CSIS

Tomb Sweeping Day:

Deadline for a U.S. China
Policy
March 14, 2017

If reports are accurate that President Xi Jinping of China will

visit with President Donald Trump in Mar-a-Lago on April 6–7, the
United States has essentially three weeks to come up with a
China policy. Appropriately, the deadline falls on China’s Tomb
Sweeping Day—set for April 4 this year—which is an occasion to
pay respect to one’s ancestors, as well as celebrate the arrival of
spring and the pursuit of good health. The core decision
President Trump has to make is whether to follow in the
footsteps of every president since Richard Nixon and pursue
engagement or whether to set out on a new course of more
uniform confrontation.

President Trump has offered snippets of a possible policy, calling

China a currency manipulator, flirting with modifying the “one-
China” policy, and criticizing Chinese actions in the South China
Sea and over North Korea. But a complaint here and threat there
do not constitute a policy or provide sufficient basis for a two-
day meeting between leaders, let alone an agenda for the entire
relationship. And simply playing it by ear is a nonstarter.

Getting from here to there will be no easy task, in part because

the administration still is operating with a skeleton staff. There
are cabinet secretaries and a permanent civil service, but very
little of the team in between: deputies, undersecretaries,
assistant secretaries, and their deputies. Few have been
nominated, let alone confirmed or integrated into a systematic
interagency consultation process.

The extended period of uncertainty has created deep anxiety

among everyone with a stake in the relationship. The Chinese
government has calculated that a full-blown trade war, with U.S.
tariffs jacked up to 45 percent, would knock at least one full
point off the Chinese growth rate (with unofficial estimates at
double this figure), at a time when the economy is already
struggling and they are heading into a leadership transition later
this year. U.S. companies that do business with China
desperately want help prying open China’s markets, but in
interviews, they admitted to being petrified that a Trump-like
rescue would leave them even worse off due to likely Chinese
retaliation. At the same time, there are internal divisions in the
administration, particularly over trade policy, with competing
voices arguing alternatively for intense pressure or patient
diplomacy. Chaos appears not just to be a strategy but a
condition that is hindering the administration from developing
and carrying out a consistent China policy.

The meeting with Xi Jinping provides an opportunity to quiet the

doubts and articulate a clear vision. To address the uncertainty,
President Trump will need to answer five questions.

First, how does the U.S.-China relationship fit into the overall
goals of promoting American prosperity and security? In April
1984, during his state visit to Beijing, President Ronald Reagan
said: “A strong China, dedicated to peace, clearly is in the best
interest of international stability and in the best interest of the
United States.” Every U.S. president since the normalization of
diplomatic relations in 1979 has offered a similar formula.
President Barack Obama’s version, from November 2014: “The
United States welcomes the continuing rise of a China that is
peaceful, prosperous and stable and that plays a responsible role
in the world.” Is President Trump ready to say something similar?
The implication is that the United States believes that its
commercial and security interests are served by a successful
China provided it operates within the confines of the
international system. If so, the United States’ policy challenge is
not to limit China’s rise but to shape its trajectory.

It is important not to confuse such a statement with the

inevitable demand by China to accept its formulation of a “new
type of great power relations.” That phrase does not mean the
simple acceptance of constructive relations, rather it implies
that the United States does not challenge any of China’s “core
interests” (most importantly, the Communist Party’s monopoly on
power and China’s territorial integrity), gives China wider latitude
in Asia, and is ready to cooperate with China in addressing major
global issues. Such a characterization, which essentially
recognizes China as a coequal, is an unrealistic expectation to
put on the United States. Former vice president Joe Biden
uttered the phrase during a trip to China, and the administration
spent a lot of energy walking back the statement. Regardless of
whatever U.S.-based framework the Trump administration settles
on, it should scrupulously avoid making this faux pas.

Second, what does Trump want from Xi? Everyone is aware of

the complaints, but almost every Chinese official I have met in
the past few months is entirely unclear what the United States
wants China to do to address its concerns.

Take the economy. Trump has complained about barriers to U.S.

imports and investment, but he might be satisfied with a
reduction in two-way trade if it resulted in a larger drop in
imports and hence a smaller bilateral trade deficit. He’s
complained about currency manipulation, but it’s unclear if he
would accept a free-floating renminbi if that led to a depreciation
and more competitive Chinese exports. Trump has railed against
Chinese industrial policy, but he needs to articulate which areas
of state support he finds most egregious. Additionally, he needs
to explain whether satisfactorily addressing U.S. concerns
should be measured by changes to Chinese policies or
commercial outcomes.

On security, the “asks” for the Asia-Pacific region seem clearer:

increase pressure on North Korea and accept U.S.–South Korea
joint steps to protect themselves against the growing
capabilities of Pyongyang; pull back from militarization of islands
and reefs in the South China Sea, be more willing to negotiate a
resolution with the other claimants without coercion, and accept
freedom of navigation for U.S. military and commercial vessels in
the region’s international waters and airspace; and avoid
provocative steps that destabilize the Taiwan Strait. But Trump
needs to explain how these steps are consistent with China’s
own security needs. Far less clear is how he would want China to
help, if at all, in addressing issues beyond the region, in
particular, fighting terrorism.

Third, what compromises is the United States prepared to make

in exchange for these steps from China? President Trump can
bet that Xi Jinping will come with his own list of “asks.” To date
the administration has implied that it is expecting unilateral
Chinese concessions and that nothing more is required of the
United States in terms of general reassurances or specific policy
adjustments. The Trump administration needs to decide how it
will respond to a wide range of requests, among them a bilateral
investment treaty, market-economy status, reduced controls on
exports of advanced U.S. technology, agreeing to dialogue with
North Korea, and restraining U.S. military activities in areas near
China.

Fourth, what is the Trump administration prepared to do should

China not be forthcoming on its long list of demands? It is a
virtual certainty that China will not address the core issues
quickly. China may take superficial steps—push up the renminbi’s
value, sign contracts for some big-ticket imports (for example,
shale gas), and ink a code of conduct with Southeast Asian
countries—but true resolution requires more fundamental
changes to China’s economic governance and security posture
that could take years to implement. The administration will need
to determine how long it is willing to wait and, once its patience
runs out, what sticks it will use, such as increasing tariffs across
the board, self-initiating trade remedy and World Trade
Organization (WTO) cases, suspending or limiting Chinese
investment in the United States, expanding U.S. military support
for its allies and others in the region, etc. And it will need to
decide whether it will justify these steps based on reference to
Chinese violations of its commitments—via the WTO, the Hague
decision on the South China Sea, etc.—or due to a lack of
reciprocity or a general sense of fairness, even in cases where
China has never made a clear promise. The hardest part of this
calculus will be determining how much the United States is
willing to sacrifice in the short term to achieve a better outcome
in the long term, considering China is unlikely simply to give in
and will retaliate in ways both big and small, visible and opaque.
If the United States is going to play hardball, it will need to show
it has the will to stick it out.

Fifth and finally, how will China policy be organized? The Trump
administration needs to decide whether it wants to continue with
bureaucracy-based dialogues or place more emphasis on
personalized leadership-level engagement and negotiations. On
the one hand, the Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) have created
processes for reducing bureaucratic stove-piping of issues. On
the other hand, they have also grown to be so large as to include
quotidian problems that could be handled through regular
channels. If the United States is going to reduce the breadth or
depth of the S&ED or JCCT, then the White House will need to
commit more time and energy to provide hands-on management
of the relationship, including more frequent and regular meetings
between Trump and Xi.

The administration will also need to settle on an internal

decisionmaking structure. At the moment there appear to be
multiple power centers competing for President Trump’s ear.
That is a difficult approach to maintain with such a complex, far-
ranging relationship. The administration could instead permit a
division of labor on economic and security issues among these
different groups, or it could return to a more traditional
hierarchical and integrated process. There are clear benefits to
the last type of structure, which seems more stable and cohesive
than the other two options; regardless, some kind of clarity on
process would be an achievement.

Instead of golf, Presidents Trump and Xi would be well served by

trying their hands at a famous activity for Tomb Sweeping Day:
kite flying. In some ways, U.S.-China relations are like a kite
being bounced around by the volatile winds of competing
nationalisms. Whether outside on the Mar-a-Lago grounds or in
the negotiating room, it will take great dexterity by Trump and Xi
to keep the relationship between the two countries from being
overtaken by the ongoing storm and remain aloft.

Scott Kennedy is deputy director of the Freeman Chair in China

Studies and director of the Project on Chinese Business and
Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and

International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution
focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is
nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific
policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and
conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood
to be solely those of the author(s).

India stratigics studies

22 MARCH 2017

** Turnabout is fair play: A Marine officer interviews Tom about

military leadership
Source Link

BY THOMAS E. RICKS

Here is an exchange I had with Lieutenant

Colonel Jeannette Haynie, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, who is working on her doctoral dissertation. I
am running it here with her permission. Some of this is familiar stuff to longtime readers, but I am
offering it because it is a pretty good summary of what I see as the core problems of the U.S.
military. Newcomers to the blog may find it helpful.

1) Are there Services, or elements within the Services, that still exercise in some ways or at some
points the kind of leadership that Marshall and Eisenhower exhibited during WWII? Or more
generally, is the military as a whole as far from that template as it seems to be, with no outliers, after
reading the book?

Yes, I have occasionally seen elements within the services that remind me of the U.S. military
leaders of World War II. Indeed, the current defense secretary, James Mattis, seems to come from
that mold. He is, as you know, a retired Marine. I think the Corps has more of these sorts of leaders
than the other service, but even there, they strike me as a small minority. Anthony Zinni was another
one. They are not necessarily easy to work for, but they tend to be seen as fair and rigorous, and
attract subordinates who like that approach.

I also see these sorts of leaders in Special Operations. Stanley McChrystal may be one such — I
have not watched him in the field, and so don’t know.

The problem here is how to make these sorts of leaders not the charismatic exception but the
expected standard. I think George Marshall aimed for that in World War II. He got it a lot of the time.
Not always. But he also knew that he would remove the bottom 10 percent or so of leaders. They
knew it too. That helped spur laggards to do better.

2) Given the risk-averse nature of today, how can we begin to shift back to a paradigm where
leaders accept more risk and allow their subordinates to take more risks and thus learn more
effectively?

We get there by making risk-aversion more dangerous. Churchill understood this. He did not punish
generals for taking reasonable risks, but he did punish them for inactivity or over-caution. He
understood that in war when you are too cautious, you probably cede the imitative to the foe. The
point is to keep trying, and to make the enemy worry more about what you are doing than you worry
about what he is doing.

A good example of the unplanned benefits of that approach is the fighting in Norway in the spring of
1940. This was a defeat for Britain and in fact led to the fall of the Chamberlain government. But in
the course of getting kicked out of Norway, the British inflicted enough damage on the German navy
to make a German invasion of England far more difficult that year. Thus a tactical defeat was also a
hidden strategic victory.

2a) How does the 24/7 nature of technology inhibit risk-taking in this sense, and what can we do to
overcome it in your opinion? (This calls to mind micromanagement via internet connectivity, constant
HQ presence, and the way instantly available information and communication makes leaders eager
to manage every aspect. It also reflects how technology allows mistakes to be instantly broadcast
around the world, deepening the damage they cause.)

I don’t know. I suspect that poor commanders tend to complain about this more than highly
competent ones. It is all part of your environment. Good leaders learn how to use their environment,
or at least how to live with it. Complaining about the information environment seems to me like
complaining about the rain.

If higher headquarters constantly wanting information is a problem for a commander, it seems to me

that he or she should do one of three things: Either become the provider of information and put a
subordinate in command; or put a subordinate in charge of providing the information; or telling HQ
they are getting in the way and that you will be in touch when possible.
3) What is the role of education in changing the way we as a military think and operate? To
elaborate — what can/should we do to teach and enable critical thinking in a military that has
overwhelmingly abandoned its practice, despite lip service to the contrary?

— Note: these are my own thoughts and words, so if you disagree with the assumptions of a
question please let me know!

I agree with the question. I think what is necessary is for military education to become rigorous
again. Any officer captain or above should know how to read and write with clarity. I was struck
yesterday in reading a Civil War history how plainly Grant, Lincoln, and Sherman expressed
themselves, all while operating at the strategic level of war.

The Army used to care about mental fitness as much as it did physical fitness. Before an officer was
sent to Command and General Staff College, his unit would prepare him. Recent graduates in the
unit would tutor him, and he would begin doing the readings. (This was done with young Dwight
Eisenhower, for example.)

Such preparation still happens with Ranger School, but not with CGSC. An officer’s performance
there is no longer a matter of unit pride. When Eisenhower graduated No. 1 in his class, the Army
paid attention. Now no one cares, because a CGSC degree has been debased — that is, it is no
longer a guarantee that the officer is someone special. It has lost its currency.

Yes, there are band aids that will help with critical thinking. Sending some officers to do graduate
degrees at civilian institutions would help. Making West Point more than a gold-plated community
college degree (with most teachers having master’s degrees) would also help. I thought the School
of Advanced Military Studies would help, but I worry that all it did was make generals like Tommy R.
Franks think that critical thinking is someone else’s job — when it is in fact the essence of
generalship.

Bottom line: Until the U.S. military cares as much about an officer being a thinker as being a physical
stud, the problem will remain.

4) At one point in your book, you describe an interaction between Marshall and British General
Harold Alexander, where Marshall comments that American troops do start out making a ton of
mistakes, but they learn quickly and never repeat those, whereas British troops make the same
mistakes for a year. Do you think this quality of American troops is still present in some form, and if
not, when do you think it disappeared?

I think that we now have a more professional army. It is far better trained than the army of World War
II was. But I suspect it is less educated, especially in the officer corps. (Because a high school
graduate in the 1920s probably knew about as much as most college graduates do nowadays.)

Overall, I think today’s military has lost the distinction between training and education. Training
prepares for the known. (How to operate a .50 caliber machine gun.) Education prepares for the
unknown. (How to assess a complex situation and discern the facts of the matter, and then develop
a response.)

5) What do you suggest that we do to encourage more courageous and intelligent leadership,
specifically among junior officers and enlisted?

Make it a requirement. Promote leaders who show those qualities and remove those who don’t.
Right now U.S. military culture is against this. It is seen as unfair to officers. But I think leaving
dunderheads in place is unfair to their subordinates.

6) Given that we cannot expect generals to just start thinking critically after years of institutional
inhibitions against critical thinking, how do we start to develop those skills from the beginning? What
should we do with senior officers who have deeply ingrained habits of institutionalized thinking?

Yes. The U.S. Army did this well in the interwar period, and so leaders knew how to recognize
critical thinkers. Today we have many senior leaders unable to do that.

7) Are Professional Military Education schools the best method for encouraging critical thinking
among growing leaders? Or is the tension between the need to transmit grade-appropriate
institutional knowledge and the need to encourage freer thinking and learning too great for the
vehicle of PME schools? If so, what would you suggest instead?

Yes, the Professional Military Education institutions can do this well. But to do it, their teachers need
to be intellectually rigorous themselves. Today many are not. Too many are retired mediocre officers
themselves.
Once the teachers start improving, they can start improving the students. I would have weekly class
rankings, made public. Rigor and integrity would be demanded. Command and General Staff
College and war college time should not be rest stops. Plagiarism would result in immediate
expulsion, and perhaps Uniform Code of Military Justice charges. The bottom 10 percent of
graduates probably would be told that future promotions were unlikely. The top 10 percent of
graduates would be sought after.

As I said earlier, when the military cares as much about CGSC as it does about Ranger School, the
problem will be solved.

8) For lack of better words…as a whole, what should we do to change the force? As a pilot, I
remember regularly chafing at the requirement to spend two hours talking about risk assessments
before every flight, the need to increasingly restrict instructor methods and freedoms in teaching new
lieutenants how to fly the Cobra, and the intrusion of some commanding officers into every radio call
and pattern adjustment made in the flight pattern around a deployed ship. As a PhD student, 100%
of the current/retired career military officers in my cohort failed the comprehensive exams the first
time around, and only three of us managed to progress successfully to candidacy. As a result I see
the problem much as you describe it: we are overly risk-averse and thus micromanage our
subordinates, creating more risk-averse and weak leaders; and we have institutionalized thinking to
such a degree that many of us have forgotten how to think critically, if we even learned how to in the
first place. So how do we stop being risk-averse and being unaware or unable to think critically, and
how do turn this ship around?

Reward success, punish failure. Ask yourself, “WWGMD?” (That is, “What would George Marshall
do?”)

Btw, General John A. Lejeune was a great admirer of Marshall. He wanted Marshall to lead a Marine
regiment in World War I, but Pershing wouldn’t let Marshall go. Later he tried to get Marshall to head
Virginia Military Institute. I wrote about this in the Marine Corps Gazette a year or two ago.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:42

22 MARCH 2017

Time Ripe For China And Russia To Form An Alliance – Chinese

Expert
Source Link
 Ahead of the Silk Road summit in Beijing in
May, a reporter from the Kommersant Daily spoke to Yan Xuetong, Dean of the Institute of Modern
International Relations at Tsinghua University, about China’s relations with Russia, challenges faced
by BRICS and the drawbacks of globalization

In May 2017 Beijing will host the Silk Road summit, where over 20 countries including Russia will
engage in building a strategic undertaking to promote East-West cooperation. In an interview with
Kommersant, Yan Xuetong, Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua
University, spoke optimistically about the prospects for the development of China-Russia relations.

Why there is no Russia-China alliance

Despite the fact, that Moscow and Beijing “are not formal allies,” Yan said the countries share a
common threat – the U.S. “We don’t support each other openly and that limits our cooperation,” the
expert told the paper. “China is a superpower now and I don’t understand why Russia doesn’t want
an alliance with us.”
According to Yan, a Russia-China alliance “could increase the political power of [the two] countries
and protect [their] territories from the U.S.”

SCO and BRICS are not effective

“After India and Pakistan join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) the organization may
lose its potential,” Yan said. He believes that instead of “active terrorism-prevention measures” the
South Asian countries have to “stop conflicts between themselves.”

When talking about BRICS, Yan Xuetang expressed little faith in its power. He called BRICS a
grouping of “countries with no connection and common strategy whatsoever” and added that the
countries “were united by a Golden Sachs analyst.”

How Russia’s relations with other countries influence China?

When speaking about Crimea’s reintegration with Russia, Yan said, “It was a good example of how a
country should protect its basic interests.” He also refused to draw parallels between Russia’s
territorial disputes and those of China. Yan said China’s disputes with its neighbors could lead to a
war that “Beijing won’t start.”

Yan seemed skeptical about the thaw in Russia-Japan ties. “Abe is trying to buy you off to decrease
the Russian influence on Chinese politics in the East Asian Sea,” he said.

On Chinese globalization

Yan Xuetang insisted that globalization had “two sides” and that at some point “its drawbacks
became more visible than its benefits.”

He added, “General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping supports free movement
of goods and services, but with tight control of capital.”
According to expert, China doesn’t plan on becoming a torchbearer of globalization since the country
“does not have resources for that.”

Yan Xuetong was born on December 1952 in Tianjin. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from
Berkeley University. As a Chinese expert in International Research he is an author of many books
on Modern Chinese politics. He also teaches at Tsinghua University and was named as one of
world’s Top 100 public intellectuals by the American journal Foreign Policy.

