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5 - Strategic Debt Restructuring in India
5 - Strategic Debt Restructuring in India
5 - Strategic Debt Restructuring in India
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The Strategic Debt Restructuring Regime in
India: Does It Need Strategic Restructuring?
By Pravesh Aggarwal and Rahul Bajaj*
This article seeks to enunciate several important ways in which Indias
strategic debt restructuringregime can be made more robust, transparent,
practical,and relevant.
Even though the Indian economy has grown at a robust pace over the last
decade, regulators have struggled to put in place efficacious processes and
systems for the absorption of risks and the protection of the financial market
from incipient challenges, without which the financial system cannot grow in
an inclusive and sustainable manner. One critical problem which has, in some
sense, significantly undercut the appeal of the India growth story has been the
rapid rise in non-performing assets ("NPAs").' Indeed, the recent events in
Greece have certainly taught us that the success of any economy, at a micro as
well as macro level, is in large part shaped by the strength of the mechanisms
2
that are put in place for the allocation, monitoring and recovery of debts.
Therefore, for securing the growth of a financial system on a solid foundation,
it is imperative that financial regulators put in place effective frameworks within
the confines of which a concerted effort can be made to balance the competing
claims of different stakeholders involved in a loan and for ensuring that the
interests of creditors are given the importance and priority that they deserve,
while at the same time providing debtors adequate opportunities for unlocking
the potential latent in their business which can allow them to repay their debts
and make a meaningful contribution to the growth of the economy at large.
Pravesh Aggarwal, a third year student pursuing a B.A.LLB (Hons.) at Rajiv Gandhi
National University of Law, Punjab, and Rahul Bajaj, a fourth year student pursuing a B.A. LLB
(Hons.) at Dr. Ambedkar College of Law, Nagpur University, may be contacted at
praveshaggarwal08@gmail.com and rahul.bajaj 1038@gmail.com, respectively.
1 See Section 2(o) of the SARFAESI Act which defines "non-performing asset" as "an asset or
account of a borrower, which has been classified by a bank or financial institution as
sub-standard, doubtful or loss asset,-(a) in case such bank or financial institution is
administered or regulated by any authority or body established, constituted or appointed by any
law for the time being in force, in accordance with the directions or guidelines relating to assets
classifications issued by such authority or body; (b) in any other case, in accordance with the
directions or guidelines relating to assets classifications issued by the Reserve Bank"; also see
http://www.livemint.com/Industry/xPuLSOoxWckzmLk8RhnrGJ/Bankers-expect-NPA-crisis-
to-worsen-in-next-few-years-EY-su.html.
2 See http://www.rediff.com/business/column/the-greece-crisis-and-its-lessons-for-india/
20150703.htm.
PRATT'S JOURNAL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
To this end, regulators in recent years have developed a potent tool known
as strategic debt restructuring ("SDR") which allows creditors to actively assert
their interest by reshaping the functioning of the debtor in a positive and
mutually beneficial manner. On account of the increased scope and depth of the
Indian financial market, coupled with the adoption of aggressive lending
policies by banks, SDR has emerged as a powerful stabilizing force by making
the debt recovery procedure more predictable, uniform and less adversarial.
It is dismaying to note, however, that the substantial potential of the SDR
regime to improve the quality of the extant credit culture in India is
significantly undercut by the lack of proper articulation of a set of concise
policy goals and long-term vision which ought to underpin the regime coupled
with the procedural delays that the regime, in its present form, is crippled with.
Therefore, this article seeks to iron out the creases in the existing regime by
enunciating several important ways in which it can be made more robust,
transparent, practical, and relevant. It is divided into four main parts. In
addition to analyzing recent attempts by financial regulators aimed at making
India's credit culture more stable and secure, the first part seeks to situate the
need for a robust SDR framework within a broader economic context. The
second part examines measures by the Reserve Bank of India ("RBI") to
promote corporate debt restructuring and the third part succinctly analyzes the
contours of the SDR regime, with special emphasis on its key merits and flaws.
