The Nonproliferation Review

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Brazilian nuclear policy during the Workers' Party

years

Mônica Herz, Layla Dawood & Victor Coutinho Lage

To cite this article: Mônica Herz, Layla Dawood & Victor Coutinho Lage (2016) Brazilian nuclear
policy during the Workers' Party years, The Nonproliferation Review, 23:5-6, 559-573, DOI:
10.1080/10736700.2016.1246100

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1246100

Published online: 09 Aug 2017.

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 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, 2016
VOL. 23, NOS. 5–6, 559–573
https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1246100

Brazilian nuclear policy during the Workers’ Party years

Mônica Herz, Layla Dawood, and Victor Coutinho Lage

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Focusing on the tenure of the Workers’ Party (2003–16), we appraise Brazil; South America;
the tensions between the Brazilian government and international deterrence; naval
nuclear governance mechanisms after the end of the Cold War. submarines; development;
We examine three main dimensions of Brazilian nuclear policy: Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear
the search for autonomy and the affirmation of sovereignty, Weapons
the economic-development rationale, and the security aspect. We
present an interpretation of Brazilian nuclear policy within its
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broader cultural setting and the framing of foreign policy and

international relations as defined by the ruling elite.

This article is a critical reflection about a complex and multifaceted element of Brazil’s pol-
itical agenda, where national and international dimensions intersect. We take a critical
view of the insulation of much analysis of Brazilian policy toward the nonproliferation
regime from wider debates on nuclear-technology policy and the country’s role in the
international system, which involves concepts of autonomy, sovereignty, and develop-
ment. The dual nature of nuclear technology inevitably implicates several technical and
political aspects: technological improvement in areas such as health and agriculture,
national energy policy, economic development, national-defense strategy, and Brazil’s
foreign-policy approach to mechanisms of international governance, which include
norms, institutions, organizations, and treaties. Although the dual nature of nuclear tech-
nology is at the core of much of the literature on nonproliferation, it has not sufficiently
informed the analysis of Brazilian nuclear policy in a way that integrates domestic politics,
foreign policy, and international politics. This understanding illustrates how the tension
between the Brazilian government and the nonproliferation regime has evolved, empha-
sizing the conditions that allowed this tension to emerge.
The ideas that have shaped these policies will be analyzed through the notion of frames.
Frame analysis constitutes a perspective for the study of the organization of social experi-
ence. It involves an analysis of the arguments actors use to explain or understand an
empirical event. In this article, this concept helps us to understand how Brazilian ruling
elites conceptualize and categorize experiences related to nuclear policy.1 Different
framing thus enables different justifications for political action. We will consider the argu-
ments put forward by the relevant actors, how these arguments are embedded within
Brazilian elite culture, and the process of making arguments into public policy. We under-
stand political argument as “public reason.”2 In examining how arguments translate into
action, we are particularly interested in practical arguments, which refer to how to act in

CONTACT Mônica Herz m.herz.rio@gmail.com

© 2017 Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
 560 M. HERZ ET AL.

the social world. These arguments establish perceived cause-and-effect relations. As differ-
ent actors make public arguments, they frame or represent situations.
We analyze how the arguments developed by the Brazilian leadership are embedded
within broader cultural and historical associations between international autonomy and
nuclear technology, between development and nuclear technology, and between security
and nuclear technology. Recognizing this embeddedness permits an understanding of
the jigsaw of ideas that allow for the frames and arguments made by the Brazilian
ruling elite, discussed below, to make sense.3 In the next three sections, we discuss
three different but interrelated frames established by the ruling elite: the first section
deals with how ruling elites mobilize autonomy and sovereignty in their explanation or
understanding of nuclear policies; the second turns to nuclear technology and develop-
ment; finally, the third section addresses the arguments related to security. We then con-
clude by highlighting the intertwining of these three aspects.
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Autonomy and sovereignty

The Brazilian posture toward international nuclear governance in recent decades can be
characterized as a mixture of acceptance and tensions. Since the 1990s, Brazil has ratified
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and several other inter-
national agreements related to nonproliferation, including the Treaty for the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) in 1994 and the Comprehen-
sive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996. Brazil also joined the Missile Technology Control
Regime in 1995 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1996. Brazil’s participation in
these nuclear-governance mechanisms must be understood within its wider acceptance of
the international liberal order and its regimes on human rights, commerce, intellectual
property, peace operations, and the control of weapons of mass destruction. The
change in posture regarding the NPT became possible after relations between Brazil
and Argentina improved, making it possible to create the Argentine-Brazilian Agency
for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in 1991, to apply full-scope
safeguards to all nuclear activities in both states, and to establish the Quadripartite Agree-
ment between Brazil, Argentina, ABACC, and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), which placed all nuclear facilities in both states under IAEA supervision.
The commitments made by the Brazilian government, both constitutionally and
through international treaties, attest to its acceptance of international nonproliferation
norms. According to the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, “all nuclear activity within the
national territory shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval
by the National Congress.”4 Still, Brasília has refused to adopt the IAEA Additional Pro-
tocol and has not accepted a number of other post-Cold War innovations devised to
strengthen the nonproliferation regime.5 Despite pressure to adhere to the Additional Pro-
tocol, the government has maintained its position against it, as expressed in the National
Defense Strategies of 2008 and 2012.6 The government has argued that the Additional Pro-
tocol extends the scope of activities that must be declared to the IAEA, damaging Brazilian
interests and ultimately hurting state sovereignty and autonomy. The ruling elites argue
that autonomy to develop technology, research, and economic interests should be pre-
served. The expansion of inspections and the corresponding flow of information
allowed by the Additional Protocol damage these interests.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 561