22 MARCH 2017

China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent

Source Link

PDF file 1.9 MB

China's approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first nuclear test in
1964. Key elements are its no-first-use policy and reliance on a small force of nuclear weapons
capable of executing retaliatory strikes if China is attacked. China has recently accelerated nuclear
force building and modernization, and both international and domestic factors are likely to drive
faster modernization in the future. Chinese nuclear planners are concerned by strategic
developments in the United States, especially the deployment of missile defenses. Within the region,
Beijing is also an actor in complex multilateral security dynamics that now include several nuclear
states, and the improving nuclear capabilities of China's neighbors, especially India, are a growing
concern for Beijing. Constituencies for nuclear weapons have gained in bureaucratic standing within
the People's Liberation Army (PLA). With few, if any, firewalls between China's conventional and
nuclear missile forces, new technologies developed for the former are already being applied to the
latter, a trend that will almost certainly continue. Given these changes, China is likely to increase
emphasis on nuclear deterrence, accelerate nuclear force modernization, and make adjustments
(although not wholesale changes) to policy.

Key Findings

China's Approach to Nuclear Deterrence Has Been Broadly Consistent Since Its First Nuclear Test
in 1964

China has, however, recently accelerated nuclear force building and modernization.

Chinese Nuclear Strategists Still Key Primarily on Nuclear Developments in the United States
Strategists are especially concerned about the development of U.S. missile defenses and
conventional prompt global strike capabilities.

But planners are also concerned about the growth of nuclear inventories in Asia and the complex
nuclear dynamics emerging there.

Some strategists say privately that China might not accept a push from India for nuclear parity,
should New Delhi embark on such a course.

Bureaucratic Processes and Politics Are Likely to Affect the Development of Chinese Nuclear Forces
and Thinking

Civilian leaders are reportedly less involved than they once were in the details of decisionmaking
about nuclear research, development, and production

The nuclear constituency within the PLA is also gaining increased status and voice.

There is no firewall between China's conventional and nuclear missile forces, and technologies and
practices developed for the former are already being applied to the nuclear forces.

In the future, this may give China some limited counterforce capability.

China Is Likely to Increase Emphasis on Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Forces in the Coming
Years

Although unlikely to change formal policy formulations, China may adjust its definitions of key terms
or add caveats.

It may, for example, hedge its language on no-first-use to include a conventional attack on its
nuclear forces as "first use," thus permitting a nuclear response.
Recommendations

The United States and China should deepen their dialogue on strategic issues to better understand
where restraint might have the greatest positive impact.

The United States should limit national missile defense to a scale commensurate with the its stated
purpose, defense against attack by rogue regimes. Missile defenses are one of the primary drivers
of Chinese nuclear force building.

China, for its part, should work toward visibly separating its conventional and nuclear missile force
elements to reduce the possibility of confusion in the event of a conflict.

China should also minimize the MIRVing of missiles, especially missiles that might be vulnerable to
preemptive attack. Decades of arms control experience suggest that MIRVs can, under some
circumstances, diminish crisis stability by increasing the incentives for both sides to strike first.

U.S. leaders should take steps to fortify the credibility of extended deterrence. As Chinese
capabilities improve, some regional states, especially Japan and South Korea, may request more
than purely rhetorical reassurance. They may also seek the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons
in Asia, and Washington will want to consider how far in this direction it is willing to go.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:25

2 MARCH 2017

Checking China’s Maritime Push

Source Link

MICHAEL SWAINE

Summary: The only effective way to create a more stable environment in the maritime areas near
China is for the United States to lead a serious diplomatic dialogue with Beijing and other claimants
aimed at establishing mutually acceptable restraints, accompanied by strong U.S. and allied
deterrence signals.
Since roughly 2007–2008, the People’s Republic of China has clearly taken a more active, assertive
stance toward its longstanding territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea
(ECS), both bordering its long maritime coast. Such activities have included, among others:

Strong statements criticizing the actions and claims of other disputants, especially Japan (in the East
China Sea) and Vietnam and the Philippines (in the South China Sea)

The establishment of new administrative authorities charged with managing various aspects of the
claimed land and sea features

The increased use of military and especially para-military air and naval assets to challenge the
activities of other claimants in disputed areas, and sometimes even in what are generally regarded
as “open ocean” areas or within the exclusive economic zones of other nations

The establishment of an air defense identification zone over the East China Sea that includes
disputed territories with Japan

The creation of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands and the deployment of air defense weapons
systems and the construction of dual-use civilian-military facilities on those islands

While not taking any formal position in support of any claimant’s sovereignty position, Washington
has clearly focused the vast majority of its concern, and its actions since roughly 2010, on Beijing.
This has led many in China to conclude that the United States is actively supporting the other
disputants while attempting to undermine China’s position and influence in the disputed areas.

The obvious danger presented by this situation is that increasing numbers of U.S. and Chinese air
and naval assets operating in close proximity to one another, or perceived provocations of various
sorts including further military deployments onto islands or rocks or possible clashes between China
and other disputants, could produce escalating crises. These might draw the United States into
direct confrontation with Beijing, as the latter acts excessively to strengthen its position and thereby
deter or counter perceived provocations (perhaps out of an exaggerated sense of its growing power)
and the former overreacts to such a perceived challenge in an effort to reaffirm its predominant
position and maintain its credibility as a security guarantor.
This danger is reinforced by the absence of any serious dialogue among the claimants and between
the United States and China regarding limits on the level and type of militarization occurring in
disputed maritime areas, and the failure of China—and to a lesser extent other disputants—to clarify
their specific claims regarding various waters, particularly in the South China Sea. Contrary to
widespread claims in the media, Beijing has yet to define exactly what the so-called Nine-Dashed-
Line denotes regarding the waters within it.

The resulting uncertainties stimulate worst casing about motives and behavior, thus leading to
further escalation. And of course the fact that sovereignty issues are generally zero-sum in nature
and elicit strong nationalist emotions further adds to the dangers.

Managing this complex and potentially volatile issue requires a clear understanding of the stakes
involved for all sides (both now and in the future), the likely foundations of long-term stability, and the
probable resources available to the United States to manage this issue.

MARITIME MOTIVES AND STAKES

China’s ultimate motives in expanding its influence and presence in nearby disputed maritime areas
are not entirely clear, despite what some observers argue is a clear effort to “control” these areas
and push the United States out of East Asia.

In truth, the historical dynamic at work in the disputed maritime areas has long involved an
interactive tit-for-tat rivalry among the claimants, made possible by the absence of any clear and
commonly accepted code of conduct (beyond the voluntary, nonbinding, and vague 2002
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed between China and ASEAN)
and driven by deep-seated suspicions and strongly felt nationalist impulses on all sides.

In the South China Sea competition (which focuses mainly on the southern Spratly Islands since
China has firmly held the northern Paracel Islands for many years), Beijing is by far the biggest
player. There, it is seeking to use its growing capabilities to more effectively defend and advance
what it regards as its indisputable claims to the land features and undefined adjoining waters of the
area, as well as certain also undefined historical rights. Other claimants are doing virtually the same
thing, except their capabilities and claims are not as extensive, their actions not as effective, and
hence their activities do not generate as much attention. In general, they are hopelessly outmatched
by Beijing in this competition.

In recent years, however, Beijing has certainly gone beyond a proportional tit-for-tat interaction to
apparent attempts to establish itself as the dominant claimant in the Spratly Islands, arguably to
deter future perceived provocations by others and to establish a strong position in future
negotiations. This impulse is driven even further by the fact that Beijing has historically held a very
weak position in that area compared with Vietnam, the other claimant to virtually all the land features
within the South China Sea.

In the case of the East China Sea dispute with Japan, Beijing has also departed from its past basic
tit-for-tat stance in an attempt to establish itself in recent years as an equal claimant to Tokyo over
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, thereby supposedly correcting years of Japanese dominance.

Regardless of its motives, China’s more recent, escalatory behavior has contributed significantly to
the buildup in tensions in the disputed maritime areas. At the same time, when measured against the
metric of a supposed direct challenge to the U.S. position in Asia, Beijing’s actions appear at least
somewhat cautious. It generally avoids the use of warships to assert its claims, has given
assurances that it does not intend to militarize the Spratly Islands beyond the placement of what it
calls “defensive capabilities,” and has certainly not attempted to seize land features long held by
other claimants to assure its control of the area.

Moreover, Beijing continues to insist that it is dedicated to a peaceful, negotiated solution of the
disputes and supports the peaceful objectives of the 2002 declaration. Most recently, it has
supported reaching a basic framework for a more detailed Code of Conduct by mid-2017. In general,
one can say that it is attempting to increase its influence in both seas without greatly increasing the
chance of armed conflict with the United States or other claimants.

This could change, of course, as China’s power and presence in the area increase. Those in and out
of the U.S. Government who call for a zero-sum confrontation with Beijing over the maritime disputes
assert that it certainly will, allegedly because China’s caution thus far conceals its “real” expansionist
and aggressive motives.

This is pure speculation, but of a dangerous sort, since if accepted as a basis for U.S. policy it would
basically lock in a zero-sum interpretation of every assertive Chinese action, thereby justifying an
equally zero-sum U.S. move in response. And of course, such actions would indeed cause Beijing to
eventually adopt precisely the threatening motives that some observers insist (in my view incorrectly)
are already present.

RELATIVE CAPABILITIES

Beyond basing itself on a purely speculative and dangerous set of assumptions about Chinese
motives, a zero-sum, confrontational argument calling for a doubling down of U.S. capabilities in the
Western Pacific also employs another highly dubious (at best) set of assumptions regarding
American and Chinese defense spending relevant to Asia.

Barring an unlikely near-total collapse of the Chinese economy and/or a major surge in the overall
U.S. GDP, Washington will not possess the capacity to greatly exceed the kind of military and
economic capabilities that China will be able to bring to bear in its nearby maritime areas over the
coming years.

In fact, projections by myself and other scholars at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
along with other reputable sources, predict a much more likely movement toward parity between
U.S. and Chinese capabilities in that region, in other words, a de facto strategic equilibrium or
balance of power.1

Of course, the United States could devote a much larger share of its available economic resources
to defense spending, and to spending in Asia in particular, in an attempt to remain clearly dominant
militarily in the Western Pacific near China. However, that would likely require either considerable
belt-tightening elsewhere, especially in vital social welfare or entitlement areas, or a huge expansion
in the government deficit. Neither of these is politically feasible at present or for the foreseeable
future, absent a truly major increase in public perceptions of the threat posed by China.

Disputes over rocks and islands in the far reaches of Asia are unlikely to motivate such a level of
alarm, unless a crisis in that region escalates to a genuine Sino-U.S. military clash of serious
proportions. While certainly possible, such a hypothetical crisis should not be assumed and likely
could not a priori alter threat perceptions.

THE MOST FEASIBLE AND VIABLE WAY FORWARD

The complexity of the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, involving a) economic
resources; b) differing interpretations of applicable international law and historical rights; c)
overlapping jurisdictional claims based on continental shelves, exclusive economic zones, and other
relevant legal zones; and d) domestic political factors rooted in strong nationalist sentiments,
together suggest that any resolution, if at all possible, will take many years, and perhaps decades, to
achieve.

In the meantime, a stable, enduring modus vivendi among all relevant parties is needed, centered on
mutual restraint in asserting local sovereign or special rights as well as an effective, peaceful
process for handling incidents.
Such an understanding ideally should consist of several elements. The first is an initial shift away
from military and para-military competition and maneuvering toward an emphasis on diplomacy,
primarily via an initial set of interim (short- to medium-term) understandings among the claimants
and between Beijing and Washington regarding levels and types of militarization and the non-use of
force. This must be based on clear, agreed-upon definitions of acceptable and unacceptable military
behavior and clear, specific proscriptions on the unprovoked display and use of force.

As a part of this negotiation process, some level of mutually acceptable long-term equilibrium in the
military capabilities of the claimants within the Spratly archipelago in particular must be achieved, as
a stable ceiling against future militarization. This might involve permission for claimants other than
China (such as Vietnam) to upgrade or expand their facilities on land features in the Spratly Islands
to bring them up to a par with those that Beijing has constructed.

Without such an understanding, any transition toward diplomatic efforts on claims, jurisdictions,
resource development, and an eventual long-term code of conduct for both the East China and
South China Seas will remain virtually impossible, as all sides continue to maneuver militarily to
deter one another.

The United States and China must take the lead in this effort, based on a common recognition of the
need to remove the maritime issue as a driver of their deepening strategic contention. That said, a
Chinese acceptance of such limits would doubtless prove conditional, based on the eventual
acceptance by the other claimants.

Such agreements will require overcoming domestic military and paramilitary resistance to any
restraints on military activities in disputed areas, including limits on the frequency of Freedom of
Navigation (FON) operations by the U.S. Navy. They will also require overcoming the argument that
any agreement to eschew an unprovoked use of force would undermine the sovereignty claims of
China and the other claimants.

Second, a staged diplomatic process is necessary for clarifying the precise content and legal or
other rationale of the many claims involved, that is, the jurisdictional disputes involving both
sovereignty issues and non-sovereignty (but privileged) rights over resource extraction, such as
fishing. Washington should do more to facilitate this effort.

This could proceed on a bilateral or multilateral basis but should gradually expand to eventually
include all extant claims across the East China and South China Seas. During this process, Beijing
would need to clarify the meaning of the nine-dash line, and all claimants would specify their claims
to land or underwater features and corresponding waters as they relate to relevant legal (that is,
based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) definitions, as well as so-called
historical rights. When the status of specific features (as islands, rocks, reefs, and so on) is clearly in
dispute, the parties concerned must negotiate a compromise or petition for a ruling from the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) under UNCLOS.

Third, on the basis of such clarification of claims and jurisdiction, all parties must reach an
agreement on those areas subject to joint resource development and a procedure for implementing
such development. Although often called for, joint development cannot actually occur unless all
disputants clarify those areas that are subject to such development, and this cannot occur until the
specific areas of overlapping claims are identified and agreed upon.

In principle, joint development of disputed maritime areas is already accepted by most if not all
disputants as a valid interim means of exploiting resources before any resolution of claims, although
some compromise and agreement on the division of proceeds is required. Hence an agreement on
such development, once the areas of overlapping claims have been identified, should not prove
excessively difficult to achieve.

Fourth, on the basis of the previous actions, the claimants must eventually negotiate elements of a
binding code of conduct for limiting levels of militarization and handling future incidents over the long
term. This code must build on: a) previously agreed-upon, clear definitions of prohibited activities of
all kinds, military and nonmilitary alike (the existing 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea is extremely vague on this point); b) a process for identifying and interpreting such
activities; and c) a means of punishing violations.

Some observers might argue that the formulation of a binding code of conduct should precede these
steps, as a necessary precondition. However, it is almost certainly the case that the willingness of
highly assertive states locked in contentious sovereignty disputes to agree confidently to a binding
code will require a prior increased level of trust, a reduced propensity for military competition, and a
clear understanding of the nature and extent of competing claims that can only result from the above
steps.

Obviously, many obstacles would confront any efforts to greatly reduce disputes over maritime
territorial claims as a source of Sino-U.S. tension or conflict, including distrust among virtually all the
parties concerned, nationalist domestic pressures, and deeply entrenched bureaucratic interests.
And American leverage is extremely limited by its failure to ratify UNCLOS. How can Washington
seriously press China and others to abide by UNCLOS rulings and establish a Code of Conduct
when it refuses to subject itself to such scrutiny? In addition, more extensive confidence-building
measures (CBMs) and crisis management mechanisms (CMMs) are also likely to constitute
necessary preconditions, to reduce distrust and strengthen confidence in the enforceability of a
legally binding code of conduct.

On the U.S. side, political leaders will also need to reassure Manila and especially Tokyo that any
agreement Washington makes with Beijing to limit the content or scope of its military activities in
disputed areas will not place those countries at a disadvantage either militarily or with regard to
sovereignty claims.

U.S. leaders will also need to clarify what constitutes unacceptable coercion or intimidation. Not all
forms of Chinese assertiveness would necessarily threaten the U.S. interest in a stable and peaceful
environment. Similarly, on the Chinese side, limits on the use or display of force and clarifications of
existing claims will require, on both sides, a determined and strong leadership able to manage
backlashes by nationalists and the military and a clear sense of what constitutes unacceptable
coercion.

In sum, the only effective way to create a more stable environment in the maritime areas near China
is for the United States to lead a serious diplomatic dialogue with Beijing and other claimants aimed
at establishing mutually acceptable restraints, accompanied by strong U.S. and allied deterrence
signals, ideally as part of a larger effort to create a regional balance of power. Such deterrence
signals should involve clear indications of the adverse consequences for China (and for regional
stability) that would result from a failure to reach an agreement. A unilateral, near-term doubling
down on military deployments, a drastic increase in defense assistance to those powers opposing
China, or a drawing of high stakes “lines in the sand” directed at Beijing on their own will not achieve
this objective and could make the situation much worse.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:25

21 MARCH 2017

** Why India must avoid falling into China's trap over disputed
territory
Source Link

By KANWAL SIBAL
 Dai Bingguo id the former Special Representative for
boundary talks with India

In characteristic Chinese subterfuge diplomacy, Dai Bingguo, the former Special Representative
(SR) for boundary talks with India, in an interview with a Chinese magazine, holds India responsible
for the existing impasse in negotiations.

'If the Indian side takes care of China's concerns in the eastern sector of their border, the Chinese
side will address India's concerns elsewhere', he has said.

According to him, 'The disputed territory in the eastern sector of the China-India boundary, including
Tawang, is inalienable from China's Tibet in terms of cultural background and administrative
jurisdiction.'

Jurisdiction

He claims, 'Even British colonialists who drew the illegal McMahon Line respected China's
jurisdiction over Tawang and admitted that Tawang was part of China's Tibet'.

He believes India is not acceding to China's 'reasonable requests' on border settlement.

By demanding that India cede Tawang, Dai Bingguo is repudiating Article VII of the 2005 Agreement
on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of India-China Boundary Question.

This cardinal provision states, 'In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due
interests of their settled populations in the border areas.'

The imperative word 'shall' has been used and the reference is to 'their settled populations'.

A Chinese soldier gestures as he stands

near an Indian soldier on the Chinese side of the ancient Nathu La border crossing between India
and China

This clearly excludes Tawang from negotiations as India is neither claiming any territory beyond the
McMahon Line nor seeking sovereignty over 'settled populations' on the Tibetan side.

The use of the word 'their' implicitly recognises that the settled populations on our side are Indian,
not Chinese.

This is not the only article that Dai Bingguo ignores in his interview. Article IV states, 'The two sides
will give due consideration to each other's strategic and reasonable interests, and the principle of
mutual and equal security.'
By claiming Tawang, which is strategically of key importance for the defence of Arunachal Pradesh,
China, under the guise of historical cultural and administrative links with Tibet, is actually brushing
aside India's 'strategic and reasonable interests' in the context of the China's increasing militarisation
of Tibet and the threat to Indian security.

An Indian soldier stand guard at the Chinese side of the ancient Nathu La border crossing between
India and China

Because it is not offering to India anything in return by way of a critically located settled area on its
side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the requirement of 'equal security' is not being met.

Dai Bingguo is in breach of Article V of the Agreement too which says: 'The two sides will take into
account, among other things, historical evidence, national sentiments, practical difficulties and
reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and the actual state of border areas.'

