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China's Threat To Global Democracy
China's Threat To Global Democracy
China's Threat To Global Democracy
ISSUE DATE:
January 2023
VOLUME: 34
ISSUE: 1
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ABSTRACT
S ince ancient times, contests among great powers have often involved contests
of ideas. The Peloponnesian War was not simply a clash between a regnant Sparta
and a rising Athens, but also pitted a liberal, seagoing protodemocracy that saw
itself as the “school of Hellas” against a militarized, agrarian slave state. The
ideological threat that revolutionary France posed to the European order was just
as serious as the military one. In the run-up to the Second World War, fascist
powers and democracies squared off; during the Cold War, the superpowers
divided much of the world along ideological lines.
Michael Beckley
Michael Beckley is associate professor of political science at Tufts University and nonresident senior fellow
at the American Enterprise Institute.
Hal Brands
Hal Brands is the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
This belief in the superiority of an autocratic Chinese model coexists with deep
insecurity: The PRC is a brutally illiberal regime in a world led by a liberal
hegemon, a circumstance from which the CCP draws a sense of pervasive danger
and a strong desire to refashion the world order so that the PRC’s particular form
of government is not just protected but privileged. That is why a powerful but
anxious Chinese regime is now engaged in an aggressive effort to make the world
safe for autocracy and to corrupt and destabilize democracies. Democracy
promotion may be out of style in U.S. foreign policy, but what the scholar Jason
Brownlee calls “democracy prevention” is very much at the heart of Chinese
strategy today.
Yet China is moved by more than the cold logic of geopolitics. It is also reaching
for glory as a matter of historical destiny. China’s leaders view themselves as heirs
to a Chinese state that was a superpower for most of recorded history. A series of
Chinese empires claimed “all under heaven” as their mandate and commanded
deference from smaller states along the imperial periphery. In Beijing’s view, a
U.S.-led world in which China is a second-tier power is not the historical norm
but a profoundly galling exception. That order was created after the Second
World War, at the tail end of a “century of humiliation” during which rapacious
foreign powers had plundered a divided China. The CCP’s mandate is to set
history aright by returning China to the top of the heap.
And then there is the ideological imperative. A strong, proud China might still
pose problems for Washington even if a liberal-democratic government held
sway in Beijing. That China is ruled by autocrats committed to ruthlessly
suppressing liberalism at home turbocharges Chinese revisionism globally. A
deeply authoritarian state can never feel secure in its own rule because it does
not enjoy the freely given consent of the governed; it can never feel safe in a
world dominated by democracies because liberal international norms challenge
illiberal domestic practices. “Autocracies,” writes China scholar Minxin Pei,
“simply are incapable of practicing liberalism abroad while maintaining
authoritarianism at home.” 5
Even when the United States has engaged China, the latter’s leaders have
detected a plot to topple their regime. In 1998, Deng’s successor Jiang Zemin
warned his colleagues that whether the United States was taking a stance of
“containment” or “engagement” toward the PRC, Washington’s real goal was to
further a “political plot” to “divide our country” and “change our country’s
socialist system.” 9 After Jiang came Hu Jintao, who spoke to his Foreign Ministry
in 2003 of the “grim reality that Western hostile forces are still implementing
Westernization and splittist political designs on China.” 10
Chinese leaders are wrong if they think that the United States is actively seeking
to overthrow the CCP regime. They are not wrong, however, to think that a world
rooted in liberal values is one in which their own rule must be perpetually
precarious. In an international system built on respect for human rights and a
preference for democracy, governments that murder their own citizens risk
censure, ostracism, and punishment—as happened to Beijing after Tiananmen
Square in 1989 and is happening again today in response to the brutalization of
the Uyghur minority. An international system in which democracies are strong,
vibrant, and globally engaged is one in which subversive tendencies will
continually tempt states ruled by tyrants: In 1989, Tiananmen Square protesters
erected a replica of the Statue of Liberty, while those in Hong Kong thirty years
later publicly waved American flags and sang “The Star-Spangled Banner.” In what
it is and what it does, a hegemonic democracy threatens the Chinese regime.