The 2012 National Defense Strategy includes the following:

Brazil will watch to keep open the access pathways to the development of its own nuclear
power technologies. Brazil will not adhere to amendments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
that seek to extend the restrictions provided by the NPT itself, unless countries that
possess nuclear capability advance their own disarmament.7

The 2012 National Defense White Paper highlights that the NSG recognized that the
Quadripartite Agreement “provides in political terms, equivalent safeguards to the
Additional Protocol and IAEA safeguards agreements.”8
To further justify these policies, the Brazilian government argues there is a growing
imbalance between nonproliferation and disarmament obligations, created by a deficit in
compliance with Article VI of the NPT, which obligates the recognized possessors of
nuclear weapons to pursue disarmament in good faith; the existence of states with
nuclear capabilities outside the NPT receiving preferential treatment, in particular India
and Israel; and an artificial distinction between states considered sufficiently reliable for
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developing an enrichment capacity and those under suspicion for pursuing such a capacity.9
The Brazilian ruling elite have viewed with suspicion several changes in the rules and
decision-making procedures of the nonproliferation regime, particularly the growing focus
on controlling the spread of “sensitive” technology.10 Similarly, they have become con-
cerned that the shift in IAEA safeguards from nuclear-material accountancy to a detec-
tion-based approach involves excessive intrusions into domestic affairs, and that
multinational approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle might hamper legitimate, peaceful pro-
grams. The move from multilateral fora to informal and plurilateral arrangements has also
generated concern. Brazil has not endorsed the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
which aims to interdict illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction, and which Brazil
regards as detrimental to multilateralism and the UN system.11 Brazil supported the
Nuclear Security Summit process of 2010–16, while insisting that the United Nations
play a central role in nuclear governance.
Apart from the continuous pressure for Brazil to sign the Additional Protocol, there are
tensions in other contexts, too. Conflicts over IAEA safeguards inspections conducted in
Brazil in 2004 raised questions about the purely peaceful character of the Brazilian nuclear
program.12 This uncertainty began in early 2004, when the Brazilian government of Pre-
sident Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva prevented the IAEA from conducting unrestricted inspec-
tions of Brazil’s Resende uranium-enrichment facility, claiming the need to protect
commercial secrets. By September, the IAEA and Brazil established an agreement to
allow the inspections, which granted inspectors full access to all facilities, although
certain machinery was shielded from view. The case had significant international reper-
cussions.13 In addition, the United States pressured Brazil over its civilian nuclear
cooperation with China and Venezuela.14 Major powers also criticized and opposed the
attempt by Brazil and Turkey to reach an agreement with Iran on Tehran’s controversial
nuclear program.15 In this context, the Brazilian government has framed its role as that of
a mediator between nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-weapon states, seeking not
only to ensure compliance with the NPT—which includes ensuring the possibility of
using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, such as for energy production and
medical uses—but also to enhance Brazil’s international prominence.
 562 M. HERZ ET AL.

By contrast, however, in the area of nuclear security and safety, the Brazilian stance has
been to adhere to international norms and regulations. Brazil supports the IAEA’s Code of
Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, the IAEA’s Guidance on the
Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, and the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Moreover, Brazil has put in place
the procedures demanded by UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which obligates states
to adopt appropriate legislation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and bio-
logical weapons and their means of delivery.
Brazil’s criticism of the discriminatory nature of certain nonproliferation norms and
obligations represents a line of continuity with its traditional posture toward the regime
since its establishment in the late 1960s. The Brazilian ruling elite consistently affirms
that it considers the current mechanisms of nuclear proliferation to be temporary.
Various sectors of Brazilian society frequently note the discriminatory nature of the
nonproliferation regime and the need to advance nuclear disarmament. In line with this
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position, Brazil is a member of the New Agenda Coalition, which played a central part
in building support among NPT state parties for the adoption of the consensus final
document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, particularly the “Thirteen Practical
Steps to Disarmament.”16
Brazil’s attitude and policies toward nuclear governance can be best understood in
terms of Brazil’s search for relative autonomy and a more prominent international role,
one based on the principles of multilateralism, legalism, sovereignty, and the diversifica-
tion of international relations. These principles must be understood in terms of how the
Brazilian ruling elites frame the country’s search for relative autonomy as a fundamental
aspect of its role in the international scene.
Brazil’s search for autonomy has been widely discussed in the literature on Brazilian
foreign policy.17 There has been a constant debate over the best strategy to obtain
greater autonomy, usually a debate over relations with the United States. The policy
pursued before the end of the Cold War can be understood as “autonomy through dis-
tance,” and the path sought since the 1990s as “autonomy through participation.”18
This latter strategy focused on attaining greater autonomy by strengthening engagement
with international institutions and building new links across South America, the Global
South, and other parts of the world.19
Several noted Brazilian scholars have discussed Brazil’s pursuit of autonomy through
participation in the 1990s.20 As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council,
Brazil was consistently critical of resolutions that involved the United Nations in coercive
action and voiced concern with interventionist policies, as clearly expressed in its cautious
position regarding the “Responsibility to Protect.”21 Noninterventionism acquired new
prominence in Brazilian discourse on international relations, which posits sovereignty
and the value of state boundaries as central to the legitimacy and stability of the inter-
national system.
The search for autonomy is also a search for power. There is a deeply embedded expec-
tation among the ruling elite that Brazil must play a greater role in world affairs, given its
size, population, and level of industrialization, as if there were a dissonance between the
country’s potential and real power. In fact, since Brazil became a republic in 1889, it
has actively participated in international fora.22 During Lula’s tenure, the focus on auton-
omy was more clearly linked to a belief in the country’s greater potential for global
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 563

