SEC. 13.

No SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRE- SENTATIVES MAY HOLD ANY OTHER
OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOV- ERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR
INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT- OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIE S, DURING HIS TERM WITHOUT FORFEITING HIS SEAT.
NEITHER SHALL HE BE APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICE WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN

CREATED OR THE EMOLUMENTS THEREOF INCREASED DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS
ELECTED.

A. See Section 13.

Q« What are the prohibitions imposed on a members of the

Congress?

NOTE: Petitioner Liban, a private citizen, alleged that by remaining Chairman of the National Red Cross
Senator Gordon has forfeited his seat in the Senate. Liban, however, has no standing to challenge
Gordon's occupation of his senatorial seat and the National Red Cross is not a government owned
corporation but a private corporation performing public function. Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No.

175352, July 15, 2009. See Nachura dissent.

Q. May a member of Congress resign in order to accept an appointment in the governm ent before the
expiration of his term?

A. Yes. See the first Sentence of Section 13.

Q. But are there offices appointment to which is prohibited dining his term even if the member of
Congress resigns his seat?

A. Yes. He cannot accept appointment to an off ice which may have been created or the emolument of
which may have been increased during his term, and this, even if he had already resigned when the
office was created or the emolument increased. See the second sentence of Section 13.

SEC. 14. No SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY PERSONALLY APPEAR AS
COUNSEL BEFORE ANY

COURT OF JUSTICE OR BEFORE THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL S , OR QUASI-J UD IC IAL AND OT H

ER

ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. NEITHER SHALL HE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BE INTERESTED

FINANCIALLY IN ANY CONTRACT WITH, OR IN ANY FRANCHISE OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED
BY

THE GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF,

INCLUDING ANY GOVERNME NT- OWNED OR CONTROLLE D CORPORAT ION, OR ITS SUBSIDI A RY
,

DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE. He SHALL NOT INTERVENE IN ANY MATTER BEFORE ANY OFFICE OF

THE GOVERNME NT FOR HIS PECUNIA RY BENEFIT OR WHERE HE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO ACT
ON ACCOUNT OF HIS OFFICE.

Q. What are the prohibitions on a member of Congress relative to the practice of his profession?

A. See Section 14.

Q. A Congressman buys a nominal amount of shares in a corporation which is party to a suit before the
Securities and Exchange Commission and then appears in "intervention." Should the intervention be
allowed?

A. "A ruling upholding the 'intervention' would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All [a
Congressman] need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the 'interest' of a client and then

236 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 15-16

A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

'intervene' in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by
indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or
impliedly prohibited." Puyat v. De Guzman, Jr., 113 SCRA 31, 37 (March 25,1982).
Q. Does the prohibition applicable to lawyer -Congressmen apply to the law firm of which they may be
members?

A. No. The prohibition is personal. SEC. 15. THE CONGRESS SHALL

CONVENE ONCE EVERY YEAR ON

THE FOURTH MONDAY OF JULY FOR ITS REGULAR SESSION, UNLESS A DIFFERENT DATE IS FIXE
D BY LAW, AND SHALL CONTINUE TO BE IN SESSION FOR SUCH NUMBER OF DAYS AS IT MAY DETERMINE
UNTIL THIRTY DAYS BEFORE THE OPENING OF ITS NEXT REGULAR SESSION, EXCLUSIVE OF

SATURDAYS, SUNDAYS, AND LEGAL HOLIDAYS. THE PRESIDENT MAY CALL A SPECIAL SESSION AT
ANY TIME.

Q. What distinguishes a special session from a regular session?

A. A special session is one called by the President while the legislature is in recess. Underthe 1935
Constitution the distinction between regular and special session was significant because during a special
session the legislature could consider only the subject matterdesignated by the President. It is submitted
that under the present law, which leaves discretion to Congress as to the numberof regular session days,
the distinction is no longer significant for the purpose of determi ning what the legislature may consider.

SEC. 16. (1) THE SENATE SHALL ELECT ITS PRESIDENT AND THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ITS SPEAKER, BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS RESPECTIVE MEMBERS.

EACH HOUSE SHALL CHOOSE SUCH OTHER OFFICERS AS IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY.

(2) A MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE SHALL CONSTITUTE A QUORUM TO DO BUSINE S S , BUT A

SMALLER NUMBER. MAY ADJOURN FROM DAY TO DAY AND MAY COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF
ABSENT MEMBERS IN SUCH MANNER, AND UNDER SUCH PENALTIES, AS SUC H HOUSE MAY
PROVIDE.

