LAW435 LAW OF TORTS 1

NAME STUDENT ID TUTORIAL

GROUP
2022997033 LW435B

WAN AMIRUL HAZIQ BIN WAN HUZAINI

TOTAL 40%

*For lecturer’s use.

 QUESTION 1

a)
The issue is whether Jenna is liable in tort of negligence towards Dina and Kris

Psychiatric illness can be defined as a nervous shock and Lord Ackner in the case of
Alcock v Chief Constable of South also defined that psychiatric illness is a sudden
appreciation by sight or sound of a horrifying event, which violently agitates the
mind. In the situation given above, it can be separated that the primary victim is
directly involved an accident in danger zone while secondary victim can be classified
as witnesses in which passively involved but not in a danger zone. The primary victim
based on the situation above is Henry which he has been hit by a car crashed that
cause his head severed from his body. While secondary victims are Dina and Kris as
a witness of Dina’s husband which suffered from shock and traumatized from
gruesome accident.

To begin, the psychiatric condition must be reasonably foreseeable. According to the

case of Bourhill v Young, the court determined that the plaintiff's sorrow was
unforeseeable because she only learned of the event after it occurred. Dina heard the
screeching of the car brakes and observed the car hit Henry based on the
circumstances. As a result, Dina's trauma was entirely predictable. Meanwhile, Kris
had only heard about the accident and seen its aftermath. As a result, the shock that
suffered by Kris’s was unforeseeable.

Second, the mental disorder must be substantiated by medical proof. The court ruled
in Jub'li v Sunway Lagoon that in order to make a claim for psychiatric disorder, the
disease must be supported by medical proof from a psychiatrist or medical doctor.
Dina suffered trauma as a result of the scenario, and she was hospitalized for a week.
This demonstrated that Dina's psychiatric disorder was medically recognized. Kris, on
the other hand, experienced shock, but there was no indication that it was validated by
a psychiatrist.
In addition, Kris experienced shock on the ground as a result of what she observed,
not when she treated the victim. In White v. Chief Constable of Yorkshire, the court
denied the claim since none of the plaintiffs were exposed to the danger zone because
the accident had already occurred. Therefore, Kris was not in danger when she arrived
at the scene, as the disaster had already occurred.

Third is the familial examination. In this test, the closeness of the plaintiff's
relationship to the accident victim is determined. The court ruled in the case Alcock v.
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire that a lack of emotional connection between a
spouse and a child or a parent and a child led to mental illness when their loved ones
are affected by tragedy. Dina has close emotional ties with the sufferer because they
are husband and wife, given the circumstances. For Kris, though, there is no close
bond because they are both strangers.

Fourth is the temporal test. In this test, it is emphasized that the plaintiff must arrive at
the scene of the accident, be nearby, or encounter the accident immediately after it
occurred. This is evident in the case McLoughlin v. O'Brian, in which the court ruled
that "immediate aftermath" includes the hospital where the victims are brought.
According to the circumstances, both Dina and Kris were nearby the collision. Dina
was in the store at the time of the accident and witnessed the entire incident. Upon the
occurrence of the accident, she went to the scene. She was therefore in the immediate
aftermath. At the moment of the disaster, Kris was standing on the overhead bridge.
Upon the occurrence of the accident, she went to the scene. This demonstrated Kris in
the immediate aftermath.

Fifth is the spatial test. This test emphasizes that the plaintiff's perception of the injury
must be unaided. This is shown in the case of Boylan v. Keegan, in which the court
dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the grounds that he heard the accident through
enhanced senses, rather than his own eyes and hearing. Given the circumstances, both
Dina and Kris witness the accident through their natural senses. They both heard the
accident with their own ears, and Dina saw it with her own eyes.
 In conclusion, Dina passes all of the tests as a whole, so Jenna is responsible for the
trauma Dina went through. Jenna is not liable to Kris due to the absence of a personal
relationship and the fact that the accident has already occurred. To resolve this, Jenna
may file a claim for general damages for her medical bills.

b) Jenna has a number of legal options available to her for defending herself in court. To
begin, there is the defense of contributory omission. The reason for this is because
Henry's decision to cross the street without using the pedestrian overpass contributed
in some way to the accident that occurred. This is supported by the case of Rubaidah
bt Dirin vs. Ahmad Arifin, in which the court determined that the plaintiff was 70% to
blame for the accident, while the defendant was 30% to blame because the plaintiff's
husband contributed to the accident. This case provides further evidence in favor of
this proposition.

