SPE 123593

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Radioactive Sources in Petroleum Industry: Applications, Concerns and
Alternatives

A. Badruzzaman, SPE, Chevron Energy Technology Company, S. Barnes, Chevron North America E & P Company, F. Bair, Chevron North
America E & P Company, K. Grice, Chevron Energy Technology Company
Copyright 2009, Society of Petroleum Engineers

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 2009 SPE Asia Pacific Health, Safety, Security, and Environment Conference and Exhibition held in Jakarta, Indonesia, 4–6 August 2009.

This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents of the paper have not been
reviewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers and are subject to correction by the author(s). The material does not necessarily reflect any position of the Society of Petroleum Engineers, its
officers, or members. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper without the written consent of the Society of Petroleum Engineers is prohibited. Permission to
reproduce in print is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words; illustrations may not be copied. The abstract must contain conspicuous acknowledgment of SPE copyright.

Abstract
Radioactive sources utilized in many industries, including the petroleum industry, have raised security, safety and
environmental concerns. Oilfield sources are highly mobile, transported across the world and often used in remote locations.
Despite safeguards and regulations, such sources have been lost, stuck down-hole, or breached. Concerns have been raised
on sources being used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD). The US National Academy of Sciences, being concerned
primarily with RDD, recently recommended replacing radioactive sources used in several industries with alternative sources.
These include replacing Am-Be neutron sources used in porosity devices with either neutron generators which are switchable
or with Cf-252 which would contain a lower amount of radioactivity. The lower risk Cs-137 source used in measuring
density was spared at this time. However, a breached Cs-137 density source down-hole recently necessitated the setting up
of a very long-term, elaborate monitoring program and thus such sources are of concern too.

This paper discusses the critical role of radioactive sources in petroleum exploration and production, protocols prescribed by
regulators and the International Atomic Energy Agency for their safe use, concerns about their RDD potential, and lessons
learned from a recent breached radioactive source incident in the field. The paper identifies additional procedures the oil
industry needs to consider to use radioactive sources safely and securely, reviews the NAS recommendations and their
potential impact on the industry, and describes alternatives to current chemical sources the industry is considering and the
challenges which have arisen in making the transition.

Introduction
Devices with radioactive sources are used for a wide range of beneficial applications. These include cancer therapy,
irradiation of blood for transplant patients, sterilization of medical equipment, non-destructive testing of structures, and
petroleum exploration and production. In the petroleum industry, such sources are used in applications ranging from
radiography of platform and flow equipment to flow monitoring to down-hole measurements for reserves estimation. In
addition, naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) containing potassium, thorium and uranium can deposit on walls
of pipes carrying fluids from the reservoir and have to be disposed off.

Despite the strict protocols mandated in utilizing radioactive sources in petroleum and other industries, radiation
contamination from industrial use of sources has caused serious health effects and even death [IAEA, 1988]. Following the
tragedy of September 11, 2001, concerns have been heightened on potential use of industrial radioactive sources in
radiological dispersal devices (RDD’s). According to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], millions of sources
have been distributed in the past 50 years for the variety of applications cited, but they were not well-catalogued. Citing the
United States (US) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the IAEA noted that US companies have lost track of nearly
1,500 radioactive sources within the country since 1996 with more than half of these never recovered [IAEA, 2002]. The
same IAEA report cites a European Union (EU) study which estimated that up to 70 sources are lost per year from regulatory
control in the EU. Most sources contain low-level radioactivity and thus are unlikely to cause harm. However, according to
the IAEA, there are over 20,000 operators of sources with significant radioactivity [IAEA, 2002].

While the potential for harm from industrial use of such sources is significantly greater in other industries, sources used in the
oil industry may pose certain unique hazards. Such sources are highly mobile, are transported across the world and are often
SPE 123593 2

used in remote locations. There are approximately 9,000 well logging sources in the field [Roughan, 2007] and hundreds of
such sources have been lost down-hole and cemented in place over the years. For example, according to an inventory taken
by the IAEA, more than 40 Am-Be (~16 Ci or 592 GBq of activity1) sources and a similar number of Cs-137 (~2 Ci or 74
GBq of activity) sources were lost down-hole in the Gulf Mexico offshore operations alone through 1992 [IAEA, 2001].

In addition to the above, the IAEA has reported illicit trafficking in radioactive sources and nuclear materials.2 Between

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1993 and 2002, there were 284 cases of illicit trafficking in radioactive sources alone [IAEA, 2002]. Many of these sources
had the potential to cause great harm. In 2003, a source went missing in a petroleum operation in Africa [Guardian, 2003].
The source was later recovered, but its course after being lost is not clear.

In view of the above incidents, a primary concern has arisen that, in wrong hands, these sources can potentially be used as
RDD’s where a radioactive source containing a sufficient amount of activity is exploded using conventional explosives to
destabilize a community and possibly cause significant health effects [US DOE, 2003]. In a testimony before the US Senate,
it was reported that an RDD using an Am-Be source, typically utilized in the petroleum industry, can cause significant harm
[Kelly, 2002]. These risks are in addition to the operational concerns that a breached well logging source may present. A
breached well logging source incident was reported recently [NRC, 2006]. It has resulted in an expensive clean-up effort,
lost production, and a long-term monitoring program.

In order to address the RDD concerns with sources, a number of protocols have either been strengthened or new ones
developed in the past several years. The IAEA have developed a Categorization of Sources based on the harm these are
likely to cause [IAEA, 2003]. In addition, the IAEA have developed a Code Conduct for utilizing sources and an
Import/Export Guidelines document for countries to adopt [IAEA, 2004; IAEA 2005]. A large number of governments have
accepted these and many countries, including the United States, have aligned their source safety procedures accordingly. In
the petroleum industry, oil service companies own and operate the sources. Government regulations specific to oil industry
sources and elaborate shielding, security and mitigation protocols have been in place for some time [NRC, 1987; IAEA,
2003a].

In this paper we first briefly discuss radiation protection terminology and the IAEA Categorization of Sources based on their
radiological health impact. We then discuss the sources used in the petroleum industry, focusing primarily on those used in
down-hole measurements for reservoir characterization and monitoring. We illustrate the vulnerabilities such sources can
cause or have caused. While oil service companies own the sources and perform down-hole measurements, we identify a
number of specific protocols operators need to adopt since these sources are used in their operations, if such protocols are not
already in place.

