Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia, A Translation and Commentary,

and: Johann Georg Hamann, Philosophy and Faith (review)

Philip Merlan

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 7, Number 3, July 1969, pp.

327-335 (Review)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.1380

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/229444/summary

Access provided by University of Winnipeg Library (31 Jul 2018 15:29 GMT)
 BOOK REVIEWS 327

conceptual impositions and consider nirvana in the light of its own "intentional infra-
structure." Interpreted as doctrine, nirvana is a wooden category; as a path, subtle and
paradoxical, a factor celebrated in the later M a h a y a n a texts (samsara is nirvana;
nirvana is samsara). In pleading for sensitivity to context, Welbon maintains that the
Buddha was not a philosopher, much less a nineteenth-century one, but a saint and
a "genius as a soteriological tactician":

Depending on the context and in particular the needs of the individual(s) to whom he
spoke, his emphasis varied. To those full of self, his message was expressed negatively. To
those full of fear, the message expressed confidence. To those full of suffering, the message
expressed hope. (p. 300)

Nirvana's "meanings," then, are many, and include "both annihilation and bliss,
negation and affirmation, nonexistence and existence" (p. 302).
Yet the author's primary concern is not simply to advance one more theory of
nirvana, lined up beside the rest; it is rather to elucidate the role of theory in its
relation to intercultural and history of religions data. Interpretations are themselves
phenomena whose intentionality, context, or history must be clarified. The differences
between the scholars surveyed in this b o o k stem not so much from varying conclusions
about given data as from differences of premise and method; they are differences of
questions rather than answers. Nirvana, a religious ultimate without the conception of
deity, has indeed been a classic stumbling block to Western theories. The encounter,
Welbon suggests, documents not only a history of methodological shortcomings, but
"the fragile and inadequate nature of our understanding of what religion itself may
be" (p. 301).
WILLIAM E. PADEN
University of Vermont

Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia, A Translation and Commentary. By James C. O ' F l a -

herty. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. xv+229. $7.50)
Johann Georg Hamann, Philosophy and Faith. By W. M. Alexander. (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Pp. xii+212. Gld. 28.25)

America continues to contribute more than a fair share to the study of H a m a n n

---even though the Hamann News-Letter, edited by James C. O'Flaherty, had to stop
appearing in 1963. It is now the same O'Flaherty who opens wide the gates for the
study of H a m a n n in the English-speaking world by translating the Socratic Memorabilia
and providing an introduction and explanatory notes. The Memorabilia without doubt
offer the best first approach to Hamann. t But so great is the obscurity of H a m a n n
that it is by no means sure that the Memorabilia have now become an exotericum.
Before reviewing O'Flaherty's book I shall therefore present the content of the
Memorabilia. If only we had simple blow-by-blow accounts of all of his writings before
we embark on a wholesale interpretation!

a For decades they were available in Reclams Universalbibliothek (in c. 1914 at a price of
about three cents) and have now (August, 1968) been republished (together with Hamann's
Aesthetica in nuce) with excellent notes and a commentary by Sven-Aage Jorgensen (present
price: about twenty cents). In 1959 F. Blanke published another amply annotated edition with
an extensive thorough commentary.
328 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

