G.R. No.

148198 October 1, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ELIZABETH "BETH" CORPUZ, appellant.

FACTS:

Private complainants went to Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation at 1651

to apply for employment as factory workers in Taiwan. They were introduced to the agency’s President
and General Manager who then asked them to accomplish the application forms. Thereafter, they were
told to return to the office with P10,000.00 each as processing fee.

Private complainants returned to the agency to pay the processing fees. Mrs. Reyes was not at
the agency that time, but she called appellant on the telephone to receive the processing fees.
Thereafter, appellant advised them to wait for the contracts to arrive from the Taiwan employers.

Two months later, nothing happened to their applications. Thus, private complainants decided to
ask for the refund of their money from appellant who told them that the processing fees they had paid
were already remitted to Mrs. Reyes. When they talked to Mrs. Reyes, she told them that the money she
received from appellant was in payment of the latter’s debt.

Private complainants filed their complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation. She was
then charged of Illegal Recruitment Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of l99

HELD:

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove appellant’s active
participation in the illegal recruitment activities of the agency. She neither gave an impression that she
had the ability to deploy them abroad nor convinced them to part with their money. More importantly,
she had no knowledge that the license was suspended the day before she received the money. The
appellant merely received the processing fees upon instruction of Mrs. Reyes.

Moreover, as stated in the last sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held
liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons,
the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable. In the case at bar,
the prosecution failed to establish that appellant, as secretary, had control, management or direction of
the recruitment agency

An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as

principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal
recruitment. However, there was no cooperation between the appellant and the general manager nor
does she consciously participate in illegal recruitment.
 G.R. No. 121828 June 27, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT
PILOLA, Appellant.

FACTS:

Joselito and Julian were drinking beer when Edmar and Odilon arrived at the store. They invited
them to join their drinking spree, and although already drunk, the two newcomers obliged. In the course
of their drinking, the conversation turned into a heated argument. An altercation between Julian and
Edmar ensued. The owner of the store advised them to go home as she was already going to close up.

The accused left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon
returned, blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face. They then
exchange some blows. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists when Odilon pulled out his knife and
stabbed the latter.

Ronnie and the appellant, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the
victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed
Joselito. The victim fell in the canal. Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and
tried to stab him. When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped and
looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed Joselito’s head. Not
content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled from the
scene. Joselito died on the spot.

HELD:

The appellant together with his co-accused are principal by direct participation as they conspired
with one another in killing the victim. From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.
Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime, performing an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the conspiracy.

In this case, the appellant and Ronnie were on the side of the street when the incident took
place. When they saw Odilon stabbing the victim, they agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and
also stabbed the victim with their respective knives. The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless
victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from the scene together, while Ronnie went after Julian. When he
failed to overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow block
and a broken bottle. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the
stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim.

Hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latter’s death since in conspiracy the act of one is
the act of all. The appellant is not merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct participation as he
contributed materially to the victim’s death.
 G.R. No. 127962 April 14, 2004

KINGSTON(E) LI Y NUNEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

The victim was watching television at home with his sisters, girlfriend, and his sister’s boyfriend,
when they suddenly heard a noise outside. Peering through the window, they saw Li and Sangalang
taking a bath completely naked, facing the house of the victim.

Enraged, the victim yelled, yelled at them. The accused shouted back and challenge the victim to
come out. The victim went out the house where he was met by Li, who was wearing briefs and carrying a
baseball bat. The first blow was struck by Li, hitting the victim with a baseball. The victim then armed
himself with a bolo hit Li on the head. After Li had fallen unconscious, Sangalang, himself armed with a
knife, fatally stabbed Arugay at least four times. Tan, on other hand, picked up the baseball bat dropped
by the wounded Li and struck Li on the head with the bat.

HELD:

In the case at bar, no conspiracy was established between the petitioner and his alleged co-
conspirator Sangalang.

Based on the testimony of medical experts, the four wounds inflicted on the victim were the
same in character. Thus, there is only one person who inflicted these wounds, not two (2) or three (3).
The fact that the victim sustained the same kind of stab wounds tends to support the conclusion that
only one knife was used on him.

On the other hand, the injuries suffered by the petitioner were defense wounds, and that there
were two (2) weapons used in inflicting injuries on the petitioner. One is a sharp edge instrument such as
a bolo and the other one is a blunt instrument, causing incised wounds and contusion. Hence, petitioner
has no complete power to perform volitional acts because he must have lost partially or totally his
consciousness.

