other
express consent (Nachura, Outline
evidence is necessary or convenient to
Reviewer in Political Law, 2016 Ed., p. 273).
determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority
(CONST., Art. XIII, Sec. 18[8]). a. To substantiate a claim of double
jeopardy, the following must be
proven:
2. Use Immunity Statute/ Use-and-Derivative
prohibits the use of a witness’ compelled
testimony and its fruits in any manner in i. A first jeopardy must have
connection with the criminal prosecution attached prior to the second
of the witness (Galman v. Pamaran, 138 (Bernas, The 1987 Philippine
SCRA 272). Constitution: A Comprehensive
Reviewer, 2011 Ed., p. 161).

33
 NOTE: In one case, the accused
had first entered a plea of guilty.
Subsequently, however, he
testified, in the course of being
allowed to prove mitigating
circumstances that he acted in
complete self-defense. Said
testimony, therefore — as the
court a quo recognized in its
decision — had the effect of
vacating his plea of guilty and the
court a quo should have required
him to plead a new on the charge,
or at least direct that a new plea
of not guilty be entered for him.
This was not done. It follows that
in effect there having been no
standing plea at the time the court
a quo rendered its judgment of
acquittal, there can be no double
jeopardy (People v. Balisican, G.R.
No. L-26376, August 31, 1966).
ii. The first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated;
1) By acquittal
2) By final conviction
3) By dismissal without express
consent of the accused
4) By dismissal on merits Bernas,
The 1987 Philippine
Constitution: A Comprehensive
Reviewer, 2011 Ed., p. 163)
iii. The second jeopardy must be for
the same offense, or the second
offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in
the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or is
a frustration thereof (Bernas, The
1987 Philippine Constitution: A
34
Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011 Ed.,
p. 161).
The constitutional meaning of
“the same offense” includes any
offense charged in the former
complaint or information (Tacas v.
People, L-37406, August 31, 1976).
Doctrine of Supervening Facts. The accused
may still be prosecuted for another offense if
a subsequent development changes the
character of the first indictment under which
he may have already been charged or
convicted. Thus, under Section 7, Rule 117,
Rules of Court, the conviction of the accused
shall not be a bar to another prosecution of
the for an offense which necessarily includes
the offense in the original complaint in the
information when:
1) The graver offense developed due to
supervening facts arising from the same
act or omission;
2) Facts constituting the grave offense
arose or were discovered only after the
filing of the former complaint or
information;
3) The plea of guilty to a lesser was made
without the consent of the fiscal or the
offended party (People v. Judge Villarama,
210 SCRA 246).
Limitations
Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal
1. A judgment of acquittal, even if
erroneous, ends the case finally (People v.
Hernando, 108 SCRA 121) A judgment of
acquittal becomes final immediately after
 promulgation and cannot be recalled for
correction or amendment, because of the
doctrine that nobody may be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offence (Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100).
2. No error, how flagrant, committed by the
court against the State, can be reversed by
it for decision of the Supreme Court when
the defendant has once been place in
jeopardy and discharged even though the
discharge was the result of the error
committed (State v. Rook, 49 L.R.A.186,
quoted in People v. Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil.
475).
3. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot
appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the
defendant in a criminal case. The reason is
that a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory, and the
prosecution is barred from appealing lest
the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy be violated. Despite
acquittal, however, either the offended
party or the accused may appeal, but only
with respect to the civil aspect of the
decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal
may be assailed through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court showing that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment, but
also exercised grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
or a denial of due process, thereby
rendering the assailed judgment null and
void. If there is grave abuse of discretion,
granting petitioner’s prayer is not
tantamount to putting private
respondents in double jeopardy. (People vs.
CA, et. al., G.R. No. 183652, February 25,
2015).
35
4. The rule prohibiting appeal should not be
avoided in the guise of certiorari (Central
Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41859,
March 8, 1989). The special civil action for
certiorari is intended for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction. Its principal office is
only to keep the inferior court within the
parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent
it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It is not a remedy for errors of
judgment (People v. CA, G.R. No. 142051,
February 24, 2004).
5. However, an appeal from the order from
the order of dismissal shall not constitute
double jeopardy:
a. Dismissal is made upon motion, or
with the express consent of the
defendant;
b. Dismissal is not acquittal or based
upon consideration of the evidence or
on the merits of the case;
c. The question to be passed upon by the
appellate court is purely legal so that
should the dismissal be found
incorrect, the case would have to be
remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings, to determine the
guilt or innocence of the defendant
(People of the Philippines v. City of
Manila, G.R. No. L-36528, September 24,
1987).
6. The accused cannot appeal a judgment of
acquittal, except to strike out and expunge
from the records the hurtful and irrelevant
remarks against the accused (People v.
Mendoza, 74 Phil. 119).
 Dismissal with Consent of Accused the prosecution and the accused move
for a provisional dismissal of the case;