The resulting insecurity has powerful implications for Beijing’s statecraft. Chinese
leaders feel a compulsion to make international norms and institutions friendlier
to illiberal rule. They seek to push dangerous liberal influences away from the
PRC’s borders: In Beijing’s mind, writes Timothy Heath, a “harmonious Asia”
would feature a “political order shaped by Chinese political principles.” The rulers
in Beijing feel that they must wrest international authority away from a
democratic superpower with a long history of bringing autocracies to ruin. And
as an authoritarian China becomes powerful, it inevitably looks to strengthen the
forces of illiberalism—and to weaken those of democracy—as a way to enhance its
influence and bolster its own model. 11 China is doing so, moreover, at a time
when the world, and its prevailing distribution of ideological power, presents the
CCP with both keen anxieties and tantalizing opportunities.
Although PRC leaders long chafed at this ideological pressure, it was bearable so
long as China enjoyed a booming economy and a stable periphery. When Gross
Domestic Product was growing three times faster than the democratic average
during the 1990s and 2000s, it was easy for Beijing to persuade people at home
and abroad that authoritarianism was best for China, if not for other countries.
But now, China’s economy is slowing, and the regime is coming under greater
domestic pressure—witness the large-scale protests that broke out against Xi’s
covid-zero policy in multiple cities and on dozens of university campuses in late
2022. Beijing is encountering growing international criticism and resistance on
other fronts as well. Around the world, negative views of China have surged to
highs not seen since the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. The Taiwanese have
become more determined than ever to maintain their de facto sovereignty. Japan
is doubling its defense spending and explicitly preparing for war against China
this decade. Under a new democratically elected government, the Philippines is
bolstering its defense ties with the United States. India is massing forces on
China’s western border. The European Union recently labeled China a “systemic
rival” and suspended its investment treaty with Beijing. Even the UN, in which
China holds numerous leadership positions, recently released a report declaring
that Beijing may have committed “crimes against humanity” in Xinjiang. Buffeted
by growing headwinds, autocracy is no longer such an easy sell for the CCP.
China’s citizens were willing to forgo political rights when their wallets and their
country’s international status were swelling, but it is an open question whether
they will continue to do so under harsher conditions. That question is especially
pressing as regards China’s millennials, born in the 1980s and 1990s, who have
known nothing but upward economic and international mobility.
China’s rulers also have long understood what political scientists have proven
empirically: Autocracies often fall in waves, as revolutionary activity in one
country inspires popular uprisings in others. 12 A democratic domino effect
brought down communist regimes across Central and Eastern Europe in 1989.
The self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit vendor in late 2010 set much of the Arab
world aflame. The lesson is that revolution anywhere is a threat to autocracy
everywhere. Xi Jinping knows this: Not long after the Arab Spring, he privately
fretted to President Barack Obama and Vice-President Joe Biden that China was a
target of “color revolutions” and vulnerable to the type of upheaval engulfing the
Middle East. 13
The CCP has responded with stepped-up repression over the past decade—jailing
dissidents, mobilizing security forces, censoring information, and preempting
dissidents, mobilizing security forces, censoring information, and preempting
popular unrest. Yet China is now strong enough that it can do more than just
hunker down in the face of foreign pressure. Xi believes that the CCP’s domestic
power will be enhanced if authoritarianism is prevalent and democracies are
dysfunctional—fellow despots will not punish China for rights abuses, and the
Chinese people will not want to emulate the chaos of liberal systems. He thinks
that preventing revolts against authoritarianism in other countries will lower the
odds of such a revolt erupting in China. And he believes that silencing critics
abroad will limit the challenges facing the CCP within China. Xi sees rolling back
democracy overseas as part of his plan to secure his regime at home.
Democracy Prevention
The PRC wrote its first formal national-security strategy under Xi, in
2014. 14 Whereas regime security used to be one of many government priorities
(albeit the most important), it is now the priority. 15 All other issues—trade,
diplomacy, military modernization—are adjuncts to keeping the CCP in power. As
a result, every issue is a matter of regime security. A trade war with rich
democracies is no longer just an economic disagreement; it is an assault on the
Chinese state and a possible prelude to a shooting war.
