Republic of the Philippines
NATIONAL POLICE COM
ISSION
NAPOLCOM CENTRAL OFFICE
NAPOLCOM Bldg., EDSA corner Qt
Quezon City
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
Complainant - Appellee,
yzon Avenue
Administrative Case No.
RIAS3-NMP-ADM-22-022
-versus- For: Gi
‘CONDUC
\VE MISCONDUCT and
UNBECOMING OF A
POLICE OFFICER.
PMAJ FERDINAND MANA MENDOZA;
PSSG MHARK ANTHONY REYES IRAL;
PSSG SANNYRIC — SALANGSANG|
ALICANTE; PCPL KENNETH RHEINER|
FERRER DELFIN; PCPL RICHMOND)
PINAS FRANCIA; PCPL JOHN GERVIC
NIEVA FAJARDO; PAT HERMOGINES|
ABRERA ROSARIO, JR; and PAT|
LEANDRO MANGATE VELOSO,
Respondents - Appellants.
x
MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL
TO THIS HONORABLE OF
COMMISSION, comes the respondent
NATIONAL POLICE
appellant, PAT
HEROMGINES ABRERA ROSARIO, JR, through by the
undersigned counsel, most respectfully af
peals the Resolution
dated 08 November 2023 and Decision dated 18 August 2022,
respectively, and in support thereof, furthel
following, to wit-
respectfully submit the
4.0 PREFATORY STATEMENT
In the assailed Decision rendered by tt
the Chief of the Philippine National Poli
distinguished Office of
on the above-entitled
case, and respondent - appellant was |meted the penalty of
DISMISSAL from the PNP service in the asspiled Decision dated 18
August 2022. Although, a Motion for
Reconsideration was
seasonably filed, however, the same has been denied in a
Resolution dated 08 November 2023.With all due respect, it is an obvious| violation and disregard
of the right to due process was cpmmitted against the
respondents - appellants in this case. 1]
the assailed Decision is based on mere al
e Honorable Office in
gations not supported
by evidence sufficient to draw a conclusidn so as to comply with
Sec. 14, Article VIII of the constitution.
Honorable Supreme Court held the followi
On this premise, the
9, to wit-
"The court finds occasidn to remind
courts and quasi-judicial bodies that “[a]
decision should faithfully
imply with
Section 14, Article VIII of the |Constitution
which provides that no decision shall be
rendered by any court [or
body) without expressing th
jasi-judicial
rein clearly
case and
Itisa
requirement of due process and fair play
that the parties to a l
explanation of the factual]
reasons that led to the conel
court [or quasi-judicial body]|
igation be
led, with an
and legal
jsions of the
A decision
that does not clearly and distinctly state
the facts and law on which|
it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how
it was reached and is
prejudicial to the losing p
unable to pinpoint the possil
the court for quasi-judicial
review by a higher tribunal.
In administrative proceedings, due pr
opportunity to explain one's side or th
especially
ty, who is
le errors of
body] for
cess simply means the
‘opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of”. The standard
1 Saballla vs. NLRC, ibid, citing Nicos
Industrial Corp vs CA, 206 SCRA 127,
2M, Ramirez Industries vs. The
Honorable Secretary of Labor and
Employment and Carolyn Alfaro, et
al., G.R. No. 89894, January 3, 1997.
-2-of due process that must be met in adminis
ratve tribunals allows @
certain latitude as long as the element of fairess is not ignored
Although respondents — appellants wet
however, they were not afforded the proc
which includes the right to present one’s ca:
support thereof, and more importantly, to
and their witnesses. Right to a hearin
element of due. process’.
In the said administrative hearing,
served with summons,
ural right to a hearing
and submit evidence in
mnfront the complainants
py is an indispensable
herein respondents -
rable office could have
appellants may be afforded the right to ojo the complainant and
his alleged witnesses, and thereafter, this hot
evaluated and assessed the instant case in
mandated by our constitutional provisions.