The purpose of the Memorabilia is to "convert" two friends of Hamann, Kant

and Berens, from Enlightenment to Christianity (the two tried to do the opposite
to Hamann) and to defend himself and his Christianity from their criticisms. To do so,
Hamann decides to use philosophic rather than religious language. In so doing he
will present himself as another Socrates, because, as H a m a n n sees it, it was the mission
of Socrates to lead the Athenians to the unknown God, thus prefiguring the mission of
St. Paul, and because Socrates opposed the then "enlighteners," viz., the Sophists. In so
doing he furthermore compares some of his own character traits (for which he was
blamed by K a n t and Berens) and some events in his life with Socratic ones. But as
he compares (equates) Socrates with the prophets and with Jesus, he by the same token
compares (equates) himself with them. Of course, H a m a n n knows that the Enlighten-
ment also admired Socrates. But it did so for entirely wrong reasons: they praised
Socrates at the expense of Jesus Christ. F o r Hamann Socrates remains merely a man.
Of the qualities of Socrates none attracted H a m a n n more than his professed
ignorance. This ignorance, H a m a n n avers, must not be understood as profession of
scepticism. The sceptic professes ignorance as a doctrine; Socrates lived it. 2 It is
obviously the Socratic kind of ignorance which H a m a n n claims for himself. What
is the subject-matter of this (Hamann's) ignorance? It is ignorance of one's own nature
or of the nature of the divine. A n d H a m a n n quotes Bayle, who says that faith must
contain a measure of o b s c u r i t y - - a n d the attendant ignorance (lack of knowledge);
he furthermore explains Socrates' ignorance by quoting 1 Cot., 8, where the Apostle
says that he who fancies himself to know anything, still does not know anything as
it should be known, whereas he who loves G o d is known by God. Apollo's testimony
that Socrates was the wisest of all men proves that Socrates was loved by GOd. By
professing his ignorance, Socrates fulfilled the command "know thyself."
At this point we can see clearly those aspects of the Memorabilia which, better
than others, lend themselves to being presented in "academic" language: the relations
between the claims of reason and knowledge as defended by the Enlightenment and
the claims of faith. 3
(A) In Greek attitudes towards oracles, apparitions, dreams, etc., the Enlightenment
could see nothing but examples of its arch-enemy--superstitious obscurantism. Hamann
defends these very attitudes. First, the history of philosophy cannot be adequately
understood without them; the scholarly histories of philosophy of a Stanley, a Brucker,
or a Deslandes produce nothing but chimeras or toys. Second, it is true what Bayle,
one of the prophets of the Enlightenment, said: illusions, fancies, faith in their time
caused greater miracles than their objects themselves. In fact, says Hamann, it befits
G o d more to instruct us by our illusions and fancies than by the dubious insights of
physics and astronomy. In other words, Hamann objects to all attempts of the
Eniightenment to prove the existence of GOd or His providence by the scientific study
of nature.
This does not mean that H a m a n n rejects the interpretation of nature as God's
work. But it is not science which provides us with the right insight; it is the Scriptures.

See below.
' A familiarity with the ideas of Pascal (1623-1662), Jurieu (1637-1713), and Bayle (1647-
1706) in France (not to speak of Voltaire) and of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) and Bolingbroke
(1678-1751), in England (not to speak of Hume), is of great help in placing Hamann In
perspective. It is regrettable that nobody yet has undertaken to check in detail Nadler's
assertion (1919) of the great indebtedness of Hamann to Rapin (1621-1687).
 BOOK REVIEWS 329

H a m a n n , of course, considers the Scriptures to be quite literally God's word; he simply

shrugs off all attempts to interpret them as the product of the Jews (this most ignorant
of all nations, according to the Enlightenment). He who looks for instruction concerning
nature in some other source instead of believing Moses and the prophets, he who tries
to analyze a body to catch God at his work, produces nothing but poetry (read: fiction),
as exemplified by Buffon's natural history.
Now as to the history of philosophy and of history in general: they must also be
read in the light of the Scriptures. And this, in turn, means that all Scriptural passages
refer to all historic events--past, present, and future. 4 Again, he who analyzes historic
events (viz., into their secular components) only produces another kind of fiction, as
exemplified by Montesquieu's History of Rome.
I n short, nature and history do lead to the knowledge o f God if observed in the
light of belief rather than that of reason. H a m a n n can understand Socrates (and, thus,
himself) only with the help of the Scriptures.
(B) Every historian of philosophy is familiar with the passage related to Hume. s
What H a m a n n finds in Hume is that even our own existence (i.e., in Hume the belief
in our continued identity) and the reality of the external world cannot be proven by
reason but only believed in. This, according to Hamann, implies Hume's admission that
belief (equated by H a m a n n with faith)6 does not need any proofs and therefore can-
not be refuted by reason. Obviously H a m a n n objects to all attempts of the Enlighten-
ment to prove or to disprove the reasonableness of Christianity.7
These are the leading ideas of the Memorabilia. Let us add two somewhat peripheral
ones. As much of the writing is a reaction to conversations with K a n t and Berens, the
complete contents of which remain u n k n o w n to us, it does not seem to be possible to
interpret the Memorabilia in a strictly immanent manner or to prove its complete unity.
(A) H a m a n n discusses Socrates' homosexuality. He not only admits it, he defends
i t - - i n a very remarkable way. First, he states that warm friendship always contains
an admixture of sensuality; the autobiographical character of this statement is obvious, s
Secondly, he justifies the attraction which beautiful bodies exercised on Socrates by
the statement that the Greeks considered beauty to be a symbol of the divine. Even the
Jews were shocked by the appearance of Jesus as they, according to Ps. 45, 3, expected
the Savior to appear as the fairest of all men. And now, disregarding logic, H a m a n n