It is not clear why China's 'reasonable concerns' require it to claim Tawang, whereas India's
'reasonable concerns' about China occupying Tawang and outflanking Indian defences are clear.

Besides this, the 'practical difficulties' involved in Tawang changing hands apply only to India and not
to China.
 Once China accepted 'practical difficulties'
as a consideration, its stand on Tawang is spurious to that extent.

Indian Army soldiers of the Gorkha Regiment carry weapons as they walk through snow, along the
India-China border at the height of 16,000ft near Tawang

Concerns

Article VI of the Principles negotiated by Dai Bingguo himself has also been conveniently overlooked
by him in his psychological warfare against India.

This says, 'The boundary should be along well-defined and easily identifiable natural geographical
features to be mutually agreed upon between the two sides.'

Implicitly this means acceptance of the easily identifiable high watershed principle defining the
natural geographic boundary in the east, a principle accepted by China in defining its boundaries
with Nepal and Myanmar.

Tawang being well to the south of the Himalayan high watershed, Dai Bingguo's position on Tawang
is once again counterfeit.

China is actually claiming the Tawang tract, which makes its claim fluid. In 2006, China's
ambassador to India had said brashly: 'In our position, the whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh
is Chinese territory. And Tawang is only one of the places in it.'
While Dai Bingguo has talked vaguely of 'addressing India's concerns elsewhere', China's claim in
the eastern sector is being made more concretely.

Flexibility

China wants to retain full flexibility to decide what to offer in the western sector after India is trapped
into agreeing in principle to a major territorial concession in the east.

In our view, China not only initially occupied Aksai Chin unilaterally, it is, post-1962, occupying areas
that transcend its own 1959 claim line.

In 1962 it occupied Tawang but subsequently withdrew to the McMahon Line, accepting it implicitly
as the de facto border.

Besides this, China was in the past willing to accept the McMahon Line in exchange of India ceding
claim on Aksai Chin.

Chinese soldiers stand at a Chinese post on the Chinese side of the border at Nathu La

It has subsequently reversed its position by seeking major concessions in the east against some
adjustments in the west. Its position on the border settlement is, therefore, based on power
equations and not on any principle.
China has repeatedly demonstrated that either it does not respect the agreements it signs or
interprets them as it wants.

In 1996 it agreed to 'clarifying the alignment of the LAC in those segments where they (the two
sides) have different perceptions'.

In 2002 (when the writer was Foreign Secretary) China decided to repudiate this agreement
unilaterally.

If Dai Bingguo claims that even the British admitted that Tawang was part of 'China's Tibet', he
should explain why Tawang is 37 km south of the British drawn McMahon Line which also the Dalai
Lama accepts.

Dai Bingguo stands reason on its head by portraying China's self-serving propositions on settling the
border as 'reasonable'.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:43

21 MARCH 2017

Developing Special Operations Forces in China and Russia

Source Link

WILL EDWARDS

When Syrian government forces retook the

ancient city of Palmyra from ISIS for the second time in early March, they had the assistance of one
of the world’s elite special operations forces: Russia’s Special Operations Command (SSO). In
coordination with Russian air power, the combined forces killed or wounded 1,000 ISIS militants and
destroyed more than 150 vehicles,according to a Russian military leader.

The development of the SSO is part of a larger shift by Russia to modernize and professionalize its
military, and it is not the only one of the United States’ global competitors doing so. China is also in
the midst of its own military modernization program, and chief among its goals is a larger and more
capable complement of special operations-capable forces.

Both Russia and China have observed the successes of the United States’ Special Operations
Forces (SOF) and have sought to incorporate successful elements into their own mission needs and
concepts of warfare. While many of the missions and capabilities overlap with those of U.S. SOF,
neither country can yet field SOF forces who can operate as robustly or independently as those of
the United States.

Russia

Russia uses the term Spetsnaz (special purpose) to refer to its cadre of SOF. Spetsnaz dates back
to the end of World War II but came into its own during the Cold War. Spetsnaz units have been
created for all branches of the Russian military and are meant to support traditional forces in
reconnaissance and sabotage roles rather than operate independently. While Russia has made
strides to professionalize Spetsnaz, as many as 20 percent are still conscript forces.

Russia’s newest unit, the SSO, is different for several reasons. It is an entirely professional force that
can operate independently of conventional units. Its first deployment was in Crimea in 2014 and then
Syria in 2015. The SSO is a successful product of Russia’s sweeping military reforms that began in
2008, and the unit incorporates lessons learned from the U.S. and other Western powers. Michael
Kofman, a research scientist at CNA and a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, told The Cipher
Brief that “Russia's Chief of General Staff, Valeriy Gerasimov, made clear that their inputs were a
study of the training and application of special operations by the leading foreign powers,” and
“Russia's SSO continues to learn from the exploits of Western counterparts.” How the SSO is
organized and commanded is up for debate. As Kofman says, “it is unclear whether it answers
directly to the Russian General Staff or is an autonomous component within the GRU.”

Both the legacy Spetsnaz and the new SSO are important to Russia’s concept of “non-linear
warfare,” the combination of intelligence, cyber, and SOF capabilities that augment conventional
forces and underpinned Russia’s successful annexation of Crimea in 2014. As Russia continues to
develop this operational concept and the capabilities of SSO, it may be seeking new opportunities to
test its forces in combat. Kofman notes “There is word now that Russian SOF have deployed to an
airbase in Western Egypt near the Libyan border, perhaps that will be their next experience.”

China

The development of Chinese SOF has followed a very different trajectory than that of Russia.
China’s military, collectively known as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), did not create units with
specialized training and missions until relatively recently. The PLA Ground Forces was the first to do
so in the late 1980s, and since then other branches have followed suit. Today, Chinese SOF number
somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000, according to former U.S. military attaché to China and
Cipher Brief expert Dennis Blasko.

China’s special forces are organized to confront its unique security needs internally and externally.
Unlike many countries, China has a militarized police force known as the People’s Armed Police
(PAP) for internal security. The PAP utilizes several SOF units for counterterrorism and riot control
operations. These forces have been used in attempts to quell the ongoing unrest and threat of
Islamist extremism in the western province of Xinjiang.

China’s SOF units train for missions in support of the Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket
Force (nuclear forces). Though China does not detail how or where its SOF would be used in
combat, many analysts assume that operations against Taiwan are a likely scenario. Unlike U.S. and
Russian SOF, Chinese SOF have no combat experience and lack a robust ability to operate
independently of conventional forces. Blasko explains this is in large part because of organizational
structure, but also an absence of “the numerous types of special-mission aircraft (long-range
helicopters, aircraft etc.) that are important force multipliers for U.S. Special Operations Forces.”

Though China’s SOF capabilities are behind its geopolitical peers, it has made large strides in the
last 30 years. Blasko notes, though “PLA SOF units do not have as long a history as SOF units in
other countries, they have been given priority for development and could see further expansion as
the PLA reorganizes.”

Conclusion

As Russia and China continue their comprehensive military modernization and professionalization
campaigns, advancing SOF capabilities is likely to remain a priority. While each country’s SOF is
making strides in expanding mission types and developing independence of operation from
conventional forces, there is one area where the U.S. maintains a clear advantage that is difficult to
duplicate. The United States’ strong network of alliances, something China and Russia lack, means
its SOF have a long history of interoperability with allied militaries across the globe. This is a critical
edge that expands the possibilities of where SOF can operate and what missions they can execute.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:25

No comments:

1 MARCH 2017

Letting NSG and Masood Azhar get in the way of Indo-China ties.
Is it worth it?
Source Link

MANOJ JOSHI

Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar recently

visited Beijing for what was billed as a new round of the India-China Strategic dialogue. Expectations
that the talks would lead to a reset of the troubled India-China relations have been belied. Only a
hardened optimist expected forward movement on the issues bedeviling their relations, especially
India’s demand that China support its Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG) membership and effort to
designate Masood Azhar a terrorist under UN rules. And now, the Chinese have signalled that if
India goes ahead with the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang, things could get much worse.

The reason why Sino-Indian relations are in a bad state has a lot to do with the way India conducts
its foreign policy, rather than their much talked up geopolitical rivalry.

The Chinese perspective is apparent from the comment of a Chinese diplomat that India was
“behaving like a kid in a candy store” in loudly clamouring for membership of the NSG. He had a
point. India already has a waiver on civil nuclear trade since 2008. And in 2011, the NSG added a
rule which will deny us the one thing we want—enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Is this
hollow prize worth the price we are paying in derailing our relations with China?

Let’s look at the problem another way. Assume the government has good reasons for India to be a
member of the NSG, the question then is: What price are we willing to pay for it? The US has not
backed us for free. Not only did we agree not to conduct any more nuclear tests, we also gave
verbal assurances that we would make significant purchases of US nuclear equipment. The French
and the Russians, too, were promised nuclear sales. Unfortunately for the Chinese, they are being
asked to support New Delhi for free.

India seems to be demanding that Beijing support India’s entry into the NSG and lift its hold on the
designation of Masood Azhar as a terrorist under the UN’s 1267 committee, on a matter of principle.
The only thing on offer is Indian goodwill, a currency that has little value with the hard-headed
Chinese, who like most other nations, believe that international relations are about give and take.

Now with a President with a “What’s in it for me and America?” ethos in the White House, India has
cause to worry. In recent times Indian foreign policy leaned on American indulgence leavened with
generous conventional military purchases. At some point, the Trump Administration could ask for
something new in exchange for America giving so many jobs to Indians, or the diplomatic support on
Masood Azhar and the NSG application. Whatever it is, the terms of engagement could become
clearly transactional.

India is not quite used to this world. We’ve been a free rider on the international system by declaring
that we were a poor, but a non-aligned Third World country. Our preachiness was irritating, but we
did extract considerable economic assistance from both the US and the USSR. We have been the
largest recipients of foreign aid from the US — $ 65 billion. Yet, we did not support them in the Cold
War, the Vietnam war, and did Bangladesh despite them. The Americans came to come to our aid in
the dark days of November 1962, but we haven’t even bothered to name a road after John F
Kennedy, though we have named them after Nasser, Olof Palme, Nkrumah and Dubcek.

The Soviets didn’t get anything more. Though much poorer, they helped us with things that the West
was reluctant to provide — steel and machine tools technology, our first submarines, a licence to
manufacture the Mig-21, their frontline fighter at that time, political support on Kashmir and military
backing in 1971. But they didn’t even get verbal support for their adventure in Afghanistan.

Being a poor and high-minded about-to-be-great nation has stood us well till now, countries have
been willing to invest politically and financially in India in the hope of recovering their cost
handsomely when we strike it big. So we have demanded and got concessions on emissions criteria,
IPR and trade regimes. When the US sanctioned Iran in 2010, we got a waiver. But in today’s
troubled times when even the US feels victimised by the international system, the appetite for
accommodating India is wearing thin. Actually it has been for a while.

In fact, the signs have been evident for some time now. After the Soviet collapse, a contrite New
Delhi went to the Americans demanding technology as a price of better relations. They did not offer
much by way of exchange except the usual IOUs encashable in the future. The US has refused to
unbelt and has, instead, focused on our lucrative market for their military equipment. As for
technology, they have their own IOUs, offering it always in some unspecified future.

The one big power that has never quite fit into this paradigm is China. They offered to swap their
claim on Arunachal Pradesh for the Indian territory in Aksai Chin, New Delhi did not bite in 1960, it
didn’t do so again in 1981. So they have gone back on the offer and now call Arunachal “southern
Tibet.” The non-aligned preachiness did not help because Beijing was even better than New Delhi in
feeling entitled, first as the vanguard of the revolution, and now as a country recovering from “a
century of humiliation”.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:25

21 MARCH 2017

Exclusive: Taiwan says Chinese military threat grows, U.S.

regional strategy unclear

By J.R. Wu

Source Link

China's accelerated military development and recent activity by its military aircraft and ships around
Taiwan pose an increased threat to the self-ruled island, according to a Taiwanese government
defense report draft reviewed by Reuters.

The 2017 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) also highlights the uncertainty over the future
strategic direction of the United States in the region, the impact of Japan flexing its military
capabilities and "conflict crisis" potential in the disputed South China Sea.
"The recent activity of Chinese jets and ships around Taiwan shows the continued rise in (China's)
military threat capabilities," highlighting the importance of Taiwan's need to defend itself, the review
will say.

"In addition to posing a military threat to our country, it also has a negative impact on regional
stability."

The document is due to be presented to parliament on Thursday by Taiwan defense minister Feng
Shih-kuan. The defense ministry had no comment on the report on Wednesday.

The four-yearly review is the first since President Tsai Ing-wen took office last May and the first
under her Democratic Progressive Party, which traditionally advocates independence for Taiwan.

"The country's military development and Taiwan's freedom and prosperity are the same living body,"
according to the draft.

WAYWARD PROVINCE

The QDR comes as China - which claims Taiwan as a wayward province to be taken back by force if
necessary - has been stepping up air and sea military exercises in waters surrounding Taiwan as
part of a sweeping modernization of its armed forces.

Speaking in Beijing at his annual news conference on Wednesday, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang
repeated that China was resolutely opposed to Taiwan independence but it would uphold peace
across the Taiwan Strait.

"No matter how the situation on the island may evolve, the fraternal bond between the two sides
cannot be severed and will not be able to change history or the fact that both sides belong to one
and the same China," Li said.

Developments in the South China Sea, including rejection of an international court ruling by other
claimants on territorial rights of the Philippines in the disputed waters, China's land reclamation and
militarization, and freedom of navigation patrols championed by the United States, could deepen
strife in the area, the review will say.

"Sovereignty disputes in the region and strategic competition could intensify, leading to hidden
conflict crisis."

China has begun new construction work on a disputed island in the South China Sea, satellite
images show, just days ahead of the first official visit to the region by U.S. Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson.

The review also listed Japan's move away from its pacifist constitution "to strengthen its armaments
and lift a ban on using troops abroad" as having deep and far-reaching impacts on the security
situation in the Asia-Pacific and the Taiwan Strait.

Reuters reported this week that Japan plans to send its largest warship on a three-month tour
through the South China Sea beginning in May - its biggest show of naval force in the region since
World War Two.

Among security challenges for Taiwan, the review also said "the United States' Asia-Pacific strategic
direction and troop deployment was not clear" under the new administration of President Donald
Trump.

Trump provoked consternation in Beijing by taking a congratulatory call from Taiwan's Tsai and then
calling into question adherence to the "One China" policy, under which Washington acknowledges
the Chinese position that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it.

Last month, Trump agreed to honor the policy during a phone call with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

The United States remains Taiwan's biggest ally and arms supplier and is bound by legislation to
provide the means to help the island defend itself.

The review reflected the realities of Taiwan's situation, but wasn't specific enough on how Tsai's
government will address budget needs for major indigenous defense programs or the shrinking
number of soldiers in the armed forces, said Chieh Chung, a research fellow in the national security
division of Taiwan's National Policy Foundation, a local think tank.

The review affirmed Taiwan's push to develop and build its own submarines, jets and ships, and
strengthen its electronic and cyber defenses against China.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:25

20 MARCH 2017

South China Sea Options: The Road To Taiwan

By Divergent

View Original

National Security Situation: The Republic of China (Taiwan) exists in a singular position in world
affairs. Taiwan is viewed as a breakaway province by the communist People’s Republic of China
(PRC), who controls the Chinese mainland. However, Taiwan possesses its own government,
economy, and institutions, and its nominal independence has been assured by the United States
(U.S.) since 1949. However, the PRC views any move toward actual independence as casus belli
under its “One China” policy, which has been in place for decades. Recognition or even
acknowledgement of Taiwanese positions is a veritable geopolitical and diplomatic taboo.

The recent election of Donald Trump as president of the United States (POTUS) potentially
undermines the previous order that has been in place since the Nixon Administration. Campaigning
as a change agent, and one to defy convention, President Trump has suggested the U.S. rethink the
“One China” policy. POTUS’ reception of overtures from Taiwan and hard rhetoric towards the PRC
brings the question of Taiwan’s status and future to the forefront of geopolitics once again.

Background: The communist victory during the Chinese Civil War caused the Nationalist government
under Chiang Kai-Shek, with 2 million of its supporters, to flee from the Chinese mainland to the
island of Taiwan. The gradual transition of the island to a democratic form of government, its
industrialized, capitalist economy, and its reliance on western benefactors for defense established it
as a bulwark of western influence in Asia. As a result of Cold War rivalries and competing ideologies,
the independence of Taiwan has been assured in all but name for more than 65 years by the U.S. A
series of crises, most recently in 1996, demonstrated the inability of the PRC to project military force
against Taiwan, and the willingness of the U.S. to ensure Taiwan’s independence. Today, though
the PRC is internationally recognized as the government of China, and the “One China” policy is a
globally accepted norm, Taiwan still maintains de facto independence.
Events since the onset of the 21st century have caused the balance of power to shift ever more in
favor towards the PRC. Impressive military expansion and diplomatic initiatives on the part of the
PRC have emboldened it to challenge U.S. hegemony in Asia, and defy United Nations (UN)
mandates. The most overt of these initiatives has been the PRC’s assertion of sovereignty over the
SCS, and the seeming unwillingness of the international community to overtly challenge PRC claims,
beyond referring them to legal arbitration. The emerging policies of the newly elected POTUS may
further exacerbate the situation in the SCS, even as they may provide opportunities to assure the
continued independence of Taiwan.

Significance: Taiwan is a democracy, with a dynamic capitalist economy. It has diplomatic and
military ties to the U.S., and other countries, through arms sales and informal partnerships. It is
strategically positioned along major oceanic trade routes from Southwest Asia to Japan and South
Korea. The issue of Taiwanese independence is a global flash point due to PRC adherence to the
“One China” policy. If the U.S. were to abandon Taiwan, it would effectively terminate the notional
independence of the island, and end any hopes of preventing the PRC from becoming the regional
hegemon.

Option #1: Taiwan rejects all PRC claims to the SCS, beyond its exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
and supports the rulings of the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration, with the goal of gaining
international support, especially from the new U.S. administration.

Risk: The PRC maintains sovereignty over all Chinese affairs. Such an act would undoubtedly result
in a forceful response from the PRC. The PRC may move militarily to isolate Taiwan and/or attempt
to force a change in government through any means necessary. Depending on the perceived
international response, the PRC may resort to war in order to conquer Taiwan.

Gain: Taiwan must break its diplomatic isolation if it is to survive as an independent state. This
means currying favor with the UN, regional powers such as Japan and South Korea, and other
regional nations such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Moreover, given the new POTUS’ perceived
willingness to break from the “One China” policy, there is a chance to induce greater commitment
from the U.S. by ensuring Taiwan’s policies match those of the U.S.

Option #2: Taiwan maintains the status quo and adheres to the “One China” policy, even in the face
of tough U.S. rhetoric.
Risk: If the PRC’s ambitions are not curbed, the status quo will no longer be enough for PRC
leaders. The creation and subsequent defense of artificial islands in the SCS is a relatively low risk
activity. If the response of the international community is found wanting, then it will only embolden
the PRC to seek bigger game. The ultimate conquest of Taiwan, while by no means an easy task, is
a logical step in fulfilling the PRC’s regional ambitions. Conversely, standing with the PRC may
infuriate the new POTUS, and result in the withdrawal of U.S. support.

