Professional Documents
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SSRN Id4060927
SSRN Id4060927
SSRN Id4060927
Markets∗
Lei Huanga Fangzhou Lua
Abstract
We estimate the direct and indirect impact of Russian sanctions on the global equity mar-
kets since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Countries that impose sanctions on Russia have
higher institutional quality and lower corruption scores. Sanctions against Russia on average
cost 0.11 trillion USD for each country’s stock market, and -2.39% for each stock. Given that
the average stock’s market capitalization is 3.79 billion USD in our sample, the average loss
is 90.7 million USD per stock. A back-of the envelop calculation suggests that the Russian
stock market loses between 137 billion and 353 billion USD, which is 7% to 20% of Russian’s
annual GDP. This is the loss from the listed sector alone and from the combined effect of
invasion and the sanctions. The average equity market loss for the country that impose
sanctions on Russia is close to 3% of its GDP, which is between 16% to 43% the loss that
Russian suffers as percentage of its total GDP. We also show that even within country that
impose sanctions on Russia, the firms that publicly announce a withdrawal of business from
Russia suffers an additional 2.3% drop in their stock prices. These firms tend to have higher
ESG governance, social, and environment scores.
∗a
HKU Business School, The University of Hong Kong. Please send correspondence to:
hlei123@connect.hku.hk.
Abstract
We estimate the direct and indirect impact of Russian sanctions on the global equity mar-
kets since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Countries that impose sanctions on Russia have
higher institutional quality and lower corruption scores. Sanctions against Russia on average
cost 0.11 trillion USD for each country’s stock market, and -2.39% for each stock. Given that
the average stock’s market capitalization is 3.79 billion USD in our sample, the average loss
is 90.7 million USD per stock. A back-of the envelop calculation suggests that the Russian
stock market loses between 137 billion and 353 billion USD, which is 7% to 20% of Russian’s
annual GDP. This is the loss from the listed sector alone and from the combined effect of
invasion and the sanctions. The average equity market loss for the country that impose
sanctions on Russia is close to 3% of its GDP, which is between 16% to 43% the loss that
Russian suffers as percentage of its total GDP. We also show that even within country that
impose sanctions on Russia, the firms that publicly announce a withdrawal of business from
Russia suffers an additional 2.3% drop in their stock prices. These firms tend to have higher
ESG governance, social, and environment scores.
The global financial market is shocked by the sudden Russian invasion of Ukraine and the
Russian stock market tumbled more than 50% and eventually the Moscow Exchange shut
down since Feb. 25 and remained closed. The price of global listed Russian firms as de-
pository receipts such as Sberbank plunged into the pennies and are completely wiped out.
Brent Oil Price reached the highest level since 2008 and all commodity prices experience a
large spike. Given the wide range of large economic adjustment globally that deeply disrupt
a lot of firm’s operation, evaluating the impact of sanctions is crucial.
We study the impact of sanction of global equity market, as sanction is one of the most
factors that shape firm’s future cash flow besides the war’s disruption itself. We identify the
sanction both at the country level as well as the firm level. First consider the case where
the sanction is imposed at the country level. When an entity A imposes a sanction on entity
B, the cost may be on A, B, or both A and B. In a world with comparative advantage, a
sanction cost generates even benefits of an entity and the eventual total welfare may not be
a zero-sum game. Entity B may also retaliate by imposing an another sanction on entity
A. Therefore, we attempt to evaluate the average impact of sanction on entity A and B
compared to an unaffected entity C. Even with a country, the sanction may benefit some
industries at the cost of others. therefore, it is also possible to observe distribution effect if
the sanction is imposed at a country level.
Now consider the case where the sanction happens at the firm level. A sanction can both
affect a firm’s cost and revenue. Through disrupting supply chains, a firm may have to pay
a high cost for its input, through restricting range of operation and access to its customers.
We also attempt to tease out these two effects separately.
Cost of Sanction is very large. Russian government has depleted half of its foreign reserve.
At the end of 2011 Q4, the Moscow stock market has a market capitalization of 353 billion
USD. When the Moscow stock market stopped trading on February 25th, 2022, the total
market capitalization is 216 billion USD. Consider the total market capitalization of the
2 Data
Figure 1 shows the stock market performance of sanction vs. non-sanction countries. Arith-
metic average or median are computed across each subgroup. In the top two graphs, we
classify countries into sanction vs. non-sanction group based on Russian government’s “un-
friendly country list” published on March 7th 2022. In the bottom two graphs, we classify
countries into “For” and “Against or abstention” based on each country’s voting during UN’s
emergency session demanding Russian army to withdraw from Ukraine. Before the sanction,
roughly unsanctioned countries and sanctioning countries have a five percent return differ-
ence, this difference becomes 10% after the sanction. So on average, a 5% market drop is
seen for countries that impose sanction on Russia.
Figure 2 and 3 show the stock market performance of sanction vs. non-sanction countries
by industry. Clearly we can observe a redistribution effect of sanction. For industries such as
Energy sector in the US, the ban on Russian crude oil make Shale oil looks promising again,
therefore it actually benefit the Energy sector. But most sectors suffer from this sanction,
take the consumer cyclicals and Financial sectors for example, these industries all suffer from
sanction on Russia.