9 Classic example: in London Hamann suddenly realizes that, as presented in the

Scriptures, the history of the Jeers is at the same time a history of his own life. Another
example from the Memorabilia: nobody can understand Socrates' relation to the Athenians
or his to Kant and Berens unless he is familiar with the undertaking of St. Paul to show the
Athenians the God who remained hidden to them. To construe for the purpose of shock
another example: the kind of rule of Frederick II and its effects on the financial situation of
Hamann is prefigured in the Bible.
5 I have dealt with the Hume-Hamann problem so often that I shall be as brief as
possible here and refer the reader to my papers: "From Hume to Hamann," The Personalist,
XXXII (1951), ll-18; "Hamann et Les Dialogues de Hume," Revue de Mdtaphysique et de
Morale, LIX (1954), 285-289; "Johann Georg Hamann," Claremont Quarterly, III (1954),
33-42; "Kant, Hamann-Jacobi and Schelling on Hume," Rivista Critica di Storia della Filo-
sofia, IV (1967), 481-494. My interpretation was criticized by Alexander (see below), but this
is not the appropriate place to answer him.
6 Hamann does not hesitate to quote Aristotle's &s~T&p 7rt~r162 ~ v ~-~04vovr~ (Soph.
El. 165b), as Aristotle's admission, albeit an unconscious one, that faith should precede
reason.
We feel reminded of the postdogmatic Kant, who indeed in his own manner tried to
establish the complete independence of faith from all cognitive (reasonable) claims. Of course,
what he means by faith is entirely different from its meaning to Hamann.
8 See H. A. Salmony, Johann Georg Hamanns Metakritische Philosophie, Vol. I
(Zollikon, 1958) and my review in The Hamann News-Letter, III (1963), esp. n. 15.
330 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

continues by saying that anyway the pagan poets prepared the Greeks to recognize the
contradiction between the inward and the outward, 9 until their Sophists (as ours,
too) protested in the name of reason against this paradox, x0 As a specific example
H a m a n n quotes the oracle of Apollo (Socrates, though he professed to know nothing,
is declared by him the wisest of all men). Thus Hamann almost explicitly says: the
oracle of Apollo can be understood only by the believer who fully recognizes the
contradiction between the outward appearance of Jesus and His divine character.
H a m a n n ' s lack of logic is obvious. He should condemn Socrates for misunder-
standing the fables of the poets (or the oracle of Apollo) and for being attracted to
beautiful bodies. But we should not forget that Hamann defends Socrates' homosexual
feelings and virtually denies that he engaged in homosexual practices (which Socrates,
according to Hamann, hated and f o u g h t - - t h e autobiographical component again!). This
is the same H a m a n n who called the man who taught him to masturbate a "B/~sewicht"
and asked G o d to forgive both of them (cf. Gedanken iiber meinen Lebenslau[, II, 17).
(B) Another peripheral idea. As according to Hamann, G o d decided to become
an author, small wonder that His providence should quite particularly include the
world of books. H o w much H e is interested in this world can be seen from the fact
that He even recorded the monetary value of nonchristian books burned obviously
with His consent (Acts 19: 19). Therefore small wonder that he let perish, for instance,
the works of Celsus. We should praise Him for this--just as we praise Pompeius for
having burned the writings of His enemy Sertorius. N o ancient work of any value for
us has been lost. Thus H a m a n n "understands" the action of Pompeius only in the light
of the Scriptures. This is the way in which one should understand history.
So much about the content of the Memorabilia. It will, I trust, be a good intro-
duction to either of the books to be reviewed, because it contains very many o f
H a m a n n ' s leading ideas. Let us now turn to O'Flaherty's book.