Finally, the fourth part concludes by enunciating the possible steps that can be
taken to make the existing regime more purposeful and efficient.
purpose and the stability of the financial system is safeguarded. These steps
include enactment of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985,
Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993,
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest ("SARFAESI") Act, 2002, and creation of a framework by RBI
for the declaration of wilful defaulters.
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985
In keeping with the forward-looking recommendations of the Tiwari
Committee,3 the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985
("SICA") was enacted in the year 1985 in order to institutionalize a robust
machinery to efficaciously detect, analyse and mitigate administrative and
financial risks faced by sick industrial companies 4 which were rising at a
rampant pace at or prior to the time of enactment of the SICA. The Board for
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction ("BIFR") and the Appellate Authority
for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction ("AAIFR") that the SICA brought
into existence were tasked with the principal responsibility of finding concrete
ways of transforming sick industrial units from passive consumers of scarce
public resources to active engines of economic growth.5 To this end, the Act
empowers the BIFR to effectuate a large set of structural and functional
alterations in a company, such as restructuring the management and board of
directors, sale/leasing of surplus assets to generate more resources, structuring
merger and amalgamation agreements and adopting solutions involving mul-
tiple stakeholders who can contribute finances, expertise and resources that are
critical for unlocking the potential latent in floundering businesses. 6 However,
the BIFR has been largely unsuccessful in accomplishing the goals for which it
was set up-a conclusion best evidenced by the fact that only 8.9 percent of the
companies registered by the BIFR within the first 15 years of its inception could
be rehabilitated and the success rate was a mere 39 percent even for companies
for which a comprehensive rehabilitation scheme was designed after appropriate
7
viability studies.
Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993
The Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act ("RDDB
3 See http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/ciber/files/Sujata%/20Visaria.pdf.
4 See Preamble, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.
5 See Chapter III of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 which deals
with References to the Board (BIFR), Inquires into working of sick industrial companies and
various schemes that can be prepared to revive sick companies.
6 See Section 18, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.
7 See http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/ 10603/6846/11/1 1-chapter%203.pdf.
47
PRATT'S JOURNAL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
Act"), enacted in 1993, is the most comprehensive code grappling with debts
exceeding 10 lakh rupees.8 The Act, whose codification was actuated by the
twofold objective of facilitating expeditious recovery of large debts and putting
in place a well-structured legal machinery for the adjudication of such disputes,
empowers banks and other financial institutions to recover debts ideally within
a period of 180 days of filing their original application if they are able to
substantiate their claims. 9 The capacious scope of the Act is best epitomized by
the fact that the definition of the term "Debt" in Section 2 (g) of the Act is
couched in very expansive language and includes any "liability, including
interest due from any person by a Bank during the course of any business
activity undertaken by the Bank under any law for the time being in force in
cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or whether payable under a
decree or order of any civil Court or otherwise subsisting or legally recoverable
on the date of the application."' 10 However, the RDDB Act has failed to bring
about a transformational shift in the manner in which debts are recovered
because of the fact that the law is heavily tilted in favour of creditors, making
debtors feel less invested in the system, coupled with the inability of the law to
delineate clear, fair and simplified processes for the proper attachment and
foreclosure of assets linked with loans." In addition, within a decade of the
DRTs being set up, it became amply clear that they were exacerbating, as
opposed to alleviating, existing problems, and that the only meaningful way in
which the problem of debt recovery could be solved would involve the vesting
of greater powers in the lenders themselves. 12 More specifically, even though
DRTs are mandated to dispose applications within a period of 60 days of their
filing, extendable to 120 days, 13 they have shown themselves to be woefully
inadequate to the job because of absence of appropriate resources and
8 See http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/Upload/80938A41-3558-4A9F-BB18-
FD5C692CA00.pdf. Also prior to 1993, banks had to take recourse to the long legal route
against defaulting borrowers, beginning with the filing of claims in the courts. Many years were
therefore spent in the judicial process before banks could have any chance of recovery of their
loans: See https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS-SpeechesView.aspx?id-931.