(3) EACH HOUSE MAY DETERMINE THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, PUNISH ITS MEMBERS FOR
DISORDERL Y BEHAVIOR, AND WITH THE CONCURRE NCE OF TWO-THIRD S OF ALL ITS MEMBERS,
SUSPEND OR EXPEL A
MEMBER. A PENALTY OF SUSPENSION, WHEN IMPOSED, SHALL NOT EXCEED SIXTY DAYS.

(4) EACH HOUSE SHALL KEEP A JOURNAL OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, AND FROM TIME TO TIME PUBLISH
THE SAME, EXCEPTING SUCH PARTS AS MAY, IN ITS JUDGMENT, AFFECT NATIONAL SECURITY; AND THE
YEAS AND NAYS ON ANY QUESTION SHALL, AT THE REQUEST OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE MEMBERS
PRESENT, BE ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL.

EACH HOUSE SHALL ALSO KEEP A RECORD OF ITS PROCEEDINGS.

(5) NEITHER HOUSE DURING THE SESSIONS OF THE CONGRESS SHALL, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF
THE OTHER, ADJOURN FOR MORE THAN THREE DAYS, NOR TO ANY OTHER PLACE THAN THAT IN
WHICH THE TWO HOUSES SHALL BE SITTING.

Q. Who are the officers of Congress?

A. The Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and

"such other officers as [each House] may deem necessary."

Q. On the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senators Fernan and Tatad contested forthe
Senate Presidency. Fernan won by a vote of 20 to 2. With the agreement of Senator Santiago, Tatad
manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader explaining that those who had voted
for Fernan comprised the maj ority, while those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to
the minority. However, the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators had chosen SenatorGuingona as the
minority leader. Later, Fernan formally recognized Guingona as such. Santiago and Tatad filed before the
Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Guingona "had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Se nate minority leader," a position that rightfully belonged to
Tatad.

1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2) Petitioners claim that Art. VI, §16(1) has not been observed in the selection of the minority leader.
Decide.

A. 1) Yes. "It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its
officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of
their functions and prerogatives." Santiago v. Guingona, G.R No. 134577, November 18,1998, p. 18.
238 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 15-16

A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

2) This provision is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, but silent
on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. The method of choosing
who will be the other officers must be prescrib ed by the Senate itself. The Rules of the Senate neither
provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders nor prescribe the manner of creating such
offices or of choosing the holders thereof. Such offices exist by tradition and long practice. "But, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon
which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the
basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature;
it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work." Id. at 23-24 (citing New
York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Steingut , 353 NE2d 558).

Q. What is the existence of a quorum based on?

A. On the proportion between those physically present and the total membership of the body.

Q. Is disciplinary action taken by Congress against a member subject to judicial review?

A. No, because each House is the sole judge of what disorderly behavior is.

Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).

Q. May the Court intervene in the implementation of the rules of either House of Congress?

A. On matters affecting only internal operation of the legislature, the legislature's formulation and
implementation of its rules is beyond the reach of the courts. When, however, the legislative rule affects
private rights, the courts cannot altogether be excluded. United States v. Smith,

286 U.S. 6 (1932). See also Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 206 (1946).

Q. What is the purpose of the requirement that a Journal be kept?

A. The duty to keep a Journal has a dual purpose: (1) "to insure publicity to the proceedings of the
legislature, and a correspondent responsibility of the members to their respective constituents," and (2)
to provide proof of what actually trans
pired in the legislature. 1 STORY COMMENT A RIE S 840, quoted with approval in

Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670 (1892).

Q. What matters may Congress keep out of the Journal?

A. The Constitution exempts from publication only such matters "as may, in [the Congress'] judgment,
affect national security." This new rule is an application of Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which says:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

Q. What is the value of the Journal as evidence of what actually transpired in Congress when the Journal
conflicts with extraneous evidence such as the testimony of witnesses or newspaper reports, etc.?

A- The Journal is conclusive upon the courts. United States v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729 (1916).

Q. What is the enrolled bill doctrine?

A. The signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification
by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that such bill was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14,1997,277 SCRA 268.

Q. What is the value of the Journal as evidence of the contents of a law when what the Journal says
conflicts with the "enrolled bill?"

A. The "enrolled bill" is the official copy of approved legislation and bears the certification of the
presiding officer of the legislativebody. The respect due to a coequal department requires the courts to
accept the certification of the presiding officer of the legislativebody. The respect due to coequal
department requires the courts to accept the certification of the presiding officer as conclusive
assurance that the bill

so certified is authentic. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 7

SCRA 347 (1963).