Gain: The PRC has successfully integrated other economic and governmental systems into its own
system before, under the “One Party, Two Systems” policy. While this led to a loss of political
freedom for Macau and Hong Kong, the two former enclaves still maintain their capitalist systems,
and enjoy very high standards of living. Furthermore, Taiwan is culturally and economically closer to
the PRC than to any other nation.

Other Comments: Any conflict between the PRC and Taiwan would be devastating to the island. The
PRC is simply too large and too close. However, Taiwan has been nominally independent for more
than 65 years. Its people are the descendants of the generations that fought the communists, and
stood firm during the Cold War, events that are still in living memory. Independence from the
mainland is the legacy of the island, and is worth fighting for.

Recommendation: None.

19 MARCH 2017

** “PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH”: DETERRENCE IN CHINESE

MILITARY DOCTRINE
Source Link

DENNIS J. BLASKO
 The idea of “peace through strength” can be
traced back to at least Roman times and almost certainly goes back even further, but in U.S. history,
it is associated with Ronald Reagan. In his essay, “The Ancient Foreign Policy,” historian Victor
Davis Hanson salutes its origins and links this “common wisdom” to the concept of deterrence.

From Vegetius’s Si vis pacem, para bellum [If you want peace, prepare for war] to Ronald Reagan’s
“peace through strength,” the common wisdom was to be ready for war and thereby, and only by that
way, avoid war, not to talk bellicosely and to act pacifistically … Deterrence (and with it peace) often
was not defined only in material terms; it rested also on a psychological readiness to use
overwhelming power to confront an aggressor … Again, deterrence (“the act of frightening away”)
rested not just on quantifiable power but also on a likelihood to use it.

Though Hanson’s article was not intended as a theoretical exposition on deterrence, he describes a
psychological battle based on the threat of force with the goal of preventing war. For most
Americans, there is no contradiction in pursuing peace through the threat or use of a strong military
when vital national interests are at stake.

As China has grown stronger economically and militarily over the past two decades, the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) has developed a parallel understanding of the need for a strong military.
Through long-term military modernization, Beijing aims to create a capable and credible military
force to protect China’s core interests. As stated in its white paper on China’s Military
Strategy published in 2015, “[w]ithout a strong military, a country can be neither safe nor strong.”
Although focused primarily on developing warfighting capabilities, the PLA is also used for
deterrence and other non-combat missions.

Though the United States and China may share the objectives of possessing powerful militaries and
maintaining regional stability, American vital interests and Chinese core interests are vastly different.
And because their political systems are different, there will always be a degree of distrust,
confrontation, and competition between the two states. Official Chinese sources have outlined
Chinese national objectives, its military strategy, and its concept of deterrence. The role of
deterrence in PLA doctrine is key to understanding China’s actions and the intentions its government
may be trying to communicate.

In reviewing what China says and thinks about deterrence, it is possible that many in the United
States and elsewhere overlook or misperceive the intentions behind some Chinese actions. When
China acts to deter, the media and other governments may misinterpret what they see as aggression
or preparation for war. For example, even with the great commonality in their respective theories of
deterrence, the United States views its own actions in the South and East China Seas as deterrent
in nature, yet does not attribute similar aims to China’s activities. This, of course, is emblematic of a
security dilemma.

If the United States and others misinterpret Chinese signals in relatively quiet times, it increases the
chance that they will misconstrue similar signals in times of crisis. A lack of understanding among
the general public and media about how the PLA trains and tests weapons compounds the situation.
Accordingly, an accurate understanding of “normal” activities, such as military deployments, training,
and weapons tests, is necessary to assess when the Chinese are shifting from their routine to signal
that someone is approaching or crossing a line that could lead to conflict.

Basic Principles of PLA Doctrine

Insights into Chinese military strategy and operations are widely available. Official government
documents, such as the series of defense white papers, provide statements of China’s defense
policy and doctrine. Writings by and about senior Communist Party and PLA officials are carried in
the Chinese media, especially in websites run by the PLA or Ministry of National Defense. PLA
professional military education institutions publish textbooks, many of which are available to foreign
readers. However, the Chinese government does not release to the public all aspects of its defense
policy, keeping secret details that other countries routinely make available.

Statements and articles in the Chinese media vary in authoritativeness depending on who or what
organization is speaking. Not all speakers, writers, media sources, and articles/commentary carry
equal weight or credibility. The Chinese media can further confuse the issue by quoting foreign
sources about military developments without confirming the accuracy of their information. In addition
to explicating defense policy, as Paul Godwin and Alice Miller explain, Beijing uses public
statements and the media for deterrence purposes through a “carefully calibrated hierarchy of official
protests, authoritative press comment, and leadership statements.”

As a party-army, the Chinese armed forces – that is the PLA, the People’s Armed Police, and the
militia – are required to obey the party’s absolute leadership. A corollary to party loyalty is
the subordination of military development to national construction. One of the most important
ramifications of this principle was the flat-lining of defense budgets in the single-digit billions of U.S.
dollars in the 1980s and early 1990s when China’s economy was expanding quickly. Even with the
increases in announced defense spending since the mid-1990s, the World Bank assesses China’s
military expenditure (including estimated extra-budgetary sources of spending) to be in the vicinity of
two percent of GDP and about six percent of total government expenditure. Having learned from the
negative example of profligate Soviet defense spending, Beijing has prioritized building the civilian
economy over the military and has not sacrificed civilian development in the pursuit of military
modernization. War of any type is not good for China’s economic development.

The most basic tenet of China’s national defense policy is that it is strategically defensive in nature.
Yet, like other militaries, the PLA recognizes the decisive nature of the offensive once the threshold
of warfighting has been crossed. The PLA will undertake offensive actions at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels of war, according to the principle, “We will not attack unless we are
attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.” This posture is framed as the “strategic
concept of active defense” and is considered the essence of China’s strategic thought. Active
defense results in an action-reaction cycle, which quickly devolves, however, into a spiraling dispute
over who is justified in their response to another’s earlier move.

Nonetheless, reflecting the continuing influence of Sun Tzu on PLA doctrine, China prefers to “win
without fighting” whenever possible. In part, this is due to the PLA’s lack of modern combat
experience and its stark publicly stated assessment that its modernization lags behind advanced
global peers and its officers lack the skills required for modern war. While the PLA has made
progress in certain operational areas, especially if fighting relatively close to its shores, it still lags
behind what China calls “advanced global peers,” such as the U.S. military. Accordingly, PLA
doctrine frequently refers to the “weak overcoming the strong.” However, left unsaid officially, but
often implied, the sheer size of the PLA could overwhelm forces of many smaller regional neighbors
unless they are supported by the United States or another advanced power.

In order to achieve its objectives, compensate for perceived military weaknesses, and save money,
the Chinese government seeks to use all elements of national power, including civilian economic,
diplomatic, geographic, demographic, and scientific strength to augment its armed forces. Multiple
components of national power are fused together under the rubric of “military-civilian integration” in a
modern permutation of Mao Zedong’s concept of people’s war. The principles of “winning without
fighting,” the “weak overcoming the strong,” and integrating military and civilian capabilities have
been widely demonstrated in recent years by the employment of civilian law enforcement agencies,
commercial entities, and maritime militia forces, with the backing of active duty forces, in the South
and East China Seas.
Within the framework of these strategic principles, the PLA regards preparing its forces for combat
and warfighting as its “core function” and the primary responsibility of all officers and soldiers. The
better the PLA is prepared to perform its main mission of fighting, the better it is prepared to conduct
deterrence and military operations other than war (MOOTW) missions. This triad – warfighting,
deterrence, and MOOTW – are defined as the three basic ways of using military force.

Chinese Doctrine on Deterrence

Despite the Chinese propensity for summarizing many ideas in an idiom or slogan, there appears to
be no pithy phrase capturing the idea of “peace through strength.” Nonetheless, the concept is a
basic component of the PLA’s doctrinal approach to deterrence. The 2005 English translation of The
Science of Military Strategy contains text that expresses the same meaning: “Thus the preparation of
strength is the essential and most reliable preparation in all war control preparations.” A few pages
earlier it states the “objective of war control is to prevent the occurrence of war.” In other words,
military strength is necessary to avoid war – for peace. A full chapter on “Strategic Deterrence”
follows immediately thereafter. This chapter is the most extensive explanation of China’s concept of
deterrence available to foreign readers and is extensively quoted below.

The Chinese concept of deterrence is based on using the threat of military force to achieve either
compellence/coercive or prevention objectives: “deterrence is the military conduct of a state or
political group in displaying force or showing the determination to use force to compel the enemy to
submit to one’s volition and to refrain from taking hostile actions or escalating the hostility.”
Deterrence can have both military and political objectives: “Strategic deterrence is a major means for
attaining the objective of military strategy, and its risks and costs are less than strategic
operations…. Strategic deterrence is also a means for attaining the political objective.” However,
deterrence “may fail and even war or war escalation may be triggered if one mishandles the complex
situation.” Therefore, “[w]arfighting is generally used only when deterrence fails and there is no
alternative,” and the “more powerful the warfighting capability, the more effective the deterrence.”

Three conditions are necessary for deterrence: 1) an “adequate deterrent force”; 2) the
“determination and volition [to employ] the strategic deterrent force”; and 3) interaction (signaling)
“between the deterrer and the deterred.” These elements conform exactly to the formula
proposed by Adm. Harry Harris, commander of U.S. Pacific Command: Capability x Resolve x
Signaling = Deterrence. (While there may be debate about the validity of this formula or China’s
three conditions, some decision-makers on both sides appear to have similar views of deterrence,
yet they may not admit this is the case.)

Deterrence seeks to change “the pattern of the opponent’s psychology” leaving “some leeway” for
compromise and concession. The deterring side seeks to achieve “momentum,” taking action that
the opposing side can see, such as “large-scale military review, joint military exercise, and military
visit,” and, left unsaid, military deployments and weapons tests. (The Chinese definition of joint
exercises includes those employing multiple services of the PLA, as well as exercises with foreign
militaries.) Deterrence seeks to display one’s superiority over the enemy’s weaknesses while
“concealing one’s weakness.”

Strategic deterrence includes nuclear deterrence, but also has multiple conventional components
including information, space, and cyber operations. It further includes the “deterrence of people’s
war,” and involves other government agencies and civilian capabilities. In peace, the objective of
deterrence is “to delay or curb outbreak of war,” while in war deterrence seeks “to control its vertical
and horizontal escalation.”

Fighting a “small war” to avoid a larger one may be necessary. Likewise, active defense requires
that “‘the first shot’ on the plane of politics and strategy must be differentiated from ‘the first shot’ on
the plane of tactics” and “if any country or organization violates the other country’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity, the other side will have the right to ‘fire the first shot’ on the plane of tactics.”
Thus, the PLA may conduct preemptive actions in a period of tension if the Chinese government
concludes the enemy has already decided to “violate” China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

However, because China considers its deterrence to be “self-defensive in essence,” it distinguishes

itself from other states that pursue offensive strategies to compel opponents to submit. Rather,
China’s deterrence is portrayed as preventative, “to deter foreign invasion, defend sovereignty, rights
and interests” and to deter internal and external conspiracies to separate and subvert China. The
PLA further differentiates itself from other militaries as it sees its own use of stratagem as “the main
idea of traditional Chinese strategic thinking … the use of limited force to achieve victory … Western
strategic thinking pays more attention to the contest of strength, emphasizing direct confrontation.”
This assertion inexplicably ignores many examples of deception, misdirection, and stratagem
performed by conventional and special operations forces of the U.S. and its allies over the past three
decades of conflict.

In the 2005 edition of The Science of Military Strategy, the chapter on deterrence concludes by
admitting “strategic deterrence is not omnipotent … in carrying out strategic deterrence, one should
examine the worst and the toughest scenarios and be well prepared in advance, so as to steadily
and effectively cope with the opponent in case of failure of deterrence.” This cautious approach to
both deterrence and warfighting is repeated in book’s final chapter:

Therefore, imprudent decision to use force is never permitted … The reason for the existence of the
army is to prevent and win a war … We may not launch a war in a hundred years but we can never
be unprepared for war for even one day … Only when an army is fully prepared for war, can it be
prudent to start a war and react quickly in war … So long as we can solve the problem with military
deterrence, we will not resort to war.

The 2013 edition of The Science of Military Strategy also has a chapter on deterrence, which
underscores the basic principles from a decade earlier updated according to changes in the
international security environment and technological advances, particularly in the PLA’s level of
information technologies, space, and cyber capabilities. No official English translation of the 2013
edition is available, but several books and essays discuss it in detail. In particular, this volume
mentions the peacetime enhancement of island and reef defenses as part of China’s deterrence
system to protect its maritime sovereignty and rights.

The Impact of Chinese Deterrence

Though the theory behind China’s deterrence posture can be found in PLA textbooks, the Chinese
government has not done a very good job at explaining this aspect of its military doctrine to the
outside world (and would likely not be believed by many even if it tried harder). As a result, some
Chinese actions and signals were probably intended to send warnings, but deterrent messages can
be interpreted as having hostile, aggressive intent.

Misperceiving actions and signals is complicated by the differences in the U.S. and China’s
deterrence objectives due to the differences between Chinese core interests and American vital
interests. Official U.S. deterrence objectives in Asia have been defined mostly in general. For
example, the Department of Defense’s 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy aims to
strengthen American “military capacity to ensure the United States can successfully deter conflict
and coercion and respond decisively when needed.” More recently the Asia Society Task Force on
U.S.-China Policy (unofficially) reiterated the goal to “deter a potentially aggressive and overreaching
China.” Deterring “conflict and coercion” and an “aggressive and overreaching China” provide policy-
makers great latitude in their actions. A specific example was raised last year in this publication with
an article titled, “The United States may have just quietly deterred China.”

China has been a bit more forthcoming in its deterrence objectives beyond the generalities
mentioned earlier. For example, its 2005 Anti-Secession Law begins with a list of five objectives in
Article 1, the first of which is “opposing and checking Taiwan’s secession from China by
secessionists in the name of ‘Taiwan independence.’” In other words, Beijing’s first objective is to
deter further movement of Taiwan towards independence. (This law may be in the process of
being amended.) Similarly, for many years, the Chinese government has identified “US vessel and
aircraft reconnaissance along China’s coastline” as one of “three obstacles” hindering bilateral
relations. It is safe to assume that deterring close-in reconnaissance missions and challenging U.S.
freedom of navigation operations is a PLA mission. Pursuit of this objective has led to multiple
incidents in the air and at sea between U.S. military and Chinese civilian and government aircraft
and vessels. While China has been successful to date in deterring Taiwan’s independence, its
military modernization continues to be perceived as threatening to Taiwan and the region. On the
other hand, China has not been successful in deterring or limiting U.S. military operations in the
region, with increases in the intensity of operations expected. Additionally, a proposed change to
China’s maritime traffic safety law to “empower maritime authorities to prevent foreign ships from
entering Chinese waters if it is decided that the ships may harm traffic safety and order” also is
unlikely to stop U.S. operations near China. In short, Chinese deterrent actions in the South China
Sea, to include the expansion of facilities on Chinese-occupied reefs, have led to escalation and
increased tensions, not only with the U.S. but with China’s neighbors.

Actions such as routine PLA training and weapons tests are subject to misinterpretation and being
portrayed as causally linked to some recent political event. PLA training is planned a year or more in
advance with training objectives announced annually. In general, units follow a pattern progressing
from basic training, to small unit and functional training, to larger exercises, culminating in joint
and/or evaluation exercises. Because of the size of the PLA, the Chinese media usually reports on
some sort of training nearly every week of the year, and, because of new equipment entering the
force, much training now occurs in locations farther from China where the PLA has not operated
frequently. Often, training takes place shortly before, during, or after a newsworthy item of
international interest, such as a U.S. military event in the region. Consequently, PLA training and
external events are frequently assessed by observers as related to one another, generally resulting
in a Chinese spokesperson describing the training as routine and in accordance with the annual
training schedule. Conversely, the Chinese government will not hesitate to publicize PLA training
when it serves a deterrent objective, such as it did for a series of exercises opposite Taiwan in the
early 2000s. Similarly, weapons tests usually occur according to parameters defined by the research
and development process, not in direct response to outside events.

Returning to Reagan’s vision of “peace through strength,” earlier this year Hal Brands warned on
these pages that “both of the nouns in that phrase [are] essential, and the latter [enables] the
former.” As both the United States and China pursue their deterrence objectives in the region, all
elements of Adm. Harris’ equation (and Chinese doctrine) need to be balanced and mutually
understood in order not to undermine the shared goal of regional stability.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:42

19 MARCH 2017

LIAONING RAISES MORE QUESTIONS FOR CHINA

Source Link

By Vidya Sagar Reddy

Introduction

China’s sole aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, had put on a display of its skills recently as the carrier
group transited the Western Pacific.Liaoning’s excursion, marking Beijing’s core interests, is a
political message to the United States and the world as uncertainty grips them. It also marks the
beginning of a new episode in the military history of Western Pacific, which has been dominated by
American aircraft carriers since the Cold War, especially during the Taiwan Strait crises. Taiwan also
believes that Liaoning represents China’s military ability to break through the first island chain.

Historical Context

A recount of Cold War history and Beijing’s narratives of its historical and maritime supremacy in the
Western Pacific serves to put this development into a more sober perspective, informing future
political and military balance in the region.

China’s civil war led to Communists controlling the mainland territory while the Nationalists retreated
to Taiwan. Subsequently, the People’s Republic of China and Republic of China were established on
either side of the Taiwan Strait. In the 1950s, the U.S. drew up security and mutual defense treaties
with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand as a bulwark of its
containment policy against the spread of Communism in Asia. The U.S. also extended its diplomatic
and military support to Taiwan while confronting China in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

In the 1950s, China and Taiwan clashed over the control of strategically located islands in the
Taiwan Strait. The U.S. deployed its naval assets to the Strait, forcing cessation of hostilities and
also signaling its political will to defend Taiwan from military aggression. However, U.S.-China
relations improved in the 1970s with the former recognizing the PRC. The diplomatic recognition by
the U.S. helped China modernize its industries and expand its economy.
As China’s domestic circumstances and international stature improved, it sought to define its
national interests. In 2003, China’s Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, identified Taiwan as one of
China’s “core interests” in his meeting with then U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell. The
subsequent official writings use terms such as ‘upholding territorial integrity and national sovereignty’
and ‘reunification’ in an attempt to extend China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. The South China Sea
was included in the ‘core interests’ in 2010 and the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East
China Sea in 2013. China is undertaking reforms and modernizing its military capabilities to attain
and defend these core interests.

Admiral Liu Huaqing, called China’s Mahan, was the most influential in lobbying for a blue-water
navy for the country. He oversaw the radical modernization of China’s navy in terms of concepts,
strategies, and capabilities. He even drew up a timeline for China’s navy to be able to exert sea
control within the first island chain by 2000, control second island chain waters by 2020 and project
power as a true global navy by 2050. The aircraft carrier is the quintessential military platform that
embodies such intentions, particularly for global power projection. The fact that American aircraft
carriers operating across the globe, including the Western Pacific, underline this fact to China.