prominence, and Brazil has increasingly been viewed—both by others and by its own
elites—as an emerging power.23 Gaining major-power status became a central and explicit
goal of Brazilian foreign policy in Lula’s second term (2007–10).24 His Workers’ Party
emphasized opportunities created by the changing distribution of power in the inter-
national system and the new role of coalitions and South-South cooperation.25
These attempts to occupy a more significant position on the international stage can
be observed throughout Lula’s tenure, when Brazil was regularly depicted as prominent
among emerging powers within a multipolar system. Lula’s social programs to combat
poverty and hunger and the improvement in Brazil’s wealth distribution were recog-
nized across the world, providing him with leverage for his assertive foreign policy,
which aimed at diversifying Brazil’s relations and strategic alliances.26 This strategy
can be named “latent multi-institutionalization,” expressed through the pursuit of flex-
ible alliances characterized by low degrees of institutionalization.27 One clear example
of this “autonomy through diversification” is the formation, along with India, China,
South Africa, and Russia, of the “BRICS” group of strategic partners, which sought
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to highlight the changing power relations within the international system.28 Other
examples include Brazil’s participation in the formation of the Group of 20 in
Cancun in 2003, and its partnerships with South Africa and India through the IBSA
Dialogue Forum. Brazil’s aspiration for regional leadership and a stronger international
position is also evinced in its increased contributions to UN missions, particularly its
support for the UN mission in Haiti.29 Throughout all of this, Brazil maintained its
pursuit of a permanent seat on the Security Council. Dilma Rousseff’s administration
(2011–16) continued these projects, albeit with dampened enthusiasm following econ-
omic and political crises.

Nuclear technology and development

In Brazil, whereas debates over national development acquired a central place in academic
and public discourse, the interest concerning deterrence remains restricted mainly
within the military and a small part of academia. In Brazilian nuclear policy, the ruling
elite has always connected security with development. Hence the potential success of
the spill-over argument: that technology acquired in the military sphere can benefit
other sectors of the economy.
Brazil’s interest in nuclear technology and the establishment of a link between econ-
omic development and a nuclear capability dates to the 1930s.30 But in the 1960s, invest-
ment in nuclear research within the strategy of development and modernization grew
considerably, a link reinforced throughout the Workers’ Party tenure. Brazilian elite—par-
ticularly scientists, the military, and political leaders who make investment choices—view
nuclear technology as a passport to modernity.31 Nuclear policies concerning the nuclear
fuel cycle, including the role of nuclear technology in energy, medicine, and agriculture,
must be understood within the broader framing of development.
According to the 2008 National Defense Strategy, Brazil has a strategic need to develop
and master nuclear technology.32 The document states that “the nuclear sector is of strategic
value and transcends by its very nature the division between development and defense” and
that Brazil should complete “the full nationalization and the development at [an] industrial
scale of the fuel cycle [including uranium conversion], as well as the technology for the
 564 M. HERZ ET AL.

construction of nuclear reactors.” The document also stipulates the objective of accelerating
“the mapping, ore searching and utilization of uranium reserves.”33
Beyond defense strategy, nuclear technology is considered crucial to the country’s
future energy supply, according to the National Energy Plan 2030, published by the
Ministry of Mines and Energy in 2007, and the Decennial Energy Plan 2020, published
in 2011.34 Two nuclear-power plants are operational and one is under construction
with the goal of connecting to the national power grid by 2018. Four more plants are
planned, although these have yet to be approved in Congress. The production of
nuclear fuel is being industrialized, although Brazil still relies on France’s Areva for fuel
supply. Producing fuel pellets, loading them into fuel rods, and bundling the fuel rods
together into fuel assemblies is done in the country. Up to 5 percent uranium-235 enrich-
ment takes place at the Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó, São Paulo. Enrichment
is considered a central component of Brazil’s nuclear policy, enabling the use of
Brazilian-enriched uranium in nuclear-power plants and nuclear submarines, which
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will use low-enriched-uranium fuel.

Beyond cooperation with France—aimed at developing a nuclear-powered submarine
—Brazil’s most significant investment in nuclear technology is its collaboration with
Argentina, geared toward constructing a nuclear research reactor.35 In 2008, Brazil and
Argentina established a Binational Commission on Nuclear Energy, known as COBEN,
with the mission of extending cooperation in the nuclear field. Initially, the agreement
included the creation of a binational company involved in uranium enrichment and the
joint development of a multipurpose reactor or research reactor designed mainly to
produce radioisotopes and radiopharmaceuticals.36 By 2010, the binational company
idea had lost momentum, and Presidents Lula and Cristina Kirchner signed an agreement
(the “Declaración Conjunta sobre Cooperación Nuclear”) to construct two multipurpose
reactors: the Brazilian Multipurpose and the RA-10 in Argentina. The construction of a
multipurpose reactor would make Brazil self-sufficient in the production of radioisotopes
and radiopharmaceuticals, as well as facilitate nuclear-technology research and testing.37
In 2011, the presidents signed another agreement involving Comissão Nacional de
Energia Nuclear and Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica to specify the terms for
the cooperative construction of the reactors. In 2013, an agreement was signed with
Argentina’s Investigación Aplicada S.A. (INVAP) at an estimated cost of 60 million
Argentine pesos. The expectation was that the reactor’s development and construction
would take four years (2014–18), though a February 2016 interview with INVAP
General Manager Héctor Otheguy revealed that the project is not on time.38 The basic
engineering was not concluded until the beginning of 2016, and with two more years
needed for detailed engineering and four years for construction, the reactors are more
likely to be completed between 2020 to 2022.
The current investment in technology is best understood through the developmentalist
school of thought, to which the post-World War II Brazilian ruling elite, along with many
other self-perceived latecomers to industrial development, subscribed. This theory articu-
lated a link between nation building and development, whereby industrialization—marked
by heavy state intervention and guidance—would help overcome underdevelopment and
poverty.39 By substituting imported goods with domestically produced ones, Brasília—
like other states of the Global South pursuing import-substitution industrialization
policies—sought to expedite development while avoiding industrialization’s negative
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 565

