J-11 8010 Manual ACN-3-A

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY S0570-AC-CCM-010/8010
ACN 3/A
S0570-AC-CCM-010/8010
REVISION 0 ACN 3/A
NAVSEA TECHNICAL PUBLICATION
INDUSTRIAL SHIP SAFETY MANUAL FOR FIRE

PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D: DISTRIBUTION AUTHORIZED TO DoD AND U.S. DoD CONTRACTORS ONLY (06 February
2014). OTHER REQUESTS FOR THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BE REFERRED TO NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND (SEA 04X6).
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: DESTROY BY ANY METHOD THAT WILL PREVENT DISCLOSURE OF CONTENTS OR
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT
PUBLISHED BY DIRECTION OF COMMANDER, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
11 February 2021
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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NAVSEA TECHNICAL MANUAL CERTIFICATION SHEET 1 of 1

Certification Applies to: New Manual  Revision  Change 
Applicable TMINS/Pub. No.
NAVSEA S0570-AC-CCM-010/8010
Publication Date (Mo, Da, Yr)
07/17/2018
Title: INDUSTRIAL SHIP SAFETY MANUAL FOR FIRE PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
TMCR/TMSR/Specification No: N/A
CHANGES AND REVISIONS: See the following pages ii thru v.
Continue on reverse side or add pages as needed.

CERTIFICATION STATEMENT
This is to certify that responsible NAVSEA activities have revised the above identified document for
acquisition compliance, technical coverage, and printing quality. This form is for internal NAVSEA
management use only, and does not imply contractual approval or acceptance of the technical manual by
the Government, nor relieve the contractor of any responsibility for delivering the technical manual in
accordance with the contract requirement.
Authority Name Signature Organization Code Date

Acquisition William /S/ W.Gembach NAVSEA 04X6 11Feb21
Gembach
Technical William /S/ W.Gembach NAVSEA 04X6 11Feb21
Gembach
Printing NA NA NA NA NA
Release
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CHANGES AND REVISIONS:

List of Effective Pages: Updated page numbers.
Table of Contents: Updated page numbers and paragraph titles.
List of Illustrations: Updated page numbers and figure titles.
List of Tables: Updated page numbers and table titles.
Chapter 2
Added the following reference:

(b) S9AA0-AB-GOS-010, REV. 7 General Specifications for Overhaul of Surface Ships.
2.1.1.5 Added requirement for the FSC to use and maintain the ship plan of the day (SPOD) as an active tracking
document. Additionally, added specific SPOD requirements list 2.1.1.5a through 2.1.1.5l for FSC use and maintenance of
the ship plan of the day (SPOD) when invoked.
2.1.1.8 Added requirements for NSA to establish processes to ensure all work, testing, and evolutions that impact fire
safety are routed to the FSO and FSC for review and approval.
2.1.2 through 2.1.2.2 Added clarification to the duties and responsibilities prescribed for the fire safety officer (FSO) as
well as assignment criteria.
2.1.3 through 2.1.3.3 Added clarification to the duties and responsibilities prescribed for the fire safety watch (FSW) as
well as assignment criteria.
2.3 Added new subsections to clarify NSA, RA, and Host Facility briefing requirements for fire prevention and response.
Additionally, clarified FSO and FSW training and qualification requirements.
2.3.1 Added clarification to training requirements for FSO and FSW personnel.
2.3.2 Added specific briefing and training requirements for RA personnel, NSA and host facility personnel, FSWs, and
ship’s force personnel necessary to support fire response.
2.3.3 Added practical and knowledge based training requirements necessary for FSO qualifications.
2.3.4 Added practical and knowledge based training requirements necessary for lead maintenance activity (LMA) FSW
qualifications.
2.3.5 Added training requirements necessary for ship’s force FSW qualifications.
2.4 Added new administration subsection.
2.4.1 Added FSO duties and responsibilities and distribution requirements for the FSO assignment memorandum.
2.4.2 Added qualification program requirements that include: written exams, maintenance of records, and the upkeep of
qualification lists.
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Chapter 3
Added the following reference:

(x) OPNAVINST 3440.18, Procedures and Reporting Requirements for Major Shipboard Nonnuclear Casualties While in
Port at a U.S. Naval Installation or a U.S. Ship Repair or Construction Activity.
3.2.2.1 and 3.2.17 Invoked reverence (x) where applicable.
3.4 Added training requirements necessary for shipyard emergency response managers prior to assignment to an
emergency response team (ERT) role.
3.4.1 Added clarification for personnel that are assigned to the ERT.
3.4.2 Added initial training requirements for personnel assigned to the ERT.
Updated table 3-2 “FEMA On-Line Training Courses “ to reflect current Federal Emergency Response Agency (FEMA)
course numbers and titles.
3.4.3 Added continuing training requirements for ERT assigned personnel.
3.5 Added ship’s force (SF) ERT training requirements.
3.5.1 Added clarification to SF personnel assignment to the ERT.
3.5.2 Added pre-availability training requirements for SF ERT assigned personnel.
Added table 3-3 “SF Pre-Availability Firefighting Training Topics.” Table provides general topics from reference (b) and
(c) of chapter three of this manual.
Added table 3-4 “NSA Conducted Firefighting Training Topics.” Table provides general topics from reference (b) and (c)
of chapter three of this manual.
3.5.3 Added continuing training requirements for SF ERT assigned personnel.
3.6.1 Added the following sentences: “When damage control equipment on submarines shall be removed from service for
maintenance (e.g., SCBA cylinder hydrostatic testing), the NSA shall provide replacement equipment. Daily fire safety
inspections will spot check ship’s damage control equipment to determine if the equipment is available and properly
maintained.”
3.6.9 Added requirements for NSA provided supplementary damage control (DC) equipment.
3.6.10 Added requirement for DC locker equipment custody and accessibility.
Chapter 4
Added the following references:

(j) United States Navy Regulations (k) NAVSEA 389-0288, Radiological Controls (NOTAL)
(l) NAVSEAINST 9210.22F, Security and Safety of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Material (NOTAL)
(m) S9223-AJ-OMP-010, Battery, Submarine Main Storage - Submarine Valve Regulated Lead Acid (SVRLA) Technical
Manual
(n) S9223-AC-OMP-010, Battery, Submarine Main Storage - Submarine Valve Regulated Lead Acid (SVRLA) Technical
Manual
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Chapter 4 (Continued)
4.1.2 Added additional requirements in subsection 4.1.2c for MOA concurrence process.
4.2.1 Added subsection 4.1.2j to provide clarification for the hot work authorization notification process.
4.2.2 Added requirements and clarification for permit approval authority process.
4.3.7 Added clarification to submarine battery charging requirements to define when a charge is considered a gassing
charge requiring hotwork to be secured.
Chapter 7
Introduction: Added the following sentence: “The FSC shall review for likely single-point failure scenarios (e.g., ships
with a single shore power location cannot rely on two off-hull power supplies since a catastrophic failure of the only shore
power switchboard could result in a major fire and loss of all ship systems, as well as the plan enacted to maintain
firefighting capability).”
7.1.1 Added the following sentence: “For the purposes of this manual, a submarine’s trim system and any interconnected
drain pumps are considered components of the fire main.”
7.1.1.6 Added electrical power redundancy criteria and requirements for ship’s fire main.
7.1.1.7 Added redundancy criteria and requirements for ship’s fire main.
7.1.1.8 Added NFPA-20 requirements for the use of booster pumps when installed to boost shore firefighting supply to
ship or temporary firefighting system.
Chapter 8
8.2.5 Added the following sentences: “Any facility attached to the ship, enclosed structures (e.g., offices) placed inside or
on the ship, and all crew berthing barges shall be connected to the ship general announcing system or have a direct-dial
phone connecting the ship and a continuously manned watch station. Industrial facility watches will be continuously
manned when the facility is occupied.”
Chapter 10
10.4.7 Added the following sentence to existing quick disconnect fitting (QDF) requirement: “QDFs and associated
isolations, shall be installed in such way that emergency responders can readily access the QDF without assistance, operate
without tools, and be…”
Chapter 11
Introduction: Removed reference to maintaining “fire and smoke boundaries” to narrow scope to only fire zone
boundaries. Added the following sentence: “This chapter provides requirements for sustaining fire zone boundaries
during industrial availabilities. This chapter applies to all platforms – submarines, surface ships, and aircraft carriers.”
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Chapter 12
12.2.2 Added subsection 12.2.2g through 12.2.2l to provide additional selective drill attributes.
12.5.3 Added requirements for drill periodicity waver.
Appendix O
Added appendix O to provide SPOD requirements and sample illustrations for clarification of SPOD format .
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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
Dispose of superseded pages in accordance with applicable regulations.
Dates of issue for original and subsequent revisions:
Original……………………………06 February 2014
ACN 1/A…………………………..19 April 2016
ACN 2/A…………………………..17 July 2018
ACN 3/A…………………………..11 February 2021
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES IN THIS TECHNICAL MANUAL IS 198,

CONSISTING OF THE FOLLOWING:
PAGES REV CHANGE #
Cover Sheet --- 00 ACN 3/A
Certification Sheet i 00 ACN 3/A
Changes and Revisions ii through vi 00 ACN 3/A
List of Effective Pages viii through ix 00 ACN 3/A
Record of Changes x 00 ACN 3/A
Table of Contents xi through xix 00 ACN 3/A
List of Figures and List of Tables xx through xxi 00 ACN 3/A
Commander’s Guidance xxiii 00 Original
Foreword xxv 00 Original
Chapter 1 1-1 through 1-4 00 Original
Chapter 2 2-1 through 2-8 00 ACN 3/A
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Chapter 14 14-1 through 14-4 00 Original
Appendix A A-1 through A-4 00 ACN 2/A
Appendix B B-1 through B-4 00 Original
Appendix C C-1 through C-4 00 ACN 2/A
Appendix D D-1 through D-4 00 ACN 2/A
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Appendix E E-1 through E-2 00 Original
Appendix F F-1 through F-4 00 Original
Appendix G G-1 through G-2 00 Original
Appendix H H-1 through H-6 00 Original
Appendix I I-1 through I-2 00 Original
Appendix J J-1 through J-6 00 Original
Appendix K K-1 through K-2 00 Original
Appendix L L-1 through L-6 00 ACN 2/A
Appendix M M-1 through M-4 00 ACN 2/A
Appendix N N-1 through N-2 00 ACN 2/A
Appendix O O-1 through O-16 00 ACN 3/A
TMDER Last Page - -
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RECORD OF CHANGES
CHANGE DATE OF TITLE OR BRIEF DESCRIPTION ENTERED

NO. CHANGE BY
(INITIALS)
ACN 3/A These changes are intended to address outstanding
OSCAR AUSTIN action items from the fire review
board. Additionally, these changes provide immediate
corrective actions and clarifications from the preliminary
review of the BONHOMME RICHARD failure as
directed by joint CPF/USFF Naval Message
COMPACFLT 220242Z OCT 2020.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................................................... xvi
LIST OF TABLES.....................................................................................................................................................xvii
COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE ................................................................................................................................ xix
FORWARD ................................................................................................................................................................ xxi
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose .........................................................................................................................................................1-1
1.2 Scope ............................................................................................................................................................1-1
1.2.1 CNO Scheduled Availabilities ...........................................................................................................1-1
1.2.2 Non-CNO Availabilities .....................................................................................................................1-1
1.2.3 New Construction and Repair Availabilities in Private Shipyards .....................................................1-2
1.2.4 Ship’s Force........................................................................................................................................1-2
1.3 Background ..................................................................................................................................................1-2
1.4 Responsibilities.............................................................................................................................................1-2
1.4.1 General Guidance ...............................................................................................................................1-2
1.4.2 NSA Responsibilities .........................................................................................................................1-2
1.4.3 Director of Nuclear Propulsion Responsibilities. ...............................................................................1-2
1.4.4 Director, Strategic Systems Programs Responsibilities ......................................................................1-2
1.4.5 Executive Agent for Damage Control Responsibilities ......................................................................1-2
1.5 Fire Safety Plan ............................................................................................................................................1-3
1.6 Glossary of Terms ........................................................................................................................................1-3
Chapter 2 ORGANIZATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
2.1 Fire Safety Organization ...............................................................................................................................2-1
2.1.1 Fire Safety Council .............................................................................................................................2-1
2.1.2 Fire Safety Officer ..............................................................................................................................2-3
2.1.3 Fire Safety Watch ...............................................................................................................................2-4
2.2 Emergency Management ..............................................................................................................................2-5
2.3 Training and Qualification Requirements.....................................................................................................2-5
2.3.1 Discussion ..........................................................................................................................................2-5
2.3.2 Briefing and Training Requirements ..................................................................................................2-5
2.3.3 FSO Qualification...............................................................................................................................2-5
2.3.4 LMA FSW Qualification ....................................................................................................................2-6
2.3.5 Ship’s Force FSW Training ................................................................................................................2-6
2.4 Administration ..............................................................................................................................................2-7
2.4.1 FSO Assignment Memorandum .........................................................................................................2-7
2.4.2 Qualification Program ........................................................................................................................2-7
2.5 Fire Data Tracking and Analyses .................................................................................................................2-7
2.5.1 Reportable Fires .................................................................................................................................2-7
2.5.2 Reporting of Shipboard Fires .............................................................................................................2-7
2.5.3 Trend Analysis of Fires and Fire Related Problems ...........................................................................2-8
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2.5.4 Quarterly Reports ...............................................................................................................................2-8
2.6 Trouble Reports and Mishap Reports ...........................................................................................................2-8
2.7 Audits ...........................................................................................................................................................2-8
2.7.1 Local Audits .......................................................................................................................................2-8
2.7.2 NAVSEA and CNIC Audits ...............................................................................................................2-8
Chapter 3 FIRE RESPONSE PLANNING
3.1 Background ..................................................................................................................................................3-2
3.2 Fire Safety Plan ............................................................................................................................................3-2
3.2.1 Firefighting Principles .........................................................................................................................3-2
3.2.2 Command and Control .......................................................................................................................3-2
3.2.3 Designation of Responsibility and Authority .....................................................................................3-6
3.2.4 Assignment of Designated Personnel to Specific Positions in the Emergency
Response Team (ERT).......................................................................................................................3-7
3.2.5 Training and Integration of Firefighting Services ..............................................................................3-7
3.2.6 Personnel Accountability....................................................................................................................3-8
3.2.7 Response Actions ...............................................................................................................................3-8
3.2.8 Firefighting Doctrine ..........................................................................................................................3-8
3.2.9 Logistic and In-Hull Support Requirements .......................................................................................3-8
3.2.10 SCBA Recharge Capability ...............................................................................................................3-9
3.2.11 Medical Triage and Treatment ..........................................................................................................3-9
3.2.12 Management of Firefighting Effluents ..............................................................................................3-9
3.2.13 Firefighting Equipment ...................................................................................................................3-10
3.2.14 Technical Assistance and Coordination ..........................................................................................3-10
3.2.15 Extended Operations Plan ...............................................................................................................3-10
3.2.16 Ship Conditions ...............................................................................................................................3-10
3.2.17 Reporting Procedures ......................................................................................................................3-10
3.2.18 Procedures for Liaison with Civil Authorities .................................................................................3-11
3.2.19 Public Affairs ..................................................................................................................................3-11
3.2.20 Accident Information Collection and Storage .................................................................................3-11
3.2.21 Roles and Responsibilities of Activities ..........................................................................................3-11
3.2.22 Radio Communications ...................................................................................................................3-11
3.3 Training ......................................................................................................................................................3-12
3.3.1 F&ES Training .................................................................................................................................3-12
3.4 Shipyard Emergency Response Managers Training ...................................................................................3-12
3.4.1 ERT Assignment ..............................................................................................................................3-12
3.4.2 Initial ERT Training .........................................................................................................................3-12
3.4.3 Continuing ERT Training .................................................................................................................3-13
3.5 SF ERT Training ........................................................................................................................................3-13
3.5.1 ERT Assignment ..............................................................................................................................3-13
3.5.2 ERT Pre-Availability Training .........................................................................................................3-13
3.5.3 SF Continuing ERT Training ...........................................................................................................3-14
3.5.4 Knowledge .......................................................................................................................................3-14
3.5.5 Practical Abilities .............................................................................................................................3-14
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3.5.6 Re-verification ..................................................................................................................................3-14
3.5.7 Mutual Aid Agreements ...................................................................................................................3-14
3.6 Rapid Response Damage Control CONEX Box.........................................................................................3-14
3.6.1 Damage Control (DC) Equipment ....................................................................................................3-15
3.6.2 Storage of DC Equipment ................................................................................................................3-15
3.6.3 Custody of DC Equipment ...............................................................................................................3-15
3.6.4 Alternate Storage Location ...............................................................................................................3-15
3.6.5 Staging of DC Equipment ................................................................................................................3-15
3.6.6 Accessibility of DC Equipment ........................................................................................................3-15
3.6.7 Transition to Habitability .................................................................................................................3-15
3.6.8 Rapid Response Damage Control Equipment for CVNs and Surface Ships ....................................3-15
3.6.9 NSA Supplementary DC Equipment ................................................................................................3-16
3.6.10 Custody of NSA Damage Control Equipment.................................................................................3-16
3.7 Fire Lanes ...................................................................................................................................................3-17
3.7.1 Fire Lane Width and Markings .........................................................................................................3-17
3.7.2 Vertical Clearance ............................................................................................................................3-17
3.7.3 Angle of Approach/Departure ..........................................................................................................3-18
3.7.4 Wintertime Maintenance ..................................................................................................................3-18
3.7.5 Waiver Request ................................................................................................................................3-18
3.7.6 Approval to Temporarily Block a Fire Lane ....................................................................................3-18
Chapter 4 HOT WORK AND FIRE WATCH
4.1 Hot Work Memorandum Of Agreement .......................................................................................................4-1
4.1.1 Classifications of Hot Work ...............................................................................................................4-1
4.1.2 Hot Work MOA..................................................................................................................................4-2
4.2 Hot Work Authorization ...............................................................................................................................4-2
4.2.1 Written Notice ....................................................................................................................................4-2
4.2.2 Permit Approval Authority .................................................................................................................4-3
4.2.3 Posting of Notice ................................................................................................................................4-3
4.2.4 Notice to the CO’s Representative. ....................................................................................................4-3
4.3 Gas-Free Procedures And Special Hazards ..................................................................................................4-3
4.3.1 Governance for Gas Free Procedures .................................................................................................4-3
4.3.2 Restricted Areas for Hot Work ...........................................................................................................4-3
4.3.3 Coverings ...........................................................................................................................................4-3
4.3.4 Hot Work in the Presence of Lines/Piping Containing Flammable or Combustible Fluids ...............4-3
4.3.5 Proximity of Flammables and Combustibles ......................................................................................4-3
4.3.6 Ammunition or Explosives .................................................................................................................4-3
4.3.7 Submarine Main Storage Battery Operations .....................................................................................4-4
4.3.8 Additional Precautions .......................................................................................................................4-4
4.4 Fire Watch Requirements And Training .......................................................................................................4-4
4.4.1 Fire Watch Policy ...............................................................................................................................4-4
4.4.2 Additional Duties During Hot Work ..................................................................................................4-4
4.4.3 Limitations to Single Fire Watch with Multiple Hot Workers ...........................................................4-4
4.4.4 Hot Work Involving Multiple Levels .................................................................................................4-4
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4.4.5 Bulkhead, Overhead, or Deck Hot Work............................................................................................4-4
4.4.6 Blind Compartment Hot Work ...........................................................................................................4-4
4.4.7 Communication Between Fire Watches .............................................................................................4-4
4.4.8 Fire Extinguishers...............................................................................................................................4-4
4.4.9 Fire Watch Training ...........................................................................................................................4-5
4.4.10 Fire Watch Portable Extinguishers ....................................................................................................4-5
Chapter 5 SHIPBOARD INDUSTRIAL MATERIAL USE AND STORAGE
5.1 Flammable and Combustible Material..........................................................................................................5-2
5.1.1 Materials Used Shipboard By Maintenance Activities .......................................................................5-2
5.1.2 Consumable Materials ........................................................................................................................5-2
5.1.3 Fire Resistant Materials ......................................................................................................................5-3
5.1.4 Plastic Trash Cans .............................................................................................................................5-3
5.1.5 Plastic Bodied Tools ...........................................................................................................................5-3
5.1.6 Metal Canister Vacuum Cleaners .......................................................................................................5-3
5.1.7 Smoking Policies ................................................................................................................................5-4
5.1.8 Flammable Compressed Gas Cylinders ..............................................................................................5-4
5.1.9 Flammable and Combustible Liquid Usage .......................................................................................5-4
5.1.10 Combustible Materials and Waste .....................................................................................................5-4
5.1.11 Large Quantity Drums .......................................................................................................................5-4
5.1.12 Fueled Equipment-Moving Vehicles .................................................................................................5-4
5.1.13 Fueling Operations ............................................................................................................................5-4
5.1.14 Openings Above the Reactor Compartment. .....................................................................................5-5
5.2 Stowage of Ship’s Flammable and Combustible Material ...........................................................................5-5
5.2.1 Flammable Gas Stowage ....................................................................................................................5-5
5.2.2 Oxidizers ............................................................................................................................................5-5
5.2.3 CO2 Absorption Chemicals ................................................................................................................5-5
5.2.4 Refrigerant and Air Conditioning Gas Cylinders (R134, R114, R12, etc.) ........................................5-5
5.2.5 Ammunitions and Explosives .............................................................................................................5-5
5.2.6 Ship’s Hazardous Material Storage Facilities .....................................................................................5-5
5.3 Temporary Structures and Laydown Areas ..................................................................................................5-6
5.3.1 Temporary Structures ..........................................................................................................................5-6
5.3.2 Use of Wood........................................................................................................................................5-6
5.3.3 Sizing and Positioning of Structures ...................................................................................................5-7
5.3.4 Storage of Material ..............................................................................................................................5-7
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5.4 Fire Safety Inspections .................................................................................................................................5-7
5.4.1 Fire Prevention And Safety Inspections .............................................................................................5-7
5.4.2 Minimum Requirements for Inspection ..............................................................................................5-7
Chapter 6 FIRE DETECTION...................................................................................................................................6-1
6.1 Temporary Installation Of Automatic Fire Detection System On Submarines. ...........................................6-1
6.1.1 Applicability .......................................................................................................................................6-1
6.1.2 Combination Smoke and Heat Detector Hardware Requirements......................................................6-2
6.1.3 Alarm Panel Hardware Requirements. ...............................................................................................6-3
6.1.4 Automatic Fire Detection System Installation Criteria. ......................................................................6-3
6.1.5 Automatic Fire Detection System Testing. .........................................................................................6-4
6.1.6 Automatic Fire Detection System Protection. ....................................................................................6-5
6.1.7 Automatic Fire Detection System Installation and Removal. .............................................................6-5
6.2 Temporary Installation Of Automatic Fire Detection Systems On Surface Ships And Aircraft Carriers. ..6-6
6.2.1 Fire Detection System. .......................................................................................................................6-6
6.2.2 Fire Detection System Protection. ......................................................................................................6-6
Chapter 7 FIREFIGHTING SYSTEMS ....................................................................................................................7-1
7.1 Fire Protection Systems. ...............................................................................................................................7-2
7.1.1 Firefighting Systems. ..........................................................................................................................7-2
7.1.2 Hazards of Fixed Extinguishing Systems. ........................................................................................7-10
7.1.3 Pumping and Dewatering Capability. ...............................................................................................7-11
7.1.4 Operation of Major Machinery in Engineering Spaces. ...................................................................7-11
7.1.5 Liquid Fuel Pumping and Transfer. ..................................................................................................7-11
7.1.6 Mechanical Aqueous Film Forming Foam Producing Equipment. ..................................................7-11
7.1.7 Portable Fire Extinguisher Requirements. ........................................................................................7-11
7.1.8 Hose and Hose Reel Protection. .......................................................................................................7-12
7.1.9 Dry Dock Firefighting Requirements. ..............................................................................................7-12
7.2 Submarines. ................................................................................................................................................7-13
7.2.1 General. ............................................................................................................................................7-13
7.2.2 Temporary Firemain and Water Supply. ..........................................................................................7-13
7.2.3 Temporary Topside Hose Station Manifolds. ...................................................................................7-14
7.2.4 Temporary Internal Hose Reels. .......................................................................................................7-15
7.2.5 Temporary Firemain, Hose Station, and Hose Reel Testing. ...........................................................7-16
7.2.6 Strategically Loaded SSBNs. ...........................................................................................................7-17
7.3 Surface Ships. .............................................................................................................................................7-18
7.3.1 General. ............................................................................................................................................7-18
7.3.2 Water Supply Requirements for Firefighting. ..................................................................................7-18
Chapter 8 ALARMS AND COMMUNICATIONS ...................................................................................................8-1
8.1 Shipboard Fire Reporting System.................................................................................................................8-1
8.1.1 Fire Reporting Devices. ......................................................................................................................8-1
8.1.2 Annunciator Panel. .............................................................................................................................8-2
8.1.3 Reporting to Emergency Dispatch Center. .........................................................................................8-2
8.1.4 Defective or Inoperative Alarms. .......................................................................................................8-2
8.1.5 Fire Reporting in Dry Dock. ...............................................................................................................8-2
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8.2 Casualty General Announcing System. ........................................................................................................8-2
8.2.1 Temporary System. ............................................................................................................................8-2
8.2.2 Testing of Systems. ............................................................................................................................8-2
8.2.3 Brief Outages. .....................................................................................................................................8-2
8.2.4 Hot Work. ...........................................................................................................................................8-2
8.2.5 Announcing on Barges and attached Structures .................................................................................8-2
8.3 Damage Control Central/CASCON Station, Submarines .............................................................................8-3
8.3.1 Location of CASCON Station. ...........................................................................................................8-3
8.3.2 Fire Detection System Alarm Panel. ..................................................................................................8-3
8.3.3 Required Items at CASCON Station. .................................................................................................8-3
8.4 Damage Control Central/Quarterdeck, Surface Ships. .................................................................................8-3
8.4.1 Damage Control Policies and Procedures. .........................................................................................8-3
8.4.2 Alternate DCC. ...................................................................................................................................8-3
8.4.3 DCC Located Off Ship. ......................................................................................................................8-3
8.4.4 Receiving and Escorting F&ES Officers. ...........................................................................................8-4
8.4.5 Required Items at DCC/Quarterdeck. .................................................................................................8-4
8.5 Stop Hot Work Alarm System. .....................................................................................................................8-4
8.5.1 Requirements. .....................................................................................................................................8-4
8.5.2 Installed Alarm and Announcing System. ..........................................................................................8-4
8.6 Evacuate Ship Alarm System. ......................................................................................................................8-4
8.6.1 Requirements. .....................................................................................................................................8-4
8.6.2 Installed Alarm and Announcing System. ..........................................................................................8-4
8.7 Portable Radios.............................................................................................................................................8-5
Chapter 9 LIGHTING ................................................................................................................................................9-1
9.1 Permanent Lighting Requirements ...............................................................................................................9-1
9.2 Temporary Lighting Requirements...............................................................................................................9-1
9.2.1 Lighting Guards. .................................................................................................................................9-1
9.2.2 Electric Cords. ....................................................................................................................................9-1
9.2.3 Exposed Non-current-carrying Metal Parts. .......................................................................................9-1
9.2.4 Portable Emergency Lighting Equipment. .........................................................................................9-1
9.2.5 Dark Spaces. .......................................................................................................................................9-1
9.2.6 Restricted Usage. ................................................................................................................................9-1
Chapter 10 SHIPBOARD ACCESS/EGRESS AND ROUTING OF TEMPORARY SERVICES .........................10-1
10.1 Shipboard Access And Egress Number And Location .............................................................................10-1
10.1.1 Egress Requirements (Submarines). ...............................................................................................10-1
10.1.2 Shipboard Access (Submarines). ....................................................................................................10-1
10.1.3 Access to Machinery Space (Surface Ships). .................................................................................10-2
10.1.4 Shipboard Access (Surface Ships). .................................................................................................10-2
10.1.5 Securing of Brow/Gangway. ..........................................................................................................10-2
10.2 Maintaining Access And Egress Condition ..............................................................................................10-2
10.2.1 Brow/Gangway Requirements. .......................................................................................................10-2
10.2.2 Safety Nets. ....................................................................................................................................10-2
10.2.3 Condition of Brow/Gangways. .......................................................................................................10-2
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10.2.4 Marking Routes of Escape..............................................................................................................10-2
10.2.5 Use of Announcing System for Access and Egress Routes. ...........................................................10-2
10.2.6 Fall Protection. ...............................................................................................................................10-2
10.3 Emergency Air Breathing System (Submarines) ......................................................................................10-3
10.3.1 Required Emergency Air Breathing System...................................................................................10-3
10.3.2 Service to Maneuvering. .................................................................................................................10-3
10.3.3 Breathing Air Supply for Egress. ...................................................................................................10-3
10.4 Routing Of Temporary Services ...............................................................................................................10-3
10.4.1 Pre-plan for Temporary Services. ...................................................................................................10-3
10.4.2 Routing of Temporary Services Through Installed Ship Hull Openings. .......................................10-3
10.4.3 Additional Hull Cuts. .....................................................................................................................10-4
10.4.4 Materials used for Suspending Temporary Services. .....................................................................10-4
10.4.5 Temporary Services Isolation List. .................................................................................................10-4
10.4.6 Marking Temporary Services. ........................................................................................................10-4
10.4.7 Quick Disconnect Fittings. .............................................................................................................10-4
10.4.8 Air Flow Control. ...........................................................................................................................10-4
10.4.9 Service Lines Crossing Fire Zone Boundaries. ..............................................................................10-5
10.4.10 Protection during Installation, Operation and Removal of Temporary Services. .........................10-5
Chapter 11 FIRE AND SMOKE BOUNDARIES ....................................................................................................11-1
11.1 Fire Zone Boundaries. ..............................................................................................................................11-1
11.1.1 Requirements for Fire Zone Boundaries.........................................................................................11-1
11.1.2 Fire Zone Boundaries (Submarines). ..............................................................................................11-1
11.1.3 Temporary Access Cuts through Fire Zone Boundaries. ................................................................11-1
11.1.4 Disabling/Degrading Fire Zone Boundaries. ..................................................................................11-1
11.1.5 Marking Fire Zone Boundaries.......................................................................................................11-1
11.1.6 Record of Boundary Openings. ......................................................................................................11-1
11.1.7 Boundaries on Carrier Type Ships. .................................................................................................11-1
Chapter 12 FIRE DRILL REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................................12-1
12.1 Periodic Fire Drills. ..................................................................................................................................12-1
12.2 Drill Attribute Requirements. ...................................................................................................................12-1
12.2.1 Attributes For All Fire Drills. .........................................................................................................12-1
12.2.2 Selective Attributes For Fire Drills. ...............................................................................................12-2
12.2.3 Burden Of Requirements. ................................................................................................................12-3
12.3 Drill Evaluation. .......................................................................................................................................12-4
12.4 Drill Team, Guides, And Post-Event Evaluation. ..............................................................................12-4
12.4.1 SRCA Drill Team. ..........................................................................................................................12-4
12.4.2 Drill Guide......................................................................................................................................12-4
12.4.3 Drill Termination. ...........................................................................................................................12-4
12.4.4 Response To Actual Casualty. ........................................................................................................12-4
12.4.5 Realistic Fire Scenario. ...................................................................................................................12-4
12.4.6 Minimize Simulations. ...................................................................................................................12-5
12.4.7 SRCA Response. ............................................................................................................................12-5
12.4.8 Drill Hotwash. ................................................................................................................................12-5
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12.4.9 Drill Evaluation. .............................................................................................................................12-5
12.4.10 Written Report. .............................................................................................................................12-5
12.4.11 Action For An Unsatisfactory Grade. ...........................................................................................12-5
12.4.12 Submitting The Report. ................................................................................................................12-5
12.4.13 Fire Response Capabilities During The Drill. ..............................................................................12-5
12.4.14 Duration Of Drills. .......................................................................................................................12-5
12.5 Drill Frequency. ........................................................................................................................................12-6
12.5.1 Back-Shift Drill. .............................................................................................................................12-6
12.5.2 Waiver Of Drill Requirements. ......................................................................................................12-6
12.5.3 Periodicity Waiver ..........................................................................................................................12-6
Chapter 13 MAJOR FIRE DRILL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................13-1
13.1 Drill Attribute Requirements. ...................................................................................................................13-1
13.2 Drill Evaluation. .......................................................................................................................................13-3
13.3 DRILL TEAM, GUIDES, AND POST-EVENT EVALUATION. ..........................................................13-4
13.3.1 Major Fire Drill Team. ...................................................................................................................13-4
13.3.2 Drill Evaluators. .............................................................................................................................13-4
13.3.3 Drill Guide......................................................................................................................................13-4
13.3.4 Drill Hotwash. ................................................................................................................................13-5
13.3.5 Drill Evaluation Team. ...................................................................................................................13-5
13.3.6 Evaluation of Simulated Press Conference/Availability. ...............................................................13-6
13.3.7 NAVSEA and CNIC Review. ........................................................................................................13-6
13.3.8 Drill Brief, Execution, and Debrief Schedule. ................................................................................13-6
13.3.9 Written Evaluations/Reports. .........................................................................................................13-6
13.3.10 Nuclear Powered Warships. .........................................................................................................13-6
13.3.11 Nonnuclear Powered Warships At Private Repair SRCAs. ..........................................................13-6
Chapter 14 SPECIAL SUBMARINE SHIPBOARD FIRE HAZARDS ..................................................................14-1
14.1 General. ....................................................................................................................................................14-1
14.2 Battery Compartment Casualties ..............................................................................................................14-1
14.2.1 General. ..........................................................................................................................................14-1
14.2.2 Hydrogen Explosion. ......................................................................................................................14-1
14.3 Special Hull Treatment (SHT) Fires in Dry Dock ....................................................................................14-2
14.3.1 General. ..........................................................................................................................................14-2
14.3.2 SHT Materials. ...............................................................................................................................14-2
14.3.3 Flammability and Fire Spread. .......................................................................................................14-2
14.3.4 SHT Flammability. .........................................................................................................................14-2
14.3.5 Fire Spread. ....................................................................................................................................14-2
14.3.6 Extinguishing Methods. ..................................................................................................................14-2
14.3.7 Fire Attack. .....................................................................................................................................14-3
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Appendix A
Principles of Emergency Response for a Shipboard Fire ...................................................................................A-1
Appendix B
Fully Developed Incident Management Structure for Shipboard Fire Emergency............................................. B-1
Appendix C
Engineered Fire Response Strategy .................................................................................................................... C-1
Appendix D
Rapid Response Damage Control CONEX Box, Submarines ............................................................................D-1
Appendix E
SSN-688 Class; Approximate Locations for Combination Smoke and Heat Detectors ..................................... E-1
Appendix F
SSN-21 Class; Approximate Locations for Combination Smoke and Heat Detectors ....................................... F-1
Appendix G
SSN-774 Class; Approximate Locations for Combination Smoke and Heat Detectors .....................................G-1
Appendix H
SSBN/SSGN-726 Class; Approximate Locations for Combination Smoke and Heat Detectors ......................H-1
Appendix I
Combination
Smoke and Heat Detector Spacing ...................................................................................................................... I-1
Appendix J
Sample Air and Smoke Control Curtain and Sock .............................................................................................. J-1
Appendix K
Drill Guide and Authorization Forms .................................................................................................................K-1
Appendix L
Glossary .............................................................................................................................................................. L-1
Appendix M
List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................... M-1
Appendix N
Press Statement...................................................................................................................................................N-1
Appendix O
Ship Plan of the Day ...........................................................................................................................................O-1
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 3-1. Incident Management Structure for Shipboard Fire Emergency (Stage 1). ............................................3-4
Figure 3-4a. Incident Management Structure for Shipboard Fire Emergency (Stage 4)............................................3-5
Figure 3-4b. Integrated In-Hull Operations Section. .................................................................................................3-6
Figure 7-1. Shipyard/F&ES Water Supply System Diagram...................................................................................7-24
Figure 10-1. Sample Vertical Hatch Access Divider (Back Side Isometric View). ................................................10-5
Figure 10-1. Sample Vertical Hatch Access Divider (Top View). ..........................................................................10-6
Figure 10-1. Sample Vertical Hatch Access Divider (Top View). ..........................................................................10-6
Figure B-1. Incident Management Structure for Shipboard Fire Emergency (Fully Developed). ............................ B-1
Figure B-2. Integrated In-Hull Operations Section (Fully Developed). ................................................................... B-2
Figure D-1. Damage Control CONEX Box (Top View). .........................................................................................D-3
Figure D-2. Damage Control CONEX Box (Cutaway Inboard Profile, Left). .........................................................D-3
Figure D-3. Damage Control CONEX Box (Cutaway Inboard Profile, Right). .......................................................D-4
Figure D-4. Damage Control CONEX Box (Interior View). ....................................................................................D-4
Figure E-1. First Platform, Forward (SSN-688 Class).............................................................................................. E-1
Figure E-2. Second Platform, Forward (SSN-688 Class). ........................................................................................ E-1
Figure E-3. Third Platform, Forward (SSN-688 Class). ........................................................................................... E-1
Figure E-4. First Platform, Aft (SSN-688 Class). ..................................................................................................... E-2
Figure E-5. Second Platform, Aft (SSN-688 Class). ................................................................................................ E-2
Figure E-6. Third Platform, Aft (SSN-688 Class). ................................................................................................... E-2
Figure F-1. First Platform, Forward (SSN-21 Class). ............................................................................................... F-1
Figure F-2. Second Platform, Forward (SSN-21 Class). .......................................................................................... F-1
Figure F-3. Third Platform, Forward (SSN-21 Class). ............................................................................................. F-2
Figure F-4. Fourth Platform, Forward (SSN-21 Class). ........................................................................................... F-2
Figure F-5. Hold, Forward (SSN-21 Class). ............................................................................................................. F-3
Figure F-6. First Platform, Aft (SSN-21 Class). ....................................................................................................... F-3
Figure F-7. Second Platform, Aft (SSN-21 Class). .................................................................................................. F-3
Figure F-8. Third Platform, Aft (SSN-21 Class). ..................................................................................................... F-4
Figure G-1. First Platform, Forward (SSN-774 Class). ............................................................................................G-1
Figure G-2. Second Platform, Forward (SSN-774 Class). ........................................................................................G-1
Figure G-3. Third Platform, Forward (SSN-774 Class)............................................................................................G-1
Figure G-4. First Platform, Aft (SSN-774 Class). ....................................................................................................G-2
Figure G-5. Second Platform, Aft (SSN-774 Class). ................................................................................................G-2
Figure G-6. Third Platform, Aft (SSN-774 Class). ...................................................................................................G-2
Figure H-1. First Platform, Forward (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). ..............................................................................H-1
Figure H-2. Second Platform, Forward (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). ..........................................................................H-1
Figure H-3. Third Platform, Forward (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). .............................................................................H-2
Figure H-4. Fourth Platform, Forward (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). ...........................................................................H-2
Figure H-5. Hold, Forward (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). ............................................................................................H-2
Figure H-6. First Platform, Missile Compartment (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). .........................................................H-3
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Figure H-7. Second Platform, Missile Compartment (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). .....................................................H-3
Figure H-8. Third Platform, Missile Compartment (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). ........................................................H-3
Figure H-9. Fourth Platform, Missile Compartment (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). ......................................................H-4
Figure H-10. Hold, Missile Compartment (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). .....................................................................H-4
Figure H-11. First Platform, Aft (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). ....................................................................................H-4
Figure H-12. Second Platform, Aft (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). ................................................................................H-5
Figure H-13. Third Platform, Aft (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). ...................................................................................H-5
Figure H-14. Fourth Platform, Aft (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class). .................................................................................H-5
Figure H-15. Hold, Aft (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)....................................................................................................H-6
Figure I-1. Combination Smoke and Heat Detector Spacing, Smooth Overheads. ................................................... I-1
Figure I-2. Combination Smoke and Heat Detector Spacing [30 ft Listed Spacing], Rectangular Area. ................. I-2
Figure J-1. Sample Air and Smoke Control Curtain. ................................................................................................. J-1
Figure J-1. Sample Air and Smoke Control Curtain. (Cont.) ................................................................................... J-2
Figure J-2. Sample Air and Smoke Control Sock. ..................................................................................................... J-5
Figure O-1 through Figure O-10 Sample Ship’s Plan of the Day ...................................................... O-7 through O-16
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3-1 Hazardous Constituents and Action Levels. ............................................................................................3-10

Table 3-2 FEMA On-line Training Courses. ...........................................................................................................3-13
Table 3-3 SF Pre-Availability Firefighting Training Topics ...................................................................................3-13
Table 3-4 NSA Conducted Firefighting Training Topics ........................................................................................3-14
Table 3-5 Minimum DCRS Number and Location Requirements for CVNs and Surface Ships ............................3-17
Table 7-1 Temporary Hose Reel Connections for SSN-688 LOS ANGELES Class. .............................................7-15
Table 7-2 Temporary Hose Reel Connections for SSBN/SSGN-726 OHIO Class. ................................................7-15
Table 7-3 Fire Protection Water Supply Requirements. ..........................................................................................7-19
Table 7-4 Hose Capacity (gpm) ...............................................................................................................................7-20
Table C-1 Engineered Fire Response Strategy Attributes ....................................................................C-2 through C-3
Table D-1 Damage Control Equipment Inventory. .............................................................................. D-1 through D-2
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COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE
On 23 May 2012, a major fire occurred on board USS MIAMI (SSN 755) during her overhaul at Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard, which caused major damage to the forward compartment of the submarine and resulted in her inactivation
from the Fleet ten years before scheduled. While the cause of the fire was arson, there were many lessons learned
from combating this casualty, and Navy leadership recognized a clear need to raise our standards and capabilities,
and develop cost effective solutions to improve fire prevention, detection, immediate response, and extended
response for ships undergoing industrial maintenance.
Developed and reviewed by industrial and fire safety experts across the Navy, including NAVSEA, CNIC, SSP,
Naval Reactors, both Fleets, and all TYCOMs, the manual represents a major accomplishment toward improving
shipboard fire safety during industrial work. It applies to all Ship Repair and/or Construction Activities (SRCAs),
both public and private, and to all ship availabilities. It is the right long-term response to the watershed event the
MIAMI fire represents. It is imperative that all organizations implement the applicable requirements of this manual
and ensure their fire safety and response procedures and capabilities are solid. The Navy cannot afford another
setback, such as loss of MIAMI, due to a major casualty or fire.
With the current and projected challenging fiscal environment, the Navy cannot afford blind compliance, and this
manual will present a unique challenge in implementation because it covers all ships and all availabilities. There are
tiered risk mitigations based on the amount and complexity of the work performed (e.g., operational condition of
ship’s firefighting systems, communication and alarm systems, ship’s force habitability, etc.). I expect thoughtful
consideration by the Naval Shipyards (NSYs), Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs), Trident Refit Facilities
(TRFs), Fleet Maintenance Activities (FMAs), private repair shipyards, new construction shipyards, and ships in
determining how to apply the requirements for each availability. Local engineering organizations and Fire Safety
Councils (FSCs) are empowered to address unique situations. These groups and their parent organizations are
expected to be judicious and make smart decisions to achieve an optimum balance of all the risks – fire safety as
well as cost and schedule.
The manual requires the SRCA to document how requirements will be implemented on each availability in a formal
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the ship. The MOAs provide formality to the process and ensure that all
organizations understand their roles and responsibilities. The MOAs will also be reviewed for lessons learned, and
provide a vehicle for NAVSEA and the TYCOMs to evaluate how well the SRCAs and the ships are balancing the
risks.
As we move forward with the implementation of this new manual, all organizations should provide feedback and
improvement recommendations. The intent of this manual is to provide the most cost effective practices that
minimize the likelihood of another substantial shipboard fire but ensure we have the capability to deal with it should
one occur. I am counting on all of you to be safe, smart, and effective. Remember, it’s all about the ships.
W.H. Hilarides
Vice Admiral
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command
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FOREWORD
This specification covers the requirements for the prevention of, detection of, immediate response, and extended
response to fires onboard Navy vessels during industrial work to ensure safety of equipment and personnel.
TMDER INSTRUCTIONS
Ships, training activities, supply points, depots, Naval Shipyards and Supervisors of Shipbuilding are requested to
arrange for the maximum practical use and evaluation of NAVSEA and SPAWAR technical manuals (TMs). All
errors, omissions, discrepancies, and suggestions for improvement to NAVSEA and SPAWAR TMs shall be
submitted as a Technical Manual Deficiency/Evaluation Report (TMDER). All feedback comments shall be
thoroughly investigated and originators will be advised of action resulting there from.
The NAVSEA/SPAWAR Technical Manual Deficiency/Evaluation Report form, NAVSEA 4160/1 is included at
the back of the TM.
Copies of form NAVSEA 4160/1 may also be downloaded from:
https://nsdsa.nmci.navy.mil/nsdsarepository/TMDER_BLANK_REV_9-2010-1.pdf
The following methods are available for generation and submission of TMDERs against unclassified TMs:
 For those with a Technical Data Management Information System (TDMIS) account, the most expedient
and preferred method of TMDER generation and submission is via the TDMIS Web site at:
https://mercury.tdmis.navy.mil.
 For those without a TDMIS account, generate and submit TMDER via the Naval Systems Data Support
Activity (NSDSA) Web site at: https://mercury.tdmis.navy.mil/def_external/pubsearch.cfm. (TDMIS
accounts may be requested at https://nsdsa.nmci.navy.mil.)
 When internet access is not available, submit TMDER via hardcopy to:
COMMANDER
CODE 310 TMDERs
NAVSURFWARCENDIV NSDSA
4363 MISSILE WAY, BLDG 1389
PORT HUENEME, CA 93043-4307
 TMDERs against classified/restricted (includes all NOFORN) TMs must be submitted using the hardcopy
method cited above.
 Urgent priority TM deficiencies shall be reported by naval message with transmission to Port Hueneme
Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center (Code 310), Port Hueneme, CA. Local message handling
procedures shall be used. The message shall identify each TM deficiency by TM identification number and
title. This method shall be used in those instances where a TM deficiency constitutes an urgent problem,
(i.e., involves a condition, which if not corrected, could result in injury to personnel, damage to the
equipment, or jeopardy to the safety or success of the mission).
Complete instructions for TMDER generation and submission are detailed on the NSDSA Web site at:
https://nsdsa.nmci.navy.mil/tmder/tmder.asp?lvl=1.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
References
(a) S9AA0-AB-GOS-010, General Overhaul Specifications For Overhaul of Surface Ships (GSO)
(b) S0902-018-2010, General Overhaul Specifications For Deep Diving SSBN/SSN Submarines (DDGOS)
(c) S9002-AK-CCM-010/6010, Industrial Ship Safety Manual For Submarines
(d) COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4790.3, Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual
(e) COMNAVSEA ltr 11320 Ser 04X/370 of 21 Nov 12; Subj: Emergency Fire Response Planning and Execution of
Major Fire Drills at Naval Shipyards; Updated Guidance and Request for Action
(f) United States Navy Regulations
(g) OPNAVINST 11320.23, Navy Fire and Emergency Services Program
(h) Occupational Safety and Health Standards for Shipyard Employment, 29 CFR Part 1915 Subpart P, Fire Protection in
Shipyard Employment
(i) CNO ltr 3541 Ser N00/100080 of 5 Dec 12; Subj: Damage Control Modernization and Improvement
(j) COMUSFLTFORCOM Norfolk VA Msg DTG 241251Z APR 13; Subj: Designation as Executive Agent for Damage
Control
1.1 PURPOSE. The purpose of this manual is to provide a single source document of requirements for the prevention of,
detection of, and response to fires onboard Navy vessels during industrial work to ensure safety of equipment and personnel.
1.2 SCOPE. The requirements of this manual are applicable to all Ship Repair and/or Construction Activities (SRCAs) that
perform industrial work (maintenance, repair, modernization, inactivation, and/or construction) on Navy vessels and are
implemented in ship availabilities and construction projects as specified below. This includes Naval Shipyards (NSYs),
Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs), Trident Refit Facilities (TRFs), Fleet Maintenance Activities (FMAs), private repair
shipyards, and new construction shipyards. The requirements provide tiered risk mitigations based on the amount and
complexity of the work performed (e.g., operational condition of ship’s firefighting systems, communication and alarm
systems, Ship’s Force (SF) habitability, etc.). Requirements contained in this manual apply to new construction ships in
private shipyards as invoked in shipbuilding contracts.
1.2.1 CNO Scheduled Availabilities. The requirements apply to all Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) scheduled
availabilities of commissioned ships. However, the details of implementation will vary depending on the platform, type of
availability, condition of the ship, and work planned. Naval Supervising Authorities (NSAs) shall ensure that the SRCA
executing the CNO Availability develops a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the ship to ensure each organization
agrees with and understands how the requirements will be implemented, and is aware of and acknowledges their assigned
roles and responsibilities. Where MOAs have been instituted by an established process (e.g., TYCOM Instruction for CVN
Planned Incremental Availabilities (PIA) and Docking Planned Incremental Availabilities (DPIA), project execution
strategies, or SRCA standard operating procedures), this agreement should be incorporated into the existing process. These
MOAs shall be reviewed in post availability hot washes to identify lessons learned and make any needed improvements.
1.2.2 Non-CNO Availabilities. For non-CNO scheduled availabilities, the requirements shall be implemented in whole or in
part whenever the Ship’s Commanding Officer (CO), Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC)/ Type Commander (TYCOM)
(as determined by the TYCOM), Naval Supervising Authority (NSA )/Lead Maintenance Activity (LMA) and SRCA assess
the risks and agree that the scope of work and condition of organic firefighting capabilities warrant implementation.
Agreements reached should be documented via a MOA before the start of each availability, and any disagreements should be
raised to the TYCOM, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and/or or Fleet, as applicable for resolution. The MOA
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shall also include how the requirements will be implemented and assigned roles and responsibilities as discussed in 1.2.1
above.
1.2.3 New Construction and Repair Availabilities in Private Shipyards. For new construction ships and repair availabilities
in private shipyards, the requirements apply in whole or in part when invoked in shipbuilding or repair contracts. For new
construction ships, the current contractual requirements for hot work, fire watch, firefighting system, alarm and
communication system, and fire and smoke boundaries shall be implemented instead of the requirements in chapters 4, 7, 8,
and 11.
1.2.4 Ship’s Force. These requirements are not applicable to SF when underway or in port except when invoked for SRCA
work in accordance with paragraphs 1.2.1 through 1.2.3 above.
1.3 BACKGROUND. This manual institutionalizes the corrective actions developed as a result of the
USS MIAMI (SSN 755) fire and integrates them with existing fire safety requirements in references (a) through (d) to
provide a single source document for all industrial activities that work on Navy vessels. Where conflicts exist with the fire
prevention and response requirements of references (a) through (d), this manual shall take precedence. This manual also
formally institutionalizes and, upon implementation, supersedes the requirements established in reference (e) and MIAMI fire
serial messages released through December 2013.
1.4 RESPONSIBILITIES.
1.4.1 General Guidance. This manual integrates and complies with the applicable fire safety responsibilities in chapter 8 of
reference (f) providing the Ship Commanding Officer (CO) responsibility for fire safety onboard commissioned vessels, in
reference (g) providing Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES) responsibility for fire safety on Navy Installations, and in
reference (h) providing the SRCA responsibility for worker safety as the host employer, respectively. During new
construction, responsibilities are as defined in the shipbuilding contract. Responsibilities of the employers of personnel who
perform work on ships are defined in reference (h). This manual has been developed to assist SRCAs, Ship COs, Navy
F&ESs, other response organizations, and employers of personnel performing industrial work shipboard in carrying out their
assigned responsibilities regarding shipboard fire safety. The contents of this manual, however, should in no way be
construed as relieving any activity from their assigned responsibilities regarding fire safety as required by reference (h), or as
invoked under the terms of the applicable contract.
1.4.2 NSA Responsibilities. NSAs shall ensure implementation of the requirements of this manual to improve fire
prevention, detection, and response associated with maintenance and modernization, and in private shipyards where invoked
in shipbuilding and repair contracts.
1.4.3 Director of Nuclear Propulsion Responsibilities. The Director of Nuclear Propulsion (NAVSEA 08) is responsible for
all technical matters pertaining to nuclear propulsion of U.S. Navy ships and craft, including all aspects of integration of the
nuclear plant into the ship system. This manual provides fire safety requirements applicable to SRCAs performing industrial
work in nuclear-powered warships; however, nothing in this manual detracts in any way from NAVSEA 08 responsibilities.
Accordingly, the Director of Nuclear Propulsion (NAVSEA 08) shall be consulted in all matters pertaining to, or affecting,
nuclear propulsion plants, including all nuclear and nonnuclear propulsion plant systems and components.
1.4.4 Director, Strategic Systems Programs Responsibilities. The Director, Strategic Systems Programs (DIRSSP) is
responsible for providing materiel support (acquisition and fleet support) to ballistic missile and strategic weapon systems,
including missiles, platforms, associated equipment, and installation and direction of necessary supporting facilities. This
manual provides fire safety requirements applicable to SRCAs performing industrial work in ballistic missile submarines;
however, nothing in this manual detracts in any way from DIRSSP responsibilities. Accordingly, the Director, Strategic
Systems Programs (DIRSSP) shall be consulted in all matters pertaining to, or affecting, strategic systems.
1.4.5 Executive Agent for Damage Control Responsibilities. In reference (i) as promulgated by reference (j), the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) designated Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) as the Navy’s Executive Agent for
Damage Control (EA for DC) and to serve as the Head of a Senior Advisory Group to the CNO on all Damage Control
matters. As stated in reference (i) and in coordination with Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPF), USFF is charged with the
oversight of changes to doctrine, training, and equipment resulting from Class A, B, and C mishaps, Safety Investigation
Boards, and Judge Advocate General (JAG) investigations. USFF will ensure the Damage Control improvements and
modernization are properly identified and prioritized in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) requirements process.