II

It consists essentially of two parts, The first (135 pages) mainly presents the life
of H a m a n n and the cricumstances which motivated him to write the Socratic Memora-
bilia; analyzes the outward and inward form (style and "dramatic unity"), or, as
O'Flaherty says, takes an aesthetic approach to the work; discusses a number of
characteristic terms; xl and concludes mainly by drawing a parallel between K a n t ' s
doctrine of a priori forms as preconditions for any empirical knowledge and H a m a n n ' s
insistence on the central importance of the fact that in Jesus G o d abased Himself 12
so that appearance (the suffering servant) hides or even belies reality (divinity), by
asserting that the hidden unity of the work symbolizes the immediate relationship of
all reality to God, 13 and by stressing the antirational character of H a m a n n ' s convictions.
T h e author obviously considers his "aesthetic" interpretation of the Memorabilia
his most distinct contribution to the studies of Hamann. A n d indeed it seems to me

9 Obviously Hamann is thinking of pagan gods appearing as animals, etc.

10 Here we have before us most of Kierkegaard's Training in Christianity in a nutshell.
xl Specifically the transformation of terms which in ordinary language have pejorative
connotations into symbols of a higher spiritual reality (p. 125).
12 I think this parallel is wayward. What Hamann says is that we can understand
neither natural phenomena nor historical events unless we see them in the light provided by
the Scriptures (as a whole--the incarnation is not the only biblical topic providing this
light); I cannot see any similarity between this assertion of Hamann and Kant's doctrine
of a priori.
13 Another idea which I find wayward.
 BOOK REVIEWS 331

that O'Flaherty's discussion of H a m a n n ' s style, including the influence of his "typo-
logical" interpretation of the Scriptures (pp. 80-83) on his own manner of writing, his
delight in expressing an elevated concept in a trivial, paradoxical, or even shocking
manner (pp. 78-80), and his "metaschematization," i.e., interpreting actual events and
situations by paralleling them with some other well-known historic events or situations
(e.g., H a m a n n : K a n t and Berens: :Socrates:the Sophists) is very enlightening. But why
he considers this metaschematization as constituting the essential unity of the work
(pp. 88-91) remains unclear to me. A n d I also find myself unable to follow O'Flaherty
when he argues that underlying the Memorabilia is something like a classic dramatic
pattern--three or five acts (pp. 101-108)--and even less when he, as one of his proofs,
points to the passage where H a m a n n suggests that his writing should have laxative,
purging effects on K a n t and Berens. Hamann, O'Flaherty says, must be thinking here of
Aristotle's katharsis as one of the main aspects of a tragedy (pp. 104-106). 14
The second part (pp. 136-206) brings, on opposite pages, the original text and the
translation, followed by notes. The translation is of excellent quality. I offer some
suggestions:

1) I do not think that lange Weile, as used by Hamann, should be translated by

"boredom." Rather, it means "the time in which there is nothing to do," for example,
the time one simply waits for something or has nothing important to do. K a n t and
Berens probably reproached H a m a n n as an idler. The possibility that H a m a n n should
designate himself as a friend of boredom seems rather remote. In other words, lange
Weile means "idle hours." Strangely, O'Flaherty did not translate lange Weile on
pages 144f. When H a m a n n designates himself as a lover of the lange Weile, he means:
I like to spend my time doing nothing---or, as the Germans would express it, being
a Miissiggiinger (an "idler"). is
2) The word Kiichlein he translates by "lump," though its literal meaning is,
according to O'Flaherty, supposed to be "little cakes" (p. 141; cf. p. 105). O'Flaherty
did not notice (though he was very close to noticing it) that Kiichlein m a y simply
be Hamann's spelling of Kiiglein ("little balls"). 1~ Kiiglein means in this context "little
laxative ball-shaped pills."
3) Hamann compares his Memorabilia with laxative pills and recommends them as
such to his readers in general and to Kant and Berens in particular. A n d he says
specifically: "Was ihre Wirkungen anbetrifft, so lernte bei einem ~hnlichen GefOhl
derselben Vespasian zuerst das Gliick Deines Namens erkennen, und soil auf einem
Stuhl, der nicht sein Thron war, ausgerufen haben: 'uti puto, deus rio'." W h a t H a m a n n
means is this: If my writing should have the effects of laxative pills, that is, cause my
readers to have a bowel movement, so much the better. Vespasian, who felt his death
approaching while he was sitting on a chamberpot and having a bowel movement,
exclaimed: "I guess, ] am on the verge of becoming God!" (because he knew that the