tendencies. Economist Celso Furtado applied this economic theory to the Brazilian case in
what became a classic reference in the country, and which came to influence further theor-
etical elaborations, such as dependence theory.40 According to dependence theory, techno-
logical progress did not reach the periphery of the international system given the
mechanisms of the market, which often worked to worsen the terms of exchanges for
this part of the world. In this way, development assumes a foreign-policy dimension,
leading Brazilian diplomats to insist that development and the reduction of inequality
on an international level be treated as equally important as security issues.
Two distinct periods in Brazilian history epitomize the concern with development in
terms of industrial and rapid technological modernization: the Juscelino Kubitschek
years (1956–61) and the military dictatorship (1964–85). During the Workers’ Party
tenure, too, development again became a central part of the narrative about the
country, as Brazilian firms “internationalized” and a new relationship with Brazilian
engineering firms and agroindustry grew.41
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The country’s uranium resources are well documented and represent 5 percent of the
world’s total.42 This availability of natural resources has allowed arguments for technologi-
cal development in the nuclear field to become embedded into this wider debate on devel-
opment, industrialization, and Brazil’s insertion in the global economy.
Finally, the role of the Brazilian Navy in the development discourse is significant, con-
sidering its historic role in fostering the creation of a national naval industry and creating
graduate engineering courses for its officers.43 In fact, consolidating a national-defense
industry, although not a novel objective, was part of the Workers’ Party agenda.
In the 1970s, while still under military dictatorship, the navy was responsible for devel-
oping the nuclear-fuel cycle, a nuclear reactor, and the nuclear-powered submarine. The
navy’s relationship to the Brazilian nuclear program is essential to understanding present
investment choices. It is thus crucial to understand how the navy incorporated the devel-
opment frame and turned it into an argument for investing in nuclear technology.44
The navy’s development argument is very much intertwined with its own argument
about the need to construct a nuclear-powered submarine. In other words, its develop-
ment argument is connected to its security argument.

Security
We turn to the definition of threat and the security discourse and practice that has justified
the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine project. We ask how it was possible to mobilize
the meanings in question, not only through language, but also through methods,
procedures, and plans. We start by stressing that defining both the threat and what is
threatened is a political process requiring constant choices.45 The definition of threat
and the priorities it engenders are always in dispute. We analyze the manner in which
the ruling elite has justified the need for investment in nuclear technology by framing
the South Atlantic region as a domain of insecurity.
For the ruling elite, the fear of losing control over the South Atlantic constitutes the
guiding threat.46 Military exercises and administrative events in the South Atlantic are
considered security events, particularly those undertaken by the navy.47
The navy-controlled Brazilian Nuclear-Submarine Project is based at the Navy Aramar
Experimental Center, where work is underway to develop a prototype of a nuclear-
 566 M. HERZ ET AL.

powered submarine.48 This is a long-term project that aims to complete the construction
of the first submarine in 2023. The goal of building a nuclear submarine has been present
in Brazilian politics since the 1970s, stalled in the 1990s, and resumed during the Lula
administration.49 Brazil’s future nuclear-powered submarine capability is hailed as
crucial in defending the country’s territory and resources, particularly in off-shore
waters. It is seen as a tool for strategic flexibility and broader maritime protection,
helping to secure Brazil’s regional-security interests, including the control of natural
resources in the South Atlantic and denial of access to unspecified outside actors. It will
be armed with conventional torpedoes to increase Brazil’s deterrent capability.
In order to understand the security rationale, it is crucial to look into the framing of the
South Atlantic as a region. In 2004, Brazil submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf a claim to extend its continental platform to 900,000 square kilo-
meters. The commission accepted this claim in 2007, which reinstated the relevance of the
nuclear-submarine project. Admiral Roberto de Guimarães Carvalho coined the
expression “Blue Amazon” to highlight the need to protect this area by claiming that
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the South Atlantic could bring benefits to Brazil of the same magnitude as the Amazon
forest.50 The concern regarding the protection of the South Atlantic was confirmed in
the National Defense Policy (NDP) of 2005 and in the National Defense Strategy of
2008.51 According to the NDP, Brazilian interests at sea require the means “of exercising
the surveillance and defense of the Brazilian jurisdictional waters, as well as the mainten-
ance of the security of the sea lines of communications.”52 For that purpose, Brazil should
“intensify the cooperative exchanges with the friendly nations’ armed forces, particularly
those in South America and Africa, bordering the South Atlantic.”53
In 2012, President Rousseff created a state-run enterprise, Amazônia Azul Tecnologias
de Defesa SA (Blue Amazon Defense Technologies, or Amazul), subordinate to the navy,
with the objective of developing technological projects for the Brazilian nuclear program
and the nuclear navy.54 For the Brazilian government, Amazul represents a step toward
developing the first viable Brazilian nuclear submarine, an industrial-scale nuclear-fuel
cycle, and the technology for the construction of nuclear reactors.
Several developments contributed to the framing of the South Atlantic as threatened
and thus a security concern: the discovery of large offshore oil reserves; increased links
with African states; new access to minerals due to new technologies; threats of fishery
decline and depletion; control over commerce lanes and piracy; and the 2008 decision
by the United States to re-establish the Fourth Fleet in the region (originally formed in
1942 and disbanded in 1950).
Given this growing interest in the South Atlantic and the need to increase the resources
available for operations in this theater, the nuclear submarine was gradually consolidated
in the domestic political debate as the most viable means to protect Brazilian interests
at sea. An important development occurred in 2007, when President Lula visited the
Aramar facilities and announced that he would authorize one billion Brazilian reals to
revitalize the program.55
High-ranking navy officials usually justify the nuclear-submarine project by mentioning
the natural resources present in Brazilian waters and the consequent need to protect them.
For example, in September 2008, during the establishment of the General Coordination of
the Nuclear Submarine Development Program, Admiral of the Fleet Marcus Vinicius
Oliveira dos Santos, general director of the equipment of the navy at the time, held:
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 567