In addition, administrative due process
notice, be it actual or constructive, of|
proceedings that may affect a person's
opportunity to appear and defend his
witnesses and relevant evidence in his
constituted as to give him reasonable a
impartiality, and one of competent jurisdicti
decision by that tribunal supported by subste
at the hearing or at least ascertained in th
the parties’
Due process is an assurance and a
faimess®. It is designed to secure justice
sacrifice it by paying undue homage to for
Vigilant not for those who, having the right t
silent, only to complain later that they must
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
3 Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs.
Amores, 152 SCRA 237.
4 Fontelera vs. Amore, 70 SCRA 37.
Singson vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 1222389,
June 9, 1997.
Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs.
Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 25 SCRA 700.
Albert vs. University Publication Co.,
Inc., 13 SCRA 84
manner prescribed and
includes (a) the right to
the institution of the
right; (b) reasonable
ints and to introduce
vor, (¢) a tribunal so
lurance of honesty and
1; and (d) a finding or
jal evidence presented
records or disclosed to
\guaranty of justice and
's a living reality, not to
ality’. It is only for the
be heard, choose to be
been heard. Itis the
bmit any evidence onemay have in support of his defense. It guarantees the observance of
both substantive and procedural rights ~ -
Iwhatever the source of
such sights, be it Constitution itself or only a statute or @ rule of
court
Based on all the foregoing Supreme|
respondents - appellants have definitely
constitutional right to due process of law.
Court pronouncements,
lbeen deprived of their
2.0 TIMELINESS OF THE] APPEAL
On 24 November 2023, herein respon
a copy of the Resolution dated 08 Nov
DENIED respondents’ Motion for Consi
dated 18 August 2022 rendered by the Off
Hence, herein respondent-appellant
lent — appellant received
ber 2023 which has
ration to the Decision
of the Chief PNP.
has ten (10) days or
precisely until 04 December 2023 within which to file this Notice of
‘Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal, and
within the reglementary period.
Ithus, the same is filed
3.0 GROUNDS RELIED UPON TER THE GRANT
OF THE APPEAL
Respondent - Appellant, PAT ROS ABRERA
ROSARIO, JR., is very much confident that
a second hard look on the following grounds:
3.1. RESPONDENTS - APPE!
BEEN DENIED THE Ri
PROCESS OF LAW.
3.2 THE ASSAILED DECISI
CLEARLY AND DISTINCT}
THE ISSUES, AND FUR’
EXTENSIVELY EXPRES‘
AND THE LAW ON
BASED.
8 Cong. Aniag, Jr. vs. Comelec, et al.,
G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994,
-4-
e instant case deserves
LLANTS HAVE
HHT TO DUE
IN DID NOT
Y RESOLVED
HER DID NOT
THE FACTS
ICH IT WAS33 RESPONDENT — sereav DOES
iE
NOT DESERVED To DISMISSE!
D
FROM THE SERVICE, |
4.0 DISCUSSION 1 anc)ucars
4.1 RESPONDENT — APPELLANT
HAS BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT |
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. |
———SEPROCESS OF LAW.
4441
As mentioned earlier, alth ugh the respondents —
appellants were
served with summons, however, they were not
afforded the procedural right to a hearing|which includes the right
to present one’s case and submit evidence in ‘Support thereof, Right
to a hearing is an indispensable it of due process®.
Respondents — appellants were irrefragably denied due process,
Its to this humbly submission that it is not enough
that the respondents - appellants were setved with summons and
made to file their counter affidavit and other material evidence. In the
summary dismissal proceedings, respondents - appellants should
afforded the right to confront the complainants and their alleged
witnesses, and thereafter, this honorable office could have evaluated
and assessed the instant case in a manner prescribed and mandated
by our constitutional provisions. Worth emphasizing that
complainants-witnesses have executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance
which has been ignored by the honorable office.
|
Although an administrative hearing was conducted,
however, the respondents — appellants were not given the
‘opportunity fo examine the complainants and his witnesses
which is indispensable element of an administrative hearing.