240 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sec. 17

A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

Q. If the presiding officer should repudiate his signature in the "enrolled bill," will the enrolled bill still
prevail over the Journal?

A. The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due to a coequal department. When such
coequal department itself repudiates the enrolled bill, then the journal must be accepted as conclusive.
Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).

Q. If the enrolled bill conflicts with the Journal on a matter required by the

Constitution to be entered in the Journal, which should prevail?

A. The Supreme Court has explicitly left this matter an open question in

Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).

SEC. 17. THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL EACH HAVE AN ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL WHICH SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION,
RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. EACH ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL
BE COMPOSED OF NINE MEMBERS, THREE OF WHOM SHALL BE JUSTICES OF

THE SUPREME COURT TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE, AND

THE REMAINING SIX SHALL BE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AS
THE CASE MAY BE, WHO SHALL BE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-
LIST SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE SENIOR JUSTICE IN THE

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE ITS CHAIRMAN.

Q. Who is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of Congress?

A. When there is an election contest, that is, when a defeated candidate challenges the qualification and
claims the seat of a proclaimed winner, the respective Electoral Tribunal of each House is the sole judge,
and neither the Supreme Court nor each House of Congress nor the Commission on Elections can
interfere. In the absence of an election contest, however, the Electoral Tribunals are without
jurisdiction. Thus, the power of each House to defer the oath-taking of members until final
determination of election contests filed against them has been retained by each House. Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).

Q. When does a case pass from the Comelec to the electoral Tribunal?

A. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the House of Representatives, COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Aggabao v. Comelec, G.R. No.
163756, January 26, 2005; Limkaichong v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 17883132, April 1, 2009.

Q. Who decides whether a party list representative is qualified?

A. The HRET. But the Comelec can decide whether a party-list organization is qualified to join the party-
list system. Abayon u. Comelec, G.R. No.

189466, February 11, 2010.

Q. Do not the powers of Congress and the Comelec to entertain pre-proclamation controversies conflict
with the power of the Electoral Tribunals?

A Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand,
and the PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes.
The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice President. The SET is the sole, judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked
once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the
other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this
power before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates.
Banat v. Comelec, G.R No. 177508, August 7, 2009.

Q. What is the composition of each Electoral Tribunal? A. See Section 17.

NOTE: The Constitution gives to the two Houses of Congress the primary jurisdiction over who should sit
in the Commission on Appointments. This includes determination of party affiliation and number of
party members for the purpose of determining proportional representation. Drilon, et al. v. Speaker,
G.R. No.

180055, July 31,2009.

242 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees.

15-16

A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

Q. May the Supreme Court intervene in the creation of the Electoral Tribunal?

A. The case of Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991), involved a blatant attempt of a political party to
manipulate the decision of the Tribunal by manipulating its membership. On the eve of the
promulgation of a decision of the Tribunal against a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP), the LDP expelled Camasura from the party, and therefore as LDP representative in the Tribunal,
on the ground of disloyalty. Camasura, the LDP member of the Electoral Tribunal, had confided to the
LDP that he was voting against the party's candidate. The Supreme Court invalidated the e xpulsion of
Camasura from the Tribunal saying that it was a clear impairment of the Tribunal's prerogative to be the
sole judge of election contests. Id. at 810-812. See dissent of Padilla and Sarmiento saying that the
decision impairs the independence of the House.

The jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to be sole judge comes only after a valid proclamation of a
winner. Under Article VIII, Section 1, judicial power includes the authority "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.'' Robles v. House Electoral Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780 (1990);
Co v. House Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991). On this basis, the Supreme Court has invalidated a
final vote tally made by the Electoral Tribunal without supporting evidence. Lerias v. House Electoral
Tribunal,

202 SCRA 808 (1991); Arroyo v. House Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.

118597, July 14,1995.

Q. What major difference is there in the composition of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1935
Constitution and of those under the new Constitution?

A. Under the 1935 Constitution, only the two major political parties had representation and they had it
equally between them, Tanada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. 10520, February 28, 1957; under the new
Constitution, all political parties are given proportional representation.

Q. The right of Farinas to sit in the House of Representatives is challenged on the ground that his
certificate of candidacy was invalid. The challenger claims that, although Farinas has already been
proclaimed winner and is actually holding office, the case does

not come under the Electoral Tribunal because the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under Article VI,
Section 17 of the Constitution is limited only to the qualifications prescribed under Article V I, Section 6
of the Constitution. Consequently, he claims that any issue which does not involve these constitutional
qualifications is beyond the realm of the HRET. The filing of a certificate of candidacy being a statutory
qualification under the Omnibus Election Code is outside the pale of the HRET. Decide.

A. Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution cannot be circumscribed lexically. The word
"qualifications" cannot be read as qualified by the term "constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit noc nos
distinguire debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish,
the courts should not distinguish. In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a
winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that
issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of
proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's
mandate. Moreover, whether Farinas validly substituted for someone else must likewise be addressed
to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Only thus can we demonstrate fealty to the
Constitutional provision that the Electoral Tribunal of each House of Congress shall be the "sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members." Guerrero v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000.
NOTE: This is different from Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) where the Federal Court said that
Congress can pass judgment only on constitutional qualifications. The Tribunal's power, however, covers
not just qualifications but also "election" and "returns."

Q. May Congress regulate the actions of the Electoral Tribunals even only in procedural matters?

A. No. The Tribunals are independent constitutional bodies.

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.

Q. Petitioners, seeking to disqualify Harry Angping, failed to make the cash deposit required by the rules
of the HRET. When the petition was dismissed, they claimed grave abuse of discretion. Decide.

A. The petition for quo warranto attacks the ineligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office as a
Membe r of the House of Representatives, not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. This is a
serious charge, which, if true, renders Congressman Angping disqualified from such office. In view of the
delicate nature and importance of this charge, the observance of the HRET Rules of

244 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

Procedure must be taken seriously if they are to attain their objective, i.e., the speedy and orderly
determination of the true will of the electorate. Correlatively, party litigants appearing before the HRET
or, to be more precise, their lawyers, are duty bound to know and are expected to properly comply with
the procedural requirements laid down by the Tribunal without being formally ordered to do so. They
cannot righteously impute abuse of discretion to the Trib unal if by reason of the non-observance of
those requirements it decides to dismiss their petition. Imperative justice requires the proper
observance of technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper and swift dispensation. Therefore,
we find that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in applying its Rules strictly and in
dismissing the Garcia v. HRET, 6.R. No. 134792. August 12,1999.

Q. What is the extent of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the Electoral Tribunals?

A. Judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the Electoral Tribunals is possible only in the
exercise of the Court's so -called extraordinary jurisdiction upon a determination that the tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
constituting denial of due process. Robles v. House Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February
5,1990;Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30,1991; Lerias
v. House Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 97105, October

15,1991.

Q. On the eve of the promulgation of a decision against an LDP member, the LDP expelled Camasura
from the party (and therefore as LDP member of the HET), one of its representatives in the Electoral
Tribunal and the alleged ground of disloyalty for having shown his support for Cojuangco. Camasura had
previously confided to LDP that he had voted against the LDP Congressman. As a consequence the
decision could not be promulgated. Was the removal of Camasura valid?

A. The action taken by LDP was a grave abuse of discretion which the Supreme Court can correct by
virtue of its power under Article VIII, Section 1 to review "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." Bondoc v.
Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991.

Q. . The Senator-members of the Electoral Tribunal are sought to be disqualified on the ground that
they, together with all the other Senators, are respondents in the contest filed by the opposition. May
the Electoral Tribunal function as such when all of the Senator-members in it have been disqualified,
either voluntarily or involuntarily?

A. No. "Where as here a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in
the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification if sanctioned and ordered would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform but which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators." They must
therefore discharge their function. Abbas, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651 (1988).

Q. Petitioner contends that the protest before the Electoral Tribunal was filed out of time and therefore
should be dismissed. True enough, the protest was filed within the period prescribed by the Tribunal
rules, but out of time if computed on the basis of the Election Code for filing cases before the COMELEC.
Decide.

A. The applicable rule is not the Election Code rule, which is for cases filed before the COMELEC, but the
Tribunal rule. In fact, Congress may not prescribe for the Electoral Tribunal a period for filing cases
before it. The Tribunal is sole judge of election contests. This power necessarily includes the rule making
power with which Congress may not interfere. Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 84297,
December 8,1988.

SEC. 18. THERE SHALL BE A COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

CONSISTING OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, AS EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMA N, TWELVE SENATORS

AND TWELVE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTAT IVE S, ELECTED BY EACH HOUSE ON

THE BASIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND

PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE
CHAIRMA N OF THE COMMISSION SHALL NOT VOTE, EXCEPT IN CASE OF A TIE. THE

COMMISSION SHALL ACT ON ALL APPOINT ME NT S SUBMITT ED TO IT WITHIN THIRTY SESSION

DAYS OF THE

CONGRESS FROM THEIR SUBMISSION. THE COMMISSION SHALL RULE BY A

MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS MEMBERS.

