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What are the problems and challenges with the law’s interpretation and application of autonomy?

Autonomy as a general concept refers to ‘matters concerning the freedom of the will,’ 1 and recent

legislative developments have seen a judicial attempt to focus on upholding the individual’s ability to

exercise their autonomy. Prima facie, the law bestows legislative protection upon autonomy to ensure

in a medicolegal sense ‘every adult has the right to decide whether or not he will accept medical

treatment, even if a refusal may risk permanent injury to his health or even lead to premature death.’ 2

However, judicial ‘protection’ of autonomy, misguided by the paternalistic imperative inherent in the

conduct of health care professionals (HCPs), often results in a system which is ‘counter-productive for

precisely the vulnerable patients who need it most.’3

Theoretical Framing: Multifarious Conceptions of Autonomy-

A fundamental inadequacy in the law’s interpretation of autonomy is the perception of autonomy as a

singular, unitary conception. Coggon’s illuminating theorisation of how autonomy is actually a multi-

faceted principle led to ‘three philosophical understandings of autonomy.’ 4 The exercise of the first

variation, ideal desire autonomy, manifests a result driven by a universally desirable value system. 5

The second variation, best desire autonomy, is arguably the most authentic exercise of one’s true

autonomy. To exercise best desire autonomy is to act in accordance with one’s internalised value

system, even if this runs contrary to an immediate need or desire. Current-desire autonomy, Coggon’s

final variation, occurs when an individual’s long-term value system is compromised by an instinctive

reaction to meet an immediate need. This results in outcomes that may not be truly autonomous but

nonetheless achieve what a person desired in a singular moment.

1
B. Jennings, “Autonomy” in B Steinbock (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics (Oxford 2007)
2
Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R. in Re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam. 95
3
J. Coggon, J. Miola, ‘Autonomy, Liberty, and Medical, Decision-Making’ [2011] Cambridge Law Journal,
523–547
4
J. Coggon, ‘Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: Justifiable Inconsistency or
Blinkered Moralism?’ [2007] Health Care Anal 15, 235–255
5
Ibid, 240
However, any conception of autonomy ‘demands a focus on assuring that an agent has the rational

acumen (‘mental capacity’) to reach a decision,’6 and thus where an agent is deemed to lack mental

capacity, an entirely new set of challenges is presented in the law’s interpretation of autonomy.

Determining Incapacity:

The initial presumption is that an individual has capacity until it is established otherwise. Thorpe J

propounded a three-step test to aid in identifying whether a patient has capacity. In order to be

deemed capacitious, a patient must have the ability to do three things: (1) to take in and retain

treatment information, (2) to believe it and (3) to weigh that information, balancing risks and needs. 7

When a finding of incapacity occurs, a decision must be made under the Mental Capacity Act 2005

(MCA), ‘for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity, […] in his best interests.’8

Whose Best Interests?

This essay argues that the archaic gender discrimination bias of the medico-legal world unmistakably

finds its origins in judges utilising the ‘equivocal nature of the concept [autonomy] to try to achieve

outcomes that they consider to be morally desirable.’9 This essay further submits that the tendency of

the courts to shape the application of autonomy in line with their own moral compass results in the

detrimental conflation of a constructed ideal desire autonomy with the patient’s actual best desire

autonomy. As a result, female patients suffer at the hand of the court’s inclination to disguise

paternalistic impositions of treatment. These impositions of treatment are often dressed up as judicial

attempts to preserve an artificial construction of the patients ‘best desire’ autonomy, which is

determined by widely held views of legal and HCPs. This essay argues that ‘excessive commitment to

ostensible rather than substantive protection of autonomy’10 results in the complete deprivation of

personal agency in both capacitous and non-capacitous women.

6
P. Bielby, “The Conflation of Competence and Capacity in English Medical Law: A Philosophical Critique”
(2005) Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 357
7
C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment), Re, [1994] 1 W.L.R. 290 (1993), p.3
8
Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.1(5)
9
N4, 236
10
N3, 524
However, the inadequacy of this superficial determination of an individual’s values is exasperated

when a finding of incapacity occurs and a ‘best interest’ (BI) judgement must be made. This often

leads to judicial defiance to ‘respect a refusal of treatment because it seems palpably in breach of

some obvious kind of ideal desire autonomy.’11 This essay will first address an incomprehensible

unconformity in judicial reasoning in two refusal of treatment cases, illustrating how the balance

between promoting an individual’s autonomy rights and ensuring protection from harm is often tipped

in favour of the paternalistic latter through the infliction of ‘ideal desire’ autonomy.