From the facts of the case, it can be concluded that it was Sangalang alone who stabbed the
victim four times, at the time petitioner lost his consciousness. Even as Li struck the victim with a
baseball bat, it was not proven that Li had asked for, or received, any assistance from Sangalang. Based
on these circumstances, it was not clearly established that the accused had acted in concert to commit
the offense.

The fact that both Sangalang and Li armed with respective weapons when they confronted the
victim and that they were in the same house at the same time is not in itself sufficient to establish
conspiracy. Conspiracy transcends companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does
not in itself amount to conspiracy.

A well-settled principle in criminal law is that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused. Since the injury inflicted by petitioner is not fatal. He is only guilty with slight physical injury.
 G.R. No. 126021 March 3, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RENE SIAO, accused-appellant

FACTS:

Gimena, a house boy, and Ester a 14-year-old “probinsyana”, were forced and intimidated at
gunpoint by accused-appellant to have carnal knowledge of each other. Said appellant ordered Gimena
to bring Estrela inside the women's quarter. Thereafter, he ordered Ester to be naked who acceded to
appellant’s command as a gun was pointed at her. He then ordered Gimena to rape Ester in three (3)
different positions, pointing the handgun at them the whole time. At first Gimena refused to heed the
command of appellant to rape Estrella because, according to Gimena, he has a sister. Appellant then
threatened to kill them. Both Gimena and Ester performed the sexual act because they were afraid, they
will be killed.

HELD:

Accused-appellant was guilty of the crime of rape as principal by induction for forcing and
intimidating both Gimena and Ester to have a carnal knowledge and performed sexual acts, depriving
them of their own will. By using words of command and by taking advantage of his weapon which causes
uncontrollable fear, accused-appellant induces Gimena and Ester to commit the acts of rape. While the
appellant did not directly commits the offense, his inducement, intimidation, and threatening, was the
determining cause to consummate the crime of rape.
 G.R. No. 201443 April 10, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BETTY SALVADOR y TABIOS, MONICO SALVADOR, MARCELO LLANORA, JR. y BAYLON, ROBERT
GONZALES y MANZANO, RICKY PEÑA y BORRES @ RICK, ROGER PESADO y PESADO @ GER, JOSE
ADELANTAR y CAURTE, LOWHEN ALMONTE y PACETE, JUBERT BANATAO y AGGULIN @ KOBET, and
MOREY DADAAN, Accused-Appellants.

FACTS:

Private-complainant testified that while he was aboard his Toyota Prado, a Hi-Ace van suddenly
stopped and blocked the Civic car. Six men with long firearms alighted from the van and motioned the
Pinky, the passenger of the civic car to step out of the car and ride the Hi-Ace. Private-complainant was
likewise ordered to alight from the vehicle and ride the Hi-Ace.

They were then brought to a safe house where they were detained. Private-complainant then
negotiated with the assailants regarding the ransom. The boss of the group demanded USD 1,000,000.00
for his release. A rescue operation was then conducted, private-complainant and Pinky were released.

During investigation, private-complainant attested that he saw Monico and Betty visiting the
house, and that it was the latter who brought them food. Both Monico and Betty denied knowledge of
the kidnapping incident and that they merely received PhP 3,000.00 as rental for their house.

HELD:

The court find Betty and Monico guilty as conspirators in the crime of Kidnapping for ransom
While both Monico and Betty did not directly take part in the crime of kidnapping for ransom, they are
likewise guilty in providing material and moral aid in the execution of the crime.

The previous or simultaneous acts of Betty in giving victims their food, allowing the culprits to
use their house as a hideout, and the act of Monico in assisting complainant when the latter descended
the basement stairs shows they knowingly concurs with the criminal design and purpose of the
aggressors which is to kidnap complainant for the purpose of extorting ransom.

Their acts may not be indispensable in the commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom,
being of minor importance, pertain only to those committed by mere accomplices. Both are guilty as
conspirators since in conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the place where the
victim is to be detained is logically a primary consideration.