Q. What is the composition of the Commission on Appointments?

A. It is composed of the Senate President as Chairman, twelve Senators and

twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each

House according to proportional representation of the parties or

organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The total composition will
thus be twenty five, but the Chairman votes only to break a tie.

246 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees.

15-16

A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

Q. What is the function of the Commission on Appointments?

A. The Commission on Appointments acts as a legislative check on the appointing authority of the
President. For the effectivity of the appointment of certain key officials enumerated in the Constitution,
the consent of the Commission on Appointments is needed.

Q. Petitioner was a member of the Commission on Appointments representing the Liberal Party. With
the organization of the LDP (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino), some congressional members belonging
to

the Liberal Party resigned from said party to join the LDP. When the

Commission on Appointments was reorganized, petitioner was

replaced by an LDP representative.

1. Does the situation present a "political question?"

2. Petitioner contends that the organization of the LDP cannot affect the composition of the
Commission on Appointments because LDP is not a registered party and has not yet shown the stability
of a party. Decide.

A. 1. The question is justiciable. The issue is one of legality not of wisdom. The ascertainment of the
manner of forming the Commission on Appointments is distinct from the discretion of the parties to
designate their representatives. And even if the question were political in nature, it would still come
underthe expanded powerof review in Article VIII, Section 1.

2. The Constitution requires proportional representation of the parties in both houses of Congress.
Nowhere, however, does the Constitution require that the party must be a registered party.
(Moreover, in the course of the litigation, the Commission on Elections affirmed the registration of the
LDP as a political party.) The sense of the Constitution is that the membership in the Commission on
Appointments must always reflect political alignments in Congress and must therefore adjust to
changes. It is understood that such changes in party affiliation must be permanent and not merely
temporary alli- ances. Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21,1989.

Q. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA. After the reorganization of party
alignment when many joined the LDP and with the endorsement of nine other Congressmen she sought
appointment to the Commission on
Appointments as a minority representative. Is she entitled to a seat under the rule of proportional
representation?

No. This is a justiciable question since it involves the legality of the distribution of seats. Even if KAIBA
were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member represents only 0.4% of the House
membership and thus not entitled to one of the twelve seats. Under the total membership of the House,
to be entitled to a seat the party should comprise 8.4% of the House membership. Nor can the
endorsement of the nine members be counted in Coseteng's favor because they are not members of her
party. Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr., G.R. No. 86649, July 12,

1990.

NOTE: The arithmetic involved in the formation of the Commission on Appointments has occasioned a
number of controversies and was once again the subject of controversy in Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214
SCRA 789 (1992). The case involved the Senate contingent in the Commission. The senatorial elections of
1992 yielded 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC, 3 Lakas-NUCD, and 1

LP-PDP-LABAN. On the basis of proportional representation,

therefore, the Commission on Appointments could contain 7.5

LDP, 2.5 NPC, 1.5 Lakas, and .5 LP-PDP-LABAN. The Senate,

however, put in 8 LDP by rounding out 7.5, 2 NPC by ignoring .5, 1

LAKAS also by ignoring .5, and 1 LP-PDP by rounding out .5 to 1.

Was this constitutional? The Court ruled that rounding out 7.5 to 8

and .5 to 1 was unconstitutional because it deprived Lakas and

NPC of .5 each. Nor could the holders of .5 each, while belonging

to distinct parties, form a unity for purposes of obtaining a seat in

the Commission. Thus, under the Court's arithmetic, the result

would be a total of only 11 members. The Court ruled that a full

complement of 12 was not mandatory.

The case of Lorenzo Tanada being given a seat in the Commission on Appointments in the old Senate in
spite of his being the only member of the Citizens Party was cited as justification for reconsidering the
decision. The Court did not consider the case of the older Tanada as precedent because the action of
the Senate then was never challenged in court. Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326 (1993).

NOTE: The Constitution gives to the two Houses of Congress the primary jurisdiction over who should sit
in the Commission on Appointments. This includes determination of party affiliation and number of
party members for the purpose of determining proportional representation. Drilon, et al v. Speaker, G.R.
No.

180055, July 31, 2009.

SEC. 19. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS AND THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE
CONSTITUTED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL
HAVE BEEN

ORGANIZED WITH THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SPEAKER.

THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTME NTS SHALL MEET ONLY WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION, AT

THE CALL OF ITS CHAIRMAN OR A MAJORITY

OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, TO DISCHARGE SUCH POWERS AND FUNCTIONS AS ABE HEREIN

CONFERRED UPON IT.