Unfortunately, the administrative hearing vas only held purposely to
explore the possibilty of setting the issue or dispute.
|
If only the Honorable had afforded the
respondents — appellants the procedural right to a hearing which is
an indispensable element of due procass, the distinguished assigned
hearing officer could have evaluated personally and more extensively
the instant case and more importantly the complainant and his
witnesses including that of the respondents, and in a manner
prescribed and mandated by our constitutional provisions. As such,
the distinguished hearing officer would be able to weigh the pieces of
evidence submitted and adduced by the parti
° Fontelera vs. Amore, 70 SCRA 37.
“Se44.2 Though inistrati
rocesdi _ Procedural rules in administrative
ce are less stringent and often| applied more liberally,
fundament ie Proceedings are not exempt from basic and
invest ‘al procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
igations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural
due process is applicable to administrative proceedings.
Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due
Process is simply an opportunity to be Heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity ta explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration the action or ruling
complained of. ?
413 unerqualy, this ue, as & is stated, strips down
administrative due process to its most fundamental nature and
sufficiently justifies freeing administrative | proceedings from the
Tigiity of procedural requirements. In particular, however, due
process in administrative proceedings has iso been recognized to
include the following: (1) the right to actual rr constructive notice of
the institution of proceedings which may affpct a respondent's legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard! personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's
favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to affprd a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee pf honesty as well as
impartiality, and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
41.4 Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising
quasi-judicial powers are not strictly [bound by procedural
requirements, they are still bound by law aye equity to observe the
10 Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 36
Phil. 486, 491 (1999).
11 Westmont Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Samaniego, G.R. Nos. 146653-54, 20
February 2006, 482 SCRA 611, 619.
12 pO2 Ruel C. Montoya Petitioner, vs. Police
Director Reynaldo P. Varilla, Regional
Director, National Capital Region, Poli
Office, and Atty. Rufino Jeffrey L. Mé
Regional Legal Affairs Service, Respontlei
G.R. No. 180146, December 18, 2008
nts.
és{undamental requirements of due process
to be heard and widence I
of a trivial
in iministra
the application of th i
safegi 'e principle of
445
ne re inicallt
the alia mater in_any administrative or ici proceedings. ® In
due process, what is sought to be
juarded is not lack ‘of previous notice but the denial of the
opportunity to be heard
; The cardinal precept is that where there is a
violation of basi a
ic constitutional rights, cout
Jurisdiction, The violation of a partys right
s are ousted from their
jo due process raises a
Serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
‘ fundamental right of due
Process is apparent, a decision rendered in|disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction *®
416 The rule must be equall
true for quasi-judicial
administrative bodies, for the constitutional guarantee that no man
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is
unqualified by what type of proceedin
administrative) he stands to lose the
Decision dated 05 February 2020 of this
sing fe appellants
4.2 THE ASSAILED DECISION DID
NOT CLEARLY AND
DISTINCTLY RESOLVED THE
ISSUES, AND FURTHER DID
18 National Power Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil.
89, 107 (1997); citing Philippine
National Construction Corporation v.
Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. L-80485, 11
November 1988, 167 SCRA 294, 301.
14 Vda. de Emnas v. Emnas, 184 Phil.
419, 424 (1980).
1 State Prosecutors v. Muro, Adm. Mat
No. RTJ-92-876, 19 September 1994,
236 SCRA 505, 522-523; see
also Paulin v. Gimenez , G.R. No.
103323, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA’
386, 392.