In the case of Betty and Monico, their house has a basement. It can be reasonably inferred that
the house fitted the purpose of the kidnappers. In other words, Betty and Monico were indispensable in
the kidnapping of Albert because they knowingly and purposely provided the venue to detain Albert.
 [ G.R. No. 180969*. September 11, 2017 ]

NOEL NAVAJA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO OR HIS SUCCESSOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA & GARCIA-HERNANDEZ,
JAGNA, BOHOL, AND ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

DKT Philippines, Inc. (DKT) charge its then-Regional Sales Manager for Visayas, Ana Lou B. Navaja
of the crime of falsification of a Private Document. In the course of the said proceeding, a certain Ms.
Magsigay a material witness for DKT, was subpoenaed to appear in a hearing before the OPP-Bohol

Petitioner, who is Ana Navaja's husband, allegedly went to Ms. Magsigay's workplace and told
her that as per instruction from his wife’s lawyer, Atty. Bonghanoy her attendance in the scheduled
hearing is no longer needed. Thus, Ms. Magsigay no longer attended the scheduled hearing where
petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy presented an affidavit purportedly executed by Ms. Magsigay and
notarized by a certain Atty. Grapa (Atty. Grapa), supporting Ana Navaja's counter-affidavit.

This prompted Atty. Borje, counsel of DKT PH to file criminal complaints before the OPP-Bohol
and the City Prosecution Office of Tagbilaran City: the first one, charging petitioner of Obstruction of
Justice, specifically, for violation of Section 1 (a) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1829; and the second
one charging petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy of Obstruction of Justice as well, specifically, for violation of
Section 1 (f) of the same law.

Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash Information (Motion to Quash) before

the MCTC-Jagna, principally arguing that the charge of violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 pending
before it should have been absorbed by the charge of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law pending
before the MTCC-Tagbilaran.

The MCTC-Jagna Ruling

the MCTC-Jagna denied petitioner's Motion to Quash. It held that petitioner had no right to
invoke the processes of the court, since at the time he filed said motion, the MCTC-Jagna has yet to
acquire jurisdiction over his person. It ruled that in the criminal case before it, petitioner is being charged
with violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829, an offense separate and distinct from violation of Section 1 (f)
of the same law, which is pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran. As such, said offenses may be prosecuted
independently from each other.

The RTC Ruling

The RTC denied the petition, thereby, affirming the MCTC-Jagna Ruling. It held that the criminal
cases pending before the MCTC-Jagna for violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 and MTCC-Tagbilaran for
violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law are two (2) separate offenses.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated June 26, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that petitioner
allegedly committed several acts which constitute violations of different provisions of PD 1829.
Moreover, the CA pointed out that the foregoing acts were committed in distinct places and locations. As
such, there is more than enough basis to try petitioner for two (2) separate crimes under two (2) distinct
Information’s.

HELD:

Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes the acts constituting the crime of obstruction of
justice, the pertinent portions of which read:

Sec. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases
by committing any of the following acts:

(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the
commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery,
misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;

(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its
falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official
proceedings in, criminal cases;

The elements of the crime are: (a) that the accused committed any of the acts listed under
Section 1 of PD 1829; and (b) that such commission was done for the purpose of obstructing, impeding,
frustrating, or delaying the successful investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.

The Court holds that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD
1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse - that
is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding. The foregoing conclusion is premised
on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts
arising from one criminal intent or resolution.

In contrast, petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying
in a preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly motivated
by a single criminal impulse in order to realize only one criminal objective, which is to obstruct or
impede the preliminary investigation proceeding. Thus, applying the principle of delito continuado,
petitioner should only be charged with one (1) count of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed either in
Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly prevented from appearing and testifying, or in
Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit in the same case.

According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts
performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or
purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and
the same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.
The concept of delito continuado although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to
crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of [Republic Act] No. 145 penalizing the charging of
fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits x x x.

Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the
latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1829

PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS

WHEREAS, crime and violence continue to proliferate despite the sustained vigorous efforts of
the government to effectively contain them;

WHEREAS, to discourage public indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and

prosecution of criminal offenders, it is necessary to penalize acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to
obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND, E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers vested in me by law do hereby decree and order the following:

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from
1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the
commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation,
deceit, intimidation, force or threats;

(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with
intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any
investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official
proceedings in, criminal cases;

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent
his arrest prosecution and conviction;

(d) publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or
the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same
purpose or purposes;

(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court
orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;

(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its
falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in,
criminal cases;

(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from,
discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender;
 (h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person,
honor or property or that of any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such
person from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a
condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation
of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases;

(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies
from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating
information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of
background information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the
investigator or to the court.

If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the
higher penalty shall be imposed.

Section 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or employee, he shall in
addition to the penalties provided thereunder, suffer perpetual disqualification from holding public
office.

Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.