Signaling Capability and Strategic Intent

Liaoning then speaks of Beijing’s political will and ambition to break through the first island chain,
which China considers a geographical and political containment of its power. The first island chain is
a virtual line drawn from the islands of Japan passing Taiwan and the Philippines and curving at the
southern end of the South China Sea between Malaysia and Vietnam. Variations include the line
either passing through the west coast or the east coast of Taiwan as well as extension of the line
through the Indonesian archipelago to even reach Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. In any case,
China is bound to come in contact with its immediate neighbors Japan, South Korea, Vietnam,
Malaysia, and the Philippines, countries with which it shares a long, complex history of both
cooperation and conflict.

China has also shown its knack for picking its moments to send political messages using military
means. It took advantage of the world’s fixated attention on the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958
to resume the bombing of Jinmen and Mazu islands in the Taiwan Strait. China’s armed incursion
across the Indian border in 1962 coincides with the Cuban Missile Crisis. At present, the domestic
political transition phase of the U.S. had lent Liaoningpolitical space to carry out its objectives in
support of Beijing’s core interests. Liaoning’s excursion also occurred just as President
Trump signaled possible recalibration of ‘One China’ policy before his inauguration. Carrier
operations require significant advance preparation, so while President Trump’s comments may not
have triggered the Liaoning’s transit, the Chinese surely planned this December deployment well in
advance of the U.S. election to send a message to the U.S. president-elect, whomever it would be.
China has liberally shared photographs and videos of Liaoning’sdeck operations, perhaps as an aid
to counter the criticism of its minimal experience in carrying out carrier operations in deep seas.
Nevertheless, China cannot be expected to master those skills and capabilities inherent to
maintaining a carrier strike group as its Asian peer India or the U.S. have acquired over
many decades and at considerable costs. Most importantly, before China can earn international
prestige, Liaoning or its successors must operate outside the overshadowing Anti-Access/Area
Denial protective bubble and sustain their operations to become true power projection assets.

Liaoning operations in December 2016. PLA Navy chief Admiral Wu Shengli is seen shaking hands
and speaking to crew members. (CCTV)

Even if it is the intention of China to intimidate its smaller neighbors by parading the Liaoning in the
near seas, investing the financial and human resources demanded by an aircraft carrier in the Coast
Guard and maritime militia makes better sense. China’s maritime militia deployed on the open seas
backed by the Coast Guard and the Navy has emerged as the true instrument of coercion for
altering the status quo in the South China Sea, complicating the response mechanisms of disputant
countries while the U.S. has yet to officially recognize it as a concentrated force.

Extending the cost-benefit perspective to a wartime situation, it again makes better sense for China
to continue investing in its missile capabilities that better serve its sea denial strategy against an
adversary advancing over the seas towards its shores. The new classes of China’s destroyers and
submarines, owing to their numbers and increasing technological sophistication, are already
considered formidable. Even if the carriers are able to extend the reach of China’s military aircraft
over the seas, they would tie down some of the aircraft and naval assets for protection against the
adversary’s own long-range missile strikes.

Conclusion

In essence, China has made a fine point: it finally possesses a steaming aircraft carrier that has
operated without incidents on its first venture over the seas. Beijing successfully highlighted and
marked some of its core interests. While Liaoning’s foray into the seas certainly sets a mark in the
fluctuating military balance of the Asia-Pacific, China has some decent obstacles to maneuver
before it can claim or demand recognition for possessing an aircraft carrier. And given China’s zero
tolerance for accidents, it remains to be seen how the cautious approach would help China gain
mastery in this domain. As the carrier operations continue and more platforms join the Navy, China
will have to determine if these platforms are indeed worth the risk and costs. Even so, China needs
to assess the optimum roles that can be assigned to its carriers within the country’s overarching
political and military strategies.
Vidya Sagar Reddy is a research assistant in the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative of the Observer
Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:25

19 MARCH 2017

China’s amazing capabilities threatens even US defence

superiority in new battlefronts
Source Link

PRAVIN SAWHNEY

Technology has changed the way wars would be fought and won. In the 20th century, wars were
fought on three battlefields, namely, land, air and sea. In this century, three more battlefields have
been added — space, electromagnetic, and cyber. Since China lagged far behind the United States
and Russia (the successor state of the Soviet Union) in the traditional battlefields and a catch-up
was not possible, Beijing has focussed on the new battlefields to challenge Washington. India’s
technological capabilities in comparison to China’s are extremely modest.

Take space for instance. It begins at 40km above the earth where the atmospheric limit ends. In
2007, China demonstrated its anti-satellite capability by destroying its own legacy satellite with a
land-based interceptor. This alarmed the US. Considering that the US has hundreds of military and
commercial satellites in space, it desires good space situational awareness. China’s anti-satellite
capability could smash satellites into smithereens, leaving clouds of debris, which would adversely
affect much-needed situational awareness. While this cannot be construed as an act of war, it would
play havoc with space supported Command, Control, Computer and Intelligence (C3I) systems.
Moreover, in 2013, China launched three small satellites into orbit as part of Beijing’s covert anti-
satellite warfare programme. These satellites have the capability to co-orbit, or enter into the orbit of
other satellites, and with a retractable arm, they can be used for a number of things — to gouge out,
knock off, or grab passing satellites. This is part of a Chinese ‘Star Wars’.

This is not all. Since the dividing line between atmosphere and space has blurred — with the global
militaries referring to it as aerospace — China, like the United States and Russia, is working on a
new type of weapon called a DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle, which recently had its fourth test-firing.
This will be able to travel at more than 7,000 miles per hour, and manoeuvre erratically to avoid anti-
missile defences, and, given its speed, will have high energy on impact to achieve equivalent effects
of nuclear weapons. Unlike a ballistic missile which travels in a parabolic arc and enters space, the
hypersonic vehicle will glide within the atmosphere once separated from its booster rocket. The
hypersonic vehicle will make the requirement of nukes and contact war — the hallmark of the
traditional battlefields — unnecessary.

Regarding air battlefield, China has an impressive array and probably the largest number of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (more than the US) in the world. It is also developing hypersonic UAVs
and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) for both near-space earth orbit mission, as well as
for Perdix autonomous armed and unarmed UAVs missions. The latter are a swarm of smart drones
capable of course correction by a collective ‘brain,’ which can guide each UAV towards its tactical
mission. On the electromagnetic battlefield, China has made massive strides in directed energy and
electromagnetic weapons like railguns. Instead of chemical explosives or gunpowder, railguns will
use electromagnetic force to propel projectiles to hypersonic speeds, potentially up to ranges of
several hundred miles. This will give the People’s Liberation Army a cheaper and higher volume of
fire and a less risky alternative to ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as air strikes.

The cyber battlefield is perhaps the most ironic one. While the US invented the internet, China took
early advantage of it to challenge the US in asymmetric war by developing cyber offensive
capabilities. The Chinese reckoned that since the US’ military command, control, communication
and intelligence was its mightiest strength, paralysing it or corrupting information systems would
thwart US’s victory. With this strategic objective in mind, the PLA has been actively creating
Information Warfare militias, recruited from universities, research institutes, and commercial IT
companies, especially telecom firms. Above all this, the PLA, as a part of President Xi Jinping’s 2016
military reforms, has formed a new Strategic Support Force to bring all space, cyber,
electromagnetic and technical assets, which are critical for information warfare, under one roof.
These will be in support of combat operations both for continental defence and for expeditionary
forces.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:25

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19 MARCH 2017

How China Plans to Win the Next Great Big War In Asia
Source Link

Michael Raska

China’s cyber capabilities are continuously evolving in parallel with the People’s Liberation Army’s
(PLA) ongoing military reforms and modernization drives. As the PLA invests in the development of
comprehensive cyber capabilities, the character of future conflicts in East Asia will increasingly
reflect cyber-kinetic strategic interactions.
In a potential conflict with Taiwan, for example, the PLA may put a strategic premium on denying,
disrupting, deceiving, or destroying Taiwan’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. This would be followed by the
deployment of the PLA’s conventional air wings, precision ballistic missile strikes, and sea power
projection platforms – all within the first hours of the conflict.

A key target for the PLA, for example, would be the highly-advanced US-made ultra-high frequency
(UHF) early warning radar system located on top of Leshan Mountain near the city of Hsinchu.
Activated in February 2013, the radar is reportedly capable of detecting flying objects up to 5,000km
away, and provide a six-minute warning in preparation for any surprise missile attack from the
Chinese mainland. The radar essentially tracks nearly every sortie of the PLA Air Force flying across
China’s opposite coastline.

The Leshan Mountain radar also has capabilities to electronically jam China’s major signal
intelligence station located at Dongjing Shan. Moreover, the radar is likely linked with the US Air
Force’s Space Command Defense Support Program (DSP) that operates reconnaissance satellites
for the US Satellite Early Warning System. The system is reportedly capable of providing
comprehensive surveillance of North Korean missile launches.

PLA Concepts of ‘Network Swarming Warfare’:

The PLA’s Strategic Support Forces (SSF) envisions such operations under the conceptual umbrella
of integrated network electronic warfare (INEW), or wangdian yitizhan. In China’s strategic thoughts,
INEW has a holistic representation that combines coordinated use of cyber operations, electronic
warfare, space control, and kinetic strikes designed to create “blind spots” in an adversary’s C4ISR
systems.

These concepts have also been reflected in the PLA’s recent writings on “network swarming
warfare” that envisions future campaigns as “multi-directional maneuvering attacks” conducted in all
domains simultaneously: ground, air, sea, space, and cyberspace.

While specific operational aspects and capabilities are clouded in secrecy, papers by the PLA’s
semi-authoritative military sources such as the National Defense University indicate a simultaneous
application of multiple force elements, including small and multi-functional operational forces,
electronic warfare and counter-space forces, cyber units, and long-range precision firepower.

Space-based information asset control

An essential element for China’s cyber operations is the control of space-based information assets
as a means of achieving “information dominance.” Specifically, PLA authors acknowledge that space
dominance is essential for operating joint campaigns and for maintaining the initiative on the
battlefield. Conversely, they view the denial of an adversary’s space systems as an essential
component of cyber operations and a prerequisite for victory.

Interestingly, Chinese writings note that the overall space system encompasses not only satellites in
orbit, but also terrestrial launch, mission control, tracking, and telemetry and control (TT&C) facilities,
such as the Leshan Mountain radar in Taiwan.

Consequently, establishing space dominance must incorporate offensive and defensive measures
covering the full range of targets – orbiting systems, ground-based systems, and data.

To this end, the PLA maintains a strong focus on counter-space capabilities, both kinetic and cyber.
These include developing space launch facilities; space tracking, telemetry, and control facilities;
orbital space combat capabilities and units; strategic missile forces; ground-based space defense
forces, and space logistics and safeguarding capabilities and forces.

Cyber Exploitation:

During peace time, PLA’s cyber units under the SSF are likely involved in comprehensive cyber
reconnaissance – probing the computer networks of foreign government agencies as well as private
companies.

These activities, which China denies, serve to identify weak points in the networks, understand how
foreign leaders think, discover military communication patterns, and attain valuable technical
information stored throughout global networks.

The scale, focus, and complexity of China’s cyber espionage over the past decade strongly suggest
that these operations are state-sponsored or supported with access to financial, personnel, and
analytic resources that far exceed what organized cybercriminal operations or multiple hacker
groups operating independently could likely access consistently over a long duration.
Meanwhile, it is important to note that China is also relying on traditional human intelligence
operations. According to Defense News, for example, China has been able to use its human
intelligence network in Taiwan to gather information that would compromise the Leshan Mountain
radar, as well as the island’s other strategic assets, including the Anyu-4 air defense network
upgrade program, Po Sheng C4I upgrade program, Shuan-Ji Plan (electronic warfare technology
project), Wan Chien (Ten Thousand Swords) joint standoff weapon, and the Mirage 2000 fighter
aircraft.

East Asia’s Future Conflicts:

The progressive complexity in strategic interactions and interdependencies between cyber,

information, cognitive, and physical domains will likely challenge traditional kinetic uses of force in
future conflicts in East Asia.

For example, in ensuring operational access in the East or South China Seas, the US military will
have to ensure the security, reliability, and integrity of its mission-critical C4ISR systems as well as
combat support and logistics systems that will become increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats as
well as other emerging forms of electronic warfare, including threats from electromagnetic pulse and
high-powered microwave weapons.

A sophisticated cyberattack on these systems, whether by the PLA or other potential adversary,
would likely result in cascading effects with ramifications on the individual US services and their
abilities to carry out operational missions.

As conflicts move into the cyber and information domains, the centers of gravity are also going to
shift. The value and more importantly, the accuracy and reliability of strategic information relevant for
the situational awareness and function of the nation state as a system will become even more
important with the increased dependence on cyberspace.

Cyber-enabled conflicts will evolve parallel with technological changes – e.g. the introduction of the
next generation of robots, artificial intelligence, and remotely controlled systems that will continue to
alter the character of future warfare. Ultimately, however, both cyber and information domains –
whether civil or military – may become simultaneously targets as well as weapons, including for the
armed forces of China, Russia and the US.
Michael Raska is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent
unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore.

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18 MARCH 2017

** China's Passive Management Strategy

Source Link

It is useful to look back into history to see how China has managed power in the past. For some
2,000 years, prior to European imperial advancements in the early 19th century, China sat at the
center of a regional imperial system, maintaining influence while limiting the need for direct action.
Power moved out in rings from the core. There was China proper, protected by an integrated shell of
buffer states. For some — such as Xinjiang, Tibet and Manchuria — China was not always
dominant, but when outside powers swept across the buffers to change Chinese empires, they at
times found themselves ultimately integrated into the Chinese system.

Beyond that were tributary powers, kingdoms that nominally respected China's role in the region.
These included areas such as Korea, the Shan state of Burma or even what is now Vietnam —
areas where China attempted to expand but reached the limits of its power. Beyond these were so-
called barbarian powers, ones that required minimal contact. These not only included places like the
Ryukyu Islands, parts of the Malay Peninsula and some of the Central Asian ethnic tribes, but also
the more distant European civilizations at times.

China could influence the behavior of its neighbors, but it did so as often as possible by
demonstrating power but rarely using it. So long as the neighbors did not fundamentally counter
China's core interests, they were largely left to their own devices. In this manner, China could remain
central to a regional system while expending little in time, effort or resources to enforce its will. In
short, most countries, most of the time, largely accepted the arrangement, both for cultural reasons
and because the cost of direct challenge was often too high.

China's crisis with Western imperialism through the 1800s occurred at a time of dynastic and
imperial weakness, and China was further weakened by Japanese occupation beginning in the
1930s and then by civil war from 1945 to 1949. The early Mao years were about reconstituting
Chinese unity, but also showed the stirrings of Chinese foreign interest in a modern era. Although
China under Mao played a role in the overall international Communist drive, this was paired with a
longer term and more passive strategy. China made friends, retaining influence through its backing
of leaders, from the king of Cambodia to the Nepalese monarchy to the Kim family in North Korea.
But China also acted by retaining relations with many alternatives. The idea was that, no matter who
came to power, China would have at least some existing relationship to draw on.

This is how China throughout history has dealt with its periphery and beyond. It's also how it is likely
to do so in the future.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:42

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16 MARCH 2017

A rising power without allies

Source Link

BY BRAHMA CHELLANEY

The more power China has accumulated, the

greater has been its difficulty in gaining genuine allies, underscoring that leadership demands more
than brute might. Contrast this with the strong network of allies and partners that the United States
maintains in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere. The withering of China’s special relationship with
North Korea, once its vassal, illustrates Beijing’s dilemma.

Last year, Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, said “we have allies,
friends and partners where China does not,” while U.S. Secretary for Defense Ash Carter asserted
that Beijing is “erecting a great wall of self-isolation.”

The rapid deterioration in Beijing’s ties with North Korea — which boasts good reserves of iron ore,
coal, magnesite, graphite, copper, zinc and other minerals — is sure to increase China’s sense of
being alone.

Indeed, when Pyongyang recently accused China of “mean behavior” and “dancing to America’s
tune,” it underscored not only its ruptured relationship with its powerful neighbor but also the fact that
Beijing is now left with just one real ally, Pakistan. Quasi-failed Pakistan, although a useful tool for
Beijing to contain India, is a dubious ally for China in the larger context.

China’s rift with Pyongyang has followed the considerable weakening of Beijing’s once-tight hold on
Myanmar, another country rich in natural resources — from oil and gas to jade and timber. Today,
the Beijing-Pyongyang relationship is at its lowest point since the founding of North Korea in 1948.
The reported fatal poisoning of North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un’s estranged half brother, Kim Jong
Nam, at Kuala Lumpur International Airport, represents a major setback for China. Beijing valued
him — a faded playboy with residences in Macau and Beijing — as a key asset against the North
Korean dictator.

To be clear, China’s vaunted “blood relations” with North Korea have been souring since Kim Jong
Un came to power after the death of his father, Kim Jong Il, in December 2011.

Since then, Kim Jong Un has been trying to show that North Korea is no client-state of China,
including by rekindling the “juche” ideology of self-reliance. He has defied Beijing by repeatedly
conducting nuclear and missile tests and signaled that he wants North Korea to escape from China’s
clutches through better relations with the United States — an appeal that has gone unheeded in
Washington.

Kim Jong Nam’s death, of course, is a blow not just for China but also for South Korea and the U.S.,
which had milked him for any intelligence he could provide on the inner workings of the Stalinist
regime in Pyongyang. These three countries, recognizing the importance of the Kim family bloodline
in dynastic North Korea, had indeed cultivated him as a potential replacement for his half brother.
The North Korean ruler thus had ample reason to get rid of Kim Jong Nam.

Earlier in 2013, Pyongyang executed China’s most valued friend in the North Korean power
hierarchy — Jang Song Thaek, a four-star general who was Kim Jong Un’s uncle by marriage. Jang,
a mentor to Kim Jong Nam and Beijing’s main link to Pyongyang, was accused by the regime of
abusing his power to favor China, including by underselling resources like coal, land and precious
metals.

At the center of the growing China-North Korea tensions, however, is the bad blood between Kim
Jong Un, who at 33 remains the world’s youngest head of state, and Chinese President Xi Jinping,
nearly twice as old as him.

When Xi paid a state visit to South Korea in mid-2014, he overturned decades of tradition in which
Chinese leaders always visited North Korea first. Xi has yet to travel to Pyongyang, just as Kim Jong
Un has refused to visit Beijing. Paying obeisance in Beijing, however, was customary for Kim’s
grandfather and father: Kim Il Sung, the founder of the state, paid 37 official visits to China, while his
son and successor, Kim Jong Il, went nine times.
The young ruler’s effort to chart an independent course has sparked a sustained propaganda
campaign against him in recent years by China’s state media, which has accused him of pursuing
“de-Sinification” of his country and seeking to unlock ties with the U.S. and Japan.

Despite its exasperation, China’s options against the Kim regime are limited, given the fact that it
does not want the North Korean state to unravel — a scenario that will result in a reunified and
resurgent Korea allied with the U.S. The prospect of American troops on its border is a nightmare for
China, which explains why it intervened in the Korean War when the U.S. Army crossed the 38th
parallel and threatened to advance toward the Chinese border.

For centuries, China has seen the Korean Peninsula as its strategic Achilles’ heel — a region that
offers foreign powers an attractive invasion route or a beachhead for attacking China.