14 In another passage (p. 146) Hamann praises idleness by deriving the name of Argus
or the thousand eyes (i.e., able to see more than an ordinary mortal) from ~p':~r i.e.,
"idler."
15 The two "classic" interpretations of the x~0~p~tr ~ ~ 0 ~ o ~ are to take the
genitive case either for a genetivus objectivus (the ~ r ~ 0 ~ are purified) or for a genetivus
separationis (the ~ , , 0 ~ x ~ are made objects of a purge). I am by no means sure that
Hamann adhered to the latter interpretation, nor do I see that O'Flaherty proved it (p. 106,
n. 32).
16 The letter "g" is in various parts of Germany often pronounced as soft "ch" (or even
as "j"). Goethe (Faust I, Gretchen's prayer) rhymes neige with schmerzensreiche, but the
printed text keeps the spelling with "g." Platen (Tristan) rhymes versiegen with riechen and
spells versiechen. For Kilchlein = Kilglein, see Grimm, s.v. Kiichlein, lc and 2d.
332 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

Romans would deify him)--and thus, on the occasion of having a bowel movement,
experienced the happiness of invoking the name of God. I hope therefore that my
readers also, on a similar occasion (a bowel movement caused by my writings), will be
reminded of God.
The whole passage excellently illustrates the scurrilous style of Hamann and what
O'Flaherty himself calls correctly the expression of the most elevated by shocking or
disgusting terms. In his letters and writings Hamann more than once refers in a similar
manner to digestive processes.
O'Flaherty's translation seems to miss the point. He translates Deines Namens
by "your name" and refers it, so it seems, to the public--which makes no sense at all;
he introduces (from another version of the story) the Latin clause by "Woe's me" and
misses the irony (or cynicism) of Vespasian's exclamation; and he translates "deus" by
"a god," thus dulling the edge of the passage. Hamann wanted to remind his readers
of God, not a god.
4) A large part of the Memorabilia Hamann devoted to explaining Socrates'
ignorance. One of the key passages reads: "Die Unwissenheit des Sokrates war Emp-
findung. Zwischen Empfindung aber und einen Lehrsatz ist ein grSsserer Unterschied
als zwischen einem lebenden Tier und anatomischen Gerippe desselben." O'Flaherty
translates Empfindung by "sensibility" (p. 167; cf. pp. 74, 98), in one place by "faith"
(p. 127), though he seems to approve of my translation by "live attitude" (p. 98, n. 2).
But I think in the light of the proportion Lehrsatz:Empfindung: :anatomisches Skelett:
lebendes Tier, to translate Empfindung by "sensibility" is inadequate. The skeptic
cerebrally professes ignorance; Socrates lived it.
5) No friendship without sensuousness (Sinnlichkeit) as explanation of Socrates'
homosexual leanings? No--Sinnlichkeit here means "sensuality" (p. 157).
6) False opinions concerning comets, oracles, and dreams had greater effects than
these events themselves (selbst), not as O'Flaherty has "even" these events (p. 159), as if
Hamann had written als selbst diese rather than als diese selbst.
7) O'Flaherty translates Lustseuche by "venereal disease" (p. 173). But in the context
(the Athenian "inquisitiveness" was a Lustseuche) the word can only mean "inordinate
desire" or "passion of lust" as the Standard version translates Thess. 1: 4, 5, though
Hamann certainly enjoyed the ambiguity of the word.
8) Der erste klassische Autor unserer Schulen is hardly Xenophon--it is probably
the primer from which Hamann is quoting the appropriate lines concerning Xanthippe
(Xantippe war ein" arge H[ur]), and Xanthippe stands for Berens (p. 179 with n. 54;
p. 205).
9) After his death Socrates appeared to a certain Kyrias in his dreams (13. 183).
The ultimate source of this story: Suda, s.v., Socrates. Did Hamann try to draw a
parallel with the events in Emmaus?
The notes are full and extremely helpful; again I have some suggestions:
1) Hamann says that God Himself recorded the value of the first forbidden books
which Christian zeal committed to the flames. Should not O'Flaherty inform his readers
(on p. 149) that the allusion is to Acts 19:197
2) The great men of Socrates' time accused him of making Spiine ("chips") of their
wood (p. 153). The allusion seems to be to Hippias rna. 29 304a, just as (p. 185) the
Brosamen ("crumbs") identified by Hamann himself. Hippias scorns Socrates' method
as chopping up ),6-I,0~ into xv~'ixct~ and ~ [ ~ : ~ t - r (Schleiermacher, Brocken und
Schnitzel).
I hope that the paucity and quality of my suggestions indicate both the difficulty
of translating and explaining Hamann and how well O'Flaherty succeeded.
 BOOK REVIEWS 333

