FATIMA JINNAH WOMEN UNIVERSITY

Department of Defense and Diplomatic Studies

Title: Nuclear Weapons a source of Peace and stability between

India and Pakistan.

Submitted By: Maria Kanwal

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4105194

Contents
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. 3
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 4
Proliferation Optimist’s and Pessimist viewpoint ..................................................................................... 4
Pakistan and India’s Stance towards Nuclear Weapons ............................................................................ 5
Waltz Viewpoint ...................................................................................................................................... 5
Organizational Perspective ...................................................................................................................... 5
Non state actors and Crisis ...................................................................................................................... 6
Conclusion............................................................................................................................................... 6
References .............................................................................................................................................. 6

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4105194

Nuclear Weapons a source of peace and stability between India and Pakistan.

Abstract
Deterrence is very crucial for maintain peace between rival states like India and Pakistan. In past
we have seen that nuclear weapons plays a vital role in maintaining peace between US and Soviet
Union during Cold War Era. In case of Pakistan because of tensions between India and Pakistan
the Deterrence Stability of the entire Asian region is under threat. Optimist and Pessimist maintains
different views regarding to nuclear weapons and nation’s security. In Optimists viewpoint nuclear
weapon states do not goes into war with each other. Reason behind this is massive loss both in
terms of human lives and military. But on the other hand, in Pessimist view point Nuclear Weapons
presence increases the chances of nuclear wars between both the nations. Deterrence plays a
significant role in keeping up the peace between India and Pakistan. In Waltz view point that peace
is maintained in conflicting regions through nuclear weapons. Pakistan and India’s nuclear
deterrence is exposed to non-state actors. India’s ethnocentrism-cum-superiority preoccupation,
growing conventional irregularity between aggressive nationals, Pakistan’s economic and political
instability and lacking asset in modern conservative weaponry leads to the failure of deterrence.

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Introduction
Pakistan and India uttered that nuclear deterrence is very crucial for sovereign defenses. Security
of South Asian region is under threat. Pakistan and India both are nuclear weapon states and shares
the common borders. Deterrence stability remains under threat because of bilateral tensions
between both states. Nuclear span in South Asian region is examined through spectacles of Cold
War Nuclear Opponents Soviet Union and United States. Both the Soviet Union and United States
stockpiled nuclear arsenals in order to achieve equality. After assuring Mutually Assured
Destruction and reaching the edge of nuclear conflict both states entered into agreements upon
arms control. Pakistan and Indian case are different, more challenging in many ways.

Proliferation Optimist’s and Pessimist viewpoint

 Following Rational Deterrence Theory proliferation Optimists claimed that nuclearization has
lessened the strategies which authorize Pakistan and India to utilize military gains in order to
attain favorable power distribution without endangering excessive self-destruction. Proliferation
optimists maintain the viewpoint that nuclear powers do not go into war with each other as the
cost of nuclear war is so high.
 In opposition to Proliferation optimists, Proliferation Pessimist maintains the viewpoint that
nuclear weapons Proliferation in Pakistan and India increases the chances of nuclear wars and
crisis.

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Pakistan and India’s Stance towards Nuclear Weapons
As according to Rational Deterrence Theory, deterrence is not hard to reach and every state will
be deterred from the other so in case of Pakistan and India deterrence is very crucial for
achieving the aims of

 Bring down the dependence upon allies

 Frighten the enemies
 Expand the negotiating strength
 Obtain military liberation by reducing need on external foundations of military equipment
 Deter the opponent from anticipating aggression

War is prevented between Pakistan and India through deterrence theory. Pakistan and Indian’s
stance towards the nuclear weapons demonstrate that both the states are involved in strategic
upgrading programs of significant breadth, constructing cruise and ballistic missiles and also
upgrading the air forces. Both states define the security in terms of military which depends upon
the defensive and offensive abilities of states and also upon the intentions of others.