The vastness of the South Atlantic and the magnitude of the Brazilian interests in the sea,
among other considerations, led the Navy, many years ago, to decide to equip the Brazilian
naval power with nuclear submarines. It then began the development of a nuclear program,
designed to enable the country to master the nuclear fuel cycle and to build a prototype
reactor capable of meeting the needs of a nuclear-powered plant for the submarine.56

Moreover, the nuclear-submarine project is often associated with Brazil’s econo-

mic development:
The generation of employment, the absorption of high technologies by our companies, the
training of personnel involved and the additional force given to the national economy
make the Program for the Development of a Nuclear-Powered Submarine a project of
State, in which the collective interest is the paradigm of which the Navy will never depart.57

In the words of the current navy commander:

Given the strategic need, on the one hand and on the other, the technological “apartheid” that
always denied the peripheral countries the development of technologies associated with mas-
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tering the atom, the [navy] decided to develop in an indigenous way the technology of build-
ing nuclear submarines.58

The military establishment produces specialized knowledge in the field of strategic analysis
and defense studies. Given the threat perception regarding access to the South Atlantic,
defense and deterrence are the arguments employed to justify investment in the
nuclear-submarine project. The defense strategy preferred by the navy is to deny
opponents the use of the sea:
The priority is to ensure the means to deny the use of the sea to any concentration of
enemy forces approaching Brazil by sea. The denial of the use of the sea to the enemy is
what organizes, before attending any other strategic objectives, the Brazilian strategy for
maritime defense.59

Brazilian defense policy therefore attaches great importance to submarines, since they
would be employed at the beginning of combat. According to this logic, only later, and
if needed, would the surface fleet be used. There is, accordingly, an unstated expectation
that this first phase of submarine warfare may sufficiently deter potential adversaries from
threatening Brazilian interests in the South Atlantic, thus manipulating the behavior of
others through the prospect of denying an easy victory. This expectation helps justify Bra-
zilian efforts to possess submarines with large displacement capacity and autonomy.
Deterrence-by-denial includes the threat to control the situation to the point that there
would be no viable options available to a would-be aggressor, since they would have no
prospect of success and would therefore decide not to attack.60
Another way of understanding the navy’s arguments is through the concept of general
deterrence, by which an actor seeks to influence the behavior of others, even if no other
actor is known to be planning an attack, and to prevent any actor from even thinking
of doing so.61 In general deterrence, then, targets are not always clear.
It is therefore possible to understand the nuclear-propelled submarine project in terms
of deterrence, as embedded within this broader threat perception advanced by the ruling
elite.62 The arguments concerning the importance of the South Atlantic have been framed
in terms of the fear of losing control over it. The debate on the subject involves a definition
of the nature of the threat and its subsequent political prioritization.63
 568 M. HERZ ET AL.

Conclusion
We have argued that Brazilian nuclear policy can be understood through the intertwine-
ments of three different, but interrelated, frames. This explains how ruling elites justify
the policies and how the connection of these frames operate in the definition of
nuclear policies.
Concerning the first frame, international autonomy and the affirmation of sovereignty,
we discussed how the Brazilian position has expressed both acceptance and tension in
face of nuclear-governance mechanisms. While the commitments made in the national
constitution and through international treaties show acceptance of international norms,
other aspects of nuclear governance are resisted, such as the perceived growing imbalance
between nonproliferation and disarmament obligations, the preferential treatment
received by certain states with nuclear capabilities outside the NPT, and the distinction
made between states that develop a uranium-enrichment capacity freely and
those that do so under suspicion. Brazilian ruling elites defend the right to develop
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nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, framing this right both in sovereignty and
autonomy terms.
Concerning the second frame, national development, we claimed that it has acquired a
central place in the arguments of the ruling elites in favor of investment in nuclear tech-
nology. Framed as a passport to modernity, the nuclear sector represents strategic value to
the country’s development as well as its defense. Cooperation with Argentina on the
construction of a nuclear research reactor and cooperation with France to develop a
nuclear-powered submarine are both embedded within a long developmentalist tradition
in Brazilian state building.
Finally, in relation to the security frame, we have emphasized the close ties between
security and development. We illustrated how investment in nuclear technology has
been justified through framing the South Atlantic as a domain of insecurity. Under this
rationale, the nuclear-powered submarine acquires a fundamental security role, expressed
both in terms of deterrence-by-denial and general deterrence. After the discovery of large
offshore oil reserves, one aspect of national defense has become the perceived necessity to
guard against any possible aggression that could damage one of the country’s crucial
sources of development. At the same time, ruling elites emphasize the argument that
the development of a nuclear-powered submarine will spill over to other sectors of the
economy, providing development gains to Brazil.
In sum, by focusing on the tenure of the Workers’ Party, we offered an
interpretation of the new tensions between recent administrations in Brazil and inter-
national nuclear-governance mechanisms. The definition of Brazil’s nuclear policy
is shaped by a framing process; the aforementioned three frames are intertwined,
since security and development are both evoked as fundamental aspects of Brazilian
nuclear policy.