Today, China has territorial and resource disputes with North Korea that a reunified Korea would
inherit and rail against. The territorial disputes center on Chonji, the crater lake on Mount Paektu
(where a 33-km stretch of the Sino-Korean boundary has not been settled) and certain islands in the
Yalu and Tumen rivers, whose courses broadly define the frontier between the two countries.

Indeed, as if to signal that its present border with North Korea is not final, China has posted a
revisionist historical claim that the ancient kingdom of Koguryo — founded in the Tongge River basin
of northern Korea — was Chinese, not Korean, as believed by international historians. A 2012 U.S.
Senate report warned that China “may be seeking to lay the groundwork for possible future territorial
claims on the Korean Peninsula.”

Against this background, China sees status quo on the Korean Peninsula as serving its interest best.
It will likely accept Korean reunification only if it leads to a “Finlandized” Korea making permanent
strategic concessions to it.

China’s strongest action against North Korea to date — the recently imposed suspension of coal
imports — can be ascribed to the “Trump effect.” U.S. President Donald Trump’s less predictable
line, reflected in his wavering on the “one-China” policy and his tougher stance on Chinese
expansion in the South China Sea, has prompted Beijing to take this action to blunt U.S. criticism
that it is not doing enough to implement United Nations sanctions.
But China’s growing tensions with Pyongyang mean that the value of the North Korea card in
Beijing’s dealings with the U.S. is likely to erode. For years, the U.S. has outsourced the North Korea
issue to Beijing by offering it concessions. Today, far from credibly serving as Washington’s
intermediary with North Korea, China is smarting from Pyongyang’s open disdain for it.

Still, China must grapple with the larger question of whether it can be a peer rival to the U.S. without
any allies.

Brahma Chellaney, a longtime contributor to The Japan Times, is a geostrategist and the author of
nine books, including “Water, Peace, and War.”

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18 MARCH 2017

Government report warns China and Russia dangerously ahead

of U.S. in cyberwar capabilities
Source Link

Martin Anderson

The recently published final report from the

United States’ government Defense Science Board Task Force on Cyber Deterrence paints a grim
picture that is very much in line with casual perceptions from news over the last 18 months – that
Russia and China have obtained, and are maintaining, a significant lead in capabilities for critical
cyber attacks against the west.
The report states that foreign cyberweapons capabilities ‘far exceed’ the United States’ ability to
defend its own critical civil and military infrastructure.

‘[Major] powers (e.g., Russia and China) have a significant and growing ability to hold U.S. critical
infrastructure at risk via cyber attack, and an increasing potential to also use cyber to thwart U.S.
military responses to any such attacks. This emerging situation threatens to place the United States
in an untenable strategic position. Although progress is being made to reduce the pervasive cyber
vulnerabilities of U.S. critical infrastructure, the unfortunate reality is that, for at least the next
decade, the offensive cyber capabilities of our most capable adversaries are likely to far exceed the
United States’ ability to defend key critical infrastructures.’

The findings also advise that secondary superpower threats such as North Korea and Iran have
‘growing potential’ to use native or third-party cyber-weaponry to carry out ‘catastrophic attacks’ on
United States infrastructure across the board.

It further iterates that more minor nation states similarly enabled by easy access to distributed
cyberattack methods could, while individually unable to severely compromise the U.S. economy,
cause significant aggregate damage over a sustained period in a way the report characterises as
‘death by 1,000 hacks’.

The report recommends a three-point strategy as an ‘urgent priority’: first is ‘tailored’ responses to
specific threats from individual nations or group, with the board surmising that ‘one size will not fit all’
in this respect; secondly it recommends particular attention to bolstering the defences of the ‘thin
line’ of core U.S. missile strike systems, with acknowledgement that underpinning public
infrastructure is critical to this aspect; finally, the report recommends an enhancement of the base
capabilities for cyberwar in both the Department of Defence and the U.S. government in general – in
this respect it notes the need for improvement in attribution, i.e. the potential to know at least from
which nation state a cyber-attack originated.

The report repeats a common allegation that the U.S. military’s various facets are not working in
concert against the diversity of challenges in cyberwarfare. Last week former commander of U.S.
Cyber Keith Alexander commented on the isolation of the FBI, the defense department, the
Department of Homeland Security and intelligence communities like the CIA:

“It’s not working. There are four stovepipes…If we were running this like a business, we’d put them
together. You also have all these committees in Congress looking at all this, and it’s messed up.”

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:25

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16 MARCH 2017

Acceleration Of Reforms In China

Written by Dan Steinbock, Difference Group

After political consolidation, China is ready to

begin a broader implementation of structural reforms. That is vital to double per capita income over
the interval 2010-20.

After President Xi assumed office in fall 2012, Chinese leadership has steadily moved toward more
comprehensive structural reforms. As evidenced by the recent Two Sessions in Beijing, these
reforms are about to move to a new level.

In the coming years, the focus will move toward tougher, broader and deeper execution, which is
vital for higher living standards in China.

13th Five-Year Plan policies

Adopted in March 2016, China’s medium-term plan (2016-20) reflects policies, growth priorities and
guidelines, which are subject to short-term adjustment but guided by longer-term visions. Most
importantly, China is moving from its old, low-cost growth drivers toward new industries fueled by
innovation-driven development.

The new 5-year blueprint incorporates many recent technology-related initiatives, including Strategic
Emerging Industries (SEI), Sci-Tech Innovation 2030, Internet Plus, and Made in China 2025. It is
likely to elevate the role of advanced manufacturing, modern services and strategic emerging
industries as a proportion of GDP.

In 2005, when I first lectured at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, experts of research and
development (R&D) were very concerned about China’s low level of R&D per GDP (1.3%). In 2010,
it still relied on imitation (1.6%) but today the figure (2.1%) is already higher than that of the UK, or
Italy. By 2020, it will be at par with most advanced economies (2.5%); and close to that of the US
(2.7%).

Additionally, the five-year plan features China’s accelerating efforts toward green development,
including a tighter carbon intensity target than envisioned in the past Copenhagen pledge. In turn,
one of the most sensitive initiatives will focus on the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOE), even
at the cost of shutting down the failed “zombie enterprises."

Furthermore, the plan includes an effort to bridge uneven geographic evolution through regional
development, particularly through the Yangtze River Economic Belt, and the new urbanization
strategy of large city clusters. Finally, the plan seeks more inclusive growth, including more equitable
access to basic public services, and the implementation of the renminbi internationalization.

From strong economy to higher living standards

In the past, the five-year plans focused on accelerating the growth and strengths of the Chinese
economy. In 2010-15, the annual GDP growth rate was 7.8 percent; in 2016-20, it will be closer to
6.5 percent. That is very much in line with economic development worldwide. Historically,
industrialization accelerates growth, while the transition to post-industrial society means deceleration
of growth.

In the pre-Xi China, the focus was still on growth and Chinese economy. Now it is on living
standards and Chinese people. The goal is to become a “moderately prosperous society" by 2020.
The tough objective requires doubling GDP per capita from the 2010 level, while 55 million Chinese
will be lifted from poverty.

Let’s put this goal in its context. In 2010, average living standards - as measured by inflation-
adjusted GDP per capita - were about the same in China, Peru and Namibia, based on data by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). By 2020, per capita income will be by 2.3 times higher in China,
as per capita income will double to $21,000. As living standards in Peru and Namibia will increase
1.5 times in the same period, they will fall over 25 percent behind China.

Coming after three decades of world-historical growth, China’s catch-up in living standards is world
historical and likely to serve as a new model for other aspiring emerging and developing nations. In
2010, Chinese living standards were about 40 percent behind those in Iran, Brazil and Mexico; by
2020 Chinese living standards will catch up with these peers.

During the past decade, there has been much talk about structural reforms in the U.S., Western
Europe and Japan. Yet, only China has implemented such reforms. With growth, strategic plans are
nice but execution is everything.

This is adapted from a commentary published by China Daily 07 March 2016.

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8 MARCH 2017

The PLA’s Potential Breakthrough in High-Power Microwave

Weapons
Source Link

By Elsa B. Kania

Though details are scarce, recent Chinese

reports hint at a major advance in HPM technology.
Chinese scientists have reportedly achieved unexpected success in their development of a high-
power microwave (HPM) weapon. Thispromising form of directed energy weapon combines “soft”
and “hard kill” capabilities through the disruption or even destruction of enemy electronics systems.
Such a powerful “new concept weapon” possesses unique advantages, including its potential speed,
range, accuracy, flexibility, and reusability.

The PLA’s future HPM weapons could have multiple defensive and offensive functions that would
enhance its combat capabilities. In the near term, the PLA’s probable employment of this HPM could
be as a ship-borne anti-missile system or to reinforce China’s air defense systems. Potentially, such
a weapon system would undermine the efficacy of even the most advanced U.S. missiles, such as
the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) currently under development. Its likely applications could
also include its use as an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon or incorporation with missiles in order to
overcome enemy air defenses. Once operationalized, this new weapon could thus contribute to
China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

The PLA’s apparent breakthrough in HPM weapons reflects a track record of consistent progress
over the course of decades of concentrated efforts. Given the limitations of the available information,
it is difficult to compare the extent of U.S. and Chinese progress in this domain. Until the past
several years, the U.S. military’s 50 or so years of research on HPM weapons could be dismissed as
anapparent dead end. Only recently, the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory successfully
developed and is preparing to field the Counter-electronics High-Powered Microwave Advanced
Missile Project (CHAMP), which could target an enemy’s electronics from an aircraft or missile.
While the full extent of current U.S. efforts is unknown, the PLA’s reported advance in the
development of HPM weapons could indicate that Chinese capabilities may have the potential to
keep pace with those of the United States in this disruptive technology.

Reports of a Major Breakthrough

In January, Huang Wenhua, deputy director of the Northwest Institute of Nuclear

Technology, receiveda first prize National Science and Technology Progress Award for his research
on directed energy. This prize was evidently awarded for his development of a HPM weapon, given
his extensive research on the topic and accounts of his remarks at the time. According to Huang, the
system in question was initially tested successfully in November 2010 in northwest China, in what he
referred to as the Huahai exercise. By his characterization, the completion of the exercise,
verification, and experimentation is a “pioneering” achievement, since comparable advances had yet
to be achieved elsewhere in the world. Huang also highlighted that this “disruptive technology,” in
which a “major breakthrough” has occurred, would increase China’s capabilities in future electronic
information confrontation.
At this point, the actual capabilities and current status of this weapon system remain unknown. In an
operational context, its efficacy would depend on a number of factors, including its output power,
effective range, firing rate, and power requirements. However, Huang’s frequent publications and
patents indicate continuing progress. Based on his prior writings, this HPM weapon could be
intended for initial employment as a ship-borne anti-missile system. For instance, in 2009, ahead of
its initial test, Huang co-authored a paper focused on the utility of HPM weapons against anti-ship
missiles. The authors noted that HPM weapons could be used to degrade and damage the
electronics of an incoming missile, interfering with, for instance, its data link, GPS receivers, and
other guidance mechanisms.

Contextualizing Chinese Advances in HPM Weapons

This reported breakthrough seemingly reflects the success of China’s long-term agenda for the
research and development of HPM weapons. Since Chinese efforts to create directed energy
weapons date back to the 1970s and have intensified since the 1990s, this apparent advance
reflects the results of long-term research at a number of critical institutions and the consistent
funding for their work. Throughout his career, over the course of nearly 20 years in this field, Huang
Wenhua has been instrumental in research and development of HPM technology.

Since the early 1990s, Huang has engaged in research related to HPM weapons, under the aegis of
the Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology’s Key Laboratory of High-Power Microwave
Technology. The National High-Technology Research and Development Plan or “863 Plan” has
provided extensive funding to this research agenda, including through a subsidiary fund focused on
HPM technology, with the guidance of its X07 expert group, of which Huang served as the director.

Future Prospects for the PLA’s HPM Weapons

Evidently, the PLA’s pursuit of HPM weapons has remained a consistent priority that will likely
continue to receive high-level support at the level of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
Notably, Liu Guozhi, who recently became the director of the new CMC Science and Technology
Commission, previously served as the commander of the PLA’s Nuclear Test Base in Xinjiang and
the director of the Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology. Liu himself has received multiple
awards for his own research on HPM weapons and pulsed power, initially collaborating with Huang
on this research agenda. As such, he will likely prove a pivotal figure in the PLA’s efforts to advance
this technological dimension of military innovation.
Looking forward, the PLA could continue to achieve significant progress in HPM weapons, along
with multiple forms of directed energy weapons, seeking to rival U.S. technological advances. In
response to the Third Offset, the PLA has only intensified its focus on these “new concept weapons,”
while alsodeveloping countermeasures to U.S. directed energy weapons. Although it is difficult to
evaluate their future trajectory and likely timeframe at this point, the eventual fielding of the PLA’s
HPM weapons will serve as a critical force multiplier for its war-fighting capabilities.

Elsa Kania is an analyst at the Long Term Strategy Group. Elsa is a graduate of Harvard College
and was a 2014–2015 Boren Scholar in Beijing, China.

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16 MARCH 2017

China's Xi pushes advanced technology for military

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China's military needs to promote technological innovation as the "key" to its upgrading and
modernization, President Xi Jinping told military delegates to the annual meeting of parliament.

Xi is overseeing a sweeping modernization of the country's armed forces, the largest in the world,
including stealth jet, anti-satellite missiles and advanced submarines, seeking to project power far
from its shores.

Science and technology innovation is the "key to military upgrading", Xi told military delegates, state
news agency Xinhua said late on Sunday.

"Efforts should be made to provide greater science and technology support for the People's
Liberation Army," the report paraphrased Xi as saying.

"We must have a greater sense of urgency to push for science and technology innovation and
advancement with greater determination and efforts."
There needs to be improved military and civilian cooperation in training high-quality military
personnel, he added.

"Efforts to improve the training system of military personnel should also be strengthened to foster a
large number of high-quality military talent."

Military reforms have proven controversial though, with Xi saying in 2015 that 300,000 people would
be cut from the military's ranks.

There have been protests in recent months by demobilized soldiers complaining of a lack of
support.

The military is also reeling from a concerted crackdown on deep-seat corruption, part of Xi's broader
war against graft in China.

Xi told the military delegates that "crushing momentum in fighting corruption has been realized".

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16 MARCH 2017

How China's Mad Scientists Plan to Shock America's Military:

Super Lasers, Railguns and Microwave Weapons
Source Link

Bill Gertz

China’s military is developing powerful lasers, electromagnetic railguns and high-power microwave
weapons for use in a future “light war” involving space-based attacks on satellites.
Beijing’s push to produce so-called directed-energy weapons aims to neutralize America’s key
strategic advantage: the web of intelligence, communication and navigation satellites enabling
military strikes of unparalleled precision expeditionary warfare far from US shores.

The idea of a space-based laser gun was disclosed in the journal Chinese Optics in December 2013
by three researchers, Gao Ming-hui, Zeng Yu-quang and Wang Zhi-hong. All work for the
Changchun Institute for Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics – the leading center for laser weapons
technology.

“In future wars, the development of ASAT [anti-satellite] weapons is very important,” they wrote.
“Among those weapons, laser attack system enjoys significant advantages of fast response speed,
robust counter-interference performance and a high target destruction rate, especially for a space-
based ASAT system. So the space-based laser weapon system will be one of the major ASAT
development projects.”

The researchers propose building a 5-ton chemical laser that will be stationed in low-earth orbit as a
combat platform capable of destroying satellites in orbit. Given funding by the Chinese military,
which is in charge of China’s space program, the satellite-killing laser could be deployed by 2023.

According to the article, an anti-satellite attack in space would employ a ground-based radar to
identify a target satellite, a special camera to provide precision targeting and a deployable
membrane telescope that would focus the laser beam on the target satellite.

The article also reveals that in 2005, the Chinese conducted a test of a ground-based laser weapon
that was used to “blind” an orbiting satellite.

“In 2005, we have successfully conducted a satellite-blinding experiment using a 50-100 kilowatt
capacity mounted laser gun in Xinjiang province,” the three researchers wrote. “The target was a low
orbit satellite with a tilt distance of 600 kilometers. The diameter of the telescope firing the laser
beam is 0.6 meters wide. The accuracy of [acquisition, tracking and pointing is less than 5
[microradians].”

Richard Fisher, a China military specialist at the International Assessment and Strategy Center,
disclosed the existence of the laser weapons program in US congressional testimony last month.
He did, however, caution that the publication of such articles is a clear indication that Beijing wants
the world to believe — or at least raise the possibility that it could — rapidly militarize space.

China’s space program is dual-use — supporting both civilian and military needs. For example,
China’s Shenzhou and Tiangong manned spacecraft were used to perform military missions. China’s
coming space station and plans for a future base on the moon also will have military applications. It
is conceivable that China could launch an orbiting laser gun disguised as a scientific module.

“The Chinese government would not hesitate to use the lives of its astronauts as a shield to deceive
the world about the real purpose of its space station,” Fisher says.

“Having gained the advantage of surprise, the combat space station could begin attacks against key
US satellites, thus blinding the US to the launch of new combat satellites that would attack many
more US satellites.”

Developing dedicated space combat system is in line with China’s long-term goal of achieving global
strategic ascendency. Fisher believes the threat of Chinese space weapons is more than notional
and that the US should respond by developing its own space warfare capabilities.

China has been working on developing laser weapons since the 1960s, and the People’s Liberation
Army in 2015 published the book Light War that gives a central role to fighting a future war using
lasers.

The book argues that future warfare will be dominated by combing Big Data analytics – a specialty of
Chinese military cyber warriors with artificial intelligence and directed energy weapons. According to
Light War, deploying robot laser weapons in space is needed since directed energy will dominate the
battlefields in 30 years.

“Perhaps the PLA is already reconfiguring for such a new era inasmuch as a major mission for the
PLA’s new Strategic Support Force may be to lead the weaponization of the information realm and
outer space,” Fisher says.

The Chinese effort could neutralize decades of investment by the United States in its own directed-
energy weapons, including lasers, electromagnetic railguns and high-power microwave arms. The
Pentagon in the past developed an airborne laser for use in missile defenses and railguns are
expected to be deployed in the early 2020s. High-powered compact laser guns are slated for the
2030s.

Military secrecy prevents knowing the full breadth of China’s high-tech energy weapons programs.
But the testimony and published writings make clear that the development of these arms is getting
large-scale investment and high-level Chinese support.

Michael J Listner, of Space Law & Policy Solutions, believes China is likely making substantial
progress in directed-energy devices, based on efforts being made and the resources available. “And
with their prolific network of espionage, it is likely that development is supported by foreign research
they have acquired as well,” he said.

“Such devices have a myriad of applications to include adapting them to their ASAT program,
ballistic missile defense, point-defense for their naval vessels and battlefield applications,” he added.
“Once China develops the underlying technology, the potential military applications are limitless as
are the non-military uses.”

China’s disclosures about the coming weaponization of space should greatly concern American and
allied defense planners, given the potential for these technologies to alter global stability and peace.

In light of these threats, the United States should consider changing its long-held policy of not
deploying arms in space.

“As long as China demonstrates its willingness to exploit much of its space program for potential
military missions, the US must possess options for at least neutralizing potential threats, preferably
short of threatening lives,” Fisher says.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:25

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15 MARCH 2017

** Coming Soon: China's Demographic Doomsday

Gordon G. Chang

Source Link
While India will soon enjoy something akin to "ideal demographics." How did this happen?