Secondly, this essay will seek to illuminate another dangerous issue rooted in the law’s interpretation

of autonomy by addressing various cases in which a complete overruling of women’s reproductive

autonomy can be seen. This specific gender-biased harm unarguably occurs as a result of the ‘courts’

refusal to legally acknowledge that unwanted motherhood is a ‘detriment,’’ 12 and is exacerbated

through inadequate judicial response to the interplay of religious beliefs and the legal construction of

ideal desire autonomy.

‘A Wholesale Overwhelming Of Her Autonomy,’13 But Not His:

This essay seeks to draw to light the gender discrimination enshrined in the law’s application of

autonomy by advancing that, specifically in cases of female anorexia nervosa, the law fails to

adequately uphold or even consider female patients’ personal beliefs and values. Through contrasting

A Local Authority v E [2012] and Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership v WA [2020] it can

be illustrated how substantially similar values held by opposite genders have been ascribed entirely

different weightings when making a BI determination. Through the above comparison, this essay

seeks to illustrate how the process of judicial determination when making BI decisions is often

entirely ‘emblematic of law’s failure to adequately respond to women’s experiences.’ 14

A Local Authority v E [2012]:

11
Ibid [4]
12
T. Keren-Paz, Gender Injustice in Compensating Injury to Autonomy in English and Singaporean Negligence
Law, [2018] Feminist Legal Studies, 33
13
J. Coggon, Anorexia Nervosa, Best Interests, And The Patient’s Human Right To ‘A Wholesale
Overwhelming Of Her Autonomy’ (2013) Medical Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, 119–130
14
Ibid, 35
A Local Authority v E [2012] is at best an incoherent attempt by the Court of Protection to navigate

the ‘unorthodox or (statistically) unusual values or belief system’ 15 of E, a 32-year-old adult woman

entirely aware of her situation and all the consequences which accompanied it. E, despite having a

happy early childhood was a victim of serious sexual abuse between the ages of 4-11. 16 E was first

admitted to a specialist unit in an attempt to treat her eating disorder at age 15, subsequent to 4 years

of disordered behaviour.17 Following a bad relationship, E ceased her studies at medical school and

was shortly readmitted for inpatient eating disorder treatment, lasting intermittently for six years.

It was judicially acknowledged that E evidenced the ability required by s.3(1) of the Mental Capacity

Act 2005, to understand, retain and use information relevant to the decision-making process. 18 Despite

the fact ‘E’s actual behaviour in refusing food was entirely consistent,’19 she was held to lack capacity

due to her strong emotional reactions to questions surrounding weight gain.

E described the ‘pure torment’ of her life, disclosing how forced refeeding felt ‘like reliving the abuse

she suffered as a child approximately four times every hour.’20 Nonetheless, life-sustaining treatment

was held not only to be lawful but also in her BI.21 The incoherence of the decision in A Local

Authority v E [2012], is captured in the ‘bewildering reasons for the judicial finding of current

incapacity.’22 However, this essay seeks to criticise this decision further by drawing to light its

irreconcilability with Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership v WA [2020].

Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership v WA [2020]:

WA, like E, suffered serious childhood sexual abuse, which was believed to be his prevailing trauma. 23

Moreover, an age assessment revealed WA to be five years older than he believed, resulting in the

Home Office seeking to alter his birth date. WA could not accept his new birth date and felt the

15
N13, 120
16
A Local Authority v E [2012] EWHC 1639, para 16
17
Ibid
18
Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.3(1)(C)
19
N16, [69]
20
N16, [107]
21
N16, [141]
22
C.Kong ‘Beyond the Balancing Scales: The Importance of Prejudice and Dialogue in A Local Authority v E
and Others’ (2014), Child & Family Law Quarterly 216, 230.
23
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership, North Bristol NHS Trust v WA, DT v The Official Solicitor
[2020] EWCOP 37, 2020 WL, [7]
removal of his original one was a ‘fundamental violation of his own rights and an assault on his

identity.’24 Unlike in E’s circumstance, significant weight was attached to WA’s childhood sexual

abuse resulting in his ‘sense of powerlessness and loss of autonomy […] which continue to

compromise his psychological wellbeing.’25

WA himself ‘began to feel that his situation was hopeless and started to refuse food and drink,’ 26 and

despite a finding of incapacity as a result of his ‘inability to weigh information relevant to nutrition

and hydration when considering the decision globally’27 it was found not to be in WA’s BI to forcibly

refeed him. The Court of Protection felt they were ‘able to protect WA’s autonomy, in effect, to

restore it to him,’28 and thus respected his decision to refuse treatment.