1. A case shall not be provisionally

dismissed except with the express consent
of the accused and with notice to the
offended party. (Rule 117, Sec. 8 [1]).
2. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the
express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of a criminal case is
to bar him from subsequently asserting
that the revival of the criminal case will
place him in double jeopardy for the same
offense or for an offense necessarily
included therein (Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Vol. II, 9th Revised Edition, p.
442; People v. Bellosillo, 9 SCRA 835 (1963).
b. the offended party is notified of the
motion for a provisional dismissal of
the case;
c. the court issues an order granting the
motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;
d. the public prosecutor is served with a
copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case (Id.).

3. Express consent to a provisional dismissal R. RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY

is given either viva voce or in writing. It is SERVITUDE
a positive, direct, unequivocal consent
requiring no inference or implication to
No involuntary servitude in any form shall
supply its meaning. Where the accused
exist except as a punishment for a crime
writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a
whereof the party shall have been duly
provisional dismissal of the case No
convicted (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 18).
objection or with my conformity, the
writing amounts to express consent of the
accused to a provisional dismissal of the 1. It is every condition of enforced or
case. The mere inaction or silence of the compulsory service of one to another no
accused to a motion for a provisional matter under what form for such
dismissal of the case or his failure to object servitude may be disguised (Rubi v.
to a provisional dismissal does not Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660).
amount to express consent (People v. Exceptions:
Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003).

a. As punishment for a crime whereof

4. The respondent is burdened to establish
the essential requisites of the first
paragraph thereof, namely:
a. the prosecution with the express
conformity of the accused or the
accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both
one has been duly convicted
(CONST., Art. III, Sec. 18[2]);
b. Service in defense of the state
(CONST., Art. II, Sec. 4; see People v.
Zosam 38 O.G. 1676);
c. Naval enlistment (See Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 75);
d. Posse commitatus (power of the county,
poder del condado) – an ancient