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1.4.5.1 Accordingly, this manual was developed with Fleet inputs and concurrence. USFF and CPF Fleet Maintenance
Officers' (N43) concurrence shall be obtained for any subsequent change to this manual.
1.4.5.2 In accordance with Fleet direction, Type Commanders, NAVSEA, and Commander, Navy Installations Command
(CNIC) shall track and oversee implementation of this manual and periodically report to USFF and CPF on progress and any
issues requiring resolution.
1.5 FIRE SAFETY PLAN. Consistent with reference (h) requirements, each SRCA shall develop and implement a written
fire safety plan that covers all of the actions that employers and employees must take to ensure employee safety in the event
of a fire. The following information shall be included in the fire safety plan, at a minimum:
a. Identification of the significant fire hazards.
b. Procedure for recognizing and reporting unsafe conditions.
c. Alarm procedures.
d. Procedures for notifying employees of a fire emergency.
e. Procedures for evacuation.
f. Procedures to account for all employees after an evacuation.
g. Names, job titles, or departments for individuals who can be contacted for further information about the plan.
h. The roles, including coordination of SRCAs, other maintenance and modernization outside activities, SF, and the
responsible fire department(s), as it relates to fire prevention, detection, immediate response, and extended response.
Since multiple organizations (the SRCA, SF, Navy Region/District F&ES, mutual aid fire departments, etc.) have both
distinct and shared responsibilities for shipboard fire prevention and response, SRCAs shall develop Memoranda of
Agreement (MOAs) as needed to ensure each organization is aware of and acknowledges their assigned responsibilities in the
SRCA’s Fire Response Plan (FRP). These MOAs shall be used to document each organization’s agreement with the SRCA’s
FRP and should provide any amplifying information regarding unique duties and responsibilities for a particular ship
availability not prescribed in the FRP.
1.6 GLOSSARY OF TERMS. Refer to appendix L for a glossary of terms that will be used throughout this manual.

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Chapter 2
ORGANIZATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
References
(a) S9002-AK-CCM-010/6010, Industrial Ship Safety Manual for Submarines
(b) S9AA0-AB-GOS-010, REV. 7 General Specifications for Overhaul of Surface Ships
(c) Occupational Safety and Health Manual, 29 CFR Part 1915
(d) NAVSEAINST 4700.17, Preparation and Submission of Trouble Reports
(e) OPNAVINST 5102.1D, Navy and Marine Corps Mishap and Safety Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping
Manual
Introduction
This chapter provides the organizational structure and training requirements for each SRCA to maintain a fire
safety organization, including a Fire Safety Council (FSC) and Fire Safety Officers (FSOs). This chapter applies
to all SRCAs and covers all Navy ships – submarines, surface ships, and aircraft carriers.
The FSC represents a group of personnel detailed in paragraph 2.1.1.7 of this chapter that is responsible for
ensuring compliance with the fire safety requirements contained in this manual. As such, the FSC has been
empowered with the authority to decide how to implement the requirements contained here-in to unique situations
as they are presented during an industrial availability, and properly balance fire safety with cost and schedule
concerns. The proper level of risk mitigation, alternative means of ensuring the intent and safety contained in
these requirements are implemented, and documentation of actions taken to incorporate flexibilities contained
here-in are integral pieces of this responsibility. Each SRCA is required to maintain a local audit program
relating to the implementation of these requirements to further ensure the safest means of mitigating the risks
associated with fire safety are taken in a judicious and cost-effective manner. The empowerment and flexibilities
relating to the FSC’s responsibility and authority for fire safety are highlighted in each chapter, respectively.
2.1 FIRE SAFETY ORGANIZATION. Per reference (a), all employers are required to protect all employees
from fire hazards in shipyard employment. Each SRCA shall establish an organization with necessary
implementing instructions for the control of ship fire safety as outlined herein to achieve and maintain the
standards prescribed by this manual and to achieve individual responsibility and accountability for actions
that must be taken to ensure the control of ship fire safety. Accordingly, authority commensurate with the
assigned responsibilities shall be delegated to these personnel. In adhering to these policies, each SRCA
should normally assign personnel from within existing shipyard organizations carrying out similar
responsibilities. The SRCA shall be responsible for maintaining the qualification program that includes fire
safety requirements, including the administration of tests and/or oral boards for Fire Safety Officer (FSO) and
Fire Safety Watch (FSW) candidates, and maintenance of qualification record Objective Quality Evidence
(OQE).
2.1.1 Fire Safety Council (FSC).
2.1.1.1 The Fire Safety Council (FSC) is a term used to describe collectively the persons assigned by their parent
organizations to take required local approval actions for each specific ship on work, schedules, hull cuts, fire
zones, access/egress routes, alarms, firefighting systems, temporary services routing, etc., that affect the
maintenance of ship fire safety.
2.1.1.2 For all availabilities and new construction projects, a FSC shall be established to carry out the duties and
responsibilities to ensure compliance with fire safety requirements prescribed in this manual. For the purposes of
this manual, wherever the term FSC is used, the SRCA may decide to use a separate group with representation of
the same parties to execute the FSC requirements herein. However, this manual does not supersede the Ship
Safety Council (SSC) requirements set forth in reference (b) for submarines, and when reference (b) is invoked
for submarines, the SSC shall be assigned the FSC duties and responsibilities set forth in this manual.
2.1.1.3 Decisions of this group shall be unanimous, in writing, and signed by all members of the FSC.

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2.1.1.4 Any member may request a meeting if a need exists.

2.1.1.5 The initial meeting of the FSC shall not be later than keel laying or initial module joining for new
construction ships. For commissioned ships, the initial meeting of the FSC shall be convened at or prior to the
start of the availability. The FSC shall meet as frequently as agreed to by the FSC. When invoked, the FSC shall
maintain the ship plan of the day (SPOD) as an active tracking document.
a. The SPOD of this manual is not applicable to submarines. Submarines shall use the SPOD as per
reference (a) or the Safety of Ship Maintenance Item List per requirements outlined in the Joint Fleet
Maintenance Manual. This chapter does not supersede the requirements for submarines as prescribed in
these references.
b. The SPOD is required for all CNO availabilities.
c. The FSC will determine the need for the SPOD based on the scope of work during other availabilities.
The SPOD shall be used for any availability longer the 30 days in length.
d. Any ship’s work, testing procedure, or evolutions affecting the fire safety items listed in this chapter
shall be approved on the SPOD prior to system tag out or release of the applicable work, testing
procedure, or evolution.
e. When temporary fire safety systems are installed, the FSC may stop controlling work on the
corresponding ship’s system and control work affecting the temporary system. The FSC shall designate
in writing if the ship’s system, temporary system, or both systems are being controlled for fire safety.
f. SPODs shall be customized for each ship. However, all NSA SPODs shall be maintained in a similar
format.
g. Notes for the SPOD may be used as the minutes to document FSC decisions and waivers during
meetings.
h. The SPOD shall be signed by all members of the FSC.
i. Copies of the SPOD shall be provided (at a minimum) to:
(1) the FSO (original);
(2) all FSC members;
(3) the CASCON station, central watch station, quarterdeck, and any other watch station responsible for
announcing or controlling fire response;
(4) the LMA work control; and
(5) any SF watch station authorizing tag outs or work authorization forms.
j. Original SPODs shall be retained for the entire duration of the availability.
k. If flooding protection and high risk evolution control is assigned to the FSC, complete information
regarding these controls should be included on the SPOD.
Note: An example SPOD is provided in appendix O.
l. The FSC may make waivers only after reviewing the ship’s conditions for the availability. This waiver
may be documented on the SPOD or on the FSC minutes.
2.1.1.6 The FSC may be disestablished upon commencement of Fast Cruise or similar key event signifying
completion of production work (e.g., Production Completion Date (PCD)) as agreed to by the FSC.
2.1.1.7 The FSC consists of one member, designated in writing, from each of the following organizations (each
organization represented on the FSC is further required to designate in writing one or two alternate(s) who can act
in the member's absence):
a. SRCA: The FSO for that ship, who serves as chairman.
b. Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP): representative (when a private
shipyard is the shipbuilder or LMA).

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c. Regional Maintenance Center: representative (when a private repair shipyard is the LMA).
d. Commissioned officer, as designated by the Ship’s CO for commissioned ships. For new construction
ships, prior to in service, the Ship’s Force representative designated by the Officer-In-Charge
(OIC)/Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) serves in an advisory capacity and participates in FSC
meetings. When individual systems have been transferred, the Pre-Commissioned Unit (PCU) Ship’s
Force representative is a member for those systems which have been transferred to the ship.
e. Engineering Planning Department (EPD) Representative (when a Naval Shipyard is the LMA). An EPD
Representative shall be assigned in writing by the Chief Engineer as a designated representative to the
FSC with at least one alternate. In order to ensure independent review and assessment, the EPD
Representative shall not be from the same branch as the Ship Safety Officer.
f. Project Support Engineer (PSE). The PSE is not required to be part of the FSC unless no one from the
EPD is available, the EPD does not exist or the SRCA requires it.
g. Other cognizant personnel (such as Chief Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES), Chief Test Engineers
(CTEs), Chief Refueling Engineers (CREs), Construction Manager, Ship Scheduler, Zone Manager,
Shop Supervisor, Shipyard Ship Safety Manager, Alteration Installation Team (AIT) Managers/On-Site
Installation Coordinators, etc.) may be requested to attend selected sessions to furnish expertise related to
specific evolutions. Such persons may also request that they attend a specific meeting in order to present
a specific question, problem, or proposal to the FSC. The attendance of these personnel does not
constitute membership in the FSC.
2.1.1.8 FSC Notification
a. The NSA shall establish processes to ensure all work, testing, and evolutions that impact fire safety listed
in this chapter, are routed to the FSO and FSC for approval prior to releasing for work.
b. The routing process listed in this chapter shall provide sufficient time for the FSO and FSC to review and
adjudicate the effects of the work or course of action required prior to approval.
c. The NSA shall establish processes to ensure the FSC is informed of:
(1) flammable liquid storage locations including quantities;
(2) combustible storage locations;
(3) hull cuts, removed hull valves and fittings, and other non-design airflow paths;
(4) temporary service routing plans and isolations;
(5) pier staging plan for firefighting equipment (DC Conex, FDC, etc.); and
(6) plans for shipboard repair activity (RA) laydown area(s).
d. The NSA shall establish severity criteria for tour and inspection deficiencies and define processes to
ensure a timely and appropriate response based on severity level and adverse trends.
2.1.2 Fire Safety Officer (FSO). The FSO is responsible for implementing and maintaining the safety
requirements described in this manual.
2.1.2.1 Duties and Responsibilities. The assigned FSO will:
a. tour the ship every normal workday to monitor ship conditions and document results in the approved
NSA tracking system;
b. review work and testing plans at the working level that affect fire safety during the availability;
c. maintain knowledge and administrative control of fire safety conditions and systems to support the
preparation, issue, and maintenance of the SPOD (when invoked by this chapter);
d. ensure adequate lines of communication exist between NSA, SF, and RAs to ensure that all work,
testing, and evolutions which affect fire safety is provided to the FSO in advance to allow sufficient time
for FSC review and approval;

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e. identify hazardous conditions created by proposed actions, disapproving actions (as necessary) to
maintain fire safety;
f. advise on, or facilitate identification of, an alternate course of action to resolve conflicts when proposed
actions could create an unsafe condition; and
g. be the NSAs primary point of contact with the ship's commanding officer and SF representatives
concerning fire safety.
2.1.2.2 FSO Assignment. The FSO should be assigned to the operations department (for shipyards) or repair
department (for regional maintenance centers (RMC)).
a. The FSO shall be appointed in writing by the operations officer (for shipyards) or operations manager
for other NSAs.
b. The FSO should not be assigned to more than one ship concurrently unless the assigned ships are
undergoing short availabilities where the scope of work and testing would permit such assignment.
c. Management may assign additional duties and responsibilities to the FSO, provided they do not conflict
with maintaining the standards prescribed in this manual or reference (a) SSO responsibilities.
(1) The FSO shall not be a member of the work control organization. This provision allows for an
independent assessment of work scheduling.
(2) The ship safety officer (SSO) assigned per reference (a) may be assigned some or all FSO duties at
NSA discretion.
d. The assignment of an FSO in no way relieves a ship’s commanding officer of their individual
responsibilities prescribed in Navy Regulations.
2.1.3 Fire Safety Watch (FSW). The FSW monitors day-to-day fire safety conditions and initiates response
actions in the event of a fire.
2.1.3.1 FSW Duties and Responsibilities
a. The FSW will be assigned no other duties or responsibilities while on watch. SF watches stationed per
ship instructions may also be designated as FSWs.
b. Roving FSWs shall continuously patrol all areas of the ship affected by the industrial work to inspect for
smoke, fire, hazards, or other conditions not compliant with the requirements of this manual.
2.1.3.2 FSW Assignment on Commissioned Navy Ships
a. The functions of the FSW will be performed by the SF duty section as directed by the ship’s officer in
charge or commanding officer per responsibilities delineated in Navy Regulations.
b. The casualty control (CASCON) station, central watch station, quarterdeck, and any other watch stations
responsible for announcing or controlling fire response shall be manned (as applicable) by a FSW at all
times.
c. All ships shall have at least one roving FSW. The number of roving FSWs and log recording will be
determined by the FSC based on ship size, conditions, temporary systems, scope of work, and alarm and
warning system status.
d. The SSW assigned per reference (a) and the FSW positions may be combined.
e. The FSW shall immediately report all deviations from prescribed procedures or other abnormalities to
the SF duty officer and the NSA assigned FSO.
2.1.3.3 FSW Assignment on New Construction Ships
a. LMA FSWs shall be assigned by the operations officer or operations manager (in private shipyards)
when shipyard personnel are assigned these duties on unmanned ships.
b. The SSW assigned per reference (a) and the FSW positions may be combined.
c. The CASCON station or other controlling watch station may serve more than one ship provided
individual ship’s information is clearly identified.

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d. A minimum of one roving FSW shall be assigned to each new construction ship commencing at keel
laying or initial module joining.
e. The FSW shall immediately report all deviations from prescribed procedures or other abnormalities to
the SF duty officer (if assigned) and the NSA assigned FSO.
2.2 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT. The Incident Management Structure (IMS) for Shipboard Fire
Emergency is provided in chapter 3 of this manual.
2.3 TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
2.3.1 Discussion. This section establishes fire safety briefing and training requirements for SF and all personnel
working on ships to include qualification requirements for FSO and FSW personnel.
a. FSOs and FSWs shall meet the qualification requirements of this section for the class of ship to which
they are assigned.
b. Each LMA is responsible for the training and qualification of assigned personnel.
c. The standards established in this chapter do not relieve RAs of responsibility for ensuring employed
personnel maintain ship fire safety.
2.3.2 Briefing and Training Requirements
a. All RA personnel shall be briefed to report all fires to the CASCON Station, damage control central
(DCC) or the quarterdeck following activation of an alarm-type fire reporting device. This action
rapidly provides critical information used for fire response.
b. NSA or host facility personnel involved with ship fire response shall be trained per applicable
requirements contained in this manual and the response requirements described in reference (c).
c. All project managers and personnel assigned work control duties shall be briefed on the processes
prescribed in this chapter.
d. Specific FSW training is not required on temporary systems that are not installed or used on the ship to
which the FSW is assigned.
e. When temporary systems are installed after FSW training is complete, instruction and practical training
shall be conducted before this system is used in place of the ship system. The certifying official for the
FSW will determine experience requirements.
f. All SF personnel that support fire response shall receive FSW training. Training may be limited to their
specific role (e.g., medical department personnel are only required to be trained on their REHAB role).
g. All SF personnel shall be trained on the role of the FSC and the processes prescribed in this chapter.
h. Additional training requirements for emergency response team (ERT) managers are provided in chapter
3 of this manual.
2.3.3 FSO Qualification
a. Prior to qualification, the FSO shall satisfactorily complete:
(1) instruction;
(2) practical training;
(3) a written examination; and
(4) an oral board provided by the NSA covering all applicable requirements of this manual.
b. The FSO shall demonstrate knowledge of:
(1) requirements of this manual applicable to the assigned class of ship;
(2) all FSW knowledge factors;
(3) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) course IS 00100 – Introduction to the Incident
Command System;
(4) FEMA course IS 00200 – Basic Incident Command System for Initial Response;
(5) Navy firefighting and damage control processes;

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(6) fire safety and response plans required by this manual;
(7) characteristics, arrangement of compartments, tanks and accesses for the assigned class of ship;
(8) configuration, function, capabilities, and operation of damage control systems for the assigned class
of ship;
(9) tagout and work control processes;
(10) industrial hotwork processes; and
(11) NSA regulations, instructions, and orders pertaining to shipboard fire safety.
2.3.4 LMA FSW Qualification
a. The FSW shall satisfactorily complete instruction, practical training, and a written examination provided
by the LMA covering the applicable requirements of this manual prior to their qualification.
b. A general knowledge exam for FSWs shall be based on the ship class to which the FSW is assigned.
The exam shall include (when applicable):
(1) general firefighting and damage control procedures;
(2) shipyard firefighting organization and damage control procedures;
(3) operation and lineup of ship damage control systems (e.g., firefighting, dewatering,
communications, and alarms);
(4) operation and lineup of temporary damage control systems (e.g., firefighting, dewatering,
communications, and alarms);
(5) electrical power and lighting distribution and isolation;
(6) housekeeping and equipment protection procedures;
(7) the role of the FSC and processes prescribed in this chapter; and
(8) regulations pertaining to fire prevention and response should include how and when to make
applicable ship announcements (e.g., evacuate ship or zone, stop hot work) and how to call F&ES.
c. Practical training shall include demonstration of:
(1) ability to check battery ventilation system for proper operation per the ship systems manual for the
appropriate class of ship (submarines);
(2) ability to operate quick-disconnects; and
(3) ability to operate alarm, announcing, and damage control systems.
2.3.5 Ship’s Force FSW Training. SF FSWs shall complete a course of instruction and practical training that is
provided by the NSA or LMA no more than 30 days before the start of any availability. The instruction should
include (at a minimum):
a. Firefighting training conducted by SF before, but within 90 days of, the start of the availability on the
tactical execution of the topics listed in table 3-3.
b. Training provided by the NSA or LMA within 30 days of the availability start that includes:
(1) LMA housekeeping and equipment protection procedures;
(2) the role of the FSC and the processes prescribed in this chapter;
(3) tactical execution of the fire response plan (FRP) and application table 3-4 in-port firefighting
procedures;
(4) applicable host facility firefighting organization and damage control procedures;
(5) host facility regulations pertaining to fire prevention and response including how and when to make
applicable ship announcements (e.g., evacuate ship or zone, stop hot work) and how to contact
F&ES;
(6) LMA provided temporary firefighting, communication, and alarm systems (including how to
operate each system); and
(7) demonstrated ability to operate quick-disconnects and secure temporary services.

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2.4 ADMINISTRATION
2.4.1 FSO Assignment Memorandum. An assignment memorandum shall be issued assigning the FSO to a
specific availability to ensure that the FSO’s authority in matters of fire safety is recognized.
a. Assignment memorandums shall describe the FSO’s duties and responsibilities.
b. Assignment memorandums shall be adequately distributed.
c. Distribution of the assignment memorandum should include:
(1) the ship’s commanding officer;
(2) the nuclear production department (if applicable);
(3) the project superintendent or manager;
(4) F&ES;
(5) project chief test engineers (CTE);
(6) Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 04X shipyard field representative;
(7) the NSA (private shipyards); and
(8) the naval reactors representatives office (NRRO) (or their equivalent).
2.4.2 Qualification Program. The NSA and LMA shall maintain a qualification program that includes:
a. administration of written exams and oral boards as required for FSO and FSW candidates;
b. maintenance objective quality evidence for qualification records; and
c. qualification lists of shipyard personnel who are qualified as FSO or FSW.
(1) Qualification lists shall indicate the ship class for which they are qualified.
(2) Qualification lists shall track when the candidate was last assigned to a shipboard fire safety
function. Personnel that have not actively engaged in a ship’s fire safety functions for six months
shall be disqualified.
(3) Requalification will be determined by the manager based on the duration of the assignment gap and
program changes during that period. Requalification shall include both a written and an oral exam.
Note: When candidates are qualified in multiple classes, maintaining proficiency in one class maintains all
class qualifications.
2.5 FIRE DATA TRACKING AND ANALYSIS.
2.5.1 Reportable Fires. Reportable fires are any shipboard or drydock fires occurring at all SRCAs, both public
and private, and to all ship availabilities, any naval installation, ship, sub, or aircraft (to include small fires in
which no personnel were injured and the material property damage was limited to the originally ignited materiel
and not propagated to other materials). Fires are unintended states, processes, or instances of combustion in
which fuel or other material is ignited and combined with oxygen, giving off smoke, sparks, or flame. Smoke or
sparks may or may not be present. However, if unexpected smoke or sparks exist, a fire should be assumed to
exist (this is especially relevant to Class 'C' fires when the smoke or sparks cease after power is secured).
Evidence of previously unreported combustion or explosion should also be reported upon discovery. Reports
solely based on acrid odor (no evidence of combustion upon inspection) are not required.
2.5.2 Trend Analysis of Shipboard Fires. SRCAs shall collect, maintain, and continuously perform trend
analysis on all shipboard fires. Specifically, fire data elements such as number of reported fires by: fire
type/class, source of flammable material, cause (e.g., intentional, equipment malfunction, hot work, act of nature);
method of extinguishing; who extinguished (e.g., tradesman, SF, F&ES, Mutual Aid, combination); location
within, on or under the ship; geographic location (e.g., SY pierside, SY in drydock, base pierside, etc.); shift/time;
normal workday vs. weekend/holiday; response times (initial firefighting agent/effort applied, fire declared out,
evacuation muster completed, etc.); injuries; how fire was detected (including, if applicable, who first reported
the fire). The SRCA must report the cause (e.g. Electrical, Cigarette, Hot Work, etc.) and root cause (e.g. Work
Practice, Supervision, Procedures, Training, and Material Failure etc.) of each fire in their quarterly report trend

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analysis. If either the cause or root cause of the fire is “Unknown” then an explanation must be provided. The
trend analysis of shipboard fires described in this paragraph shall be regularly updated on a quarterly basis.
2.5.3 Trend Analysis of Fire Related Problems. In addition to trend analysis of actual fires, trend analysis of
fire-related problems is also beneficial in preventing fires. Trends such as high levels of explosive gas detected,
hot work performed without valid hot work authorization, hot work performed without fire watch, required fire
detection/suppression system disabled without FSC authorization, etc. shall also be collected and maintained by
each SRCA. The trend analysis of fire related problems described in this paragraph shall be regularly updated on
a quarterly basis.
2.5.4 Quarterly Reports. These analyses will drive prioritization of local fire prevention and response efforts and
feed corporate analysis. Each SRCA shall provide and submit quarterly reports containing the data and analysis
prescribed herein to NAVSEA (including Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center (CNRMC) for
RMCs) and CNIC. The quarterly reports must be submitted within the following timeframes; January 1st – 15th,
April 1st – 15th, July 1st – 15th, and October 1st – 15th.
2.6 TROUBLE REPORTS AND MISHAP REPORTS. For Naval activities, and when contractually invoked at
private shipyards and AITs, the Trouble Report (TR) requirements of reference (d) apply. For Naval activities,
the mishap investigation and reporting requirements, including damage and injury thresholds, of reference (e)
apply.
2.7 AUDITS.
2.7.1 Local Audits. SRCAs that have this manual implemented, shall audit compliance with the requirements of
this manual and other applicable fire safety and response requirements every 12 months using an audit plan. The
audit plan, with all attributes documented as reviewed, shall be maintained in an auditable format for a minimum
of four years, and shall be made available to the Government. When reference (a) is invoked for submarines, it is
acceptable to combine these local audits with those required by reference (a).
2.7.2 NAVSEA and CNIC Audits. NAVSEA (CNRMC for RMCs) shall audit each Navy activity that performs
or contracts for ship construction and shipboard maintenance and each nuclear capable shipyard that has this
manual contractually invoked at 24-month intervals. CNIC shall participate in those audits where Navy F&ES is
the organization responsible for primary fire response. TYCOM audits of fleet maintenance activities shall meet
the requirements of this paragraph, and NAVSEA will assist in these audits as appropriate.

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Chapter 3
FIRE RESPONSE PLANNING
References
(a) Occupational Safety and Health Standards for Shipyard Employment, 29 CFR Part 1915 Subpart P, Fire
Protection in Shipyard Employment
(b) S9086-S3-STM-010, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 555, Volume 1, Surface Ship
Firefighting
(c) S9086-S3-STM-020, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 555, Volume 2, Submarine
Firefighting
(d) S9211-05-MMA-000/(C), Radiological Emergency Planning Manual for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program
(e) OPNAVINST 3040.5, Procedures and Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Reactor and Radiological
Incidents
(f) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic Incidents
(g) DoDINST 6055.17, DoD Installation Emergency (IEM) Program
(h) OPNAVINST 11320.23, Navy Fire and Emergency Services Program
(i) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 1561, Standard on Emergency Services
Incident Management
(j) NAVSEAINST 1601.7, NAVSEA Emergency Operations Center Manning Requirements and Crisis
Management Operations
(k) CNRMCINST 4790.13, Emergency Fire Response Planning and Execution of Major Fire drills at Private
Shipyards; Guidance and Plan for Execution
(l) National Fire Protection Administration (NFPA) Codes and Standards 1981, Standard on Open-Circuit
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for Emergency Services
(m) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Emergency Response Air Monitoring Guidance Tables
(n) Uniform Industrial Process Instruction 0900-453: Critique and Problem Analysis Matrix Processes; Problem
Identification and Investigation
(o) NAVSEAINST 4700.17, Preparation and Submission of Trouble Reports
(p) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 1405, Guide for Land-Based Fire
Departments that Respond to Marine Vessel Fires
(q) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 1403, Standard on Live Fire Training
Evolutions
(r) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 1, Fire Code
(s) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 1141, Standard for Fire Protection
Infrastructure for Land Development in Wildland, Rural, and Suburban Areas
(t) NAVFAC Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 3-600-01, Fire Protection Engineering For Facilities
(u) NAVFAC Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-152-01, Design: Piers and Wharves

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(v) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 1584, Standard on the Rehabilitation
Process for Members During Emergency Operations and Training Exercises
(w) NAVSEA Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) Environment, Safety, and Health (ESH) Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP)
(x) OPNAVINST 3440.18, Procedures and Reporting Requirements for Major Shipboard Nonnuclear Casualties
While in Port at a U.S. Naval Installation or a U.S. Ship Repair or Construction Activity (NOTAL)
Introduction
In accordance with reference (a), SRCAs are required to have Fire Response Plans (FRPs) to deal with fire casualties in
their facilities, including Navy vessels under construction or repair. In addition, many SRCAs have emergency response
plans for major incidents, such as nuclear/radiological accidents and natural disasters (hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes,
etc.), that require a large scale on-scene response, activation and manning of the Emergency Control Center
(ECC)/Emergency Operations Center (EOC), as applicable, as well as off-yard coordination.
However, these plans have not included the response required to deal with a major fire that burns for an extended period of
time involving multiple levels. Utilizing existing requirements in references (a) through (c) and applying lessons learned
from the MIAMI fire, an expanded set of FRP requirements were developed to ensure all SRCAs are capable of
responding to and successfully fighting a major fire on all Navy Ships undergoing industrial availabilities.
This chapter applies to all SRCAs and covers all Navy ships – submarines, surface ships, and aircraft carriers. While the
chapter lays out all the detailed requirements and structures required for a major fire on a nuclear powered ship that
threatens the reactor plant, the chapter also provides each SRCA with the flexibility to adapt the requirements to their
situation based on the type of ship being built or maintained as well as the nature of the work. Examples where
efficiencies can be gained include sharing local Engineering and Environmental, Safety, and Health (ESH) personnel to
support on-scene responders, combining multiple operations centers into a joint facility/staff where practical (e.g., EOC
and ROC), or utilizing trained personnel from another SRCA to provide on-scene support at a neighboring SRCA.
However, some of the fundamental tenants, such as the ship’s Commanding Officer for a commissioned Navy ship being
the In-Hull Incident Commander, should be the standard for all FRPs.
3.1 BACKGROUND. This chapter provides NAVSEA and CNIC requirements for SRCAs in coordination with Region
and Installation Fire Chiefs for emergency response plans to address fires aboard Navy ships.
3.2 FIRE RESPONSE PLAN. Each SRCA shall prepare a coordinated Fire Response Plan (FRP) and incorporate it into
emergency response plans to meet the requirements of Standards 501, 505, and 508 of reference (a). In circumstances
where there are multiple SRCAs executing work during a ship maintenance availability, one SRCA shall be designated by
the NSA as the host employer and shall be responsible for the FRP and the host employer responsibilities identified in
Standard 501 of reference (a). This designation will typically align with the location of the ship. The FRP shall address
response for all fires and require that all fires be reported to the Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES) department. This
plan shall also address as a minimum the following aspects for combating a major fire aboard a ship undergoing
construction or a maintenance availability:
3.2.1 Firefighting Principles. The FRP shall follow a set of principles specific to firefighting as provided in appendix A,
which are applicable to all shipboard fires. For fires that threaten the reactor or propulsion plant of a Nuclear-Powered
Warship (NPW), the plan shall be developed using the requirements and response structure outlined in reference (d).
When applicable, these principles shall be integrated with the Radiological Emergency Response Organization principles
of reference (d).
3.2.2 Command and Control.
3.2.2.1 It is anticipated that a major fire will be the result of a minor fire that grows beyond the ability of initial responders
to control. Emergency Response plans must therefore account for the transition from initial response (who will normally
be SF for commissioned vessels), to the integration of F&ES personnel, and finally to the declaration of a “major fire”.
This declaration of a “major fire” may occur very early in the response and on-scene incident command responders may
arrive early in the response, and therefore responders should be flexible in how and when the final emergency response
structure is established. This transition is represented in Figures 3-1 through 3-4 resulting in a command structure as
depicted/described in Figures B-1 and B-2 in appendix B. Declaration of a major fire on submarines will implement
reference (e). For CVNs, declaration of a major fire will implement reference (e) when the fire threatens the nuclear

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propulsion plant, otherwise declaration will implement reference (x). Declaration of a major fire on surface ships will
implement reference (x).
3.2.2.2 For a commissioned ship, the FRP must be based on the principle that the ship’s Commanding Officer or
designated representative (i.e., the Ship’s Duty Officer) is in charge of the actions inside the ship at all times and therefore,
per the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and reference (d) for NPWs, is the Incident Commander (IC). The
ship’s Commanding Officer is responsible for setting the goals and objectives of the in-hull casualty actions to control and
put the fire out. During a fire, the ship will exercise command and control from a central location depending on the
condition of the ship and the extent and location of the fire (Figure 3-1). Thus the response plan shall include
contingencies for command and control with the ship’s command station (e.g., CASCON Station and/or Damage Control
(DC) Central) on or off the ship.
3.2.2.3 When the responding Fire Chief or Senior Fire Officer arrives at the scene, they will assist the Ship’s
Commanding Officer by establishing an incident command post (Figure 3-2) and integrating with SF to fight the fire. The
In-Hull Incident Commander, with the support of the F&ES Chief/Senior F&ES Officer is responsible for the safety,
accountability, and well-being of the integrated F&ES, SF, and mutual aid firefighting resources. When representatives of
additional organizations arrive (e.g., senior SRCA representative, Security, etc.), the Commanding Officer, with the
support of the Fire Chief, will direct all on and off-hull actions until establishment of on-scene incident command, who
will assume responsibility for off-hull actions. Emergency Response Plans shall include a pre-planned fire command post
location for all routine ship berths and drydocks, and logistics to readily provide required utilities and communications for
the command post. The FRP shall provide an alternate command post location for these locations if the wind and smoke
plume is in the direction of the primary command post location and affecting operations. The In-Hull Operations section
will normally be located at or near the Casualty Control (CASCON) Station or DCC/Quarterdeck.
3.2.2.4 SRCA personnel actions and responsibilities for an extended response Incident Management Structure (IMS) shall
include the following:
a. As identified in Figures 3-3 through 3-4a, the SRCA member of the In-Hull Incident Management Structure
(IMS) will normally be the Project Superintendent (PS) (or equivalent SRCA official/manager). However, it is
expected that another responsible SRCA manager may arrive before the PS (e.g., Shipyard Duty Officer,
Operations Officer, Deputy PS, etc.) and assume this duty until relieved by the PS or the senior project team
member if the PS is not available. FRPs shall include procedures implementing the assumption and turnover of
this duty. As depicted in Figures 3-3 and B-1 in appendix B, the PS (or equivalent SRCA Manager) will remain
part of the in-hull IMS but will supplement his role as an advisor to the Commanding Officer for in-hull
operations with that as an advisor to the On-Scene Incident Commander (OSIC) for off-hull actions under the
direction of the OSIC. In this role, the PS advises rather than directs the actions of responders. The fully
developed IMS, as well as explanatory notes, is contained in Figures B-1 and B-2 in appendix B.
b. When a major fire requiring extended response is declared for a NPW, Emergency Response will transition to
operating under the requirements of reference (e). Upon arrival of the SRCA’s OSIC, the In-Hull Incident
Command Post (ICP) will transition their focus to in-hull firefighting and the OSIC will assume the responsibility
of off-hull emergency response actions (Figures 3-4a and 3-4b). However, in most cases, emergency response
actions immediately adjacent to the ship will remain the responsibility of the In-Hull Incident Command Post
(e.g., Man-In-Charge (MIC) of pier support). In other cases, fire support functions may transition to the OSIC
(e.g., rehabilitation will transition to the on-scene fire and rescue officer, responsibility for the safety of material
in the drydock).
3.2.2.5 While this IMS supports coordinated integration with the Radiological Emergency Response Organization
(RERO) of reference (d) for a commissioned NPW, each SRCA shall develop a similar IMS to support integrated
command and control at the scene for all ship types and availabilities.

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Figure 3-1. Incident Management Structure for Shipboard Fire Emergency (Stage 1)

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Figure 3-4a. Incident Management Structure for Shipboard Fire Emergency (Stage 4)

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Figure 3-4b. Integrated In-Hull Operations Section
3.2.3 Designation of Responsibility and Authority.

3.2.3.1 The FRP shall clearly define responsibilities and authority of SF, the F&ES Department, Mutual Aid, crews from
other ships, and the SRCA using the content of this chapter and Appendix B as a guide, which integrate SF, F&ES, and
SRCA operational requirements. Navy F&ES Departments operate in accordance with references (f) through (i). DoD
adopted the NIMS and Installation and Mutual Aid F&ES departments operate under the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) Incident Command System (ICS) and NIMS structure to ensure compliance with requirements of
references (f), (g), and (i). In accordance with Navy regulations, the Ship’s CO or his designated representative (e.g.,
Ship’s Duty Officer or Command Duty Officer) is responsible for all actions in the ship during the emergency and thus per
NIMS, is the Incident Commander. Under the command of the Ship’s CO and as part of the Incident Command Staff, the
senior F&ES Fire Chief is expected to provide expertise and guidance for the overall response effort and along with the
CO has responsibility and authority for accountability and safety of all personnel entering the Immediately Dangerous
to Life or Health (IDLH) atmosphere (i.e., the hot zone).
3.2.3.2 The first arriving F&ES Chief/Senior F&ES Officer reports to the In-Hull Incident Commander and will integrate
as part of the in-hull incident command staff and will remain with the In-Hull Incident Commander. Further, the FRP
should specify that, the F&ES Officer will offer F&ES resources and capabilities to help combat the casualty. Once the
ship accepts assistance from F&ES with combating the casualty, the next F&ES Chief/Senior F&ES Officer will serve as
the In-Hull Operations Section Chief or assist the In-Hull Operations Section Chief as one of the Tactical Advisors. Based
on the priority dictated by the casualty situation, additional roles for senior F&ES officers, such as the On-Scene Fire and
Rescue Officer and elevation of the In-Hull Safety Officer to a senior F&ES officer, need to be filled as additional senior
F&ES officers arrive. Fire Response Plans (FRPs) and standard operating procedures should include a means to assemble
the necessary number of senior F&ES officers to staff the above roles. The In-Hull Operations Section Chief position
shall be filled by an experienced/DC trained member of SF (e.g., the DCA, Command Master Chief) or a senior F&ES
officer at the discretion of the In-Hull Incident Commander. Selection of the In-Hull Operations Section Chief by the In-
Hull Incident Commander should be based on the nature and circumstances of the casualty/response, including, but not
limited to, whether the majority of casualty responders are/will be SF or F&ES/mutual aid members. The In-Hull
Operations Section Chief is supported by Tactical Advisors which include a senior F&ES officer (if the In-Hull Operations
Section Chief is SF) or an experienced/DC trained member of SF (if the In-Hull Operations Section Chief is a senior
F&ES officer) and a designated SY manager (e.g., Deputy or Assistant PS, the Ship’s Safety Officer, Temporary Service
Coordinator).

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3.2.3.3 The In-Hull Operations Section is expected to assess the firefighting equipment and personnel resources, develop
the strategy for combating the fire in order to achieve the goals/objectives established by the Incident Commander, and
provide tactical firefighting direction, including management of all of the resources combating the fire (SF, other ship
crews, Navy F&ES, Supporting F&ES, and Mutual Aid responders), and how the resources will be integrated and
coordinated. This organization is adaptable to and consistent with the existing shipboard DC organizations on all
Navy ships. In cases where the SF Inport Emergency Team (IET) is intact and has significant capability (e.g., CVNs,
LHDs), the IET will provide the initial and likely the majority of damage control response. For these situations, the
SRCA shall develop into their FRP an IMS consistent with this chapter that integrates the response personnel from
shore based firefighting organizations and unaffected ships into the established DC organization and command
protocol. In addition, the roles of the senior SRCA representative on the in-hull and off-hull incident command staff, the
In-Hull Operations Section and staff, as well as the On-Scene Incident Commander (OSIC) need to be defined, consistent
with the radiological emergency response organization, if applicable, and integrated with the Ship’s CO and F&ES Fire
Chief to effectively provide all required support and assistance.
3.2.4 Assignment of Designated Personnel to Specific Positions in the Emergency Response Team (ERT). This will
include initial SF responders, F&ES, members of the incident command staff, and key personnel manning the SRCA ECC
and/or EOC. For SRCAs with NPW responsibility, ERT members will be organized in such a manner as to be readily
assimilated into the shipyard’s RERO, if applicable.
3.2.4.1 The ERT organization in the ECC/EOC shall include the following Branches or Sections to support an integrated
Incident Management Structure per section 3.2.2 and as illustrated and described in appendix B for Incident Command and
Control:
a. Command
b. Logistics
c. Public Affairs
d. Engineering Technical Branch (ETB)
e. Environmental, Safety and Health Technical Branch (ESHTB)
The ETB and ESHTB will provide technical assistance to effectively fight the fire, manage the operation of temporary
services (e.g., tool service air and electrical power, etc.), temporary ship systems (e.g., breathing air, lighting, high pressure
air), and permanent ship systems in the affected areas, and coordinate environmental aspects (sampling, notifications, etc.).
Each SRCA shall incorporate these branches into their FRP and prepare operating procedures that define their duties and
responsibilities. A representative from the F&ES providing emergency response to SRCAs should be incorporated into the
ERT organization in the ECC/EOC (e.g., as a member of Command, Logistics, ETB, or ESHTB). This representative
should serve as the primary F&ES liaison between the ECC/EOC and the F&ES Chief/Senior F&ES Officer at the ICP
regardless of which branch this representative is a member of.
3.2.4.2 For NPWs, the ETB and ESHTB supplement the branches specified in reference (d) and will use the
teleconferencing bridge telephone numbers provided in reference (j) and follow the communication practices discussed in
Section 5.E of reference (d). For non-CVN surface ships, SRCAs/RMCs shall also comply with reference (k) and shall
adopt a modified RERO for their ERT organization/Incident Command System or otherwise establish a NIMS-compliant
model.
3.2.4.3 The plan shall include a method to recall ERT members and alternates, and address how to properly integrate and
coordinate SRCA ECC/EOC and Regional Operations Center (ROC)/EOC efforts.
3.2.5 Training and Integration of Firefighting Services. Plans and procedures shall be included to train and integrate
firefighting and emergency medical services, Navy and other primary responding F&ES organizations, SF, other ship
crews, supporting F&ES, and mutual aid organizations into the incident action plans. This integration will include use of
the FRP Interoperable Radio Communication Plan used by SF, F&ES, and the incident command staff. The FRP shall
address the specific strategy of establishing integrated hose teams of SF, F&ES, and mutual aid personnel early in the
incident to ensure the most effective response. This arrangement enables SF to provide ship centric technical Subject
Matter Expert (SME) support and the F&ES personnel to provide firefighting/fire behavior SME support to enhance fire
response capabilities. The FRP shall address a hose team relief process to keep hoses staffed.

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3.2.6 Personnel Accountability. Procedures for personnel evacuation and post-evacuation mustering, including non-
SRCA personnel (e.g., Alteration Installation Team (AIT) members) and reporting the muster status to Incident Command
Post. Shipboard workers shall be trained that any information about the fire and affected shipboard conditions are
included in the muster report. The plan shall also identify procedures and responsibility to account for the location and
assignment of personnel (SF, SRCA, F&ES, and mutual aid responders) taking actions to combat the casualty.
3.2.7 Response Actions. Per references (b) and (c), an in-hull ship fire can rapidly escalate to a major fire condition where
it becomes untenable for the firefighting teams to directly fight the fire due to the effects of excessive heat and smoke.
Consequently, each SRCA’s FRP must emphasize rapidly attacking a fire with initial responders (who will normally be SF
for commissioned vessels) and then quickly integrating the installation and mutual aid firefighters per the following
requirements:
3.2.7.1 For incipient fires that have been extinguished by initial responders and do not require full response per the FRP,
the SRCAs shall ensure that FRP procedures require that these incidents are promptly reported to F&ES.
3.2.7.2 Dispatch of firefighting resources shall be rapid, should include the resources needed based on knowledge of the
event, and shall ensure relief teams are in place when needed to relieve initial hose teams.
3.2.7.3 The FRP shall contain clear guidance on who is responsible for requesting the additional resources to include
station move up assignments and staging of additional response forces close to the ship. The plan shall also address
safeguards to preclude requesting additional resources (beyond the initial alarm) for minor events.
3.2.7.4 Utilizing appendix C that contains the attributes for an Engineered Fire Response Strategy (EFRS), the plan shall
include expected response capabilities and times for all actions by ERT personnel (SF, initial F&ES, full alarm F&ES,
additional F&ES, and mutual aid).
3.2.7.5 The FRP shall also address when the fire has escalated to a major fire requiring extended response, and thus
requires activation of the full radiological emergency response capability for NPWs. The ship’s CO (or designated
representative), senior fire chief, or SRCA leadership will determine when a fire shall be declared a major fire. In general,
the fire should be declared a major fire requiring extended response if the fire has progressed beyond the incipient stage,
beyond the ability of the initial responders (usually SF on ships in commission) to control, and is still not under control
when the first hose team outfitted in Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBAs) and Firefighting Ensembles (FFEs)
needs to be relieved. Due to its limited compartmentalization and absence of installed fire suppression systems, a
submarine fire that has spread to a second level shall be declared a major fire. For surface ships, there may be
circumstances where the fire has spread to a second level and is under control, but in general, a multi-level spread should
be considered a trip point for a major fire declaration in surface ships as well.
3.2.7.6 Once the fire is extinguished, the FRP shall include provisions to demobilize responders that were assembled to
combat the fire.
3.2.8 Firefighting Doctrine. The FRP will supplement the guidelines of references (b) and (c) for fighting in port
shipboard fires in an industrial environment (e.g., control of air paths through hull cuts that feed the fire, ventilation of heat
and smoke to maintain tenable ingress/egress of personnel, how to attack a multi-level fire, management of personnel and
stand-by fire personnel, management of firefighting water pressure/levels, etc.). The FRP shall include trip points for
when to escalate the effort (e.g., when to shift to other firefighting agents or to activate the mutual aid response). This
shall include SF casualty procedures tailored to the SRCA environment.
3.2.9 Logistic and In-Hull Support Requirements. The FRP shall establish a process to manage immediate logistic
requirements and support to the in-hull firefighting operations. The anticipated support required to combat a fire requiring
extended response includes: equipment, services, facilities, and materials. This shall include quantities and location of the
material and equipment and the capability to replenish those that will be expended by a major casualty. Locations may be
at the scene, on site or nearby but must be available when needed by the ERT. The FRP shall include use of an enclosed
facility to store and provide SF ready access to damage control equipment including FFEs and SCBAs. The SRCA shall
ensure that the ship’s strategy to inventory and perform maintenance of ships damage control equipment provides for
ready use in the event of emergency. The ship shall validate to the SRCA that they have conducted an inventory of
damage control equipment per applicable Navy instructions with a plan to correct any shortages that exist prior to the
availability.

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3.2.10 SCBA Recharge Capability. For an extended duration casualty, firefighting resource management is optimized by
including adequate quantities of 45-minute SCBA cylinders and recharge capability. The FRP shall include the
availability of 45-minute SCBAs and the ability to recharge SCBA cylinders on scene. Cylinders may be recharged by a
facility meeting the standards of reference (l).
3.2.11 Medical Triage and Treatment. The plan shall include medical triage and treatment of injured personnel at the
scene, and transportation to medical facilities. This shall include identifying and maintaining accountability of these
personnel.
3.2.12 Management of Firefighting Effluents. The FRP shall identify the resources necessary to dewater the ship to avoid
the weight and stability effects of an accumulation of firefighting water. Watertight integrity shall be established to
prevent progressive flooding. In addition, the FRP shall include procedures to address environmental concerns associated
with water releases from firefighting effluents and air emissions from the fire and smoke. Actions taken shall not delay
efforts to extinguish the fire or care for injured personnel.
3.2.12.1 During a fire event varying quantities of firefighting water and fire suppression agents (i.e., foam, halon, and
carbon dioxide) will primarily be contained in the hull of the vessel and/or drydock. However, there may be discharge of
some of these effluents to surrounding waters. The Clean Water Act (CWA) is the primary federal law governing water
pollution and may be applicable to such discharges. The SRCA shall incorporate into their FRP any applicable
requirements of the CWA, underlying permits issued under the CWA, and the following requirements in this section. The
FRP shall include procedures for the control of firefighting process water, suppression agents, and when in drydock,
associated drydock effluents such as non-contact cooling water, seepage water, and precipitation that may be commingled
with discharges associated with firefighting efforts. This procedure shall include but not be limited to the following:
a. Establishment of environmental controls during the fire event to limit or prevent discharges associated with
firefighting efforts (i.e., the use of booms, skimmers, berms, etc.).
b. Identify sampling and analytical capabilities should sampling of discharges associated with firefighting efforts be
required. A sampling plan shall be prepared that includes sampling rationale, sample collection methods,
constituents to be sampled, analytical methods and equipment used for analysis, analytical turnaround times, and
who performs the analysis.
c. The procedures for management of discharges associated with firefighting efforts shall include the operation of
the drydock dewatering pumps (auto vice manual operation), estimated timelines for holding of drydock water in
the confines of the drydock, use of ancillary equipment (oily water treatment systems, dissolved air floatation
devices) to treat drydock water, and routing of drydock water when discharged (sewer, holding tanks, and
harbor). All such procedures outlined in the FRP shall be coordinated with appropriate regulatory officials and be
consistent with underlying CWA permit requirements.
3.2.12.2 During a fire, three main sources of hazards are generated: heat, smoke, and depletion of oxygen; each of which
interact producing varying quantities of airborne products dependent upon characteristics such as the heat release rate,
combustible material involved (fuel source), oxygen supply, and volume of the space(s) involved. Under the authority of
the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), the EPA has issued
guidance addressing the hazards of these airborne products in the “Emergency Response Air Monitoring Guidance
Tables”, reference (m). In most circumstances shore-based emergency responders will respond to shipboard fires with the
capability to monitor for these airborne products. Although specialized knowledge is required to combat a shipboard fire,
the airborne products generated by a shipboard fire are not specifically unique. Unless significant quantities of known
hazardous substances (e.g., composite materials, specialized coatings, flammables, etc.) are involved or have been
introduced by the repair process, the airborne products during a shipboard fire are identified in reference (w). Reference
(w) publishes the NAVSEA hazardous constituents and action levels outlined in Table 3-1. The SRCA shall incorporate
into their FRP any applicable requirements of the CAA, underlying CAA permits, EPCRA, Table 3-1, and the following
requirements:
a. Identify gas monitoring instrumentation available to perform air monitoring/sampling utilizing the information
contained in Table 6, General Industrial Fires, of reference (m). Instrumentation may include the following:
particulate monitors, colorimetric tubes, pH paper, portable gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer, gas detectors
with electrochemical sensor, etc.