Q. How should the Commission arrive at its decisions?

A. First, the Commission must act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days from
submission. This rule is intended to prevent the Commission from freezing appointments. Second, the
Commission shall decide by majority vote. Thus, the dissent of one member should not block action by
the Commission. Finally, the Commission can meet and act only when Congress is in session.

SEC. 20. THE RECORDS AND BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF THE CONGRESS

SHALL BE PRESERVE D AND BE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC IN ACCORD A NCE WITH LAW, AND SUC H

BOOKS SHALL BE AUDITED BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH SHALL PUBLISH ANNUA L L
Y AN ITEMIZED LIST OF AMOUNTS PAID TO AND EXPENSES INCURRED FOR EACH MEMBER.

SEC. 21. THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OR

ANY OF ITS RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES MAY CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION IN

ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DULY PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE. THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS APPEARING
IN OR AFFECTED BY SUCH INQUIRIES SHALL BE RESPECTED.

NOTE: Legislative hearings.

There are two provisions on legislative hearing, Sections 21 and

22. Section 21 is about legislative investigations in aid of legislation. Its

scope and limitation has been the subject of earlier rulings but Senate v.

Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20,2006, specified who may and who

may not be summoned to Section 21 hearings. Thus, under this rule,

even a Department Head who is an alter ego of the President may be

summoned. Thus, too, the Chairman and members of the Presidential

Commission on Good Government (PCGG) are not except from

summons in spite of the exemption given to them by President Cory

Aquino during her executive rule. Sabio v. Gordon, G.R.

No. 174318, October 17, 2006. The Court ruled that anyone, except the President and Justices of the
Supreme Court, may be summoned. Nor may a court prevent a witness from appearing in such hearing.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Judge Majadueon, G.R. No. 136760, July 29,

2003.

Section 22, for its part, establishes the rule for the exercise of what is called the "oversight function" of
Congress. Such function is intended to enable Congress to determine how laws it has passed are being
implemented. In deference to separation of powers, however, and because Department Heads are alter
egos of the President, they may not appear without the permission of the President. This was explicitly
mentioned in the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention where some Delegates had
doubts about the propriety or constitutionality of Department Heads appearing in Congress. Such
deference is not found, by the Court's interpretation, in Section 21.

It should be noted, however, that the exemption from summons applies only to Department Heads and
not to everyone who has Cabinet rank.

Q. Must the rules for investigation be published?

A. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to

punish or otherwise burden a citizen forthe transgression of a law or

rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code,

which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a

newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." The absence of any amendment to the rules
published some years ago cannot justify the Senate's defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of
Section 21, ArticleVI of the Constitution. The organiclaw instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make

any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional
mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008

In De la Paz v. Senate, G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009 petitioners argue that respondent
Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction because it violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the
warrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent
Committee and because they were not published as required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be
used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident. But Section 16(3),
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this
power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process. But the Senate is
still subject to the imperatives of quorum, voting, and publication. (The Senates rules had in fact been
published and were followed by the Senate.)

Q. What is the purpose of legislative investigation?

A. The powerof inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not infrequently true — recourse must

be had to others who do possess it. Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, 45 (1950).
Q. How is the power of legislative investigation enforced?

A. Experience has shown that mere requests forinformation are frequently unavailing and that
information that is volunteered is not always accurate or complete. Hence, the power of investigation
necessarily includes the power to punish a contumacious witness for contempt. Arnault v. Nazareno,
supra.

Q. May a court enjoin the appearance of a witness?

A. No. A court has no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent to appear and
testify before it. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Judge Majaducon, G.R. No. 136760, July 29,2003.

Q. When may a witness in an investigation be punished for contempt?

A. No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness unless his testimony is required in a matter
into which the legislature or any of its committees has jurisdiction to inquire. The requirement that the
investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an essential element for establishing the jurisdiction of the
legislative body. It is, however, a requirement which is not difficult to satisfy because, unlike in the
United States, where legislative power is shared by the United States Congress and the state
legislatures, the totality of legislative poweris possessed by Congress and its legislative field is well-nigh
unlimited. "It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be
bounded." Moreover, it is not necessary that every question propounded to a witness must be material
to a proposed legislation. "In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its
direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question."
Arnault v. Nazareno, supra.

Q. Upon the instigation of Senator Enrile who said in a privileged speech that there was need to
determine the existence of violation of law in the alleged transfer of some properties of "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group of companies, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee decided, purportedly in
aid of legislation, to investigate the transaction. Meanwhile, too, the petitioners in this case had been
charged before the Sandiganbayan in connection with the same transaction. Meanwhile, too, the
petitioners in this case had been charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan in connection with the
same transaction.
A. The Court ruled that the investigation was not in aid of legislation because "the speech of Senator
Enrile contained no

suggestion of contemplated legislation" but merely pointed to the need to determine whether "the
relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law." To allow the
investigation to continue would violate separation of powers. (The Court did not find it necessary to
discuss the due process allegation.) Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914,
November 20,1991. See dissents.