By 2022—and probably sooner—India willovertake China to become the world’s most populous
state, a status the latter has held for at least three centuries and perhaps for all recorded history.

And once the Chinese nation loses its demographic crown, it will fall fast. The country’s population
will peak in 2028 according to the UN’s “World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision,” released
at the end of July. China in its peak year will have 1.42 billion people. By the end of the century, the
country will be just a smidgen over a billion—and very, very gray.

India, on the other hand, has a bright demographic future. No country will contribute more to global
population growth between now and 2050. And the Indian state will continue to grow well into the
second half of the century. India, according to the UN, will peak in 2068, when it will be home to 1.75
billion souls. That year, China is projected to have 541 million fewer people.

China will also be behind where it counts, workers. India’s workforce—people aged 15 to 59—will
overtake China’s within a decade. By mid-century, there will be 1.05 billion Indians of working age,
375 million more than the Chinese in the same age group.

Moreover, India’s demographic profile will be close to perfect. By 2050, its median age—the point
where half the population is younger and half older—will be a youngish 37.3 versus China’s 49.6.
Then, the percentage of people 65 and older will be 27.6 percent in China and only 13.7 percent in
India.

The subcontinent is in a demographic “sweet spot,” the term Credit Suisse’s Robert Prior-
Wandesforde used in comments to CNBC, when he pointed out that “India has close to ideal
demographics.”

China, on the other hand, is experiencing accelerating demographic decline. Case in point: the
crossover time of 2022 is six years earlier than the previous UN estimate. That previous estimate
was issued just two years ago.
Because UN numbers are derived from figures the nations themselves supply, the trends could be
even worse for China than the world body suggests. Beijing’s figures, not surprisingly, tend to mask
its decline.

For example, the 2015 Revision, as noted, predicts China will peak in 2028. That’s unlikely,
however. The high point will, in all probability, be closer to 2026, as the U.S. Census Bureau
estimated a half decade ago, or 2025, as leading Chinese demographer Li Jianxin predicted. It could
even be as early as 2020. That’s the year senior Chinese official Liu Mingkang, speaking at the Asia
Global Dialogue in May 2012, admitted growth will end.

Changes in the workforce show similar fast erosion. The number of working age Chinese peaked in
2011 according to the official National Bureau of Statistics. As recently as the end of last decade,
Beijing was predicting the highpoint would not be reached until 2016.

China’s now-intractable demographic troubles are the inevitable result of two contradictory
population policies. Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic, had an expansive vision,
wanting as many Chinese in the world as possible. His pro-growth policies resulted in a total fertility
rate—generally, the number of births per woman—of 5.9 in the early 1970s.

The high-fertility, of course, was unsustainable, and toward the end of Mao’s rule Beijing adopted the
mostly voluntary wan, xi, shao—“late, long, few”—program to limit runaway growth.

The program halved the birth rate in less than a decade, but that was not enough for the next
Chinese leader. Deng Xiaoping rolled out the one-child policy, termed the world’s most draconian
social experiment, in 1979 and 1980 as one of his first initiatives after assuming power.

Chinese leaders now congratulate themselves for this “policy,” which they credit for preventing 400
million births, yet Beijing has progressively relaxed one-child rules in recent years. For one thing, it’s
clear the obsessively enforced program created demographic abnormalities, a horrendous gender
imbalance and the almost complete disappearance of aunts, uncles, and cousins.

Another problem has been the policy’s adverse economic effect. China prospered during its so-
called “reform era”—the decades following the Communist Party’s historic Third Plenum of 1978—
largely because the country was propelled by the “demographic dividend,” the enormous bulge in the
workforce caused by Mao’s and Deng’s population policies.
The dividend has already been pocketed, and a shrinking workforce will be wrenching for China for
the rest of this century and beyond. The declining number of workers does not ensure a contracting
economy, but it means Chinese leaders will have to succeed in spite of demography instead of being
propelled by it.

India, on the other hand, will have a different type of challenge. It is often said that New Delhi will
have to provide for its population, but that’s the wrong way of looking at the situation. In reality, all
the Indian government need do is step out of the way of its ambitious, talented, and restless people,
removing legal, institutional, bureaucratic, and social barriers that have impeded them since
independence, in 1947. That’s what the charismatic Narendra Modi, a reformer when he was chief
minister of the state of Gujarat, has set out to do since becoming prime minister in May 2014.

Modi talks about our time as “India’s century,” challenging the notion held by many Chinese that they
own this era. There is almost a sense of entitlement in China, that because of its population it is
destined to sit atop the world.

Many Chinese believe, understandably, that with population comes heft and with heft comes
influence. “More people means more power,” wrote “Fang Feng” on the Strong Country Forum of the
Communist Party’s People’s Daily a half decade ago. “This is the truth.”

The truth is that China will soon race pass an inflection point. “When you see a country’s population
decline, the country will definitely degrade into a second-rate one,” says Yao Yang of Peking
University’s China Center for Economic Research.

Will Beijing, before suffering decline, try to undermine India to prevent it from realizing its
demographic potential? At the end of last decade a number of Chinese security analysts proposed
taking on New Delhi while they still had the upper hand. For instance, in August 2009 Zhan Lue, a
Chinese strategist connected to the Ministry of National Defense, suggested Beijing try to break up
India into as many as 30 independent states. Zhan’s article, widely circulated in Chinese policy
circles, resonated among hardliners.

Since then, Beijing appears to have continued support to insurgents in India. Recently, Indian
intelligence agencies and some in the Indian army contended that the senior leaders of NSCN-
Khaplang, which was behind the killing of 18 Indian troopers in Manipur in early June, have ongoing
contacts with China’s People’s Liberation Army. There are even suggestions that the PLA
had urgedthe militants to break the ceasefire, thereby encouraging the killings.
For decades, Beijing’s policy toward New Delhi has been driven by a desire to keep a possible peer
competitor down. The risk for India is that in coming years the Chinese, due to plunging
demography, will become even more insecure and ramp up efforts to target the Indian state.

The Chinese take great pride in their position at the top of the population rankings, so the next few
years are bound to be traumatic for them, which is another way of saying we could be entering a
time of high drama.

Beijing, unfortunately, just might not be ready to concede that the century belongs to another nation
—India—no matter what demographic trends suggest.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:42

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15 MARCH 2017

* Why the absurd one-China policy must be upheld

Source Link

FEW diplomatic sophisms are as skilfully

worded as America’s “one-China policy”. Mere repetition by American officials that their country
sticks to it has helped more than anything else to keep the peace between two nuclear-armed
powers. Were America to reject the policy, mainland China would be enraged. Anti-American riots
would erupt. The government in Beijing might even respond by launching a military attack on
Taiwan, or American forces in the region. The global economy would shudder. Millions of lives would
be threatened.

Small wonder, then, that pulses quickened on both sides of the Pacific when Donald Trump, as
president-elect, questioned the policy. (“I don’t know why we have to be bound by a one-China
policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade,” he said.)
Last month he changed his mind and reassured China’s president, Xi Jinping, that he would, in fact,
uphold it. Yet the one-China policy is in a fragile state. Far from casting doubt on it, Mr Trump needs
to make America’s support for the status quo clearer than ever.

The one-China policy is a fudge. At the time it was devised, the governments in Beijing and Taipei
both claimed to be the rightful rulers of all China. (Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan’s leader until 1975, had
fled from the mainland in 1949 after losing a civil war against Mao Zedong.) Until the 1970s, America
recognised only “Free China”, ie Taiwan. Under the new policy, it acknowledged that both sides
believed there was only one China while tactfully not saying who was the rightful ruler of Taiwan.
The aim was to butter up Red China, which Richard Nixon wanted as an ally in the cold war against
the Soviet Union. The communists would have preferred America to accept what they call the “one-
China principle”—namely that Taiwan is a renegade province of China, and ought to bow to the
Communist Party. But they were content that America was prepared to switch diplomatic recognition
from Taiwan to the People’s Republic and withdraw American troops from the island (both of which it
did in 1979). So the fudge stuck.

The result has been an extraordinary relationship between two great powers. They were divided by
ideology but united initially by their common hatred of the Soviets and later by their common pursuit
of wealth by trading with each other.

However, Taiwan remains a flashpoint (see article). Communist China has not given up its dream of
taking control of the island, by force if necessary. America has kept on selling weapons to Taiwan.
The “Taiwan Relations Act” requires it to view an attack as a matter of “grave concern” to America: a
hint that it might come to Taiwan’s aid. China has often made clear its outrage at this. Its rapid
military build-up in recent years has been aimed, not least, at deterring America from trying to
defend Taiwan. If it could keep America out, it could, in all probability, inflict a crushing defeat on the
island.

One China, one Taiwan

This tinderbox has now been exposed to the spark of Taiwanese democracy. In the 1990s the island
began to cast off authoritarianism. The Taiwanese are pragmatic. Last year they elected an
independence-leaning president, but one who prefers not to antagonise the communists. Most
believe that the island is already autonomous enough. Few want to enrage China by formally
declaring independence. But they have also started to question the idea of “one China”. They see
the mainland as a different country, and abhor the idea of being swallowed by the giant dictatorship
next door. Taiwan has never been ruled by the communists. Since 1895 it has been under the
mainland’s control for less than five years.

Most are happy to let the one-China fudge persist. But will it? Having stirred up nationalist feelings
for so long, the Communist Party can never abandon its claim. Some day, to shore up its popularity,
it may be tempted to invade Taiwan.

America’s ability and willingness to deter China is not only vital to Taiwan but also a measure of its
role in the world more broadly. The arms that America sells to Taiwan would not enable the island to
hold out for long against a Chinese onslaught, but they are a token that America has a stake in
Taiwan’s fate, and that China should beware. Rather than using Taiwan as a bargaining chip,
America should maintain its military support for the island. If repeating a misleading mantra is the
price of peace, it is worth it.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:41

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5 MARCH 2017

Why is China trying to shift goalposts?

Source Link

Abhijit Bhattacharyya

The writer is an advocate practising in the

Supreme Court. The views expressed here are personal.
There is no doubt that the Sino-Indian border has become more problematic than what it was 100
years ago.

There is no doubt that the Sino-Indian border has become more problematic than what it was 100
years ago. And the bad news is that both sides have to answer first to their domestic audience
before addressing the bilateral issue.

A media report “China ready to cede land for part of Arunachal?” made an interesting point, but
without substance, as several unanswered questions instantaneously crossed one’s mind. Thoughts
went back and forth to several media stories of the late 1950s and the news of that fateful day of the
Chinese attack on the Kameng sector of Arunachal Pradesh, then the North-East Frontier Agency
(NEFA), in India, Bhutan and Tibet trijunction, early in the morning on October 20, 1962, in which the
rag-tag, ill-equipped, starving, ammunitionless, shorn of woollens and obsolete, 303 “bolt” rifles (with
10-round capacity) grasping Indian soldiers of four crack units of 1 Sikh, 2 Rajput, 9 Punjab and 1/9
Gurkhas were wiped out followed by the forlorn brigadier, of 7th Brigade of 4 Infantry Division of IV
Corps, being taken prisoner of war by the PLA.

Fifty-five years later, the Chinese have now (reportedly) come up with a “new formula to settle the
dispute”. What is this new formula? And what was the old one? In what way is the new formula an
improvement over the old one? One has to first try and analyse the “new” formula, and then
compare both.

The “new” Chinese proposal wants India to cede the “Tawang tract” to pave the way for a
“settlement”. How? According to the Chinese: “If the Indian side takes care of China’s concerns on
the eastern section of the border, the Chinese side will respond accordingly and address India’s
concerns elsewhere”. India to take China’s “concerns on the eastern section of the border”. Specific.
Precise. It is Arunachal Pradesh. But India’s concerns are unaddressed, unfocused and unspecified.
It talks of “India’s concerns elsewhere”? What and where is this “elsewhere”? North, south, central,
west of the Himalayas, where? Though unsaid and unspecified, “elsewhere” implies the eastern
border/sector of Jammu and Kashmir as it simply cannot be Rajasthan, West Bengal, Punjab or
Haryana. But why this sudden shift of goalposts after more than five decades? It is time to explore
and remind the Chinese of some salient features of the issue.

Let the fundamentals be clear — that the present Sino-India border imbroglio is the legacy inherited
from the 19th-20th century competitive imperialism of London and Moscow, with a comparatively
weaker, and hence smaller, imperial China trying hard to remain relevant in the periphery/tertiary,
with its own territorial ambition; an enterprise which, however, ceased to exist in 1911-1912, on the
eve of the First World War (1914). The entire gamut of Great Eurasian “border games” peaked as an
Anglo-Russian bilateral, which soon created multiple and multi-front “situations” after the Second
World War and the “unavoidable imperial retreat of the West”. The retreat, in its turn, however, left
behind a “vitiated vacuum” filled by competitive and overlapping nationalist Sino-Indian aspirations
around and across the Himalayas, leading to the October 1962 Sino-Indian war.

In fact, contrary to what the Chinese are suggesting today, their illustrious predecessor, Zhou Enlai,
had crisply clarified the genesis of the problem: “The McMahon Line was a product of the British
policy of aggression… In view of the various complex factors, the Chinese government on the one
hand finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line and, on
the other hand, cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter.” Zhou had
made his point. There were two front problems. Arunachal’s McMahon Line in the east and
Ladakh/Aksai Chin sector, constituting the north-eastern frontier of J&K, adjoining western Tibet.
The interesting point is that whereas the McMahon Line constituted the sole point of difference of
opinion between China and India, the western sector of Ladakh-Aksai Chin-Lhasa axis had multiple
“demarcated” or “delineated” borders at different times by different personalities, thus making it more
complex and complicated for both China and India to come to a common minimum (base)
agreement.

In the western sector there are at least four “lines” which overlap/ differ with each other, thereby
creating complications. First, the “Foreign Office line of 1873”, falling south of the Karakoram range,
takes India’s northern border from north of Galwan river to a straight south-eastern point of Lanak
La. The second is the Macartney-MacDonald line of 1899, beginning at the Karakoram Pass, which
forms a watershed (in line with the Karakoram range) between two systems of rivers. The first
system, north of the line, consists of Karakash river, flowing south to north (which shows it to be
beyond India). The second system of rivers, south of the line, Chip Chap, Galwan, Chang Chenmo
and Shyok flowing north to south and falling under the Indian side. The third is the Johnson-Ardagh
Line, beginning north of Karakoram range (from Shahidullah) and running northwest to southeast
(north of Haji Langar), turning sharply to south from Kunlun Mountains, and ending at Lanak La
(which is virtually at the southernmost tip of the Karakoram range). And finally, there stands the
“alignment of British Boundary Commission of 1946-1947”. All four taken together make a “royal
British imperial frontier cocktail of the orient”, thereby leaving Beijing and New Delhi to thrash out the
knotty boundary issue through mutual thrashing of each other’s soldiers in the high hills of the
Himalayas.

There is no doubt that the Sino-Indian border has become more problematic than what it was 100
years ago. And the bad news is that both sides have to answer first to their domestic audience
before addressing the bilateral issue. In this situation, the fresh Chinese proposal does not help
anyone at all. India’s Arunachal of 1947, 1949 or 1962 cannot be compared to the Arunachal of
2017.
No doubt the Dalai Lama crossed over to India on March 30, 1959 through Tawang, Arunachal, and
was received by Indian officials at Tezpur on April 18, 1959. Nevertheless, China needs to
understand that their tacit consent to accept the McMahon Line as the de facto Sino-Indian border in
the 1950s must have been in their mind when they retreated to the prewar “Line of Actual Control” in
the aftermath of the October-November 1962 war, thereby giving credence to the McMahon Line as
the mutually accepted and acceptable border in India’s Northeast.

China’s position, unlike that of India, in Central Asian topography is unlikely to be a bed of roses
owing to non-Indian factors. As it is, India, after having faced ceaseless invasions through its
northwest frontier, before and since 1947, also found China fully exploiting the situation, first with its
military alliance with Pakistan, and then with the CPEC. Although, initially the former prima facie, did
not violate India’s J&K territory, CPEC constitutes a direct assault on Indian sovereignty. And that
must not be ignored or overlooked by China even as it now proposes to make an impossible-to-
accept, change of border-resolution goalpost.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:40

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17 MARCH 2017

China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent

Source Link

PDF file 1.9 MB

China's approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first nuclear test in
1964. Key elements are its no-first-use policy and reliance on a small force of nuclear weapons
capable of executing retaliatory strikes if China is attacked. China has recently accelerated nuclear
force building and modernization, and both international and domestic factors are likely to drive
faster modernization in the future. Chinese nuclear planners are concerned by strategic
developments in the United States, especially the deployment of missile defenses. Within the region,
Beijing is also an actor in complex multilateral security dynamics that now include several nuclear
states, and the improving nuclear capabilities of China's neighbors, especially India, are a growing
concern for Beijing. Constituencies for nuclear weapons have gained in bureaucratic standing within
the People's Liberation Army (PLA). With few, if any, firewalls between China's conventional and
nuclear missile forces, new technologies developed for the former are already being applied to the
latter, a trend that will almost certainly continue. Given these changes, China is likely to increase
emphasis on nuclear deterrence, accelerate nuclear force modernization, and make adjustments
(although not wholesale changes) to policy.

Key Findings
China's Approach to Nuclear Deterrence Has Been Broadly Consistent Since Its First Nuclear Test
in 1964

China has, however, recently accelerated nuclear force building and modernization.

Chinese Nuclear Strategists Still Key Primarily on Nuclear Developments in the United States

Strategists are especially concerned about the development of U.S. missile defenses and
conventional prompt global strike capabilities.

But planners are also concerned about the growth of nuclear inventories in Asia and the complex
nuclear dynamics emerging there.

Some strategists say privately that China might not accept a push from India for nuclear parity,
should New Delhi embark on such a course.

Bureaucratic Processes and Politics Are Likely to Affect the Development of Chinese Nuclear Forces
and Thinking

Civilian leaders are reportedly less involved than they once were in the details of decisionmaking
about nuclear research, development, and production.

The nuclear constituency within the PLA is also gaining increased status and voice.

There is no firewall between China's conventional and nuclear missile forces, and technologies and
practices developed for the former are already being applied to the nuclear forces.

In the future, this may give China some limited counterforce capability.
China Is Likely to Increase Emphasis on Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Forces in the Coming
Years

Although unlikely to change formal policy formulations, China may adjust its definitions of key terms
or add caveats.

It may, for example, hedge its language on no-first-use to include a conventional attack on its
nuclear forces as "first use," thus permitting a nuclear response.

Recommendations

The United States and China should deepen their dialogue on strategic issues to better understand
where restraint might have the greatest positive impact.

The United States should limit national missile defense to a scale commensurate with the its stated
purpose, defense against attack by rogue regimes. Missile defenses are one of the primary drivers
of Chinese nuclear force building.

China, for its part, should work toward visibly separating its conventional and nuclear missile force
elements to reduce the possibility of confusion in the event of a conflict.

China should also minimize the MIRVing of missiles, especially missiles that might be vulnerable to
preemptive attack. Decades of arms control experience suggest that MIRVs can, under some
circumstances, diminish crisis stability by increasing the incentives for both sides to strike first.