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b. Prepare an air monitoring/ sampling plan that addresses the following. The type of equipment in response kits,
response kit locations, responsible party(s) for deployment of response kits, constituents to be measured,
sampling locations and sampling intervals, analysis of sampling results.
c. Prepare recommended actions to be implemented on-site or recommended for the public off-site (e.g., shelter in
place, press releases, evacuation, etc.) and the sample or monitoring value action level necessary to implement.
Each recommended action shall include guidance indicating when a given action is no longer required or
necessary.
d. Identify plume modeling capability that is available to the shipyard for a fire event to estimate downwind
concentrations for gaseous and particulate fire byproducts. Identify weather forecasting services available to
determine real time meteorological data such as wind speed, wind direction, precipitation amounts, locations,
intensity, etc.
Hazardous Constituent NAVSEA Action Level

Particulate Matter (PM2.5) 3,000 mg/m3
Carbon Monoxide (CO) 25 ppm
Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) 0.3 ppm *
Hydrogen Chloride (HCl) 1.8 ppm
Hydrogen Cyanide (HCN) 1.0 ppm *
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) 0.2 ppm
* Lowered due to instrument readability
Table 3-1. Hazardous Constituents and Action Levels
3.2.13 Firefighting Equipment. The FRP shall address systems that supplement basic firefighting equipment (e.g., high
expansion foam systems, clean agent fire suppression systems), if these systems currently exist in the SRCA or are
available from mutual aid.
3.2.14 Technical Assistance and Coordination. The FRP shall contain a plan for coordination and technical assistance in
the techniques and procedures to deal with shipboard energized electrical systems and pressurized fluid systems, including
the management of temporary support systems and services, and actions to take with them during the casualty. The FRP
shall address methods to sustain onboard life-safety systems (e.g., breathing air for remaining shipboard watch-standers).
SF and SRCA personnel shall be prepared to seal hull openings with staged material to control available oxygen to the fire
and control temporary ventilation systems and flow paths to support tenable access/egress of personnel and de-smoking of
spaces.
3.2.15 Extended Operations Plan. The plan shall include response (shift coverage) for extended operations that will last
more than several hours, including identification of the means to recall off-duty personnel.
3.2.16 Ship Conditions. The FRP shall address changing ship conditions during the various stages of a ship’s construction
or maintenance: Waterborne or in drydock, in-hull and drydock basin, access changes due to variations in hull access cuts,
staging, hatch accessibility, submarine protective shelters, conditions below decks, etc.
3.2.17 Reporting Procedures. The FRP shall include procedures for implementing Navy Operational Reporting (OPREP)
requirements and communications procedures with Naval Command Activities including: NAVSEA, TYCOM, Fleet,
Navy Region, and CNIC. If applicable, once reference (e) or (x) becomes the governing instruction, OPREP procedures
shall be per references (d) and (e), respectively.

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3.2.18 Procedures for Liaison with Civil Authorities.

3.2.18.1 For major shipboard fires aboard NPWs, liaison with Federal, State, and local officials will be conducted
consistent with the procedures and requirements of reference (d), if applicable. Prior to reference (e) being invoked,
communications with State and local authorities shall be coordinated between the cognizant Navy Region EOC/ROC and
affected SRCA.
3.2.18.2 For major fires aboard non-NPWs, each NSA, in conjunction with the cognizant Type and Fleet Commanders,
shall have procedures and equipment in place and personnel assigned to notify and communicate with civil authorities per
the following guidance.
a. State and Local authorities are responsible for the management of off-site activities and for the protection of
the public during any emergency that affects public safety or health, regardless of the source. To assist these
authorities in executing their duties, each NSA shall include in their FRP the 24-hour civil authority
emergency management personnel points of contact with their office and home/cellular phone numbers.
b. Initial notification. The timing of initial notification as well as the level and seniority of personnel notified
(i.e., Local vs. State, Fire Chief vs. City Mayor, State EMO vs. Governor) shall be governed by the scope of
the casualty.
c. Consistency of protection recommendations. It is important to establish and maintain a consistency relative
to off-site personnel protection recommendations made to civil authorities and those actions that are being
taken on the site. For example, if on-site shelter-in-place actions are being taken for personnel affected by
the fire, then recommendations for similar protection for off-site personnel should be made unless there is
valid technical basis for not doing so. This information shall be shared with the civil authorities.
d. Communications with cognizant Federal Agencies. Notification and follow-up communications with other
federal agencies such as the EPA and FEMA will be determined by and the responsibility of NAVSEA in
consultation with CNIC and the cognizant Fleet Commander. The SRCA shall provide notifications to
regional EPA and FEMA offices, where applicable, after discussions with NAVSEA Headquarters and
ROC/EOC command personnel. If regional federal offices are to be notified, they will be done only after
notifying state and local officials of the major fire.
e. Media notification. Prior to release of any information to the media, the initial notification shall be made to
civil authorities per section 3.2.18.2.b. These authorities shall be kept appraised of any planned media
notification such as a press release, media availability or press conference. The NSA, in conjunction with the
cognizant Type and Fleet Commanders, shall ensure the information is provided to civil authorities prior to a
press release and extend an invitation to civil authorities to be present or participate at any press availability.
3.2.19 Public Affairs. The FRP shall include procedures for the release of information to the public (press releases, press
conference/availability, etc.). For major fires in NPWs, release of public information shall be conducted consistent with
the requirements and procedures of reference (e). Prior to reference (e) being invoked for NPWs, public releases shall be
coordinated between the cognizant Navy Region EOC/ROC, NAVSEA 08, and affected SRCA. Any press releases shall
use Appendix N as the standard template.
3.2.20 Accident Information Collection and Storage. The FRP shall include provisions to assemble and store information
generated during an accident to enable an accurate reconstruction of the event for review by senior officials and public
notification. All fires shall be investigated. When invoked, references (n) and (o) shall be used. In conjunction with this
investigation or separately, the SRCA shall lead an ERT debrief to evaluate the effectiveness of the fire response actions
and take corrective action to improve the FRP, including ERT training.
3.2.21 Roles and Responsibilities of Activities. Where a SRCA relies upon and/or interacts with other Activity
Emergency Operations Centers, the FRP shall include the roles and responsibilities of the government, region, and base
emergency operations (where applicable) centers or refer to these procedures that define these duties.
3.2.22 Radio Communications. The FRP shall include an Interoperable Radio Communication Plan (IRCP). The IRCP
shall identify the radio system(s) that will be used during response to a fire casualty. The radio system(s) identified in the
IRCP shall be tested to validate operability throughout the entirety of the vessel. Where vessel locations exist that radio
system operability cannot be validated, and a technology solution to coverage cannot be identified or is impractical, the

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IRCP shall list these specific locations as well as a means to mitigate such with solutions such as radio or manned
communication relays. The IRCP shall also identify a means for interoperable communications between SF and
responding F&ES agencies to exist at the Incident Command Post (ICP) and at the physical location of the In-Hull
Operations Section Chief. Interoperable communications at these two locations are a minimum. Expanded SF/F&ES
communication interoperability is encouraged where practical. In addition, the IRCP shall include an estimate of the
number of portable radios that will be necessary to radio equip all function areas of the Incident Management Structure for
Shipboard Fire Emergency (Stage 4) (Figure 3-4a) and all teams or personnel anticipated to enter the IDLH atmosphere. It
is recognized that multiple communication methods and plans, specific to each location and ship platform, may be required
at a SRCA depending on ship and local capability. The radio system(s) identified in the IRCP shall not interfere with or
modify any of the shipboard interior communication systems.
3.3 TRAINING.
3.3.1 F&ES Training. Navy F&ES departments and crews that respond to initial alarms to shipboard fires where ships are
in industrial availabilities shall conduct training sessions to improve proficiency, familiarity, and knowledge of common
terminology with shipboard spaces that will enhance the ability to fight a shipboard fire.
3.3.1.1 Navy F&ES personnel designated to respond to or support shipboard firefighting shall be trained in accordance
with the F&ES department’s training plan. The training plan will leverage training from the SRCA and SF in conducting
classroom (knowledge base) and practical (skills practice) sessions to ensure personnel are familiar (space identification
names) with the ship’s industrial environment and to practice FRP execution to include integrated firefighting response,
incident command, accountability, rehabilitation, hose line advancement, SCBA recharging, resource staging, and Rapid
Intervention Team (RIT) searches.
3.3.1.2 F&ES practical training shall include participation in scheduled shipboard fire drills per chapters 12 and 13. Navy
firefighters will have live fire training annually. ISICs shall provide guidance for appropriate level of SF participation in
live fire training when available. SSBN ISICs should include, when possible, classroom or table top style organizational
training and live fire coordination training into pre-deployment training periods or certifications appropriate to upcoming
in-port periods. F&ES training shall be documented.
3.4 SHIPYARD EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGERS TRAINING. NSA, lead maintenance activity (LMA), and
installation personnel assigned to the emergency response team (ERT) shall be trained and certified prior to assignment of
an ERT role.
3.4.1 ERT Assignment. The following positions are considered members of the ERT: NSA managers (e.g., project and
deputy project superintendents or equivalent), NSA and host facility incident management system section chiefs, public
information officers, ECC, EOC, and ROC command table and command staff personnel, liaison officers, in-hull incident
management supervisors
3.4.2 Initial ERT Training. ERT personnel shall undergo initial ERT training prior to being assigned to a position on the
ERT. ERT training and knowledge requirements consist of: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on-line
training courses listed in table 3-2; a thorough knowledge of the FRP, including: principles and procedures to use when
combating a shipboard fire; and special scenarios as defined in reference (b), section 8 or reference (c), section 36; duties
and responsibilities of their assigned position; demonstration of knowledge and practical abilities during training sessions
or functional area drills; demonstration of knowledge and practical abilities of the FRPs firefighting principles and
engineered fire response strategy.
Note: FEMA on-line training courses do not apply to Radiological Emergency Response Organization (RERO)
personnel who are assigned and trained per the requirements defined in reference (e).

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Course Title
IS 00100 Introduction to the Incident Command System
IS 00200 Basic Incident Command System for Initial Response
IS 00700 National Incident Management System (NIMS), an Introduction
IS 00800 National Response Framework, an Introduction
Table 3-2 FEMA On-Line Training Courses

3.4.3 Continuing ERT Training. All personnel assigned to an ERT position shall maintain proficiency by regular
participation in a continuing training program established by each NSA and installation command. Continuing training
requirements shall include quarterly training on the FRP and applicable emergency response procedures. This training
may focus on a specific aspect or response vice the entire FRP. Participation in fire drills per the frequency established in
in this manual may be used to meet the quarterly FRP continuing training requirements. Periodic training shall be include
the training requirements defined in standards 505 and 508 contained in reference (a). The NSA and installation shall
maintain documentation showing regular participation in the emergency response continuing training program. The NSA
and installation shall establish criteria to determine when ERT proficiency is lost and shall be re-certified per the
knowledge and practical abilities of subsection 3.5.2.
3.5 SF ERT TRAINING. ERT training for SF shall be completed on all availabilities longer than 90 days.
3.5.1 ERT Assignment. The SF commanding officer, executive officer, command or ship’s duty officers, engineering
duty officers, and all personnel assigned as incident management supervisors and section chiefs positions are considered
members of the ERT.
3.5.2 ERT Pre-Availability Training. SF shall conduct refresher training for ERT personnel before (within 90 days) the
start of the availability on the strategic execution of the topics listed in table 3-3. Completion of training shall be reported
to the Fire Safety Council (FSC). The NSA or LMA shall conduct training for ERT members within 30 days (before and
after) the start of the availability that includes: the role of the FSC and the processes per the requirements contained in
chapter 2 of this manual; applicable NIMS concepts contained in reference (k) taken from the topics listed in table 3-2;
strategic execution of the FRP and application of firefighting doctrine per the applicable reference contained in table 3-4
including host facility firefighting organization; industrial damage control procedures; host facility regulations pertaining
to fire prevention and response including how and when to make applicable ship announcements (e.g., evacuate ship or
zone, stop hot work) and contact F&ES; and overview of LMA provided temporary firefighting, communication, and
alarm systems.
Reference (b) Reference (c)
Fire Spread Between Compartments by Conduction Naval Firefighter’s Thermal Imager (NFTI)
Electrical Cableway Fires Active Desmoking
Naval Firefighter’s Thermal Imager (NFTI) Hull Insulation Fire

Protect Compartments Exposed to Fire Flammable Gas Fires
Active Desmoking Compressed Gases
Flammable Gas Fires Battery Compartment Casualties
Lithium Battery Firefighting Procedure Lithium Battery Firefighting Procedure
Chimney Space Firefighting Procedure Special Hull Treatment (SHT) Fires in Dry dock
Table 3-3 SF Pre-Availability Firefighting Training Topics

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Reference (b) Reference (c)
Firefighting While the Ship is Pier Side Firefighting While the Ship is Pier Side
Firefighting While the Ship isin Dry Dock Firefighting While the Ship is in Dry Dock
Table 3-4 NSA Conducted Firefighting Training Topics

3.5.3 SF Continuing ERT Training. To provide additional training experience for scenarios outside of chapter 12
events; all availabilities greater than 12 months will conduct a table top exercise (TTX) for SF ERT members, scheduled
to be conducted approximately in the middle of the availability. For availabilities longer than 24 months, a TTX will be
scheduled every 9 to 15 months. The TTX should include NSA and F&ES participation. The TTX will include one of
the special fire scenarios listed, where the hazard exists: flammable gas fire; chimney space fire; submarine battery
compartment fire; special hull treatment fire that spreads in-hull; submarine hull insulation fire; or lithium battery fire.
The special fire shall be one that was not tested during an integrated fire drill or exercise. Additionally, the scenario
should be a special fire that is not likely to be included in a future integrated drill or exercise.
3.5.4 Knowledge.
3.5.4.1 ERT personnel shall have a thorough knowledge of the FRP and the principles and procedures to be used in
combating a shipboard fire. This shall include the special scenarios specified in Section 8 of reference (b) and Section 36
of reference (c).
3.5.4.2 Assigned personnel shall read and be familiar with the duties and responsibilities of the assigned position before
assuming that role.
3.5.5 Practical Abilities. Personnel knowledge and demonstration of practical abilities shall be demonstrated during
training sessions or functional area drills. This shall include the plan’s Firefighting Principles and EFRS of appendices A
and C.
3.5.6 Re-verification.
3.5.6.1 All personnel assigned to ERT positions shall be re-verified for this assignment by repeating the knowledge and
practical abilities of paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5 or by validation of regular participation in the emergency response continuing
training program. The periodicity of these training requirements shall be established by each SRCA and installation
command, shall be compliant to the requirements of reference (a), and shall include as a minimum, quarterly training on
the applicable emergency response procedures and participation in the fire drills per the frequency established in chapters
12 and 13 of this manual.
3.5.6.2 Installation firefighters at SRCAs and those firefighters designated as initial responders, shall receive annual live
fire training per references (p) and (q).
3.5.7 Mutual Aid Agreements. SRCAs should work through the Navy F&ES department when a mutual aid agreement is
in place and required to support the FRP. At SRCA locations requiring civilian fire department support to execute the
FRP, the SRCA shall enter into appropriate agreements. The SRCA shall approve classroom/practical shipboard
firefighter familiarization training for mutual aid civilian departments.
3.6 RAPID RESPONSE DAMAGE CONTROL CONEX BOX. For submarines, the NSA shall ensure each SRCA
implements the following requirements of paragraphs 3.4.1 through 3.4.7 to improve response to a major fire in
submarines undergoing availabilities. Actions apply to all commissioned submarines in CNO scheduled availabilities. For
CVNs and surface ships, follow the guidance in paragraph 3.4.8.

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3.6.1 Damage Control (DC) Equipment. Each availability shall have a dedicated set of the DC equipment listed in
appendix D as required by this manual. When damage control equipment on submarines shall be removed from service for
maintenance (e.g., SCBA cylinder hydrostatic testing), the NSA shall provide replacement equipment. Daily fire safety
inspections will spot check ship’s damage control equipment to determine if the equipment is available and properly
maintained.
3.6.2 Storage of DC Equipment. The DC equipment shall be staged in a “locker” on the pier adjacent to the brow to
provide for a rapid response by SF in the event of an emergency. The Rapid Response DC CONEX box portrayed in
appendix D is intended to serve as this locker. This locker shall be the stowage location for all DC equipment required for
casualty response for the duration of the availability and shall be incorporated into the SRCA FRP.
3.6.3 Custody of DC Equipment. The SRCA shall adhere to the requirements written in paragraph (a), or paragraph (b)
below. Choosing which paragraph to adopt will be made by the SRCA.
a. The SRCA shall maintain custody of the DC equipment provided to the ship for the duration of the availability.
This agreement shall be documented in the MOA between the SRCA and the ship. "Custody" includes
responsibility for periodic maintenance of the equipment. The SRCA shall ensure that SF is trained on the use of
the DC equipment and is informed when periodic maintenance of the equipment is accomplished. The SRCA
shall ensure that SF has ready access to the Rapid Response DC CONEX box for immediate use in the event of an
actual casualty or drill scenario. The SRCA will maintain responsibility to procure and/or replace material if
required.
b. The SRCA shall enter into an agreement with the ship to turn over custody of the DC equipment provided to the
ship for the duration of the availability. The ship will relinquish custody at the conclusion of the availability.
"Custody" includes responsibility for periodic maintenance of the equipment. Maintenance requirements cards
and the methods to document completed maintenance will be provided by the SRCA. The SRCA will maintain
responsibility to procure and/or replace material if required.
3.6.4 Alternate Storage Location. The SRCA shall provide an alternate storage location for SF DC equipment removed
from the ship during the availability. The storage location shall be within close proximity to the ship.
3.6.5 Staging of DC Equipment. To optimize deployment of SF DC personnel and to allow efficient SF and F&ES
firefighter integration, the augmented DC equipment shall be staged near the ship and in the CONEX box(es) also used to
stage their normal DC equipment when removed from the ship due to industrial work. These storage boxes shall be
equipped with lighting, heat, and air conditioning systems to facilitate DC gear breakout during the casualty and to
maintain the gear within normal ambient temperature ranges.
3.6.6 Accessibility of DC Equipment. The DC CONEX box and equipment shall be available to the crew upon entering
drydock or before the ship’s DC equipment is removed from the ship. When hot work is needed prior to the ship being
provided the CONEX box and augmented gear, a mitigation plan to ensure the ship’s fire response is adequate shall be
approved by the FSC.
3.6.7 Transition to Habitability. The additional DC equipment and CONEX storage box is no longer required once the
habitability key event (HB00) is attained. Under these ship conditions, the crew has moved back on board and most
industrial hot work has been completed. Normal DC equipment must be installed and operational. Disestablishing the
requirement shall be approved by the FSC.
3.6.8 Rapid Response Damage Control Equipment for CVNs and Surface Ships. The ship’s design normally includes
Damage Control Repair Stations (DCRS) spread throughout the ship for survivability. DCRS readiness can be affected by
the industrial work being performed and may require removal or relocation of DC equipment. These spaces may be kept
locked for security of the DC equipment normally remaining in place. However, due to the scope of work, they may not
all remain readily accessible during industrial availabilities.
3.6.8.1 The minimum requirements for the number and location of fully functional DCRSs to be maintained operational
during an industrial availability are “Ship Class” specific, as defined in table 3-5. The requirement for more than one
operational DCRS and/or an off-hull DC CONEX box is intended to minimize the possibility of single fire casualty effects
rendering all DC equipment on/for a ship inaccessible. A current list of the location(s) of the operational DCRSs and/or
the SRCA provided DC CONEX box shall be maintained at DCC/Quarterdeck to assist in casualty response.

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3.6.8.2 Where table 3-5 specifies the presence of a DC CONEX box, the SRCA shall provide a CONEX box of adequate
size to provide readily accessible storage of the off-loaded DC equipment listed on the serving ship’s Allowance Equipage
List (AEL) for an operational DCRS, with emphasis placed on the rapid retrieval of firefighting, gas-free, and de-smoking
equipment. The DC CONEX box shall be located at an agreed upon on-hull or off-hull location within close proximity to
the ship access brow, as noted in table 3-5. The DC CONEX box shall not be located within the same fire zone as the
remaining operational DCRS(s). The agreed upon location(s) shall be such as to minimize any repositioning and establish
accessibility by SF and all applicable casualty response organizations. A minimum cleared area of 300 square feet shall be
provided, physically marked, and maintained clear outside the DC CONEX box entrances to provide access and a dressing
area for casualty responders.
3.6.8.3 The ship’s Damage Control Assistant (DCA) or their designated representative (e.g., Engineering Duty Officer
(EDO)) shall designate primary casualty response using the on-hull DCRSs or the SRCA provided DC CONEX box,
ensuring communications are maintained with designated firefighting teams and F&ES.
3.6.8.4 Where DCRSs and/or the SRCA provided DC CONEX box are kept locked, the watch-bill designated Scene
Leader and the Duty Fire Marshall shall carry access keys or know the access combination.
3.6.8.5 Patrol Coastal (PC) class ships have limited allowance for permanent Fire Protective Gear (FPG) due to the small
crew and ship size. For maintenance availabilities, PC class ships shall be provided a minimum of six temporary FPGs for
use in casualty response. This will allow for SF to integrate with mutual aid fire departments during casualty response.
3.6.9 NSA Supplementary DC Equipment. The NSA shall provide supplementary damage control equipment per the
requirements defined in this subsection. When a ship is not equipped with 45 minute SCBA cylinder, the NSA shall
provide these cylinders on availabilities longer than 90 days. Submarines shall be provided with a rapid response DC
CONEX box (i.e., DC locker) with an inventory consistent with the requirements defined in appendix H (at a minimum)
on availabilities longer than 90 days. Patrol coastal class ships shall be provided with a minimum of six sets of fire
protective gear (FPG) for use in casualty response during all maintenance availabilities. When conditions require NSA
issued DC equipment be provided, the equipment will remain in place until dock trials or other similar end-of-production
milestone.
3.6.10 Custody of NSA Damage Control Equipment. DC lockers and equipment shall remain unlocked and readily
accessible to ensure that the SF has rapid access for immediate use in the event of a casualty.

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Minimum DCRS
Class Class Name Requirement Location
PC Patrol Combatants 1 DC CONEX Box Off Hull
MCM Mine Counter Measure Ship 1 DC CONEX Box Off Hull
LCS Littoral Combat Ship 1 DC CONEX Box Off Hull
Differing fire zones or CONEX box located
DDG Guided Missle Destroyer 2 DCRSs 1,2
off hull
Differing fire zones or CONEX box located
CG Amphibious Combat Ship 2 DCRSs 1,2
off hull
One aft below flight deck
LCC Landing Ship Dock 2 DCRSs 1
One Midships or FWD
LSD Landing Ship Dock 2 DCRSs 1,2 Any two DCRSs
One AFT below flight deck in vicinity of
LPD Amphibious Transport Dock 2 DCRSs 1,2 hanger (DCRS 3S or 3P)
One midships or FWD
One on gallery deck (02 level)
One on DC deck AFT (main deck in vicinity
LHD Amphibious Assault Ship 3 DCRSs 1,3 of hanger).
One on DC deck FWD
(FWD main deck)
LHA Amphibious Assault Ship 3 DCRSs 1,3 of hanger).
One on DC deck FWD
(FWD main deck)
CVN Aircraft Carriers 4 DCRSs 1,3 of hanger).
One on DC deck FWD
(FWD main deck).
Notes:
1. A DC CONEX box may be substituted for on of the required DCRSs. The DC CONEX box shall be located at
an agreed upon on-hul or off-hull location in close proximity to the ship’s access brow. The DC CONEX box
shall not be located in the same fire zone as the remaining operational DCRSs.
3. DCRSs shall be located in the same fire zone.
4. DCRSs shall be distributed forward and aft in differing fire zones for seperation.
Table 3-5. Minimum DCRS Number and Location Requirements for CVNs and Surface Ships
3.7 FIRE LANES. In accordance with references (r) and (s), and (t) for Navy facilities, fire lanes shall be designated and
identified adjacent to ships pier side, dockside while in drydock, or on building ways to provide access for emergency
apparatus.
3.7.1 Fire Lane Width and Markings. Fire lanes shall be maintained in accordance with reference (u). Accordingly, retain
and mark, with a painted yellow line, a 15-foot-wide (4.6 m) unobstructed fire lane. Provide a marked (with dashed,
painted yellow lines) 2.5-foot-wide (0.8 m) “dual use” buffer on both sides of the 15-foot-wide (4.6 m) unobstructed fire
lane. Local enforcement would keep this area clear enabling a total available fire lane width of 20 feet. However,
encroachment into the “dual use” buffer by cranes is acceptable. Any other encroachment into the “dual use” buffer will
be handled on a case-by-case basis. For wharves, provide a 20-foot-wide (6.1 m) unobstructed fire lane immediately
adjacent to the operating area. These requirements need not be applied to small craft or yard craft piers.
3.7.2 Vertical Clearance. At least 13 ft 6 in. (4.2 m) nominal vertical clearance shall be provided and maintained over the
full width of a fire lane.

ACN 3/A
3.7.3 Angle of Approach/Departure. The angle of approach and the angle of departure shall not exceed 8 degrees at any
point on the fire lane or its intersection with other roads or fire lanes. Minimum inside turn radius shall be 25 ft. and
minimum outside turn radius shall be 50 ft.
3.7.4 Wintertime Maintenance. A plan for wintertime maintenance of access through any gates and along any fire lane
shall be submitted to the responsible fire department.
3.7.5 Waiver Request. Due to existing infrastructure, some requirements of this section may not be achievable in the
timeframe of manual implementation. In those cases, the SRCA should submit a waiver request to NAVSEA citing the
specific conditions that require a waiver and include an estimate for the cost and time necessary to achieve compliance.
3.7.6 Approval to Temporarily Block a Fire Lane. When facilities work projects or other situations require a fire lane to
be temporarily blocked, the FSC and Fire Chief shall approve the project in advance.

ACN 3/A
Chapter 4
HOT WORK AND FIRE WATCH
References
(a) S9086-CH-STM-010, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 074, Volume 1, Welding and Allied
Processes
(b) S6470-AA-SAF-010, Naval Maritime Confined Space Program Manual
(c) Occupational Safety and Health Standards for Shipyard Employment, 29 CFR Part 1915 Subpart P, Fire Protection in
Shipyard Employment
(d) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 51B, Standard for Fire Prevention During
Welding, Cutting, and Other Hot Work
(e) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 312, Standard for Fire Protection of Vessels
During Construction, Conversion, Repair, and Lay-up
(f) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 306, Standard for the Control of Gas Hazards on
Vessels
(g) Occupational Safety and Health Standards for Shipyard Employment, 29 CFR Part 1915 Subpart B, Confined and
Enclosed Spaces and Other Dangerous Atmospheres in Shipyard Employment
(h) NAVSEA OP 4, Ammunition and Explosives Safety Afloat
(i) S9086-CH-STM-030, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 074, Volume 3, Gas Free Engineering
(j) United States Navy Regulations
(k) NAVSEA 389-0288, Radiological Controls (NOTAL)
(l) NAVSEAINST 9210.22F, Security and Safety of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Material (NOTAL)
(m) S9223-AJ-OMP-010, Battery, Submarine Main Storage - Submarine Valve Regulated Lead Acid (SVRLA) Technical
Manual
(n) S9223-AC-OMP-010, Battery, Submarine Main Storage - Submarine Valve Regulated Lead Acid (SVRLA) Technical
Manual
Introduction
In accordance with the hot work requirements of references (a) through (c), this chapter implements the necessary
precautions, procedures, and safety requirements as related to hot work operations during an industrial availability. This
chapter applies to all SRCAs (except new construction shipyards) and covers all Navy ships – submarines, surface ships,
and aircraft carriers.
The very existence of hot work operations in an industrial environment poses an increased risk to SF and SRCA workers,
justifying the need for additional fire watches and fire extinguishers, in parallel with the combustible loading requirements
contained in chapter 5 of this manual. Flexibilities are built into the fire watch requirements contained here-in to ensure
proper visible coverage of hot work operations by minimal personnel. In implementation of these requirements, it is
important to note that the prevention and early detection of a small fire is the most effective means of preventing a major
shipboard fire.

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4.1 HOT WORK MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT.

4.1.1 Classifications of Hot Work. Consistent with references (a) and (b), hot work includes the following operations:
a. Flame heating, welding, torch cutting, brazing, and carbon arc gouging.
b. Work which produces heat, by any means, of 400 °F (204 °C), or more.
c. Grinding, drilling, abrasive blasting, or similar spark-producing operations EXCEPT when such operations are
isolated physically from any atmosphere containing 10 percent or greater of the Lower Explosive Limit of a
flammable or combustible substance.
4.1.2 Hot Work MOA. Prior to performing hot work during an availability, the NSA shall ensure that a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) is in place with the ship to cover the hot work notification process. The ship shall be notified in
advance of hot work, and status of hot work jobs shall be kept up to date at least daily. The following shall be considered
with regards to the MOA:
a. The NSA shall ensure that all hot work performed by all maintenance and modernization activities during the
availability is coordinated through the LMA.
b. For hot work performed outside of an availability with an assigned NSA, the SRCA will establish a MOA(s)
between the ship and all outside activities performing hot work.
c. The MOA shall include a hot work concurrence process. The ship shall provide concurrence for all shipboard
hotwork when flammables or ordnance are not off loaded. The ship’s commanding officer (CO) may invoke SF
concurrence based on ship conditions per the requirements defined in reference (j). The LMA’s radiological
controls organization shall provide concurrence when hot work is performed on or in a radiological material
storage area per the requirements defined in reference (k). The NSA refueling safety officer shall provide
concurrence when hot work is performed on or in a reactor compartment undergoing defueling or refueling
operations per the requirements defined in reference (l). When concurrence is required or invoked, the NSA,
LMA, and the ship shall ensure sufficient processes and manning are in place to adjudicate notifications within
one shift.
4.2 HOT WORK AUTHORIZATION.
4.2.1 Written Notice. As required per reference (c), hot work shall only be conducted after a written notice for each job or
separate area of hot work aboard ship is provided and a fire watch posted. The written notice shall include the following
attributes:
a. State a description of the work to be done.
b. List the specific location of the hot work to include compartment number and the compartment numbers of
adjacent decks, bulkheads and similar structures upon which hot work is to be accomplished.
c. State the time hot work will commence.
d. List the current gas-free status of the area.
e. List the absence or existence of combustible material within 35 feet of the operation (or further if affected by the
operation), and if combustible material exists, the action taken to protect the material from fire.
f. State the provision and assignment of a fire watch.
g. Affirm that conditions at work site (ventilation, temporary lighting, and accesses) permit the fire watch(es) to
have a clear view of and immediate access to all areas included in the fire watch.
h. Affirm that a suitable fully charged fire extinguisher is available at the job site.
i. Provide for an inspection of the area 30 minutes after completion of the hot work or the cessation of hot work at
the job site as the final action to complete the notice. If after 30 minutes the job site is not cool to the touch, do
not leave the job site, and notify the nearest watch-stander/manager. When strip heaters are in use for post weld

ACN 3/A
heat treatment, the fire watch shall remain in the hot work area for at least 30 minutes after completion of the
welding, and shall survey the exposed area(s), and make a determination that there is no further fire hazard prior
to completing the notice and leaving the area.
j. Notifications should be limited to expected work for the shift (as much as practical) to ensure ship’s force (SF)
understands the scope of the shipboard work and hazards. When the repair activity (RA) is not able to routinely
work 80 percent of submitted notifications, the NSA or LMA shall review work assessment, notification
processes, and implement actions to reduce the quantity of unexecuted hot work.
4.2.2 Permit Approval Authority. All RAs shall designate supervisors as permit authorizing individuals (PAI). PAIs shall
review the work site every shift in order to: check for safe conditions; review work scope with hot work mechanics and
fire watches; and authorize work for the current shift by signing the permit.
4.2.3 Posting of Notice. The hot work notice shall be maintained with the associated work package and made readily
available at the hot work location, but should be kept out of the immediate hot work area as to not create a combustible
hazard. The Commanding Officer’s designated representative shall be notified of all areas where hot work is being
performed.
4.2.4 Notice to the CO’s Representative. The notice to the Commanding Officer’s designated representative shall precede
the initiation of the actual hot work in order to permit the Commanding Officer to designate a member of the crew to
observe the operation, if desired.
4.3 GAS-FREE PROCEDURES AND SPECIAL HAZARDS.
4.3.1 Governance for Gas Free Procedures. The Navy Maritime Confined Space Program Manual, reference (b), shall be
the governing authority for gas-free procedures for industrial availabilities. All gas-free procedures shall be in accordance
with references (d) through (f).
4.3.1.1 For Naval activities, gas-free procedures shall also be in accordance with reference (b).
4.3.1.2 For contractor activities, gas-free procedures shall also be in accordance with reference (g).
4.3.2 Restricted Areas for Hot Work. Hot work shall not be conducted in closed or poorly ventilated spaces as defined in
reference (b), subject to the risk of fire, explosion, exposure to toxic substances, or suffocation or asphyxiation, until
appropriate test and procedures have been conducted in accordance with references (b) and (c).
4.3.3 Coverings. Fire-resistant coverings meeting the requirements of chapter 5 of this manual shall be secured in place
prior to commencing hot work to adequately protect piping and equipment.
4.3.4 Hot Work in the Presence of Lines/Piping Containing Flammable or Combustible Fluids. Prior to beginning hot
work in areas containing pressurized systems (e.g., hydraulic, refrigeration, or air systems) that could be affected by hot
work, the systems should be depressurized, if practicable. If pressurized systems are unable to be depressurized, Piping,
fittings, valves, and other system components shall be protected from damage resulting from contact with flames, arcs, hot
slag, heat, or sparks. For systems that have already been depressurized and may contain residual flammable or
combustible fluids, the associated piping, fittings, valves, and other system components shall be protected from damage
resulting from contact with flames, arcs, hot slag, heat, or sparks. Care shall be taken to ensure that all contamination
within the space, such as leaking hydraulic fluids, is cleaned and removed prior to beginning hot work. Hydraulic fluids
and refrigerants in the presence of high temperatures can decompose and produce highly toxic byproducts.
4.3.5 Proximity of Flammables and Combustibles. Consistent with references (a) and (c), where practicable relocate all
flammables and combustibles at least 35 feet from hot work operations to prevent the spread of fire unless the
requirements of paragraph 4.1.1.(c) are met. Where relocation is impracticable, protect combustibles with metal or guards
and curtains constructed of material meeting the requirements of sections 5.1.3.1 or 5.1.3.2.
4.3.6 Ammunition or Explosives. Hot work operations in or adjacent to areas containing ammunition or explosive
material or substance shall be conducted in accordance with reference (h).
4.3.6.1 Hot work shall not be conducted during any logistics or maintenance movement of ammunition or explosives.

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4.3.6.2 Hot work shall not be conducted during any fueling operations without approval by the FSC and risk mitigation
implemented.
4.3.7 Submarine Main Storage Battery Operations. Per references (m) or (n), when performing a constant-voltage or
constant-current charge (elevated charge) where total battery voltage reaches or exceeds 2.45 Volts Per Cell (VPC) and
battery temperature meets or exceeds 65 degrees ℉; all hot work shall be suspended throughout the ship and within 25 feet
of any ventilation overboard discharge during the elevated charge and for a minimum of 1 hour after completion.
4.3.8 Additional Precautions. Necessary safety precautions shall be taken prior to conducting hot work on tanks, piping
systems, or components which have previously contained flammable liquids. This includes hot work operations within 35
feet of tanks or piping that contain or previously contained flammable liquids in accordance with reference (b).
4.4 FIRE WATCH REQUIREMENTS AND TRAINING.
4.4.1 Fire Watch Policy. Each SRCA shall create and maintain a written fire watch policy meeting the requirements of
reference (c). Personnel, including SF, performing hot work and/or hot work watch standing shall undergo a training
program that covers their specific responsibilities in accordance with reference (c). A primary function of the fire watch is
to anticipate, detect, and extinguish small fires started by hot work before they can spread.
4.4.2 Additional Duties During Hot Work. The fire watch shall not accomplish other duties while hot work is in progress.
4.4.3 Limitations to Single Fire Watch with Multiple Hot Workers. A single fire watch may provide protection where
several hot workers are performing hot work in a single work area with the following limitations:
a. The fire watch must have an unobstructed view, without turning, of all hot work operations and exposed areas
from a single fixed location at which he is stationed and have no physical obstructions or barriers that would
prevent immediate access by the fire watch to the hot work operation should a fire occur.
b. No more than four hot workers shall be attended by a single fire watch.
c. The fire watch cannot rove from one compartment/area to another in carrying out their duties as a fire watch in a
way which would affect the requirement of maintaining a continuous line of sight view of all hot work.
d. A means of communicating between the fire watch and all hot workers shall be provided such that in the event of
a fire, the fire watch can immediately notify all hot workers to stop operations.
4.4.4 Hot Work Involving Multiple Levels. In cases in which hot material from hot work may involve more than one
level, as in trunks, machinery spaces, and on scaffolding, a fire watch shall be stationed at each level unless positive means
are available to prevent the spread or fall of hot material.
4.4.5 Bulkhead, Overhead, or Deck Hot Work. In cases where hot work is to be accomplished on a bulkhead, overhead,
or deck, opposite side combustible material shall be stripped back in accordance with paragraph 4.3.5. In instances where
the combustible material cannot be adequately removed, the FSC and GFE/Marine Chemist (or qualified hot work safety
professional) shall approve a plan for hot work safety that will be followed during the work. The plan shall include the
following, as applicable to the situation: assessment of the risks of leaving the material in place, heat input control
methods, cooling methods, temperature monitoring needs, minimum strip back distances, means to protect combustible
materials, placement and actions of fire watches, communication between fire watches, fire extinguisher type, local
exhaust ventilation to control smoke or off-gassing from heated material in place, respiratory protection, stop points, and
emergency actions. An opposite side fire watch is required in all cases, even when opposite side combustibles have been
removed.
4.4.6 Blind Compartment Hot Work. If multiple blind compartments are involved in any hot work job, fire watches shall
be posted simultaneously in each blind area.
4.4.7 Communication Between Fire Watches. When more than one fire watch is required, a communication means
between the fire watches shall be established.
4.4.8 Fire Extinguishers. Fire extinguishers used for hot work shall be provided by the performing activity and shall not
be a ship’s installed extinguisher.

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4.4.9 Fire Watch Training. All fire watches shall undergo a training program in accordance with references (a) and (c)
that covers, at a minimum, their responsibilities, use of fire extinguishing and other required safety equipment, inspection
of immediate and surrounding areas before, during, and after hot work, assigned station during actual hot work, method of
communication between fire watch and hot work operator, the appropriate reporting procedure for a fire while assigned as
a fire watch and the sounding of fire alarms.
4.4.10 Fire Watch Portable Extinguishers. Consistent with NFPA and NSTM guidelines, the following guidance shall be
used for the selection of fire watch portable extinguishers. Fire classification definitions are provided in Appendix L.
Normally, AFFF or CO2 shall be provided for fire watch use only. Where the potential is greater for a specific class of
fire, additional extinguisher shall be at the fire watch location as described below. In accordance with reference (i), never
use vaporizing liquid extinguishers in a confined space.
a. Class A fires are normally extinguished with pressurized freshwater or AFFF portable fire extinguishers.
b. Class B fires are normally extinguished with AFFF or Potassium Bicarbonate (PKP) portable fire extinguishers.
c. Class C fires are normally extinguished with CO2 portable fire extinguishers. The most effective tactic is to de-
energize and handle the fire as a class A fire. Use of CO2 should not be delayed to retrieve an alternate
extinguisher. When fires are deep seated, clean agents that pose no cleanup problem, such as CO2, are preferred.

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ACN 2/A
Chapter 5
INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS USED AND STORED SHIPBOARD
References
Shipyard Employment
(d) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
(e) S9086-WK-STM-020, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 670 Stowage, Handling, and Disposal of
Hazardous General Use Consumables, Volume 1, Afloat Hazardous Material Control and Management Guidelines
(f) S9086-WK-STM-020, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 670, Volume 2, Afloat Hazardous Material
Control and Management Guidelines Hazardous Materials User Guide (HMUG)
(g) MIL-STD-1623, Fire Performance Requirements and Approved Specifications for Interior Finish Materials and
Furnishings (Naval Shipboard Use)
(h) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 701, Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame
Propagation of Textiles and Films
(i) MIL-C-24576, Military Specification: Cloth, Silica Glass, Cloth, Coated, Glass, Silicone Rubber Coated
(j) American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard D6413, Standard Test Method for Flame Resistance of
Textiles (Vertical Test)
(k) MIL-L-19140, Military Specification: Lumber and Plywood, Fire Retardant Treated
(l) S9086-KC-STM-010, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 300, Electric Plan – General
(m) NAVSEA 0989-043-0000, Commissioned Surface Ship General Reactor Plant Overhaul and Repair Specification
(n) NAVSEA OP 4, Ammunition and Explosives Safety Afloat
Introduction
This chapter provides requirements for the stowage and protection of combustible materials used shipboard during
industrial work. This chapter applies to all SRCAs and covers all Navy ships – submarines, surface ships, and aircraft
carriers. These sections were developed largely from existing requirements in references (a) and (b), satisfy the cognizant
requirements in reference (c), and incorporate new requirements to minimize the amount of combustible material brought
onboard by the industrial activity and to ensure it is properly protected. The importance of these requirements stems from
the scope and amount of industrial work that is performed onboard Navy ships and submarines during a maintenance
availability, as well as the increased risk for a shipboard fire to spread rapidly during an availability in comparison to at sea
conditions. Many of the ship’s permanent firefighting systems are secured during an industrial availability, requiring the
installation of similar temporary firefighting systems. The ship condition also potentially compounds the risk of fire
ignition and spread. All these factors combined make it crucial to properly control the combustible materials brought and
used onboard.
The chapter does provide some flexibility in how the requirements are met. For example, temporary structures with closed
overheads and open sides installed in ship hangar bays can be protected with temporary sprinkler systems or configured so

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they can be adequately protected with fire hoses. These flexibilities and others will allow the SRCAs to adapt the
requirements to meet the availability requirements in a safe and cost effective manner.
In addition, section 5.4 of this chapter provides requirements for fire prevention and safety inspections on each project, in
alignment with required inspections per reference (c). These inspections are intended to identify and remove fire safety
hazards, as well as provide the FSC with appropriate cognizance over the ship status to mitigate the risks inherent to
maintenance availabilities. It is impossible to remove all of the risk associated with industrial shipboard work, but
appropriate steps need to be taken to mitigate the risks in balance with cost and schedule concerns, and ensure the safety of
the ship and all personnel working shipboard.
5.1 FLAMMABLE AND COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL.
5.1.1 Materials Used Shipboard By Maintenance Activities. The terminology of “flammable” and “combustible” is
sometimes used interchangeably due to differing definitions in industry, regulatory bodies, and the military. For the
purposes of this manual Combustible and Flammable materials are defined in appendix-L with combustible referring
lower risk hazards and flammable pertaining to volatile liquids and gases, determined by reference (d). The following is a
list of items that are routinely used by maintenance activities that, unless specifically treated, are combustible or
flammable. This list is not all inclusive, but serves as a reminder that many of the supplies and tools used by maintenance
activities are combustible or flammable..
a. String/rope (for lines and leads, slings for equipment support/rigging).
b. Compressed gases tanks/containers (propane, aerosols).
c. Cleaning products (petroleum based distillates).
d. Lubricants (petroleum hydrocarbons, i.e., oil and grease).
e. Rubber products (electrical insulation, vibration reduction, gaskets).
f Paints/thinners/strippers (aromatic hydrocarbon thinners in uncured form).
g Adhesive/adhesive removers (alcohols in uncured form).
h Containments (shop tool bag, various size plastic bags, containers, and sheets).
i Bottles (plastic collecting, material transport, and sampling).
j Plastic bodied tools/equipment (vacuum cleaners, hand tools).
k Batteries (flammable and various toxic chemicals).
l. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (disposable tank suits, hard hats, gloves).
m. Cellulose based products (kimwipe or like material, paper, folders for work packages).
n. Wood structures (ladders, staging, temp decking, temporary enclosures).
o. Hydraulic fluids.
p. Power extension cords and cables.
q. Absorbent booms/pigs used for fuel spill clean-up.
5.1.2 Consumable Materials. Consumable materials (e.g., kimwipes or like material, rags, greases, paint, solvents, etc.) in
use at a work site shall be limited to a quantity that will cover one shifts work or sufficient to complete the job, whichever
is smaller. Hazardous materials brought to the worksite shall be kept in approved containers and handled in accordance
with references (e) and (f). Unused quantities shall be removed from the ship immediately and returned for reissue or
disposal as appropriate. Soiled rags, paper, or other oil soaked articles shall be removed immediately following clean up,
or may be collected in approved metal receptacles. Receptacles shall be emptied at the end of each shift.
5.1.2.1 For ships without large temporary shipboard stowage locations, small quantities (e.g., several days’ worth) of
combustible cleaning materials (kimwipes or like material, rags, small cleaning buckets) may be centrally stored onboard

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in small quantities in approved metal containers. A portable extinguishing agent (e.g., CO2 bottle) shall be staged with
these stowage containers. For commissioned ships, the stowage plan shall be agreed to by the ship’s Commanding
Officer.
5.1.2.2 This guidance does not apply to pre-staged hazardous material emergency spill kits.
5.1.3 Fire Resistant Materials.
5.1.3.1 Non-fabric material used in hull for containment or as protective coverings for equipment, decking, and
furnishings shall be in accordance with reference (g). Fabrics used in hull for containment or as protective coverings for
equipment, decking, and furnishings shall be tested in accordance with and meet the requirements of reference (h) or be
listed as an acceptable "Drapery or Curtain" in reference (g). Flame-resistant material shall be marked with symbol "FR".
5.1.3.2 Fireproof or fire-resistant covering such as fireproofed canvas, fire-resistant synthetic fabrics, noncombustible
fabrics, metal covers, or other suitable materials, shall be used to protect intricate and vulnerable items of machinery and
equipment from falling sparks or other potential sources of fire. Materials other than meeting the requirements of
reference (i) or metal covers shall be tested in accordance with reference (j) and demonstrate the following performance:
maximum char length of 1.5 inches, maximum after flame of 1 second, maximum afterglow of 2 seconds, and not exhibit
any molten or flaming droplets. Coverings shall be secured in place prior to commencing hot work to provide adequate
protection. Asbestos and materials containing asbestos shall not be used.
5.1.3.3 Use of non-fire retardant lumber products shipboard and/or in the vicinity (within 35 feet) of the ship, not
including drydock blocks, as needed to support production work and tooling needs (such as shimming and wedges) shall
only be permitted when a fire retardant lumber product is not available or practical. For these cases, use shall be
minimized, excess material shall be trimmed so that the non-FR material is of the minimum acceptable dimensions for the
intended purpose, and non-FR materials not actively in use shall be removed from the ship and its vicinity. Fire retardant
lumber products shall be in accordance with reference (k), Type II, Category 2. Manufacturers’ marking shall remain
visible at all times, unless wrapped by “FR” material. Lumber products that have become worn or deemed structurally
deficient due to placement in heavy traffic areas or exposure to weather shall not be reused. Fire retardant wood meeting
the requirements of paragraph 5.3.2 of this manual is authorized for use as a temporary replacement or supplement for a
horizontal deck plate or tank access cover, as long as it meets the minimum strength requirements for that application.
Special attention must be given when considering this use in a direct path of the designated ship access/egress routes. Use
of only wood at the landing point of any ship access ladder to topside, should be avoided and only used as an emergent
short term correction until a metal replacement can be manufactured. The ship’s Commanding Officer and the FSC shall
be aware of and authorize the use of wood in the direct access/egress paths.
5.1.3.4 Temporary ventilation ducts that support hot work (at a minimum), both supply and exhaust, shall be fire resistant.
Manufacturer’s markings on the duct, "FR" or "Fire Resistant", shall be visible on each installed duct segment.
5.1.3.5 This guidance does not apply to currently regulated and controlled radiological containments, nor does it
supersede any requirements of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
5.1.4 Plastic Trash Cans. Outside Activity (OA) plastic trash cans are prohibited in hull in affected spaces where
industrial work is being performed for trash collection. Plastic trash bags may be used in hull as a liner for a metal trash
can.
5.1.5 Plastic Bodied Tools. Plastic bodied tools and equipment may be stowed onboard, provided that they are stowed in
metal tool boxes or stored in designated storage areas per paragraph 5.3.4, otherwise, they shall be removed at the end of
each shift. Equipment that must remain in service after working hours (e.g., temporary lighting, poly bottles, monitoring
devices, etc.) is exempt from this requirement. This guidance does not apply to currently regulated and controlled
radiological containments, nor does it supersede any requirements of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
5.1.6 Metal Canister Vacuum Cleaners.
5.1.6.1 All OA vacuum cleaners used shipboard shall have metal canisters. This includes those used for post hot work
clean up.
5.1.6.2 OA plastic canister vacuum cleaners may still be employed for general housekeeping off-hull in shops, dry docks,
and work areas.

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5.1.6.3 The use of metal canister vacuum cleaners shall comply with the requirements of reference (l).
5.1.6.4 This guidance does not apply to currently regulated and controlled radiological and Hazmat/Hazwaste vacuum
cleaners nor does it supersede any requirements of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
5.1.7 Smoking Policies. NSA shall ensure compliance with SRCA smoking policies. Where SRCA policies allow
smoking shipboard (large decks), it shall be restricted to designated areas on the weather deck. Shipboard smoking areas
shall be approved by the NSA with concurrence from the ship’s CO for commissioned vessels.
5.1.8 Flammable Compressed Gas Cylinders. Flammable compressed gas cylinders placed aboard ship shall be
minimized. Portable flammable compressed gas cylinders shall not be placed below the main deck, in confined spaces, or
under the overhanging decks. Locate supply on the pier and furnish gases from header to manifolds on the ship. In order
to allow personnel to replenish their gas supply, additional gas cylinders, not to exceed one-half the number of in-use
cylinders, may be located in a remote area on the ship’s weather decks. Each industrial gas system shall be arranged to be
secured by a master valve and marked to show its purpose.
5.1.9 Flammable and Combustible Liquid Usage. The quantity of flammable and combustible liquids, such as paints and
lubricants brought to the work site, shall be kept to a minimum and shall not exceed that necessary for one shift’s use.
Appropriate fire extinguishing equipment (Class B) shall be located in the vicinity of these limited quantities. Unused
flammable and combustible liquids shall be removed from the ship at the end of the work day and stowed in a suitable
shore storage facility.
5.1.10 Combustible Materials and Waste. The ship and surrounding areas shall be maintained in a neat and orderly
condition. All waste material shall be collected and removed as it accumulates. Packaged material, other than that
scheduled for immediate use, shall not be allowed to accumulate, unless meeting the material storage requirements in
paragraph 5.3.4. Wherever practicable, materials and equipment shall be uncrated off the ship. Construction materials
stowed aboard ship shall be arranged so as not to restrict the access to doors and hatches or impede the passage of
firefighting parties. Direct contact of combustible material with the overhead, bulkheads, and decks shall be avoided.
5.1.11 Large Quantity Drums. Fifty-five gallon or larger drummed quantities of liquids with specification flash point of
150 degrees F. or less shall ONLY be permitted aboard ship during TEMPORARY operations such as flight deck (Helo
deck), hangar bay resurfacing in an FSC approved fuel storage tank placed in an FSC approved location on an exposed
weather deck (flight deck (Helo deck), deck edge elevator). Such liquids brought aboard in smaller approved containers
including degreasers, solvents and fuels shall be kept topside in safety cans when not in actual use or when left unattended
and shall be limited to one shift’s supply and shall not be stored aboard ship.
5.1.12 Fueled Equipment-Moving Vehicles. The number of equipment-moving vehicles/generators/compressors fueled
by gasoline, propane or other flammable gases shall be limited aboard ship based on space and fire lane egress/access.
Vehicles/generators/compressors that are used aboard ship for extended periods of time (over several weeks/months) shall
be stowed and/or parked when not in use on the flight deck, hangar bay, or deck edge elevators clear of obstructions,
structures, and fire lane egress/access.
5.1.13 Fueling Operations. Fueling operations shall be conducted at designated sites on exposed weather decks. All fuel
shall be transferred aboard ship in approved safety containers. Direct fueling of vehicles aboard ship shall be avoided but
may be utilized during operations via an approved fuel storage tank on the weather deck (flight deck (Helo deck) or deck
edge elevator) provided the following safety precautions are provided and maintained by the performing activity:
a. Fuel storage tank use will be either of double wall construction or have integral cofferdam sized to exceed tank
capacity. Therefore, two separate casualties would have to occur to result in uncontrolled release of liquid fuel.
b. Fuel storage tanks will be located in an FSC approved location open to atmosphere on an exposed weather deck
and not in interior spaces where a build-up of fuel vapors would be of concern.
c. Fuel storage tanks are to be inspected and verified to meet safety requirements by safety personnel.
d. Perform and document weekly inspections of the fuel storage tanks.
e. Two dry chemical fire extinguishers provided for each fuel storage tank.