Basics of Radiation Protection

Ionizing radiation can cause significantly adverse health effects both from external and internal exposure. The effect can be
acute, such as nausea and vomiting, and delayed, such as various cancers and formation of cataracts appearing years after the
exposure. Radiation produces biological effects by two mechanisms, directly by dissociating molecules following their
excitation and ionization and indirectly by producing free radicals and hydrogen peroxide in the water of the body fluids
[Cember, 1976]. The actual health effect depends on the level of radioactivity, the application, the organ exposed (and
duration) and the quality factor (or the radiation weighting factor) of the damage a given radiation type can cause. The basic
unit of radiation dose in terms of energy deposited is in the US is rad (Radiation Absorbed Dose.)3 One rad is 100 ergs of
energy deposited per gram of tissue. However, the energy deposited in the tissue is not a good indicator of the biological
effect. For example, 1 rad of Alpha radiation will be biologically 20-fold more damaging than 1 rad of gamma radiation.4
Consequently, a parameter, dose equivalent, is defined by multiplying the deposited energy by such radiation weight factors
for various types of radiation. Its unit is rem.5

Appendix A defines a number of terms used in radiation protection literature to measure the level of radioactivity, the
absorbed energy, the equivalent radiation dose, etc.

1
There are two units in use to report the activity (in terms of disintegrations per second), Curie (Ci) and the newer unit Becquerel (Bq). 1 GBq =27.03 mCi.
This is discussed further in Appendix A. In the present paper we will primarily use Ci.
2
Nuclear materials are also radioactive but by convention they refer to Plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238;
uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233; uranium containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore or
ore-residue; any material containing one or more of the foregoing [IAEA,1980]. Uranium 233, uranium-235 and plutonium-239 are the major fissile
materials which can be used in nuclear weapons besides being used in nuclear reactors.
3
The newer unit of energy deposited is Gray (Gy) (joules/kg). Note that 100 rads = 1 Gy. See Appendix A.
4
Both types of radiation (Alpha and gamma) arise from use of radioactive isotopes in various industries, including petroleum.
5
The newer unit is seivart (See Appendix A). 100 rem = 1 sievart. The allowable radiation dose is often cited in millirem (mrem); 1 mrem = 10 micro-
sievarts (µSV).
SPE 123593 3

The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has defined two categories of exposure, 1) occupational
exposure to radiation workers (who have to be adults above the age of 18) and 2) exposure of the general public. Initially,
radiation workers were divided into two categories: (a) women of reproductive capacity and (b) all other radiation workers,
with a different amount of allowable dose equivalent for each category. The ICRP recommendation was that the total
accumulated dose due to occupational exposure shall not exceed 5(N-18) rems, where N is the age of the worker in years
amounting to an exposure rate of 5 rem/yr (or 5000 mrem/yr) for a radiation worker who begins to work at age 18 [Cember,

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1976]. A 3000 mrem (30 mSv) limit was also placed on the dose equivalent for a consecutive 13-week period.6

The criteria evolved over time with new ICRP recommendations and their adoption. The 13-week limit was removed. The
EU criteria for yearly exposure was made more nuanced with 5000 mrem (50 mSv)/yr for a total of 10000 mrem (100 mSv)
in a consecutive five-year period [EU, 2009]. The distinction between sexes was eliminated. Instead, a criterion was added
for protecting the fetus of a declared pregnant occupational worker. In US regulations, it is 500 mrem (5 mSv) of dose for
the duration of the pregnancy while it is 100 mrem (1 mSv) in the most recent EU recommendations [NRC, 1991; EU, 2009].
Note that an average person receives 100 mrem (1 mSv)/yr exposure from natural radiation. Both the US and have EU
adopted this as the public exposure limit.

IAEA Categorization of Sources

The IAEA developed a radioactive source categorization system to provide an internationally accepted common
(“harmonized”) basis for “risk-informed decision making” to utilize radioactive sources safely and securely by protecting the
worker and the public [IAEA, 2003]. The categorization system is based on the potential of a radioactive source to cause a
deterministic health effect which can result in harm ranging from acute radiation sickness to death. The potential of adverse
health effect is developed based on a number of parameters. These include the actual practice of how the source is utilized,
shielding used to limit radiation, the portability of the source, the level of supervision, etc. Table 1 summarizes the IAEA
developed Category of Sources and the corresponding A/D Ratio, where A is the actual activity of the radioisotope and D is
its “dangerous” activity based on its potential for causing harm and the health impact. Sources rated as Category 1 present
the highest risk, those rated Category 5 the lowest.

Radiation Sources in Petroleum Industry

General: Sources of ionizing radiation are present in various phases in the petroleum industry. These include sources used in
radiography for quality assurance of welds and equipment, installed nuclear gauges to monitor or control the density of fluids
flowing through pipelines and control fluid levels in vessels, mobile gauging equipment for smoke detection and determining
fluid levels in fire extinguishers, well logging for down-hole characterization and monitoring of geological formations to
initially estimate reserves and later locate remaining hydrocarbons, radioactive tracers for inter-well profiling, and the NORM
deposited in tubulars [IAEA, 2003a]. In addition, sources, often low-level, are used for Frack-pack monitoring. The type of
radioactive isotope and level of radioactivity vary depending on the application.

The physics of the interactions is fairly straight-forward. In applications with Cs-137 (or Co-60) sources, which emit
photons, one records the scattered photons as an indicator of the density of the medium, whether it is the formation or the
pipeline. In applications with Am-Be sources, which emit neutrons, one primarily measures the hydrogen index (HI)
obtained from slowing down of neutrons. In the formation, the HI indicates water, hydrocarbons and/or clay (shale). In the
case of the pipeline, the HI indicates the moisture in the space between insulation and pipe wall, for example. In
spectroscopy applications, one records the secondary radiation, namely photons, which arises from interaction of neutrons
with specific nuclei in the rock or the material one uses to dope the propant in Frack-packs. Cf-252 produces neutrons.