9 See Section 19(24), the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act,
1993.
2
10 Section (g), the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.
11 It was also observed in the year 2014 that there are over 40,000 cases worth Rs 1.73 lakh
crore pending before various courts and Debt Recovery Tribunals: See http://www.dnaindia.
com/money/report-rbi-gets-tough-says-even-guarantor-to-be-tagged-as-wilful-defaulter-if-
obligations-not-met-20175 10.
12 https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS-SpeechesView.aspx?id-931.
13 Section 17 (5), the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.
THE STRATEGIC DEBT RESTRUCTURING REGIME IN INDIA
manpower coupled with the problem of rapidly rising cases, a large portion of
which are filed frivolously and are dismissed in limine. 14 This thereby defeats
the very object of the Act which provides for expeditious adjudication and
5
recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions by the DRT.1
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement
of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002
After the government realized that extant legal frameworks were inadequate
and ineffective in addressing the pressing problems of rising NPAs, it
constituted various committees, most notably the Narasimham Committee II
and Andhyarujina Committee to find ways of facilitating the sale of collateral
securities in ways that were consistent with the need to circumvent protracted
litigation and institutionalize market-driven solutions to the problems of rising
defaults. 16 To this end, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002, was
brought in force to pave the way for the robust securitization and reconstruc-
tion of financial assets that undergird debts.' 7 The Act envisages the creation of
securitization and reconstruction companies which are empowered to enter into
agreements with banks to acquire the debts which banks are entitled to recover
from borrowers.' 8 Not only are such companies better positioned than lender
banks to expedite the recovery of debts through the adoption of more
innovative techniques, but the Act also empowers them to take a set of powerful
measures to facilitate quicker recovery of debts, such as restructuring the
borrower's management, selling or leasing their business, rescheduling the
amount of debts, settlement of dues and taking possession of underlying
securities. 19 More significantly, in order to circumvent complicated legal
processes, the Act empowers secured creditors to take over the possession of the
underlying security or business of the debtor and sell, lease or assign the same
for the purpose of recovering the debt amount if the debtor fails to pay the same
14 http://www.cppr.in/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 1O/A-STUDY-ON-THE-
EFFECTIVENESS-OF-REMEDIES-AVAILABLE.pdf pg, 18; Also see supra note 11.
15 See Preamble, the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.
16 See http://www.isec.ac.in/WP%/0202520/%20-%/20Meenakshi%/o20Rajeev%/o20and%/o20H%/
20P%20Mahesh.pdf.
17 See Preamble, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement
20 Section 14, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002.
21 See http://www.financialexpress.com/article/industry/banking-finance/npas-why-rbis-
flexibility-may-not-be-an-optimal-solution/141741/.
22 A wilful defaulter is somebody who has essentially not used the fund for the purpose it has
been borrowed or when he has not repaid when he can do so; when he has siphoned off the funds
or when he disposed of the assets pledged for availing of loan without the bank's knowledge: see
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-04-19/news/61304025 1 defaulters-psu-
banks-gross-npas; Also see https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BSViewMasCirculardetails.aspx?id-
9907.
23 http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/kingfisher-case-shows-why-india-
24 http://www.financialexpress.com/article/industry/banking-finance/npas-why-rbis-
flexibility-may-not-be-an-optimal-solution/141741/.
25 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-08-20/news/65667139-1-psu-banks-
npa-sme-loans.
PRATT'S JOURNAL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
take-5 1-in-stressed-firms/.
28 https://rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id-8532&Mode-0.
29 https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/pdfs/NPA300 11 4RFF.pdf.
THE STRATEGIC DEBT RESTRUCTURING REGIME IN INDIA
more than 30 days but the account shows incipient stress; SMA-1 in which the
principal or interest is overdue for a period between 31 and 60 days and SMA-2
in which the principal or interest is overdue for a period between 61 and 90
days.