Jenna can also defend on the basis of illegality. Given that there was an overhead
bridge for pedestrians to use, it is illegal for them to cross the street without utilizing it.
Therefore, Jenna cannot sue Henry for damages if he violates public policy. This can be
observed in Ashton v. Turner, when the illegality defense was used to prevent the plaintiff
from winning the case.
QUESTION 2

The issue is whether Peter committed an attack by shouting at Faiz. The second question
is whether Simon committed conversion when he ripped up the ticket. Thirdly, it must be
determined if Faiz committed trespass to goods when he deflated Peter's car's tires.

For the first issue, an attack might be characterized as the defendant's act of creating a
reasonable fear in the plaintiff that he will be subjected to battery by the defendant.
Certain conditions must be met in order to determine whether or not an assault has
occurred.

First, the defendant's mental state. The defendant must have a deliberate desire to terrify
the plaintiff. In the case of R v. St. George, the court determined that when the defendant
points a gun at the plaintiff without informing them that there is no bullet, this indicates a
sense of menace. Therefore, when a person points a pistol in a menacing manner, the
intent is to terrify the target. Given the circumstances, when Peter yelled "Enough!" We
have had enough of this. Peter's threat, "One more word, and I'll punch you,"
demonstrates his purpose to intimidate Faiz and prevent him from bragging.

The second requirement is apprehension. The plaintiff must anticipate that the defendant
will apply force. This can be shown in the case Stephen v. Myers, in which the court ruled
that an assault has occurred until the defendant is stopped by a third party, as this leads
the plaintiff to feel fear. Faiz returned to his job in silence after Peter yelled at him since
he was aware of Peter's short fuse.

Thirdly, the threat must be imminent or imminently imminent. This can be demonstrated
in R v. Constanza, in which the court ruled that words might constitute assault if they
induce the plaintiff to fear immediate violence. Faiz would be punched quickly if he
boasted again under the current circumstances.

Fourthly, the accused is capable of carrying out the threat. In the case Stephen v. Myers,
the court determined that the defendant was capable of carrying out the threat since he
was waving his clinched fist. Given the circumstances, Peter is capable of carrying out the
threat due to his volatile temperament.

To be concluded, Peter is considered to have committed assault when he shouted at Faiz.

For the second issue, Winfield defines conversion as the improper disposition of another
person's property that deprives him of possession. Certain conditions must be met in order
to determine whether a conversion crime was committed.

The defendant's mental state comes first. The defendant must intend to deprive the
plaintiff of his possessions. The court ruled in RH Willis and Son v. British Car Auctions
that the defendant was responsible for conversion when the auctioneer sold the car, the
buyer became the new owner, and the car was in the buyer's possession. As a result, the
plaintiff lost possession of the property because the auctioneer had been involved in the
transaction. In light of the circumstances, when Simon seized Faiz's ticket, he became the
new owner of the ticket and had it. Consequently, Faiz lost ownership.

Second, the interference with the property violates the owner's rights. In the case of Lim
Chuai v. Zeno Ltd, the court ruled that Ahmad was not the owner of the property because
the respondent only placed the building materials in order to continue construction.
Ahmad was therefore a mere bailee and not the owner; he lacked both the title and the
right to sell the land. Ahmad had neither the title nor the power to sell the house, as he
was not the owner. In light of the circumstances, Simon was neither the owner nor
authorized to destroy the ticket.

Finally, we have the plaintiff. The plaintiff must have an immediate right to possession of
the goods. This is demonstrated by the fact that Faiz has instant custody of the ticket
because he purchased it.

Holistically, When Simon took the ticket and shredded it, he committed conversion from
a holistic standpoint.

For the third issue, Winfield defines interference of goods as the unlawful physical
interference with custody of goods. Several conditions must be met in order to determine
whether or not there was an interference of goods.

First is the defendant's mental condition. The defendant must clearly intend to touch the
plaintiff's property. This can be shown in the case of Wilson v. Lombank, in which the
court determined that the defendant intended to steal the car since he took the plaintiff's
car because he believed it was his. Faiz likely intended to deflate Peter's tyre when he
touched it and released the air.
The second factor is interference. A direct act of the defendant must cause instant touch
with the plaintiff's property. This is seen in the Kirk v. Gregory case, in which the court
determined that physically transporting the things to different locations constitutes a
trespass to goods. Given the circumstances, it can be concluded that Faiz's action of
releasing air from Peter's tyre caused it to go flat. Thus, rendering Peter unable of
operating his car.

Third is goods. To qualify as a good, an item must be movable and not consist of
currency or land. Given the circumstances, the tyre qualifies as movable property and is
not attached to the land.

Finally, we have the plaintiff. The plaintiff must have physical custody and control over
the goods. Given the circumstances, Peter has actual custody and physical control over
his tyre.

To be conclude, When Faiz let out the air in Peter's car's tyres, we may say that he
committed trespass to commodities on a holistic level. This is because of the nature of the
situation.