Gendered Harm:

Keren-Paz advances that, ‘gender injustice might result from application of seemingly equal rules to

facially non-gendered harms by ignoring background conditions which disadvantage women.’ 29 This

essay seeks to critique and advance this view, illustrating that one of the fundamental flaws in the

law’s interpretation of autonomy is the predisposition of the courts to focus on conditions which, at

one time in a woman’s life, may have provided what society would deem an ‘advantage’. Take, for

example, E’s brief study in medical school, or more broadly a woman’s ability to fall pregnant. Courts

appear to proceed to treat any deviation from this conventional path as a divergence in rationality.

Thus, instead of considering ‘the patient’s welfare in the widest sense as well as their wishes and

feelings,’30 a judicially constructed notion of ‘ideal desire’ autonomy is imposed to protect against any

consequences of this perceived lapse in judgement. This essay argues that the antiquated approach to

women’s autonomy in line with traditional gendered conventions undermines the concept of

24
Ibid, [6]
25
Ibid
26
N23, [13]
27
N23, [63]
28
N23, [103]
29
N12, 7
30
Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (Respondent) v James (Appellant), [2013] UKSC 67,
[33]
autonomy as a whole given that ‘in reality, we find plural levels of diversity in persons’ lived

experiences and vulnerabilities.’31

To illustrate this criticism, the background conditions disadvantaging E and WA were largely similar-

namely the lasting trauma of childhood sexual abuse. However, in WA’s case, the traumatic impact of

this abuse was emphasised far more heavily. The Court of Protection were entirely sympathetic with

WA, and gave significant weighting to the HCP evidence that forcibly refeeding would be tantamount

to ‘replicating his feelings of subjugation at the hands of his abusers.’ 32 However, when forcibly

refeeding was emphasised by E herself and recognised by HCPs as ‘an unconscious replay of her

childhood sexual abuse,’33 instead of affording E the same level of sympathy afforded to WA, it was

suggested she, ‘take some responsibility for her fate rather than remaining a powerless victim.” 34

Uncovering the Aim of the Patient:

This discrepancy appears to be indefensible, especially when applying a type of exegetical

interpretation35 to both the expressed wishes and behaviourally implied desires of E and WA. At once

it becomes evident that the ‘best-desire’ autonomy of both patients is to put an end to their suffering

caused by reliving their past forms of abuse.

This best-desire autonomy cannot be ignored when explained through Bordo’s allusion to Freudian

theories of the ‘anorectic’s resistance to developing a female body.’ 36 Bordo emphasises ‘the

significance of the fact that a strategy utilised by female victims of sexual abuse is to restrict the

development of their feminine body to prevent ‘attracting the sexual attention of men.’37 Thus, the

courts in affording WA psychological protection and not forcibly refeeding him due to the fact that

such an invasion could ‘not be reconciled, […] with the protection of WA’s autonomy,’ 38 but then

31
C. Dietz et al., ‘A Jurisprudence of the Body’ [2020], Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies, 35
32
N23, [73]
33
N16, [84]
34
Ibid.
35
A process of interpretation used to uncover the true and intended meaning of a passage.
36
S.Bordo, ‘Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, And The Body’, (1947) University of California
Press, 10th Edn, 46
37
Ibid
38
N23, [102]
denying the very same psychological safety sought by E, illustrate a grave problem inherent in the

law’s gendered interpretation of autonomy.

This essay submits that a significant proportion of incoherent medico-legal decisions are disguised

instances of gendered harm. There appears to be a judicial tendency to utilise past ‘advantages’ in a

woman’s life in conjunction with a conventionally determined ‘ideal desire’ autonomy which legal

and HCPs deem morally commendable, resulting in an absolute deprivation of autonomy.