But when bank officers who had been summoned used the Bengzon argument in Standard Charter v.
Senate, G.R. No. 167173, December 27,2007, the Court said that the factual milieu in Bengzon did not
obtain in the case. Resolution No. 166 calling for the hearing was explicit about the subject and nature
of the inquiry to be conducted by the respondent Committee.

Q. What does the Constitution mean when it says that "The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected?"

A. This is just another way of saying that legislative investigations must be "subject to the limitations
placed by the Constitution on governmental action." And since all governmental action must be
exercised subject to constitutional limitations, principally found in the Bill of Rights, this limitation really
creates no new constitutional right.

Q. For how long may Congress keep a contumacious witness in detention?

A. In addition to the above express limitations on the power of Congress is the implicit limitation that
the legislature's power to commit a witness for contempt terminates when the legislative body ceases
to exist upon its final adjournment. "This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power

to impose such a penalty is the right which the legislature has to self-preservation, and which right is
enforceable during the existence of the legislative body." Avancena, C.J. concurring in Lopez v. de los
Reyes,

55 Phil. 170,186 (1930).

Q. May the inherent powerof Congress to punish forcontempt be applied, mutatis mutandis, to local
legislative bodies?

A. No. The power is recognized as inherent in Congress as a matter of self-preservation of one of the
three independent and coordinate branches of government. It is sui generis and may not be claimed by
local legislative bodies. Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative
v. Sangguniang Panglunsod, G.R. No. 72492, November 5,1987.

SEC. 22. THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS MAY UPON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE
PRESIDENT, OR UPON THE REQUEST OF EITHER HOUSE, AS THE RULES OF EACH HOUSE SHALL

PROVIDE, APPEAR BEFORE AND BE HEARD BY SUCH HOUSE ON ANY MATTER PERTAINING T O
THEIR DEPARTME NT S. WRITTEN QUESTIONS SHALL BE SUBMITTE D TO THE PRESIDENT OF TH E

SENATE OR THE SPEAKER OF

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AT LEAST THREE DAYS BEFORE THEIR

SCHEDULED APPEARANCE. INTERPELLAT IONS SHALL NOT BE LIMITED TO WRITTEN QUESTI O N S

, BUT MAY COVER MATTERS RELATED THERETO. WHEN THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OR THE PUBLIC
INTEREST SO REQUIRES

AND THE PRESIDENT SO STATES IN WRITING, THE APPEARANCE SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN

EXECUTIVE SESSION.

Q. What is the purpose of Section 22?

A. The provision formalizes the "oversight function" of Congress. The special mention of heads of
departments was put in, even under the Administrative Code before the 1935 Constitution, was
intended to forestall any objection to a department head's appearance in Congress.

Q. Does Section 22 provide for a "question hour?"

A. No. The "question hour" is proper to a parliamentary system where there is no separation between
the legislative and executive department. Section 22, unlike in the "question hour" under the 1973
Constitution, has made the appearance of department heads voluntary. They can appear on theirown
initiative, with the consent of the President, or at the request of Congress. Because of the se paration of
powers, however, department secretaries may not impose their appearance upon either House.

SEC. 23. (1) THE CONGRE SS, BY A VOTE OF TWO-TH IRD S OF BOTH HOUSES IN JOINT SESSION
ASSEMBLE D, VOTING SEPARAT EL Y, SHALL HAVE THE SOLE POWE R TO DECLARE TH E
EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF WAR.

(2) IN TIMES OF WAR OR OTHER NATIONA L EMERGENCY, THE CONGRESS MAY BY LAW AUTHORIZE
THE PRESIDENT, FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND SUBJECT TO SUCH RESTRICTIONS AS IT MAY PRESCRIBE,
TO EXERCISE POWERS NECESSARY AND PROPER TO CARRY OUT A DECLARED NATIONAL POLICY.
UNLESS SOONER WITHDRAWN BY RESOLUTION OF THE

CONGRESS, SUCH POWER SHALL CEASE UPON THE NEXT ADJOURNME NT THEREOF.

Q. What is the difference, if any, between the war power of

Congress under the 1935 Constitution and the war power of

Congress now?