The third and most important factor supercharging China’s efforts is the ongoing
digital revolution. 22 The CCP possesses data-collection and messaging power to
rival that of Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Twitter. 23 By combining
artificial intelligence (AI) and “big data” with cyber, biometric, and speech- and
facial-recognition technologies, Beijing is pioneering a system that will allow
dictators to know everything about their subjects—what people are saying and
viewing, whom they hang out with, what they like and dislike, and where they are
located at any given time—and to discipline citizens instantly by restricting their
access to credit, education, employment, medical care, telecommunications, and
travel if not to hunt them down for more medieval forms of punishment.
The evil genius of this “digital authoritarianism” is that most people will be
seemingly free to go about their daily lives. In truth, however, the state will be
constantly censoring everything they see and tracking everything they do. With
old-school authoritarianism, one at least knew where the oppression was coming
from. But now people can be nudged and cajoled by invisible algorithms
delivering personalized content to their phones. In past eras, autocrats had to
make tough choices between funding death squads or economic development.
Today, however, repression is not only affordable, but also profitable, because
“smart-city” technologies that enable tight social control can also be used to fight
crime, diagnose diseases, and make the trains run on time.
As more governments partner with Beijing, the reach of China’s surveillance state
will grow. 26 Existing autocracies will become more totalitarian, and some
democracies will drift into the authoritarian camp. International conflicts will
likely proliferate—not merely those of ideas but those of arms, for as Putin’s
invasion of Ukraine illustrates, dictatorship often turns to blood-and-soil
nationalism and violent revanchism. The liberal belief that democracy and peace
are destined to spread around the world will be upended. So will the comforting
myth that humanity has evolved past the point of mass atrocities, because digital
authoritarianism does not displace gulags and genocide; it enables them. When
dictatorships ramp up digital repression, they also engage in more torture and
murder. 27 Computers and cameras handling everyday surveillance free the
regime’s foot soldiers for tasks such as ethnic cleansing and beating dissidents
into submission. Xinjiang, with its smart cities and concentration camps, offers a
into submission. Xinjiang, with its smart cities and concentration camps, offers a
glimpse of this dire future. 28
Democracy Protection
China’s ideological offensive is thus at the heart of its effort to reshape the global
order. A crucial part of the democratic world’s China strategy, therefore, must
involve securing democratic institutions against authoritarian assault. If
democracy promotion has a bad name, democracy protection is becoming
indispensable.
This ideological campaign does not entail seeking regime change in China.
Democracy may eventually take hold in that country, but there is little prospect
of it anytime soon, and active efforts to destabilize the CCP could be
counterproductive and dangerous. During the Cold War, the United States never
really tried to overthrow the Soviet government. This was out of concern that
doing so might trigger the hot war that Washington hoped to avoid. The same
cautionary principle ought to apply today. Democracy protection is an essentially
defensive strategy, although in some cases it will require tactics that are more
assertive than those which the United States and its allies have been willing to
employ to date.
At its core, democracy protection requires what military planners call “defending
forward”—safeguarding democratic systems by actively weakening an opponent’s
ability to damage them. 29 The United States should do whatever it can to shore
up democracy at home and abroad, but the immediate priority must be to blast
holes in the digital iron curtain that Beijing is drawing around large swaths of the
globe. If the world is indeed at an “inflection point” in the struggle between
democracy and autocracy, as Biden and Xi seem to think it is, an America that
remains on the defensive will not tip the balance. Getting “America’s democratic
house in order” is a wonderful idea, but it will take years, if not decades, and
would lend only indirect help in halting the spread of autocracy overseas.
Forming a giant alliance of democracies is a worthy objective, but might deliver
endless debate instead of decisive action. In 2000, the Bill Clinton administration
created the “Community of Democracies,” which ultimately included 106
countries. After years of meetings, its sole accomplishment was a bland
statement criticizing the 2021 military coup in Burma.