(whether judicial orNOT EXTENSIVELY EXPRESS
THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON
WHICH IT WAS BASEt
424 With the highest respect tt this Honorable Office,
herein respondent ~ appellant strongly cofftends that the assailed
decision did not clearly and distinctly resolved the issues, and further
eo extensively express the facts and the law on which it was,
a
422 In resolving the instant cai
or proof of robbery, versus Shotgun
conclusion.
is the lack of evidence
iccusation, of general
‘As aforementioned, the assailed Decision finds and
contends that:
“Respondents were charged |as'follows . « -
“took and carried away) the personal
belongings, among others, of|Xiao Han, Hong
Zu YI, Qi Chenze, Yang Hai Long. Ma Yun Xin,
Li Sheng Qian, Wang Yow
Basilio Carolina with intent to
their consent” (page 1):
Applying the law (Art. 293,
‘elements of the crime of robbery is present (ie,
1. There is taking: 2. Of another's personal
property: 3. With animus luerqndi; and 4. With
violence, intimidation,or force),|that is, the act of
the respondents in forcibly entering the house of
the private complainants, ining them with
violence and Intimidation, taking the
{firearms that belong to the priate complainants
with intent to gain constitute the crime of
robbery (page 2)
) in the case, the
Furthermore, the documer
circumstantial pieces of evidence presented by
the prosecution are substantial enough and
worthy of belief to prove that respondents
committed Grave Misconduct (page 3);”
4.2.3 There is nothing in the Decision |which points or refer to
any such documentary and circumstantial pieces of evidence
allegedly presented by the prosecution which prove substantialenol |
ugh and worthy of belief to evidence tt
Tesponder i misconduct ascribe to
Pondents. There is only such allegation of insinuation
4.24 Itis ele 7 ,
rendition, muse eementary that a Decision n laying the bass fr ts
is finding oF corer ex the reasons br ergumenis supporting
Nn. More importantly, tHe facts or evidences that
: ;
‘upport Such reason or arguments must be ¢learly and unequivocally
Presented and elucidated. However, there was none that was even
remotely mentioned in this Decision other than the bare allegation or
Statement of prosecution witness stated in th
“Affidavit of Arrest’.
4.2.5 Should such adjudication be a
obtained thereby can never be valid and a
beg the question or issue resolved in
evidences of respondents’ guilt for Robbery
the Affidavit of Arrest of the prosecution wit
of Arrest proves Robbery committed by
Affidavit is evidence enough to substantiate
ded to, the reasoning
pted, for it will always
the conclusion that is,
re substantial based on
sses, thus, the Affidavit
respondents as such
1e same.
4.2.6 This is all that the Decision
conclusion pronouncing the guilt of respon
evidence to clearly and satisfyingly sub:
against them.
inuates, a generalized
nts sans the particular
fantiate the accusation
4.2.7 If so (lack of evidence), how fan there even be an
appreciation that such (prosecution) evidence are substantial enough
and worthy of belief to prove that respontients committed Grave
Misconduct? Make no mistake, the assailed Decision clearly made a
sweeping generalization of respondents’ |guilt premised on an
apparent lack of evidence (other than the bare allegation in the
Affidavit of Arrest) and utter disregard of controverting evidences
proffered by respondents that exculpate them from such accusation.
4.2.8 Indeed, how can it even be said that the law (Art. 283,
RPC) applies in the case when there is not even a single proof of
the following elements: (1) "TAKING" of |personal property; (2)
“BELONGING TO ANOTHER"; and (3) "WITH INTENT TO GAIN"?
\
a. What are these personal properties referred to in the
Charge Sheet?
b. Whose properties are these, or were they validated to
be owned by any of the eight (8) persons stated in the
Charge Sheet, or that will just Be simply presumed or
assumed therein?
¢. What prosecution exhibits are|these sald personal
properties?d. Were the.
Se 5
t proves et actually taken away? How so?
0 be so? Is tere any validation or
confirmation
at all of i
away, stolen or iene ‘personal properties taken
- If so,
bee how was there intent to gain at all if taking of
rty is not even established or validated? Again»
9
ais that simply presumed of assumed from the
\ffidavit of Arrest of prosecution witnesses? ;
‘evidence therein? IS
J What firearm is being referred to fs
that firearm licensed so it can
treated as personal property?
g. Whose firearm is that? Was there any
ownership?
legally and validly
validation of its
this case pertinent to an o
nature only to the offended party?