III

As the subtitle indicates, W. M. Alexander is mainly interested in the relation

between faith and philosophy. Let us therefore simply enumerate the first four chapters
(Hamann's life; H a m a n n authorship as to content and style; meaning of faith) as
introductory t7 and turn to the rest of the book. Its outline is as follows: H a m a n n ' s
attack on philosophy, Hamann's recognition of philosophy preceding faith, H a m a n n ' s
idea of the "right" philosophy. This is a promising outline, but when it comes to filling
it out, it is not always easy to follow Alexander.
Let us begin with the shortest section: philosophy before revelation. Undoubtedly
Socrates presents for Hamann, in the sense stated above, the highpoint of philosophic
prechristian possibility: insight into the role of reason, viz., to reveal to us our
ignorance and so to pave the way for the advent and acceptance of the Savior who will
dispel that ignorance. Reason, then, has been given to the Greeks for a purpose
analogous to that for which the law was given to the Jews: to convince them of their
ignorance and their sin, respectively, and to prepare them for the advent of the Savior.
This, then, is Hamann's recognition of philosophy and reason in a pagan world.
N o w "true" philosophy (from faith to faith): this is the second longest section, but
about a third of it (pp. 179-191) is obviously irrelevant for the problem of philosophy;
it is devoted by Alexander to presenting the character of a "true" study of nature and
of history according to Hamann. Here we find one of the neatest formulas, unfortu-
nately buried in a footnote: whereas the Enlightenment tried to elicit the knowledge of
G o d from nature, Hamann's " G o d cannot be derived from nature, but being known
He can be recognized in nature" (p. 187, n. 1; cf. "pp. 27f.). The rest of the section
presents what Alexander conceives to be "'truC' philosophy according to Hamann.
The subsections are a different concept of (1) reason, (2) reality, (3) truth, (4) set of
categories, (5) history, and (6) concept of man. W h a t (1) means is that H a m a n n con-
ceives of reason as merely receptive, another neat formula: "reason must receive
truth in the lowly and contingent forms of history and sense experiences" (p. 77, n. 2).
And (3) means for Hamann that truth is not an idea; its model is the Incarnation.
A n d Christianity "cannot be appropriated as a set of correct ideas." As for (4), these
new categories are irony and patience. W i t h (5) we are already partly f a m i l i a r - - a l l
history is prefigured in the Bible. But in this context Alexander also presents what he
considers one of the most important ideas of Hamann: the universal is the historical.
The similarity of this formula to the well-known one by Hegel seems to have been of
no interest to Alexander. As for (6), the authentic man, according to Hamann, is not
the "pure" mind inhabiting a body, but a rational and emotional, intellectual and sexual,
totality. Subsection (2) remained unclear to me. I leave it to the reader to decide
whether any of this casts light on what H a m a n n conceived "Christian" philosophy to
be. I a m not sure that he himself ever succeeded in clarifying his ideas on this point, or