Table 2 displays a representative (but not exhaustive) list of radionuclides used in the petroleum industry, with application,
activity range (A) and D-values, and Category based on the A/D ratio and that assigned by the IAEA. Note that oil industry
sources range from Category 5 to Category 2 if one considers the A/D value. While well logging sources are among the
highest Category sources, some of the others are also fairly high Category sources in terms of the hazards they pose.7

Note that in some cases the IAEA assigned Category may differ from that inferred from the A/D ratio. For example, the
IAEA assigned the Cf-252 in a logging tool to be a Category 3 source while numerically from Table 2 we see that it is a
Category 4 source. The US National Academy Sciences’ report on sources also cites it as a Category 3 source [NAS, 2008].
On the other hand, IAEA assigns Category 3 to the Am-241 in the Am-Be source probably based on the A/D ratio of 8 if one
assumes a typical neutron porosity tool of 16 Ci. However, in general, the activity of Am-Be sources used in well logging
may still cover a range since early generation of neutron tools were 20 Ci, making them Category 2 sources based on the A/D
ratio. Besides, even at A/D=8, it is a high Category 3 source. The US National Academy of Sciences in its report assumes

6
For a woman of reproductive capacity, the limit for each consecutive 13-week period was 1.3 rem (1300 mrem).
7
NORM will not be further discussed in the paper.
SPE 123593 4

the Am-Be source used in logging tools to be a Category 2 source [NAS, 2008]. We will use the NAS category assignment
and cite Am-241 and Cf-252 to be to be a Category 2 and Category 3 sources, respectively. Note that Cs-137 used in the
density logging tool is assigned Category 3 by the IAEA; the NAS uses the same categorization. Table 2 also shows that one
of the nuclear gauges may have a higher amount of Cs-137 than that in the density logging tool.

Well Logging: Well logging sources are perhaps the most important radioactive sources used in the petroleum industry. The

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formation density tool (with a Cs-137 source) provides the most accurate measure of porosity (in sandstone reservoirs), a
parameter essential for estimating petroleum reserves.8 Table 3 displays the uncertainty which would arise in reserves
estimates due to one porosity unit (pu) error at different reference porosity levels. Note that a 1-pu error in a 15-pu reservoir
with a nominal reserve of one billion barrels would result in an uncertainty of 67 million barrels.

Note from Table 2 that down-hole measurement tools generally appear to contain the most significant levels of radioactivity
and thus pose the most significant hazard. In the reservoir characterization phase, there are three major tools which use
chemical radioactive sources with significant amount of activity, density tools with a 1.7 to 2 Ci Cs-137 source, neutron
porosity tools with approximately 8-23 Ci Am-Be source, and the elemental capture spectroscopy tool by one vendor which
uses a 16 Ci Am-Be source. In addition, a Frack-pack monitoring tool by a certain vendor also uses a 16 Ci Am-Be source.9

Cs-137 emits medium energy (662 keV) gamma rays and low-energy beta particles and has a half-life of 30.2 years. The
gamma radiation is highly penetrating and thus can result in external and internal damage for decades. Am-241 in Am-Be
source primarily emits high-energy (5.5 MeV) Alpha particles, low energy (60 keV) gamma rays. With a 433 year half-life,
it has the potential to cause harm for a long time. Both Alpha and beta particles do not have much penetrating power. For
example, Alpha particles can be stopped with a piece of paper to prevent external exposure. However, if it is inhaled or
ingested, an Alpha-emitter can potentially cause significant internal damage [ANL, 2005]. In a logging tool, Am-241 is
encapsulated as a mixture with Beryllium to produce fairly high-energy neutrons needed to measure porosity. Like the
gamma rays from a Cs-137 source, neutrons are also highly penetrating and cause long-term external and internal damage.
Cs-137 in a well logging tool is in glass matrix and thus its solubility is presumed to be extremely low and the ability to
contaminate underground water is small.

Source Protection in Petroleum Industry

General: In view of the potential hazards the misuse of radiation can pose to human health, radioactive sources, including
those used in the petroleum industry, are utilized under defined safety and security protocols enforced by regulatory agencies
in each country and monitored by the IAEA whose source categorization is utilized to develop the protocols. Organizations
utilizing sources are licensed by appropriate regulatory agencies and only authorized personnel handle sources. Storage,
movement and transport of sources, and permissible dose rates are defined under International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) protocols. Each type of application, from radiography to well logging, has its own protocols. For
example, site radiography sources are categorized as portable, mobile and fixed, according to their mobility, and the exposure
limit is defined for each category. The Cs-137 radiography source (emitting 662 keV gamma rays) will be contained in steel
containers of 50-100 mm while a Co-60 (emitting 1.17 MeV and 1.33 MeV gamma rays) would be in a 50-150 mm
container. The maximum dose equivalent rate at 50 mm from external surface of the container, irrespective of the source
type, would be 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr)10 for portable sources, and 100 mrem/hr each for mobile and fixed sources. At 1
mm from container surface, these are 2 mrem/hr, 5 mrem/hr, and 10 mrem/hr, respectively [IAEA, 1999]. The corresponding
parameters are different for well logging sources, as discussed in the next sub-section.

Well Logging: Density and neutron tools are used, either after a hole has been drilled or while drilling, to estimate key
reservoir parameters [Ellis, 1987; Badruzzaman, et al, 1997]. Post-drilling and while-drilling devices are called wireline and
logging-while drilling (LWD) tools, respectively. The capture spectroscopy tool noted previously (with an Am-Be source) to
predict lithology is a wireline tool [Herron and Herron, 1996]. We will note later that operational risks associated with
wireline tools versus those with LWD tools are different.

Figure 1 displays the schematic of a dual-detector wireline density device. Similarly, the neutron tool with the Am-Be
source is also a dual-detector device. From Figure 1 we note that sources in wireline tools are securely located with no

8
Acoustic and magnetic resonance techniques can also estimate porosity. The acoustic-based porosity is intrinsically less accurate and is affected by
formation damage. NMR gives a liquid porosity. It is a much slower measurement and its accuracy depends on a number of assumptions about the fluids
involved.
9
Tools in the reservoir monitoring phase use deuterium-tritium (D-T) neuron generators emitting 107 to 108 neutrons/sec. Such neutron sources are
switchable and thus are advantageous. However, they have a different set of concerns not discussed here. Also, tritium is radioactive and has a half-life of
12 years but its radioactivity is small. Also, some vendors use a small amount of Cs-137 in such tools for spectral calibration. Thus, generator-based
sources follow the same radiation protection protocols, but their RDD potential and breached source impact will be significantly lower.
10
From Appendix A, 1 mrem/hr =10 µSV/hr.
SPE 123593 5

contact with the external environment under normal operation. The source is placed in the source housing just before
lowering the tool down-hole. Source handling will cause some exposure and would limit the number of times a well logger
will be able to handle sources over a period of time.