36
 obligation of the individual to assist
in the protection of the peace and
good order of his community is still
recognized in all well-organized
governments. Under this power,
those persons in the state, county, or
town who were charged with the
maintenance of peace and good order
were bound, ex oficio, to pursue and
to take all persons who had violated
the law. For that purpose they might
command all the male inhabitants of
a certain age to assist them. (see U.S.
v. Pompeya, 31 SCRA 245);
e. Return to work order in industries
affected with public interest
(Kapisanan ng mga Manggawa sa Kahoy
v. Gotamco Sawmills, 45 O.G. Supp. No.
9, p. 147); and
f. Patria potestas -- Children are obliged
to obey their parents so long as they
are under parental power, and to
observe respect and reverence
toward them always (NCC, Art. 311).
S. RIGHT AGAINST EXCESSIVE FINES
AND CRUEL AND INHUMAN
PUNISHMENTS
1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 19 [1]).
2. The employment of physical,
psychological, or degrading punishment
against any prisoner or detainee or the
37
use of substandard or inadequate penal
facilities under subhuman conditions
shall be dealt with by law (CONST., Art.
III, Sec. 19 [2]).
3. The prohibition against cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment extends only to
situations of extreme corporeal or
psychological punishment that strips the
individual of his humanity. It applies
only to a punishment that is flagrantly
and plainly oppressive and wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of
the community. Perpetual
disqualification from public office for the
repeated failure to file the SOCE and
does not constitute cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment (Maturan v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227155,
March 28, 2017).
4. Mere severity does not constitute cruel
or inhuman punishment (People v.
Dionisio, 22 SCRA 299). To violate
constitutional guarantee, penalty must
be flagrant and plainly oppressive,
disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the senses of the
community. Thus, to determine whether
a penalty is cruel and inhuman, the
following factors shall be considered:
a. A punishment must not be so severe
as to be degrading to the dignity of
human beings
b. It must not be applied arbitrarily
c. It must not be unacceptable to
contemporary society
d. It must not be excessive, and it must
serve a penal purpose more
effectively than a less severe
punishment would.
 e. Excessive fine, or one which is
disproportionate to the offense
(Justice Brennan Concurring in Furman
v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238, in Bernas, The
1987 Constitution: A Comprehensive
Reviewer, 2011 Ed., p. 154).
5. Death penalty is not cruel or unusual
punishment (People v. Camano, 115 SCRA
688). It is an exercise of the State’s power
to secure society against the threatened
and actual evil (People v. Echegaray, 267
SCRA 682).
6. The constitutional exercise of this
limited power to re-impose the death
penalty entails (1) that Congress define
or describe what is meant by heinous
crimes; (2) that Congress specify and
penalize by death, only crimes that
qualify as heinous in accordance with
the definition or description set in the
death penalty bill and/or designate
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death in which latter case, death can
only be imposed upon the attendance of
circumstances duly proven in court that
characterize the crime to be heinous in
accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill;
and (3) that Congress, in enacting this
death penalty bill be singularly
motivated by "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes" (Id.).
7. Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence
that the death penalty per se is not a
cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. In the oft-cited case of
Harden v. Director of Prisons (81 Phil 741),
this Court held that punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of
death is not cruel, within the meaning of
38
that word as used in the constitution. It
implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life.' Would the
lack in particularity then as to the details
involved in the execution by lethal
injection render said law 'cruel,
degrading or inhuman'? The Court
believes not (People v. Mercado, G.R. No,
116239).
8. Indisputably, Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights enshrines the
individual's right to life. Nevertheless,
Article 6(2) of the Covenant explicitly
recognizes that capital punishment is an
allowable limitation on the right to life,
subject to the limitation that it be
imposed for the most serious crimes
(Id.).
NOTE: On July 27, 1982, the Human
Rights Committee issued General
Comment No. 6 interpreting Article 6 of
the Covenant stating that '(while) it
follows from Article 6(2) to (6) that State
parties are not obliged to abolish the
death penalty totally, they are obliged to
limit its use and, in particular, to abolish
it for other than the 'most serious
crimes.' Accordingly, they ought to
consider reviewing their criminal laws in
this light and, in any event, are obliged
to restrict the application of the death
penalty to the 'most serious crimes.' The
article strongly suggests (pars. 2[2] and
[6]) that abolition is desirable. x x x. The
Committee is of the opinion that the
expression 'most serious crimes' must be
read restrictively to mean that the death
penalty should be a quite exceptional
measure. Further, The Safeguards
Guaranteeing Protection of Those Facing
 the Death Penalty adopted by the
Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations declare that the ambit of
the term 'most serious crimes' should not
go beyond intentional crimes, with lethal
or other extremely grave consequences
(Id.).
3. Poll tax – can be understood as the cedula
tax or residence tax. The Constitution
does not prohibit the cedula tax but it
prohibits imprisonment for non-
payment of the cedula or residence tax
(Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution:
A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011 Ed., p.
160).

T. NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBTS

1. No person shall be imprisoned for debt
or non-payment of a poll tax (CONST.,
Art. III, Sec. 20).
U. EX POST FACTO LAW AND
BILL OF ATTAINDER
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall
be enacted (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 22).

2. Debt – any civil obligation arising from

contract (Bernas, The 1987 Philippine
Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer,
2011 Ed., p. 160).
1. Kinds (Nachura, Outline Reviewer
a. Generally, a debtor cannot be
imprisoned for failure to pay his
debt. However, if he contracted his
debt through fraud, he can be validly
punished in a criminal action as his
responsibility arises not from the
contract of loan but from commission
of a crime (Lozano v. Martinez, G.R.
No. L‐63419, December 18, 1986).
b. BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) does not
violate the constitutional provision of
non-imprisonment for debt. The
gravamen of the offence is not the
non-payment of a debt but putting
into circulation of a worthless check
(Id.).
c. BP 115 (Trust Receipt Law) does not
seek to enforce a loan but to punish
dishonesty and abuse of confidence
in the handling of money or goods to
the prejudice of another.
Ex Post Facto law
in
Political Law, 2016 Ed., p. 279):
a. Law criminalizing act done before its
passage;
b. Law aggravating penalty for crime
committed before passage;
c. Law inflicting greater or more severe
penalty;
d. Law altering legal rules of evidence
and receives less or different testimony
than law required at the time of
commission, in order to convict
accused;
e. Law assuming to regulate civil rights
and remedies only, in effect imposes a
penalty of deprivation of right for
something which when done was
lawful; and,
f. Law depriving accused of some lawful
protection to which he had been
entitled, such a protection of a former