U.S. leaders should take steps to fortify the credibility of extended deterrence. As Chinese
capabilities improve, some regional states, especially Japan and South Korea, may request more
than purely rhetorical reassurance. They may also seek the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons
in Asia, and Washington will want to consider how far in this direction it is willing to go.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:25

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17 MARCH 2017

Japan’s Senkaku challenge

https://chellaney.net/

At a time of shifting power dynamics in Asia,

Japan faces pressing security challenges. Of the 400 remote islands that serve as markers for
determining Japan’s territorial waters, only about 50 are inhabited. But no group of islands poses a
bigger challenge for its security than the Senkakus, a clutch of five uninhabited islets and three
rocks.

This challenge is compounded by demographic and military trends. Japan has barely one-tenth the
population of China’s. Moreover, its population is not just aging but also shrinking significantly; it
declined by nearly a million just between 2010 and 2015.

About a decade ago, Japan’s defense budget was larger than China’s. But now China’s military
spending surpasses the combined defense expenditure of Japan, Britain and France.

To make matters worse, China’s increasing territorial assertiveness and muscular foreign policy are
contributing to a sense of insecurity in Japan.
President Xi Jinping declared much of the East China Sea, including the Senkakus, to be a Chinese
air defense zone in 2013, and since then China has stepped up its challenge to Japan’s control over
those islands, including through repeated intrusions by its military aircraft and warships. Beijing has
hardened its stance by elevating its claim to the Senkakus to a “core interest,” while some in China
have gone to the extent of questioning Japan’s sovereignty over even Okinawa.

Against this background, many Japanese have wondered whether the United States would come to
Japan’s defense in the event of a Chinese attack on the Senkakus. The 1960 U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty states that an armed attack on either country in the territories under Japan’s administration
would prompt joint action “to meet the common danger.”

Then U.S. President Barack Obama’s contradictory rhetoric instilled a sense of skepticism in Japan.
Obama publicly affirmed that the U.S.-Japan security treaty covered the Senkakus. But in the same
breath he refused to take a position on the islands’ sovereignty and advised Tokyo and Beijing to
sort out their dispute peacefully.

Obama said the U.S. security treaty with Japan covered the Senkaku Islands because they “are
under Japanese jurisdiction,” yet “we also stress that we don’t take a position on the sovereignty of
the Senkaku Islands.”

At his April 2014 joint news conference with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Tokyo, Obama, while
unveiling his position on the Senkakus, urged Japan to refrain from “provocative actions” and
emphasized that his administration was committed to encouraging China’s “peaceful rise.”

He stated: “We don’t take a position on final sovereignty determinations with respect to Senkakus,
but historically they have been administered by Japan and we do not believe that they should be
subject to change unilaterally … In our discussions, I emphasized with Prime Minister Abe the
importance of resolving this issue peacefully — not escalating the situation, keeping the rhetoric low,
not taking provocative actions, and trying to determine how both Japan and China can work
cooperatively together. And I want to make that larger point. We have strong relations with China.
They are a critical country not just to the region but to the world. Obviously, with a huge population, a
growing economy, we want to continue to encourage the peaceful rise of China.”

How could such doublespeak reassure Japan? In fact, such statements sowed doubt over America’s
willingness to go to war with China to back Japan’s territorial rights, in the event of a surprise
Chinese invasion of the Senkakus. The Obama administration responded by simply saying that “we
do not envision that this current tension will rise to that level in any foreseeable scenario.”
Add to the picture Obama’s conspicuous inaction and silence on China’s 2012 seizure of the
disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, despite America’s longstanding mutual defense
treaty with Manila. That development served as a wakeup call for Japan and other U.S. allies in
Asia.

By contrast, the new U.S. administration led by President Donald Trump has taken a more clear-cut
stance in reassuring Japan that the U.S. would defend it in any confrontation with China over the
Senkakus. It has done so without the Obama-style caveat — that Washington does not take sides in
the sovereignty dispute and calls on China and Japan to resolve their dispute peacefully through
dialogue.

In fact, the recent Trump-Abe summit marked the first time that the U.S. commitment to defend
Japan’s control over the Senkakus was recorded in a joint statement.

The Feb. 12 Trump-Abe joint statement came out strongly for Senkakus’ defense: “The two leaders
affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the
Senkaku Islands. They oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration
of these islands … The United States and Japan oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims
through the use of intimidation, coercion or force.”

This unambiguous commitment should be seen as an important success of Abe’s proactive

diplomacy in seeking to build a personal connection with the new U.S. president. Abe was the first
foreign leader Trump hosted at Mar-a-Lago, which he calls “The Southern White House.” Earlier, just
after Trump’s unexpected election victory, Abe met face-to-face with him by making a special stop in
New York en route to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Peru.

Let’s be clear: The Senkaku issue is not just about a seven-square-kilometer real estate or the
potential oil and gas reserves that lie around it. The strategically located Senkakus, despite their
small size, are critical to maritime security and the larger contest for influence in the East China Sea
and beyond.

China is seeking to wage a campaign of attrition against Japan over the Senkakus by gradually
increasing the frequency and duration of its intrusions into Japan’s airspace and territorial waters. In
doing so, it has made the rest of the world recognize the existence of a dispute and the risks of
armed conflict.
To be sure, changing the territorial status quo is nothing new for Beijing. The People’s Republic of
China has been doing that ever since it was founded in 1949. The early forcible absorption of the
sprawling Xinjiang and Tibetan Plateau more than doubled China’s landmass.

In the 21st century, Chinese expansionism has increasingly relied upon “salami tactics” — a steady
progression of small, furtive actions, none of which serves as a casus belli by itself, yet which help to
incrementally change facts on the ground in China’s favor.

Unlike China’s success in expanding its frontiers in the South China Sea, it has found the going
tough in the East China Sea. Indeed, Beijing’s actions have shaken Tokyo out of its complacency
and diffidence and set in motion the strengthening of Japan’s defense capabilities, including arming
its far-flung island chain in the East China Sea with a string of anti-ship, anti-aircraft missile batteries.

At his joint news conference with Trump at the White House, Abe pledged that Japan will play a
“greater role” in East Asian security. It was as if he was responding to Trump’s campaign rhetoric
that Japan, which hosts about 50,000 American troops, should do more to defend itself.

One effective way the Trump administration can encourage Japan to do more for its own defense is
by lending full support to the Abe-initiated national security and constitutional reform process. Such
reforms could help forestall the emergence of a destabilizing power imbalance in East Asia. Japan is
already working to constrain China with its own version of Beijing’s “anti-access, area denial”
doctrine against the U.S.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including “Water, Peace, and
War.”

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:25

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15 MARCH 2017

Chinese Chop Hooey

Source Link
Nitin Pai

Dai Bingguo, a Chinese former high-level

diplomat, has made vague statements to the effect that China would concede in the Western sector
if India were to do so in the Eastern sector, and thus resolve the boundary dispute.

This is being interpreted, in the Indian media, to mean that China would trade Aksai Chin (that it
controls) for Arunachal Pradesh in general or the Tawang region in particular that we deem a part of
India. The problem, according to Mr Dai, is that successive Indian governments are unwilling to
engage in such a reasonable compromise.

The generality and vagueness of Mr Dai’s statements are perhaps intended to make the hinted offer
appear more attractive than whatever the Special Representatives of the two countries have
negotiated over the years. China appears to be willing to give up vastly greater real estate in
exchange for what it is asking for. Yet it would take one to be especially credulous to believe that
Beijing would ever make such an offer seriously. The Western sector — Aksai Chin and Pakistan-
occupied Kashmir — is of strategic importance to Beijing. It’s not for nothing that China is pouring
money into infrastructure in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, over disputed territory. So forget
about what Indian democracy thinks of the idea of giving up territory in Arunachal Pradesh — few
seriously believe China can concede anything meaningful in Aksai Chin and Kashmir.

Beijing is surely aware of this. Why then did Mr Dai fly that balloon again at this time? Quite likely, as
part of Beijing’s pressure tactics to dissuade New Delhi from permitting the Dalai Lama to visit
Tawang. It’s a way of letting the people of India know why Beijing will take coercive or punitive action
should the Dalai Lama make the trip.

Beijing can invest in building infrastructure and stationing its security personnel in territory that India
claims. That’s fine. New Delhi can’t allow the Dalai Lama to merely visit — he’s not moving there
permanently — to territory that China claims. Oh, that’s not fine. The appropriate, polite and
diplomatic response to this is for someone in the Indian capital to pick up that hotline to Beijing and
say “Hello!”

This is supposed to be a politically sensitive year for General Secretary Xi Jinping and a sensitive
month for the Communist Party because their charade of a parliament is in session. Well, then, it’s
for Mr Xi and the Communist Party of China to try not to let matters flare up. Indeed, if Beijing goes
beyond indicate displeasure then the Modi government should respond in kind. The onus of keeping
things quiet during a ‘sensitive time’ is on Mr Xi because it is sensitive for him, not for New Delhi.

If the Modi government signals that India won’t be coerced by Chinese pressure, it is likely that
Beijing will be deterred from applying it. They are, of course, welcome to loudly protest their
displeasure.

As for arriving at a solution to the border dispute by making land-swap agreements, well, what’s the
rush? We can wait a few more decades. Or centuries.

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14 MARCH 2017

THAAD and China's Nuclear Second-Strike Capability

Source Link

By Ankit Panda

China may be afraid that THAAD will degrade its

own nuclear second-strike capability.
Earlier this week, hours after North Korea’s launch of a four-missile salvo into the Sea of Japan, the
United States delivered and began deployment of part of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) system. “Continued provocative actions by North Korea, to include yesterday’s launch of
multiple missiles, only confirm the prudence of our alliance decision last year to deploy THAAD to
South Korea,” said the head of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, underlining the
rationale behind the decision.

China, South Korea’s neighbor and the United States’ great power competitor in Asia, has long been
vocally opposed to the deployment of THAAD on the Korean peninsula. In response to the
deployment, Geng Shuang, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, noted that China was
“resolutely against the deployment of THAAD by the US and the ROK in the ROK, and will take firm
and necessary steps to safeguard our security interests.”

For starters, let’s put to rest the misconception that China’s opposition to the THAAD deployment is
because it is worried about the interceptor shooting down its missiles. As the ‘T’ indicates in THAAD,
the system is only capable of intercepting projectiles in their “terminal” phase (or as they’re hurtling
towards the earth in descent). Unless China would consider firing ballistic missiles at South Korea,
THAAD will do no good against its missiles (say, it’s intercontinental ballistic missiles going toward
the United States in a nuclear exchange).

For China, opposition to THAAD is simple: it’s all about the X-band AN/TPY-2 radar unit that
accompanies the interceptor battery and aids in targeting. The radar unit has yet to be delivered; it is
expected to arrive in South Korea in April.

To be clear, China hasn’t been coy about specifically pointing to the radar issue. In fact, it has been
explicit. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has made multiple references to the “X-band radar” that
accompanies the THAAD battery, pointing out last February that it “goes far beyond the defense
need of the Korean Peninsula.” This isn’t a case of Beijing nebulously stating its opposing to the
deployment in terms of its national interest.

However, by that same token, China has turned down good faith offers from the United States for
technical talks and consultations on the THAAD deployment in South Korea. The Obama
administration, looking to assure China that the deployment wasn’t all a ruse to hurt China’s
interests, invited Beijing to talks as early as a year ago. “We will be very glad and hope we’ll have
the opportunity to sit down and talk with China about those very technical limitations and facts about
the system,” Rose Gottemoeller, the former undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, had said at the time. China rebuffed those offers. Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokeswoman Hua Chunying noted last year that THAAD was “certainly not a simple technology
issue” for China.

So, what is it about THAAD — specifically about the X-band AN/TPY-2 radar accompanying the
battery in South Korea — that so vexes China? What is it about this radar that drove Beijing to
initiate a thorough dismantling of a slowly-but-surely improving bilateral relationship with South
Korea through 2015 and early-2016?

Two Competing Hypotheses

There are two possible serious explanations for how THAAD infringes on Chinese national interests.
One is less convincing than the other. I’ll address both in order, beginning with the less convincing
explanation.

The first hypothesis is that China may fear that the AN/TPY-2 radar at the former Lotte Group golf
course in Gyeongsangbuk-do will give the United States unprecedented surveillance insight into
sensitive Chinese missile testing and development work deep within the mainland.

This may sound convincing at first glance, but there’s a few reasons why it doesn’t hold water. First,
the South Korean THAAD deployment is not the first AN/TPY-2 deployment from the United States;
nor is it even the first deployment of an advanced radar by the United States to the region. The U.S.
already has two AN/TPY-2 installations in Japan, at the Kyogamisaki Communications Site in Kyoto
prefecture and Shariki in Aomori prefecture.

Second, while we have no watertight estimates on just how capable the AN/TPY-2 radar is and in
what configurations, even the most generous estimates don’t leave the Gyeongsangbuk-do unit
capable of any useful surveillance deep into the Gobi desert, where China has its most active and
sensitive missile testing ranges. (AN/TPY-2 range estimates go from “several hundred miles” to
3,000 km.) I’ve mapped out the ranges below with the most generous range estimate of 3,000 km,
using a Chinese ballistic missile impact range that Thomas Shugart at War on the Rocks recently
revealed as a test-bed for potential People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force preempetive warfare
tactics (i.e., a site of surveillance interest for the United States).
Red line represents 3,000 km range perimeter for a Gyeongsangbuk-do AN/TPY-2 radar, based off
the greatest range estimates for the system. Source: Google Earth

Adding the westernmost AN/TPY-2 in Japan — the Kyogamisaki Communications Site unit — the
map doesn’t change drastically, either. (Incidentally, North Korea’s latest missile test resulted in
three missiles splashing down in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, between the two AN/TPY-2s in
the country — a less-than-subtle show of confidence.)
Red line represents 3,000 km range perimeter for a Gyeongsangbuk-do AN/TPY-2 radar, based off
the greatest range estimates for the system. Yellow line represents 3,000 km range estimate for a
Kyogamisaki Communications Site AN/TPY-2 radar. Source: Google Earth

Basically, the surveillance explanation doesn’t appear to be terribly convincing here. The United
States additionally has an older PAVE PAWS installation in Taiwan that adds to its long-range radar
capabilities in the region. Given these existing capabilities, the Gyeongsangbuk-do THAAD battery
and its accompanying radar won’t give the United States a new and potent looking glass into China
that it doesn’t already possess.

The second hypothesis is, I think, more convincing, and one where Beijing may have legitimate
concern about the Gyeongsangbuk-do AN/TPY-2 radar upsetting U.S.-China strategic nuclear
stability. Specifically, China may — correctly or incorrectly — fear that its nuclear second-strike
capability is significantly degraded as a result of a third U.S. AN/TPY-2 radar going up specifically
near the southern tip of the Korean peninsula.
To avoid the need for a massive nuclear build-up and to feel comfortable with its several hundred or
so nuclear warheads for targeting, China needs to feel comfortable enough its intercontinental
ballistic missiles can reliably penetrate U.S. antiballistic missile countermeasures. Pre-THAAD-in-
South-Korea, a Chinese ICBM launch would still have been exposed to the AN/TPY-2s in Japan, but
that exposure alone wouldn’t have been enough to reliably help U.S. ground-based interceptors
(GBI) in Alaska get a convincing edge against incoming Chinese warheads. (Set aside GBI’s patchy
success record for the moment.)

With a third AN/TPY-2 in South Korea, the resolution of U.S. data on incoming Chinese warheads
would potentially be greatly enhanced. Specifically, China may fear that penetration aids for its
ICBMs — such as decoy warheads — would be degraded, lowering the certitude that its existing
arsenal would be sufficient for penetrating past the U.S. ABM apparatus. Theoretically, a
triangulated AN/TPY-2 setup between Japan and South Korea could give U.S. midcourse
interceptors in Alaska enough warning to have a better shot at an incoming Chinese missile.

Moreover, specifically, a Gyeongsangbuk-do-based AN/TPY-2 would also potentially have a unique

vantage point for differentiating real warheads from decoys. Li Bin, writing for the Kyunghyang
Daily,outlines this case in greater detail: “The THAAD radar to be deployed in the ROK would be in a
very special position where it could view the back of the Chinese warheads flying over the northeast
part of China when it is deployed to watch missiles from North Korea.”

Li’s proposed solution for the United States was simple enough: the United States could “deploy its
Green Pine radar or another radar with similar capabilities to guide the THAAD interceptors.” Li add
that the “THAAD TPY-2 radar does not provide more capability to protect the ROK from the North
Korean missile threat relative to a Green Pine-level radar since the TPY-2 radar’s detection range
goes too far beyond North Korean territory.” It’s unclear also if a Green Pine radar would synergize
with the existing AN/TPY-2s in Japan.

Instability and Insecurity

Even without entering technical talks with the United States on THAAD, it’s possible that Chinese
strategic planners are all-but-certain that the AN/TPY-2 at Gyeongsangbuk-do will severely degrade
their confidence in their nuclear second-strike capability. That explains why Beijing’s been so vocally
opposed to the deployment, why it is dismantling all bilateral momentum with South Korea, and why
it shows no signs of budging. In fact, given that many analysts also speculate that China’s
recent foray into multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capable ballistic
missiles was primarily based around increasing penetration aids, Beijing may see the U.S.-South
Korea move as effectively nullifying its investment.
It’s unclear how China will choose to maneuver from here if the second hypothesis — insecurity
about the status of its second-strike — is what’s driving its opposition to THAAD. One solution could
be to engage in a massive build-up of its warhead and ballistic missile stockpiles. China’s existing
arsenal is far more modest than the Soviet Union at the height of its Cold War nuclear rivalry with the
United States and remarkably asymmetrical with existing U.S. stockpiles.

Interestingly, it is possible that Chinese concerns could have been somewhat assuaged if the
Obama administration had moved forward with a declaration of a formal no-first-use doctrine for the
U.S. nuclear arsenal. China has repeatedly affirmed its own no-first-use doctrine and some of its
concern over second-strike degradation may have been assuaged over this. Of course, with the
Trump administration in the White House and determined to ensure that the U.S. “expand its nuclear
capability,” this now seems like far from a realistic proposal. Moreover, given the declaratory nature
of doctrinal pronouncement, Beijing would still look to shore-up its second-strike capability.

China’s best option, however, simply may be South Korean domestic politics. Moon Jae-in of the
Minjoo Party appears to be in a strong position as South Korea’s next election approaches later this
year. Moon and his party have vocally opposed THAAD, but Moon changed his tone recently, saying
that he didn’t think it would be “easy to cancel the agreement which has already been made between
Korea and the United States.” Nevertheless, more so than now-disgraced former President Park
Geun-hye, Moon, if elected, may be open to a pragmatic quid pro quo arrangement with China to
reverse the deployment of THAAD.

China has invested considerable diplomatic capital in opposing the deployment and it remains to be
seen how it will choose to handle the situation once the battery and radar are fully operational.
Meanwhile, North Korea shows no sign of abating its ballistic missile testing, which serves to simply
underline the point the United States and South Korea have long made in favor of the deployment:
it’s necessary to defend South Korea. Whatever comes next, the THAAD saga on the Korean
peninsula is certainly far from over.

Ankit Panda is a senior editor at The Diplomat, where he writes on international security, economics,
and politics. He tweets at @nktpnd.

Posted by Strategic Studies at 00:25

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