Figure 2 displays a nuclear LWD tool [Holenka, et al, 1995]. Since LWD measurements involve introducing radioactive
sources into the drillstring bottom-hole assembly (BHA), the risks associated are greater than those with wireline tools with

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sources. The additional risks include possible exposure of rig personnel required for the makeup and movement of the BHA
and loading and unloading of sources into a BHA, in addition to the LWD operator, the possibility of a source falling out of
the tool in the high vibration/shock environment of drilling, the need to pull the BHA increasing exposure potential, erosion
of source capsule by circulating fluids and cutting, and a stuck BHA. Consequently, service companies have designed
specific LWD source assemblies and procedures to load sources to safeguard against these risks [Aitken, 2002]. From
Figure 2 we note that the density and the neutron sources as placed in a single assembly which is then loaded through the
annulus of the LWD collar. This encapsulates the sources within the collar body. The source housing is secured on the drill
collar with multiple locking systems consisting of bolts and pins. One design has a fishing assembly connected to the source
assembly to allow retrieval of the source, if necessary.11

Well logging radiation sources are often used in extreme temperature and pressure conditions. They are mobile, transported
across the world, and often used in remote locations. Thus, they are ruggedized, shielded, and transported in heavy (shielded)
containers. The radioactive material is doubly or triply encapsulated and the encapsulation is designed to withstand a
minimum pressure of 25,000 psi (tested to 60,000 psi.) Figure 3 displays shielded containers used for logging tool sources
by one vendor [Jacobson, 2009]; these are representative of what is used in the industry. The shell (of the container shown in
Figure 3) is 12-gauge stainless steel. The neutron shield is approximately 1 ½ ft in diameter (excluding handles, etc.) and
weighs about 150 lbs whereas the density shield is slightly less than 7 inch in diameter and weighs about 200 lbs.12 The
shields in Figure 3 are designed such that the dose rate during transport (the so-called transport index) for the density shield
is limited to 70 mrem/hr at surface and 1 mrem/hr at 1m. For the neutron shield, the corresponding values are 90 mrems/hr at
the surface and 6 mrems/hr at 1m, respectively.13

The actual source section is usually small. Figure 4 displays a typical unit containing a Cs-137 (2 Ci) source in the density
tool. The actual size of the Cs-137 in the unit is approximately the size of a pencil eraser. Note that the source is taken out of
the container for mounting in the tool just before the tool is calibrated on-site to be lowered into the hole.

The density and the neutron sources used in logging tools are transported in separate heavy containers with transport
packages meeting the criteria defined for IAEA Category 3 sources [IAEA, 2000]. For example, when used offshore,
shipping containers (which double as storage containers) for Cs-137 sources are large thick-walled boxes of external
dimensions 1.75 m x 1.75 m x 1.75 m. The logging engineer hoists the source into position above the well using a long
handling rod (~1.5 m). Owing to the construction of the Cs-137 source assembly, the dose rate is not isotropic and radiation
dose rate can exceed 0.75 mrem (7.5 μSv)/hr for up to 30 meters in the forward direction and about four meters behind the
engineers [IAEA, 2003a]. For neutron sources, it is isotropic and can exceed this value at approximately four meters [IAEA,
2003a].

The radiation protection protocols are developed and enforced by service companies. Note that under normal operations, a
logging engineer would be limited to the radiation worker exposure limit of 5000 mrem/yr.14 Well-logging company
personnel handling radioactive sources are issued dosimeters like other radiation workers and wear protective clothing as
prescribed.

Source Vulnerabilities
We noted that radioactive sources are used in several phases of the petroleum industry and they are small, mobile and
transported across the world. Thus, vulnerabilities under normal operations would include both safety and security during
transport, storage and utilization. We noted in a previous section in the paper some of the key source and associated radiation
protection protocols the petroleum industry utilizes. However, despite these, two major areas of potential concern arise,
radiological dispersal and breached sources. We discuss these next.

Radiological Dispersion: We previously noted in the paper reports of illicit trafficking in radioactive sources and the lost
logging source incident in Africa few years back. These incidents have raised concerns and a testimony before the US Senate
11
“Fishing” is the word used to describe retrieving a stuck or lost source from a well.
12
The neutron shield is filled with borated polyethylene and the density shield is filled with lead.
13
Both containers are certified by an independent laboratory to meet US Department of Transportation radiation safety and transport requirements.
14
A recent study indicated that although the exposure of logging engineers was still well below the limit, it had increased, from 20 mrem/yr to over 200
mrem/yr, over a nine-year period [Fujimoto, et al, 1985]. The report cited a number of reasons, including inappropriate handling of sources.
SPE 123593 6

Foreign Relations Committee in 2002 suggested, based on a simulation study, that an oil industry Am-Be source, if exploded
over New York City, could result in people in an area roughly ten times (several city blocks) the area of the initial blast
requiring medical supervision and monitoring [Kelly, 2002]. The simulation indicated that people over a five-block area
would receive radiation doses exceeding the maximum annual dose for radiation workers and an even larger area would have
to be evacuated before the radiation cloud passes. The (simulated) impact was not uniformly distributed. In general, it will
depend on prevalent wind direction, dispersion properties of the material and explosives used, which would make it a

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complex event to prepare for or mitigate.

While a single source may not be a cause for RDD concern, a series of sources or conglomeration could represent a potential
threat as noted above.

Breached Source: We noted previously that LWD tool sources are located on the drill collar which is secured in place with
bolts and pins. Thus, in extreme drilling conditions it is possible for the source assembly to dislodge and drop down-hole,
with the potential for the source to be breached by continued drilling.15 Thus, as noted previously, there is a source retrieval
assembly in nuclear LWD tools. We also noted that source assemblies in wireline tools are designed differently and under
normal operation, sources in these tools would not dislodge. In addition, wireline logging takes place post-drilling.