To its credit, Canberra refused to cave, and it slowly found alternative markets, in
part by launching a “fight communism, buy Australian wine” public-relations
campaign. The Biden administration informed PRC officials that bilateral tensions
would not subside if the CCP was beating up on U.S. allies, and Washington
promised to supply Australia with nuclear technology to power cutting-edge
attack submarines. Australia’s economy did suffer a blow, however—and,
awkwardly, firms from other democracies grabbed some of the resulting market
share. Denser economic ties among democracies and friendly nondemocracies
that fear Chinese coercion, such as Vietnam and Singapore, can cut the costs of
future resistance. Even better would be if rich democracies agreed to inflict
future resistance. Even better would be if rich democracies agreed to inflict
reciprocal pain on Beijing through countersanctions. China could still try to
censor democratic speech in foreign countries, but only at the cost of its own
economic growth.
China would certainly bristle at these measures, but to some degree that is a
good thing, because it provides opportunities to bait Beijing into strategic
blunders. Recall what happened in March 2021, when the United States, the
European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada sanctioned four Chinese
officials for human-rights abuses in Xinjiang. The sanctions were wrist slaps, but
they triggered a self-defeating “wolf-warrior” outburst: Beijing unleashed a
diplomatic fusillade and sanctioned EU officials and think tanks; the EU
responded by freezing the pending China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on
Investment. America and its allies can goad China in subtle ways that do not risk
war but do bring on blustery overreactions through which Beijing isolates itself.
A sixth aspect of forward defense involves more actively fighting the information
war. China’s strategy involves relentlessly touting the supposed benefits of its
own model, while fanning the flames of political discord in democratic societies.
Exposing fake civil society groups or media outfits that are tools of Chinese
Exposing fake civil society groups or media outfits that are tools of Chinese
influence is obviously vital. Equally important, though, is to be more aggressive in
turning the tables on Beijing by spreading word of its rights abuses, mounting
economic and social problems, rampant corruption, predatory overseas-lending
practices, and other CCP crimes and shortcomings. The United States
accumulated plenty of experience with such efforts during the Cold War, when
institutions such as the now-defunct U.S. Information Agency told the truth
about the Soviet bloc while contesting communist lies about the free
world. 34 Today, similar messages may not resonate with kleptocratic foreign
leaders who are bankrolled by Beijing—but such communications will help to
make the global information environment less favorable to CCP propaganda.
Seventh, the United States and its allies must more effectively contest the
institutional terrain, because those who rule the world’s international bodies
write the world’s rules. Turning international organizations into tools of domestic
entrenchment and global influence for authoritarian regimes is a longstanding
CCP strategy. Beijing regularly buys votes from member states in these
organizations, which then elect PRC-favored candidates to lead them. To halt
China’s march toward institutional dominance, the United States must learn to
rally shifting coalitions of democratic countries behind candidates who will stand
up for the free world’s basic values. This happened in September 2022, when
Doreen Bogdan-Martin was elected secretary-general of the UN’s International
Telecommunication Union.
Finally, the United States needs to help shield democracies that border
authoritarian aggressors. Defending vulnerable nations matters not least because
successful authoritarian coercion in one place may encourage dangerous actions
elsewhere. The key battleground today is Ukraine, with Taiwan a close second. By
bolstering Taiwan with military protection and economic lifelines, Washington
can preserve a potent ideological alternative to the CCP—and fortify a free-world
coalition that can keep the world safe for democracy in the decades ahead.
coalition that can keep the world safe for democracy in the decades ahead.
This essay is adapted from the authors’ book, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with
China (2022).
NOTES
1. Jessica Chen Weiss, “A World Safe for Autocracy? China’s Rise and the Future of
Global Politics,” Foreign Affairs 98 (July–August 2019): 93–94.
3. “The Long and Short of the CCP Congress,” China Media Project, 16 October
2022, https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/10/16/the-long-and-short-of-xis-
political-report. The quoted words are from the short version of Xi’s speech,
which can be downloaded in Chinese from a link on this page and then run
through a translation program.
4. Nicholas Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and
the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1942), 20–22.
5. Minxin Pei, “Assertive Pragmatism: China’s Economic Rise and Its Impact on
Chinese Foreign Policy,” IFRI Security Studies Department, Fall
2006, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/Prolif_Paper_Minxin_
Pei.pdf.
6. Suisheng Zhao, “Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival,” Journal of Democracy 27 (July 2016):
85, www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Zhao-27-3.pdf.