Acknowledgements
We thank Lucas Peres for research assistance. We also thank the Hewlett Foundation, the National
Counsel of Technological and Scientific Development (CNPq), and the Foundation for State
Research in Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ) for funding this research.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 569

Notes
1. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York,
Harper & Row, 1974).
2. Neta C. Crawford, Argument and Change in Word Politics. Ethics, Decolonization, and
Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 12.
3. The ruling elite refers to those in control of strategic decision-making processes in society.
The ruling elite changes constantly and includes actors that have access to economic, mili-
tary, political, and cultural resources that enable a significant impact in the way a society
is governed. The competition between various regional or functional elites, clearly present
during the democratic phase of Brazilian history, will not be analyzed here, although it
has core relevance to this debate. See, for instance, Ettori Albertoni, Mosca and the Theory
of Elitism (Oxford, New York: B. Blackwell, 1987).
4. Constituição [Constitution], 1988, <www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.
htm>.
5. The 1997 Additional Protocol changes the IAEA’s safeguards regime from a quantitative
system focused on accounting for known quantities of materials and monitoring declared
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activities to a qualitative system aimed at gathering a comprehensive picture of a state’s

nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including all nuclear-related imports and exports.
Most states have signed the protocol, and Brazil has been under pressure to do the same.
6. Ministry of Defense of Brazil, “Estratégia Nacional de Defesa [National Defense Strategy],” 2008,
<www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/estrategia_defesa_nacional_portugues.
pdf>; Ministry of Defense of Brazil, “Estratégia Nacional de Defesa [National Defense Strategy],”
2012, <www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/estado_e_defesa/END-PND_Optimized.pdf>.
7. The same paragraph was included in National Defense Strategy (2008), p. 34.
8. Ibid., p. 40.
9. Article VI of the NPT refers to the obligation of states with nuclear weapons to pursue nuclear
disarmament. See, for instance, Celina Assumpção do Valle Pereira, “Statement by Brazil at
the 1st Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 NPT Review Conference,”
New York, April 8, 2002, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/npt/prepcom02/statements/8April_Brazil.pdf>; Luis Felipe de Macedo Soares, “Statement
by Brazil to the 2nd Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2010 NPT Review Conference,”
New York, April 28, 2008, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/npt/prepcom08/statements/BrazilApril28.pdf>; Antonio Guerreiro, “Statement by Brazil
to the 1st Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference,” New York, May 2,
2012, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom12/
statements/2May_Brazil.pdf>; “Statement by Brazil at the IAEA Board of Governors on the
Conceptualization and Development of Safeguards Implementation at the State-level,”
Vienna, September 2013, <www.facebook.com/Delbrasaiea/posts/243920075757581>; New
Agenda Coalition, “Joint Statement by the New Agenda Coalition to the Conference on
Disarmament,” Vienna, March 31, 2005, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/
Disarmament-fora/cd/2005/statements/Mar31NAC.pdf>; New Agenda Coalition, “Joint
Statement by the New Agenda Coalition to the Conference on Disarmament,” Vienna,
August 3, 2006, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/
2006/statements/3AugustNAC.pdf>; New Agenda Coalition, “Working Paper by the New
Agenda Coalition to the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT Review Conference Document
NPT/CONF.2010/WP.8),” New York, March 23, 2010, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/
documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/documents/WP8.pdf>.
10. For a view of the changes made to nuclear governance in the post-Cold War period, see Neil
Cooper and David Mutimer, “Arms Control for the 21st Century Controlling the Means of
Violence,” in Neil Cooper and David Mutimer, eds., Reconceptualising Arms Control
(London: Routledge, 2012); Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba, “Proliferation Rings:
New Challenges to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime,” International Security 29 (Fall
2004), pp. 5–49.
 570 M. HERZ ET AL.

