62 Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement

responsibility: duty to one’s superiors and accountability for the effects of

one’s actions. In a system of wrongdoing, the best functionaries are those
who honor their obligations to authority but feel no personal responsibility
for the harm they cause. They work dutifully to be good at their evildoing.
Followers who disowned responsibility, without being bound by a sense of
duty, would be quite unreliable in performing their duties when the authori-
ties were not present.

Diffusion of Responsibility
The exercise of moral control is also weakened when personal agency is ob-
scured by diffusing responsibility for detrimental behavior. Any harm done by
a group can always be attributed largely to the behavior of others. Figure 2.2
shows the level of harm inflicted on others on repeated occasions depending
on whether the harm was done by a group or by individuals (Bandura et al.,
1975). People act more cruelly under group responsibility than when they
hold themselves personally accountable for their actions.
Kelman (1973) describes the different ways in which personal account-
ability is dispersed. Group decision making is a common practice that can
result in otherwise considerate people behaving inhumanely. The faceless
group becomes the agent that does the deciding and the authorizing. Mem-
bers can discount their contribution to the policies and practices arrived at
collectively so they are not really responsible. When everyone is responsible,
no one really feels responsible. Napoleon put it well when he noted that

5
Level of punitiveness

2
Group Responsibility
Individual Responsibility
1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Occasions
Figure 2.2 Level of punitiveness by individuals. From “Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of
Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims,” by A. Bandura, B. Underwood, & M. E. Fromson, 1975,
Journal of Research in Personality, 9, 253–269, Figure 4. Reprinted with permission from Elsevier.
 Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement 63

“collective crimes incriminate no one.” Social systems go to great lengths

to devise social arrangements for diffusing responsibility for decisions that
affect outsiders adversely.
A division of labor also diffuses, and thereby diminishes, a sense of re-
sponsibility. Most undertakings require the services of many people, each
performing subdivided jobs that seem harmless in themselves. Depart-
mentalization of subfunctions into isolated units within a system creates
a further sense of detachment from the production of tools of destruction.
After activities become routinized into detached subfunctions, people shift
their attention from the morality of what they are doing to the operational
details of the fragmented activity and efficiency in performing their specific
job (Kelman, 1973). The implementers strive to be good at their particular
piecework.
The most graphic example of moral self-exoneration through diffusion of
responsibility occurs within the act of intentionally putting a human being to
death. Executing a person requires subdivision of the task to get individuals to
do it. In execution by lethal injection, the drug subfunctions are spread across
the team of drug technicians. Some members insert the intravenous lines
for the syringes into the inmate’s veins; others attach the electrocardiogram
electrodes to monitor the inmate’s heart rate. In the semiautomated drug
delivery system, still others push the plungers. Responsibility is similarity
diffused in the strap-down teams. Each member straps an isolated part of
the body. The power of diffusion to erase a sense of personal responsibil-
ity is revealed in the remarks of a guard in San Quentin whose role was
limited to strapping down an inmate’s leg to the electric chair in 126 execu-
tions (Marine, 1990). This spared him the appearance of executioner. “I never
pulled the trigger,” he said. “I wasn’t the executioner.” He goes on to describe
how, over time, an execution becomes a routinized task performed perfunc-
torily. “But after I’d get home I’d think about it a little bit. But then it would
go away. And then, at last, it was just another job.”
Collective action is the third form of moral disinhibition through diffused
responsibility. Several psychosocial processes are at work. Collective action
adds legitimacy to harmful means, especially if supported by principled justi-
fications (Bandura, 1973). Enmeshment in group action fueled by mounting
emotional arousal can override cognitive control. In highly aroused states,
individuals are prone to act impulsively with little thought about the con-
sequences of their actions. Group actions also provide a sense of anonymity
(Zimbardo, 1969). As long as one remains personally unrecognizable, one
need have little concern for adverse social evaluation.
The preceding disinhibitory processes are rooted in a reduction of per-
ceived social sanctions. Amid many players acting together, one easily can
discount one’s contribution to the harm perpetrated by the group. As a con-
sequence, people act more cruelly when responsibility is diffused than when
they hold themselves accountable for the effects of their actions. However,
64 Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement

enmeshment in group action does not completely eliminate self-awareness:

Individuals still have to contend with their self-evaluation.
Egregious systemic transgressions fostered surreptitiously from above
make it hard to believe that the upper echelon is entirely blameless. In a
common scenario, top officials evade accountability by stepping forward
with a ritualized public apology. They announce that they accept ultimate
responsibility because the transgressions occurred “under their watch.”
However, the scenario frames the issue as a lapse in oversight of wrongdoers
rather than the culpability of those in charge. This sleight of hand quickly
shifts responsibility to rogue underlings who are charged with violating the
organization’s policies and values. Expressing hurt feelings over a wrong-
doer’s betrayal can arouse empathy in others for the officials’ plight. If skill-
fully orchestrated, apologetic admission of ultimate responsibility can bring
forgiveness and even sympathy for officials portrayed as victims of subordi-
nate wrongdoers. The public apology typically closes with a forward-looking
statement aimed at curbing further probing. It is time to put the problem
behind us, the officials announce, and quickly move on to right the wrongs
and restore public trust. Admissions of ultimate responsibility are usually
devoid of consequences. The officials are not chastised, demoted, dismissed,
docked pay, or penalized in other ways.

THE EFFECTS LOCUS

Disregard, Distortion, and Denial of Harmful Effects
Other ways of disengaging moral control operate by minimizing, disregard-
ing, or even disputing the harmful effects of one’s actions. When people
pursue activities that harm others, they avoid facing the harm they cause
or minimize it. They are especially prone to minimize the harm they cause
when they act alone and thus cannot easily evade responsibility (Mynatt &
Herman, 1975). If minimization does not work, the evidence of harm can
be discredited. As long as the harmful results of one’s conduct are ignored,
minimized, or disputed, there is little or no reason for self-censure to be
activated. Vigorous battles are therefore fought over the credibility of evi-
dence of detrimental effects. Witness the heated dispute over the existence
of global warming and whether it is caused by human activity.
It is easier to harm others when their suffering is not visible and when
destructive actions are physically and temporally remote from their effects.
When people can see and hear the suffering they cause, vicariously aroused
distress and self-censure become self-restraining influences (Bandura,
1992). As shown in Figure 2.3, people are less likely to comply with the com-
mands of authorities to carry out injurious actions when the victims’ pain
becomes more evident and personalized (Milgram, 1974). Even a high sense