However, in the event a source is stuck down-hole, a small but finite probability exists for a wireline source tool being
breached while retrieval is attempted. This unlikely event occurred in late 2006 when during a routine logging job; a wireline
tool was stuck in a well in California at about 1820 ft and breached during recovery operations [NRC, 2006]. Part of the tool
containing the neutron source was recovered during the fishing operation. In further efforts to retrieve the density source (1.2
Ci Cs-137), the protective container was breached, releasing radioactive material which was detected in the drilling mud at
the surface. The recovery operation was immediately shut-down, the crew evacuated, and surrounding wells within a 300 ft
radius were shut-in to insure no pressure draw-down. No personnel exposure was detected and the event was reported to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State of California as required by law [NRC, 2006]. Here are some highlights of the
impact of this incident:

Incident Response and Remediation: The well was abandoned in accordance with appropriate regulations with a permanent
marker. All drilling equipment was decontaminated and released from location or transported to an approved disposal
facility (located in Utah). All contaminated waste was shipped to an approved facility for disposal. Surrounding wells in a
defined exclusion zone based on reservoir engineering analysis were shut in resulting in a 60-100 BOPD loss in production.

Next, we briefly describe the monitoring program approved by the State of California.

Monitoring Program: The operator will monitor the source and any possible movement of the radioisotope for 300 years or
10 half-lives of Cs-137, the radioisotope involved.16 A study was done on the flow behavior expected in the field. It
indicated that any flow would be in a direction away from the source and most likely downdip or along geologic strike.17
Several monitoring techniques were assessed and a three-component monitoring program to detect any radiation release was
developed and was approved by the State of California. Fluid sampling and surface monitoring are part of the Radioactive
Materials License requirements approved by the State of California. The third component, down-hole monitoring, is an
activity being evaluated by the operator to be used as a proactive monitoring method. Below is a description of each
component:

(i) Fluid sampling: Samples are periodically collected and sent off to a California State certified lab for analysis using a
tested, well defined set of procedures that ensures maximum safety at all times. The results have been negative to date for
Cs-137.

(ii) Surface monitoring: The system design includes flow line monitoring via gamma-ray detectors, SCADA, remote
monitoring, and isolation capabilities should a pre-determined threshold count be reached or exceeded. The gamma ray
detector installed is functioning with no alarms or failures reported.

(iii) Down-hole monitoring: This will involve designated surrounding wells and an appropriately calibrated spectral gamma
ray tool has been selected.18 The first test performed in a temperature observation well located in the monitoring zone
indicated no presence of Cs-137 in the near well-bore region of the formation.

15
Nuclear LWD tools use fewer curies than wireline tool, especially in their Am-Be sources [Badruzzaman et al, 1997].
16
In 10 half-lives, the activity of a radionuclide reduces to approximately 1/10 of its initial value.
17
Since the Cesium isotope is encased in a glass matrix, the possibility of the radioactive material being released is remote. However, in the regulatory
world one assumes the worst-case scenario.
18
A spectral gamma-ray tool, HNGS, which had been calibrated in the early 1990's for Cesium detection at Hanford Nuclear Waste facility, is being
SPE 123593 7

Initiatives on Addressing Source Vulnerabilities

An increased awareness of the dangers of industrial and medical application of radioactive sources has resulted in a number
of initiatives to safeguard the public primarily from RDD’s. These include government and industry efforts. The petroleum
industry on its own has been assessing the feasibility of enhanced safety protocols and replacement of current generation of
radioactive sources with alternative radiation sources. We discuss these next:

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Governmental and International Agency Initiatives: There have been a number of initiatives by the IAEA and various
governments. We briefly discuss a few:

1. The annual G-8 summit in Evian, France, held in June 2003 issued a statement on non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and securing of radioactive sources, encouraging countries to strengthen control of radioactive
sources.

2. The IAEA has established a Code of Conduct and Import/Export Guidelines on radioactive sources [IAEA, 2004;
IAEA, 2005]. The Code of Conduct covers Category 1, 2 and 3 sources. The Import/Export Guidelines cover only
Category 1 and 2 sources. Under the Import/Export Guidelines, each country will have to establish procedures to
meet IAEA guidelines and identify a point of contact (POC) to deal with import and export of radioactive sources.
These are not legally binding but form the basis for developing policies and practices for safe and secure use of
radioactive sources worldwide. However, compliance has been mixed.19

3. The US government has endorsed both the IAEA Code of Conduct and the Import Export Guideline. The 2005 US
Energy Policy Act codified the IAEA Code of Conduct. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations were
modified accordingly. The US government established a national source tracking system to cover Category 1 and 2
sources [Sowder, 2006]. Well logging sources are either Category 2 or high Category 3 sources and would likely be
included.

4. The Government of Nigeria reinforced its 1995 Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Act and has promulgated
radiation safety regulations for nuclear well logging.

5. Under the 2005 Energy Act, the US Congress asked the National Research Council of the US National Academy of
Sciences to assess the security of radioactive sources used by various industries in the US. In its report, issued in
2008, the Academy recommended replacement of (chemical) radioactive sources used in several applications with
alternative, possibly switchable sources. Among the sources recommended for replacement was the Am-Be source
used in neutron porosity tools, by either a Deuterium-Tritium (D-T) neutron generator (which is switchable) or a Cf-
252 source which uses a few millicuries of radioactivity. The Cs-137 source used in the density tool was spared. As
noted previously, formation density is a critical parameter and currently, there are no alternatives to the Cs-137
source. In addition, it is a lower category source and the cesium is in a glass matrix making it insoluble in water.20

Petroleum Industry Initiatives: In view of the concerns due to use of radioactive sources, a number of initiatives have been
underway in the petroleum industry. A short-lived industry/government partnership was initiated to assess existing oil
industry source security and related protocols, and recommend steps to strengthen those [Cefus, et al., 2006]. It was
primarily a service company-related effort. In addition to this, source management vendors are developing comprehensive
source management schemes to inventory and track radioactive sources [Rotty, 2008; Nuclear SIG, 2008]. Various logging
tool designers have initiated an assessment of options to replace current Am-Be sources with alternative sources for neutrons
and nuclear experts in the petroleum industry have come together, under the umbrella of the Nuclear Logging Special Interest
Group (SIG) of the Society of Professional Well Log Analysts (SPWLA), to identify common challenges and approaches to
address them [Nuclear SIG, 2008].21 Next, we briefly discuss the likely alternatives to current sources and potential
challenges in implementing them.

