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Gener v. de Leon
Gener v. de Leon
SYNOPSIS
On April 30, 1990, respondents Gregorio de Leon and Zenaida Faustino led a
forcible entry case against petitioner alleging that they are the original claimants and
actual possessors in good faith under a bona de claim of ownership of a parcel of
agricultural land situated at Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan with an area of
approximately Four Thousand Four Hundred Four (4,404) square meters. Petitioner
denied the material allegations of the complaint. Instead, he alleged that he is the real
owner and lawful and actual possessor of the land in dispute evidenced by a notarized
deed of sale executed on October 10, 1988 by Benjamin Joaquin, heir of the previous
owner, Proceso Joaquin. After weighing the con icting evidence, the Municipal Trial
Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan rendered a decision in favor of respondents. On appeal to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, the trial court sustained petitioner's
claim of ownership of the property in dispute by virtue of having bought such property
from the heir of the former owner thereof and has been in possession of the disputed
property since October 10, 1988. Insisting on the validity of their cause, respondents
interposed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court and reinstated the decision of the Municipal Trial Court.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court. Hence, the
present petition for review. Petitioner contended that the appellate court disregarded
evidence showing his prior possession of the disputed property which if properly
considered will negate the alleged cause of action of respondents for ejectment.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court ruled that the documentary
evidence of petitioner's prior possession, more particularly the evidence of the two (2)
incidents of October 24, 1988 and March 12, 1989 resulting in the ling of criminal
cases for malicious mischief prevails over the mere testimonial evidence relied upon by
respondents that they were forcibly ejected from the land by petitioner on May 8, 1989.
Oral testimony, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as
written or documentary evidence, especially when said documentary evidence is not
opposed. The Court also ruled that the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray should have
taken judicial notice of the said criminal cases involving the subject parcel of land and
pending in its docket. The Court held that a court may properly treat all or any part of
the original record of a case led in its archives as read into the records of a case
pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to
it, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is su ciently designated
subject only to the exception that there is no objection and it is a matter of convenience
to all the parties. In the case at bar, respondents did not impugn nor object to the
evidence of petitioner on the existence of the said criminal cases of malicious mischief
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that sprung from the alleged forcible entry of petitioner's alleged property. Thus, the
said Municipal Trial Court should have taken judicial notice of these facts in resolving
the issue of prior possession. In view of the evidence on the possession of petitioner
prior to May 8, 1989, as shown by the incidents on October 24, 1988 and March 12,
1989, the cause of action of respondents for forcible entry against the petitioner had
already prescribed when they led the complaint for ejectment on April 30, 1990.
Consequently, the Municipal Trial Court was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the
subject ejectment case.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
DE LEON , JR. , J : p
1. the defendant and/or all persons claiming right under him to vacate the
portion described in Tax Declaration No. ARP-4675 and described in the
Sketch Plan marked as Exhibit "M";
2. the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P1,000.00 as litigation expenses;
3. the defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as attorney's fees;
These two (2) incidents, are the subject of: (a) Criminal Case No. 3998 for malicious
mischief against Rosendo Buen and Ignacio Cadungol alias Lolong, two (2) alleged helpers
of the land of respondent Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land on
October 24, 1988 and destroyed coconut trees, papaya and langka trees which allegedly
belonged to the petitioner, and (b) Criminal Case No. 4043 against Hugo de Leon and Rolly
de Leon, brothers of respondent Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed
land on March 12, 1989 and destroyed mango trees and other plants which allegedly
belonged to the petitioner. These twin incidents, evidenced by "Sinumpaang Salaysay" and
Complaint 2 1 show that prior to May 8, 1989, the alleged date of forcible entry of
petitioner, petitioner was already in possession of the disputed land.
As against the mere testimonial evidence relied upon by respondents that they were
forcibly ejected from the land by petitioner on May 8, 1989, the documentary evidence of
petitioner's prior possession, more particularly the evidence of the two (2) incidents of
October 24, 1988 and March 12, 1989, must prevail. Oral testimony, depending as it does
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence, 2 2
especially when said documentary evidence is not opposed. As Judge Limkin of Georgia
once said, "I would rather trust the smallest slip of paper for truth than the strongest and
most retentive memory ever bestowed on mortal man." 2 3
The Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray should have taken judicial notice of the said
criminal cases involving the subject parcel of land and pending in its docket. While, as a
general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records
of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending
before the same judge, 2 4 this rule is subject to the exception that "in the absence of
objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any
part of the original record of the case led in its archives as read into the records of a case
pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it,
by name and number or in some other manner by which it is su ciently designated." 2 5
Respondents did not impugn nor object to the evidence of petitioner on the existence of
the said criminal cases of malicious mischief that sprung from the alleged forcible entry of
petitioner's alleged property. Thus, the said Municipal Trial Court should have taken judicial
notice of these facts in resolving the issue of prior possession.
In view of the evidence on the possession of petitioner prior to May 8, 1989, as
shown by the incidents on October 24, 1988 and March 12, 1989, the cause of action of
respondents for forcible entry against the petitioner has already prescribed when they filed
the complaint for ejectment on April 30, 1990. Because forcible entry cases must be led
within one year from the date of actual entry on the land. 2 6 Forcible entry is a quieting
process and the one year time bar to the ejectment suit is in pursuance of the summary
nature of the action. 2 7 After the lapse of the one year period, the remedies of the party
dispossessed of a parcel of land is to le either an accion publiciana which is a plenary
action to recover the right of possession or an accion reivindicatoria which is an action to
recover ownership as well as for the recovery of possession. 2 8 Consequently, since
respondent's cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed, the Municipal Trial Court
was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject ejectment case.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia and concurred in by Associate Justices
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Artemio G. Tuquero, Fifteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No.
37346, Rollo, pp. 23-32.
2. Penned by Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr, in Civil Case No. 370-M-93, Rollo, pp. 66-68.
3. Penned by Judge Romulo C. Basa, in Civil Case No. 612, Rollo, pp. 59-65.
4. Rollo, pp. 43-47
5. Id.
6. Rollo, pp. 48-51.
7. Rollo, pp. 60-63.
8. Rollo, pp. 59-65.
9. Rollo, pp. 66-68.
10. Rollo, pp. 23-32.
11. Rollo, p. 33.
12. Rollo, pp. 12-13.
13. Section 1, Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
14. China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137898, December 15,
2000, p. 7; Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 337 SCRA 381 (2000).
15. Thermochem, Inc. v. Naval, G.R. No. 131541, October 20, 2000, p. 5; Borlongan v.
Madrideo, 323 SCRA 248, 255 [2000]; Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 118, 126-
127 [1999].
16. Diu v. Ibajan, 322 SCRA 452, 458 [2000]; Ceremonia v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 731,
736 [1999]; Gachon v. Devera, Jr., 274 SCRA 540, 552 [1997]; German Management &
Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 495, 499 [1989].
17. First Nat'l Bank v. Socony Mobil Oil Co. (Mo) 495 SW2d 424, 25 Am Jur 2d, Ejectment
§6.
25. People of the Philippines v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25, 41 [1996]; U.S. v. Claveria, 29 Phil.
527, 532 [1915].
26. Section 1 of Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court; Article 1147, Civil Code of the Philippines.