11. See “Proliferation Security Initiative Participants,” US Department of State, June 9, 2015,
<www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm>.
12. Mônica Herz and Nizar Messari, “A Política na Política Internacional,” Política Externa 20
(2012), pp. 47-60.
13. Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, “Noites tropicais: O Brasil e a Nova Era da Não Proliferação e do
desarmemanto Nucleares (2003–2010),” Revista de Sociologia e Política, 20 (2012), pp. 43–57.
14. Daniel Flemes, “Brazil’s nuclear policy from technological dependence to civil nuclear
power,” GIGA 23 (June 2006).
15. The Brazilian-Turkish effort was then criticized by the United States and other nuclear
powers, and, in June 2010, the UN Security Council approved a resolution imposing new
sanctions to Iran. See Carlo Patti, “Brazil and the Nuclear issues in the years of the Luiz
Inacio Lula da Silva government,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53 (2010),
p. 192.
16. The main goal of the 1998 New Agenda Coalition is the elimination of nuclear weapons and
the guarantee of the prohibition of their future production. Members include Brazil, Egypt,
Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa. (Slovenia and Sweden, other original
members, subsequently withdrew after the coalition’s 1998 debut.)
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For the full text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, see <www.
un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml>. See also Sharon Squassoni, Grading
Progress on 13 Steps Towards Disarmament (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2009); Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, “Autonomia e proteção: os
Estados nas Conferências de Exame do TNP (2000–2010),” Oikos 11 (2012), pp. 36–62;
Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, “Mirando o passado: autonomia e proteção nas Conferências
de Exame do TNP (2000–2010),” História 31 (January/June 2012), pp. 392–419. The Thir-
teen Steps are in paragraph 15 of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Final
Document, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), 2000, <https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.
com/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/finaldocs/2000%20-%20NY%20-%20
NPT%20Review%20Conference%20–%20Final%20Document%20Parts%20I%20and%20
II.pdf>, pp. 14–15.
17. For example, Letícia Pinheiro, “Traídos pelo Desejo: Um Ensaio sobre a Teoria e a Prática da
Política Externa Brasileira Contemporânea,” Contexto Internacional 22 (July/December
2000), pp. 305–35.
18. Gelson Fonseca Jr., “Alguns Aspectos da Política Externa Brasileira Contemporânea,” in
Gelson Fonseca Jr., A Legitimidade e Outras Questões Internacionais (São Paulo: Paz e
Terra, 1998), pp. 353–74.
19. Sean W. Burges, “Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold
War,” International Relations 22 (March 2008), pp. 65–84; and Andrés Malamud, “A Leader
without Followers? The Growing Divergence between the Regional and Global Performance
of Brazilian Foreign Policy,” Latin American Politics and Society 53 (Fall 2011), pp. 1–24.
20. Tulio Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, “A Política Externa de Lula da Silva: A Estratégia da
Autonomia pela Diversificação,” Contexto Internacional 29 (2007), pp. 273–335. See also
Pinheiro, “Traídos pelo Desejo,” pp. 305–35.
21. Mônica Herz, “Brazil and R2P: responsibility while protecting,” in Mónica Serrano and
Thomas Weiss, eds., The International Politics of Human Rights: Rallying to the R2P
Cause? (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 107–28.
22. Maria Regina Soares de Lima, “Aspiração Internacional e Política Externa,” Revista Brasileira
de Comércio Exterior 82 (2005), pp. 4–19.
23. Maria Regina Soares de Lima, “Brazil Rising,” Internationale Politik (2008), pp. 62–67.
24. Mônica Herz, “Brazil: Major Power in the Making?” in Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta,
Keith A. Grant, and Ryan G. Baird, eds., Major Powers and the Quest for Status in Inter-
national Politics: global and regional perspectives (New York: Palgrave/MacMillan, 2011),
pp. 159–79.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 571

25. Monica Herz and João Pontes Nogueira, Ecuador vs. Peru: Peacemaking Amid Rivalry
(Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
26. “Brazil takes off,” Economist, November 12, 2009, <www.economist.com/node/14845197>.
27. Daniel Flemes, “Emerging Middle Powers´ Soft Balancing Strategy State and Perspectives of
the IBSA Dialogue Forum,” GIGA Working Papers 57, GIGA Institute of Latin American
Studies, 2007.
28. Tulio Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, “A Política Externa de Lula da Silva,” pp. 273–335.
29. Kai Michael Kenkel, “Interesses e identidades na participação do Brasil em Operações de
Paz,” Revista Tempo do Mundo 3 (August 2011), pp. 9–35. On Brazilian foreign policy
during the period, see Paulo Almeida, “Uma nova arquitetura diplomatica? Interpretações
divergentes sobre a política externa do governo Lula (2003–2006),” Revista Brasileira de Polí-
tica Internacional 49 (January–June 2006), pp. 95–116; Paulo Almeida, “Lulás Foreign
Policy,” in J. Love and W. Baer, eds., Brazil Under Lula Economy, Politics, and Society
Under the Worker-president (New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009), pp. 167–83;
Amado Cervo, “A política exterior de Cardoso a Lula,” Revista Brasileira de Política Inter-
ncional 46 (January-June 2003), pp. 5–11; Maria Regina Soares de Lima, “Tradición e inno-
vación en la política exterior brasileña,” Plataforma Diplomática – Working Paper 3 (2010),
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pp. 1–31, <www.plataformademocratica.org/Arquivos/Tradicion%20e%20Innovacion%20en

%20la%20Politica%20Exterior%20Brasilena.pdf>; Alcidez Vaz, “Brazilian Foreign Policy
Under Lula Change or Continuity?,” Dialogue on Globalization - FEX Briefing Paper
(April, 2004), pp. 1–4, <www.fes.org.gt/documentos/Foreignpol-Brazil.PDF>; and Alcidez
Vaz, “O Governo Lula Uma nova política exterior?” in Clóvis Brigagão and D. Proença Jr,
eds., O Brasil e a Conjuntura Internacional: Paz e Segurança internacional (Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil: Gramma, Fundação Konrad Adenauer, 2006), pp. 85–96.
30. For more information, see Carlo Patti, O programa nuclear brasileiro: uma história oral (Rio
de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2014) and Carlo Patti, “Origins and evolution
of the Brazilian Nuclear Program,” Wilson Center, Nuclear Proliferation International
History Program, 2013, <www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/origins-and-evolution-the-
brazilian-nuclear- program-1947-2011>.
31. José Goldemberg, “News and Views: Perspectives for Nuclear Energy in Brazil After Fukush-
ima,” Brazilian Journal of Physics 41 (September 2011), pp. 103–06.
32. Ministry of Defense of Brazil, Estratégia Nacional de Defesa [National Defense
Strategy], 2008.
33. Ibid., p. 33.
34. Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil, Plano Nacional de Energia 2030, <www.epe.gov.br/
PNE/Forms/Empreendimento.aspx>. See also Leonam dos Santos Guimarães, “Nuclear
Power In Brazil,” presentation at the workshop “Brazil and the Global Nuclear Order,” orga-
nized by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Getúlio Vargas Foundation
(FGV), Rio de Janeiro, May 15, 2012.
35. L. Machado, “Brasil e Argentina assinam acordo para construção de reatores nucleares de pes-
quisa," Informe CNEN 2 (2011); NPS Global, “Nuclear agreement between Argentina and
Brazil after Dilma Rousseff’s official visit,” NPS Global website, February 1, 2011, <http://
npsglobal.org/eng/news/139-peaceful-uses/1001-nuclear-agreement-argentina-brazil-dilma-
rousseff-official-visit.html>; and Luis Nassif, “Brasil e França iniciam construção de
submarino nuclear,” Luis Nassif Online, July 8, 2012, <http://advivo.com.br/blog/luisnassif/
brasil-e-franca-iniciam-construcao-de-submarino-nuclear>; and R. Giraldi, “Dilma e Cristina
Kirchner vão fechar parceria para construção de reatores nucleares,” Correio Democrático,
October 2, 2012, <www.correiodemocratico.com.br/2011/01/dilma-e-cristina-kirchner-
vaofechar-parceria-para-construcao-de-reatores-nucleares>.
36. Gabriel de Paula, “Brasil e Argentina consolidan su estratégia de desarrollo bilateral,” U238,
April 9, 2015, <http://u-238.com.ar/argentina-y-brasil-consolidan-su-estrategia-de-
desarrollo-bilateral/>.
37. Ibid.
 572 M. HERZ ET AL.