Alternative Sources
Neutron sources: The recommendation of the US National Academy of Sciences to replace the Am-Be source used in
neutron porosity tools [NAS, 2008] has bolstered efforts to replace this source. One service company had already marketed a

utilized.
19
As of 23 February, 2009, the Code of Conduct has been accepted by 94 countries. Of the three components of the Import/Export Guidelines, 76 countries
have identified the POC but only 52 of these have committed to the guidelines themselves, and 42 countries have supplied to the IAEA the response to the
Self-Assessment Questionnaire.
20
Cesium chloride used in other industries in powder form is highly soluble in water and was recommended for immediate replacement.
21
The National Academy of Sciences report also recommended that the Nuclear SIG be tasked to address the technical obstacles of implementing the
replacement of the Am-Be source [NAS, 2008].
SPE 123593 8

(D-T) neutron-generator based wireline (neutron) porosity tool in the 1990’s [Mills et al, 1988; Scott et al, 1994] but the tool
did not perform adequately [Badruzzaman, 2005]. Recently, the vendor has undertaken an effort to improve the
interpretation of the tool [Fricke, et al, 2008]. The same vendor has marketed an LWD tool where the neutron sonde uses a
D-T generator [Evans, et al, 2000], with significantly greater accuracy in the estimated porosity than was achieved by its
wireline counterpart. Another vendor has developed an LWD tool with a 16 mCi Cf-252 source [Valant-Spaight, 2005].22
Other vendors are assessing their options [Truax and Jacobson, 2008; Gilchrist, 2009]. As for the 16 Ci Am-Be source in a

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Frack-pack monitoring tool, a neutron generator can possibly be used instead and should be studied.

Density sources: Currently, there are no viable alternatives to Cs-137 sources to measure formation density. A tool with a
linear electron accelerator (LINAC) emitting a photon spectra (unlike the single energy photon emitted by Cs-137) was tested
successfully in the 1980’s but was not commercialized [King et al, 1987]. Research on similar concepts continues. Inelastic
photons from interactions of high-energy neutrons with materials can be used to compute a pseudo-density. Several tool
ideas have been proposed or tested using this concept [Badruzzaman, 1998; Odom et al, 1999; Evans et al, 2000]. However,
the accuracy of the method is not well established. Research on this concept continues. It should be noted that X-ray sources
(which are switchable) may be able to replace the Cs-137 (or Co-60) sources used in nuclear gauges and assessment of this
option should be considered.

In addition to the above efforts underway, the petroleum industry may be able to adapt, for down-hole formation
characterization, novel generator-based radiation source concepts being developed at national laboratories for cargo
inspection [Celata et al, 1997]. However, a number of significant hurdles, such as miniaturization and minimization of the
power requirement, will have to be overcome for down-hole application.

Potential Challenges of Source Replacement: Replacing current sources used in the petroleum industry would involve a
number of challenges, whether one is contemplating using a generator-based source or an alternative chemical source.
Appendix B discusses the issues in greater detail, especially for a D-T generator vs. Cf-252 as a source for neutron porosity
tools. Briefly, the challenges may include development or adaptation of novel hardware requiring much R&D, detailed
calibration and field testing by vendors, and time-consuming adaptation by the oil companies for application in their fields,
where field-specific normalizations of tool response, often developed over many years, play a key role. In general, the
process to fully adopt a novel tool takes years. This will be particularly challenging if the physics involved is significantly
different from that incorporated in current tools and their interpretation. This was illustrated by the less than satisfactory
porosity prediction by a D-T source wireline neutron porosity tool to replace the Am-Be source; D-T neutron generators emit
14-MeV neutrons while Am-Be sources emit a spectrum with a peak energy of ~ 4.3 MeV [Badruzzaman, 2005]. Besides,
generator-based sources, being electronic, pose reliability problems; chemical radioactive sources do not. On the other hand,
Cf-252, a short half-life isotope with a lower peak energy being tested as an alternative neutron source, poses its unique set of
challenges as noted in Appendix B. However, papers by Evans, et al (2000) and Valant-Spaight, et al (2006) indicate that it
would be possible, though with a considerable effort, to replace at least the Am-Be source in the neutron porosity tool.

Suggested Operator Protocols

While the petroleum industry continues the effort to replace Am-Be sources, the need for radioactive sources will remain
strong. Although service companies own and operate the nuclear tools containing the sources, such tools are utilized on the
premises of the operators, whether on-shore or off-shore. Thus, a missing-source incident or a breached-source incident can
create serious issues for the operator in terms of cleanup, monitoring, regulatory regimes and of course, significant financial
impacts. Consequently, the authors recommend that if they have not already done so, operators consider implementing
source safety and security protocols encompassing the following elements:

1. Source inventory and tracking: Procedures to maintain and track the inventory of all sources in use on their premises in
both upstream and downstream operations.

2. Source use and handling: Protocols to use and/or handle sources safely covering three major aspects of operator interest:
(i) receipt of radiation sources on operator premises, (ii) safe and secure storage, handling and utilization while these sources
are on operator premises, and (iii) moving them out after use, with clear documentation at each step. The protocols should
identify potential hazards and corresponding mitigation at each step. The protocols should establish clear procedures to
retrieve a stuck source in conjunction with those of the service company and report a missing source.

3. Decision chain: Establish a clear decision chain to resolve radiation-related issues which may arise during routine
operations or during a source incident.

22
Wireline tools with Cf-252 had higher amount of radioactivity.
SPE 123593 9

4. Health, safety and environment (HSE) protocols and radiation safety officer (RSO): Develop clear HSE protocols and
designate a RSO, at each business and/or operating area, as the key contact for dealing with nuclear radiation source issues.
This will be similar to the IAEA requesting designation of one official point of contact on sources by each country.

5. Radiation safety advisor (RSA): Ideally, each operator should consider designating corporate-level Radiation Safety
Advisor, if it does not have one.

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6. Training and Education: Incorporate, disseminate and reinforce, through formal and informal training, the major tenets
regarding government regulations, industry safe practices and procedures to all who would deal with radioactive sources.

7. Internal radiation safety/security clearance: All projects involving radiation sources should have an internal radiation
safety/security clearance before they are undertaken. These would complement any government clearance needed at this
level. In Nigeria, a permit to utilize nuclear sources, whether chemical or pulsed, is required on each and every well [Zalan,
2009].

8. HSE competency: Maintain/develop an adequate HSE competency in nuclear radiation safety area.

9. Contractor competency: Ensure that contractors performing radiation source related jobs are thoroughly trained with a
documented competency and familiarity with operator protocols and expectations.

In addition to the above, operators should encourage vendors to develop or utilize alternative radiation sources to replace
current chemical radioactive sources wherever feasible.