The courts heavy focus on E’s missed opportunity to make ‘a success of her life by using her

considerable talents in pursuing a medical career,’39 emphasises that often the courts outrightly

overlook express patient-centric wishes and values in favour of predetermined assumptions based on

conventional gendered norms. This essay has sought to show that E’s attempt to ‘fortress herself

against unwanted invasion and intrusion’40 was struck down by the courts in favour of a notion born

out of an improper fusion of best desire and ideal-desire autonomy. The ability to attend medical

school is a societally deemed advantage. Thus, this begs the question, are HCPs and the judiciary

fixated on statistics that female ‘patients with anorexia have a higher socioeconomic status than the

general population,’ 41 and as a result, discount their suffering as a privilege? Whilst this

predetermined bias may explain the disparity between the decisions in relation to the BI

determinations of E and WA, employing such an indefensible justification rooted in sexism makes the

medicolegal world vulnerable to patriarchal criticisms from a feminist point of view.42

Restriction on Reproductive Autonomy:

This essay seeks to evidence how one of the fundamental problems with the law’s interpretation of

autonomy manifests itself in its inability to adequately safeguard women’s reproductive autonomy,

particularly in cases where the patient holds different religious beliefs to legal and HCPs. This deeply

concerning overwhelming of female reproductive autonomy occurs as a result of the judicial practice

of blanketly relying on the opinions of HCPs, which particularly in obstetric scenarios, ‘render[s]

39
N16, [75]
40
N16, [84]
41
G. Russell, "Disorders of Eating," [2009], New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry, 777-8
42
N12, 51
mothers noncredible through delegitimising their judgments and presenting their viewpoints as

irrational.’43

Through interpreting the case of Al Hamwi v Johnston [2005] in a somewhat heretical way, whilst

drawing on the case of Re A (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] this essay seeks to

evidence that ‘while the law allows a woman with capacity to place foetal life in danger […] the

courts’ vision of normality is so challenged by any woman who actually avails herself of her right in

this regard.’44 Both cases- whilst interference was justified in the latter- are nonetheless a clear-cut

manifestation of one of the biggest challenges prevalent in the law’s application of autonomy. The

failure of the law to protect women’s reproductive autonomy, with courts utilising conflicting

religious beliefs to disguise the interferences in both cases, is a practice entirely detrimental to the aim

of enhancing autonomy through the ‘movement to reconfigure the relationships between patient and

doctor, with a view to empowering the former and to separating the latter’s professional, clinical

expertise.’45

Al Hamwi v Johnston [2005]: Communicating Morals, Not Facts

Whilst courts consider that ‘providing information itself will be enough to render a patient’s decision

autonomous,’46 this essay argues the antagonistic view. The delivery of information by HCPs is often

determined by their own personal moral compass working in conjunction with a conception of ‘ideal-

desire’ autonomy, and can be the very factor leading to the interference with ‘women’s bodily

autonomy and sense of humanity.’ 47

Al Hamwi v Johnston [2005] concerned an evident manipulation of information from the HCP, Miss

Kerslake, author of ‘Christian Choices in Health Care on Abortion.’ Miss Al Hamwi, given her

extensive family history of children being born with ‘significant mental and physical impairment,’

43
P. Fielding-Singh and A. Dmowska, ‘Obstetric Gaslighting And The Denial Of Mothers’ Realities’ (2022),
Social Science & Medicine 301, 5
44
S. Sheldon and M. Thompson, ‘Feminist Perspectives On Mental Health Law’ [1998], Feminist Perspectives
on Healthcare Law
45
N22, p.37
46
N3, 538
47
Sadler Et Al. ‘Moving Beyond Disrespect And Abuse: Addressing The Structural Dimensions Of Obstetric
Violence’ [2016] Reprod. Health Matters 24 (47), 47–55.
sought amniocentesis to assess whether her unborn child would suffer the same debilitating

impairments. Al Hamwi, an already vulnerable patient given her lack of English fluency, was certain

she would terminate her pregnancy ‘if the tests had shown her baby to be affected.’48 In this respect, it

was very clear Al Hamwi’s best desire autonomy was to not give birth to a child who would endure

the same poor quality of life as those who suffered in her extended family.

However, Al Hamwi was dissuaded from undergoing amniocentesis following an unarguably biased

imparting of information, likely determined by Miss Kerslake’s moral compass. This included Al

Hamwi being left with the ‘impression that the chance of miscarriage was extremely high,’ as opposed

to the reality of the risk being around 1%,49 as well as being led to have doubts about the

determinative value of a negative result. Whilst this would worry any prospective Mother, the

concerns were likely perceived as far more forbidding given Al Hamwi’s main language was Arabic.

This evidences a clear example of HCPs utilising the unequal power balance to create ‘a situation

wherein mothers’ own judgments were framed as likely detrimental to their babies’ well-being,’ 50

entirely compromising the reproductive autonomy of the Mother and compelling them to diverge from

their chosen medical path.