38. Exequiel Lacovsky, “La cooperacíon nuclar entre brasil y Argentina,” U238, December 11,
2012, <http://u-238.com.ar/la-cooperacion-nuclear-entre-argentina-y-brasil/>.
39. For more on the “developmentalist” project in Brazil, see Ricardo Bielschowski, Pensamento
econômico brasileiro: o ciclo ideológico do desenvolvimentismo (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Con-
traponto, 2000 [1988]); and Rafael Ioris, Transforming Brazil: a history of national develop-
ment in the postwar era (New York: Routledge: 2014).
40. Celso Furtado, Formação Econômica do Brasil (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2007
[1959]). See also Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependência e Desenvolvi-
mento na América Latina: Ensaio de Interpretação Sociológica (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização
Brasileira, 2004 [1970]).
41. Anthony Pereira and Lauro Mattei, eds., The Brazilian Economy Today: Towards a New
Socio-Economic Model? (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
42. World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Brazil,” World Nuclear Association, October
2015, <www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Brazil/>.
43. Pedro Carlos da Silva Telles, História da construção naval no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação
de Estudos do Mar, 2001); Alexandre M. Saes and Roney Cytrynowicz, Cinquentenário do
convênio entre a Marinha do Brasil e a Universidade de São Paulo. A criação do curso de
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Engenharia Naval na Escola Politécnica (São Paulo: Narrativa, 2007).

44. Daniel Theberge de Viveiros and Diego da Silva Cespes, “Submarino nuclear: poder de dis-
suasão no mar,” Revista Marítima Brasileira 133 (July-September 2013), pp. 201–09; Julio
Soares de Moura Neto, “Comandante da Marinha: ‘A importância da construção do submar-
ino de propulsão nuclear brasileiro’,” Marinha do Brasil, August 4, 2009, <www.mar.mil.br/
menu_h/noticias/cm/Aimportanciadaconstrucaodosubmarinodepropulsaonuclearbrasileiro/
Aimportanciadaconstrucaodosubmarinodepnb.htm>.
45. Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU (London: Rou-
tledge, 2006), p.11. We choose not to engage in the debate on the role of intentions in the
construction of arguments developed by the ruling elite.
46. Ibid., p.16.
47. Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of
Unease,” Alternatives 27 (Special Issue, February 2002), pp. 63–92.
48. José Roberto Martins Filho, “O Projeto do Submarino Nuclear Brasileiro,” Contexto Interna-
cional 33 (July/December 2011), pp. 277–314; and José Roberto Martins Filho, “The Brazilian
Nuclear Submarine Project,” presentation at the workshop “Brazil and the Global Nuclear
Order,” organized by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Fundação Getulio
Vargas (FGV), Rio de Janeiro, May 15, 2012.
49. Ibid.
50. Fernanda das Graças Corrêa, O projeto do submarino nuclear brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro:
Capax Dei, 2010), p. 175.
51. Ministry of Defense of Brazil, “Política de Defesa Nacional,” 2005, <www.planalto.gov.br/
ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2005/Decreto/D5484.htm>; Ministry of Defense of Brazil, “Estra-
tégia Nacional de Defesa,” 2008.
52. Ministry of Defense of Brazil, “Política de Defesa Nacional,” 2005.
53. Ibid.
54. Yara Aquino, “Governo Cria Empresa para Desenvolver Tecnologias do Programa Nuclear,”
Agência Brasil, September 9, 2012, <http://memoria.ebc.com.br/agenciabrasil/noticia/2012-
08-09/governo-cria-empresa-para-desenvolver-tecnologias-do-programa-nuclear>. See the
definition of Amazul according to Nuclebras Equipamentos Pesados S.A. (NUCLEP), a
company associate with the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, at <www.
nuclep.gov.br/en/news/o-que-amazul>.
55. Togzhan Kassenova, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity (Washington: Car-
negie Endowment for Peace, 2014).
56. Marcus Vinicius Oliveira dos Santos, “Submarino Nuclear,” Revista Marítima Brasileira 128
(October/December 2008), pp. 8–12.
57. Ibid., p. 10.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 573

58. Moura Neto, “A importância da construção do submarino de propulsão nuclear brasileiro.”

59. Ministry of Defense of Brazil, “Estratégia Nacional de Defesa,” 2008, p. 20.
60. This concept originates in Glenn H. Snyder, “Deterrence by Denial and Punishment,”
Research Monograph No. 1, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, January
2, 1959. See also Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005). – ed.
61. Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publi-
cations, 1977).
62. Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity, 2006. See also Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A
Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977). – ed.
63. Morgan, Deterrence, p. 3.
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