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f. Signs posted at each storage tank designating ownership and contact numbers in the event of an emergency.
g. Oil and Hazardous Substance Spill Response kit staged at each fuel storage station.
h. Metal coamings 4 inches high, tack welded and caulked to the deck, shall be installed around all through deck
access openings and shall serve to control flammable liquid spills. Modifications from this requirement based on
location of the access openings may be approved by FSC with risk mitigation.
5.1.14 Openings Above the Reactor Compartment. When openings are cut or hatches are open into the spaces directly
above a reactor compartment of a NPW, actions shall be taken per reference (m) to minimize the possibility of firefighting
water from entering the space above the reactor compartment.
5.2 STOWAGE OF SHIP’S FLAMMABLE AND COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL. For CNO scheduled availabilities, at a
minimum, the NSA based on the scope of the work package shall minimize the amount of ship’s flammable and
combustible material storage that remains shipboard. In the case of surface ships, “minimize” should be based on the size
of the ship, location, and the amount/scope of industrial work being performed. For non-CNO scheduled availabilities, the
SRCA may invoke these requirements based on the amount of and scope of industrial work being performed.
5.2.1 Flammable Gas Stowage. When no longer needed for shipboard operations or to maintain plant chemistry, any
flammable gases stored on-board in the vicinity of or adjacent to hot work shall be off-loaded and stowed in a suitable
location until required to be re-stored onboard the ship. Shore stowage locations shall be in accordance with local SRCA
procedures for stowage of flammable gas cylinders.
5.2.2 Oxidizers.
5.2.2.1 After submarine shipboard oxygen storage and generation is no longer needed for operations, the ship’s oxygen
cylinders (medical and industrial) and the oxygen-generating chlorate candles shall be off-loaded and stowed in a suitable
location ashore until they are required onboard to support underway.
5.2.2.2 When no longer needed, the ship’s Oxygen flasks and liquid Oxygen storage tanks and associated inboard headers
shall be purged and made inert to less than 22% Oxygen by volume.
5.2.3 CO2 Absorption Chemicals. When operations are completed prior to the availability, off-load and stow in suitable
location ashore all Lithium Hydroxide (LiOH) canisters and blankets. LiOH will absorb CO 2 used to combat fires
shipboard which may hinder the response to an incipient fire.
5.2.4 Refrigerant and Air Conditioning Gas Cylinders (R134, R114, R12, etc.). Prior to major industrial hot work in the
vicinity of refrigerant and air conditioning gas cylinders (R134, R114, R12, etc.), all portable cylinders shall be off-loaded
and stowed in a suitable location until they are required to support ship operations. These chemicals, if released to the
ship’s environment, will create a potentially lethal toxic atmosphere.
5.2.5 Ammunitions and Explosives. In accordance with reference (n) ships scheduled for an availability period in excess
of 45 days shall be completely offloaded of all ammunition, except for that quantity of small arms ammunition which the
ship's CO considers to be required for maintaining security aboard ship. Other exceptions and the process for retaining
weapons on board during availabilities are provided in reference (n).
5.2.6 Ship’s Hazardous Material Storage Facilities. Ship’s installed hazardous material storage facilities that meet the
requirements of references (e) and (f) may remain in service for SF use, provided all safety attributes and any installed
fire suppression systems associated with the facility are fully operational. In the event hot work is to be performed in
or adjacent to the facility, the requirements of chapter 4 of this manual shall apply. Further, references (e) and (f) shall
be consulted to determine if industrial processes performed in the vicinity of stored hazardous materials may result in
adverse chemical reactions. Where reaction is a possibility, the hazardous materials shall be offloaded from the ship
or moved to an alternate unaffected facility that is in accordance with references (e) and (f).

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5.3 TEMPORARY STRUCTURES AND LAYDOWN AREAS.

5.3.1 Temporary Structures. In order to minimize combustible materials, temporary structures erected aboard ship should
be avoided. Where such structures are used such as on large deck ships, construction staging supports and bracing shall be
made of metal. The use of wood shall be minimized to reduce the fire hazard. Where CONEX boxes/MILVANs and
office trailers (excluding Job Readiness Cells) are used, they shall be supported at least ten inches above the deck. This
space shall be kept free and clear of storage, trash, and construction debris
5.3.2 Use of Wood. Where wood is used for plywood, pallets, platform planking or scaffold planking aboard ship or in
the vicinity (within 35 feet) of the ship, such wood shall be procured with an impregnated fire-retardant treatment in
accordance with reference (k), Type II, Category 2. Pieces cut from scaffold planking need not be remarked or rebranded.
Pieces larger than one square foot which are cut from plywood shall show some part of the original mark or staining or
shall be remarked to distinctly indicate that they are fire retardant treated. Impregnated wood previously employed in
construction shall be sample-tested to ensure that its fire-retardant characteristics have not been reduced by exposure to the
weather; if so it shall be retreated or replaced. Fire-retardant wood shall be clearly marked with symbol "FR" or other
standard symbols prescribed by the SRCA. Non fire retardant temporary wooden structures located on the pier, drydock
edge, or in the drydock (not including drydock blocks) shall be a minimum of 35 feet from the ship to prevent spread of
fire.
5.3.2.1 Pallets which have not been treated in accordance with above requirements can be stored on the weather deck or in
a designated storage area per paragraph 5.3.4 as long as they are stored clear of structures in minimal quantities that
maintain orderly fashion that do not obstruct fire lane egress.
5.3.2.2 The presence of significant quantities of combustibles in large open areas of ships (e.g., hangars, vehicle decks)
presents a possible risk of conflagration. The conflagration potential is exacerbated where combustibles are shielded from
overhead sprinkling, leaving manual firefighting as the sole means of available suppression. The potential is further
exacerbated in the absence of automatic fire detection, relying on occupants or watches to discover the fire, which could
lead to significant delays in discovery, most especially during off-hours, allowing fires to grow, potentially to a size
uncontrollable by initially responding hose teams. To minimize this risk, any type of temporary structure with a closed
overhead (e.g., office trailers, Job Readiness Cells (JRC), enclosed tool issue structures, etc.) that is constructed or staged
in an internal sprinklere covered area of a ship, shall be equipped with a fire suppression system meeting the applicable
requirements of paragraphs 7.3.2.13 and 7.3.2.14 based on the structure’s use. A structure is considered as having a
“closed overhead” if it has any surface located between a ship’s installed sprinkler system and the interior of the structure
with a uniform free opening of less than 80%. Only Class A type combustibles and non-combustibles are permitted to be
stored within such structures.
a. CONEX boxes/MILVANs meeting the requirements of paragraph 5.3.2.3 are exempt from the requirements of
paragraph 5.3.2.2.
b. It is estimated, based on the National Fire Academy Fire Flow Formula, that the maximum size fire that is
controllable with two responding hangar hoses is 625 square feet. Therefore, a temporary structure where the
sides are completely open other than supporting columns and open link fencing (e.g., Job Readiness Cells), is
exempt from the requirements of paragraph 5.3.2.2 if any of the following conditions are met:
(1) The structure’s footprint is 625 square feet or less (not greater than 50 feet in any direction), or
(2) The total footprint of combustible storage within the structure is 625 square feet or less (not greater
than 50 feet in any direction), or
(3) Where total combustible material storage within the structure exceeds 625 square feet, the stowage is
subdivided into footprint areas less than 625 square feet (not greater than 50 feet in any direction)
separated by aisles of at least six feet in width and no combustibles are stored within 24 inches of the
overhead. Where multiple combustible areas exist and it is necessary for combustibles to be stored
within 24 inches of the structure overhead, draft stops are installed above the dividing aisles to prevent
rapid fire communication between the stowage areas via fire ceiling jets. Stops shall be constructed of
rigid non-combustible or flame retardant material with a minimum depth of 18 inches below the
overhead.

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Note: The content of this section is designed to minimize the volume of combustible material to a volume that can be
addressed with two hoses, a fire can be seen or detected, and a fire can be addressed with firefighting agents in its
incipient stage. Where the FSC determines that the content of this paragraph will not adequately achieve such or
mitigate the risks discussed in paragraph 5.3.2.2 due to the presence of unique hazards, it may impose additional
mitigations (e.g., consideration of portable fire extinguishers in structures containing both material stowage and
installed electrical components).
5.3.2.3 Where CONEX boxes/MILVANs are staged within the ship for material storage or other operational purposes,
they shall be of all steel exterior construction and be capable of being completely sealed closed. Only Class A type
combustibles and non-combustibles are permitted to be stored within such structures and they shall remain completely
sealed closed when not being physically manned. When such structures are used as manned office or operating spaces
(including temporary Enclosed Operating Stations), they shall be equipped with smoke detection in accordance with
paragraph 7.3.2.14, have portable fire extinguishers in accordance with paragraph 7.3.2.14, and have the use of kitchen
appliances (microwave, coffee makers, hot pots, etc.) and hot work within the unit prohibited.
5.3.3 Sizing and Positioning of Structures. All temporary storage facilities, office trailers, and other temporary structures
shall be sized and positioned to achieve adjacent six-foot-wide aisles clear of obstructions on all sides for ready hose line
access and fire break purposes (surface ships only). Non-combustible scaffolding and other non-combustible structure is
permitted to be located above such walkways provided that a free and clear width of six feet and height of seven feet above
the walking surface is maintained along the entire walkway length. For the purposes of this section, walkways constructed
of non-combustible material providing access to the first level of structures are permissible to serve as the required aisles
provided they meet the above applicable clear width and height requirements and are accessible by stairs or ramps at each
end. A twenty-foot wide center lane shall be kept free and clear at all times (surface ships only). In addition, temporary
storage facilities, office trailers, and other temporary structures shall be sized and positioned such that all sides and interior
areas of all structures are reachable by two of the ship’s installed fire hose stations or temporary hose stations meeting the
requirements of Chapter 7.
5.3.4 Storage of Material. Storage of material aboard ship shall be limited to that which is required for work in progress.
Such storage shall be located in areas that do not interfere with access to firefighting equipment or personnel access.
Where equipment and materials, including that stowed in bins, is placed and held temporarily onboard, a limit of 8 feet
shall be established for high piling stock and the deck space shall not exceed 625 square feet (no greater than 50 feet in any
direction) with adjacent six foot wide aisles on all sides for ready hose line access and a twenty-foot wide center lane kept
free and clear at all times.
5.4 FIRE SAFETY INSPECTIONS.
5.4.1 Fire Prevention and Safety Inspections. Each SRCA shall conduct fire prevention and safety inspections on each
project for each manned shift where industrial work is being performed to note and initiate actions to eliminate fire hazards
or to implement work procedures to keep these hazards to a minimum. For minor repairs, the inspection may be limited to
the actual working area and adjacent compartments. An initial inspection shall be made by the SRCA to evaluate potential
fire hazards as soon as practicable after the availability is started and before any industrial work commences. This
inspection shall be conducted jointly by SRCA and senior (E-7 & above or personnel qualified their senior enlisted in-port
qualification if no E-7 & above is available) SF representatives. Once on each manned/ regular workday, follow on
inspections (which should rotate through different areas on large deck ships) shall include: senior (Zone Manager
equivalent or higher) project management representative, ship’s representative, ship’s safety officer, or equivalent. When
the availability is performed in a Navy installation, installation fire and emergency services representatives shall be invited
to attend and may be counted as shipboard familiarity training. Deficiencies noted shall be corrected immediately, and
forwarded to the project superintendent, ship’s CO and FSC, or equivalent, and SRCA safety organization. The SRCA
shall compile project provided data to determine where additional focus is required to improve project safety and fire
prevention performance.
5.4.2 Minimum Requirements for Inspection. The inspection shall note the following, as a minimum:
a. Housekeeping conditions, including location of trash.
b. Type and amount of cargo aboard.

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c. Type, amount, and condition of the fire protection equipment.

d. The types and approximate amounts of fuel and other flammable liquids, including all associated piping systems.
e. The visible requirements of this manual such as cleanliness, access and egress routes, temporary systems, fire
extinguishers, condition of combination smoke and heat detectors, fire reporting and communication systems, and observe
fire watch and hot work authorizations for hot work in progress.

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Chapter 6
FIRE DETECTION
References
(a) NAVSEAINST 5400.95, Waterfront Engineering and Technical Authority Policy
(b) Underwriter Laboratories (UL) Standard 268, Smoke Detectors for Fire Alarm Systems
(c) Underwriter Laboratories (UL) Standard 521, Heat Detectors for Fire Protective Signaling Systems
(d) Underwriter Laboratories (UL) Standard 864, Control Units and Accessories for Fire Alarm Systems
(e) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 72, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code
Introduction
This chapter provides requirements for the installation of a temporary automatic fire detection system in commissioned
submarine, surface ship, and aircraft carrier availabilities. This chapter applies to SRCAs that perform maintenance
availabilities on submarines, surface ships, and aircraft carriers.
An industrial availability presents an increased risk environment that affects SF capability to quickly detect and immediately
respond to a fire due to a reduced number of SF personnel onboard and the ship’s damage control equipment moved off hull.
The capability to quickly identify and locate the source of a fire while in this increased risk environment is imperative. This
system consists of smoke and heat detectors for the purpose of quickly identifying the source and location of a fire when the
ship’s crew is moved off hull during industrial work. The FSC has the authority to adjust the timing of the installation and/or
removal of the detection system based on the scope and amount of work (e.g., hot work) contained in the Availability Work
Package (AWP), and the status of the ship’s damage control equipment. FSCs are encouraged to mitigate the risks associated
with adjusting the timing of the installation and/or removal of the detection system by effective alternate means, such as
increased fire watches and complying with the combustible loading requirements of this manual. In addition, there may be
areas of the submarine that do not need the detectors in accordance with paragraph 6.1.1.2.
6.1 TEMPORARY INSTALLATION OF AUTOMATIC FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM ON SUBMARINES.
6.1.1 Applicability An automatic fire detection system meeting the requirements of this chapter shall be temporarily
installed on commissioned submarine availabilities where habitability is being disestablished and the crew moved off hull, as
a minimum, to alert SF and SRCA personnel of fires on the submarine. The FSC has the authority to require installation of
the automatic fire detection system based on the type and amount of work specified in the Availability Work Package (AWP)
and the status of the permanent ship’s systems. Further system installation guidance is provided in paragraph 6.1.7.1
6.1.1.1 The system shall consist of individually-addressable combination smoke and heat detectors, located throughout the
submarine, which are powered and monitored by an alarm panel. The system shall automatically detect and alarm for smoke
and/or high temperature conditions, and shall identify the specific location of the detector in alarm. The alarm panel shall be
located in a continuously-manned topside watch area (e.g., CASCON Station), protected from inclement weather. The
automatic fire detection system shall be stand-alone and separate from the CASCON system itself.
6.1.1.2 NAVSEA and the local technical authority in accordance with the process specified in reference (a) shall review and
approve the selection of the automatic fire detection system components (i.e., alarm panel, combination smoke and heat
detectors, isolator bases). Disabling any portion or capability of the automatic fire detection system also requires review and
approval of the FSC. The system’s condition and any deviation to it shall be reviewed and approved by the FSC in writing.
a. A capability needs to exist to detect fires via automatic detection or visual watch-standing and respond to these fires
with extinguishers or a hose reel within ten minutes. Taking this into consideration, the FSC shall have the authority
to approve not installing detectors in certain spaces within a compartment that are continuously manned throughout
the availability, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week (e.g., Maneuvering Room, if applicable) or if the FSC determines
that a fire can be visually detected in the space via watch-standing or dedicated fire watches and an extinguisher or

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¾” hose reel can be discharging on the fire, all within ten minutes of ignition at all times (24 hours per day, 7 days
per week).
6.1.1.3 Based on shipchecks of SSN-752, SSN-22, SSN-778, and SSBN-737, quantities of detectors were estimated and
are noted here. For submarines within the same class having identical internal arrangements and identical overhead
beam structures to those shipchecked, Appendices E through H depict recommended locations based on the requirements
of this chapter. Where submarines have different internal arrangements and overhead beam structures, the detailed
placement guidance in this chapter and Appendix I shall be used to locate the detectors. The approximate quantities of
detectors required for each submarine hull and compartment are as follows:
a. SSN-688 class: 48 detectors FWD, 24 detectors AFT, total of 72 detectors. See appendix E for the approximate
locations for these detectors.
b. SSN-21 and SSN-22: 56 detectors FWD, 33 detectors AFT, total of 89 detectors. See appendix F for the
approximate locations for these detectors. Quantities of detectors for SSN-23 shall be based on the quantity for
SSN-21 with additional detectors added for the plug area. More detailed quantities and layouts are being developed.
c. SSN-774 class: 59 detectors FWD, 21 detectors AFT, total of 80 detectors. See appendix G for the approximate
locations for these detectors.
d. SSBN/SSGN-726 class: 55 detectors FWD, 65 detectors MID, 31 detectors AFT, total of 151 detectors. See
appendix H for the approximate locations for these detectors.
NOTE: Approximate quantity of detectors does not include reactor compartments. Requirements for reactor compartments
are under development.
6.1.1.4 A temporary fire detection system meeting the EMI testing requirements of MIL-STD-461 shall be installed in the
Missile Compartments of strategically loaded SSBNs entering a normal refit or extended refit period. This requirement does
not apply for short duration in port periods or when the installation of temporary systems is impractical (e.g., berth shifts,
DABOB), or when a permanent system is installed and operational. Local exceptions may be required by these operational
considerations and shall be approved by the FSC (if established), SRCA, ship, and ISIC.
6.1.2 Combination Smoke and Heat Detector Hardware Requirements.
6.1.2.1 The combination smoke and heat detectors shall be Underwriters Laboratories (UL) listed in accordance with
references (b) and (c). The combination smoke and heat detectors shall also be UL-listed for use with the alarm panel. The
heat detector portion of the combination smoke and heat detector shall have a minimum UL-listed spacing of 30 feet.
6.1.2.2 The following design criteria shall be met:
a. Combination smoke and heat detectors shall be spot-type and be restorable after alarm only after a reset of the
latched audible and visual alarm at the alarm panel is manually executed. A non-restorable fusible alloy is not
permitted as the operating mechanism of the heat detector portion of the combination detector. Combination smoke
and heat detectors in alarm shall cause audible and visual alarms to occur at the alarm panel, but shall not initiate
audible and visual notification appliances throughout the submarine. Combination smoke and heat detectors shall
not generate an audible alarm themselves (i.e., detector sounder bases shall not be used).
b. The heat detector portion of the combination smoke and heat detector shall have a fixed temperature alarm threshold
of 135°F. The smoke detector portion of the combination smoke and heat detector shall be the photoelectric light-
scattering type and have at least two programmable sensitivity settings (all within the allowable reference (b) range)
and shall be programmed and installed using the least sensitive alarm threshold (i.e., the highest percent obscuration
per foot sensitivity setting). Ionization smoke detection shall not be permitted for the smoke detection portion of the
combination smoke and heat detector.
c. The combination smoke and heat detector shall consist of the detector head as well as the detector’s base and a
watertight junction box. The junction box may be developed by the installing activity. The watertight junction box
shall contain at least two mounting holes/tabs to allow for the installation of the detector in the overheads using
approved fastening hardware specified in paragraph 10.4.4 of this manual. At least two red labels (e.g., stickers,
signage) shall be affixed to the sides of the watertight junction box and shall state “Do not tamper with this fire
detector or move it from this location without authorization from the FSC”. Each combination smoke and heat

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detector shall have at least one Light Emitting Diode (LED) which shall identify that power is being supplied to the
detector and shall also identify, in a different visual way (e.g., separate LED or indicator, one LED capable of two
colors, LED flashing versus steady, etc.), when the detector is in an alarm state. Each combination smoke and heat
detector base shall contain a short circuit isolator that shall protect all other detectors on the looped detector power
and monitoring cabling from any cable conductors that are accidentally shorted.
6.1.2.3 The automatic fire detection system shall be installed in a looped configuration such that a cable break/open
anywhere in the loop allows the alarm panel to continue to power and monitor all detectors from both sides of the remaining
loop portions, while also providing a trouble indication that there is a break in the looped cabling. The watertight junction
box shall have electrical connectors to allow for quick-disconnect connections of the incoming and outgoing detector
power/monitoring cabling, where the cabling has the mating electrical connectors.
6.1.3 Alarm Panel Hardware Requirements.
6.1.3.1 The alarm panel shall be UL listed in accordance with reference (d).
6.1.3.2 The following design criteria shall be met:
a. The alarm panel shall be capable of powering and monitoring at least 200 addressable detectors. The alarm panel
shall be capable of powering at least four loops of detectors in a Class A style, as defined by reference (e). The
alarm panel shall contain an internal back-up rechargeable battery power source, capable of operating the alarm
panel for at least 24 hours if primary 120 VAC, 60 Hz power is lost.
b. When a combination smoke and heat detector alarms, the alarm panel shall be capable of identifying and displaying
whether the smoke portion of that detector alarmed or the heat portion of that detector alarmed. The alarm panel
shall also be capable of temporarily disabling only the smoke portion of any one or a group of detectors, while
leaving the heat detection portion of that one detector or a group of detectors fully capable of responding and
alarming to high temperatures. When such a disabling feature is employed, the appropriate trouble indication(s)
shall occur at the panel for that/(those) detector(s) that lost its/(their) smoke detection capability. The capability to
disable any detector or feature of a detector shall be password protected.
6.1.3.3 All detectors in the Forward part of the submarine shall be powered and monitored on one alarm panel cabling loop.
All detectors in the aft/Engine Room of the submarine shall be powered and monitored on a different/second alarm panel
cabling loop. For SSGNs/SSBNs, all detectors in the Missile Compartment shall be powered and monitored on a
different/third alarm panel cabling loop. No detector loops shall cross the boundary between forward, mid, and aft/Engine
Room compartments.
6.1.3.4 The alarm panel shall have an alphanumeric display of at least 60 characters that can identify each specific
combination smoke and heat detector when in an alarm state, as well as in a trouble state. The alarm panel shall be
programmed such that when a detector goes into an alarm or trouble state, the name of the space (where the detector is
located) is displayed in the alpha-numeric display of the alarm panel, as well as additional information that can accurately
identify the location of the specific detector in an alarm or trouble state. This additional information displayed about the
detector shall include at least the frame number where the detector is installed, the level of the space (for multi-level spaces),
and the relative location of the detector at that frame number (e.g., port, centerline, or starboard), as well as the detector’s
assigned numerical address number and (for detectors in alarm) whether the smoke or heat portion of the detector is in an
alarm state.
6.1.4 Automatic Fire Detection System Installation Criteria. Combination smoke and heat detectors shall be installed in the
overheads of the spaces throughout the submarine using the following criteria:
6.1.4.1 Combination smoke and heat detectors shall be installed in the overheads of the submarine spaces, using approved
fastening hardware specified in paragraph 10.4.4 of this manual. Detectors shall be installed within 12 inches of the
overhead. Where firm foundations in the overhead do not exist in the immediate area, detectors may be installed up to 30
inches below the overhead. Overhead areas that require detectors shall include the horizontal solid overhead areas of spaces
in the forward section of the submarine (e.g., Staterooms, Crew Living Spaces, Chief Petty Officer (CPO) Lounge, Fan
Rooms, Auxiliary Machinery Room, Torpedo Room, etc.), the overall domed overhead above the uppermost level of the
submarine, and the solid deck (or solid machinery/structure) overheads of middle or lower levels in the multi-level spaces of
the submarine (e.g., the engine room, missile compartment).

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6.1.4.2 Combination smoke and heat detectors shall not be located in any direct airflow or closer than 36 inches from an air
supply diffuser or return air opening, where air can negatively influence the performance of the detector. Such an installation
could allow incoming air to directly prevent the smoke and heated air from a fire in the space from reaching the detector or
could disperse such smoke/air, thus preventing the detector from providing an alarm during an actual fire.
6.1.4.3 The following area coverage and spacing requirements shall be met:
a. Smooth Overheads. For compartments or areas of the submarine with smooth overheads (where overhead beams or
frames are less than or equal to four inches in depth), the distance between combination smoke and heat detectors
shall not exceed their listed spacing of 30 feet (thus 900 ft 2 area coverage), even if the UL listed spacing for the heat
detector portion of the detector is more than 30 feet. Combination smoke and heat detectors may be mounted on the
smooth overhead itself or on the bottom of these beams. For any detectors mounted on the bottom of a beam,
consideration shall be given to ensure that the detectors are not subject to damage from “normal” shipyard work,
operations, and movements. For smooth overheads, one of the following requirements shall apply:
(1) The distance between detectors shall not exceed 30 feet, and there shall be detectors within a distance of 15
feet, measured at right angles from all bulkheads (See, appendix I, figure I-1).
(2) For the “corners” of a space, all points on the overhead shall have a detector within a distance equal to or less
than 21 feet (i.e., 0.7 times the listed spacing of 30 feet) (See appendix I, figure I-1).
b. Beamed Overheads.
(1) Beam depths less than 0.1 overhead height. Overhead height is defined as the distance from the deck to the
solid overhead structure. For an arched overhead (e.g., upper level of the submarine), it is the highest distance,
normally at the centerline). For overheads with beam depths of less than 10 percent of the overhead height (H)
(i.e., 0.1H), smooth overhead spacing of 30 feet shall be permitted. Detectors shall be permitted to be located
on the overhead or on the bottom of beams. For any detectors mounted on the bottom of a beam, consideration
shall be given to ensure that the detectors are not subject to damage from “normal” shipyard work, operations,
and movements.
(2) Beam depths equal to or greater than 0.1 overhead height. For overheads with beam depths equal to or greater
than 10 percent of the overhead height (H) (i.e., 0.1H), the following requirements shall apply:
(a) Where the distance (i.e., spacing) between the beams is equal to or greater than 40 percent of the
overhead height (H) (i.e., 0.4H), detectors shall be located on the overhead in each beam pocket.
(b) Where the distance (i.e., spacing) between the beams is less than 40 percent of the overhead height (H)
(i.e., 0.4H), smooth overhead spacing of 30 feet shall be permitted in the direction parallel to the beams,
but one-half the smooth overhead spacing of 30 feet (i.e., 15 feet) shall be permitted in the direction
perpendicular to the beams. Detectors shall be located either on the overhead or on the bottom of the
beams. For any detectors mounted on the bottom of a beam, consideration shall be given to ensure that
the detectors are not subject to damage from “normal” shipyard work, operations, and movements.
c. Rectangular Compartments. In practical applications, few compartments on submarines are exactly square, with
rectangular compartments more common. Appendix I, figure I-2 shows a combination smoke and heat detector with
compartment area coverage and listed spacing of 900 ft2 or 30 ft x 30 ft. A detector with such 30 ft spacing can also
cover a 25 ft x 34 ft area, or a 20 ft x 37 ft area, or a 15 ft x 39 ft area, or a 10 ft x 41 ft area, or any rectangular area
contained within this circle. A compartment larger than any singular rectangle in appendix I, figure I-2 requires
extra detectors. The proper placement of detectors in such larger compartments shall be obtained by breaking down
the larger compartment into multiple rectangles. In general, all points in the overhead of a compartment should have
a detector within a distance of 0.7 times the selected spacing (See appendix I, figure I-1). For irregularly shaped
areas, the spacing between detectors shall be permitted to be greater than the listed spacing, provided the maximum
spacing from a detector to the farthest point of a bulkhead or corner is not greater than 0.7 times the listed spacing.
6.1.5 Automatic Fire Detection System Testing. An operational test of the automatic fire detection system shall be
conducted after the installation is complete. This operational test shall consist of subjecting each combination smoke and
heat detector to an appropriate smoke signature (e.g., using smoke test gas recommended by the smoke detector
manufacturer) and ensuring an alarm occurs at the alarm panel for each detector installed. This operational test shall also
consist of subjecting each combination smoke and heat detector to an appropriate heat signature (e.g., using a heat gun) and

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ensuring an alarm occurs at the alarm panel for each detector installed. The detector LED(s) described in paragraph 6.1.2.2
shall also be checked for proper operation during these detector smoke test gas and heat tests. This operational test shall also
consist of temporarily removing the 120 VAC power to the alarm panel, for at least 5 minutes, to ensure the automatic
transition to back-up battery power, the full powering and monitoring of all detectors on battery power for those (at least) 5
minutes, as well as the automatic transition back to 120 VAC when 120VAC is restored after (at least) 5 minutes. Consistent
with reference (e), this overall operational test of the entire automatic fire detection system shall be performed at least
annually. Where the performance of a scheduled annual operational test is precluded, due to conflicts with work or ship
condition, or is deemed unnecessary due to imminent completion of the industrial period, the FSC has the authority to grant a
single three-month extension to the annual test completion date. Such extensions should not be granted in cases where the
frequency of known malfunctions has caused the system reliability to become questionable. Testing shall be aligned with
other facility testing requirements where feasible. F&ES shall be offered the opportunity to witness and verify the automatic
fire detection system is adequately tested. In addition, operational testing of both the smoke and heat detection portions of
any specific combination smoke and heat detector shall also be performed on any detector after the re-installation of any
detector that was temporarily removed, as well as on any replacement detector.
6.1.6 Automatic Fire Detection System Protection.
6.1.6.1 Protection prior to automatic fire detection system initial operation. During the early stages of the automatic fire
detection system installation, where individual detectors have been installed but the overall system has not yet been
energized/operational, dust covers (that are normally delivered with the procured fire detectors) or other means (e.g.,
paper/low tack masking tape wrapped around detector) shall be temporarily installed on the detectors to protect them from
being damaged/contaminated from excessive dust, dirt, grinding, and welding smoke. When the system is first energized and
operational, these dust covers or low tack masking tape shall be removed (otherwise, the detector will not properly
respond/alarm to smoke, heat, or fire).
6.1.6.2 Protection during the availability. If, during certain stages of the availability, specific detectors in a portion of the
submarine will be exposed to potentially damaging work (e.g., lengthy and significant grinding), the FSC shall review and
approve the detector covering actions outlined in 6.1.6.1, prior to any detectors being covered, which will render those
detectors essentially non-responsive, and the FSC shall record that degradation. If, during other stages of the availability,
certain detectors and the detector interconnecting cabling are at a significant risk of damage, the FSC shall review and
approve the removal of the select detectors and their interconnecting loop cable sections, prior to any detector or cabling
removal, and the FSC shall record that degradation. When any detectors are temporarily covered or removed in these
situations, written notification of all missing/non-operating detectors shall be posted on the alarm panel. When it is necessary
to remove portions of loop cabling, that cabling removed shall be limited to only one section of cables (and associated
detectors), thus ensuring that the cabling and detector portion located prior to this removed area, as well as the cabling and
detector portion located after this removed area, are still connected to the alarm panel, fully powered and operational. That
is, for a loop of 40 detectors (i.e., installed along the loop cabling with sequential addresses #1 through #40), if detectors #25,
#26, #27, #28, and #29 and their interconnecting cabling must be temporarily removed from their location, detectors #1
through #24 shall remain connected, powered, and monitored by the alarm panel from their (front) side of the loop cabling,
and detectors #30 through #40 shall remain connected, powered, and monitored by the alarm panel from their (back) side of
the loop cabling.
6.1.6.3 Detector cleaning. Detectors that become visibly excessively dirty (e.g., dirt/dust collecting on the outside of the
detector) shall be externally cleaned in accordance with the manufacturer’s published instructions. Detectors that report a
“smoke detector dirty”, “smoke detector excessively dirty”, or similar trouble signal to the alarm panel shall also be
externally cleaned in accordance with the manufacturer’s published instructions. If such cleaning methods do not restore the
detector to a fully functioning trouble-free state, a new/spare smoke detector shall be installed and operationally tested in
agreement with the procedures established in paragraph 6.1.5 of this manual.
6.1.7 Automatic Fire Detection System Installation and Removal.
6.1.7.1 The automatic fire detection system shall be installed and operational at the start of commissioned submarine
availabilities, prior to the initiation of hot work, and/or prior to habitability being disestablished from the submarine,
whichever occurs first. When hot work is needed prior to the system being operational in the affected spaces, a mitigation
plan to provide continuous monitoring and notification shall be implemented. The mitigation plan shall be approved by the
FSC.

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6.1.7.2 The system may be removed from the ship once the habitability key event (HB00) is attained. Under these ship
conditions, the crew has moved back on board and most industrial hot work has been completed. Normal DC equipment
must be installed and operational. Actual removal date will be agreed to by the FSC, but must occur prior to the final crew
certification for fast cruise. Individual compartment sections of the system in the engineering spaces are authorized for
removal prior to HB00 under the following conditions:
a. The system may be removed from the engineering spaces once the Start Steaming (SS00) key event is attained.
b. Ship’s DC gear shall be reinstalled in the engineering spaces.
6.2 TEMPORARY INSTALLATION OF AUTOMATIC FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS ON SURFACE SHIPS AND
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.
6.2.1 Fire Detection System. The ship’s permanently-installed fire detection system shall be maintained in an operational
condition during the availability. The FSC shall be made aware of any existing system impairments prior to beginning work
in the availability. Any work that would impair the permanently-installed fire detection system shall be minimized to the
maximum extent possible, shall be reviewed and approved by the FSC in writing, and shall be conducted in such a way that
leaves as much of the system operational as possible. In more extensive impairments of the permanently-installed fire
detection system, consideration shall be given towards providing a temporary fire detection system that mirrors that detector
type, quantity, and locations of the permanent system.
6.2.1.1 Temporary fire detection systems shall follow the hardware and installation requirements of paragraph 6.1 of this
manual, except that the temporary alarm panels shall be sized to accommodate the number of detectors required based on the
applicable size of the ship and applicable quantity of compartments needing detector coverage. The FSC or local technical
authority may approve deviations from paragraph 6.1 requirements where they are deemed solely applicable to submarines.
6.2.1.2 In emergent situations, when a ship’s permanently-installed fire detection system becomes inoperable and an
appropriate temporary fire detection system is not readily available, the FSC shall specifically approve that condition,
including identifying mitigation actions, and ensure all personnel working on board are notified.
6.2.2 Fire Detection System Protection.
6.2.2.1 Permanently Installed Detection Systems. If, during certain stages of the availability, specific detectors in a
compartment will be exposed to potentially damaging work (e.g., lengthy and significant grinding, painting, etc.), which
could damage or render those detectors non-responsive, then the FSC shall review and approve a detector protection plan
prior to work commencing. Plan shall include protective actions such as use of paper and low tack adhesive tape to isolate
the detector(s) from being damaged/contaminated from excessive dust, dirt, paint, grinding, and welding smoke. Heat-only
detectors shall be required to be protected from painting operations only. The plan shall not degrade detectors in adjacent
compartments or levels that do not directly contain the potentially damaging work. Plan shall include posting notifications of
impaired detectors at the alarm panel/DC console/Machinery control display. Immediately after completion of potentially
damaging work, the protective coverings and impairment notifications shall be removed. Detectors that have been protected
due to hot work shall be returned to service immediately after cessation of hot work. In cases of hot work extending across
multiple work shifts or days, detectors shall be returned to service during any shifts or overnight periods where such work is
not being executed.
6.2.2.2 Temporarily Installed Detection Systems. Refer to paragraph 6.1.6 of this manual.

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Chapter 7
FIREFIGHTING SYSTEMS
References
(a) Occupational Safety and Health Standards for Shipyard Employment, 29 CFR Part 1915 Subpart P, Fire Protection in
Shipyard Employment
(b) S9AA0-AB-GOS-010, General Overhaul Specifications For Overhaul of Surface Ships (GSO)
(c) S0902-018-2010, General Overhaul Specifications For Deep Diving SSBN/SSN Submarines (DDGOS)
(d) NAVSEAINST 5400.95, Waterfront Engineering and Technical Authority Policy
(e) MIL-F-24385, Military Specification: Fire Extinguishing Agent, Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) Liquid
Concentrate, For Fresh and Seawater
(f) S9086-S3-STM-020, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 555, Volume 2, Submarine Firefighting
(g) MIL-H-24580, Military Specification: Hose Assemblies, Synthetic Rubber, Noncollapsible, Firefighting
(h) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and
Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems
(i) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 1962, Standard for the Care, Use, Inspection,
Service Testing, and Replacement of Fire Hose, Couplings, Nozzles, and Fire Hose Appliances
(j) S9086-S3-STM-010, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 555, Volume 1, Surface Ship Firefighting
(k) NAVFAC Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-150-02, Dockside Utilities for Ship Service
(l) NAVFAC Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-213-10, Design: Graving Drydocks
(m) NAVFAC Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-213-12, Drydocking Facilities Characteristics
(n) NAVFAC Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-150-06, Military Harbors and Coastal Facilities
(o) NAVFAC Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-152-01, Design: Piers and Wharves
(p) Underwriter Laboratories (UL) Standard 199, Automatic Sprinklers for Fire-Protection Service
(q) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 72, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code
(r) Underwriter Laboratories (UL) Standard 864, Control Units and Accessories for Fire Alarm Systems
(s) Underwriter Laboratories (UL) Standard 268, Smoke Detectors for Fire Alarm Systems
(t) NAVSEA 0989-043-0000, Commissioned Surface Ship General Reactor Plant Overhaul and Repair Specification
Introduction
Compliant to the requirements of reference (a), this chapter provides the firefighting system requirements for industrial
availabilities. This chapter applies to all SRCAs (except new construction shipyards) and covers all Navy ships –
submarines, surface ships, and aircraft carriers.
This chapter is divided into three sections; section 7.1 provides general firefighting protection system requirements
pertaining to both submarine and surface ship availabilities, while sections 7.2 and 7.3 apply to only submarines and

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surface ships, respectively. The additional risk presented during industrial work is compounded when the ship’s
permanent firefighting systems are temporary removed or disabled, thus increasing the necessity for alternative and similar
firefighting protection systems to be installed to provide adequate firefighting capability to prevent or combat a major
shipboard casualty. The ship’s firefighting system must retain adequate redundancy to be considered operational. The
FSC shall review for likely single-point failure scenarios (e.g., ships with a single shore power location cannot rely on two
off-hull power supplies since a catastrophic failure of the only shore power switchboard could result in a major fire and
loss of all ship systems, as well as the plan enacted to maintain firefighting capability). These requirements were largely
developed from existing fire protection requirements contained in references (b) and (c), but also incorporate significant
lessons learned from the MIAMI fire, including a topside fire main and manifold system and temporary internal hose reels
designed to facilitate SF, SRCA, and F&ES fire fighters integration for an increased level of immediate and extended
response. Flexibilities have been incorporated throughout this chapter, providing the FSC with the authority to mitigate
the risks associated with implementing these requirements. For example, section 7.1.1.2 empowers the FSC to approve the
condition and mitigation actions taken with respect to emergent situations, when a ship’s firefighting capability becomes
inoperable and an appropriate temporary firefighting capability is not readily available.
7.1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS.
7.1.1 Firefighting Systems. The ship’s permanent firefighting systems, including portable fire extinguishers, shall be
maintained in as ready for use condition as possible during the availability. A temporary firefighting capability that meets
the requirements of this manual shall be provided prior to removal of permanent firefighting equipment or securing of the
ship’s fire main or other permanent firefighting system. F&ES shall be offered the opportunity to witness the installation
of temporary firefighting systems. For the purposes of this manual, a submarine’s trim system and any interconnected
drain pumps are considered components of the fire main.
7.1.1.1 In unique cases where a temporary firefighting capability is not specified in this manual, the local technical
authority in accordance with the process specified in reference (d) shall determine an appropriate temporary firefighting
system.
7.1.1.2 In emergent situations, when a ship’s firefighting capability becomes inoperable and an appropriate temporary
firefighting capability is not readily available, the FSC shall specifically approve the condition including identifying
mitigation actions, and ensure all employers working on board are notified.
7.1.1.3 When a ship system is disabled, but initial responder equipment such as hose racks/reels are left on board, the
disabled system/equipment shall be clearly identified as out of service at each activation location.
7.1.1.4 Where a ship’s permanent firefighting system is solely intended to protect from a specific hazard and the hazard
has been removed from the ship during the availability, it is permissible for the system to be inoperable in the absence of
the intended hazard.
7.1.1.5 Where hangars, well decks, and vehicle stowage spaces will be used for staging materials, work areas, offices,
temporary structures, etc., the sprinkling systems shall be kept operational with either Aqueous Film Forming Foam
(AFFF) or seawater sprinkling available. Individual sprinkler zones may be secured as needed for maintenance, provided
adjacent zones are operational. The time the zone is out of service shall be minimized. Deviations from these
requirements shall be approved by the FSC.
7.1.1.6 Minimum Electrical Power Criteria. Whenever the ship’s fire main is the primary firefighting system, redundant
electrical power supplies (i.e. shore power and a shipboard generator) shall be available.
a. On submarines, the second source of power shall be the ship’s battery to maintain damage control power
continuity.
b. When these power redundancy requirements cannot be met:
(1) a back-up power supply that is sufficient to power lighting, communications, and other critical systems shall
be available; and.
(2) a shore firefighting supply shall be connected to the operating ship’s fire main; or

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(3) a shore supplied firefighting system shall be installed that meets the requirements of subsection 7.2 or 7.3 of
this chapter.
c. The Fire Safety Council (FSC) may waive power redundancy requirements for up to 24 hours. In this case, the
mitigation shall include securing all hotwork and informing all employers of the condition.
d. The naval supervising authority (NSA) manager responsible for fire safety and ship’s force (SF) commanding
officer may waive power redundancy requirements for up to 3 days. In this case, the mitigation shall include:
(1) securing all hotwork;
(2) limiting the quantity of contractor personnel shipboard; and
(3) a proven process to restore communications and fire main during a casualty.
7.1.1.7 Minimum Fire Main Criteria. When relying on the ship’s fire main as the sole means of firefighting, the system
shall meet the redundancy criteria of this section.
a. Surface ship fire mains shall maintain sufficient fire pumps to supply daily system cooling and flushing (i.e.,
auxiliary) loads plus the fire protection water supply requirements contained in table 7-3.
b. Submarines shall maintain two operating trim or drain pumps.
c. Available fire pumps shall be physically located in different spaces. For ships requiring more than four
operational pumps, up to 25 percent may be collocated.
d. Fire pumps shall be powered from different switchboards or have operable automatic or manual bus transfers. A
submarine’s main storage battery meets the intent of a bus transfer when in service.
e. When these fire main system requirements cannot be met:
(1) a shore firefighting supply shall be connected to the operational ship’s fire main; or
(2) a shore supplied firefighting system shall be installed that meets the requirements of subsection 7.2 or 7.3
of this chapter.
f. The FSC may waive fire main system requirements for up to 24 hours. In this case, the mitigation shall include
securing all hotwork and informing all employers of the condition.
g. The NSA’s manager responsible for fire safety and SF commanding officer may waive fire main redundancy
requirements for up to 3 days. In this case, the mitigation shall include:
(1) securing all hotwork;
(2) limiting the quantity of contractor personnel shipboard; and
(3) a proven process to restore fire main during a casualty.
7.1.1.8 Booster Pumps. When pumps are installed to boost installation supply pressure for a ship’s temporary firefighting
system or shore connection to ship fire main, those pumps shall meet the criteria of this section.
a. Pumps shall operate automatically which includes:
(1) cycling to maintain system pressure;
(2) starting automatically when a hose is operated; and
(3) stopping when hose use is secured.
b. Pumps shall include a pump running light and supervisory alarms at a continuously-manned SF watch station
(e.g., CASCON station, quarterdeck, etc.). Alarms shall include (at a minimum):

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(1) low pressure;

(2) high pressure;
(3) power trouble (e.g. loss of power, phase reversal, and loss of phase) for motor driven pumps.
(4) control switch off or in manual; and
(5) trouble on controller or engine.
c. Where the temporary firefighting system is the sole means of fire response to a ship or a significant portion of the
ship, two pumps (at a minimum) shall be provided.
(1) Each pump shall be capable of supplying the required system flow rate.
(2) Each pump shall have independent prime movers (e.g., one electric and one engine driven, or both electric
supplied from separate substations).
(3) Pumps shall be physically separated.
(4) Pumps shall be positioned and powered in such a way that a single failure will not result in a loss of
firefighting water pressure.
(5) Pump operating pressures shall be staggered to minimize pump cycling (i.e., one pump starts at 140 psi to
restore the system to 150 psi and the second is set to start at 130 psi)
7.1.2 Hazards of Fixed Extinguishing Systems. Per reference (a), each SRCA shall comply with the provisions of this
section whenever employees are exposed to fixed extinguishing systems that could create a dangerous atmosphere when
activated in vessels and vessel sections, regardless of geographic location.
7.1.2.1 Before any work is done in a space equipped with fixed extinguishing systems, the FSC shall ensure:
a. If the specific hazard that the firefighting system is protecting for does not exist, physically isolate the systems or
use other positive means to prevent the systems’ discharge; or
b. If the specific hazard that the firefighting system is protecting for does exist, ensure employees are trained to
recognize:
(1) Systems’ discharge and evacuation alarms and the appropriate escape routes; or
(2) Hazards associated with the extinguishing system and agents including the dangers of disturbing system
components and equipment such as piping, cables, linkages, detection devices, activation devices, and alarm
devices.
c. System is restored immediately upon completion of work.
7.1.2.2 During dock trials, the SRCA shall ensure that all systems shall remain operational.
7.1.2.3 With regards to doors and hatches, the SRCA shall:
a. Take protective measures to ensure that all doors, hatches, scuttles, and other exit openings remain working and
accessible for escape in the event the systems are activated; and
b. Ensure that all inward opening doors, hatches, scuttles, and other potential barriers to safe exit are removed,
locked open, braced, or otherwise secured, so that they remain open and accessible for escape if systems'
activation could result in a positive pressure in the protected spaces sufficient to impede escape.
7.1.2.4 Before conducting maintenance on a fixed extinguishing system, the SRCA shall ensure that the system is
physically isolated.
7.1.2.5 If fixed manual extinguishing systems are used to provide fire protection for spaces in which the employees are
working, the SRCA shall ensure that:

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a. Only authorized employees are allowed to activate the system;

b. Authorized employees are trained to operate and activate the system; and
c. All employees are evacuated from the protected spaces and accounted for, before the fixed manual extinguishing
system is activated.
7.1.2.6 For carbon dioxide total flooding systems which create an IDLH atmosphere, detailed safety procedures, equal to
Navy Planned Maintenance System (PMS), must be implemented to assure operator safety for disabling and enabling the
system.
7.1.3 Pumping and Dewatering Capability. During transit from drydock to wet berth, all ships without installed pumping
and dewatering capability shall maintain portable saltwater pumping capability.
7.1.4 Operation of Major Machinery in Engineering Spaces. Major machinery in engineering spaces shall not be operated
without the ship’s permanent firefighting systems operational unless temporary firefighting systems are made available for
immediate use in the event of a fire. Where the protecting firefighting system (permanent or temporary) requires the
development and maintenance of gaseous/mist concentration (e.g., halon, water mist, HFP, CO 2), all openings to the
affected space shall be capable of being shut or isolated to prevent the escape of firefighting agents. FSC concurrence
shall be obtained prior to machinery operations when a temporary system is established for firefighting use in place of the
ship’s permanent system. Major machinery consists of propulsion machinery, boilers, oil fuel units, steam and internal
combustion engines, and generators where a significant class B fire hazard exists.
7.1.5 Liquid Fuel Pumping and Transfer. The pumping or transfer of liquid fuel onto or within the ship shall not take
place without the ship’s permanent firefighting systems protecting all of the fuel system components being operational, or
a suitable temporary firefighting system is made available for immediate use in the event of a fire. FSC concurrence shall
be obtained when a temporary system is established for firefighting use in place of the ship’s permanent system prior to
fuel pumping or transfer operations.
7.1.6 Mechanical Aqueous Film Forming Foam Producing Equipment. SRCA shall ensure mechanical Aqueous Film
Forming Foam (AFFF) producing equipment, such as portable educators and AFFF concentrate, is available to initial
responders in sufficient quantity to protect any compartment from fire where spillage of flammable or combustible liquids
could occur. The AFFF shall be in accordance with reference (e), listed on the Qualified Products List (QPL)-24385, and
compatible with the AFFF producing equipment.
7.1.7 Portable Fire Extinguisher Requirements. CO2 portable extinguishers of 15-pound capacity, Dry Chemical
Potassium Bicarbonate (PKP), or water, or AFFF extinguishers of 2½ gallon capacity, shall be available as the initial
means of fighting fires. Ships installed portable CO2, PKP, and AFFF fire extinguishers shall be retained on board and
shall remain throughout the availability for initial response to a fire. Alternatively, the SRCA shall provide the
extinguishers as long as they are in accordance with the same specifications, the same quantity, and installed at the same
locations as the ships permanently installed extinguishers. CO 2 portable extinguishers should not be used in poorly
ventilated or enclosed spaces because they displace oxygen and can quickly create an atmosphere unable to sustain life.
Portable fire extinguishers shall remain on station, unless removal as interference per the AWP is required. In this event,
the SRCA shall provide a temporary stowage bracket in the vicinity of the installed bracket to enable the relocation of the
removed extinguisher. Where extinguishers are relocated, location placards at the original location shall direct personnel
to the temporary location. The ship’s portable fire extinguishers are not to be used for fire watch. SRCA shall ensure that
fire watches are provided with a portable fire extinguisher.
7.1.7.1 Portable fire extinguishers shall be installed so that the maximum travel distance to an extinguisher from any
interior point of the ship on the same level shall be no more than 50 feet. For reactor compartments and other machinery
spaces not normally open underway (excluding tanks, voids, and vent plenums); portable fire extinguishers shall be
installed by the SRCA when the space is open for industrial work so that the maximum travel distance to an extinguisher
from any point of the space on the same level shall be no more than 50 feet.
7.1.7.2 In the case of hot work, a SRCA supplied extinguisher shall be located so that an agent can be applied to an
incipient fire within 15 seconds of discovery.
7.1.7.3 Additional extinguishers shall be stowed on the pier ways or on the dock, in a readily accessible location.