We also show the characteristics of the countries that enforce sanction on Russia and
the characteristics of the countries that do not enforce sanction on Russia. The upper
figure: Russia as partner shows that from those other countries’ perspective, the percentage
1 2
Also see
3.1 Methodology
where the subscript k refers to the firm, i refers to the industry of the firm, c is the
country where the firm’s headquarter is, and e is the country where a firm is listed, and
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return, -1 to +1 days relative to the event day. Sanctionc
is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s headquarter or main source of revenue
is from a country c that applies sanction on Russia, or is imposed a sanction by Russia.
Notice that a firm’s headquarter may be very different from its country (location) of listing.
F E(zi,,c,e ) represents the fixed effects. We include exchange fixed effect, industry fixed effect
in F E(zi,c,e ) in different specifications to absorb unobserved heterogeneity exposure to the
Russo-Ukraine invasion. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level to allow for serial
dependence of the error term. The coefficient of central interest is β1 , where it measure the
effect of sanctions on firm’s return during this invasion.
We pick several potential CAR days, the first one is Feb 24th, 2022, the first day that
Russian invades Ukraines. and the second one is when the United Nations (UN) that con-
3.2 Results
Using the day that Russia draft the sanction list as event day, Table 1 shows that for the
each country’s stock market that impose a sanction on Russia, average stock drops -2.395
percent. Given that the average stock’s market capitalization is 3.79 billion USD in our
4 Conclusion
Cost of Sanction is very large. Russian government has depleted half of its foreign reserve.
At the end of 2011 Q4, the Moscow stock market has a market capitalization of 353 billion
USD. When the Moscow stock market stopped trading on February 25th, 2022, the total
market capitalization is 216 billion USD. Consider the total market capitalization of the
Moscow stock market is 18.645 percent of its GDP, and major Russian banks such as the
Sherbank almost lose all its market capitalization in London stock exchange, so a back-of
the envelop calculation suggests that the Russian stock market loses between 137 million
USD and 353 billion, which is 7% to 20% of Russian’s annual GDP. This is the loss from the
listed sector alone.
Compared to Russia, we find that We find that for the rest of the world, russian sanction
on average cost 0.1 Trillion USD for the each country’s stock market that impose a sanction
on Russia, and -2.395 percent for each stock. Given that the average stock’s market capi-
talization is 3.79 billion USD in our sample, the average loss is 90.7 million USD per stock.
The average loss is close to 3% of a sanctioning country’s GDP, which is between 16.67% to
42.85% the loss that Russian suffers as percentage as total GDP.
Deng, M., Leippold, M., Wagner, A. F., Wang, Q., 2022. Stock prices and the russia-ukraine
war: Sanctions, energy and esg. Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper .
Haidar, J. I., 2017. Sanctions and export deflection: evidence from iran. Economic Policy
32, 319–355.
Tirole, J., 2015. Country solidarity in sovereign crises. American Economic Review 105,
2333–63.
Torbat, A. E., 2005. Impacts of the us trade and financial sanctions on iran. World Economy
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Note: This figures shows the stock market performance of sanction vs. non-sanction countries. Arithmetic average or median
are computed across each subgroup. In the top two graphs, we classify countries into sanction vs. unsanction group based on
Russian government’s “unfriendly country list” published on March 7th 2022. In the bottom two graphs, we classify countries
into “For” and “Against or abstention” based on each country’s voting during UN’s emergency session demanding Russian army
to withdraw from Ukraine.
Figure 2: Global Equity Market Performance: Sanction vs. non-sanction countries by industry
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4060927
Note: This figures shows the industry level (Datastream ten industry classification) stock market performance by sanction vs.
non-sanction countries. The four subfigures show the Energy, Healthcare, Utility, and Real Estate sector.
Figure 3: Global Equity Market Performance: Sanction vs. non-sanction countries by industry
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4060927
10
Note: This figures shows the industry level (Datastream ten industry classification) stock market performance by sanction
vs. non-sanction countries. The six subfigures show the Industries, Consumer Cyclicals, Consumer Non-Cyclicals, Financials,
Technology, and Basic Material sector.
Figure 4: Characteristic of sanction vs. non-sanction countries (2020)
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4060927
11
Note: This figure shows the characteristics of the country that Russia government label as an unfriendly country and impose a
mutual sanction (blue bar) and the characteristics of the country that Russia government does not label as an unfriendly country
and thus unlikely to have imposed an sanction on Russia. The upper figure: Russia as partner shows that from those other
countries’ perspective, the percentage of Russian export and import as a percentage of its total export and import respectively.
The lower figure: Russia as a reporter shows from Russia’s perspective, the percentage of the country’s export and import as a
percentage of Russia’s total export and import respectively.
Figure 5: Impact of sanction in characteristics matched sample
Note: This Figures shows the when the sanction countries and non-sanction countries are
one-to-one matched based on the percentage of Russian export and import as a percentage
of its total export and import respectively, the country level stock market index performance
difference between the sanction vs. non-sanction countries.
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For -3.127**
(-2.70)
Nonfor 2.813*
(2.21)
Sanc -2.237*
(-2.06)
Nonsanc 2.055
(1.87)
For -3.206**
(-2.79)
Nonfor 2.905*
(2.30)
Sanc -2.395*
(-2.22)
Nonsanc 2.213*
(2.02)
13
14
For -16.80
(-0.89)
Nonfor 15.24
(0.73)
Sanc -17.07
(-0.96)
Nonsanc 16.29
(0.90)
Panel B: Based on equity’s country of issuance
For -17.04
(-0.90)
Nonfor 15.46
(0.75)
Sanc -17.53
(-0.99)
Nonsanc 16.71
(0.93)
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