Summary
We surveyed the state of radioactive source use in the petroleum industry and the associated concerns. Radioactive isotopes
emitting damaging radiation exist in all phases of petroleum industry, in sources used in down-hole logging tools, in nuclear
gauges and radiography devices, in produced water, and as NORM accumulated in piping’s. Radioactive sources used down
hole, in gauges and in radiography devices provide indispensible measurements in hydrocarbon exploration and production
operations. There are several safety protocols in place, both internationally and domestically in the US, and the industry
generally has a record of safe and secure use of these sources. However, it is perceived that at least one type of such sources
used in down-hole logging can be used in an RDD, a concern heightened by illicit trafficking in sources in general and a
missing-source incident in the petroleum industry under unclear circumstances in particular. Although an individual source
may not be a RDD concern, a conglomeration of them can represent a significant potential threat. In addition, a recent
breached source incident has drawn attention to the hazards to the environment, potential to contaminate reservoirs,
expensive clean-up and site remediation costs, lost production revenue, and potentially long-term monitoring programs.

Both the potential for RDD and the breached source incident point to the need for stronger protocols in the use of radioactive
sources. It also points to the need to develop tools with safer, alternative radiation sources. In the paper, we suggest a
number of protocols the petroleum industry, especially the operators, should consider adopting to utilize radioactive sources
safely. We also point out a number of potential alternatives to current generation of radioactive sources which are being
investigated by the vendors for adoption while other, more exotic source concepts, being developed at national laboratories
for non-petroleum applications, may potentially be adaptable for petroleum industry application.

Acknowledgements
The authors thank Chevron management for supporting the assessment reported in the paper to improve source security and
safety. Industry colleagues, especially in the Nuclear SIG, are thanked for the on-going discussion of the importance of
sources and concerns on source issues to arrive at safer practices and explore alternatives. The following individuals deserve
special thanks: Allen Gilchrist of Baker Hughes Inteq, Larry Jacobson and Jerry Truax of Halliburton, Ward Schultz and
Cornelis Huiszoon of Pathfinder, Bob Adolph, Mike Evans and Brad Roscoe of Schlumberger, Dale Fitz of ExxonMobil,
John Nieto of Cambrian, Ray Wydrinski of BP, Rich Ostermeier of Shell, Jim Klein of ConocoPhillips, and Tom Zalan,
Dennis Woods, Jim Logan, Don Mitchell, Don Seeburger, Bruce Bilodeau, Dapo Adeyemo, and Dean Gulick of Chevron.
One of the authors (AB) is grateful to Kate Roughan of QSA Global for sharing a source-supplier perspective, Vilmos
Friedrich of the IAEA for discussing regulatory issues, and Ka-Ngo Leung of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory for
pointing out potentially promising novel, non-chemical source concepts, at a 2007 American Nuclear Society panel AB
organized. Arlyn Antolak of Sandia National Laboratories is thanked for sharing their paper on novel source concepts. AB
thanks the US National Academy of Sciences for the opportunity to review the draft of their report on sources to US
Congress, and the US EPA and US NRC for insightful discussion on source issues.
SPE 123593 10

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SPE 123593 12

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Table 1
IAEA Source Category and Health Effect*

Source Category A/D Ratio Health Effect to Individuals

1 A/D> 1000 Could lead to death or permanent injury in a short period of time

2 1,000> A/D > 10 Could lead to death or permanent injury to a person in close proximity
to the source for a longer period that for Category 1 source

3 10> A/D> 1 Could lead to permanent injury to a person in close proximity to the
source for a period of time longer than a Category 2 source

4 1 > A/D > 0.01 Could lead to temporary injury to a person in close proximity to the
source for a period of time longer than a Category 3 source

5 0.01 > A/D > Exempt Could lead to minor temporary injury to a person in close proximity to
Quantity/D the source, but unlikely to do so

*Adapted from IAEA (2005) and NAS (2008)

SPE 123593 13

Table 2
Selected Petroleum Industry Applications, corresponding radioisotopes, A/D ratios and IAEA Category

Category IAEA

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Typical D Value (A/D- Assigned
Application Radioisotope Half-life Activity (Ci) A/D Ratio based) Category
Well logging- Am-241(Am-Be) 433 yr. 8-23 Ci 2 4-11.5 3 to 2 3
neutron porosity
Well logging- Cs-137 30.2 2 Ci 3 0.67 High 4 3
density
Well logging – Am-241(Am-Be) 433 yr. 16 Ci 2 8 High 3 3
capture
lithology
Well logging- Cf-252 2.65 yr. 0.11 -.027 0.5 0.22-.054 4 3
neutron porosity
Well logging- in H-3 12.33 yr. 1.6 to < 10 5x104 <2x10-4 5 -
D-T tools Ci
Nuclear gauges- Cs-137 30.2 yr. 0.135- 2. 7 3 .05 to ~0.9 4 to nearly 3
pipeline or 3
vessel
Nuclear gauges- Co-60 5 yr. 0.25 to 2.6 0.8 0.31 to 3.3 4 to 3 3
vessel or
pipeline
Level gauges- Cs-137 30.2 Several 3 <0.05 4 4
pipe-wall mCi
profiling
Frack-pack Am-241 (Am- 433 yr. 16 Ci 2 8 High 3 3
monitoring Be)
(Vendor A
Frack-pack Am-241 433 yr. 300 µCi 2 0.15 4 -
monitoring (Vendor B)
Interwell tracer Kr-85 10.76 1000 800 1.25 3 -
Moisture gauge Am-241 (Am- 433 0.05-0.1 2 .031-.062 4 4
in insulation- Be)
pipewall gap

Table 3
Reserves Uncertainty in Barrels with 1 Porosity Unit (pu) Error

Uncertainty for Nominal Reserves (barrels)

Reference Porosity Nominal Reserve = Nominal Reserve = Nominal Reserve = Nominal Reserve =
(pu) 100 million barrels 1 billion barrels 10 billion barrels 50 billion barrels

5 20 million 200 million 2 billion 10 billion

15 6.7 million 67 million 670 million 3.3 billion

30 3.3 million 33 million 333 million 1.67 billion

SPE 123593 14

Figure 1. A formation density tool (adapted from Ellis, 1987) Figure 2. A nuclear LWD Tool (Holenka, et al, 1995)

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Figure 3. A neutron source container (left) and a density container (right). Note the radioactivity symbol on both.
(Courtesy of Halliburton)