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7.1.7.4 If Class B fire hazards are not present on board the ship, pressurized water extinguishers are permitted as an
alternative to AFFF extinguishers. Pressurized freshwater fire extinguishers shall be provided for initial response to a fire
in the reactor compartment of NPWs.
7.1.7.5 Submarines generally have two CO2 extinguishers which have been coated with plastisol and installed near the
battery compartment for use by a fire watch. Two insulated (plastisol covered) carbon dioxide extinguishers are required
for use by fire watch personnel when hot work is performed on the boundary of the battery compartment or to protect
against a minor fire when conditions prohibit isolation of the compartment. The plastisol covered extinguishers are to be
used to attack a small fire, and should not be dropped into or left in the battery compartment unattended.
7.1.7.6 Each SRCA shall be responsible for refilling SRCA and/or ship’s portable fire extinguishers that are discharged
during incidents occurring during the industrial period. Each SRCA shall be responsible for inspecting and maintaining all
portable extinguishers provided by the SRCA. The ship shall be responsible for inspecting and maintaining all portable
extinguishers belonging to the ship.
7.1.7.7 Fire protection requirements during hot work shall be in accordance with chapter 4 of this manual. Fire hoses
shall not be used as a complement or substitute for portable extinguishers without prior approval of the ship’s
Commanding Officer.
7.1.8 Hose and Hose Reel Protection. Where temporary and permanent hose or hose reels may be subject to damage, an
enclosure shall be provided for protection. The enclosure shall be painted red and shall not significantly restrict access to
the hose or hose reel for firefighting. If the enclosure cannot be installed without significantly restricting access to the
hose or hose reel, other damage mitigating procedures may be used as approved by the FSC.
7.1.9 Drydock Firefighting Requirements. Where drydocked ships or ships under construction are constructed of
combustible hull materials such as composites and wood, materials subject to melting such as aluminum, or equipped with
combustible external hull/structure treatments such as Special Hull Treatment (SHT), Radar Absorbent Material (RAM),
or Passive Countermeasure System (PCMS), fire hose stations shall be provided such that all areas of the hull/structure are
reachable by straight streams from two separate fire hose stations when rigged with 100 feet of hose. Each fire hose
station shall include a quick-acting manual valve (fire plug); a constantly available water source with a minimum 95 gpm
flow at a 60 psi dynamic nozzle pressure at its highest elevation; at least 100 feet of pre-connected 1½ inch, 1¾ inch, or 2½
inch diameter fire hose; and a nozzle, MIL-N-24408, 1½ inch National Hose (NH) (9 TPI), rated for 125 gpm at 100 psi, or
2½ inch NH (7.5 TPI), rated for 250 gpm at 100 psi. Precautions to prevent freezing of fire hose stations shall be taken as
required. The requirements of this paragraph are in addition to any other firefighting equipment requirements specified
elsewhere in this manual and by the local firefighting instructions. Seawater is an acceptable extinguishing agent to utilize
for Special Hull Treatment (SHT) fires in the dry dock in accordance with paragraph 14.3 of this manual.
7.1.9.1 Local firefighting procedures and instructions shall address the response and pre-staged firefighting equipment
requirements for other types of fires that may occur in a drydocking facility or shipbuilding way among the industrial
equipment, structures and materials. The local firefighting instructions shall delineate the responsibilities between ship’s
force and the fire department in responding to fires in a drydocking facility external to the ship’s hull. Integrated training
of SF and F&ES firefighters shall be conducted to ensure familiarization and understanding of the firefighting policies,
equipment and responsibilities for each drydocked ship.
7.1.9.2 For ships drydocked in graving docks with flammable hull material, hulls subject to melting or combustible
external hull treatments, the fire hose stations specified in paragraph 7.1.9 shall be located at the coping level at the top of
the graving dock wall. If the size of the graving dock compared to the ship’s hull dimensions makes it impractical to direct
an effective water stream from the top of the dock wall, the fire hose stations shall be located on the dock floor with the
same coverage requirement by two separate fire hose stations as stated paragraph 7.1.9. Fire hose stations located on the
dock floor shall be located away from the combustible hull material so that they are still accessible in the event of a fire.
7.1.9.3 For ships drydocked in floating drydocks with flammable hull material, hulls subject to melting or combustible
external hull treatments, the fire hose stations specified in paragraph 7.1.9 shall be located at the top deck of the wingwall.
If the size of the floating drydock compared to the ship’s hull dimensions makes it impractical to direct an effective water
stream from the top deck of the wingwall, the fire hose stations shall be located on the pontoon deck with the same
coverage requirement by two separate fire hose stations as stated in paragraph 7.1.9. Fire hose stations located on the
pontoon deck shall be located away from the combustible hull material so that they are still accessible in the event of a
fire. In addition to the fire hose stations specified in paragraph 7.1.9 for hulls constructed of flammable materials, subject

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to melting or equipped with combustible external hull treatments, floating drydocks shall also be equipped with fire hose
stations so that any area of the pontoon deck and top deck of the wingwall can be reached with a 20-foot fog stream from a
minimum hose size of 1½ inches and a hose length no longer than 100 feet.
7.1.9.4 For ships drydocked on a marine railway or vertical lift with flammable hull material, hulls subject to melting or
combustible external hull treatments, the fire hose stations specified in paragraph 7.1.9 shall be located on or adjacent to
the marine railway cradle or vertical lift platform. The fire hose stations shall be located away from the combustible hull
material so that they are still accessible in the event of a fire.
7.1.9.5 For ships under construction at shipbuilding ways with flammable hull material, hulls subject to melting or
combustible external hull treatments, SUPSHIP shall specify by contract what stage of construction of ship sections that
the hose stations specified in paragraph 7.1.9 shall be provided, but in no case shall be later than the following. Once the
assembly of the hull from the keel to the main deck for a surface ship or pressure hull and ballast tank envelope for a
submarine is complete, the fire hose stations specified in paragraph 7.1.9 shall be provided. The fire hose stations shall be
located away from the combustible hull material so that they are still accessible in the event of a fire.
7.2 SUBMARINES.
7.2.1 General. For information on installed systems, see system technical manuals or reference (f) as follows:
a. Dry Chemical Potassium Bicarbonate (PKP) Extinguishers, refer to NSTM 555-33.1.
b. Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Extinguishers, refer to NSTM 555-33.2.
c. AFFF Fire Extinguishers, refer to NSTM 555-33.3.
d. Fire Hose Stations and Fireplugs, refer to NSTM 555-33.4.
e. Trim (Firemain) System, refer to NSTM 555-32.3.
f. Galley Fire Protection Systems, refer to NSTM 555-32.4.
g. AFFF Systems, SSN 21 Class, refer to NSTM 555-32.6.
h. Sprinkling System for Oxygen Chlorate Candle Lockers, refer to NSTM 555-32.10.
i. Sprinkler System for Pyrotechnic and Small Arms Locker, refer to NSTM 555-32.9.
7.2.2 Temporary Firemain and Water Supply.
7.2.2.1 In order to reduce the potential for chlorine induced corrosion effects, freshwater supply and adequate hose for
complete coverage shall be available as the primary source for use in all in-hull submarine space fires that cannot be
controlled by CO2 extinguishers until commencement of fast cruise. Hose lines for fighting fires in way of reactor
compartment shall be restricted to freshwater sources.
7.2.2.2 A temporary firemain shall be provided for all ships in dry-dock availabilities. The temporary firemain shall be
provided to bring water from a permanent shipyard water source to the ship for the topside hose station manifolds and
interior hose reels when installed. The system shall also provide a Fire Department Connection (FDC) for a responding
F&ES pumper to boost pressure and flow. The shipyard water supply and the F&ES water supply shall be able to operate
simultaneously. A backflow preventer acceptable to the installation’s water quality authority shall be installed in the
connection to the permanent shipyard water source. Permanently installed backflow prevention in the shipyard water
supply satisfies this requirement if the location of the backflow preventer is such that the only downstream service is a
single ship’s temporary fire main. A UL312 listed check valve shall be installed in the line to the FDC (internal FDC
clappers are not sufficient to satisfy the check valve requirement). Isolation valves shall be provided between the
permanent shipyard water source and the backflow preventer, and between the FDC and the check valve. The FDC
isolation valve shall be normally closed. In areas subject to freezing, approved automatic drip valves arranged to allow
drainage without causing water damage, shall be installed at the low-point in each isolatable section in the piping between
the FDC and check valve. See figure 7-1 for a typical system configuration.
7.2.2.3 The local F&ES providers shall be consulted to determine the type of fitting and threads they require for the FDC,
and to provide input on its pier location. The FDC shall at a minimum consist of two 2½ inch or one 4 inch or larger

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connections, and shall have signage posted stating “FDC” or “STANDPIPE FDC”, but must also state “DO NOT
OBSTRUCT”. A sign shall also state the maximum apparatus supply pressure required in paragraph 7.2.2.4 (e.g., “Do not
exceed 175 psi supply pressure”). Signage letters shall be at least 1 inch in height. The FDC shall be located not less than
18 inches or more than 48 inches above the level of adjoining grade (measured from grade to the center of the inlets).
7.2.2.4 The temporary firemain system piping shall be at least 4 inches in diameter and sized to supply two 1¾ inch hoses
each flowing 95 gpm at 60 psi dynamic at the nozzles; plus two internal hose reels flowing 18 gpm at 36 psi at the nozzles;
with the system only being supplied by the permanent shipyard water supply; and a total of 500 gpm, available at any
topside hose manifold, with a minimum residual topside hose station manifold pressure of 150 psi with F&ES pumping
apparatus connected at the FDC, with a maximum apparatus supply pressure of 175 psi.
NOTE: For the FDC test, a maximum apparatus supply pressure of 200 psi may be utilized, but would require use of
firemain components with a higher minimum allowable working pressure. See paragraph 7.2.2.8.
7.2.2.5 The permanent shipyard water supply to the firemain shall be capable of supplying two 1¾ inch hoses each
flowing 95 gpm at 60 psi dynamic at the nozzles plus two internal hose reels flowing 18 gpm at 36 psi at the nozzles
without assistance of the F&ES pumping apparatus.
7.2.2.6 The shipyard shall provide a means to isolate the permanent shipyard water supply to the ship upstream or
downstream of the backflow preventer. The isolation valve shall be located in an area that is easily and quickly accessible.
7.2.2.7 The temporary firemain shall be charged up to topside hose station manifolds at all times.
7.2.2.8 Aluminum piping or fire hose shall not be used for the temporary firemain. High pressure flexible piping rated for
a minimum allowable working pressure (MAWP) of 250 psi may be used for the temporary firemain provided it is not in
direct contact with the hull. All other temporary firemain components outside of the submarine hull shall be rated for a
MAWP of 175 psi. Temporary firemain components inside the submarine hull shall be rated for a MAWP of 250 psi.
NOTE: Where the maximum apparatus supply pressure referenced in paragraph 7.2.2.4 exceeds 175 psi, the MAWP of
temporary firemain components outside of the submarine hull must be increased accordingly.
7.2.2.9 Freeze protection shall be provided where necessary.
7.2.3 Temporary Topside Hose Station Manifolds.
7.2.3.1 Temporary topside hose manifolds shall be installed adjacent to each hatch or other personnel point of entry/exit
(e.g., patches) and supplied by the minimum 4 inch temporary firemain. If an access hatch or other entry point is to be
fouled, shut, or otherwise unusable, temporary hose manifolds shall be relocated to another point of entry/exit available for
personnel entry/egress. Each manifold shall have two 2½ inch outlets, each with a 2½ inch isolation valve and a
removable 2½ by 1½ by 1½ inch wye gate. The isolation valve shall be immediately prior to the wye gate. Both the 2½
inch isolation valve and the wye gates shall be unobstructed and shall be located not less than 24 inches or more than 36
inches above adjoining grade (measured from grade to the center of the outlet). The two wye gates are provided such that
one is left available (i.e., nothing pre-connected such as hoses, freeze protection, or interior hose reel supply) for use by
F&ES during casualties and drills to preclude or at least minimize the need for F&ES to stretch separate supply hoses to
the boat. F&ES has the option of connecting additional 1½ inch threaded attack hoses to the available wye gate; or isolate
one of the 2½ inch outlets, disconnect the wye gate, and attach a 2½ inch threaded attack hose (blitz line) or leader hose to
feed additional hoses down in the boat, all without interrupting the flow to the other wye gate, and without incurring
delays to deploy additional hose across the brow. At the preference of F&ES, one of the wye gates required above may
instead be permanently replaced with a 2½ inch hose valve to permit quicker deployment of larger diameter hose (valve
height and obstruction rules still apply). All 2½ and 1½ inch threads shall be NH for compatibility with responding F&ES
equipment. SRCAs shall verify that NH threads are compatible with local F&ES. Two spanner wrenches for each size
coupling shall be available at each manifold. A placard shall be installed at the hose manifold noting to open the valve
prior to operating the hose. See Figure 7-1 for a typical system configuration.
7.2.3.2 The water supply to the topside hose stations shall be provided by the temporary firemain and shall not be run
through the ship.
7.2.3.3 One 1¾ inch hose, MIL-H-24606, 1½ inch NH coupling threads, shall be pre-connected to a 1½ inch outlet at each
manifold, leaving another 1½ inch outlet available and accessible for connection or pre-connection of another 1¾ inch
hose (this connection is in addition to the free wye-gate for F&ES use required in 7.2.3.1). The hoses shall be of adequate

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length to reach all areas of the compartment for which they serve, but shall be limited to a maximum length of 200 feet to
assure an adequate response (For SSBN/SSGN-726 OHIO Class, an additional 50-foot length of 1¾ inch NH hose, not
connected, shall be pre-staged at each topside hose manifold to increase hose length if needed during a casualty response
on the 4th platform of the MC). A nozzle, MIL-N-24408, except that it shall have a 1½ inch NH (9 TPI) coupling, rated for
125 gpm at 100 psi, shall be pre-connected to the hose. Pre-connected hoses and nozzles shall be permanently marked,
“NH COUPLING THREADS. NOT COMPATIBLE WITH INTERIOR SHIP FIRE STATIONS.”
WARNING
Ship’s fire hoses and nozzles normally installed internal to the ship are not compatible with topside hose station
manifolds.
7.2.4 Temporary Internal Hose Reels. When the ships permanently installed firemain will be unavailable, temporary
internal hose reels shall be installed to provide a source of water for rapid response by ships force. See Tables 7-1 and 7-2
for recommended temporary hose reel locations on SSN-688 and SSBN/SSGN-726 class.
Hose Reel
Platform, Location Frame P/S/CL
Number
1 1st, Aft of Ladder 45 P
2 2nd, Pway to CPO Lounge 34 CL
3 3rd, AMR 400Hz Generator 48 P
4 UL, Port Fwd Reduction Gear 100 P
5 ML, Anti C Locker (removed) 80 CL
6 LL, PLO Bay at Workbench 101 S
Table 7-1. Temporary Hose Reel Connections for SSN-688 LOS ANGELES Class
Valve Connection Platform Frame P/S/CL
TD-353 1st 30 P
TD-256 2nd 30 P
TD-354 3rd 36 CL
TD-259 4th 36 CL
TD-272 1st 72 P
TD-270 2nd 72 P
TD-268 3rd 72 P
TD-266 4th 65 P
TD-278 UL 107 P
TD-362 ML 117 P
TD-279 LL 113 P
Table 7-2. Temporary Hose Reel Connections for SSBN/SSGN-726 OHIO Class
7.2.4.1 A minimum of one temporary hose reel shall be installed on each level in each compartment, to reach all areas of
that level. Hose reels shall be limited to a maximum length of 100 feet. Hose reel placement shall take into account fixed

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obstacles and capability to bring the hose reel to blind and dead end areas in the platform. See figure 7-1 for a typical
system configuration.
7.2.4.2 A quarter turn isolation valve shall be installed at the reel and normally closed. A placard shall be installed at the
reel noting to open the valve prior to operating the hose. Hose reels shall be charged up to the reel isolation valves at all
times.
7.2.4.3 Temporary hose reels shall utilize ¾ inch non-collapsible hose in accordance with reference (g). The hose shall
have Garden Hose Thread (GHT) with 11.5 threads per inch. Hose reel nozzles shall be Elkhart 30 gpm fixed gallonage,
100 psi nozzle, part number S/FS-GN-30, NSN 4210-01-490-1822, with ¾ inch GHT.
7.2.4.4 Some ships are provided with permanently installed ¾ inch hose reels (SSN-774 and SSN-21 Classes). Where
feasible, a temporary water supply may be provided to each hose reel, keeping it operational, and eliminating the need to
install temporary hose reels.
7.2.4.5 Temporary hose reels may be supplied by the temporary firemain supplying topside hose manifolds or a separate
freshwater source. The water supply to the temporary hose reels shall have an isolation capability outside the hull that is
accessible in the event of a fire interior to the hull. The isolation capability shall ensure that the failure of the interior hose
reels in a fire does not compromise the water supply to topside hose manifolds or other firefighting water sources. Quick
disconnects are not permitted in the supply to the temporary hose reels, unless the submarine is waterborne.
7.2.4.6 The SRCA shall provide training to the ship on the configuration and operation of the firefighting systems
contained in section 7.2.
7.2.5 Temporary Firemain, Hose Station, and Hose Reel Testing.
7.2.5.1 The following inspections and tests shall be performed annually.
a. All hoses shall be inspected per reference (i) prior to being hydrostatically tested.
b. Hoses for internal hose reels and topside hose stations shall be tested hydrostatically per the service testing
procedures for attack hose of reference (i). Hydrostatic test pressure shall not exceed the service test pressure
marked on the hose. Hose marking and test records shall be per reference (i). Hose not immediately placed in
service shall be drained and thoroughly dried. Stored hose shall be kept out of direct sunlight in a well-ventilated
location, and care shall be taken to prevent abrasion or damage.
c. Hose nozzles shall be inspected per reference (i).
d. Wye gates and hose valves shall be inspected per the requirements for fire hose appliances per reference (i).
7.2.5.2 Immediately prior to system installation, conduct a physical inspection of all hose, wye gates and nozzles per
reference (i). During the inspection, a check shall be made to determine if the service test of the hoses for internal hose
reels and topside hose stations is current and suitable for the expected length of installation (for installations exceeding 1
year, refer to 7.2.5.4.d). Inspect all other temporary firemain components for damage.
7.2.5.3 The following inspections and tests shall be performed immediately after temporary system installation. F&ES
personnel shall be informed of the testing and offered the opportunity to witness.
a. All temporary firefighting systems shall be inspected after installation to ensure minimum requirements of
reference (h) are fulfilled.
b. The installed temporary system shall be tested hydrostatically at not less than 50 psi in excess of the maximum
apparatus supply pressure identified in paragraph 7.2.2.4 for 2 hours (typically 175 psi + 50 psi = 225 psi test
pressure, but could be greater if the maximum apparatus supply pressure is higher). Hydrostatic test pressure
shall be measured at the system’s low elevation point. The isolation valve at each hose reel shall be open for this
test, however the reel nozzle shall remain closed and wired shut for the test duration. No leakage allowed.
c. A flow test shall be conducted at the most hydraulically remote nozzles of the topside hose stations and internal
hose reels. The test shall verify that the water supply provides adequate pressure to achieve the required flow at

ACN 3/A
the design pressure as cited in paragraph 7.2.2.5 with two topside hose stations and two hose reels flowing
simultaneously.
d. A flow test shall be conducted at the topside hose station that is most hydraulically remote from the FDC. The
test shall verify that the hose station is able to flow 500 gpm with a minimum residual hose station manifold
pressure of 150 psi with F&ES pumping apparatus connected at the FDC and providing the maximum apparatus
supply pressure as determined in paragraph 7.2.2.4. For this test, the topside isolation valves on the supply line(s)
to the interior hose reels shall be closed, and reopened after the test has concluded and the system has been
returned to normal operating status. Where multiple FDCs are installed, the test shall utilize the FDC and hose
station that provide the most hydraulically demanding scenario.
7.2.5.4 The following tests and inspections shall be performed on the temporary firefighting system periodically after
installation. Unless otherwise specified, the tests and inspections shall occur at least annually. F&ES personnel shall be
informed of the testing and offered the opportunity to witness.
a. Routine inspection, testing, and maintenance of the temporary firemain shall be in accordance with Chapters 6
and 13 of reference (h), except as modified in the following subsections. Table 6.1.1.2 and 13.1.1.2 of reference
(h) shall be used to determine the minimum required frequencies for inspection, testing, and maintenance of the
system and individual components.
b. Valves shall be operated through their full range of motion and returned to their normal position. Care shall be
taken during operation to prevent unintended discharge of water.
c. Hose nozzles, wye gates and hose valves shall be inspected per reference (i) on a quarterly basis (wye gates and
hose valves shall be inspected per the requirements for a fire hose appliance). For the quarterly inspections, only
the inspection steps that can be accomplished without disconnection of the nozzle, wye gate or hose valve are
required to be performed. The complete inspection per reference (i) shall be performed annually in conjunction
with 7.2.5.4.d.
d. In-service hose for internal hose reels and topside hose stations shall be replaced no later than 1 year from their
last hydrostatic test date. Replaced hose shall remain out of service until inspected and hydrostatically tested per
7.2.5.1.a and 7.2.5.1.b.
e. In-service temporary firemain hose not addressed by 7.2.5.4.d shall be visually inspected to determine continued
suitability for use at least monthly. An exterior visual physical inspection shall determine that the hose and
couplings have not been vandalized, are free of debris, and exhibit no evidence of mildew, rot, or damage by
chemicals, burns, cuts, solar exposure, abrasion, and vermin. The hose and any marks on the hose at the back of
the couplings or at external collars shall be observed for evidence of coupling slippage.
f. A hydrostatic test per 7.2.5.3.b shall be conducted.
g. A repeated flow test per 7.2.5.3.c is required to be conducted only when any of the circumstances in paragraphs
7.2.5.4.g.(1) through 7.2.5.4.g.(3) occur. A repeated flow test per 7.2.5.3.d is required to be conducted only when
any of the circumstances in paragraphs 7.2.5.4.g.(1) or 7.2.5.4.g.(2) occur.
(1) After any temporary firemain system modification, where the previously tested hydraulically most remote
stations are no longer the hydraulically most remote.
(2) After any temporary firemain system modification, where the available residual pressure at the most
hydraulically remote stations is reduced.
(3) After any shore side water supply system modification or impairment, where the available flow or pressure
at the most hydraulically remote pier outlet is reduced.
h. Where booster pump(s) are necessary to achieve the required pressures of paragraph 7.2.2.5 the pumps(s) shall be
run weekly long enough to inspect and verify that pumps operate properly.
7.2.6 Strategically Loaded SSBNs. A temporary firemain, topside hose manifolds, and internal Missile Compartment
(MC) hose reels shall be installed on strategically loaded SSBNs entering a normal refit or extended refit period, when the

ACN 3/A
ship’s trim system is not available for firefighting use, unless otherwise authorized by DIRSSP. The following are the
temporary system requirements.
7.2.6.1 Temporary Firemain. The temporary firemain shall be installed in accordance with paragraphs 7.2.2.2 through
7.2.2.9, to bring freshwater from a permanent shore water source to the ship for the topside hose station manifolds at each
personnel entry for the entire ship and interior hose reels in the MC.
7.2.6.2 Temporary Topside Hose Manifolds. Temporary topside hose manifolds shall be installed adjacent to each hatch
or other personnel entry/exit points (e.g., patches) and installed in accordance with paragraph 7.2.3. Installation of
temporary firefighting services must meet requirements for fouling of hatches contained in Chapter 10.
7.2.6.3 Temporary MC Hose Reels. Interior temporary hose reels shall be installed in the MC in accordance with the
following subsections.
7.2.6.3.1 One interior MC temporary hose reel shall be installed on each end of each level of the MC (8 total), to reach all
areas of that level. MC temporary hose reels shall be limited to a maximum length of 100 feet and placed as close to
ladders as feasible to meet the coverage requirement. MC temporary hose reel placement shall take into account fixed
obstacles.
7.2.6.3.2 MC temporary hose reels shall be installed in accordance with paragraphs 7.2.4.2, 7.2.4.3 and 7.2.4.5.
7.2.6.4 Temporary firemain, topside hose manifolds, and internal Missile Compartment (MC) hose reels shall be
inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with paragraphs 7.2.5.1 through 7.2.5.4.
7.2.6.5 Training shall be provided to SF on the location and operation of the MC temporary hose reels and topside hose
manifolds, including isolation valve locations.
7.3 SURFACE SHIPS.
7.3.1 General. For information on installed systems, see system technical manuals or reference (j) as follows:
a. AFFF Extinguishers, refer to NSTM 555-4.3.
b. CO2 Fire Extinguishers, refer to NSTM 555-4.2.
c. Dry Chemical PKP Extinguishers, refer to NSTM 555-4.1.
d. Halon 1301, refer to NSTM 555-2.9.
e. Heptafluoropropane (HFP), refer to NSTM 555-2.9.
f. Fire Hose Stations, refer to NSTM 555-4.5.
g. Freshwater Hose Reel System, refer to NSTM 555-4.12.
h. Fire Main Systems, refer to NSTM 555-2.3.
i. AFFF Systems, refer to NSTM 555-2.4.
j. AFFF Sprinkler Systems, refer to NSTM 555-2.6.
k. Installed CO2 Systems, refer to NSTM 555-2.8.
l. Water Mist Systems, refer to NSTM 555-2.13.
m. Miscellaneous Seawater Systems, refer to NSTM 555-2.11.
7.3.2 Water Supply Requirements for Firefighting. Seawater for firefighting in both drydock and wet berth shall be
provided to the ship through sufficient 2½ inch, 3½ inch, or 4-inch size hoses to efficiently carry capacities specified by
Table 7-3. These requirements shall be in addition to saltwater required for flushing and cooling, and shall be available
upon demand within 3 minutes of discovering the fire.

ACN 3/A
7.3.2.1 The number of hoses connected to the ship to meet fire protection needs shall be determined by dividing the water
supply capacity from Table 7-3, plus cooling and flushing loads by the hose line capacity from Table 7-4 for length of
hose to be used.
Example equation for DDG-51 Class with 200-foot hose:
Parameters for the example:
Table 7-3 = 1000 gpm for DDG
Reference (k) Table C-3: 250 gpm w/ 2½- inch hose
Table 7-4 = 200 gpm for 200-foot hose
Table 7-3 + Table C-3 (reference (k)) = # of hoses required

Table 7-4
(1000 gpm + 250 gpm) = 6.25 hoses

200 gpm
Requires seven (rounded up to next whole number) 2½ inch hoses to supply firefighting and cooling load.
7.3.2.2 Maximum use of the ship’s installed shore firemain connections shall be made to avoid supply through ship’s fire
plugs, and corresponding elimination of fire plug service. Where shore supply must be connected to ship’s fire plugs a tri-
gate hose connection similar to that furnished with the ship’s portable fire pumps can be used to permit fire plugs to
remain in service while also acting as shore firemain connections. The number of hoses connected to the ship from pier
shall not be reduced when ship’s pumps become operational unless the installed pumping capacity of the ship can meet the
entire fire protection water supply requirement of Table 7-3.
Ship Class Ship Type Flow (gpm) 1/
T-AG Miscellaneous Auxiliary Ship 1500
T-AGM Missile Range Instrumentation Ship 1500
T-AGOR Oceanographic Research Ship 500
T-AGS Surveying Ship 1000
T-AH Hospital Ship 1000
T-AK Cargo Ship 1500
T-AKR Vehicle Cargo Ship 1500
T-AO Oiler 1500
T-AOE Fast Combat Support Ship 1500
T-ARC Cable Repair and Laying Ship 1000
T-ARS Salvage Ship 500
T-AS Submarine Tender 1500
T-ATF Ocean Tug Fleet 500
CVN Aircraft Carrier 3000
CG Guided Missile Cruiser 1000
DDG Guided Missile Destroyer 1000
FFG Guided Missile Frigate 1000
LCC Amphibious Command Ship 1000
LCS Littoral Combat Ship 1000

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LHA2/ Amphibious Assault Ship 2500

LHD2/ Amphibious Assault Ship 2500
LPD3/ Amphibious Transport Dock 1500
LSD3/ Landing Ship Dock 2000
YRB Repair and Berthing Barge 500
YRBM Repair, Berthing and Messing Barge 500
YRBL Repair, Berthing and Messing Barge (large) 500
MCM Mine Counter Measures Ship 750
PC Patrol Coastal 500
NOTES:
1/
All flows are from the pier or drydock outlet and are available at adequate residual pressures from those systems in
compliance with present design criteria for drydocks and piers as reflected in references (k) through (o).
2/
Includes supply to operate two hangar sprinkler groups and two 2½ inch hose lines.
3/
Includes supply to operate one sprinkler group and two 2½ inch hoses.
Table 7-3. Fire Protection Water Supply Requirements
SIZE (IN.) LENGTH (100FT) LENGTH (150FT) LENGTH (200FT) LENGTH (250FT)
2½ 300 225 200 175

3½ 750 600 500 450
4 1000 825 700 650
NOTES:
1/
Based on 20 psi total friction loss.
Table 7-4. Hose Capacity (gpm) 1/.

7.3.2.3 Work shall be planned and executed in such a manner that permanent firefighting systems will be out of service
for the minimum amount of time.
7.3.2.4 Preference shall be placed on utilizing a ship’s permanent firemain piping system with associated fire plug
coverage and installed sprinkling systems rather than a shipyard furnished temporary firemain.
7.3.2.5 Firemain gages provided and utilized during overhaul shall be calibrated and in proper working order.
7.3.2.6 Where temporary firemains are necessary, they shall be equipped with a minimum of two isolation valves between
shore supply feeders. Additional isolation valves shall be placed in the remainder of the firemain loop so that the
maximum distance between any two adjoining valves does not exceed 200 feet. Pressure gages shall be installed in
reasonable strategic locations along the temporary main to allow personnel to clearly read gage-face during temporary
system operation.
7.3.2.7 Where fire hose coverage cannot be provided by using the ship’s installed fire plugs supplied from the ship’s
permanent firemain or a temporary firemain piping system, hose manifolds shall be located on the weather deck hangar
deck or on any lower deck where flooding due to a ruptured hose could be tolerated. Water supply to hose valve
manifolds shall be via jumper hose lines sized to meet performance requirements, from pier hose outlets. Hose valve
manifolds shall be provided in sufficient numbers such that all parts of the ship, including the interior of temporary
structures, can be reached by at least two 100-foot hoses.
7.3.2.8 Where coverage of the lowermost compartments (where flooding cannot be tolerated) is impossible with 100 feet
of hose from a hose manifold, unpressurized 2½ inch or 3 inch (with 2½ inch couplings) drop lines, supplied from a valved
connection to the temporary firemain in close proximity to the closest charged hose manifold (but not via one of the
required manifold hose outlets), with 2½ inch by 1½ inch by 1½ inch wye-gate fittings shall be rigged to lower levels. 1¾

ACN 3/A
inch hoses, MIL-H-24606 with 1½ inch couplings, and 1½ inch nozzles, MIL-N-24408, rated for 125 gpm at 100 psi, shall
be pre-connected and faked on racks nearby. Activating instructions and location of the control valves shall be posted by
the manifold and the drop line wye-gates.
7.3.2.9 Manifolds shall have at least three valved outlets of 1½ inch size. One hundred foot lengths of 1¾ inch hose,
MIL-H-24606 with 1½ inch couplings, shall be pre-connected to two of the manifold outlets and the hose faked on
portable racks. Hoses shall be equipped with 1½ inch nozzles, MIL-N-24408, rated for 125 gpm at 100 psi. Two spanner
wrenches for each size coupling shall be available at each manifold. A placard shall be installed at the hose manifold
noting to open the valve prior to operating the hose.
7.3.2.10 Where weather and flow conditions are such that freezing may occur, a recirculation capability shall be provided
or freeze protection shall be installed at the skin of the ship/hull. Freeze protection equipment shall be functional when
temperatures drop below 40 degrees F.
7.3.2.11 Where a permanent or temporary firemain piping system is used aboard ship, water shall be discharged from at
least one fire hose immediately after installation at a location hydraulically most remote from the water supply connection
to verify valves are not secured or obstructions in the piping system are not present.
7.3.2.12 Water flow rates for firefighting systems at piers and drydocks serving ships in overhaul shall be tested annually
by a competent authority to verify that water supplies specified are available.
7.3.2.13 Temporary firemain installations shall be provided with Fire Department Connections (FDC) for a responding
F&ES pumper to boost system pressure and flow. FDCs shall be provided as needed so that all portions of the temporary
firemain system are served, and so that the performance requirements can be met. The temporary firemain and FDC(s)
shall comply with the following requirements:
a. The shipyard water supply and the F&ES water supply shall be able to operate simultaneously. Backflow
prevention capability (check valve or backflow preventer) suitable to the local water quality authority shall exist
in the shoreside water supply to each pier’s outlet(s).
b. A UL312 listed check valve shall be installed in the line to the FDC. A normally closed isolation valve shall be
installed between the FDC and the check valve. In areas subject to freezing, approved automatic drip valves
arranged to allow drainage without causing water damage, shall be installed at the low-point in each isolatable
section in the piping between the FDC and check valve.
c. The local F&ES providers shall be consulted to determine the type of fitting and threads they require for the
FDC(s), and to provide input on its pier location. The FDC shall at a minimum consist of two 2½ inch or one 4
inch or larger connections, and shall have signage posted stating “FDC” or “STANDPIPE FDC”, but must also
state “DO NOT OBSTRUCT” in letters at least 1 inch in height. The FDC shall be located not less than 18
inches or more than 48 inches above the level of adjoining grade (measured from grade to the center of the inlets).
d. Where multiple FDCs are required, a diagram shall be provided at each FDC that indicates which portions of the
temporary firemain are served.
7.3.2.14 Conduct a test of both shore side supply and shipboard distribution of firefighting water through the temporary
firemain system. Paragraphs 7.3.2.14.a and 7.3.2.14.b shall be tested concurrent with acceptance criteria met
simultaneously.
a. Discharge firefighting water from 4 each one and three-quarters inch hoses from the two most hydraulically
remote temporary fire hose manifold stations or drop line wye-gates on the ship that share the same distribution
hose from a single pier outlet (four nozzles total). Discharge firefighting water from each hose simultaneously for
60 seconds prior to measurement start to obtain steady state flow conditions. Once at steady state, test
firefighting water flow for a minimum of 60 seconds. Measure and record flowrate and residual nozzle pressure
at each nozzle by in-line flow meter (or acceptable equivalent) and calibrated nozzle pressure gage. The elevation
of each nozzle tested shall be equal to or greater than the highest elevation compartment served by that hose.
Temporary pumps shall automatically start. Maintain flow simultaneously at each nozzle for a minimum of 60
seconds. Pressure and flowrate at each nozzle shall be a minimum of 60 psi and 95 gpm during the test.

ACN 3/A
(1) When nozzle(s) cannot be tested at the same or higher elevation as the highest compartment served by that
hose, add 4.5 PSI and 3 GPM to residual nozzle pressure/flow acceptance criteria per 10 foot drop in
elevation from the station(s).
b. While performing the discharge test required in paragraph 7.3.2.14.a, utilize a hose valve at the pier outlet to
throttle the outlet so that the residual pressure (measured downstream of the throttling valve) is no more than the
residual pressure recorded in the test required by paragraph 7.3.2.15. Measure and record the residual pressure at
the shore side supply outlet providing water to those temporary fire hose stations tested in paragraph 7.3.2.14.a,
while simultaneously discharging the 4 nozzles tested.
c. The test procedure outlined in paragraph 7.3.2.14.a shall be repeated with the following modifications. F&ES
pumping apparatus shall be connected at the hydraulically most demanding FDC that serves the hose stations
being tested. The pressure and flowrate at each nozzle shall be a minimum of 100 psi and 110 gpm during the
test, supplemented with pressure/flow modifications per 7.3.2.14.a(1) as required, with a maximum apparatus
supply pressure of 200 psi.
d. A visual inspection shall be conducted of the charged temporary firemain system during the tests of 7.3.2.14.a
and 7.3.2.14.c to ensure that there are no leaks. This inspection does not require the charging of any hose lines
with pre-connected nozzles, or the normally uncharged feeder lines supplying drop-line wye gates, other than
those that may be required to perform the discharge test, so care shall be exercised to ensure that the couplings in
these uncharged lines are sufficiently tightened.
e. Accomplish a retest in accordance with paragraphs 7.3.2.14.a and 7.3.2.14.b annually or when any of the
circumstances in paragraphs 7.3.2.14.e.(1) through 7.3.2.14.e.(3) occur. Accomplish a retest of paragraph
7.3.2.14.c when any of the circumstances in paragraphs 7.3.2.14.e.(1) or 7.3.2.14.e.(2) occur.
(1) After any temporary firemain system modification, where the previously tested hydraulically most remote
stations are no longer the hydraulically most remote.
(2) After any temporary firemain system modification, where the available residual pressure at the most
hydraulically remote stations is reduced.
(3) After any shore side water supply system modification or impairment, where the available flow or pressure
at the most hydraulically remote pier outlet is reduced.
7.3.2.15 Validate shore side water supply by conducting a flow and pressure test prior to availability start date, after any
shore side water supply system modification or impairment that could adversely impact the vessel, each time the vessel
shifts berths, and annually thereafter should the availability extend beyond one year. Measure and record flow and
residual pressure using a calibrated in-line flow meter (or acceptable equivalent) and calibrated pressure gage at the most
hydraulically remote shore side firemain supply outlet that is supplying the ship. Verify minimum water supply specified
in Table 7-3 plus flushing and cooling loads is available at the most hydraulically remote shore side firemain supply
outlet(s) and with a minimum of 150 PSI residual pressure at all flowing outlets.
7.3.2.16 The following inspections and tests shall be performed on the hoses and nozzles annually.
a. All hoses shall be inspected per reference (i) prior to being hydrostatically tested.
b. Hoses shall be tested hydrostatically per the service testing procedures for attack hose of reference (i).
Hydrostatic test pressure shall not exceed the service test pressure marked on the hose. Hose marking and test
records shall be per reference (i).
c. Hose nozzles shall be inspected per reference (i).
7.3.2.17 Where booster pump(s) are necessary to achieve the required pressures of paragraph 7.3.2.14.a, the pumps(s)
shall be run weekly long enough to inspect and verify that pumps operate properly.
7.3.2.18 Temporary structures constructed or staged onboard for the purpose of material stowage shall have sprinkling
systems installed when required by chapter 5.

ACN 3/A
a. Sprinklers shall be listed in accordance with reference (p), and shall be open pendent, upright or sidewall type,
whichever is most suitable for the shape and configuration of the protected area. Pendent and upright sprinklers
shall have 180-degree full cone spray patterns. The sprinkling density shall be 0.2 gpm/sqft and the sprinklers
shall be arranged to cover the entire level of the temporary structure and all contents. The manufacturer’s
instructions for spacing of sprinklers, distance from the overhead of the protected area, and distance from stowed
material or obstructions shall be followed. Placards shall be placed on the interior of the protected area noting the
height that material cannot be stacked above.
b. The system shall be a dry deluge type, manually operated by a quarter-turn sprinkler valve located outside and
near the access to the structure. The system shall be continuously charged up to the sprinkler valve, from the
ship’s permanent or temporary firemain, using temporary piping or a non-collapsible hose suitable for the
pressure and flow. Piping downstream of the sprinkler valve shall be metal, except that aluminum is not
permitted. A placard shall be located at the sprinkler valve identifying the protected area and providing
instructions on operating the sprinkler valve. The water supply shall be provided with freeze protection when
necessary.
c. In some cases, extended coverage sidewall sprinklers may be the most efficient way to provide coverage by
installing a single line of sprinklers along one edge of the protected area, near the overhead, directed to spray into
the protected area. Most sidewall sprinklers are limited to a range of 16 to 24 feet of spray in one direction and
require that storage and floor-mounted obstructions be located at least 18 to 36 inches below the sprinkler
deflector throughout the protected space. In other cases, pendent style sprinklers may be more suitable. Pendent
sprinklers generally allow greater stacking heights of material.
d. Automatic sprinklers, with the heat responsive and activating elements removed, may be substituted for open
(deluge) sprinklers.
7.3.2.19 Temporary structures constructed or staged onboard not for the purpose of material stowage, shall have
sprinkling systems installed when required by chapter 5. Sprinklers shall be listed in accordance with reference (p). The
sprinkling density shall be 0.1 gpm/sqft and the sprinklers shall be arranged to cover the entire level of the temporary
structure and all contents. The system shall be a wet automatic type. The system shall be continuously charged up to the
sprinkler, from the ship’s permanent or temporary firemain. A placard shall be located at the sprinkler valve identifying
the protected area and providing instructions on operating the sprinkler valve. The water supply shall be provided with
freeze protection when necessary. Operation of the sprinkler system shall sound an audible alarm outside the structure. A
smoke detection system shall be installed inside the structure in accordance with reference (q). The system hardware shall
be in accordance with references (r) and (s). Audible alarms shall be provided both inside and outside the structure.
Portable AFFF and CO2 extinguishers shall be provided interior to the structure near the access.
7.3.2.20 Per reference (t), fresh water supply and hose coverage shall be available during shipyard maintenance in
case a reactor compartment fire cannot be controlled by CO 2 extinguishers. Hose lines for fighting fires in way of
reactor compartment shall be restricted to freshwater sources.
7.3.2.20.1 For firefighting systems installed solely to meet requirements of this section:
a. Design and installation shall be per sections 7.3.2.5, 7.3.2.6, and 7.3.2.9 through 7.3.2.12.
b. The system shall be capable of supplying the two most hydraulically remote 1¾ inch hoses, each flowing 95 gpm
at 60 psi dynamic at the nozzles.
c. Hose valve manifolds shall be installed adjacent to each reactor compartment access door such that all parts of the
reactor compartment can be reached by at least two 100-foot hoses.
d. The temporary firemain shall be charged up to the hose station manifolds at all times with gauges installed for
verification.
e. Performance testing shall be per 7.3.2.14.a, 7.3.2.14.b and 7.3.2.14.d, with the exception that only 2 hoses shall
be required to be tested simultaneously.
f. Hose and nozzle maintenance shall be per 7.3.2.16.

ACN 3/A
g. Where booster pump(s) are necessary to achieve the required pressures of paragraph 7.3.2.20.b, the pumps(s)
shall be run weekly long enough to inspect and verify that pumps operate properly.
Figure 7-1. Shipyard/F&ES Water Supply System Diagram.

ACN 3/A
Chapter 8
ALARMS AND COMMUNICATIONS
References
Shipyard Employment
(d) S9086-CN-STM-020, Navy Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 079, Volume 2, Practical Damage Control
Introduction
In accordance with reference (a), each SRCA is required to maintain functional alarms and communications for use in
shipboard emergencies. The requirements of this chapter were developed from existing requirements in references (b) and
(c) with inherent flexibilities incorporated, and apply to all SRCAs (except new construction shipyards) and cover all Navy
ships – submarines, surface ships, and aircraft carriers.
Due to the industrial work being performed during a maintenance availability, there may be periods of time during which
the ship’s permanent fire reporting and announcing systems are disabled. The inherent risk for personal safety increases
during this time and it is imperative for a temporary means of reporting and announcing a casualty to be provided for
shipboard casualties. The capability for SF, SRCA, and F&ES to communicate on portable radios has been incorporated
into section 8.7. These radios are needed to promote integration and coordination between the three entities to promote an
effective response to a major shipboard casualty.
This chapter provides information for Damage Control Central (DCC) (section 8.3 for submarines and 8.4 for surface
ships) guidelines. This includes the necessary information to be staged at the cognizant DCC for use in casualty response.
These required items are vital to ensure a quick, integrated, and effective response between the ship, SRCA, and F&ES
responders during a major shipboard casualty. The FSC has been empowered with the authority to mitigate the risks
associated with the placement of the respective DCC and the required information to be staged at each DCC.
Flexibilities have been incorporated into these requirements to allow each SRCA to adapt their implementation of the
requirements to a given situation. For instance, the allowance is provided in paragraph 8.1.5 for two ships to share a
means of reporting if they are drydocked side by side and this shared means is accessible between the two ships.
8.1 SHIPBOARD FIRE REPORTING SYSTEM. To the extent practicable, the ship’s permanent shipboard casualty
reporting system shall be maintained operational throughout the period of the availability. The SRCA shall provide a
temporary shipboard casualty reporting system to take the place of non-operational permanent components subject to
section 8.1.1 and 8.1.2.
8.1.1 Fire Reporting Devices. Fire reporting devices places shipboard shall be a fire alarm pull box, a direct line
telephone, or a device combining both a pull box and direct line telephone. An adequate number of fire reporting devices,
properly marked and designated with indicator lights, shall be installed to expedite the rapid reporting of fires. Fire
reporting devices must be located in each compartment (submarine)/fire zone (surface ship). For submarines only, these
fire reporting devices shall not be more than 50 feet from any point in the compartment and a topside/outside reporting
device shall be installed along the path of travel within ten feet of each hatch. For surface ships only, fire reporting
devices shall be installed in each fire zone at least every 100 feet of ship’s length on decks and platforms that transverse
greater than 100 feet of ship’s length, placed on alternating sides of the deck/platform and located at a junction with
athwart ship passageways where practical. For the ship’s superstructure, a reporting device shall be located on each level
and in each fire zone, such that a reporting device is within 100 feet of any part of the level. For decks/platforms below
the Damage Control or Main Deck less than 100 feet of ship’s length, reporting devices shall be located in each space,
within ten feet of all exit ladders. A reporting device shall be placed within ten feet of the exit to each tank open for
maintenance.

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8.1.2 Annunciator Panel. The temporary reporting system shall include an annunciator panel installed at the CASCON
Station and/or DCC/Quarterdeck (as designated by ship’s representative) capable of distinctively indicating which fire
reporting device has been activated. If a device circuit does not produce a coded audible alarm, the CASCON Station
and/or DCC/Quarterdeck shall have the capability to sound a follow-up alarm or announcement to designate the reported
fire area. Working personnel shall be kept informed as to box locations and actions to be taken when the alarm is sounded.
8.1.3 Reporting to Emergency Dispatch Center. The means of reporting fire incidents to the emergency dispatch center,
installation fire department, and/or contractor fire department shall consist of the following:
8.1.3.1 Fire alarm system equipment that, upon activation of a fire alarm pull box, sends a signal via a direct electrically
supervised circuit to a central station service, a remote station service, a cognizant fire department, a shipyard fire
department, or a continuously manned location where trained operators can take immediate action to transmit an alarm to
the fire department. The furnished fire alarm systems shall be reliable and provide facilities at the centrally manned
location for making daily tests of the system.
8.1.3.2 A telephone that directly connects to the emergency dispatch center (e.g., “hotline” or “redphone”) or a touchtone
telephone equipped with a sign that contains the emergency number/extension for the emergency dispatch center to
provide verbal verification of alarms and augmenting information.
8.1.4 Defective or Inoperative Alarms. Defective or inoperative alarms shall be repaired or replaced immediately. No hot
work shall be performed in affected areas without operational fire reporting systems, unless a mitigation plan is approved
by the FSC. The FSC will control mitigation of resuming all other work items.
8.1.5 Fire Reporting in Drydock. When a ship is in drydock, a means of reporting a fire shall be placed on the drydock
floor so that personnel working under the ship can quickly report. Fire reporting devices shall be located at each exit from
the drydock floor, at each fire hose station serving the drydock, and such that the horizontal distance between fire reporting
devices shall not exceed 200 feet along the drydock wall, or 100 feet from either end. Fire reporting device layout shall
not require travel underneath the ship. If two ships are drydocked side by side, they may share the means of reporting if
accessible between the two ships.
8.2 CASUALTY GENERAL ANNOUNCING SYSTEM. To the extent practicable, the ship’s permanent shipboard
general announcing system shall be maintained operational throughout the period of the availability. If the ship’s
permanent shipboard general announcing system cannot be maintained fully operational, the SRCA shall provide
temporary general announcing components or an entire system to ensure an equivalent audibility within ship as that of the
ship's permanent shipboard system is maintained.
8.2.1 Temporary System. A temporary system shall be installed which can be heard in spaces that are not normally
manned and a general announcing system cannot be heard such as occupied tanks and voids, including tanks entered
through hull cut access when in drydock. Watch-standers may serve as an alternative communication system to these
areas, provided that all personnel can be alerted. In addition, a means shall be provided to transmit general announcements
to topside areas of the ship as well as drydock basin areas.
8.2.2 Testing of Systems. The ship’s permanent and temporary installed announcing system shall be tested at least once
daily. When audible alarms cannot provide effective notification, an alternative method shall be employed as approved by
the FSC with notification to the local safety office and emergency dispatch center.
8.2.3 Brief Outages. Brief outages, limited to four hours or less, of ship’s operational general announcing systems for
emergent mandatory maintenance, or to allow transfer to/from the temporary system, may be allowed based on approval
by the FSC and concurrence from the ship’s CO. A mitigation plan shall be in place to ensure all shipboard personnel can
be alerted in the case of an emergency.
8.2.4 Hot Work. No hot work shall be performed without an operational general announcing system.
8.2.5 Announcing on Barges and Attached Structures. Any facility attached to the ship, enclosed structures (e.g., offices)
placed inside or on the ship, and all crew berthing barges shall be connected to the ship general announcing system or have
a direct-dial phone connecting the ship and a continuously manned watch station. Industrial facility watches will be
continuously manned when the facility is occupied.

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8.3 DAMAGE CONTROL CENTRAL/CASCON STATION, SUBMARINES.

8.3.1 Location of CASCON Station. A CASCON Station shall be located aboard or near and in sight of the ship, or at the
SF Topside Watch Station. The CASCON Station location shall be approved by the FSC and may serve more than one
ship provided individual ship’s information is clearly identified.
8.3.2 Fire Detection System Alarm Panel. If an automatic fire detection system required per chapter 6, is installed then
the associated detection system alarm panel shall be co-located at the CASCON Station.
8.3.3 Required Items at CASCON Station. The following items shall be located at DCC and the CASCON Station to
assist with fire notification and response:
a. A fire bill and elsewhere on the ship as needed, which describes how to turn in an alarm and actions to be taken
by SRCA personnel in case of fire.
b. Telephones for communicating to the shore and internally within the ship. Emergency dispatch center and F&ES
Department response numbers shall be posted with telephone.
c. Procedures for notifying employees and fire response organizations of a fire emergency and/or unsafe condition.
d. Fire zone boundary status.
e. Simplified ship information (supplied by SRCA) showing: compartments, access status, and temporary service
system configuration (including isolations). These diagrams shall include the status of hull openings and
temporary (internal and external) access cuts and their plan for closure to prevent a “chimney effect” in the event
of a fire, and fire/flooding protections status and pumping facilities.
(1) Compartments/spaces and access status.
(2) Emergency systems installed by the SRCA for communications, lighting, and alarms, including location of
operating switches.
(3) Temporary service system configuration of major service lines, including isolations.
(4) The status of hull openings and temporary (internal and external) access cuts and their plan for closure to
prevent a “chimney effect” in the event of a fire, fire/flooding protection status, and pumping facilities.
f. Locator diagrams for the ship temporary flooding control equipment.
g. Diagrams documenting any departure from the ship’s normal de-watering systems line-up, which includes
temporary de-watering hose routes.
h. Updated list of significant shipboard fire hazards.
i. A current file of SRCA safety directives and casualty control procedures.
j. Temporary fire reporting system annunciator panel and alarm transmission equipment described in paragraphs
8.1.2 and 8.1.3.1.
8.4 DAMAGE CONTROL CENTRAL/QUARTERDECK, SURFACE SHIPS.
8.4.1 Damage Control Policies and Procedures. Ship’s damage control policies and procedures shall be per the
requirements of reference (d). The central casualty control station (normally the ship’s DCC) shall be used for both fire
protection and response purposes. The ship’s DCC shall also function, at least initially, as a command post for directing
firefighting operations of both military and civilian personnel, assuming it is not rendered untenable due to the fire.
8.4.2 Alternate DCC. For all ships not possessing an operational DCC, a suitable equivalent shall be provided.
8.4.3 DCC Located Off Ship. If DCC is not relocated to another space within the ship, then it may be established off the
ship within close proximity to the ship.

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8.4.4 Receiving and Escorting F&ES Officers. The Ship’s Quarterdeck will serve as the central location for receiving and
escorting F&ES officers to DCC or other shipboard command post location.
8.4.5 Required Items at DCC/Quarterdeck. The following items shall be located at DCC and the Quarterdeck to assist
with fire notification and response:
a. Telephones for communicating to the shore and internally within the ship. Emergency dispatch center and F&ES
Department response numbers shall be posted with telephone.
b. A fire bill, which describes how to turn in an alarm and actions to be taken by SRCA personnel in case of fire.
Additional fire bills shall be located elsewhere on the ship as needed.
c. Procedures for notifying employees and fire response organizations of a fire emergency and/or unsafe condition.
d. The ship’s damage control books and plates (DCC only).
e. Fire zone boundary status.
f. Simplified ship information (supplied by SRCA) showing: compartments, access status, and temporary service
system configuration (including isolations). These diagrams shall include the status of hull openings and
temporary (internal and external) access cuts and their plan for closure to prevent a “chimney effect” in the event
of a fire, and fire/flooding protections status and pumping facilities.
g. Locator diagrams for the ship temporary flooding control equipment.
h. Diagrams documenting any departure from the ship’s normal de-watering systems line-up, which includes
temporary de-watering hose routes.
i. Updated list of significant shipboard fire hazards.
j. A current file of SRCA safety directives and casualty control procedures.
k. Temporary fire reporting system annunciator panel and alarm transmission equipment described in paragraphs
8.1.2 and 8.1.3.1 (when installed).
8.5 STOP HOT WORK ALARM SYSTEM.
8.5.1 Requirements. An alarm system shall be provided to instruct personnel to stop all hot work. The fire alarm circuit
may be utilized for this purpose. However, the hot work alarm shall produce a clear signal distinct from the fire alarm
signal. The hot work alarm shall be actuated from the central CASCON Station and/or DCC/Quarterdeck.
8.5.2 Installed Alarm and Announcing System. The ship’s installed alarm and announcing systems, if operational, may be
used for stop hot work alarm purposes. When so used, it may not be possible to achieve separate fire, stop hot work, and
evacuate ship alarms. In these situations, the ship’s announcing system shall be used to announce the nature of the
emergency in conjunction with the alarm actuation.
8.6 EVACUATE SHIP ALARM SYSTEM. Exceptions to the following are provided in paragraph 8.2.
8.6.1 Requirements. An audible and visible system shall be provided to warn personnel to evacuate the ship. The audible
phase shall consist of a klaxon horn, siren, or other device and shall be clearly distinct from the fire and stop hot work
alarms. Sounding of the evacuation alarm shall be accompanied by the flashing of lights on all alarm box stations. Both
the audible and visible signal shall be actuated from the central CASCON Station and/or DCC/Quarterdeck.
8.6.2 Installed Alarm and Announcing System. The ship’s installed alarm and announcing systems, if operational, may be
used for evacuate ship alarm purposes. When so used, it may not be possible to achieve separate fire, stop hot work, and
evacuate ship alarms. In these situations, the ships announcing system shall be used to announce the nature of the
emergency in conjunction with the alarm actuation.