4.2.10 The foregoing queries a d refutation are vital
matters that need to be cicessed more than simply pronouncing ine
respondents are guilty and must be dismissed from service. For the
foregoing clearly spells not merely of an al trary Decision but more
importantly of plain denial of due process where, simply, the facts an
application of the law is not only rende fed doubtful but fatally
incongruent to evidence submitted (if not lack of evidence at all).
4.2.11 Thus, Article Ill, Section 4 bf the 1987 Constitution
provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property
Without due process of law’. And lest it be forgotten, ‘employment, like
any personal or real property, is such a right to property in that it is
the source of sustenance of a person's incame and means of living
for himself and his family. Thus, being such a property right, no less
than the Constitution mandates that before a person be deprived to
his right of employment or property, due process of law must first be
afforded him.
4.2.12 This circumstance scenario is exactly that sort
depicted in the case of Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, to which the
Supreme Court heavily warns —
“Looking at the present instance with an
absolutely objective eye, we are not disposed to
accept as gospel truth complainants imputationand proof. The
Should by oe
y ° e fittingly treated for what
speculate re accusatidns founded on
temerity m pane Conjecture; if not sheer
lawye rhaps we may hot realize it, but
unsubstantiated worse, e1
Prevaricated-claims. (emphasis, ours)
xxx
We must emphasize that a|mere charge or
allegation of wrongdoing dbes not suffice.
Accusation is not synonymous, with guilt. There
must always be sufficient evidence to support
the charge. T
XXX
The standard of substantial evidence required
in administrative proceedings is more than a
mere scintilla (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940].|. . While rules of
evidence prevalling in courts df law and equity
shall not be controlling. . . , this assurance of a
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure
does not go so far as to justify orders without
basis in evidence having rational probative
force (Ang Tibay).
XxX |
Lamentably, the evidence against _ the
respondent does not meet| the mandated
standard. At best, complainants would indulge
in presumptions which, unfortunately, cannot
be a valid basis to slap respondents with
administrative sanctions.
XXX
To be sure, it will take re than mere
pleadings and unreliable affidavits to lend an
aura of respectability a credibility to
complainants accusations. A| finding of guilt
should only come from strength of
complainants evidence, not from the weakness
of respondents defense.”
|
-u- |
|
|of Property Receipt
0 were duly submitted
1), Was the prosecution
personal property being
were not listed in the
n bare or general
42.13
prepared by Pggt {Me onset, Receipt
(ANNEXES 8 ‘Sg Alicante and Pat Vel
(ANNEXES 8 to 12, of Respondents| Ans
claimed by “and ‘Prove any missing item o
Receipt of Pra eight (8) complainants, th
allegation)? perty Receipt prepared (other thar
4.2.14 With the foregoi things come to
scr ER foregoing, numerous
mind. Either all complainant's statement are outright afforded
prima facie proof or treated as gosP truth, (invincible and
incapable of susceptibility for dispute a id refutation, however
versely, that all
much such refutation may be)i_ oF,
complained police officers "we °) ociptely presumed Gulty
unless they can prove their innocence fhereof? [such that Sif
respondents’ controverting evidences easily aide
brushed aside; that any and all such defenses by [respon iea
deserve scant consideration nor careful valuation of their P'
and countervailing evidences]?
i ication, it
42.15 If the foregoing are the ™ rms in adju
would certainly be a pity for Recused public officers: who
rendered decades of their life in “I 01 oa ply th
performance of their duty (that can be si
scrupulous allegation against them Tcoupled with hasty
appreciation of the merits of the opposing party's ¢ Is
arguments and evidence). |
4.2.16 For it bears to remind that,
|
| le