Figure 4. Size of unit within density tool that contains Cs-137 source (left) and approximate size of Cs-137 (right, the size of
an eraser at the end of a pencil. The eraser is depicted for illustration only and is a brainchild of one of the coauthors, SB.)
SPE 123593 15

Appendix A

Terms and Units Associated with Radioactivity and Radiation Dose

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A-1. Radiation

Unstable isotopes emit a variety of radiation in the form of charged particles or uncharged particles. Such isotopes can be
naturally occurring [Potasium-40 (K-40), Uranium-238 (U-238) and Thoroim-232 (Th-232] or man-made [Americuim-
241(Am-241), Cesium-137 (Cs-137), Cobolt-60 (Co-60, etc.]. Charged particles (electrons, protons, Alpha-particles) can
have sufficient kinetic energy to produce ionization by collision and are called directly ionizing particles. Uncharged
particles, such as neutrons and photons, called indirectly ionizing particles, can liberate ionizing particles which cause
ionization or initiate a nuclear transformation which may result is emission of secondary radiation. Photons are either X-rays
or gamma rays. Beta particles are electrons or their positively charged counterparts, positrons.

A.-2. Unit of Radioactivity

The unit of radioactivity for a long time has been curie (Ci), named after Marie and Pierre Curie. One Ci is the quantity of a
radioactive material in which the number of disintegrations is 3.7 x 1010 per second.

It is should not be confused with the number of particles being emitted by the decaying radioisotope. If the radioisotope is a
simple, pure beta-emitter, a single particle would be emitted during each disintegration, and thus one curie of the radioisotope
would emit 3.7 x 1010 particles per second. However, in the case of a more complex radioisotope, more than one particle or
photon may be emitted during each disintegration. For example, Co-60 releases a beta particle and two photons. Thus, one
curie of Co-60 would involve 3 x 3.7 x 1010 or 11.1 x 1010 radiations per second.

Recently, a new unit if radioactivity, Becquerel (Bq) has been defined to replace curie. One Bq is defined as the activity of a
quantity of radioactive material in which one nucleus decays per second, i.e., 1 Bq ≡ 1 disintegration/sec. It is the SI unit of
radioactivity. The Becquerel was named for Henri Becquerel who shared a Nobel Prize with Marie and Pierre Curie for their
work in discovering radioactivity. The conversion is as follows:

1 Bq = 2.703 x 10-11 Ci

1GBq = 27.03 mCi.

Academic radiation literature is using Becquerel with increasing frequency. However, curie still remains in use, especially in
the US and in the petroleum industry. Regulatory agencies cite radioactivity in both units.

A-3. Energy deposited in a medium: This is measured in rad (radiation absorbed dose) or the newer unit called Gray (Gy).
One rad is 100 ergs of energy deposited per gram of tissue while Gray is in joules/kg. Thus,

100 rad = 1 Gy

A-4. Dose equivalent: All radiation types do not have the same biological impact on tissue. Thus, a parameter, dose
equivalent, to reflect the biological impact, is derived for a given radiation type by multiplying the energy deposited by the
“quality factor” or the “radiation weighting factor” (Wr) of the radioisotope. Table A-1 list these factors for several types of
radiation.

The older unit of dose equivalent is rem (roentgen equivalent man). 1 rem = 1 rad x Wr. The newer unit is sievart (Sv). 1 Sv
= 1 Gy x Wr. The conversion is:

100 rem = 1 Sv
100 mrem = 1mSv
1 mrem = 10 µSv
SPE 123593 16

Table A-1

Radiation Weighting Factor to Incorporate Biological Effect

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Radiation Weighting Factor
Radiation Energy (Wr)
X-Ray, gamma rays, electrons,
positrons 1

Neutrons <10 keV 5

10 keV -100 keV 10

100 keV – 2 MeV 20

2 MeV – 20 MeV 10

> 20 MeV 5

Protons > 2 MeV 2

Proton Alpha particles, fission

products, heavy nuclides 20
SPE 123593 17

Appendix B

Challenges in Replacing Current Radioactive sources in Petroleum Industry

Designing new tools can involve utilizing novel hardware such as radiation generators instead of chemical sources, requiring
much R&D which small vendors may not be able to afford. Since the neutrons from D-T generators have high energy (14

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MeV), obtaining a porosity which would mimic conventional thermal neutron porosity has been challenging. Cf-252 would
likely do better. Deuterium –deuterium (D-D) neutron generators, with 2.45 MeV energy, have been contemplated as sources
for neutron porosity tools but their significantly lower neutron yield makes them unattractive

Generators have a finite life (several hundred hours) and reliability of such sources remains a challenge, as for any electronic
source. Cf-252 would be better from these perspectives. However, it is still a chemical source, though its half-life is 2.65
years while that of Am-Be is 433 years. The short half-life of Cf-252 raises its own challenges. For example, it will have to
be replaced much more frequently than Am-Be sources, five years vs. approximately 15 years.23 Consequently, a Cf-252
source-based tool may demand more frequent tool recalibration, will involve much more handling and there will be many
more such sources to be disposed off at the end their useful life. A debate on D-T generators vs. Cf-252 sources is underway
in the industry.

Typically, new tools are calibrated in the laboratory and then tested in the field over a number of years. While use of
numerical simulation of tool response has significantly reduced the time required to calibrate a tool [Badruzzaman, 2003], a
new tool would still take a one person-year or longer to calibrate test and deploy with corresponding cost [Jacobson, 2009].
It is conceivable that, starting from scratch, successfully replacing the Am-Be source with a D-T source in a neutron porosity
tool could take considerably more time relative to replacing it with a Cf-252 source. However, note the issues with Cf-252.

Upon successful calibration and field-testing of a tool, it is marketed to the oil companies for application. Oil companies may
perform additional field tests. Since the geology varies across fields and user- experience gained over many years to
accommodate special features of a given field and normalization factors which are developed become an integral part of
accurately interpreting the down-hole data from a given tool. With a new tool one would have to start afresh. In addition, if
the physics is significantly different, one may not be able to readily establish the reference tool response-geology correlations
an operator often utilizes based on years of experience with a tool in a given field, and additional time will be required to
address related issues. Addressing these challenges will require a collaborative effort. Thus, the effort of the Nuclear SIG to
identify issues and determine approaches, in keeping with the recommendations of the US National Academy of Sciences for
the group, is expected to be beneficial.

23
Am-Be sources are repackaged about every 15 years to account for wear and tear but not for reduced source strength; it has a 433-yr. half-life.