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8.7 PORTABLE RADIOS. For every vessel undergoing maintenance in availability, NSA shall ensure SF, SRCA, and
responding F&ES agencies have the necessary quantity of radios with appropriately programmed channels/frequencies to
enable implementation of the FRP Interoperable Radio Communication Plan (IRCP) required by Section 3.2.22. Radios
and associated frequencies intended to satisfy the FRP IRCP requirement of 3.2.22 shall be operationally tested daily and
exercised during regularly scheduled fire drills.

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Chapter 9
LIGHTING
References
(a) NAVSEA OP 4, Ammunition and Explosives Safety Afloat

Introduction
This chapter provides the requirements for temporary lighting systems to ensure normal and emergency lighting in the event
the ship’s permanent lighting systems are not operational during an industrial availability. This chapter applies to all SRCAs
and covers all Navy ships – submarines, surface ships, and aircraft carriers.
There are also requirements to prevent temporary lighting systems from igniting or contributing to a fire. It is important to
consider the scope of the work being performed, condition of the space, and duration for which the ship’s permanent system
will not be operational when implementing these requirements. The FSC has the authority to assess and mitigate these risks
appropriately.
9.1 PERMANENT LIGHTING REQUIREMENTS. To the extent practicable, the ship’s permanent and emergency lighting
systems shall be maintained throughout the period of the availability. When the ship’s lighting systems are not operational,
the SRCA shall provide two sources of lighting to all spaces normally having two sources. The lighting may be the ship’s
permanent and emergency lighting systems or a combination of temporary and ship’s permanent lighting, provided that
separate power sources are utilized for each system. The removal of lighting from a space or compartment that could impede
damage control efforts, personnel egress, and/or casualty responder access shall require approval by the FSC.
9.2 TEMPORARY LIGHTING REQUIREMENTS. When the ship’s lighting systems are not operational due to
maintenance and repair and/or when additional illumination is required for enhanced working conditions, personnel egress,
and/or casualty responder access, the SRCA shall install temporary lighting throughout the ship to provide illumination.
9.2.1 Lighting Guards. Temporary lighting shall be equipped with guards to prevent accidental contact with the bulb. When
the construction of the reflector is such that the bulb is deeply recessed, guards may not be required. Missing bulbs shall be
immediately replaced to minimize potential inadvertent contact with light socket.
9.2.2 Electric Cords. Temporary lights shall be equipped with heavy duty electric cords with connections and insulation
maintained in safe condition. Temporary lights shall not be suspended by their electric cords unless cords and lights are
designed for this means of suspension. Splices which have insulation with a capacity that exceeds that of the original
insulation of the cord are permitted, except in magazine and ammunition handling spaces as prohibited by reference (a).
9.2.3 Exposed Non-current-carrying Metal Parts. Exposed non-current-carrying metal parts of temporary lights shall be
grounded either through a third wire in the cable containing the circuit conductors or through a separate wire which is
grounded at the source of the current.
9.2.4 Portable Emergency Lighting Equipment. When temporary lighting from sources outside the ship is the only means of
illumination, portable emergency lighting equipment shall be available to provide illumination for safe movement of crew
members and workers.
9.2.5 Dark Spaces. Workers shall not be permitted to enter dark spaces without a suitable portable light. The use of matches
and open flame lights is prohibited. Temporary lighting stringers or streamers shall be so arranged as to avoid overloading of
branch circuits. Each branch circuit shall be equipped with over current protection of capacity not exceeding the rated
current carrying capacity of the cord used.
9.2.6 Restricted Usage. Temporary lighting fixtures shall not be used to power portable electric tools.

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Chapter 10
SHIPBOARD ACCESS/EGRESS AND ROUTING OF TEMPORARY SERVICES
References
Shipyard Employment
(d) NAVFAC Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-152-01, Design: Piers and Wharves
(e) Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 46 CFR Part 164 Subpart 164.009, Non-Combustible Materials for
Merchant Vessels
(f) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards 701, Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame
Propagation of Textiles and Films
Introduction
This chapter provides the necessary safety requirements for personnel access and egress during an industrial availability to
comply with reference (a), including temporary service routing requirements. This chapter applies to all SRCAs and
covers all Navy ships – submarines, surface ships, and aircraft carriers.
The personnel safety requirements were developed from existing requirements in references (b) and (c) for personnel
access and egress. It is essential to ensure that SF and SRCA workers are able to evacuate, if necessary, during a major
shipboard casualty, while maintaining accessibility for casualty responders to combat the casualty in a quick and effective
manner. Section 10.1 includes opportunities for risk mitigation and FSC involvement to secure one of the designated
pathways for personnel access/egress based on the scope and duration of work being performed.
Additional temporary service routing requirements contained in section 10.4 were developed to minimize, to the extent
practicable, the effect temporary services would have on the casualty responders’ ability to combat the fire.
10.1 SHIPBOARD ACCESS AND EGRESS NUMBER AND LOCATION. Per reference (a), each SRCA shall maintain
a primary and secondary means of access/egress for each vessel, where practicable.
10.1.1 Egress Requirements (Submarines). On submarines, at least two separate means of egress from the ship interior to
topside (not including the Bridge Access Hatch) shall be established. At least one means of egress serving the forward
compartment, and at least one means of egress serving the aft compartment on the ship, shall be maintained. The forward
most and aft most hatches shall be utilized to meet the minimum requirement unless a mitigation plan is approved by the
FSC. For compartments which do not have direct access from the ship interior to topside, at least one access shall be
maintained between adjoining compartments for personnel egress and/or casualty responder access.
a. When one of these hatches needs to be secured for 4 hours or less for the removal and/or installation of
equipment, the SRCA shall receive the review and concurrence of the FSC and provide a notification to the
emergency dispatch center. In this condition, all hot work shall be approved by the FSC and means of
access/egress shall be maintained through the other hatch.
b. If work items require that one of these hatches has to be blocked in excess of 4 hours, a mitigation plan shall be
approved by the FSC and include the requirements of paragraph 10.1.1.a, as a minimum. This mitigation plan
may also include an additional personnel access hull cut as an alternative means of personnel egress and/or
casualty responder access.
10.1.2 Shipboard Access (Submarines). On submarines, at least two brows, gangways or ramps from ship-to-shore, ship-
to-ways, ship to drydock side, or ship to drydock floor shall be provided in sufficient number to permit the rapid egress,

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under emergency conditions, of all persons aboard and support fire response. To eliminate a common path of egress, at
least two brows shall be separated by one-fourth the length of the vessel, at a minimum. Brow requirements for SSBNs
moored in a Waterfront Restricted Area (WRA) will be provided by DIRSSP.
10.1.3 Access to Machinery Space (Surface Ships). On surface ships with three or less accesses to each machinery space,
at least one access shall remain unobstructed for use as an escape route. On surface ships with four or more accesses to the
machinery spaces, at least two accesses shall remain unobstructed for use as an escape route.
10.1.4 Shipboard Access (Surface Ships). On surface ships, one gangway shall be located at the ship’s quarterdeck. For
ships less than 700 feet in length, one additional gangway shall be provided. For ships 700 feet or over in length, two
additional gangways shall be provided. Each gangway shall be located in a separate fire zone unless an alternate
arrangement is approved by the FSC.
10.1.5 Securing of Brow/Gangway. For all ships, when one of the brow/gangways designated for personnel access/egress
needs to be secured for 4 hours or less for the removal and/or installation of equipment, the SRCA shall receive the review
and concurrence of the FSC and provide a notification to the emergency dispatch center. In this condition, the FSC shall
ensure a means of access/ egress is maintained via the other required brow(s)/gangway(s).
10.2 MAINTAINING ACCESS AND EGRESS CONDITION.
10.2.1 Brow/Gangway Requirements. Consistent with reference (d), brow/gangways, landing platforms, and steps
to/from each gangway shall be a minimum of 3 feet in width of unobstructed walkway and be designed and constructed to
support a minimum load of 75 pounds per square foot. The entire length of brow/gangways and adjacent areas shall be
illuminated with outdoor use lights. Step up and step off areas shall be free of trip/slip hazards and maintain 7 to 12 inch
rise over run. Note – 7 inch rise may be increased up to 12 inches if uniform throughout entire step up/step off areas.
Pallets shall not be used unless reinforced with a solid non-skid cover and designed to meet the minimum loading
requirements herein.
10.2.2 Safety Nets. Safety nets shall be installed under brow/gangways that are not fitted with side rails having a vertical
height of 42 inches nominal and metallic meshing or similar material with small openings (approximately ½ inch) between
the top of the rail and the brow/gangway platform deck. Safety nets, when used, shall extend 6 feet beyond each side of
gangways and platforms.
10.2.3 Condition of Brow/Gangways. Brow/gangways shall be maintained free of debris, ice, snow, and foreign matter.
Each access brow/gangway shall have a clearly readable status board showing the status of all permanent and temporary
access/egress openings, and shall be updated as conditions change. Status boards shall also be used to indicate space
layouts and terminology for the ship, available passageways, and areas where access may be limited due to routing of
temporary services, work in progress and/or secured access and egress routes.
10.2.4 Marking Routes of Escape. Routes of escape leading to exits from inside the ship shall be clearly marked.
10.2.5 Use of Announcing System for Access and Egress Routes. The permanent (or temporary) announcing system shall
be used to inform workers and crew of all secured access and egress routes, and the information shall also be posted on
status boards.
10.2.6 Fall Protection. There exists an increased fall protection hazard due to the scope of industrial work performed
during maintenance availabilities. The hazard associated with deck openings is further increased for emergency
responders during near zero visibility conditions. The SRCA shall ensure the following requirements are met for the
protection and guarding of deck openings, such as open manholes.
a. SRCAs shall minimize the duration for opening manholes associated with tank openings, as practicable.
b. While a walkway or part of a walkway is being used as a working surface, the SRCA shall cordon off that portion
to prevent it from being used as a walkway.
c. Flush manholes and other small openings of comparable size (or larger) in the deck and other working surfaces,
shall be suitably covered or guarded to a height of not less than 30 inches, except temporarily where the use of
such guards is made impracticable by the work actually in progress. Guards shall be reinstalled at the cessation of

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the work, or, in cases where the work extends across multiple work shifts or days; the guards shall be reinstalled
during any periods where work is not being executed.
d. Open hatches or other large openings not protected by coamings to a height of 24 inches around the edge of the
opening shall be guarded to a height of 36 to 42 inches, except temporarily where the use of such guards is made
impracticable by the work actually in progress. Guards shall be reinstalled at the cessation of the work, or, in
cases where the work extends across multiple work shifts or days, the guards shall be reinstalled during any
periods where work is not being executed.
e. The guarding shall be attached by at least three legs spaced equally around the perimeter of the opening.
10.3 EMERGENCY AIR BREATHING SYSTEM (SUBMARINES).
10.3.1 Required Emergency Air Breathing System. The installed Emergency Air Breathing (EAB) system on submarines
shall be maintained in operation, or a temporary system shall be installed to maintain an equivalent to the submarines EAB
system while the submarine is habitable. The temporary breathing air systems shall be installed to provide an independent
system for each fire zone. Exceptions to this requirement shall be approved by the FSC.
10.3.2 Service to Maneuvering. When considering a major fire onboard and if portions of the installed EAB system are
not available for use, at a minimum, a temporary breathing air system shall be installed to provide service to maneuvering
when the submarine is no longer habitable. The ship and the maintenance activity shall determine when the submarine is
no longer habitable by mutual agreement. Additionally, to support casualties other than a major fire (e.g., toxic gas), a
temporary EAB system shall be installed to support EABs in key locations throughout the ship as approved by the FSC.
10.3.3 Breathing Air Supply for Egress. The installed EAB system or a temporary breathing air system shall include a
means to provide a breathing air supply that supports egress from maneuvering to an area external to the submarine that is
safe to breathe. SCBAs and Emergency Escape Breathing Devices (EEBD) are acceptable for use as a breathing source to
support safe egress.
10.4 ROUTING OF TEMPORARY SERVICES. For each availability, the SRCA shall designate a single point of contact
responsible for the management of all temporary services, including services provided by other maintenance activities.
The individual will be responsible for ensuring temporary services are installed, routed, and removed to allow emergency
access to all areas of the ship and are run to keep passageways clear in accordance with the requirements of this manual.
10.4.1 Pre-plan for Temporary Services. SRCA shall pre-plan for the installation of temporary services to minimize the
total number of service leads penetrating the hull by maximizing the use of backbones, and/or manifoldsr for industrial
services. Pre-planning for the installation of temporary services shall include removal (first in, last out, when no longer
required). SRCAs installing services shall pay special attention to transitional spaces (cross passages, top and bottom of
stairwells) where services could potentially fall and restrict emergency personnel egress and/or casualty responder access.
10.4.2 Routing of Temporary Services Through Installed Ship Hull Openings. The following applies to routing of
temporary services through installed ship hull openings, both exterior and interior, designated for personnel egress and/or
casualty responder access:
a. For doorways; temporary services shall be routed within the topmost area of the opening, such that the
unobstructed opening of any doorway with services run shall be at least fifty (50) inches high and twenty-six (26)
inches wide. Hatches that are less than twenty-six (26) inches wide will maintain an unobstructed width for the
entire fifty (50) inch height opening.
b. For vertical ladders; temporary services shall be routed to allow safe access for emergency responders. The
services shall be routed such that 500 square inches of unobstructed space is provided at the hatch opening.
Services shall not be routed within four (4) inches on either side of the ladder. Services routed behind the ladder
should not interfere with safe access to the ladders and rungs. Each SRCA shall have a documented, approved
hatch access process and design to implement this requirement, with concurrence from the local F&ES Fire Chief
(or designated representative). A sample vertical hatch access divider is provided as Figure 10-1.
c. The above requirements do not apply to openings and passageways that have been secured specifically for routing
temporary services. FSC approval is required prior to securing any opening for passage.

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10.4.3 Additional Hull Cuts. When temporary services cannot be routed through interior and exterior installed shipboard
personnel openings in accordance with paragraph 10.4.2, existing (or additional) access cuts shall be utilized for routing of
temporary service, personnel egress, and/or casualty responder access.
10.4.4 Materials used for Suspending Temporary Services. Temporary services shall be suspended at regular intervals, to
prevent impeding personnel access/egress and emergency response, using a high temperature line that meets the non-
combustibility test requirements contained in reference (e). When using steel wire rope, or other potentially abrasive
material, an anti-chafing material shall be used to prevent damage of the temporary service line. When available,
temporary service lines may be run through the ship’s structural elements (i.e., cable ways, light stanchions, etc.). Specific
FSC approval is required when ship’s structural elements are used to route temporary service lines within 6 feet of
designated vertical and horizontal fire zone boundaries to ensure the services are able to be removed and the boundary
isolated. When the routing of temporary services overhead is not practicable, temporary services, rigging of hoses,
welding leads, and temporary lights shall be clear of the decks on temporary “trees” or brackets and be arranged to
minimize tripping and other hazards.
10.4.5 Temporary Services Isolation List. For each availability, the SRCA shall provide an emergency Temporary
Services Isolation List (TSIL) onboard the ship. The SRCA will provide, in a readily accessible format, all service sources
that must be secured to isolate a specific fire zone. Fire zone boundaries shall be designated by the FSC in accordance
with chapter 11 of this manual. The information shall be suitable for use by emergency responders for isolation of services
during an emergency and located at the CASCON Station, DCC, and/or the Quarterdeck. The SRCA shall maintain the
data current as services change. At a minimum, the isolation list shall include:
a. Type and description of service.
b. Shore side shut-off locations.
c. Fire zone(s) and/or compartments (for submarines)affected.
d. Locations of quick disconnect fittings.
10.4.5.1 Critical Service Tracking. Those services deemed to be critical (essential to personnel, ship, or reactor safety)
will be highlighted and include the impact of securing the service in the format of section 10.4.5. These services shall
have a unique marking at the shore side shut-off location. The SRCA shall provide a simplified drawing showing the
locations for the shore side shut-off points to these critical services and their route through the ship (i.e., affected fire zones
and/or compartments). Drawings shall be co-located with the TSIL.
10.4.6 Marking Temporary Services. All temporary services shall be positively identified with highly visible, durable,
unique markings that include maintenance activity name, service type, location, and shore side shut-off points. Tags will
be located (at a minimum) at the source, point of entry aboard ship, termination point, and at Quick Disconnect Fittings
(QDFs).
10.4.7 Quick Disconnect Fittings. QDFs shall be located within 10 feet of designated vertical and horizontal fire zone
boundaries. When practicable, QDFs shall be installed within 10 feet of hull penetrations used for personnel access, to
facilitate the deployment of smoke control curtains. QDFs and associated isolations, shall be installed in such way that
emergency responders can readily access the QDF without assistance, operate without tools, and be capable of being
disconnected safely on pressurized or energized temporary systems, unless approved for use as described in paragraph
10.4.9. The use of cut-off isolation valves for temporary services are required within 6 feet of designated vertical and
horizontal fire zone boundaries unless the services are self-sealing. For temporary services routed through designated
vertical and horizontal fire zone boundaries, the QDFs must be capable of being safely isolated by casualty responders.
Pressurized and disconnected QDFs must prevent wetting of energized equipment. For hull openings used for services
only, QDFs are not required, provided the opening is fitted with an air and smoke control “sock” that remains in place
around the services. Air and smoke control curtains are not intended to provide an air tight seal of the hull opening.
Rather, the curtains, or “socks” are to ensure that emergency responders can control the flow of air and smoke through the
opening to allow for de-smoking of compartments, and minimize “chimney” effects. Curtains shall be made of fire
resistant fabric meeting the requirements of reference (f). Examples of acceptable air and smoke control curtains and
“socks” are provided in appendix J.
10.4.8 Air Flow Control. The SRCA, in conjunction with SF, shall stage material to provide for temporary closure of
access cuts, hatches, and other hull penetrations to control air flow in the event of a shipboard fire. Temporary enclosures

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erected around hull access openings shall be constructed with the ability for emergency responders to rapidly deploy
smoke control ventilation fans (e.g., damage control box fans). If the enclosures are constructed with ventilation fans
installed, the fans shall have the ability to reverse air flow, in order to provide emergency responders the ability to actively
de-smoke an affected compartment.
10.4.9 Service Lines Crossing Fire Zone Boundaries. When service lines transit a fire zone boundary which cannot be
safely disconnected locally (e.g., high voltage cables), the FSC shall approve, in advance, the method to safely secure and
remove the service.
10.4.10 Protection during Installation, Operation and Removal of Temporary Services. Ensure that adequate protection is
provided during installation, operation, and removal of temporary services. For fluid systems, spray protection shall be
installed at each mechanical joint of a temporary system that is inside of the hull of the vessel, in the vicinity of shore
power or electrical equipment, or in the vicinity of hull openings to prevent fluids other than air spray on ship’s equipment.
Spray protection shall consist of adequate see through sheeting (minimum 5 mils thickness) around each joint secured by
several wraps of tape allowing view of the component as much as possible. Anti-chafing protection shall be installed
around services in particular areas (e.g., hatches, traffic areas, vicinity of sharp objects) where there is a high risk of
inadvertent puncture or separation. These protective measures shall be addressed during SRCA safety inspections to
ensure adequate protection is maintained.
Figure 10-1 Sample Vertical Hatch Access Divider (Back Side Isometric View)

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Figure 10-1 Sample Vertical Hatch Access Divider (Top View)
Figure 10-1 Sample Vertical Hatch Access Divider (Top View)

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Chapter 11
FIRE AND SMOKE BOUNDARIES
Introduction
This chapter provides requirements for sustaining fire zone boundaries during industrial availabilities. This chapter applies to
all platforms – submarines, surface ships, and aircraft carriers.
In an industrial environment, it is imperative to maintain the integrity of ships’ fire zone boundaries in order to contain a fire
in its originating compartment/fire zone, and limit the fire from spreading to other locations in the ship. While ships are
designed and built with fire zone boundaries, maintenance availabilities present unique circumstances where these as-built
boundaries may become compromised. The FSC is empowered to mitigate the risks associated with compromised fire zone
boundaries, and guidance, including the use of non-combustible fume tight closures and smoke curtains during these
situations, is provided here-in for implementation.
11.1 FIRE ZONE BOUNDARIES. A fire zone boundary is a permanent, continuous, interior bulkhead or deck system
designed to limit the passage of flame and smoke beyond a fire zone and provides protected staging areas for firefighters.
11.1.1 Requirements for Fire Zone Boundaries. The ship’s permanent fire zone boundaries shall be maintained to the extent
practicable throughout the availability. This includes maintaining the capability of fire insulation where installed, fire-rated
penetrations such as multi-cable transits (MCTs) and pipe penetrations, fume-tightness of the boundary, etc. Existing
transverse watertight, airtight, and fume-tight bulkheads shall be used on ships built prior to the requirement for fire zones.
Where ships have fire zones by design, the designated bulkheads and decks shall be used. When authorized industrial work
requires disestablishment of ship’s permanent fire zone boundaries, alternate fire zone boundaries shall be designated by the
FSC. The fire zone boundary shall be continuous throughout the vertical extent of the ship, from keel up to the flight deck on
carrier type ships and from keel up to the main deck on other ships unless designated higher.
11.1.2 Fire Zone Boundaries (Submarines). For submarines, fire zone boundaries shall consist of the watertight transverse
bulkheads between the engine room, missile compartment (when applicable), and forward compartment.
11.1.3 Temporary Access Cuts through Fire Zone Boundaries. Temporary access cuts through fire zone boundaries shall be
minimized. Where unavoidable, they shall be provided with a temporary non-combustible closure system, such as fire
resistant smoke curtains. Aluminum shall not be used as a closure.
11.1.4 Disabling/Degrading Fire Zone Boundaries. The disabling or degrading of fire zone boundary closures or
penetrations shall be approved by the FSC and will require a temporary closure system, such as fire resistant smoke curtains,
strategically placed with an ability to drop quickly, which can be set by personnel leaving the space. Temporary services
routed through a fire zone boundary constitute disabling or degrading that boundary as it affects the normal means to secure
it. Fire resistant smoke curtains shall be pre-staged at each fire zone boundary that has temporary services routed through it.
11.1.5 Marking Fire Zone Boundaries. Each designated fire zone boundary shall be identified with a sign on each side of the
access through the boundary.
11.1.6 Record of Boundary Openings. An up-to-date record of boundary openings and access cuts, and their locations shall
be kept aboard ship by ship’s force. The location of fire zone boundaries and designated fire and smoke boundaries shall be
noted on drawings at the CASCON Station and/or DCC/Quarterdeck.
11.1.7 Boundaries on Carrier Type Ships. On carrier type ships, the hangar division door travel paths shall remain free of
obstructions such that they can be freely operated in the event of a fire. A means (such as a chain-fall) shall be provided to
close the hangar division doors in case of fire, in the event division doors are mechanically inoperable because of
maintenance actions. In the event maintenance actions will render a division door totally immovable, work shall be
sequenced and approved by the FSC, such that one set of doors will always be available to close in the event of a fire. Any
exceptions shall be submitted for approval to the FSC.

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Chapter 12
FIRE DRILL REQUIREMENTS
References
Shipyard Employment
(d) S9086-S3-STM-010, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 555, Volume 1, Surface Ship Firefighting
(e) S9086-S3-STM-020, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 555, Volume 2, Submarine Firefighting
(f) S9002-AK-CC-010/6010, Industrial Ship Safety Manual for Submarines
Introduction
Periodic shipboard fire drills are an important element of fire response planning at SRCAs to demonstrate proficiency and
coordination among ship’s force, installation firefighters, and mutual aid support. Shipboard fire drills have been required
semi-annually for surface ship CNO availabilities in accordance with reference (a), quarterly for submarine CNO
availabilities in accordance with reference (b), and at the periodicity specified in the contract for new construction ships.
However, the extent and duration of the fire drill scenarios were not specified, they typically involved fairly minor fires
that usually did not last long enough (routinely less than 30 minutes) to exercise coordinated firefighting, and they did not
include adequate evaluation or corrective action follow-up. Thus, the fire drills were not providing sufficient training to
prepare ships and SRCAs to deal with all the challenges that occur when combating a shipboard fire.
This chapter provides detailed requirements for planning, executing, and evaluating periodic shipboard fire drills. This
chapter supersedes and replaces the requirements in references (a) and (b) and in new construction contracts when
invoked. This chapter implements the fire drill requirements in Section 508 of reference (c) and will assist in developing
proficiency in firefighting capability and train the ERT to the fire response plans. This chapter is intended to raise the
standards of the drills and ensure they are providing the expected benefits. This chapter applies to all submarines, surface
ships, and aircraft carriers in CNO scheduled availabilities, new construction, and Post-Shakedown Availabilities (PSAs)
with durations greater than 90 days.
SRCAs should note that Section 12.5 provides flexibility with drill frequency and complexity depending on the overall
workload, and proficiency and availability of firefighting resources. For example, the Navy has to be careful not to
overload a city fire department providing support to multiple SRCAs in the same area. SRCAs are encouraged to be
judicious in implementing these requirements, leverage the flexibilities allowed to modify the scope, complexity, and
frequency of these drills, and balance the need to maintain fire response proficiency with the impact to availability cost and
schedule.
12.1 PERIODIC FIRE DRILLS. To implement the fire drill requirements in Section 508 of reference (c) and to assist in
developing proficiency in firefighting capability and train the ERT to the fire response plan, each SRCA shall ensure that
fire drills are conducted per the following sections in this chapter that address drill attributes, evaluation, and guides. This
chapter applies to all CNO scheduled availabilities, new construction, and Post-Shakedown Availabilities (PSAs) with
durations greater than 90 days with drill frequency per the guidelines in section 12.5.
12.2 DRILL ATTRIBUTE REQUIREMENTS.
12.2.1 Attributes for All Fire Drills. All fire drills conducted shall include the following attributes:
a. Require firefighting and other emergency response efforts to plan for and be prepared to execute an extended
response.

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b. Exercise the ability to effectively control energy sources of installed and temporary systems to protect personnel
and aid in combating the casualty.
c. The use of charged fire hoses (vice dry) pressurized to the nozzle is required. To minimize damage to ship’s
equipment via inadvertent water release, the hose station’s isolation valve may be closed after the hose has been
charged. Unused outlets on F&ES gated wyes/manifolds shall be capped prior to entering the ship.
d. Means to partially obscure visibility or turning the majority of lights off within the hull shall be employed for
realism. The use of covers over face masks to fully obscure vision in a constantly changing industrial
environment is a safety risk to firefighters and shall be avoided.
e. Using the guidelines of references (d) and (e) exercise the ability to develop and execute a firefighting strategy
based on fire type and location. Attributes to be demonstrated in execution of this strategy include the following:
(1) Direct and indirect attack techniques.
(2) Hose and nozzle handling.
(3) Space lighting.
(4) Search for vertical spread of the fire.
(5) Active de-smoking and de-watering plans. Some actions may be simulated if mutual aid is not
participating.
(6) Fire overhaul. Some actions may be simulated if mutual aid is not participating.
f. Drills shall be written to challenge responders’ ability to respond to a fire and respond to unexpected situations;
however, scenarios shall be realistic and appropriate to the numbers and capabilities of the responders. SF, Navy
F&ES and training department personnel shall be included in the planning effort to ensure a viable scenario.
Separate anomalies shall be included in the drill package to challenge in-hull responders and those personnel off-
hull providing support to the in-hull casualty actions. The anomalies shall be selected so that each is included in
one of the shipyard drill scenarios annually. Some examples of anomalies that can occur include:
(1) A failed shipboard (permanent or temporary) casualty reporting and/or announcing system (e.g., CASCON,
1MC, 4MC) delaying initial and subsequent reporting and/or announcing of a shipboard casualty.
(2) Loss of permanent or temporary (e.g., radio) communications between the Fire Operations Section (e.g.,
CASCON Station and/or DCC,) and the in-hull location of the fire.
(3) Injured personnel that require medical evacuation. This shall include anomalies where non-ambulatory
evacuation from the ship is required if mutual aid is participating.
(4) Ruptured fire hose(s) or loss of pressure (e.g., failed booster pump).
(5) Ruptured hydraulic or high pressure air header (particularly if not secured by the team in a timely manner).
(6) Ineffective fire extinguisher.
(7) Naval Firefighter’s Thermal Imager (NFTI) battery failure.
(8) Fire reported in the wrong location or unable to initially identify the location.
(9) Failure of a SCBA (e.g., SCBA found non-functioning after SF/F&ES donning resulting in response
delays).
g. Off-yard F&ES mutual aid support may be simulated. If simulated, the scenario shall include realistic arrival
times for the support.
h. The demonstration of securing temporary services and the isolation of affected fire zone boundaries is required.
The SRCA is not required to demonstrate the securing of all temporary services and may choose which temporary
services need to be demonstrated based upon practicality and training value.
i. The drill scenario shall include a SRCA missing person(s) to ensure a means to evaluate the effectiveness of the
muster and accountability process.
12.2.2 Selective Attributes for Fire Drills. Consistent with the drill scenario and the state of training of SF, SRCA, and
F&ES personnel, the following attributes shall be selectively included in drills conducted:

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a. Evaluation of public and environmental exposure to the fire and the response by-products. Activation of the
ERT’s ESHTB is not required to demonstrate this attribute. Rather, on-scene personnel shall be evaluated for
actions taken to meet exposure control attributes in the shipyard’s fire response plan.
b. Exercise the ability to medically triage and treat injured personnel at the scene and to transport them to the
appropriate medical facility. Transport of injured personnel to area medical facilities may be simulated.
c. Require that firefighting and other logistical support that arrives at the scene be replenished as required.
d. Exercise the ability to combat special fire scenarios identified in Section 8 of reference (d) and Section 36 of
reference (e). These include fires that involve electrical cable ways, hull insulation, submarine SHT,
battery/battery well, and hydraulic systems. Special fire scenarios are selected with input from F&ES and
Installation/Region training department personnel.
e. An integrated off-hull rehabilitation and staging station for all firefighters (SF, F&ES, and other ships’ crew) shall
be evaluated as part of the fire response plan and exercised during the drill if enough responders (SF, F&ES, other
responders) are available.
f. Per references (d) and (e), exercise the following firefighting strategy elements:
(1) Search and rescue.
(2) Establish tenable access/egress to hull.
(3) Protection of exposures (e.g., ship superstructure, antenna arrays, etc.), submarine SHT, and Radar
Absorbent Material (RAM).
(4) Confinement of fire (boundary protection).
g. Fire team event requiring activation of the rapid intervention team (RIT).
h. Injury requiring use of a man-basket for evacuation. Personnel should not be moved in the basket for the drill.
i. Back-shift drill run outside of the 0700 to 1700 Monday through Friday shift.
j. Ability to combat a “special fire” scenario identified in reference (d), section 8 and reference (e), section 36. This
may include but is not limited to:
(1) electrical cable ways;
(2) submarine hull insulation;
(3) submarine special hull treatment (SHT);
(4) lithium batteries;
(5) submarine battery well;
(6) hydraulic systems;
(7) hangar bays;
(8) vehicle decks; and
(9) flammable gas fires.
k. Initiating dewatering using temporary or portable pumps in the IDLH for ship stability or equipment protection.
l. Fire overhaul and space reentry by gas free engineers.
12.2.3 Burden of Requirements. There may be occasions where the number of ships in CNO scheduled availabilities or
under construction at a SRCA is high enough that invoking all requirements of this chapter would create an excessive
burden on the SRCA’s fire safety and emergency management organizations and F&ES. In those cases, some attributes of
this chapter may be relaxed as formally proposed and documented by the SRCA, RMC, or SUPSHIP and subject to the
following:
a. The decision to relax these requirements will be done after considering the state of training and readiness of the
on-scene response personnel including SF, SRCA, and F&ES.
b. At least one drill each quarter at each SRCA will meet the requirements of this chapter.
c. For submarines in CNO scheduled availabilities scheduled for greater than 12 months, one-half of the quarterly
drills for each submarine shall meet the requirements of this chapter.

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d. For CVN Refueling Complex Overhauls (RCOHs), every drill shall meet the requirements of this chapter.
NOTE: This relaxation does not allow deviation from the drill frequency requirements prescribed in paragraph 12.5.
12.3 DRILL EVALUATION. Consistent with the scenario, and using as guidelines the application of the effective
firefighting principles and the EFRS standard attributes in the SRCA’s FRP, and in appendices A and C, the SRCA, SF,
and F&ES drill team shall evaluate the following firefighting and emergency response capabilities, as applicable.
a. Performance by emergency and technical management personnel in providing technical assistance, advice, and
logistic support to response personnel.
b. Emergency medical triage and treatment of injured personnel. Transport of injured personnel to area medical
facilities may be simulated.
c. Ability of the response team to clear temporary service lines from access points, and isolate sources of energy
from the scene of the fire, including electrical power, hydraulics, and high pressure air and when applicable,
ordnance and fuel systems.
d. Adequacy and effective execution of the incident management structure.
e. Plan to deploy mutual aid support in an orderly, effective manner, including fire lane discipline before and during
the response, and off-hull staging of additional responding resources.
f. The ability to replenish firefighting and other logistical support that arrives at the scene. Periodically demonstrate
the ability to recharge expended SCBA cylinders.
g. Coordination between the SRCA, SF, other ship crews, and installation F&ES responders. This shall include
firefighter accountability procedures in the hull/IDLH zone and the level of integrated response.
h. The team’s ability to develop and execute an integrated firefighting strategy based on fire type and location and
the effectiveness of the techniques employed.
i. The team’s ability to respond to the drill anomalies.
j. The effectiveness of the integrated rehabilitation area(s) and off-hull staging area(s).
12.4 DRILL TEAM, GUIDES, AND POST-EVENT EVALUATION.
12.4.1 SRCA Drill Team. The SRCA shall establish a team of trained personnel that have the requisite experience and
knowledge to prepare for and execute fire casualty drills. These positions shall include drill initiators, simulation
providers, safety observers, and drill evaluators. The Ship, F&ES, and, where practical, the ISIC/TYCOM, SRCA Rep,
and Installation/Region training department personnel shall be included as drill evaluation team members.
12.4.2 Drill Guide. A drill guide integrating SF, SRCA, and F&ES shall be prepared using the guidelines in appendix K.
The FSC executing drill control and evaluation and an F&ES member will review the drill guide. On NPWs, the drill
guide review shall also include the Nuclear Chief Test Engineer (CTE) and Chief Refueling Engineer (CRE). The
reviewed drill guide will be submitted to the ship’s Commanding Officer and the shipyard Operations Officer (Code 300)
(or for other SRCAs, the equivalent senior manager) for approval.
12.4.3 Drill Termination. Provisions shall be in place to terminate the drill in the event there is an actual emergency on
the ship or if personnel or ship systems are placed in an unsafe condition.
12.4.4 Response to Actual Casualty. Provisions shall be in place to respond to any actual casualty at the SRCA that
would require emergency response during the drill. This may include terminating the drill if the casualty is significant.
12.4.5 Realistic Fire Scenario. Effort shall be made to produce the most realistic fire scenario possible, without risking
personnel injury or equipment damage. For example, vision may be partially obscured by devices simulating smoke (these
devices shall only partially obscure vision and shall be provided by the drill team), and access to areas might be prevented
by monitors to simulate challenges from the heat and to evaluate the capability to execute alternate firefighting strategies.
Use of live firefighting agents (charged hose or portable fire extinguishers), and dressing in full firefighting ensemble
should be the standard on all drills to replicate the challenges of moving through the ship. Safety observation for
indications of heat stress is required. When hoses are charged, the water supply valve shall be shut to avoid a large water
spill should a nozzle be accidently opened. Portable fire extinguishers shall be properly controlled so that an inadvertent
discharge during the drill does not occur.

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12.4.6 Minimize Simulations. Simulations for the casualty drill response shall be minimized. This will require advance
pre-drill actions and additional safety observers during the drill. For example, it is expected that fire hoses will be
pressurized during the drill. To do that safely, and to ensure water is not inadvertently released into the ship, hoses shall
be tested (validate all hose testing conducted and documented per Planned Maintenance System (PMS) requirements) prior
to the drill, safety observers assigned, and nozzle bails shall be temporarily secured but with materials that can be easily
removed by hand (e.g., Velcro®). Personnel wearing SCBAs shall be “on-air” when operating in the drill scenario’s IDLH
zone. Ship and temporary systems (e.g., ship’s service hydraulics, affected electrical distribution systems, ship and
aviation fuel and lube oil, temporary high pressure air) that can be secured, consistent with ship and plant safety, shall be
operated in the same manner as they would be during an actual casualty.
12.4.7 SRCA Response. The response by SRCA personnel should be as realistic as possible. For example, the affected
ship’s project team including the FSC and Joint Test and Refueling Groups (JTG/JRG) members (where applicable), shall
respond to the drill as they would for an actual casualty. Accordingly, the FSC from the affected ship shall not be part of
the drill team. A FSC from another ship or alternate FSC members from the affected ship augmented by an F&ES
member shall be used in this capacity. Personnel exemptions from the drill shall be rare and when required, minimized.
Exemption requests shall be submitted by the cognizant SRCA manager and approved by the evaluation FSC.
a. To the extent practicable, action to support a realistic response shall apply to and include other personnel
expected to respond to casualties. This includes, but is not limited to, Chief Test and Refueling Engineers (where
applicable) and other project personnel, SRCA middle managers (Engineering (e.g., Code 200/2300) Division
Heads, Safety and Health (Code 106) personnel, shop superintendents, etc.). The SRCA shall ensure senior
qualified personnel are assigned to the drill team and balance these assignments with the need to ensure senior
qualified personnel are also available to respond to the drill.
b. Activation of the RERO (NPW only) shall not normally occur during these drills. This includes response by the
RERO on-scene incident commander and his team. However, either discussion on action to activate the RERO or
simulate RERO activation is expected to occur to ensure personnel demonstrate familiarity with this action.
c. To increase the training benefit of these drills, the SRCA may coordinate with the Installation and Navy Region,
where applicable, to activate the respective EOC/ROC as part of the fire response.
12.4.8 Drill Hotwash. A drill hotwash shall be conducted by the response team immediately after drill termination.
During the hotwash, the drill evaluation team should interject, if necessary, to ensure that the major comments from the
drill are captured.
12.4.9 Drill Evaluation. Following the response team hotwash, the drill evaluation team shall meet to compile any
additional comments observed by the drill evaluators. The drill evaluation team should go through the expected and actual
actions and base any comments on the gaps between the two. The drill evaluation team shall reach agreement on the major
comments and the overall grade and evaluate the accomplishment of the stated objectives for the drill.
12.4.10 Written Report. A written report including corrective actions with due dates and recommendations for
improvement shall be produced and formally issued by the SRCA following the drill. This report shall include the
comments from the response team hotwash and those from the evaluating FSC augmented with an F&ES member.
12.4.11 Action for an Unsatisfactory Grade. Another drill shall be conducted once corrective action to address the
significant findings of the unsatisfactory drill is completed. This corrective action plan shall include the expected date for
the subsequent drill. For significant findings, the SRCA shall consider additional temporary measures to mitigate fire
hazards relevant to the finding(s) until corrective action is taken and re-evaluated by the follow-up drill. This drill may be
limited in scope but as a minimum will reevaluate the weak areas noted, shall be accomplished as soon as possible after
corrective action is completed but no later than 30 days after the unsatisfactory drill.
12.4.12 Submitting the Report. The Region/Installation training department personnel Fire Chief (N30) will be provided
a copy of the drill report.
12.4.13 Fire Response Capabilities during the Drill. The SRCA and the Region/Installation shall ensure the SRCA fire
response capabilities are not significantly reduced to meet the all hazard F&ES response mission during a drill.
12.4.14 Duration of Drills. While these drills should have durations based on response actions and the achievement of
stated drill objectives rather than elapsed time, experience by NSYs in conducting fire drills per the attributes of this
chapter indicates that drill durations should be approximately 30 - 45 minutes.

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12.5 DRILL FREQUENCY. Fire drills shall be conducted every 90 days for submarines and every 180 days for surface
ships in CNO scheduled availabilities (scheduled for greater than 6 months duration). For ships under construction, drills
meeting the attributes of this chapter shall be conducted every 6 months up to the 50 percent completion of the ship and
every 90 days thereafter on submarines and every 180 days thereafter on surface ships. For CNO availabilities scheduled
for less than 6 months but greater than 90 days (or when reference (f) is invoked for submarines), one drill meeting the
requirements of this chapter shall be conducted. The FSC shall evaluate if a drill must be run prior to allowing any hot
work onboard based on the scope of the availability and condition of organic firefighting capabilities, and should be
conducted prior to scheduling significant quantities of hot work. The fire drill shall be performed within 30 days of the
start of the availability.
12.5.1 Back-shift Drill. At least one back-shift drill per year shall be conducted at each SRCA to exercise and evaluate
the FRP throughout the day.
12.5.2 Waiver of Drill Requirements. A fire drill due after Phase I Crew Certification may be waived by the FSC.
12.5.3 Periodicity Waiver. In cases where required scheduling milestones are closely aligned, a milestone event may be
extended to a common date if still it supports maintaining safe conditions.
a. The FSC may postpone a periodic drill when it is due prior to a key event (e.g., docking, undocking) and a drill is
also required after the change in conditions. This action allows the ship and project to focus on the high-risk
evolution and conduct an integrated drill for the changed condition.
b. The periodic drill should be executed early (when practical) using the scope waiver per the requirements of
subsection 12.6.2 instead of extending the periodicity.
c. The first integrated drill may only be postponed for a period of 14 days.
d. The FSC may postpone periodic drills for a period of 14 days.
e. The FSC may postpone periodic drills for a period of 30 days with the NSA’s manager responsible for fire safety
and the ship’s commanding officer (CO) concurrence.
f. Postponement longer than 30 days require Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 04 or Commander, Naval
Regional Maintenance Center (CNRMC) and the immediate superior in charge (ISIC) or applicable type
commander (TYCOM) concurrence.

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Chapter 13
MAJOR FIRE DRILL REQUIREMENTS
References
(a) S9086-S3-STM-010, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 555, Volume 1, Surface Ship Firefighting
(b) S9086-S3-STM-020, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 555, Volume 2, Submarine Firefighting
(c) S9211-05-MMA-000/(C), Radiological Emergency Planning Manual for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
(d) NAVSEA 389-0288, Radiological Controls
Introduction
As discussed in chapter 12, periodic shipboard fire drills in ships undergoing availabilities are important to demonstrate
proficiency and coordination among ship’s force, installation firefighters, and mutual aid support in responding to
shipboard fires that may occur during industrial work. However, the drills were never required by NAVSEA to test or
evaluate the full emergency response capabilities of the SRCAs that would be needed to combat a major fire. Thus, the
criteria and requirements were developed to conduct a major shipboard fire drill at each SRCA annually and to have them
formally evaluated. This action is considered essential to ensure SRCAs building and repairing Navy ships can rapidly
respond to a major fire casualty and successfully bring it under control to minimize damage and prevent loss of the ship.
This chapter specifies the requirement to conduct an annual major fire drill that comprehensively evaluates the ability of a
SRCA to execute its full Fire Response Plan (FRP) and Emergency Response capability, and provides the attributes,
guides, and criteria for planning and executing the drills. This chapter applies to all SRCAs and involves all Navy ships –
submarines, surface ships, and aircraft carriers, and requires formal reports for sharing lessons learned and ensuring all
SRCAs benefit from the drills. This chapter builds on the foundation of the periodic fire drills required by Chapter 12, and
requires coordination with NAVSEA, CNRMC, CNIC, and applicable TYCOM to schedule and execute.
NAVSEA recognizes this is a large undertaking and the major drills will have an impact on cost and production schedules.
SRCAs are encouraged to be judicious and careful in their planning to balance the objectives of learning and
demonstrating capabilities with minimizing cost and schedule impact. Some considerations included in this chapter that
should be taken into account are as follows:
- For nuclear capable SRCAs, per section 13.3.10 of this chapter, the major fire drill can satisfy the drill
requirement of Article 109 in reference (d) once every two years if conducted on a nuclear powered warship (or
in propulsion spaces for CVNs) per Section 13.3.10, and thus not add overall cost to the Navy since the Article
109 drill must be conducted per reference (d). In the year where it would not count, the SRCA could elect to
conduct the drill on a nonnuclear ship or outside the propulsion spaces of CVNs if available, and the overall cost
would be less.
- Per section 13.3.11 of this chapter, private repair SRCAs located in the same region and supported by the same
fire department (e.g., Norfolk and San Diego) may satisfy the annual requirement by conducting the drill at one
SRCA, while the others observe and/or participate under the guidance and approval of the RMC. To ensure all
SRCAs experience the drill, it should be rotated among them each year.
SRCAs are encouraged to recommend additional ideas to NAVSEA, CNRMC and CNIC to ensure the Navy achieves
maximum benefit from these drills while minimizing impact to ship availabilities.
13.1 DRILL ATTRIBUTE REQUIREMENTS. A periodic comprehensive evaluation of a SRCA’s FRP is an essential
element to protect against a major shipboard fire during repair or construction. Each calendar year at each SRCA, one fire
drill shall be of sufficient magnitude and scope to meet the requirements of the following sub-paragraphs. A drill may be
deferred into the following calendar year as long as the time since the last major fire drill does not exceed 18 months.
a. Activate the full ERT, including manning the EOC and the ROC (if applicable), and for NPWs, the RERO and
the ECC. For CVNs, the drill does not require RERO activation if conducted outside of the propulsion spaces. It
does, however, require activation of the cognizant ERT team branches/sections in the ECC/EOC.

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b. Require firefighting and other emergency response efforts to plan for, and be prepared to, execute an extended
response.
c. Require evaluation of public and environmental exposure to the fire and the response by-products.
d. Exercise the ability to medically triage and treat at least two simulated injured personnel at the scene, and/or
transport them to appropriate medical facilities. A sketch or diagram of the injured personnel (treated, and if left
untreated or improperly treated) shall be included in the drill package. The injured person’s medical condition,
including vital signs such as blood pressure, pulse, respiration rate, a description of any wounds, as well as other
necessary medical information, shall be provided.
e. Require that firefighting and other logistics support equipment that arrives at the scene be replenished.
f. Exercise the ability to effectively control energy sources of installed and temporary systems to protect personnel,
and aid in combating the casualty.
g. Exercise the ability to combat special fire scenarios identified in Section 8 of reference (a) or Section 36 of
reference (b). These include fires that involve hangar fires involving aircraft, de-smoking amphibious ship well
decks, electrical cable ways, hull insulation, Special Hull Treatment (SHT), submarine battery/battery wells,
lithium batteries, chimney space, ordnance/magazines, and hydraulic systems. Most, if not all, of these special
scenarios would likely be encountered in a major shipboard fire, so response to these shall be included in this
annual drill scenario based on its simulated severity and location. All of these shall be included in the ERT
training program and be evaluated regularly during the more frequently conducted drills specified in chapter 12.
The use of charged fire hoses (vice dry) pressurized to the nozzle is required. A means to include compromised
visibility within the hull shall also be employed for realism.
h. Using the guidelines of references (a) or (b), exercise the ability to develop and execute a firefighting strategy
based on fire type and location for the following attributes:
(1) Direct and indirect attack techniques.
(2) Hose and nozzle handling.
(3) Space lighting.
(4) Search for vertical spread of the fire.
(5) Active de-smoking and de-water plans and execution.
(6) Search and rescue.
(7) Fire overhaul.
(8) Establish tenable access/egress to hull.
(9) Protection of exposures, SHT (submarines), and RAM, PCMS (surface ships).
(10) Confinement of fire (fire boundary protection).
i. The drill shall be written to challenge responders’ ability to respond to a major fire and respond to unexpected
situations. Separate anomalies shall be included in the drill package to challenge in-hull responders, on-scene
responders, each branch in the ECC, and the EOC/ROC. Some examples of anomalies that can occur include:
(1) A failed shipboard (permanent or temporary) casualty reporting and/or announcing system (e.g., CASCON,
1MC, 4MC) delaying initial and subsequent reporting and/or announcing of a shipboard casualty.
(2) Loss of permanent or temporary (e.g., radio) communications between the Fire Operations Section (e.g.,
CASCON Station and/or DCC) and the in-hull location of the fire.
(3) Injured personnel that require medical evacuation. This shall include anomalies where non-ambulatory
evacuation from the ship is required.

ACN 2/A
(4) Ruptured fire hose(s) or loss of pressure (e.g., failed booster pump).
(5) Ruptured hydraulic or high pressure air header (particularly if not secured by the team in a timely manner).
(6) Ineffective CO2 extinguisher.
(7) NFTI battery failure.
(8) Fire reported in the wrong location or unable to initially identify the location.
(9) Compromise or loss of a primary bridge line.
(10) Failure of an SCBA (e.g., SCBA found non-functioning after SF donning, resulting in response delays).
j. Anomalies shall be selected so that each is regularly exercised during this drill along with the periodic drills
required by chapter 12.
k. Off-yard F&ES mutual aid support may be simulated. If simulated, the scenario shall include realistic arrival
times for the support.
l. Public affairs.
(1) Include a simulated press availability or conference. This shall be conducted after drill termination but on
the same day.
(2) For each drill, there shall be a number of simulated public inquiries from outside agencies, news media
(newspapers, television, and radio stations), and private citizens. These shall include news outlets at the
local and national (broadcast and cable) levels. The drill team shall include members as role players for this
simulated media and private inquiries, and measures shall be in place to prevent actual information
exchange.
(3) The number of press inquiries and their complexity shall be prepared to challenge the state of training of the
installation’s public affairs organization and is expected to increase over time as this capability improves.
Public Affairs shall use Appendix N when issuing statements in response to press inquiries.
m. Outside agency participation. The drill shall include simulation for information exchange with outside agencies
that would be expected to be involved during an actual casualty. These include local Coast Guard and state
emergency management, health, environment and law enforcement agencies. The drill package shall include the
means for simulating and controlling interface with these agencies. It is appropriate to occasionally exercise
actual exchange with these agencies rather than it be simulated. In those cases, the drill package, when submitted
to NAVSEA (CNRMC for RMCs) and CNIC, shall identify the specific degree of involvement by any of these
agencies and control measures taken to ensure that it is clearly understood that their involvement is an exercise.
n. Require sustained and accurate communication of the event with the ECC, the Installation EOC, and the ROC.
o. For drills where the simulated fire is confined to non-propulsion spaces, the drill package shall be written to
require expected actions in the engine room (e.g., watch-standers don breathing protection) in response to the
casualty, and an evaluation of contingency actions to address a potential spread of the fire or its effects
(smoke/water) to the engineering spaces or disruption of services to and from the propulsion plant.
p. An integrated on-scene rehabilitation area(s) and staging station for all firefighters (SF, F&ES, other ships’ crew,
and mutual aid) will be established and exercised.
q. The drill scenario shall include a SRCA missing person(s) to ensure a means to evaluate the effectiveness of the
muster and accountability process.
13.2 DRILL EVALUATION. Drill evaluation shall include the following:
a. An overall assessment of the effective application of the firefighting principles and accomplishment of the EFRS
attribute standards in the SRCA’s FRP, and appendices A and C of this manual.