Waltz Viewpoint
 In Waltz view point that peace is maintained in conflicting regions through nuclear weapons.
 Foreign administrators of Pakistan and India in 2004 stated that nuclear abilities of both countries
were feature for stability. Deterrence ability regarding India’s nuclear capability was major
motivator of Pakistan’s nuclear package meanwhile early 1970s and 1998.
 Administrators of Pakistan in early 1970s viewed nuclear ability as best choice in order to
counterbalance India. Pakistan and India used the nuclear weapons not just for the purpose of
deterrence but the development of nuclear weapons the stability-instability contradiction was
introduced as an essential constituent of South Asian strategic terminology.
 No state goes towards nuclear strikes when the opposing state also has nuclear weapons.
 Nuclear deterrence is basically the prevention of eruption of total war just because of risk of
upturn into nuclear exchange and in case of Pakistan and Indian it would be harmful.
 In theory deterrence necessities are the incredible ways of defense for the reactive forces so that
the force endures surprise attack. In 2009 defense municipal of Pakistan look upon its reactive
forces which seemed safe by feature of presence either covert in silos or isolated and
technological reluctance of Indian’s nuclear infrastructure. But this situation averts as India get
assistance from the US and from other states. India is developing more exact missile capabilities
along with other infrastructures. Pakistan’s insecurity feature exposes that it needs to be vigilant
following military development by India and deliberately adjusting its prevention requirements
consequently.

Organizational Perspective
Since a quick expansion of Pakistani nuclear weapons creates a short-term nuclear dominance over
India that evidently hold back from building weapon after 1974 nuclear tests. Military biases

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giving support to preventive war was greatly powerful in Pakistan where military is in government
control. In fact military leaders of Pakistan frequently started preventive war in opposition to India.

 In September of 1965 Ayub administration launched preventive war upon India in order to
conquer Kashmir prior to expect Indian armed upsurge was completed.
 The Pakistani attack on India during 1971 was too greatly affected because of parochial
prejudice and organizational benefit of force leaders. It is to be assumed that future Pakistani
administrations will be completely challenging toward parochial military influence.

Non state actors and Crisis

Stability of nuclear deterrence is threated by non-state actors. These non-state actors fetched
Pakistan and India to the edge of war. Political shortcomings of leaders provide the way to non-
state actors to destabilize the nuclear stability between Pakistan and India.

During the Kargil crisis in 1999, military deployment in 2001-2002 and Mumbai Terrorist attack
in 2008 United State of America mediated for resolving the conflict between Pakistan and
Pakistan. United States was gradually involved in calming the deterrence in subcontinent.

Conclusion
In a nutshell it is to be concluded that in Proliferation Optimists views Pakistan and India had
settled some nuclear risk decreasing steps like not attacking upon the others nuclear units and
equipment’s and notices concerning the missiles fight tests and upon military exercise. Deterrence
between Pakistan and India is dynamic instead of static depending on opponent’s moves and
because of advancements in technologies. On opposing side Proliferation Pessimists maintains
the viewpoint that Pakistan and India’s nuclear deterrence is exposed to non-state actors. India’s
ethnocentrism-cum-superiority preoccupation, growing conventional irregularity between
aggressive nationals, Pakistan’s economic and political instability and lacking asset in modern
conservative weaponry leads to the failure of deterrence.

References

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4105194

Karl, David J. "Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited." Journal of Strategic Studies 34.4 (2011):
619-641.

Ganguly, Sumit, and S. Paul Kapur. Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Feaver, Peter D., Scott D. Sagan, and David J. Karl. "Proliferation pessimism and emerging nuclear
powers." International Security 22.2 (1997): 185-207.

Feaver, Peter D. "Optimists, pessimists, and theories of nuclear proliferation management:

debate." Security Studies 4.4 (1995): 754-772.

Ahmed, Samina. "Pakistan's nuclear weapons program: Turning points and nuclear
choices." International Security 23.4 (1999): 178-204.

Chakma, Bhumitra. Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Routledge, 2012.

Ahmed, Samina. "Security dilemmas of nuclear-armed Pakistan." Third World Quarterly 21.5 (2000): 781-
793.

Edwardes, Michael. "India, Pakistan and nuclear weapons." International Affairs (Royal Institute of
International Affairs 1944-) 43.4 (1967): 655-663.

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