17 However, it deserves particular mention that Alexander stresses (as did, e.g., Salmony
before him) that the neverending wonderment of Hamann that God abased Himself means
not only that He did so by becoming man, but also by becoming an author, and by creating
the universe. Moreover, when He became an author, He decided to record the lies of an
Abraham, the incest of Lot, and other foolish or sinful actions of man. Furthermore, I
should like to observe that I do not think Hamann ever succeeded in making clear what he
means by faith, nor that Alexander did any better. Cf. the famous passage in a letter to
Jacobi (April, 1787): "Yet know I neither what Hume nor what we both understand by faith,
and the more we should speak or write about it, the less we ,will succeed in holding fast this
quicksilver" (Alexander's trans.). This Alexander quotes on p. 130, which I would take as an
admission of his failure to make positively clear what he means by faith.
334 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

that Alexander did any better (see n . 17). M a n y of the H a m a n n quotations in this
section seem to me to have no bearing at all on the problem. Some are entirely obscure,
and Alexander would have indebted his readers by patiently unraveling their meaning
and clarifying their bearing on the problem of philosophy.
The longest section (pp. 62-145) Alexander devotes to the presentation of H a m a n n ' s
attack on "false" philosophy, that is, mainly the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The
length of this section is perhaps indicative of the fact that there is much less material
on the "positive" aspects of the problem of faith and philosophy than on the "negative"
ones. In fact it would be interesting to count the number of times H a m a n n calls
"erdighteners'" murderers and thieves, liars and hypocrites.
The philosophy of the Enlightenment is characterized b y its faith in reason (un-
corrupted by any "fall" of man) as and natural religion. This much is clear. Less clear
are the categories by which Alexander tries to articulate this criticism. According to
him, H a m a n n objects to Enlightenment curiosity and ignorance (pp. 67-71). He refers
us to a passage in the Memorabilia, but on looking it up we find H a m a n n addressing
the public (his prospective readers) with the words: "Because your face shows traces
of human ignorance and curiosity, I shall confess to you [i.e., let you in on a secret]
that the two whom I want to reach in their capacity as members of the reading public
are K a n t and Berens." How this passage proves Alexander's point, I am unable to see.
A n d the same is true of another passage quoted by Alexander from the Memorabilia.
When we look up the passage, we find that indeed Hamann calls the curiosity of the
Athenians a Lustseuche (Alexander translates "sickness," but see above), b u t mainly to
explain that this curiosity gave Socrates a chance to interrogate them. t9 A n d the
curiosity of the Enlightenment was, according to Alexander, made possible b e c a m e
it "secretly possessed the Deity," and its philosophies "rested upon a concealed faith"
(pp. 68f.). This faith H a m a n n tried to destroy "to make room for r e a s o n " - - a n under-
taking strictly contrary to that of K a n t (p. 71). I think the whole formula and what
leads to it are highly misleading. Alexander overfreights, if I may say so, the concept
of c u r i o s i t y - - a concept used by Hamann in the most casual way.
Hamann's great objection to the Enlightenment is what he calls abstraction or
separating what G o d (or nature) joined together. We shall agree with Alexander that
the classic case of this unnatural separation is the divorce of reason from "faith, sense-
experience, and the crudities of language" (p. 74). But I cannot see that H a m a n n ' s
reply to Kant's call to have the courage to exercise one's own reason has anything
to do with the problem of abstraction. On the other hand, Alexander is certainly right
in stressing that H a m a n n objects to any kind of theology which tries to interpret the
Old Testament by stripping its language from its poetic and sensuous elements and to