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b. Performance by the ECC and ROC/EOC team in providing technical assistance and advice to the on-scene
Incident Management Structure, logistics support, liaison with state and local emergency management officials,
and coordination and communications with cognizant Naval Commands (NAVSEA, NAVSEA 08, CNIC,
CNRMC, and Fleet/TYCOM).
c. Media-related actions.
d. Emergency medical triage, treatment of injured personnel, and transport area.
e. Ability of the response team to clear temporary service lines from access points, and isolate sources of energy
from the scene of the fire, including electrical power, hydraulics, fuels, lubricating oils, and high pressure air.
f. Adequacy and effective use of the incident command post and its designated location.
g. Plan to deploy mutual aid support in an orderly, effective manner, including fire lane discipline before and during
the response and off/ on-scene staging of additional responding resources. If mutual aid is simulated, elements of
the simulated response should be evaluated where practical.
h. Ability to replenish firefighting equipment, and other required logistics support. This will include a
demonstration of the ability to replenish and recharge expended SCBA cylinders.
i. On-scene coordination between the SRCA’s ERT, SF, other ship crews, F&ES, and mutual aid responders. This
shall include firefighter accountability procedures shipboard and in the IDLH, and the level of integrated
response.
j. The team’s ability to develop and execute a firefighting strategy based on fire type and location for the attributes
in 13.1.g and 13.1.h.
k. The ERT’s ability to respond to the drill anomalies.
l. The effectiveness of the integrated rehabilitation area(s) and on-scene staging area.
13.3 DRILL TEAM, GUIDES, AND POST-EVENT EVALUATION.
13.3.1 Major Fire Drill Team. The SRCA shall establish a team of trained personnel that have the requisite experience
and knowledge to prepare for, and execute, extended fire drills. These positions shall include drill initiators, simulation
providers, safety observers, and drill evaluators. This team will supplement and be integrated with the drill controllers for
radiological emergency response drills (NPWs only). The Ship and Installation/Region training department personnel
shall be included as part of the drill team.
13.3.2 Drill Evaluators. Senior drill evaluators shall be assigned to evaluate the performance of in-hull responders, the
Incident Command Post, on-scene responders, and each branch in the ECC and the EOC/ROC. Evaluators from the
SRCA, ship, and Region/Installation shall be included and led by the senior evaluator from the SRCA. These evaluators
shall be qualified for the senior position being evaluated (e.g., ECC/EOC Director for ECC/EOC, Command and Control,
Public Affairs Officer (PAO), Liaison Branch/Section, In-hull Incident Command, Fire Chief for In-Hull Firefighting and
Integrated Operations Section). Prior to the drill, each evaluator shall review the drill package and identify the expected
response actions of the team they are evaluating. These expected actions shall include expected times by which actions
should be taken and expected response to anomalies. In addition, appropriate evaluators shall tour the selected ship before
the drill and pre-drill brief. Prior to the drill, the SRCA shall conduct an interactive brief with the entire drill team (drill
controllers, role players, and evaluators) to validate the team's readiness to conduct the drill and evaluate drill responder
performance.
13.3.3 Drill Guide. A drill guide shall be prepared using the following guidelines. For NPWs, the drill guide shall also be
prepared using the guidelines in reference (c).
13.3.3.1 Provide a realistic scenario that establishes the following:
a. A drill timeline that includes a time-based description of the spread of the fire that will depend on the timeliness
of response actions. For example, fires in wireways may spread to the next compartment unless a fire hose is
brought to bear within 5 minutes.

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b. A set of initial conditions.

c. Initiation point and cause of the fire.
d. Post initiation anomalies, with a set of special scenarios identified in reference (a) or (b) included.
e. Alternate outcomes based on the team’s response to the casualty. It is expected that the drill’s complexity will
cause the drill to be an extended fire response event.
13.3.3.2 The drill guide should list a set of objectives for each drill. One objective shall be evaluation of the effectiveness
of actions taken to address significant drill findings noted during fire drills since the prior annual drill.
13.3.3.3 The drill guide shall address the progress of the casualty, and its effect on ship and ship’s systems conditions.
This section will include assumptions and calculations (if any were employed) used to determine the spread of the fire and
its containment/extinguishment.
13.3.3.4 The guide shall include a section to document the response performance for those attributes included in appendix
C of this manual. These attributes collectively are referred to as the Engineered Fire Response Strategy (EFRS), and the
drill guide shall evaluate each area.
13.3.3.5 Provisions shall be in place to terminate the drill in the event there is an actual injury on the ship, or ship systems
are placed in unsafe conditions.
13.3.3.6 Provisions shall be in place to respond to an actual casualty at the SRCA that would require emergency response
during the drill. This may include terminating the drill if the casualty is significant.
13.3.3.7 Effort shall be made to produce the most realistic fire scenario possible, without risking personnel injury or
equipment damage. For example, vision should be impacted by obscurement devices simulating smoke, and access to
areas might be prevented by monitors to simulate challenges from the heat and to evaluate the capability to execute
alternate firefighting strategies. Use of live firefighting agents (charged hose or CO2 bottle), and dressing in full
firefighting ensemble shall be employed to replicate the challenges of moving through the ship. Personnel wearing
SCBAs shall be “on-air” when operating in the drill scenario’s IDLH. After hoses are charged, the water supply valve
shall be shut, to avoid a large water spill should a nozzle be accidently bumped open.
13.3.3.8 Simulations for the casualty drill response shall be minimized. This will require advanced pre-drill actions and
additional safety observers during the drill. For example, for fire hoses to be safely pressurized, hoses shall be validated to
be within their test periodicity before the drill, and safety observers shall be assigned to ensure water is not released into
the ship inadvertently. Ship and temporary systems (e.g., ship’s service hydraulics, affected electrical distribution systems,
ship and aviation fuel and lube oil, temporary high pressure air that can be secured consistent with ship and plant safety)
should be operated in the same manner as they would be during an actual casualty.
13.3.3.9 Personnel exemptions from the drill shall be rare and when required, minimized. Exemption requests shall be
submitted by the cognizant SRCA manager or fire chief and approved by the evaluation FSC.
13.3.3.10 The drill guide shall include drill control monitor(s) charged with the responsibility of preventing and reporting
any significant or abnormal water leakage from charged hoses and any other water sources aboard a ship during a drill.
These drill control monitors shall have the ability to immediately stop the drill in the event of water leakage they deem
hazardous to the ship, and/or ships equipment.
13.3.4 Drill Hotwash. A drill hotwash shall be conducted by the response team immediately after drill termination.
During the hotwash, the drill team shall interject, if necessary, to ensure that the major comments from the drill are
captured.
13.3.5 Drill Evaluation Team. Following the response team hotwash, the drill evaluation team shall meet to compile any
additional comments observed by the drill evaluators. The drill evaluation team shall go through the expected and actual
actions, and base any comments on the gaps between the two. The drill team shall reach agreement on the major
comments and the overall grade, and for drills evaluated by a CNRMC/NAVSEA and CNIC Evaluation Team, be prepared
to brief the results to the Evaluation Team by 0800 the following day.

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13.3.6 Evaluation of Simulated Press Conference/Availability. The drill team shall evaluate the performance of the
simulated press conference/availability.
13.3.7 NAVSEA and CNIC Review. Each SRCA shall submit their approved drill package, endorsed by the respective
Installation/Navy Region Commander (where applicable), to NAVSEA (CNRMC for RMCs), and CNIC for review not
later than three weeks before the scheduled drill date. This shall include assessment guides the SRCA drill team will use
to evaluate drill performance. Private SRCAs shall submit their drill packages via the cognizant SUPSHIP or RMC.
Naval Ship Repair Facility and Japan Regional Maintenance Center (SRF-JRMC) shall submit their drill package to CPF
and CNIC.
13.3.8 Drill Brief, Execution, and Debrief Schedule. The SRCA drill team shall provide the drill brief, execution, and
debrief schedule to NAVSEA (CNRMC for RMCs) and CNIC.
13.3.9 Written Evaluations/Reports. Written evaluations/reports including corrective actions and recommendations for
improvement shall be produced and formally issued by the SRCA following the drill. Major deficiencies should be
documented with responsible organizations and completion dates for causal analysis and corrective actions specified.
Minor deficiencies do not require causal analysis, but should be tracked in the SRCA’s Deficiency Reporting and Tracking
System, and responsible organizations shall take appropriate actions to correct minor deficiencies. This report shall be
prepared within 1 month of the drill with distribution to SEA 04, SEA 05, SEA 08 (NPWs only), SEA 09, SEA 07
(Submarines), SEA 21 (Surface Ships), PMS 312 (CVNs), CNIC, CNRMC (Surface Ships), CPF (SRF-JRMC), cognizant
ISIC, TYCOM, NAVSEA 04X SFR, NRRO and NRMO, UFFC, and Navy Region (N3/7).
13.3.10 Nuclear Powered Warships. For NPWs, planning, execution and evaluation of the drill shall comply with the
requirements of references (c) and (d). If evaluated with a grade of “satisfactory”, it will satisfy the drill requirement of
Article 109 to reference (d) once every 2 years. For CVNs, the drill must be conducted in the propulsion spaces to satisfy
this requirement.
13.3.11 Nonnuclear Powered Warships At Private Repair SRCAs. SRCAs located in the same region and supported by
the same fire department (e.g., Norfolk and San Diego) may satisfy the annual requirement by conducting the drill at one
SRCA and the others observe and/or participate under the guidance and approval of the RMC. To ensure all SRCAs
experience the drill, it should be rotated among them each year.

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Chapter 14
SPECIAL SUBMARINE SHIPBOARD FIRE HAZARDS
References
(a) S9086-S3-STM-020, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 555, Volume 2, Submarine Firefighting
(b) S9086-G1-STM-010, Naval Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 223, Volume 1, Submarine Storage Batteries
(c) S6360-AD-HBK-010, Technical Handbook for Special Hull Treatment Maintenance and Repair for Submarines
(d) S6360-AV-MMA-010, Maintenance and Repair Manual for VIRGINIA Class Submarine Special Hull Treatment
Introduction
This chapter is specific to submarines and provides special protection requirements and risk mitigations associated with
submarine battery compartments and charging operations, and fires associated with Special Hull Treatment (SHT) tiles in
drydock. These two instances, specifically, present unique fire hazards and situations presented during industrial
maintenance periods and require additional precautions to mitigate the associated risks. The requirements contained here-in
are consistent with the technical requirements contained in references (a) through (d). Each SRCA that performs submarine
construction and maintenance availabilities is encouraged to develop additional means of mitigating the risks associated with
these unique fire hazards and gain FSC approval for implementing these additional methods.
14.1 GENERAL. Submarines have inherent fire hazards that could result in catastrophic consequences if a fire or casualty
involving these hazards occurs while a submarine is in an industrial availability. Therefore, it is imperative that personnel
who are managing and executing industrial work in and around these hazards are aware of their presence, take prudent
precautions to avert their involvement in a fire, and have knowledge of actions to be taken should such an event occur to
preserve the safety of all personnel and the rest of the ship. This chapter provides an extract of information from reference
(a).
14.2 BATTERY COMPARTMENT CASUALTIES.
14.2.1 General. Examples of battery compartment (well) casualties include a short-term electrical short circuit in the battery,
a class A fire involving materials in the battery compartment, an uncontrolled battery discharge, and a hydrogen explosion.
See references (a) and (b) for more guidance. The battery is considered to be installed whenever one or more battery cells are
present in the battery compartment.
14.2.2 Hydrogen Explosion. For prevention of a hydrogen explosion, see reference (b). Ignition of a hydrogen enriched
atmosphere results in an explosion which can cause structural deformation, damage to ship systems, and secondary fires in
combustible material. If the cause of hydrogen formation is not corrected, a hydrogen enriched atmosphere may reform, and
follow-on explosions can occur. Therefore, efforts shall be focused on preventing reformation of a hydrogen enriched
atmosphere. For additional information and procedures concerning the battery see reference (b).
14.2.2.1 Flooding of a battery compartment with cells installed can result in the formation of hydrogen via electrolysis of the
water by the energy stored in the battery cells. Therefore, it is imperative that flooding of the battery compartment via
pipe/hose rupture or firefighting water run-off is avoided. The following direction is provided when the main storage battery
is installed:
a. SRCA in conjunction with SF shall ensure the battery compartment hatches/doors are secured immediately upon
exiting the space and remain closed when personnel are not in the space. This includes securing of hatches/doors
when exiting for an emergency where compartment occupants are not in imminent threat of danger.
b. During battery cell loading and unloading:
(1) SRCA shall provide a temporary closure to enable sealing of the compartment in the event of a fire or
flooding. Where temporary closures are not practical, coamings of adequate height to delay water intrusion

Original
should be installed around the opening. Such coamings should be at least 4 inches in height. Actual coaming
height should take into consideration the ship’s list and trim angle. Types of openings include: temporary
access cuts, bolted access plates and personnel access hatches where the hatch closure will be rendered out of
commission. Coaming shall be installed prior to the cutting, or opening of such accesses.
(2) Battery cell loading and unloading should be considered a safety of ship item, and controlled by the ship safety
officer at the work control level through the ship safety council or equivalent. The associated precautions shall
include as a minimum:
(a) Debussing of cells prior to opening cell access.
(b) Installation of temporary closure or coaming described above.
(c) Provision of training regarding the hazards of a flooded battery compartment to ship’s crew, those
personnel executing the evolution, and those working in the vicinity of the battery compartment during
the evolution.
(d) Minimize duration of the loading and unloading sequence with consideration of working evolution round
the clock (24 hours/day) until complete to minimize period of battery compartment flooding
vulnerability.
(e) Pre-staging of equipment capable of removing firefighting water from the battery compartment at a rate
to prevent compartment flooding in the event it is not able to be sealed during a fire.
14.3 SPECIAL HULL TREATMENT (SHT) FIRES IN DRYDOCK.
14.3.1 General. Special Hull Treatment (SHT) materials are installed on the outside surfaces of submarines and may be a
fire hazard when the ship is in drydock and the material is exposed. The limited quantity of SHT exposed topside when a
submarine is in the water is not considered a significant fire hazard because of the lack of ignition sources, the limited surface
area, and the horizontal orientation which reduces flame spread.
14.3.2 SHT Materials. SHT consists of thick, flat tile, or materials molded in place. Tiles are attached to the submarine hull
by an epoxy adhesive. For additional information on SHT see references (c) and (d).
14.3.3 Flammability and Fire Spread. Testing has shown that these materials can be ignited by hot welding splatter. Other
ignition sources in a drydock include exposure to flames or heat such as from a small trash can fire or through hull cuts from
a fire internal to the submarine. In addition, SHT shall be monitored for signs of ignition via conduction through the hull
when a significant fire is occurring within the submarine. Where ignition via conduction is suspected or anticipated, exterior
cooling of the SHT via hose streams is recommended. See references (c) and (d) for hot work precautions near SHT.
14.3.4 SHT Flammability. SHT will readily ignite if exposed to the sources of ignition described above. Some forms of
SHT drip when they burn and will form a pool of burning material in the drydock. This burning pool will make the fire
larger by supporting continued combustion of the SHT above it, and spreading the fire to other materials. Flaming SHT tiles
will flake off to expose unburned material deeper in the tile for further burning. Flaming pieces of the base material will fall
into the drydock and support continued combustion of SHT, and fire will spread to other materials.
14.3.5 Fire Spread. Fires involving SHT quickly spread vertically up the submarine hull as hot smoke rises with the fire
plume to heat and support fire spread. Horizontal spread of the fire occurs when the flames meet an obstruction such as
scaffolding. The fire will spread to adjacent materials, such as wood scaffolding or staging, temporary enclosures, scrap, etc.,
due to direct contact with flames, exposure to intense heat, or windy conditions.
14.3.6 Extinguishing Methods. Water or AFFF will easily extinguish SHT fires, and is the recommended method. PKP may
also be effective for initial flame knock down on the surface of the burning material. However, the potential for reflash is
high, and therefore PKP shall only be employed when water or AFFF availability is delayed. The burning material shall be
cooled sufficiently to prevent reflash. Application of water or AFFF will remove heat and extinguish the fire.

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14.3.7 Fire Attack.

14.3.7.1 The fire watch assigned to monitor conditions outside of the ship’s hull during hot work that could affect SHT
material shall have available, as a minimum, a 2½ gallon AFFF fire extinguisher, 2½ gallon water fire extinguisher, or
(preferably) a ¾ inch hose charged with water.
14.3.7.2 Rig fire hoses from the nearest 1½ inch drydock fire hose station to the location of the fire, and attack the fire. Be
aware of intense heat and thick smoke produced by the fire. Directing hose streams onto unburned areas of the hull next to
and above the burning area may be effective to prevent fire spread. Fire attack from the drydock floor, if possible, may
provide easier access to the fire with less exposure to heat and smoke. Application of water from drydock wing walls may be
effective if hose streams will reach the fire. Wind will affect stream reach and could prevent extinguishment. When fighting
the fire, be aware of the following issues:
a. Fire may spread beneath the submarine and up the opposite side of the hull.
b. Heat transfer through the hull, or in the presence of hull cuts, may spread the fire to areas inside the submarine.
c. Until the area involved in the fire has been completely cooled, reflash is likely.
d. Smoke and heat may impede safe egress of personnel in the submarine.
e. Fires internal to a submarine could result in SHT ignition via fire or hot gas exhaust near SHT or via conduction
through the hull. Where ignition is suspected or anticipated, SHT shall be cooled with hose streams.

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ACN 2/A
APPENDIX A
PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE FOR A SHIPBOARD FIRE
A-1.1 Evacuate all non-essential personnel from affected ship1 and drydock.
a. Ensure Project Team (including contractors), Technical Codes, and Ship’s Force have accounted for all personnel.
b. Notify the Incident Command of any missing personnel and their assigned work area.
c. Isolate the affected drydock, downwind, and adjacent areas.
d. Ascertain the safety of in-hull roving and maneuvering watch standers.
e. Verify workers have placed their worksites in a safe condition.
Note 1. Entire ship evacuation for non-essential personnel is required for submarines and the affected fire zone(s) in
surface ships. For surface ships, SRCA FRPs shall include procedures for expanded ship evacuation based on location,
ship conditions (e.g., fuel, weapons load), and the progress of the fire to ensure worker safety and firefighting efforts are
not inhibited.
A-1.2 Assess and take Action to Contain and Extinguish the Fire.
a. Verify SF immediate and rapid response actions of the FRP are complete. Verify results of these actions.
b. Determine the exact location of fire. Track the status of fire growth and compartments and hatches affected by
smoke (fire and smoke boundaries). Re-evaluate evacuation plan (see Note 1 above)
c. Ensure NFTI Operator is deployed.
d. Classify the Fire. Determine and isolate the main fuel source as applicable.
a. Determine optimum use of available firefighting/fire suppression agents (water, low and high expansion foam, inert
gas suppression systems, etc.).
f. Obtain the status of all “high energy” systems or combustible material that could be affected by the fire. Secure all
non-essential services to the affected compartment.
g. Determine status of the reactor plant (NPW only) – pressure and pressure control method, temperature and
evolutions in progress.
h. Assess safety risks to (reactor plant – NPW only) watch standers.
i. Contain the fire.
j. Extinguish the fire.
A-1.3 Track and deploy firefighting resources to the affected ship.
a. Ready relief crews and DC gear from unaffected ships. Deploy relief crews as requested by the Ship’s CO.
b. Establish the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT).
c. Ensure sufficient numbers of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBAs) are deployed to scene.
d. Ensure SCBA Re-charging capability is deployed and established.
e. Deploy dewatering systems/resources (e.g., pumps/pump trucks/personnel) as required.
f. Deploy additional SRCA resources (e.g., service hoses) to the scene.
g. Ready crane, rigging, and personnel box support as required.
h. Coordinate requests for mutual aid support as required.
i. Track firefighting resources (e.g., firefighters or equipment on-scene, staged, and enrooted).
A-1.4 Establish On-Scene Command & Control.
a. Ensure Ship CO, F&ES, and SRCA/RMC Representatives are collocated at the established In-hull Incident
Command Post.
b. Establish the Integrated In-hull Operations Section.
c. Establish and control access to the IDLH zone.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A-1

ACN 2/A
d. Establish staging area for incoming support resources.
e. Establish integrated Rehabilitation area for firefighters and other response personnel.
f. Ensure accountability is maintained and controlled for all responders entering the ship, affected drydock, and
Rehabilitation center.
g. Establish a small triage, treatment, and transport section managed by trained Emergency medical technicians.
h. Ensure F&ES representative is dispatched to the ECC.
A-1.5 Establish and Maintain Communications.
a. Internal
(1) Establish in-hull communications plan for firefighting teams.
(a) Determine status of Shipboard Broadcast Driver Architecture (BDA) Enterprise Land Mobile Radio
(ELMR) and/or Wirefree Communications (WIFCOM) systems.
(b) Determine status of Ship’s communications systems (e.g., MC and sound-powered phone circuits, WIFI,
CASCON, and radios)
(c) Implement local fire incident communications plan to include deployment of technology solutions for
interoperability.
(d) Establish relay system if in-hull communications are not available.
(2) Establish communications with the affected ship.
(a) Establish communications with Damage Control and CASCON Station (Ship’s Command Link, ELMR
Radio).
(b) Establish communications with Maneuvering (phone (e.g., JA) circuits, Ship’s Data Link, ELMR Radio).
b. External
(1) Establish communications with/between Base/Installation/RMC EOC and the ROC.
(a) ROC Command Bridge Line and CNIC C4I Suite.
(b) If co-located, dispatch Liaisons to ROC and EOC. Request Command and Logistics Branch Liaisons from
Region.
(2) Establish Communications with Navy Headquarters.
(a) Engineering Technical Branch on NAVSEA Nonnuclear Technical Bridge.
(b) Environmental, Safety, and Health Technical Branch on NAVSEA Environmental, Safety, & Health
Bridge.
(c) ROC and EOC on NAVSEA Command and Control, PAO, Logistics, Nonnuclear Technical, and ESH
bridges.
A-1.6 Provide technical assistance to SF and F&ES in the development of the fire attack plan.
a. Assist with the development of the Tactical Attack Plan, including optimum use of available firefighting agents.
b. Determine and track status of ingress /egress points and pathways.
(1) Brows/Material Highways.
(2) Hatches and Hatch Enclosures.
c. Assist with the development of a Ventilation/De-smoking plan.
(1) Identify all Hull Cuts and status of lines and service leads.
(2) Identify and determine status of any additional hull and water tight openings to the affected space.
(3) Ready material and response teams to secure openings as required.
(4) Conduct risk assessment of forced ventilation.
d. Keep hull coatings cool (Special Hull Treatment (SHT), Radar Absorbent Material (RAM), Passive Countermeasure
System (PCMS)).

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e. Identify and develop plan for all potential hazards for firefighting personnel (combustible, hazardous, explosive, and
radiological).
f. Develop dewatering plan, including evaluation of ship stability.
A-1.7 Identify and determine the status of all work.
a. Affected ship and drydock.
(1) Hot Work.
(2) High Energy Systems.
(3) Battery (Submarines Only).
(4) Radiological (NPW only).
(5) Confined Space/Containment Work.
b. Other Work.
(1) Unaffected projects/ships.
(2) NAVFAC, MILCON, Facilities projects.
A-1.8 Identify and determine status of all Ship Systems.
a. Obtain and track the status of all Ship Systems affecting or being affected by the fire.
b. Conduct risk assessment of all Ship Systems (Air, Electrical, Mechanical - Permanent and Temporary)
c. Develop plan for restoration of shore power and/or use of temporary power to support and sustain ship’s condition.
A-1.9 Environmental, Safety and Health.
a. Account for tracking of all injuries/fatalities to ensure accurate information is provided.
b. Identify and evaluate impact of hazardous materials involved in the fire. Provide precautionary/protective action
recommendations.
c. Obtain and assess air, land, and water sample data. Provide protective action recommendations as required.
d. Make required Federal, State, and Navy Region notifications (verbal and written).
e. Develop plan for control of firefighting effluent.
f. Assist with the development of a recovery plan (health assessment for re-entry of ship spaces and downwind areas
and facilities).
A-1.10 Public Affairs. Provide timely, accurate and meaningful information to the public.
a. Prepare a holding statement within 15 minutes of manning Public Affairs. This is not intended to be a full press
statement, but is a preliminary statement to acknowledge that a shipboard fire has occurred. It should be written in a
manner to answer expected initial press inquiries. It should not be an official release (i.e., not on command letter
head) and shall only be provided upon request.
b. The first press statement providing more details shall be ready within the next 30 minutes and should be updated as
new information is available, approximately every 30 minutes.
c. Press statement should be sent to the state(s) officials responsible for emergency management. These officials
should acknowledge the content of each press statement before they are released to the press, in particular any
recommendations being made to the state regarding public response to the fire.
d. Keep the Command and Control Group informed of significant media interest.
e. Discuss the need for a press conference or press availability; its timing, location, and officials designated to be the
spokesperson(s). These details shall be staffed by Public Affairs and then briefed to the Command and Control
Group.
f. Ensure that information being developed by Public Affairs for dissemination to the media and then to the public
contains the proper perspective on the impact of the event.
g. Develop statements periodically to be used to provide information to the SRCA work force. A statement shall be
prepared near the end of each work shift to provide the latest information as the workers depart.

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APPENDIX B
FULLY DEVELOPED INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR
SHIPBOARD FIRE EMERGENCY
Figure B-1 Incident Management Structure for Shipboard Fire Emergency (Fully Developed)
NOTES:
 The Incident Management Structure for Shipboard Fire Emergency is consistent with radiological emergency
response organization (RERO) responsibilities and procedures for NPWs.
 The ship’s CO or his designee will serve as the In-Hull Incident Commander.
 The ship’s CO is overall in charge and accountable for actions on/in the ship. The ship’s CO, or his designated
alternate, as the In-Hull Incident Commander, is responsible for setting the goals and objectives of the in-hull
casualty mitigation efforts.
 The Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES) Chief/Senior F&ES Officer (at scene) and Project Superintendent will
integrate to take appropriate actions to achieve the goals and objectives of the In-Hull Incident Commander as part
of the incident command staff.
 The In-Hull Incident Commander, with the support of the F&ES Chief/Senior F&ES Officer is responsible for the
safety, accountability, and well-being of the integrated F&ES, SF, and mutual aid firefighting resources.
 The F&ES Chief/Senior F&ES Officer shall advise the In-Hull Incident Commander of the risks associated with
executing the objectives/actions so that the In-Hull Incident Commander can modify the objectives/actions if
necessary.
 The first arriving F&ES Chief/Senior F&ES Officer reports to the In-Hull Incident Commander and will integrate as
part of the in-hull incident command staff and will remain with the In-Hull Incident Commander. The F&ES
Officer will offer F&ES resources and capabilities to help combat the casualty. Once the ship accepts assistance
from F&ES with combating the casualty, the next F&ES Chief/Senior F&ES Officer will serve as the In-Hull
Operations Section Chief or assist the In-Hull Operations Section Chief as one of the Tactical Advisors (see notes
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY B-1

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regarding In-Hull Operations Section Chief). Based on the priority dictated by the casualty situation, additional
roles for senior F&ES officers, such as the On-Scene Fire and Rescue Officer and elevation of the In-Hull Safety
Officer to a senior F&ES officer, need to be filled as additional senior F&ES officers arrive. Fire Response Plans
(FRPs) and standard operating procedures should include a means to assemble the necessary number of senior
F&ES officers to staff the above roles.
 The On-Scene Fire and Rescue Officer will be responsible for coordinating RERO requested firefighting actions as
directed by OSIC and will be responsible for ensuring medical attention is provided to off-hull responders.
 The on-duty Senior Security Officer will initially report to the in-hull ICP in order to assist the CO and senior F&ES
officer with the determination and implementation of in-hull and immediate scene related security objectives, until
such time the OSIC ICP has been already established. When the OSIC ICP has been established, the senior security
officer will report to the on-scene operations section to assist with the determination and implementation of security
objectives.
 Upon arrival of the Shipyard OSIC, the OSIC shall report to the In-hull ICP to receive an in-brief from the In-Hull
Incident Commander before assuming duties and establishing the Off-Hull Incident Command Post (ICP). The
OSIC shall coordinate off-hull actions and assist with like functions that fall under the In-Hull Operations Section
through the Project Superintendent.
 “In-Hull” is a generic term referring to actions that take place in, on, or immediately adjacent to the ship where the
incident is occurring.
 “On-scene” and “Off-Hull” in the context of this construct refers to the portion of the command structure and
associated activities that occur off of and NOT immediately adjacent to the hull where the incident is occurring.
 The ship’s CO is the supported commander and the SY OSIC is the supporting commander for the fire as depicted
by the dashed line in Figure B-1.
 NOTE: Coordination of the EOC and ECC roles, responsibilities, and actions shall be addressed by the FRP.
Figure B-2 Integrated In-Hull Operations Section (Fully Developed)

NOTES:
 The In-Hull Operations Section Chief position shall be filled by an experienced/DC trained member of SF (e.g.,
the DCA, Command Master Chief) or a senior F&ES officer at the discretion of the In-Hull Incident Commander.
Selection of the In-Hull Operations Section Chief by the In-Hull Incident Commander should be based on the nature
and circumstances of the casualty/response, including, but not limited to, whether the majority of casualty
responders are/will be SF or F&ES/mutual aid members.
 The In-Hull Operations Section Chief is supported by Tactical Advisors which include a senior F&ES officer (if
the In-Hull Operations Section Chief is SF) or an experienced/DC trained member of SF (if the In-Hull Operations

Original
Section Chief is a senior F&ES officer) and a designated SY manager (e.g., Deputy or Assistant PS, the Ship’s
Safety Officer, Temporary Service Coordinator).
 The In-Hull Operations Section Chief is responsible for establishing the firefighting tactical direction to achieve
the goals/objectives identified by the In-Hull Incident Commander.
 The In-Hull Operations Section Chief will ensure operations efforts are accomplished utilizing the integrated team
of SF, F&ES personnel, and mutual aid to take most advantage of the skills/knowledge that each group offers.
 Fire Suppression/Rescue is the integrated team combating the fire. Integrated SF and F&ES teams are highly
recommended when combating the fire as early as possible to preserve the availability of both resources (SF and
F&ES). In all cases, a SF member will integrate with the F&ES teams employed.
 In-Hull Trade/Services Branch is responsible for securing/operation of shipboard systems and temporary systems
such as power, ventilation, air, etc.
 MIC Pier Support position is served by an integrated partnership between SF, SY, and F&ES to provide
firefighting support immediately adjacent to the ship.
 Rehabilitation. A rehabilitation area compliant to the standard of reference (v) of chapter 3 of this manual shall be
established by direction of the IMS. It shall be an integrated area adjacent to the pier efforts/personnel staging to
refresh SF, SY, F&ES and mutual aid prior to personnel being assembled into new teams in the personnel staging
area. Where the size of the incident or weather conditions dictate a need to relocate the rehabilitation area away
from the immediate area of the affected ship (e.g., field, parking lot, building remote from pier/dock area),
management of this function may be shifted to the OSIC under the supervision of the On-Scene Fire and Rescue
Officer.
 Medical monitoring in the rehabilitation area will be performed by a certified emergency medical technician
(EMT) trained specifically in the function of firefighter on-scene rehabilitation/screening and use of an automatic
external defibrillator (AED).
 The Personnel Staging area is the designated area where SF, F&ES, other ships’ crew, and Mutual Aid firefighters
ready for deployment are in-briefed, staged, and assembled into teams. Personnel that successfully complete
rehabilitation will report to the personnel staging area and become part of the resources available for deployment.
 The Apparatus Staging area that is within “Operations” houses apparatus resources that have been provided to the
in-hull organization for near term deployment. For large incidents involving great amounts of external apparatus, it
is recommended that the OSIC “Logistics” section establish a remote staging area where assets can be staged and
called as necessary by “Operations”.
 Medical Branch is an F&ES function, with possible support by trained SF, responsible to triage, treat and transport
injured personnel.
 The Branch/Group “blocks” depicted above are event driven. Some of the blocks may not be necessary for
particular event types while other unique events may dictate the need to establish additional
branches/groups/divisions.

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APPENDIX C
ENGINEERED FIRE RESPONSE STRATEGY
In coordination among NAVSEA firefighting working groups, numerous firefighting and fire safety capability changes
have been made and incorporated as FRP requirements in this manual. Improvements include shipyard firefighter
manning increases, increase to and standardization of firefighting and support equipment, enhanced training, installation of
fire detection sensors, and needed procedural improvements. These changes intuitively are expected to prevent fires and if
they occur, mitigate the risk of damage to the ship.
A preliminary standard set of response capabilities to include firefighting personnel, equipment and expected response
times have been determined. These have been exercised and validated during extended submarine exercises. Collectively,
these are the Engineered Fire Response Strategy (EFRS) attributes. It is expected the times listed will be different based
on numerous variables. Each SRCA shall evaluate their specific circumstances and establish times and response
capabilities to complete Table C-1 and incorporate the completed Table into the FRP.
A more rigorous analysis to evaluate the enhanced FRPs to ensure they have sufficient capability to control and extinguish
a shipboard fire in time to prevent significant damage is in progress. This analysis is applying engineering principles to
evaluate the firefighting capability attributes based on current knowledge and supplemented by modeling and future
lessons learned. The result will be a modification to existing requirements and SRCA FRPs to match capability to
requirements.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C-1

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Table C-1. Engineered Fire Response Strategy Attributes.

Typical Response Timelines and Capabilities
Response Level Attributes
(Note 1)
Smoke and Heat Number of detectors As specified for each ship class in Chapter 6
Detection and
Reporting Location of detectors
Distance from the source to the smoke and heat

detector
Circuitry time response to CASCON/DCC
Time response from CASCON/DCC to emergency

dispatch center
Personnel Time to detect and report the Fire 0-5 minutes

Detection and
Reporting Time response from emergency dispatch center to
90 seconds
Fire Station
Incipient/Rapid CO2 Bottle/other agents capacity

Response
Location of CO2 bottles and any other agents used to
attack fire
Time to begin attack with CO2/other agents < 1 minute
Time to man and bring quick response hose reel to

scene
SF Immediate Establish In-Hull Communications 5 minutes

Response
Time to secure ventilation into/out of ship 5 minutes
Time to execute Temporary Services Isolation List 15 minutes
Time to Rig the Ship or Set Conditions for the

Casualty (e.g., Fire, General Emergency, Primary 10-15 minutes
and Secondary Fire Boundaries)
Number of Responders
SF Transition to SF time to travel to DC locker/DCC 3 minutes

Integrated
Response SF time to don SCBAs and FFEs 5 minutes
SF Travel time from DC locker/DCC topside to

3-5 minutes
scene

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Table C-1. Engineered Fire Response Strategy Attributes. (Cont.)
Typical Response Timelines and Capabilities

Response Level Attributes
(Note 1)
F&ES Response F&ES duration to don FFEs 1 minute
F&ES duration to Travel from Fire Station to ship’s

7 minutes
brow
F&ES time to travel from ship’s brow to scene

Establish Primary/Secondary Water sources. Engine
connected to nearest hydrant with a charged manned
10-15 minutes
supply line established across ship’s brow or
connected to the manifolds FDC.
Assign F&ES IMS positions: Staging, Rehab,

15-30 minutes
Accountability and Operations
Establish Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) 20 minutes
Establish ICP with Common Communications 10-15minutes
Establish First Integrated Hose Team on-scene

fighting the fire 20 minutes
Integrated Number of fire hoses brought to the scene

Extended
Response Number of F&ES & Mutual Aid Responders
Establish SCBA Recharge Station 30-45 minutes
SCBA Recharge capability
Establish Integrated Rehabilitation Area 30-60 minutes
Rehabilitation Capability/Throughput (FFs/hour

returned to action)
Active De-smoking Capability
Dewatering Capability
NOTE:
1: Time Zero for all Response Times is Activation of SF Alarm. Unless otherwise noted, the times listed are the periods
from the time the casualty is announced.

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APPENDIX D
RAPID RESPONSE DAMAGE CONTROL CONEX BOX, SUBMARINES
DC Equipment Navy Stock Number Quantity

Boots, Firemen’s (select sizes) 20
Boots, Firemen’s size 05 8430-00-753-5935
Cable assembly triple outlet 6150-00-087-0815 2
Chem lights, Green (box of 100) 6260-00-106-7478 2
DC flashlights 6230-00-299-3035 10
Ejector, Jet, 1-1/2 in F Inlet 2-1/2 in M Outlet 4320-01-110-0299 2
Ejector, Jet, 1-1/2” Thread Adapter 1-1/2” NPSH Male to 1-1/2” NH FEMALE 2
Hose 2.5" x 50' 4210-01-131-0247 2
Extinguisher, AFFF Fire 4210-01-147-1091 2
Extinguisher, CO2 Fire 4210-00-203-0217 2
Extinguisher, PKP 4210-00-989-4589 2
Fan, Hose, Ventilation 4720-00-277-7225 3
Fan, Portable Vaneaxial 4140-00-267-0967 1
Fan, Tubeaxial 4140-01-272-6060 2
Fire Protective Gear (FPG) (select sizes) 20
FPG, large reg 4210-01-468-5565
FPG, med reg 4210-01-468-5551
FPG, small reg 4210-01-468-5528
FPG, xl long 4210-01-468-5673
FPG, xl reg 4210-01-468-5671
Gloves, Fire Fighters (Steamblock) (select sizes) 20
Gloves, Fire Fighters jumbo 4210-01-476-5036
Gloves, Fire Fighters large 4210-01-476-5024
Gloves, Fire Fighters medium 4210-01-476-5017
Gloves, Fire Fighters small 4210-01-476-5010
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY D-1

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Gloves, Fire Fighters xlarge 4210-01-476-5031

Gloves, Fire Fighters xsmall 4210-01-476-4994
Helmet with Traklite Part # Bullard FXA1TL 20
Hood, Fire Fighters 8415-01-462-7670 20
Hose, Fire 1-3/4", 50' MIL-H-24606, 1-1/2” NH coupling threads,
4
NOTE 1.
Kit, Band-it See AEL 2
Kit, Material Bag See AEL 2
Kit, Tool Roll See AEL 2
Naval Firefighter’s Thermal Imager (NFTI)
5855-01-493-5907 3
Tallisman K90-SS2000
Nozzle, Vari 1-1/2” MIL-N-24408, 1-1/2” NH (9 TPI) coupling,
4
rated 125gpm @ 100psi, NOTE 1.
PASS Part # SuperPASS 3 or later stand-alone
20
SuperPASS model.
Pump, Portable Submersible 4320-00-368-3186 2
Radio, Portable Qty to support FRP
Configured to support FRP IRCP (Section
IRCP (Section
3.2.22)
3.2.22)
Saw, Reciprocating Part # Milwaukee M28 2
SCBA Harness/Face mask and 45 min Cylinder
4240-01-602-0608 20
(15 year service life)
SCBA Cylinder Protective Sleeve 0099-LL-H96-8598 20
SCBA Spare Cylinder, 45 min (15 year service
0099-LL-H96-8523 20
life) with Protective Sleeve
Smoke Curtain 4210-01-306-7826 4
Streamlight Fire Vulcan LED Part # 44450 5
Streamlight Survivor Flashlight 6230-01-570-6621 20
Streamlight Survivor Bank Charger (5 flashlights) 6130-523-0463 4
NOTE 1 – Equipment shall be permanently marked “NH COUPLING THREADS. NOT COMPATIBLE WITH
INTERIOR SHIP FIRE STATIONS.
Table D-1. Damage Control Equipment Inventory

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TRAC-PAC (above bench) VIDMAR CABINETS VIDMAR CABINETS
SCBA bottles
(below bench)
WORKBENCH
DOUBLE DOOR
8 FEET WIDE
FFE/SCBA-PACKS/MASKS/HELMETS/BOOTS
20 FEET LONG
Figure D-1 Damage Control CONEX Box (Top View)
Radios FWD
Saw-Zaw 3 - (4 plug) – 110 outlets 2 – Florescent light fixture
NFTI
20 feet = 240 inches
3 foot work bench
30” 30” 30” 22 – 1/2” 30” 30” 30”
Figure D-2 Damage Control CONEX Box (Cutaway Inboard Profile, Left)

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FWD
20 feet = 240 inches
Bins for hanging the SCBA pack, FFE, and boots. Flash gear and helmet sit on top.
(SCBA pack hung behind the FFE)
Figure D-3 Damage Control CONEX Box (Cutaway Inboard Profile, Right)
USS MIAMI
CONEX
Radios & lights
BINS
VIDMAR
CABINETS
Figure D-4 Damage Control CONEX Box (Interior View)

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APPENDIX E
SSN-688 CLASS; APPROXIMATE LOCATIONS FOR COMBINATION SMOKE
AND HEAT DETECTORS
Legend: Approximate Location of Combination Smoke and Heat Detector.

Notes: (1) Detector locations are based on a survey of USS PASADENA (SSN 752).
(2) Detector quantities – 48 Forward, 24 Aft, 72 Total.
Figure E-1 First Platform, Forward (SSN-688 Class)
Figure E-2 Second Platform, Forward (SSN-688 Class)
Figure E-3 Third Platform, Forward (SSN-688 Class)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E-1

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Figure E-4 First Platform, Aft (SSN-688 Class)
Figure E-5 Second Platform, Aft (SSN-688 Class)
Figure E-6 Third Platform, Aft (SSN-688 Class)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E-2

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APPENDIX F
SSN-21 CLASS; APPROXIMATE LOCATIONS FOR COMBINATION SMOKE
AND HEAT DETECTORS

Notes: (1) Detector locations are based on a survey of USS CONNECTICUT (SSN 22).
(2) SSN-21 and SSN-22 detector quantities – 56 Forward, 33 Aft, 89 Total.
(3) Quantities of detectors for SSN-23 shall be based on the quantity for SSN-21 with additional detectors added for
the plug area. More detailed quantities and layouts are being developed.
Figure F-1 First Platform, Forward (SSN-21 Class)
Figure F-2 Second Platform, Forward (SSN-21 Class)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY F-1

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Figure F-3 Third Platform, Forward (SSN-21 Class)
Figure F-4 Fourth Platform, Forward (SSN-21 Class)

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Figure F-5 Hold, Forward (SSN-21 Class)
Figure F-6 First Platform, Aft (SSN-21 Class)
Figure F-7 Second Platform, Aft (SSN-21 Class)

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Figure F-8 Third Platform, Aft (SSN-21 Class)

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APPENDIX G
SSN-774 CLASS; APPROXIMATE LOCATIONS FOR COMBINATION
SMOKE AND HEAT DETECTORS

Notes: (1) Detector locations are based on a survey of USS NEW HAMPSHIRE (SSN 778)
(2) Detector quantities – 59 Forward, 21 Aft, 80 Total.
Figure G-1 First Platform, Forward (SSN-774 Class)
Figure G-2 Second Platform, Forward (SSN-774 Class)
Figure G-3 Third Platform, Forward (SSN-774 Class)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY G-1

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Figure G-4 First Platform, Aft (SSN-774 Class)
Figure G-5 Second Platform, Aft (SSN-774 Class)
Figure G-6 Third Platform, Aft (SSN-774 Class)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY G-2

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APPENDIX H
SSBN/SSGN-726 CLASS; APPROXIMATE LOCATIONS FOR COMBINATION
SMOKE AND HEAT DETECTORS

Notes: (1) Detector locations are based on a survey of USS KENTUCKY (SSBN 737).
(2) Detector quantities –55 Forward, 65 Missile Compartment, 31 Aft, 151 Total.
Figure H-1 First Platform, Forward (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)
Figure H-2 Second Platform, Forward (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY H-1

Original
Figure H-3 Third Platform, Forward (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)
Figure H-4 Fourth Platform, Forward (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)
Figure H-5 Hold, Forward (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)

Original
Figure H-6 First Platform, Missile Compartment (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)
Figure H-7 Second Platform, Missile Compartment (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)
Figure H-8 Third Platform, Missile Compartment (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)

Original
Figure H-9 Fourth Platform, Missile Compartment (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)
Figure H-10 Hold, Missile Compartment (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)
Figure H-11 First Platform, Aft (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)

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Figure H-12 Second Platform, Aft (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)
Figure H-13 Third Platform, Aft (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)
Figure H-14 Fourth Platform, Aft (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)

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Figure H-15 Hold, Aft (SSBN/SSGN-726 Class)

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APPENDIX I
COMBINATION SMOKE AND HEAT DETECTOR SPACING
1/ 2S
0.7 S 0.7 S
S S S
2S 2S
1/ 1/
1/
2S
= Combination Smoke/Heat Sensor

S = Space between sensors = 30 feet
Figure I-1 Combination Smoke and Heat Detector Spacing, Smooth Overheads
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I-1

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Figure I-2 Combination Smoke and Heat Detector Spacing [30 ft. Listed Spacing], Rectangular Area
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I-2

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APPENDIX J
SAMPLE AIR AND SMOKE CONTROL CURTAIN AND SOCK
Figure J-1 Sample Air and Smoke Control Curtain
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY J-1

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Figure J-1 Sample Air and Smoke Control Curtain (Cont.)

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Original

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Figure J-2 Sample Air and Smoke Control Sock

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APPENDIX K
DRILL GUIDE AND AUTHORIZATION FORMS
1. Drill Guides will contain the following sections:

a. Title: Brief description of the drill.
b. General Description: This should be a short paragraph amplifying the drill title.
c. Duration: Estimated time from drill initiation to completion.
d. Initial Conditions: Ship conditions (e.g., waterborne, in dock, electric plant configuration, watch condition, etc.)
required before the drill can be initiated.
e. Point of Termination: The point of termination occurs when drill training objectives are met.
f. Final Conditions: Any conditions that restrict ship’s operations that may be present at the end of the drill. The
guide shall ensure that the effects of alternate courses of action are considered.
g. Method of Initiation: Specific initiation and simulation direction to the drill team.
h. A list of post-initiation anomalies, using the special scenarios in references (b) and (c) of chapter 12 of this
manual.
i. Expected Actions: Summary of significant actions expected from the emergency response team. This section
shall include:
(1) Alternate courses of action. The drill or evolution team must understand allowable, safe alternate courses of
action and be prepared to evaluate and safely control them based on the team’s response to the casualty, as
determined by Subject Matter Experts (SME) on the drill team. This section shall include the technical data
that addresses the progress of the casualty and its effect on the ship and ship’s systems (temporary and
permanent) conditions.
(2) Timing. The drill team should understand timing of events and simulations. A drill timeline that includes a
time-based description of the spread of the fire that will depend on the timeliness of response actions is a
useful tool for drill control and evaluation and shall be included. For example, fires in wireways may
spread to the next compartment unless a fire hose is brought to bear within 5 minutes by SF.
(3) Precautions. The drill team, as defined in paragraph 1.j below, must understand precautions necessary to
prevent injury or damage to equipment.
(4) Safety intervention points. Safety intervention points are specific conditions that require action to prevent
personnel injury or equipment damage.
Note: Safety intervention points are assigned to safety observers who have no simulation or monitor duties.
j. Required Personnel: The drill guide shall include a list of personnel required to perform desired simulation
(designated simulators), personnel required to adequately monitor the event (designated monitors), and personnel
necessary to safely conduct the event (designated safety observers). This list shall include assigned tasks and
locations. Simulators, monitors, and safety observers comprise the drill team.
k. Performance criteria. The guide shall include a section to document the time of significant key events and
include criteria for satisfactory performance in meeting these times in compliance with established fire response
standards. These will include at a minimum:
(1) Immediately and accurately reporting the fire, to the CASCON/Quarterdeck and F&ES, from inception.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY K-1

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(2) Immediate response by onboard ship’s watch-standers, response by SF Rapid Response Team/DC repair
lockers personnel, and F&ES arrival at the ship.
(3) F&ES in-hull fighting the fire.
(4) Ambulance arrival or own ship medical staff response.
(5) The effective transition of firefighting from SF only to integrated fire attack teams (SF, other ship crews,
and F&ES responders).
(6) Effectiveness of evacuation and muster of SRCA, AIT, and other non-SF personnel.
2. Drill Authorization Forms (DAF) will be used to approve the conduct of an individual drill and are based on the
applicable, approved drill guide. The authorization form will contain the following information:
a. Purpose: Specifies the training objective of the drill. This section shall not merely reiterate the title of the drill,
as the same drill guide can be used for very different purposes. For example, a fire drill run using a specific drill
guide can be executed primarily to practice immediate response or to fully assess comprehensive firefighting
practices.
b. Point of Termination: Point at which this particular drill will be stopped. This point should be no later than the
termination point specified on the drill guide and will depend on the training objective of the drill.
c. Drill Guide Modifications: This section shall be used to identify minor modifications to the drill guide, if
applicable along with identifying specific details of the drill taken from the guide. For example, the guide shall
list a set of standard anomalies that can be inserted and this (or a separate) section of the DAF can be used to
identify the anomalies that will be exercised for the particular drill. It also should be used to select the specific
method of initiation. For example, the drill guide can be prepared for a Class A fire in a particular space with
multiple means to initiate/sources. The DAF shall be used to provide this specific information.
d. Personnel Assignments: A specific list of simulators, monitors, and safety observers, by name. Safety observers
must be qualified on the watch station or assignment they are observing.
e. Significant or Recurring Deficiencies: List of deficiencies the drill team should look for. These deficiencies can
be derived from a variety of sources, including recent ship/SRCA events, lessons learned, etc.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY K-2

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APPENDIX L
GLOSSARY
ALARM SYSTEM: Generic term for any initiating device and/or notification appliances. In some cases, a single locally
produced component can serve as both an initiating device and notification appliance.
ALTERATION INSTALLATION TEAM (AIT): A unit (military, civilian, or contractor) under the direction of the AIT
Manager, or designated agent of the AIT Manager, that is trained and equipped to accomplish specific alterations on specific
ships.
ANGLE OF APPROACH: The smallest angle made between the road surface and a line drawn from the front point of
ground contact of the front tire to any projection of the apparatus in front of the front axle.
ANGLE OF DEPARTURE: The smallest angle made between the road surface and a line drawn from the rear point of
ground contact of the rear tire to any projection of the apparatus behind the rear axle.
AVAILABILITY: Any maintenance, modernization period where industrial work is performed/managed by an LMA.
AVAILABILITY WORK PACKAGE (AWP): Describes/lists authorized industrial work and associated Forces Afloat work
for modernization, maintenance, and repair during the availability.
CASUALTY CONTROL (CASCON) SYSTEM: The shipboard system that replaces the ship’s permanent casualty
reporting, announcing, and communication system; used to report fires inside the ship to the central location (i.e., the
CASCON Station). [See Chapter 8].
CASUALTY CONTROL (CASCON) STATION: Central location, usually outside the ship near and in sight of the ship, that
has the alarm indication, voice communication, and other tools needed to communicate with a shipboard casualty scene,
make shipboard announcements, and initiate alarms to the emergency dispatch center. [See Chapter 8].
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (CNO) SCHEDULED AVAILABILITY: Maintenance, modernization periods where
industrial work is performed that are scheduled by the CNO. Examples include Regular Overhaul, Complex Overhaul,
Engineered Overhaul, Refueling Overhaul, Refueling Complex Overhaul, Engineered Refueling Overhaul, Depot
Modernization Period, Planned Incremental Availability, Docking Planned Incremental Availability, Selected Restricted
Availability (SRA), Docking SRA, Phased Maintenance Availability, Docking Phased Maintenance Availability, Extended
SRA, Extended Docking SRA, Incremental SRA, Interim Drydock Availability (IDD), Pre-Inactivation Restricted
Availability (PIRA), and Inactivation Availability.
CLASS A FIRE: Class A fires involve wood and wood products, cloth, textiles and fibrous materials, paper and paper
products.
CLASS B FIRE: Class B fires involve flammable and combustible liquids such as gasoline, diesel fuel (F-76), jet fuels,
hydraulic fluid and lube oil. Class B fires also involve flammable gases, such as acetylene.
CLASS C FIRE: Class C fires are energized electrical fires.
CLASS D FIRE: Class D fires involve combustible metals, such as magnesium and titanium.
COMBUSTIBLE: A material that, in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will ignite and burn; a
material that does not meet the definition of noncombustible or limited- combustible; or any liquid that has a closed cup flash
point at or above 150 °F, as determined by NFPA Codes and Standards 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code. The
terminology of “flammable” and “combustible” liquid is sometimes used interchangeably due to differing definitions in
industry, regulatory bodies, and the military.
DAMAGE CONTROL CENTRAL (DCC): The central location where reports from shipboard repair parties (fire
responders) are received, the overall condition of the ship is evaluated and corrective actions to be taken are directed in the
most effective manner. Graphic records of the damage are made on various damage control diagrams and status boards as
reports are received. During large availabilities, DCC may be moved off the ship.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY L-1

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EMERGENCY DISPATCH CENTER: The central location in the region (Federal or civil) that receives emergency calls and
dispatches Fire & Emergency Services (F&ES). The emergency dispatch center is equivalent to the Region or Installation
emergency dispatch center, and may also be referred to as the Public Safety Access Point (PSAP).
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC): The site from which Navy Installations or civil government officials
(municipal, county, State and Federal) exercise direction and control in an emergency. The Installation EOC is a NIMS-
compliant multi-agency coordination system utilizing the Incident/Unified Command System’s organizational structure to
provide an Installation staff to support execution of the Installation Emergency Management (EM) Plan, Anti-terrorism (AT)
Plan, other supporting plans, Defense Support Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions, the Operational Plans of assigned
Combatant, Component, & Fleet Commanders, and the National Response Plan. The mission of the Installation EOC is to
support the Incident Commander (IC) or Unified Commander (UC) during emergencies with resource management support
and establishing strategic/operational-level objectives, as necessary. The EOC is responsible for coordination and liaison
with Local, Other Service, and/or private response and recovery assets. From the Installation EOC, the Installation
Commanding Officer exercises and executes operational control over all assigned Installation assets and may reallocate those
assets on its own volition to support affected areas during an emergency.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (ERT): SRCA, SF and F&ES personnel who respond to major fires and constitute the
incident management structure. [See 3.2.4].
FAST CRUISE: A period immediately prior to underway trials during which Ship’s Force operates the ship for dockside
training. Fast Cruise shall, as far as practical, simulate at-sea operating conditions.
FIRE: State, process, or instance of combustion in which fuel or other material is ignited and combined with oxygen, giving
off light, heat, and flame.
FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES (F&ES): The organization responsible for the primary response to fires. The
civilian (Federal or otherwise) fire department.
FIRE BOUNDARY: A fire boundary is a temporary boundary set during a fire by immediate fire responders or firefighters
by closing doors, hatches and other closures. [See 11.2].
FIRE PROOF: For purposes of this manual, a material that is fire resistant.
FIRE RESISTANT: For purposes of this manual, a material that has been treated with a fire retardant.
FIRE RESPONSE PLAN (FRP): Plan required by Occupational Safety and Health Standards for Shipyard Employment, 29
CFR Part 1915 Subpart P, Fire Protection in Shipyard Employment that establishes in advance the actions to be taken at the
time of a fire. [See 3.2].
FIRE RETARDANT: A liquid, or gas that tends to inhibit combustion when applied on, mixed in, or combined with
combustible materials.
FIRE SAFETY COUNCIL (FSC): Collectively, the persons designated by the SRCA, the Ship CO, the NSA and the EPD
Representative (when a Naval Shipyard is the LMA) (as assigned) to approve ship specific configurations relevant to the
requirements of this manual. [See paragraph 2.1.1]
FIRE SAFETY OFFICER (FSO): The SRCA representative to the FSC. [See paragraph 2.1.2].
FIRE SAFETY WATCH (FSW): The watch-standers assigned specific fire related watch-standing duties such as patrolling
the ship and manning CASCON/DCC/Quarterdeck. Usually FSWs are SF personnel on ships in commission and are SRCA
personnel during new construction pre-commissioning and during inactivation and recycling availabilities after
decommissioning. [See paragraph 2.1.3].
FIRE ZONE BOUNDARY: A fire zone boundary is a permanent, continuous, interior bulkhead or deck system designed to
limit the passage of flame and smoke beyond a fire zone and provides protected staging areas for firefighters.
FLAME RESISTANT: A material meeting the flame propagation criteria of NFPA Codes and Standards 701, Standard
Methods of Fire Tests for Flame Propagation of Textiles and Films.