7. Quotes from Christopher A. Ford, China Looks at the West: Identity, Global
Ambitions, and the Future of Sino-American Relations (Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 2015), 186; Samuel Kim, “Human Rights in China’s International
Relations,” in Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McCormick, eds., What If China
Doesn’t Democratize? Implications for War and Peace (New York: M.E. Sharpe,
2000), 130–31.
8. Quoted in Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace
American Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 52.
11. Timothy R. Heath, “What Does China Want? Discerning the PRC’s National
Strategy,” Asian Security 8 (March 2012): 54–72.
12. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). For data, see the Mass
Mobilization Project, https://massmobilization.github.io.
13. Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, “In Turbulent Times, Xi Builds a Security
Fortress for China, and Himself,” New York Times, 6 August 2022.
14. “The CCP Central Committee–Formulated Proposal for the 14th Five-Year
National Economic and Social Development Plan, and 2035 Long-Term
Goals,” www.xinhuanet.com/2020-10/29/c_1126674147.htm.
17. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici, “Counterterrorism
and Preventive Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in Xinjiang,” International
Security 44 (Winter 2019–20): 9–47.
18. Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, “The Long Arm of the Strongman:
How China and Russia Use Sharp Power to Threaten Democracies,” Foreign
Affairs, 12 May 2021; Elizabeth. C. Economy, “Exporting the China Model,”
Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 13
March 2020, www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/USCCTestimony3-13-
20%20(Elizabeth%20Economy)_justified.pdf.
19. Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2012), 213.
20. Yaroslav Trofimov, Drew Henshaw, and Kate O’Keeffe, “How China Is Taking
over International Organizations, One Vote at a Time,” Wall Street Journal, 29
September 2020.
21. Michael J. Mazarr et al., Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and
Emerging Trends (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2019); Jeff Kao, “How China
Built a Twitter Propaganda Machine Then Let It Loose on
Coronavirus,” ProPublica, 26 March
2020, https://www.propublica.org/article/how-china-built-a-twitter-
propaganda-machine-then-let-it-loose-on-coronavirus.
22. See the articles in the January 2019 issue of the Journal of Democracy
collectively titled “The Road to Digital Unfreedom”; see also Richard Fontaine and
Kara Frederick, “The Autocrat’s New Toolkit,” Wall Street Journal, 15 March 2019.
23. Larry Diamond, “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: The Threat of Postmodern
Totalitarianism,” Journal of Democracy 30 (January 2019): 22.
24. Tiberiu Dragu and Yonatan Lupu, “Digital Authoritarianism and the Future of
Human Rights,” International Organization 75 (Fall 2021): 991–1017.
25. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Dealing with Demand for China’s Global
Surveillance Exports,” Global China, April
2020, www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-demand-for-chinas-global-
surveillance-exports.
26. Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole, “Exporting Digital Authoritarianism: The
Russian and Chinese Models,” Brookings Institution Policy Brief, August
2019, www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/FP_20190827_digital_authoritarianism_polyakova_m
eserole.pdf.
27. Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright, “The Digital
Dictators: How Technology Strengthens Autocracy,” Foreign Affairs 99 (March–
April 2020).
28. Ross Andersen, “The Panopticon Is Already Here,” Atlantic, September 2020.
29. The United States Cyber Command, for instance, has adopted this approach
in protecting U.S. networks. See Erica D. Lonergan, “Operationalizing Defend
Forward: How the Concept Works to Change Adversary Behavior,” Lawfare, 12
March 2020, lawfareblog.com/operationalizing-defend-forward-how-concept-
works-change-adversary-behavior.
31. For a list of critical technologies, see Emma Rafaelof, “Unfinished Business:
Export Control and Foreign Investment Reforms,” U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Issue Brief, 1 June 2021.
32. Richard A. Clarke and Rob Knake, “The Internet Freedom League: How to Push
Back Against the Authoritarian Assault on the Web,” Foreign Affairs 98
(September–October 2019).
34. Hal Brands, The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us About Great-
Power Rivalry Today (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022), 186–89.
SUBJECT
REGION
Multiregional
COUNTRY
China
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