Second, it paved the way for the creation of a Central Repository of
Information on Large Credit ("CRILC") which would be replete with
information of all banks having borrowers with aggregate fund-based and
non-fund based exposure of Rs.50 million and above and current accounts of
their customers with outstanding balance (debit or credit) of Rs. 10 million and
above. Further, Para 2.1.4 makes it mandatory for all banks to report the SMA
status of their borrowers to the CRILC and to take appropriate remedial steps
for accounts classified as SMA-0 and SMA-1.
Third, as soon as an account is classified as SMA-2, the Regulations envisage
the creation of a Joint Lenders' Forum ("JLF") for formulating a Corrective
Action Plan ("CAP") for early resolution of the stress in the account. For
borrowers having multiple lenders, the lender with the highest exposure must
act as the leader of the JLF and be tasked with the responsibility of convening
the JLE While the Regulations make it optional for lenders to form a JLF for
SMA-0 and SMA-1 accounts, they mandatorily require the setting up of a JLF
where the aggregate fund-based and non-fundbased exposure exceeds Rs. 100
million. Further, all the lenders are required to sign an agreement delineating
the terms governing the working of the JLF and are empowered to work with
government authorities and other interested stakeholders for the purpose of
devising efficacious ways of facilitating expeditious recovery in cases where the
loan facilitates large projects.
Fourth, the most potent tool that the Regulations create for addressing the
problem of bad debts is CAP which the JLF can form for either:
" Rectification, i.e., by asking the borrower to take robust steps for
preventing the account from being declared an NPA and for facilitating
its removal from the SMA classification. This could be done through
provisions for additional finance or equity and strategic investments;
" Restructuring, i.e., by creation of an Inter-Creditor Agreement ("ICA")
by the JLF and a debtor-creditor agreement ("DCA") which would
provide the legal foundation for any restructuring process. Further, it is
worth noting that the decisions taken by 75 percent of creditors by
value and 60 percent by number would animate and inform the
restructuring process. The parties would also be required to sign a
stand-still agreement which would ensure that all other things-such as
the management of the borrower and civil judicial proceedings-
remain equal and unchanged during the restructuring process and
53
PRATT'S JOURNAL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
30 https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id-8754&Mode-0.
THE STRATEGIC DEBT RESTRUCTURING REGIME IN INDIA
31 http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report-rbi-gives-banks-provisioning-leway-for-
reporting-frauds-on-time-2087009.
32 https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?ID 9767.
PRATT'S JOURNAL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
33 Section 19(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 provides that "Save as provided in
sub-section (1), no banking company shall hold shares in any company, whether as pledgee,
mortgagee or absolute owner, of an amount exceeding thirty per cent of the paid-up share capital
of that company or thirty per cent of its own paid-up share capital and reserves, whichever is less."
34 See Section 53 of the Companies Act, 2013 which prohibits a company
to issue shares at
a discount except as provided for issue of sweat equity shares under Section 54 of the Act.
35 http://artices.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2 15-08-20/news/65667139 1-psu-banks-
npa-sme-loans.
THE STRATEGIC DEBT RESTRUCTURING REGIME IN INDIA
the system by providing them new tools which can help them fashion more
efficacious solutions.
Third, the regime explicitly prevents lenders from selling their equity stake to
the promoter group which controlled the working of the company prior to the
conversion of debt into equity. This safeguard is critical from the perspective of
ensuring that the culture of the company does not fall prey to the same
tendencies and patterns of decision making that led to its downfall and will
allow more skilled and competent investors to accelerate the growth of the
company.
Indeed, the positive impact of the SDR regime is already visible for all to
see-it has helped facilitate the conversion of a substantial portion of a loan of
a consortium of 21 lenders to a manufacturer named Jyoti Structures 36 and
made it possible for the lenders of Electrosteel Steels Limited ("ESL") to convert
their debt worth approximately 9500 crores into equity after the CDR process
37
failed to yield any desirable results.