18 I therefore cannot understand why Alexander--albeit in Hamann's name---repeatedly

charges the Enlightenment (e.g., p. 105) with assuming that man can save himself. According
to the Enlightenment, man needs no salvation.
1~ On this occasion let it be said that much as we should be indebted to Alexander for
the wealth of quotations from Hamann, his translations are not always adequate. Why should
Leichtsinn be translated by "triviality" (p. 70)? Why gefliigelte Worte ("words on wings") by
"familiar proverbs" (p. 83), which turns Hamann's admiration for man's speech close to
the origins into criticism of its triviality? Why Sonnenfinsternis in einem Gefiisse roll Was~er
in Augenschein genommen ("looking at the reflection of an eclipse in a vessel filled with
water") by "eclipse . . . looked at through a glass of water" (whatever this means)? Why
erhielt verdienstliche Gerechtigkeit by "rears the entire jurisdiction and merit" (p. 84)?
Why Kunstnaht ("artful seam") by "artificial knot" (p. 109)? Why Erbschade ("inherited
d a m a g e " = original sin) as "original bias" (p. 111)? Furthermore sometimes the quotations
axe accompanied by a misleading commentary, e.g., Hamann objects to analyzing a body or
event for the purpose of discovering the Deity (see above), but Alexander says that if one
were omnipotent and omniscient, he by such an analysis could discover the Deity (p. 127).
 BOOK REVIEWS 335

any kind of aesthetics which applies to works of literature standards of reasonableness.

Particularly meritorious is Alexander's attempt to explain Hamann's criticism of
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. But it is somewhat marred by his misinterpretation of
Hume. Alexander presents him as if he had based his criticism of the concept of
causality on the fallibility of sense impressions (pp. l13f.), which is entirely erroneous.
And it is misleading to say that the category of causality is according to Kant pure
intuition (p. 114).
In his conclusion Alexander sums up Hamann's main objections to the Enlighten-
ment, but he also characterizes him to be, in some respects, a man of the Enlightenment.
This latter, somewhat surprising assertion Alexander substantiates: Hamann rejects
authority and drops "the legal framework as the framework of theology" (p. 198).
Since the authority to which the Enlightenment objected was the authority of the
tyrant and the priest, since Alexander quotes no specific passage proving that Hamann
also rejected these two authorities, since Hamann hardly ever deals ex professo with
"the legal framework" of Christian theology, and since the Enlightenment is hardly
interested in this specific problem, I find it difficult to follow Alexander.
"Hamann's writings are still obscure," says Alexander (p. 199) and on this modest
note closes his book. For clearing up some of Hamann's obscurities Alexander deserves
gratitude from all Hamann scholars.
PHmIP M EVa.~N
Scripps College and
Claremont Graduate School

The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. By P. F. Strawson.

(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966. Pp. 296. $6.25)

No book on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is without its difficulties. On the one
hand there is the tendency toward slavish exegesis, usually of the sort that avoids basic
philosophical problems by submerging them in the very Kantian language which gave
rise to them in the first place. On the other hand, as one's own philosophical commit-
ments come to the fore, there is an almost irresistible compulsion to merge what Kant
actually said with what he was "struggling" to say, "really" meant, or should have
said. P. F. Strawson's book has its difficulties too, but not the ones I have mentioned.
He avoids the pitfalls of Kantian terminology while remaining faithful on the whole
to the philosophical problems this terminology was designed both to clarify and to solve.
Though he has a great deal to say about Kant's actual views, what Kant seemed to
have in mind, what is salvagable in Kant's views, and what a philosopher might truly
say concerning the problems with which Kant struggled, Strawson is scrupulous in his
identification of which particular enterprise he is engaged in at any particular point in
his book. What results is a study at once both faithful to Kant and relevant to con-
temporary philosophical problems.
The source of the major difficulties in Strawson's study is at the same time the
source of its major virtues. Strawson carefully distinguishes two enterprises engaged
in by Kant: (1) the articulation of a minimal conceptual framework in terms of which
any experience can be said to be intelligible and without reference to which no
experience can be meaningfully conceived, and (2) the forging of a philosophy of
mind, a "transcendental" psychology of human cognitive mechanisms (faculties), on
the basis of which human experience becomes explicable. The former Strawson con-
strues as a metaphysics of experience, descriptive in the sense in which Strawson uses