Disregarding One Religion, Emphasising The Other:

The strength of Al Hamwi’s ‘best desire’ autonomy to undergo amniocentesis is only accentuated by

her affirmation that she would undergo termination when challenged by the judiciary on the fact that

in Islamic law, ‘termination of pregnancy after the 120-day period should only be if the life or health

of the mother is in danger.’51 Drawing on expert evidence that ‘“Islamic law has a flexible doctrine of

darura, which says “necessity permits prohibited things,”52’ this essay submits that the courts may

have better focused their attention on Miss Kerslake’s religious beliefs presenting a challenge to Al

Hamwi’s reproductive autonomy, as opposed to her own. Given how one of the passages in Miss

Kerslake’s book details how the ‘Darwinian approach’ of medical screening for termination ‘is quite

48
Al Hamwi v Johnston [2005] EWHC 206 (QB), [50]
49
Ibid, [25]
50
N43, 5
51
N48, [40]
52
Ibid
at odds with Christian love’53 it could not be more clear that Al Hamwi’s reproductive autonomy was

undermined at the expense of the judiciary’s overreliance on HCP opinion.

This natural inclination of the judges to accept the evidence of Miss Kerslake without further scrutiny

illustrates how the archaic gender-biased notions driving a conception of best desire autonomy

contribute to one of the fundamental problems in the law’s interpretation of autonomy. The courts

enthusiastically agreeing with Miss Kerslake’s statement, “people do change their minds” infers that

this ‘universally’ held ideal of a woman’s motherly instincts trumping all other values led to the

reproductive autonomy of Al Hamwi being entirely compromised. Al Hamwi encapsulates a refusal of

the courts to accept that a woman could place any value higher than that of being a Mother, and

consequently ‘if the purpose of the law in this area is to protect autonomy, then this approach is

incompatible with that ideal.’54

Religions Reduced Role In Autonomy:

Whilst ‘concern about fetal well-being is justified in many situations,’ 55 Re A (Conjoined Twins:

Surgical Separation) [2000] evidences the overriding of a woman’s reproductive autonomy

particularly in instances where religious beliefs play a determinative role. Re A concerned conjoined

twins ‘born to devout Roman Catholic parents.’56 The parents were faced with the incredibly difficult

decision of electing surgical separation, leading to the indefinite death of the weaker twin. The

parent’s devout Catholicism created their sincere belief ‘that it is God's will that their children are

afflicted as they are and they must be left in God's hands,’57 meaning they were unable to entertain

separation, as it would mean killing one of their children. Nonetheless, the decision was made that the

preservation of the life of one twin was the factor of greatest significance.

The separation of the twins in this instance was a necessary action in order to achieve the

‘minimisation of overall harm,’58 but nonetheless is a further instance of an outright overwhelming of

53
N48, [50]
54
J. Miola, ‘Autonomy Rued Ok?’ (2006) Medical Law Review 14(1): 108–114
55
Morton, et al. ‘Bearing Witness: United States And Canadian Maternity Support Workers’ Observations Of
Disrespectful Care In Childbirth’ (2018) Berkeley, Calif. 45 (3), 263–274.
56
Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] CA Fam
57
Ibid,115
58
N56, 231
a woman’s reproductive autonomy, specifically in a scenario where religious beliefs played a

contributing role. This instance of gendered harm often occurs at the hands of HCPs, leading Mothers

to feel that their opinion of their baby’s wellbeing is invalid. This consequently raises important

ethical questions as to how the law intends to guard against a woman’s ‘feelings of dismissal and

neglect’59 that accompany an overwhelming of reproductive autonomy.

Conclusion:

This essay has sought to draw out the various problems inherent in the law’s interpretation and

application of autonomy in order to address how these problems are largely born out of archaic

gendered ideals which still continue to affect the world we live in today. The notion that any

advantage in terms of career, relationships or motherhood that a woman may encounter in her life

must be protected by her at all costs- for example, E’s potential medical career, Al Hamwi’s

pregnancy, ought to be laid to rest. Whilst there has been a considerable move toward ‘reduc[ing] the

conceptual wedge which has traditionally delineated subjective wishes and feelings as opposed to

objective BI,’60 cases involving female autonomy evidently require a higher level of judicial scrutiny

to ensure this occurs.

Recent societal developments make this need direr. Take, for example, the events of June 24 th 2022.