Flaws in the SDR Regime
Notwithstanding the aforementioned advantages, the regime has several
lacunae which merit immediate attention. It would be instructive to examine
the most glaring ones to substantiate this claim.
Control over Borrowing Companies: A Difficult Task to be
Accomplished
It is pertinent to note that while the fundamental goal underpinning the
regime is to allow banks to acquire a 51 percent stake in borrower companies,
it may be practically difficult for them to do so because of diverse dynamics that
are at play in such an exercise. 38 For instance, let us assume that a company
owes a debt of Rs. 1500 crores and the book value of its shares is Rs. 3,000
crores, divided into 10 crore shares of Rs. 300 each. Now, on account of the
conversion of debt into equity, the lenders would get five crore shares, while the
existing shareholders would continue to hold 10 crore shares, as a result of
which the former's stake would be approximately 33 percent, nowhere close to
the desired 51 percent.
36 http://www.financialexpress.com/article/industry/companies/lenders-jyoti-structures-
agree-on-strategic-debt-restructuring/122411/.
37 See http://www.financialexpress.com/article/industry/companies/lenders-to-swap-debt-for-
a-stake-in-electrosteel/109063/.
38 http://capitalmind.in/2015/06/the-strategic-debt-restructuring-rules-by-rbi-banks-will-
convert-debt-to-majority-equity/.
PRATT'S JOURNAL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
2011 provides for making open offer to the shareholders of the target company on substantially
acquiring the shares or the voting rights of the target company subject to certain conditions as
prescribed therein.
Regulation 4 of the aforesaid SEBI Regulation provides that "Irrespective of acquisition or holding
of shares or voting rights in a target company, no acquirershall acquire, directly or indirectly, control
over such target company unless the acquirer makes a public announcement of an open offer for
acquiringshares of such target company in accordance with these regulations."
41 See Section 6 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, which imposes restrictions on the bank
by prescribing certain business activities in which banking companies can indulge in.
42 See Section 19(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, which imposes restrictions on
the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, along with the Reserve Bank of India Act, 43
would make it difficult for lenders and investors to find suitable ways of tapping
into the potential latent in floundering companies.
Difficulty in Building Consensus Among Lenders-
Possible Coordination Hurdles
Further, it may be very difficult for lenders, each of whom may have different
priorities and targets, to forge consensus on the need to undertake SDR and
then to determine the precise ways in which the same is to be carried into effect.
For instance, if the JLF consists of 10 lenders, the norms require at least six
lenders to give their consent to the SDR process for the process to actually
commence which may be difficult because of differing levels of access to
information about the borrower's financial position and differing views about
the JLF's ability to find a third-party buyer after it has to divest its share. In
other words, there is likely to be information asymmetry among different banks
concerning the extent of liabilities and claims on the borrower's balance sheet
and uncertainty surrounding finding a buyer for the purchased equity. While
the RBI has taken significant steps to lend greater credence to the SDR process,
by tasking SBI and ICICI bank to be part of the JLF where they are among the
lenders and by requiring that the representatives of lenders in the JLF must
typically not be below the rank of executive directors, 44 it remains to be seen
how they would be able to reconcile their frequently conflicting interests in
borrower companies.
Other Key Problems
It is also imperative that the financial infrastructure in India be sufficiently
deepened and broadened to create the conditions necessary for SDR schemes to
work effectively. For example, 74 percent of the security receipts sold from the
period between March 2010 and March 2015 were subscribed by lender banks
and financial institutions, indicating the absence of a sufficiently developed
secondary market for debts in India. 45 Sans a vibrant interest in the lending
process, banks may not want to engage in innovative experiments to exploit the
SDR regime to its fullest potential. Similarly, the transfer of management of
43 See Chapter HID (Sections 45U to 45X) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, which
grants power to the Reserve Bank of India to regulate transactions in derivatives, money market,
instruments, securities, etc.