39
 conviction or acquittal, or of
proclamation of amnesty.
2. Characteristics (Nachura, Outline Reviewer
in Political Law, 2009 Ed., p.230):
a. It refers to criminal matters;
b. It is retroactive in application; and
c. It works to the prejudice of the
accused.
Bill of Attainder
It is a legislative act that inflicts punishment
without trial (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
Political Law, 2009 Ed., p.230; Cummings v.
Missouri, 4 Wall 277, 323).
Essential Elements (Bernas, the 1987
Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011
Ed., p. 181):
1. There must be a law;
2. The law imposes penal burden on a
named individual or easily ascertainable
member of a group;
3. The penal burden is imposed directly by
law without judicial trial.
Writ of Habeas Corpus
1. The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in
cases of invasion or rebellion when
public safety requires it (CONST., Art.
III, Sec. 18).
2. It is a writ issued by the court directed to
a person detaining another,
40
a commanding him to produce the body
of the prisoner at designated time and
place, with the day and cause of his
capture and detention, to do, to submit
to, and to receive whatever court or
judge awarding writ shall consider in his
behalf (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
Political Law, 2009, p. 210).
3. Except as otherwise expressly provided
by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled
thereto (ROC, Rule 102, Sec. 1).
4. The “great writ of liberty” of habeas
corpus “was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as
the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.” Habeas corpus is an
extraordinary, summary, and equitable
writ, consistent with the law’s “zealous
regard for personal liberty.” Its primary
purpose “is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.” The restraint of
liberty need not be confined to any
offense so as to entitle a person to the
writ. Habeas corpus may be availed of as
a post-conviction remedy or when there
is an alleged violation of the liberty of
abode. (In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus, SSgt. Edgardo L. Osorio, vs.
Assistant State Prosecutor Juan Pedro C.
Navera, et al. G.R. No. 223272, February
26, 2018)
5. The writ will not issue where the person
alleged to be restrained of liberty is in
the custody of an officer under a process
issued by the court which has
jurisdiction to do so. The ultimate
purpose of the writ is to relieve a person
from lawful restraint. It is essentially a
writ on inquiry and is granted to test the
right under which he was detained.
Even if the detention is, at its inception,
illegal, supervening events, such as the
issuance of a judicial process, may
prevent discharge of the detained person
(Jackson v. Macalino, G.R. No. 139255,
November 24, 2003).
6. The waiver by the detainee or arrested
person of his right to be delivered to the
proper judicial authorities within the
periods provided in Article 125 of the
RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO,
BJMP, and PNP the unbridled right to
indefinitely incarcerate him. The waiver
must coincide with the prescribed period
for preliminary investigation. Detention
beyond this period violates the accused's
constitutional right to liberty. Stated
differently, the waiver of the effects of
Article 125 of the RPC is not a license to
detain a person ad infinitum and does
not trump his constitutional right in
cases where probable cause was initially
found wanting by reason of the dismissal
of the complaint filed before the
prosecutor's office, even if such dismissal
is on appeal, reconsideration,
reinvestigation or on automatic review
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Department of Justice, G.R. No. 232413, July
25, 2017).
7. A person is illegally arrested and
detained because of a mistaken identity
can avail himself of a petition for habeas
corpus (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas
41
Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, v.
Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597,
April 8, 2015).
Writ of Kalikasan
The writ is a remedy available to a natural or
juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people’s organization, non-governmental
organization, or any public interest group
accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons
whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity, involving environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two
or more cities or provinces (A.M. No. 09-6-8-
SC, 13 April 2010).
For a Writ of Kalikasan to issue, the following
requisites must concur:
1. There is an actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology;
2. The actual or threatened violation
arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or
entity; and
3. The actual or threatened violation
involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces.
(Segovia et.al. v. The Climate Change
Commission, et.al., G.R. No. 211010,
March 7, 2017, J. CAGUIOA)
 Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available
to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, 2
February 2008).
Writ of Amparo
1. It is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty, and security
has been violated or is threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or
entity (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, 25
September 2007).
removing from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time
(Id.).
4. Meaning of extralegal killings: Killings
committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings (Id.).
5. Elements of Enforced Disappearance:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention,
abduction or any form of deprivation
of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by,
or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization; (c) that it be followed by
the State or political organization's
refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts
of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and, (d) that the intention for
such refusal is to remove subject
person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time (Id.).

2. The protective writ of amparo is a ---oOo---

judicial remedy to expeditiously
provide relief to violations of a
person's constitutional right to life,
liberty, and security, and more
specifically, to address the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof (Callo
v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No.
230324, September 19, 2017).

3. Meaning of enforced disappearance:

The arrest, detention, or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of a State or a
political organization followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts
of those persons, with the intention of

42