On this date, Roe v Wade (1973) the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court was

overturned. Roe v. Wade established a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion, and

overruling this case will have a disastrous impact on female reproductive autonomy, giving states the

right to regulate or ban abortion. Consequently, access to abortion services will become inconsistent

and troublingly will disproportionately affect low-income individuals. This recent development

sincerely emphasises the topic of this essay. Gendered harm must begin to be remedied at state level.

The subjective values of female patients (such as different religious beliefs and attitudes towards their

body) must start to displace the objective factors predetermined by archaic conceptualisations of

59
Hodnett, Ellen D. ‘Pain and women’s satisfaction with the experience of childbirth: a systematic review’
(2002) In: American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol. 186
60
C. Kong, J. Coggon, ‘ From Best Interests To Better Interests? Values, Unwisdom And Objectivity In Mental
Capacity Law’ [2021] Cambridge Law Journal, 80(2), 262
female best-desire autonomy if we are to continue progressing in the medicolegal world and society as

a whole.

Bibliography:
Primary Sources:
Cases:
C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment), Re, [1994] 1 W.L.R. 290 (1993)

Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam. 95

A Local Authority v E [2012] EWHC 1639

Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership, North Bristol NHS Trust v WA, DT v The Official Solicitor
[2020] EWCOP 37, 2020 WL,

Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (Respondent) v James (Appellant), [2013] UKSC 67

Al Hamwi v Johnston [2005] EWHC 206 (QB)

Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] CA Fam

Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. (1973)

Legislation:

Mental Capacity Act 2005

Secondary Sources:

Journal Articles:

John Coggon, Jose Miola, ‘Autonomy, Liberty, And Medical, Decision-Making’ [2011] Cambridge
Law Journal, 523–547

John Coggon (2007) Varied And Principled Understandings Of Autonomy In English Law: Justifiable
Iconsistency Or Blinkered Moralism . Health Care Anal , 235-255.

Phil Bielby, “The Conflation Of Competence And Capacity In English Medical Law: A Philosophical
Critique” (2005) Medicine, Health Care And Philosophy, 357

Tsachi Keren-Paz, Gender Injustice In Compensating Injury To Autonomy In English

And Singaporean Negligence Law, [2018] Feminist Legal Studies, 33

John Coggon, Anorexia Nervosa, Best Interests, And The Patient’s Human Right To ‘A Wholesale
Overwhelming Of Her Autonomy’ (2013) Medical Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, 119–130

Camillia Kong ‘Beyond The Balancing Scales: The Importance Of Prejudice And Dialogue In A
Local Authority V E And Others’ (2014), Child & Family Law Quarterly 216, 230.

Priya Fielding-Singh And Amelia Dmowska, ‘Obstetric Gaslighting And The Denial Of Mothers’
Realities’ (2022), Social Science & Medicine 301, 5
Sally Sheldon And Michael Thompson, ‘Feminist Perspectives On Mental Health Law’ [1998],
Feminist Perspectives On Healthcare Law

Michelle Sadler, Mário Jds. Santos, Dolores Ruiz-Berdún, Gonzalo Leiva Rojos,
Skoko Elena, Patricia Gillen, A. Jette, Clausen, Moving Beyond Disrespect And Abuse: Addressing
The Structural Dimensions Of Obstetric Violence, Reprod. Health Matters, 24 (47) (2016), Pp. 47-55

Jose Miola, ‘Autonomy Rued Ok?’ (2006) Medical Law Review 14(1): 108–114
Christine H. Morton, Megan M. Henley, Marla Seacrist, Louise Marie Roth, Bearing Witness: United
States And Canadian Maternity Support Workers' Observations Of Disrespectful Care In Childbirth,
Birth (Berkeley, Calif.), 45 (3) (2018), Pp. 263-274
Ellen D. Hodnett ‘Pain and women’s satisfaction with the experience of childbirth: a systematic
review’ (2002) In: American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol. 186
Camillia Kong, John Coggon, ‘ From Best Interests To Better Interests? Values, Unwisdom And
Objectivity In Mental Capacity Law’ [2021] Cambridge Law Journal, 80(2), 262
Books:

Susan Bordo, 'Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, And The Body’, (1947) University of
California Press, 10th Edn, 46

Gerald Russell, "Disorders of Eating," [2009], New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry, 777-8

Chris Dietz, Mitchell Travis, Michael Thompson, ‘A Jurisprudence of the Body’ [2020], Palgrave
Socio-Legal Studies, 35

Bruce Jennings, “Autonomy” in B Steinbock (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics (Oxford 2007)