44 See http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com/Article.aspx?eid-31818&articlexml-Banks-get-
Right-to-Turf-Out-Owners-Before-25092015001014.
45 http://www.financialexpress.com/article/industry/banking-finance/npas-why-rbis-
flexibility-may-not-be-an-optimal-solution/141741/.
PRATT'S JOURNAL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
companies to banks may not necessarily yield positive results, because banks
often lack the commercial expertise and relevant skills necessary for effectively
managing sick companies. As one writer has rightly noted, it would be
counterintuitive to expect managers "who can't run their own banks that well
to actually be able to run the businesses they lend to." 46 In addition, some debts
are structured in ways that make them simply unserviceable even in favourable
economic conditions, so change in management may not be able to solve the
47
problem in such circumstances.
Also, while the Circular requires a special resolution from the borrower
company to approve the restructuring, it may be difficult for banks to convince
shareholders to dilute their holdings in the company and to handover the
company's management to a set of individuals whose only goal would be to find
ways of recovering their own money while ignoring the company's medium-
term and long-term interests.
Finally, many banks subscribe to the belief that conversion of debt into
equity actually has a negative impact on their ability to recover loans, because
as the RBI has itself noted, the interests of shareholders must be subservient to
those of debt-holders, so banks believe that they might be shooting themselves
in the foot by exercising this remedy. This is the reason why banks have typically
refrained from gaining a stake in the ownership of companies even in cases
where promoters have pledged their shares as a part of debt deals. Therefore, if
the fundamental goal is to enable banks to have a greater say in the recovery of
debts, it might make greater sense to find ways of giving them a more powerful
voice in the process instead of converting them into shareholders which may
not be beneficial unless the price of shares goes up substantially post-
conversion.
consolidated debt into equity. This would not only provide a panacea for
coordination issues, but would also make it easier for strategic and financial
investors to eventually buy the converted equity as they would only be required
to deal with a single lender. Similarly, such consolidation could also be judicially
enforced, in a manner akin to the "cramdown" process envisaged in the United
48
States Bankruptcy Code.
Second, while it may be desirable in certain circumstances to prevent the
promoter group from purchasing equity from lenders, a blanket ban may result
in economically pernicious effects. More specifically, while it is desirable to
prevent the management of a company from falling into the hands of promoters
who have a history of committing frauds or engaging in other egregious forms
of unlawful conduct, it would not be desirable to apply this principle where the
company's failure to meet viability milestones is on account of factors beyond
the control of the promoter group. Therefore, it is necessary to create
bright-line rules which would make it possible for the company to avail of the
services of promoters who are ideally positioned to manage the company in
49
ways that are in alignment with its history and ethos.
Third, while SDR may help improve the financial health of the company, the
main goal must continue to be to allow banks to recover the amount lent
effectively. Therefore, in order to facilitate full and fair recovery, it is necessary
to provide banks the right to recompense which would empower them to
recover any principal or interest earlier waived when the company is in good
financial health. This is critical to prevent leakages and will play an instrumental
50
role in improving India's credit culture.
Fourth, in order to create an enabling legal mechanism for third-party
investors, it is necessary to extend the exemptions granted under the ICDR
Regulations, 2009, and the Takeover Code, 2011 to lenders to third party
investors as well in order to incentivize the purchase of debt converted into
equity.
Fifth, while the SDR mechanism may provide some reprieve to banks
saddled with rising NPAs in the short-term, we cannot hope to usher in a new
paradigm in India's credit culture without addressing the problems of opacity,
lack of trust and inability/unwillingness to plan for different consequences that
48 See http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/ZbCBzExjbHnKyvoj2rlt7K/India-needs-a-
realistic-debt-restructuring-framework.html.
49 Ibid.
50 See http://www.rediff.com/business/column/column-why-india-needs-bankruptcy-code-
urgently/ 2 0150619.htm.
PRATT'S JOURNAL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
51 http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/at-7-per-cent-india-remains-fastest-
growing-major-economy/article7601141.ece.