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FLAMMABLE GAS: A material that is a gas at 68 degrees F or less at an absolute pressure of 14.7 psi, that is ignitable at an
absolute pressure of 14.7 psi when in a mixture of 13 percent or less by volume with air, or that has a flammable range at an
absolute pressure of 14.7 psi with air of at least 12 percent, regardless of the lower limit.
FLAMMABLE LIQUID: For purposes of this manual, any liquid with a closed cup flashpoint below 150 degrees F or less.
The terminology of “flammable” and “combustible” liquid is sometimes used interchangeably due to differing definitions in
industry, regulatory bodies, and the military.
HOT WORK: Flame heating, welding, torch cutting, brazing, carbon arc gouging, and other operations that produce heat, by
any means, of 400F (204C), or more. [See 4.1].
IN COMMISSION: Ships normally are placed in commission shortly after delivery.
IN SERVICE: Nuclear powered ships are assigned an active status of In-Service approximately two to four weeks (two to
four months for aircraft carriers) prior to the commencement of Sea Trials and maintain this status until commissioning.
INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS): A standardized incident emergency management construct specifically designed
to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or
multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. ICS is the combination of facilities, equipment,
personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure, designed to aid in the
management of resources during incidents. It is used for all kinds of emergencies and is applicable to small as well as large
and complex incidents. ICS is the standard organizational process used by F&ES Departments.
INCIDENT COMMANDER (IC): The individual responsible for all incident activities, including the development of
strategies and tactics and the ordering, and the ordering and release of resources. The IC has overall authority and
responsibility for conducting incident operations and is responsible for the management of all incident operations at the
incident site.
INDUSTRIAL WORK: Maintenance, repair, modernization, inactivation, recycling, disposal, and/or construction.
INITIAL RESPONDERS: Those personnel designated in Fire Safety and Response Plans to provide an initial attack on an
incipient stage fire and designated rapid responders to continue the initial attack. For commissioned ships, this will normally
include fire watches, on watch personnel that respond to the fire with portable fire extinguishers and quick response hose
reels where they are provided, and the designated rapid response fire team who continue to fight the fire with extinguishers,
quick response reels, and the initial collapsible attack hose. For ships in construction this will be fire watches and other
SRCA personnel trained to extinguish fires, including shipyard fire brigades.
INITIATING DEVICE: An initiating device is an alarm system component that originates transmission of a change-of-state
condition, such as a manually activated fire alarm box (e.g., pull box), smoke detector, heat detector, or supervisory switch.
A manually activated initiating device is used to report a fire or other hazard. A manually actuated initiating device placed
onboard the ship can be either a fire alarm pull box or an emergency call out direct line telephone. An initiating device
station which provides both a manual pull box and direct line telephone is preferred, but not required, to allow the quick
transmission of additional details to the Casualty Control (CASCON) Station/DCC.
JOINT TEST GROUP (JTG): Term used to describe collectively the persons assigned by their parent organizations to take
required local approval actions for a test program. Where multiple CTEs have been assigned, the CHENG shall determine
the lead (CTE-HM&E is the default lead) CTE and associated JTG, and number and area of cognizance of the JTG(s). The
JTG facilitates local approval of documents for administration, performance, and acceptance of testing and communications
among the responsible organizations. JTG decisions are to be documented by the shipyard, concurred in by all members of
the JTG, and distributed to all JTG members. Provide input to the Fire Safety Council (FSC) and ship/system status expertise
during extended casualty management.
LEAD MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY (LMA): The single activity responsible for integrating all maintenance and
modernization on U.S. Naval ships during any type availability.
MAJOR FIRE: A fire that has progressed beyond the incipient stage, beyond the ability of the initial responders (usually SF
on ships in commission) to control, and is still not under control when the first hose team outfitted in SCBAs and FFEs needs
to be relieved. A multilevel fire is a major fire. [See 3.2.7].

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MUTUAL AID: An agreement among emergency responders to lend assistance across jurisdictional boundaries. This may
occur due to an emergency response that exceeds the capacity of local resources, such as a disaster or a multiple-alarm fire.
As used in this manual, mutual aid includes those responders with whom a formal standing agreement exists for cooperative
emergency management on a continuing basis, For example, a shipyard or Navy Region may have a mutual aid agreement
with civilian municipal fire and emergency responders.
NAVAL REACTORS REPRESENTATIVE’S OFFICE (NRRO): The Naval Reactors Representative’s Office in the Naval
Shipyard and Nuclear Capable Construction Shipyard responsible for oversight of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Plant (NNPP)
matters.
NAVAL SUPERVISING AUTHORITY (NSA): The NSA is an echelon 3 command (e.g., SUPSHIP, regional maintenance
center or naval shipyard) having inherent COMNAVSEASYSCOM technical and contracting warrants. The NSA is the
single naval activity responsible for the contract administration, project management, technical authority and quality
assurance of work accomplished by activities working within the assigned availability or new construction contract. The
NSA will provide the oversight required to ensure that work in the assigned availability is authorized, controlled, executed
and verified to be in compliance with applicable technical requirements and policies.
NAVSEA REGIONAL MAINTENANCE OFFICE (NRMO): The NAVSEA Regional Maintenance Office in the Regional
Maintenance Centers.
NONCOMBUSTIBLE: A material that, in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated will not ignite,
burn, support combustion, or release flammable vapors, when subjected to fire or heat.
NOTIFICATION APPLIANCE: A notification appliance is an alarm system component such as a bell, horn, speaker, light,
or text display that provides audible, tactile, or visible outputs, or any combination thereof. A notification appliance is used
to notify workers and other shipboard personnel that a fire or other hazard exists (e.g., fire alarm), initiate the ship evacuation
alarm or initiate other actions including a stop all hot work alarm.
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE (OIC): Where the term OIC is used, Commanding Officer or Prospective Commanding Officer
(PCO) is implied for systems transferred to SF. For a new construction ship the PCO becomes the OIC when the ship’s
status changes to "in service".
OPERATIONAL: The system is capable of performing its design function as necessary to support the specified event
including appropriate indications, interlocks, alarms, instrumentation, etc.
OUTSIDE ACTIVITY (OA): Any AIT, Fleet Maintenance Activity (FMA), contractor, vendor or another Shipyard’s
personnel (e.g., TIGER TEAM), that works shipboard at the LMA.
PROJECT SUPERINTENDENT (PS): The single LMA representative, assigned by senior shipyard management, who is
accountable and responsible for the overall safe and proper execution of the ship’s availability.
PROJECT SUPPORT ENGINEER (PSE): A PSE is the equivalent to a trouble desk person at a naval shipyard. A PSE is an
engineer assigned to a maintenance team. A PSE typically acts as a liaison between the waterfront operations and
engineering, to help get engineering answers quickly.
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (RERO): Designated personnel at a NNPP
facility/organization who are assigned to respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies associated with
U.S. nuclear-powered warships and associated radioactive material. [See Chapter 3].
REGIONAL MAINTENANCE CENTER (RMC): A Navy activity that is an NSA when contracting for ship maintenance,
and is a SRCA/LMA when performing shipboard maintenance.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS CENTER (ROC): A ROC is a NIMS-compliant multi-agency coordination system utilizing the
Incident/Unified Command System’s organizational structure to provide a collaboration point and operations center for
Region staff to support execution of the Region Emergency Management (EM) Plan, Anti-terrorism (AT) Plan, other
supporting plans, Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions, the Operational Plans of assigned Combatant,
Component, & Fleet Commanders, and the National Response Plan. Activities include, but are not limited to, intelligence
gathering, suspicious incident tracking, Common Operational Picture (COP) development & input, resource management,
coordination with Federal/DoD/State/Local/Private/Host Nation agencies & department, and implementation of pre-

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cautionary/preventive measures to deter/detect events and/or mitigate potential effects. Post-event activities include, but are
not limited to, resource management, strategic guidance/direction, and coordination & liaison with Federal, DoD, State,
Local, Other Service, and/or Private (or host nation) response and recovery assets while supporting subordinate installations
during emergencies. The function of the ROC is principally to establish strategic priorities for one or more incidents at the
Installation level and allocate limited Regional/Installation resources among incident locations.
SHIPBOARD: On, inside, or immediately adjacent to the ship.
SHIP CLASS: The term "ship class" and "class of ship" refers to the general configuration groups (e.g., SSN 688 Class, SSN
774 Class, DDG 51 Class, CVN 68 Class, etc.).
SHIP REPAIR AND/OR CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY (SRCA): The Shipbuilder or Lead Maintenance Activity that
performs industrial work (maintenance, repair, modernization, inactivation, and/or construction) on Navy vessels. This
includes Naval Shipyards (NSYs), Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs), Trident Refit Facilities (TRFs), Fleet
Maintenance Activities (FMAs), private repair shipyards, and new construction shipyards.
SHIP’S FORCE (SF): Members of ship’s company.
SHIPYARD: Activity responsible for accomplishing work incident to construction, modernization, conversion, overhaul, or
other availability of ships. In the text of this manual, “Shipyard” means a private or public Shipyard.
SMOKE BOUNDARY: A smoke boundary is a bulkhead, deck, or other fume tight boundary which is set during a fire to
limit smoke spread and air supply to a fire. [See 11.2].
VITAL SERVICES: Services that must remain in operation functional during the initial response to a fire casualty. [See
10.4.5].

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APPENDIX M
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AED – Automatic External Defibrillator EPA – Environmental Protection Agency

AFFF – Aqueous Film Forming Foam EOC – Emergency Operations Center
AIT – Alteration Installation Team ERT – Emergency Response Team
ESHTB – Environmental, Safety and Health Technical
AMR – Auxiliary Machinery Room
Branch
AWP – Availability Work Package ETB – Engineering Technical Branch
BDA – Broadcast Driver Architecture FDC – Fire Department Connection
CAA – Clean Air Act FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency
CASCON – Casualty Control F&ES – Fire and Emergency Services
CFR – Code of Federal Regulations FFE – Firefighting Ensembles
CL – Center Line FMA – Fleet Maintenance Availability
CNIC – Commander, Navy Installations Command FPG – Fire Protective Gear
CNO – Chief of Naval Operations FRP – Fire Response Plan
CNRMC – Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance
FSC – Fire Safety Council
Center
CO – Commanding Officer FSO – Fire Safety Officer
CPF – Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet FSW – Fire Safety Watch
CPO – Chief Petty Officer GHT – Garden Hose Thread
CRE – Chief Refueling Engineer HB –Habitability
CTE – Chief Test Engineer HFP – Heptafluoropropane
CWA – Clean Water Act HMUG – Hazardous Materials User Guide
DAF – Drill Authorization Form IC – Incident Commander
DC – Damage Control ICP –Incident Command Post
DCC – Damage Control Central ICS – Incident Command System
DIRSSP – Director, Strategic Systems Programs IDD – Interim Drydock Availability
DoD – Department of Defense IDLH – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health
EAB – Emergency Air Breathing IMS – Incident Management Structure
ECC – Emergency Control Center ISIC – Immediate Superior in Command
ECM – Electronic Control Management JAG – Judge Advocate General
EEBD – Emergency Escape Breathing Device JRC – Job Readiness Cell
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY M-1

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EFRS – Engineered Fire Response Strategy JRG – Joint Refueling Group

JTG – Joint Test Group PC – Patrol Coastal
LED –Light Emitting Diode PCD – Production Completion Date
LMA – Lead Maintenance Activity PCMS – Passive Countermeasure System
MAWP – Minimum Allowable Working Pressure PCO – Prospective Commanding Officer
MC – Missile Compartment PIRA – Pre-Inactivation Restricted Availability
MCT – Multi-Cable Transits PKP – Potassium Bicarbonate
MIC – Man-In-Charge PMS – Planned Maintenance System
MILCON – Military Construction POM – Program Objective Memorandum
MOA – Memorandum of Agreement PPE – Personal Protective Equipment
NAVFAC – Naval Facility Engineering Command PS – Project Superintendent
NAVSEA – Naval Sea Systems Command PSA – Post-Shakedown Availability
NFPA – National Fire Protection Association PSAP – Public Safety Access Point
NFTI – Naval Firefighter’s Thermal Imager QDF – Quick Disconnect Fitting
NH – National Hose RAM – Radar Absorbent Material
NIMS –National Incident Management System RCOH – Refueling Complex Overhaul
NNPP – Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program RERO – Radiological Emergency Response Organization
NPW – Nuclear-Powered Warship RIT – Rapid Intervention Team
NRF – National Response Framework RMC – Regional Maintenance Center
NRMO – NAVSEA Regional Maintenance Office ROC – Regional Operations Center
NRRO – Naval Reactors Representative's Office S – Starboard
NSA – Naval Supervising Authority SCBA – Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
NSDSA – Naval Systems Data Support Activity SF – Ship’s Force
NSTM – Naval Ships’ Technical Manual SHT – Special Hull Treatment
NSY – Naval Shipyard SME – Subject Matter Expert
OA – Outside Activity SRA – Selected Restricted Availability
OIC – Officer-In-Charge SRCA – Ship Repair and/or Construction Activity
SRF-JRMC – Ship Repair Facility and Japan Regional
OPNAV – Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Maintenance Center
OPREP– Operational Reporting SS – Start Steaming
OQE – Objective Quality Evidence SSBN – Ballistic Missile Nuclear Powered Submarine
OSIC – On-Scene Incident Commander SSC – Ship Safety Council
P – Port Side SSGN – Guided Missile Nuclear Powered Submarine

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PAO – Public Affairs Officer SSN – Nuclear Powered Submarine

SUPSHIP – Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and
USFF – U.S. Fleet Forces Command
Repair
SVRLA – Submarine Valve Regulated Lead Acid UL – Underwriters Laboratories
SY – Shipyard VAC – Volts Alternating Current
TMDER – Technical Manual Deficiency/Evaluation Report WIFCOM –Wirefree Communications
TMMA – Technical Manual Maintenance Authority WRA – Waterfront Restricted Area
TR – Trouble Report
TRF – Trident Refit Facility
TYCOM – Type Commander
UFC – Unified Facilities Criteria

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APPENDIX N
PRESS STATEMENT
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY N-1

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY N-2

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APPENDIX O
SHIP PLAN OF THE DAY
O.1 GENERAL GUIDANCE
a. This guidance contained in this appendix shall be followed when the ship plan of the day (SPOD) is invoked by the
Fire Safety Council (FSC), or when dictated by the requirements contained in chapter 2 of this manual. When an
SPOD is used, section B3 and B4 are only required as invoked via a memorandum of agreement for the availability
between the naval supervising authority (NSA) and ship’s force (SF).
b. The FSC shall review all current tag outs, work authorization forms (WAF), and other documents which provide
objective quality evidence that system’s status as listed on the initial SPOD accurately reflects current systems status
prior to the SPOD’s approval.
c. The SPOD will be prepared based on written input provided by all organizations for opening, revising, and closing
work or testing that affects fire safety as outlined in this manual.
(1) New items and changes to existing work items listed on the SPOD will be highlighted. Copies of the SPOD do
not need to be in color, the highlight provides FSC members with the ability to readily see the updated changes
to the SPOD.
(2) WAFs currently listed on the SPOD that require a revision shall have FSC approval regardless of impact.
(a) If the revision to the WAF “does not” change the impact to fire safety conditions (e.g., no boundary
change) previously approved by the FSC, the fire safety officer (FSO) is authorized to sign the revised
WAF before updating the SPOD. At the next scheduled SPOD update, the FSO will indicate the most
currently revised WAF.
(b) If the WAF revision “does” change the impact to fire safety, the FSO shall complete an SPOD update and
obtain FSC approval prior to signing the WAF.
(3) Complete a review of the various WAF databases and logs to identify WAFs that have been closed and need to
be removed from the SPOD. Work items that have been closed will be indicated by placing a single line
through the item when the SPOD is changed. Work items that were previously lined out can be removed.
O.2 FIRE SAFETY WORK, TESTING AND EVOLUTIONS DEFINED
a. Any work that removes access to, or prohibits use of installed or temporary firefighting systems including fire hose
stations (e.g., fire pump maintenance, removing hoses from fire plug to paint, tagged out fire pump to support swim
path for divers).
b. Machinery control systems that affect the remote operation or alarm indication fire protection systems, including but
not limited to:
(1) smoke, heat, or other fire detectors;
(2) manual fire reporting devices;
(3) fire main system;
(4) Aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) systems;
(5) any shipboard sprinkling system; and
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY O-1

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(6) fixed suppression systems (Halon, HFP, CO2, Water Mist) and associated ventilation.
c. Any work that removes or disables the ship’s portable damage control (DC) equipment, including repair locker
access.
d. Any work that blocks a ladder, passageway, brow, or gangway that prevents its use for responder access or
personnel egress during a casualty. Many spaces or passageways that are “secured” to support work, repairs, or area
containment during an industrial availability do not remove passage capability during a life threatening casualty.
The FSC shall consider access completely secured only if it makes the space or passageway unavailable for
personnel evacuation and SF responders.
(1) Work examples that “do not” secure access per this manual: tile replacement or deck resurfacing, spray painting
spaces, or stores loads.
(2) Work examples that “do” secure access per this manual: removing ladders, a hatch unable to maintain the
opening size defined in chapter 10 of this manual due to services, or removing deck plates without installing
temporary replacements.
(3) The FSC shall review on a case by case basis the work scope and location to decide if the work makes the area
unsafe for responder access or personnel egress (e.g., the effect of energized work or transfer of toxic,
explosive, or flammable substances) depends on circumstances that will have to assessed by the FSC.
e. Any work or operation that disables any portion of systems supporting fire or flooding prevention and control
requirements. This work includes but is not limited to:
(1) Disabling of the main drainage system.
(2) Disabling a manual or automatic fire suppression systems.
(3) Disabling a temporary dewatering systems.
(4) Disabling an AFFF systems.
(5) Disabling fire detection system.
f. Any work which totally disables a ship’s normal or emergency lighting supply or a temporary lighting supply from a
space or compartment that could impede damage control efforts.
g. Any planned work that disables (completely or partially) the ship’s alarm and general announcing system.
h. Any planned work that disables (completely or partially) the ship’s internal radio communication system that is used
during response to a fire casualty.
i. Any planned work that disables (completely or partially) the ship’s normal or emergency reporting system (e.g.,
IVCS, telephone, J-Dial).
j. Work that degrades the integrity of an industrial fire zone boundary.
O.3 OTHER SAFETY WORK, TESTING AND EVOLUTIONS DEFINED
a. Work that violates double barrier isolation (except those penetrations designed for single enclosure) from sea-
connected systems located below the maximum anticipated waterline.
b. Any isolation (single or double closure) involving a cofferdam.

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c. Installation of a temporary system to a ship’s system which could, through an uncontrolled constant fluid supply,
introduce the potential for flooding the ship’s interior.
d. Work that violates system integrity on any component from a system which is pressurized from a constant fluid
supply, unless protected by double-valve closure.
e. Connecting or disconnecting test equipment or support systems to ship’s systems, which could affect ship safety and
where the connection or disconnection is not a specific step in a test procedure.
f. Machinery control system that affect the remote operation or alarm indication of:
(1) bilge alarms;
(2) flooding alarms;
(3) halogenated hydrocarbon monitoring systems;
(4) sewage CHT system hydrogen sulfide alarms; and
(5) sewage CHT system space ventilation and alarms.
g. Any openings or work on watertight bulkheads, including cut-out valves, doors, and the hull, up to a level 4 ft.
above the maximum anticipated draft established for the availability.
h. Any work that could affect ship’s stability.
O.4 HIGH RISK EVOLUTIONS DEFINED. Depending on the nature of the evolution or the potential risk posed to the
ship, the FSC may deem any evolution as “high risk.” Some “high risk” evolutions may include but are not limited to:
a. Docking and un-docking.
b. Ammunition on load and off load.
c. Oxygen charging or discharging.
d. Fueling or defueling.
e. Flooding the dry dock.
f. Refrigerant transfers.
g. Off-hull steam introduction of pressure exceeding 150 psi for propulsion plant testing.
h. Cofferdam only evolutions.
O.5 PREPARING THE SPOD
O.5.1 Header Data, Data Tables, Drawings. The data for subsection O5.1a through O5.1.d is input on the top of all pages of
the SPOD as seen in exhibit O-1 through O-10.
a. Indicate ship’s name and hull number across the top line of the SPOD.
b. Ensure the most current FSC and quarter deck contact phone numbers are filled in.
c. The “SPOD #” block is the day that the FSC approves (via signature) the SPOD using the DDMMMYY format.
The SPOD expiration date is entered in the same format.

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(1) For unscheduled SPOD changes that occur between scheduled meetings, the FSO will change the “SPOD #” to
the day the FSC approves the change.
(2) In the event there are two or more SPOD changes in the same day, the “SPOD #” format will be DDMMMYY
followed by a sequential number (e.g., (1), (2), (3)) as required by the number of changes.
d. Scheduled meeting frequency may increase or decrease during the availability due to workload. If the scheduled
meeting frequency changes, include this information in the “SPOD NOTES, FSC APPROVED DEVIATIONS,
AND MINUTES” section, as seen in exhibit O-10.
O.5.2 Damage Control Outages. The data for subsection O5.2a through O5.2c is input on page 1 of the SPOD as seen in
exhibit O-1.
a. The silhouette of the ship is used to indicate major outages that affect multiple decks and zones. Some examples of
these outages are listed in subsection O5.2a(1) through O5.2a(6).
(1) Major lighting outages (e.g., switchboard or load center outages).
(2) Significant fire main outages (i.e., isolation of 1/4 of the ship).
(3) Access and egress outages (e.g., doors and passage ways secured).
(4) Significant announcing system outages (e.g., 1, 3, or 5 MC).
(5) Temporary fire main installs (e.g., locations of hose reels).
(6) Completely disabled fire detection system in zone.
(7) Any other major outage discussed by the FSC.
b. Ensure fire zone boundaries are identified and highlighted.
c. Annotate the last fire and flooding drills accomplished and the next drill due by date using date format
DDMMMYY, as required.
O.5.3 Responder Access and Personnel Egress. The data for subsection O5.3a through O5.3c is input on page 2 of the
SPOD as seen in exhibit O-2.
Note: Ensure vessel overview accurately reflects the ship’s mooring configuration, fire zone boundaries, and repair
locker locations.
a. Place brow configuration in the location that the FSC has agreed upon on the overview diagram of the ship in the
“RESPONDER ACCESS AND PERSONNEL EGRESS” section of the page.
b. Indicate access points that are secured and open in the “MACHINERY SPACE ACCESS AND EGRESS STATUS”
table.
c. Indicate status of repair lockers onboard and damage control (DC) Conex boxes (if used) in the “REPAIR LOCKER
STATUS” table.
O.5.4 Fire Main Status. The data for subsection O5.4a through O5.4d is input on page 3 of the SPOD as seen in exhibit O-3.
a. Provide a simplified diagram of the ship’s fire main system. Indicate any fire pumps that are isolated on the fire
main diagram by filling in the fire pump symbol with black.

ACN 3/A
b. Track the availability of each fire pump in the “FIRE PUMP AVAILABILITY STATUS” section. Provide details
in the notes section if fire pumps are not available (e.g., tagged out, divers swim path, planned maintenance system
(PMS)).
Note: Tracking which fire pump(s) are online “is not” required. Additionally, FSC approval “is not” required to start,
stop, or shift fire pumps.
c. Track the availability of each freshwater firefighting station (if installed) in the “FRESH WATER FIREFIGHTING
AVAILABILITY STATUS” section. Provide details in the notes section if the freshwater firefighting station or
fresh water pump is not available.
d. Track the status of each “normal” and “emergency” source of electrical power to the ship (e.g., online, stand by,
emergency operation, or tagged out) in the “ELECTRICAL POWER STATUS” section.
O.5.5 Fixed Fire Suppression Systems. The data for subsection O5.5a through O5.5e is input on page 4 of the SPOD as seen
in exhibit O-4.
a. Create table that includes all AFFF Mixing Stations. This data should include the areas that each AFFF station
covers and proportioner valve operability, thereby permitting water-only sprinkling. Provide details in the “WAF
#/Notes” section of the table if AFFF stations not available.
b. Magazine sprinkler system status will be listed one of two ways, either “MAGAZINES FULLY LOADED” or
“ALL MAGAZINES EMPTY (Exceptions Below).”
(1) During CNO availabilities, the majority of the ship’s magazines will have been offloaded. For this reason, only
list the magazines that currently have ammunition stored in them and the status of the magazine sprinkler
system.
(2) For Non-CNO availabilities, the majority (if not all) of the magazines will be loaded to full capacity. In this
case, ensure that all magazines that have ammunition stored in them and the status of the magazine sprinkler
systems are indicated.
Note: A magazine sprinkler system waiver cannot be granted for a magazine containing ammunitions.
c. Other disabled systems (e.g., Halon, HFP, fixed CO2, water mist). Create a table that lists all other fixed fire
suppression systems to include areas and spaces that each system is designed to protect. Provide details in the
“WAF #/Notes” section if a system is not available.
O.5.6 Main Drainage Status. The data for subsection O5.6a and O5.6b is input on page 5 of the SPOD as seen in exhibit
O-5.
a. Provide a simplified diagram of the ship’s drainage system in the “DRAIN STATUS” section. Indicate bilge
suction circles and eductor symbols that are isolated on the drainage diagram by filling in the symbol with black.
b. Create a table to track the status of each bilge suction point and eductor in the “SPACE DEWATERING” section.
Provide details in the “WAF #/Notes” section if bilge suction or eductor is not available.
O.5.7 Work Control Tracking and Notes. The data for subsection O5.7a and O5.7b is input on page 6 of the SPOD as seen in
exhibit O-6 through exhibit O-10.
a. Work, testing, and evolutions that impact fire safety, are broken down into general categories on the SPOD. Each
category shall list at a minimum: WAF # (if used), impact to fire safety, and the FSC approved mitigation.
b. The “SPOD NOTES, FSC APPROVED DEVIATIONS AND MINUTES” block as seen in exhibit O-10 will be
used to document discussions held during the FSC meeting and any previously approved deviations. Handwritten
notes shall be transposed to the electronic copy at the completion of FSC meeting.

ACN 3/A
O.6 APPROVING THE SPOD
a. The SPOD including any modifications or changes shall be reviewed and unanimously approved (via signature) by
all members of the FSC.
Note: The SPOD may be approved by TELECON after normal working hours.
b. Once the SPOD is signed, the FSO may sign “block 11” of any WAFs that have been added or modified. In this
case, the WAF can now be presented to the watch or duty officer by the division or repair activity tasked with the
work.

ACN 3/A
USS DESTROYER (DDG-000) SHIP PLAN OF THE DAY (SPOD)

Fire Safety Council (FSC) Contacts: Quarter Deck: SPOD # Expires:
NSA FSO: XXX-XXX-XXXX SF FSC REP: XXX-XXX-XXXX
EPD FSC REP: XXX-XXX-XXXX DDMMYY DDMMYY
Fuel/Ordinance DAMAGE CONTROL Fire/Flooding Drill

Fuel (>10%) Yes/No OUTAGES Last Next Drill Due
Ordinance Yes/No Accomplished
Fire Drill DDMMYY DDMMYY
Flooding Drill N/A N/A
- STBD BREEZWAY BLOCKED
- 1MC OUT IN PORT HANGER
Above
Level
BAY
and
01
Main
Deck
SMOKE ALARMS OUT FWD BERTHING
Below
Deck
LIGHTING OUT IN FWD BERTHING,
and
2ND
TEMP INSTALLED
Figure O-1 Sample Ship Plan of the Day

ACN 3/A

RESPONDER ACCESS AND PERSONNEL EGRESS
MACHINERY SPACE ACCESS AND EGRESS STATUS

AUX 1 MER 1 GEN 3 Notes/Mitigation:
Stbd M YES Port E NO Port M YES Stbd E NO Stbd M YES Port E NO
AUX 2 MER 2 AC MACH
Stbd M YES Port E NO Stbd M YES Port E NO CL M YES Port E NO
REPAIR LOCKER STATUS

DC CONEX OTHER
REPAIR 2 REPAIR 3 REPAIR 5 DC CONEX PIER
LOCATION
STATUS: Equip Removed Available Available Available

ACN 3/A

Fire Safety Council (FSC) Contacts: Quarter Deck:
NSA FSO: XXX-XXX-XXXX SF FSC REP: XXX-XXX-XXXX SPOD # Expires:
EPD FSC REP: XXX-XXX-XXXX
FIRE MAIN STATUS
FIRE PUMP AVAILABILITY STATUS

5 3
Available Available 1 (FWD Pump RM) Tagged Out, Divers
(AC Mach) (MER 1)
6 4
Available Available 2 (AUX-1) Divers
(GEN 3) (MER 2)
FRESH WATER FIREFIGHTING AVAILABILITY STATUS
CIC Available CCS Available CSER-1 Available
CSER-2 Available CSER-3 Available CSER-4 Available
FWFP-1
Available
(AMR-1)
ELECTRICAL POWER STATUS
GTG 3 Tagged Out GTG 2 Tagged Out GTG 1 Tagged Out
Pier
Emergency Operationb Shore Power On Line
Generator

ACN 3/A

FIXED FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
AFFF Mixing Stations
Station Area Protected AFFF S/W WAF # / Notes
1 AMR #1, MER #1, FWD Vert. Rep. NO NO CROSS CONNECT AVAILABLE
2 AMR #2, MER #2, #3 GEN, Helo Hangers, AFT Vert. Rep., RMS Sprinkler YES YES
HALON Systems Magazine Sprinkler Systems

Hazard
Space/Unit Halon
Cleared?
WAF # / Notes Status: ALL MAGAZINES EMPTY (Exceptions below)
MER 1 Magazine
YES NO Magazine Notes
(4-174-0-E) Loaded?
MER 2 Fixed Gun Ammo Rocket MAG #2
YES NO NO
(4-254-0-E) (2-246-2-M)
AUX 1 Torp Missile Rocket Mag
YES NO NO
(4-126-0-E) (1-304-2-M)
AUX 2
(4-220-0-E) YES NO VLS (2 ½-78-0-M) NO
Flam Liquid Issue
5’ Loader Drum Room
Room NO YES All Flammables removed NO
(1-46-0-M)
(3-397-2-K)
Flammable Store
Weapons Mag #2
Room YES NO YES
(01-300-1-M)
(3-410-0-K)
GTM 1A Fixed Gun Ammo Rkt Mag #1
YES NO (1-318-2-M) NO
GTM 1B 5 AMMO Mag

YES NO NO
(3-42-0-M)
GTM 2A PYRO MAG #2
YES NO NO
1-342-1-M
GTM 2B PYRO MAG #1
YES NO NO
(3-338-4-M)
GTG #1 Small Arms Mag PARTIAL OFFLOAD
YES NO YES
(3-338-2-M) SCHEDULED
GTG #2 YES NO
GTG #3 YES NO

ACN 3/A

DRAIN STATUS
SPACE DEWATERING STATUS

Main Drain Secondary Drain Special Drain
Bilge Pocket Avail WAF/Notes Bilge Pocket Avail WAF/Notes Bilge Pocket Avail WAF/Notes
DIVERS Gen #3
MER #1 YES Sonar Equip Cool NO YES
(309 gpm)
DIVERS Steering Gear COFFERDAM
MER #2 YES Chain Locker NO NO
(266 gpm)
DIVERS VLS Mod A DIVERS
AMR #1 YES Sonar Dome Trunk NO NO
(960 gpm)
Ammo Strike DIVERS VLS Mod B
AMR #2 YES NO YES
Down.Trunk (1480 gpm)
DIVERS Reefer Drain /
A/C Machinery YES Passage 4-22-0-L NO YES
Tank (30 gpm)
DIVERS
Pump Room YES King Post Trunk NO
AUX #1 Eductor DIVERS DIVERS
NO Eductor (150 gpm) NO
(623 gpm)
MER #1 Eductor
YES
(910 gpm)
AMR #1 Eductor
YES
(930 gpm)

ACN 3/A

HIGH RISK EVOLUTIONS
SPACE(S) DATE/TIME OF
WAF # EVOLUTION MITIGATION REMARKS
AFFECTED EVOLUTION
REFRIGERANT IS
- ALL EMPLOYEES ARE RESTRICTED ACCESS TO THE SPACE.
TO BE
- LOW POINT AND WORK SITE VENT IS REQUIRED
7/6/20 OFFLOADED IN
RA-1234 REFRIGERANT OFFLOAD #3 A/C - ALL WATCHSTANDERS IN THE SPACE ARE REQUIRED TO #1 MMR
0800-1400 INDIVIDUAL
SHOULDER EEBDS
BOTTLES IN THE
- NO HOTWORK IS ALLOWED IN THE SPACE
SPACE
2ND DECK AND ABOVE
OFFLOADING
- NO HOTWORK DURING EVOLUTION PORT SIDE. 7/7/20
SMALL ARMS
N/A AMMO OFFLOAD - ACCESS TO BROW WILL BE LIMITED DURING TRANSFER QUARTERDECK AND 0900-1000
FROM MAGAZINE
TO ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL PIER DURING
3-338-2-M.
TRANSFER
DIVERS
DATE/TIME
WAF # SWIM PATH IMPACT MITIGATION REMARKS
OF DIVE
- 1 MDFP IS RUNNING, 3 ADDITIONAL ARE IN STBY.
- 1 and 2 MDFP - AUX 1 BILGE SUCTION ALIGNED FOR CROSS CONNECT 7/8/20 INSTALL COFFERDAM
RA-1235
- EDUCTOR’S FWD OF AUX 1 - NO INTRUSIVE WORK ON A SEA CONNECTED SYSTEM 0800-1200 (#1 MDFP SUCTION)
FWD OF AUX 1.
FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM(S)
)WAF # SUPPRESSION SYSTEM AFFECTED MITIGATION REMARKS

- AFFF #2 IS AVAILABLE VIA CROSS CONNECT
SF-ED03- - SHIP SYSTEMS ARE NOT OPERATIONAL IN THE AREAS
SECURES AFFF #1 NONE
00030 PROTECTED.
- HAZARDS THAT COULD CAUSE A CLASS B FIRE ARE REMOVED.

ACN 3/A

MSMO-
ESTIMATED COMPLETION
ER03- SECURES HALON SYSTEM (3-397-2-K) ALL FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS HAVE BEEN RELOCATED TO 3-410-0-K
DATE IS OCT20
10535
SF-ED03- - USE FPL 2-436-2 AND 2-409-2 AS MITIGATION

SECURES FPL’S 2-435-1, 2-378-1 REPLACE FM VALVE 2-418-3.
45666 - INSTALL OOC SIGNS ON AFFECTED FPLS
REPLACING MECHANICAL
RA-1285 SECURES #1 MDFP 1 MDFP RUNNING, 3 ADDITIONAL ARE IN STBY
SEAL.
ALARM AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

WAF # ALARM/COMMS SYSTEM AFFECTED MITIGATION REMARKS
PHONE OUTAGE IS PUBLICIZED ON THE OUTAGE REPORT AND
SF-EE03- IVCS PHONES DISABLED ON 02 LEVEL AND ABOVE FWD OF FRAME DISCUSSED TWICE A WEEK AT THE PRODUCTION MEETING. E-DIVISION IS REPLACING
16320 228 - REPORTING OF EMERGENCIES IN THAT AREA WILL BE VIA CELL ABT 03-125-6
PHONE OR RUNNER TO THE QD.
NO MITIGATION (SPACE IS OPEN TO FLIGHT DECK AND

RA-1222 1MC SPEAKERS IN PORT HANGAR BAY ARE DISABLED NONE
ANNOUNCEMENTS CAN BE HEARD)
- MOST COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL FROM FWD COMPARTMENTS IS

BERTHING REHAB MOD,
MSMO- SMOKE ALARMS ARE DISABLED IN ALL FWD BERTHING REMOVED
SCHEDULED TO COMPLETE
45656 COMPARTMENTS. - SF HAS ADDED A SECOND SOUNDING AND SECURITY ROVER
DEC20.
DURING THE OUTAGE
LIGHTING
WAF # SPACES AFFECTED MITIGATION REMARKS
SF-EE03-
PORT PASSAGEWAY 02 LEVEL FRAME 20-80 OUTAGE INSTALL TEMP LIGHTING NONE
12345
BERTHING REHAB MOD,
MSMO-
LIGHTING IN FWD BERTHING INSTALL TEMP LIGHTING SCHEDULED TO COMPLETE
8567
DEC20

ACN 3/A

ACCESS/EGRESS AND FIRE ZONE BOUNDARIES

WAF # DOOR / LOCATION MITIGATION REMARKS
- COMMUNICATED DURING MORNING PRODUCTION MEETING
DOOR IS SECURED DUE TO
- SMOKE CURTAIN PLACED IN STBY WITH SIGN INDICATING P-
TEMP SERVICES FALL
N/A FZB DOOR 1-126-2 WAY SECURED.
BELOW THE 50” MINIMUM
- DOORS FWD, AFT AND STBD SIDE OPEN FOR ACCESS AND
REQUIREMENT
EGRESS.
KTR RIGGING EQUIPMENT
- COMMUNICATED DURING MORNING PRODUCTION MEETING THROUGH BREEZEWAY,
MSMO-
STBD BREEZEWAY BLOCKED - DOORS FWD, AFT AND PORT SIDE BREEZEWAY OPEN FOR START DATE IS 7/16,
16242
ACCESS AND EGRESS. ESTIMATED DURATION IS 3
DAYS.
SINGLE VALVE TO SEA

WAF # SYSTEM LOCATION MITIGATION REMARKS
- ISOLATION HAS BEEN PROVEN TO HOLD REMOVE AND REPLACE
RA-006 #2 A/C A/C MACH ROOM
- SYSTEM INTRUSIVE WORK WILL NOT BE LEFT UNATTENDED STRAINER BASKET
FLOODING, PREVENTION, COFFERDAM

SYSTEM or
WAF # LOCATION MITIGATION REMARKS
SEA CHEST #
INSTALL/MAINTAIN
RA-0734 #1 MDFP FWD PUMP ROOM NONE
COFFERDAM
- AFT STEERING WILL NOT HAVE MAIN DRAIN

FM VALVE REPLACEMENT,
1P-RP05- - NO SEA CONNECTED SYSTEM INTRUSIVE WORK IN SPACE
STEERING ROOM EDUCTOR AFT STEERING ESTIMATED DURATION IS 2
01834 - MAINTAIN ABILITY TO ISOLATE SPACE IN THE EVENT OF A
DAYS
FLOODING CASUALTY

ACN 3/A

HULL CUTS OR OPENINGS (Below 2nd Deck)

WAF # / LOCATION AND SIZE OF CUT WITHIN
SPACE # MITIGATION REMARKS
DPR # SPACE
NNS-PM01- ACCESS CUT TO
8-208-2-V 4 INCH BY 4 INCH ACCESS CUT IN FWD BLKHD NONE
00052 REPAIR RUST
ALLOW FOR
8 FOOT BY 8 FOOT ACCESS CUT BETWEEN #1 MACH - SMOKE CURTAIN INSTALLED WITH MAGNETS PERSONNEL ACCESS
RA-2333 #1 MACH ROOM AND #1 AMR
ROOM AND #1 AMR, 3RD DECK CENTERLINE AROUND OPENING BETWEEN MAIN
SPACES.
OTHER SAFETY OF SHIP WORK

SYSTEM EFFECTED /
WAF # MITIGATION REMARKS
LOCATION
EQUIPMENT REMOVED FOR
RA-1111 REPAIR 2 - REPAIR 3, 5, AND DC CONEX ON PEIR AVAILABLE
RL MOD.
EMERGENCY DEISEL / GAS TURBINE/PIER GENERATOR / SHORE POWER
WAF # GENERATOR EFFECTED MITIGATION REMARKS
LMA-EE03- - PIER GENERATOR IS THE STANDBY GENERATOR

#1 GTG NONE
9876 - TSO 678 IS IN PLACE FOR PIER GENERATOR OPERATION
LONG LEAD WORK,

SF-MM03- - PIER GENERATOR IS LINED UP FOR EMERGENCY POWER
#3 GTG APPROXIMATE COMPLETION
AT THE END OF DECEMBER
LONG LEAD WORK,

SF-MM03- - PIER GENERATOR IS LINED UP FOR EMERGENCY POWER
#2 GTG APPROXIMATE COMPLETION
AT THE END OF DECEMBER

ACN 3/A

SPOD NOTES, FSC APPROVED DEVIATIONS, AND MINUTES
- DCA WILL BE ON LEAVE FROM 8/1/20 TO 8/11/20, CHENG WILL BE THE ACTING SF FSC MEMBER
- FSO TO SCHEDULE A MEETING WITH AIT, CSO, AND FSC CONCERNING POSSIBLE 1MC OUTAGE FOR MAINTENANCE.
- REVIEWED NAVSEA FOLLOW UP ACTION MESSAGE FOR THE BONHOMME RICHARD FIRE.
- REMOVING THE EMERGENCY BROW FROM FLIGHT DECK TO SUPPORT NON-SKID WORK WAIVER.
1. BROW SCHEDULED TO BE REMOVED 7/21/20 TO 7/29/20. *UPDATE BROW STATUS ON NEXT SPOD*
2. MINIMAL HOTWORK SITES ARE SCHEDULED DURING OUTAGE. MAXIMUM OF 10 SITES WILL BE AUTHORIZED.
3. NO HOTWORK OR OTHER HAZARDOUS EVOLUTIONS AUTHORIZED IN THE VICINITY OF THE REMAINING BROW.
4. 30-40 CIVILIAN WORKERS ON BOARD.
5. FSO WILL NOTIFY REGIONAL DISPATCH CENTER ON 7/20/20.
6. FSO WILL UPDATE BROW BOARDING SIGN ON 7/21/20.
7. BROW OUTAGE WILL BE DISCUSSED DAILY AT PRODUCTION MEETING THE WEEK PRIOR TO AND DURING THE OUTAGE.
8. NSA FSM AND SF CO CONCUR WITH THIS WAIVER AND MITIGATION PLAN.
TSO’S AFFECTING FIRE SAFETY:
- TSO 678 – OPERATION OF AND REFUELING OF PIER GENERATOR

- TSO 343 – OPERATION AND DAILY TESTING OF CONTRACTOR INSTALLED FIRE ALARM PULL BOXES PHONE INSTALLED AT
QUARTERDECK.
APPROVED:
NSA FSO: SF FSC REP: EPD FSC REP:
Jimmy Fire, FSO Johnny Sailor, DCA Tommy Engineer, C/246

Original
Ref: NAVSEAINST 4160.3A NAVSEA S0005-AA-GYD-030/TMMP
NAVSEA/SPAWAR TECHNICAL MANUAL DEFICIENCY/EVALUATION REPORT (TMDER)

INSTRUCTIONS: Continue on 8 ½” x 11” page if additional space is needed.
1. Use this report to indicate deficiencies, problems and recommendations relating to publications.
2. For CLASSIFIED TMDERs see OPNAVINST 5510H for mailing requirements.
3. For TMDERs that affect more than one publication submit a separate TMDER for each.
4. Submit TMDERs at web site https://nsdsa2.phdnswc.navy.mil or mail Classified to: COMMANDER, CODE 310 TMDER BLDG
1388, NAVSURFWARCENDIV NSDSA, 4363 MISSILE WAY, PORT HUENEME CA 93042-4307
1. PUBLICATION NUMBER 2. VOL/PART 3. REV/DATE OR CHG/DATE 4. SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT ID
S0570-AC-CCM-010/8010
5. TITLE OF PUBLICATION 6. REPORT CONTROL NUMBER
(6 DIGIT uic-yy-ANY FOUR: XXXXXX-03-XXXX)
INDUSTRIAL SHIP SAFETY MANUAL FOR FIRE

PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
7. RECOMMEND CHANGES TO PUBLICATION
7a. Page # 7b. Para # 7c. RECOMMENDED CHANGES AND REASONS
8. ORIGINATOR’S NAME AND WORK CENTER 9. DATE 10. ORIGINATOR’S E-MAIL ADDRESS 11. TMMA of Manual
(NAVSEA 04XQ1)
12. SHIP OR ACTIVITY Name and Address (Include UIC/CAGE/HULL) 13. Phone Numbers:
Commercial (____) ____-_____
DSN ____-_____
FAX (____) ____-_____
NAVSEA 4160/1 (Rev. 7-2003)

Original
END OF MANUAL

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY S0570-AC-CCM-010/8010

NAVSEA TECHNICAL PUBLICATION

INDUSTRIAL SHIP SAFETY MANUAL FOR FIRE

PUBLISHED BY DIRECTION OF COMMANDER, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NAVSEA TECHNICAL MANUAL CERTIFICATION SHEET 1 of 1

CHANGES AND REVISIONS: See the following pages ii thru v.

Continue on reverse side or add pages as needed.

Authority Name Signature Organization Code Date

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i

CHANGES AND REVISIONS:

Table of Contents: Updated page numbers and paragraph titles.

List of Illustrations: Updated page numbers and figure titles.

List of Tables: Updated page numbers and table titles.

Added the following reference:

2.4 Added new administration subsection.

NAVSEA TECHNICAL MANUAL CERTIFICATION SHEET 1 of 4

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ii

CHANGES AND REVISIONS:

Added the following reference:

3.2.2.1 and 3.2.17 Invoked reverence (x) where applicable.

3.4.3 Added continuing training requirements for ERT assigned personnel.

3.5 Added ship’s force (SF) ERT training requirements.

3.5.1 Added clarification to SF personnel assignment to the ERT.

3.5.2 Added pre-availability training requirements for SF ERT assigned personnel.

3.5.3 Added continuing training requirements for SF ERT assigned personnel.

3.6.10 Added requirement for DC locker equipment custody and accessibility.

Added the following references:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY iii

CHANGES AND REVISIONS:

NAVSEA TECHNICAL MANUAL CERTIFICATION SHEET 3 of 4

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY iv

CHANGES AND REVISIONS:

12.5.3 Added requirements for drill periodicity waver.

NAVSEA TECHNICAL MANUAL CERTIFICATION SHEET 4 of 4

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY v

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY vi

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES IN THIS TECHNICAL MANUAL IS 198,

PAGES REV CHANGE #

Cover Sheet --- 00 ACN 3/A

Certification Sheet i 00 ACN 3/A

Changes and Revisions ii through vi 00 ACN 3/A

List of Effective Pages viii through ix 00 ACN 3/A

Record of Changes x 00 ACN 3/A

Table of Contents xi through xix 00 ACN 3/A

List of Figures and List of Tables xx through xxi 00 ACN 3/A

Commander’s Guidance xxiii 00 Original

Foreword xxv 00 Original

Chapter 1 1-1 through 1-4 00 Original

Chapter 2 2-1 through 2-8 00 ACN 3/A

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY vii

Chapter 3 3-1 through 3-18 00 ACN 3/A

Chapter 4 4-1 through 4-6 00 ACN 3/A

Chapter 5 5-1 through 5-8 00 ACN 2/A