A. The 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25, gave to Congress "the sole power to declare war;" the
present provision, as also the 1973 provision, gives to Congress "the sole power to declare the existence
of a state of war." The difference between t he

two phraseologies is not substantial but merely in emphasis. The two phrases are interchangeable, even
under the 1935

Constitution; but the second phrase emphasizes more the fact that the Philippines, according to Article
II, Section 2, renounces aggressive war as an instrument of national policy.

Q. May the country engage in war in the absence of a declaration of war?

A. While the Constitution gives to the legislature the power to

declare the existence of a state of war and to enact all measures

to support the war, the actual power to make war is lodged

elsewhere, that is, in the executive power which holds the

sword of the nation. The executive power, when necessary, may

make war even in the absence of a declaration of war. In the

words of the American Supreme Court, war being a question of

actualities, "the President was bound to meet it in the shape

it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it

with a name; and no name given to it by him or them could

change the fact." See Prize Cases, 2 Bl. 635 (U.S. 1863).
Q. Under what conditions may emergency powers be delegated to the President?

A. See Section 23(2).

Q. What emergency powers may be delegated?

A. Under the present provision, Congress may authorize the President "to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy." Note that the nature of the delegable power is not
specified. It is submitted that, on the basis of this provision, the President may be given emergency
legislative powers if Congress so desires. This is confirmed

by the explanation made on the floor of the 1971 Convention,

which is the source of this provision, that emergency powers

can include the power to rule by "executive fiat."

Q. Does a resolution of Congress withdrawing the emergency powers need presidential approval?

A. No.

SEC. 24. ALL APPROPRIATION, REVENUE OR TARIFF BILLS, BILLS

AUTHORIZING INCREASE OF THE PUBLIC DEBT, BILLS OF LOCAL APPLICATION, AND PRIVATE
BILL S

SHALL ORIGINATE EXCLUSIVELY IN THE HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES, BUT THE SENATE MAY PROPOSE OR CONCUR WIT H AMENDMENTS.

Q. What is the meaning of the requirement that money bills must originate in the House of
Representatives?

A. The meaning of origination from the House and the scope of the Senate's power to introduce
amendments were thoroughly discussed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994),
affirmed on reconsideration October 30, 1995, involving R.A. 7716, the Value Added Tax (VAT) law. The
Court said that the exclusivity of the prerogative of the House of Representatives means simply that the
House alone can initiate the passage of a revenue bill, such that, if the House does not initiate one, no
revenue law will be passed. But once the House has approved a revenue bill and passed it on to the
Senate, the Senate can completely overhaul it, by amendment of parts or by amendment by
substitution, and come out with one completely different from what the House approved. It does not
matter whether the Senate already anticipated a bill from the House and formulated one to take the
place of whatever the House might send. The Court rejected the idea that the Senate is bound to retain
the essence of what the other House approved. Textually, it is the "bill" which must exclusively originate
from the House; but the "law" itself which is the product of the total bicameral legislative process
originates not just from the House but from both Senate and House.

NOTE: A bill of local application, such as one asking for the conversion of a municipality into a city, is
deemed to have originated from the House provide d that the bill of the House was filed prior to the
filing of the bill in the Senate even if, in the end, the Sernate approved its own version. Reiterates the
VAT case. Alvarez v. Guingona, G.R. No. 118303, January 31,1996.

NOTE: Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991), dealt with the controversy surrounding automatic
appropriation

for foreign debt servicing. Petitioners sought to declare the various

Presidential Decrees authorizing automatic appropriation of amounts to be used for servicing foreign
debts. The principal contention of petitioners was that (1) appropriation "bills" under Section 24 must
originate in the House of Representatives and

(2) there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation.

Answering the first argument the Court said that the ex- isting presidential decrees were laws and not
bills still to be enacted into law. As to the second argument, the Court resolved it by applying the
principles on delegation: The decrees are com- plete by themselves and the exact amount due can be
arrived at by arithmetical computation on the basis of existing records.

SEC. 25. (1) THE CONGRESS MAY NOT INCREASE THE APPROPRIA- TIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE
PRESIDENT FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AS SPECIFIED IN THE BUDGET. THE FORM,
CONTENT, AND MANNER OF PREPARATION OF THE BUDGET SHALL BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW.

(2) NO PROVISION OR ENACTMENT SHALL BE EMBRACED IN THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL

UNLESS IT RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO

SOME PARTICULAR APPROPRIATION THEREIN. ANY SUCH PROVISION OR

ENACTMENT SHALL BE LIMITED IN ITS OPERATION TO THE APPROPRIATION TO WHICH IT RELATES.

(3) THE PROCEDURE IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS SHALL STRICTLY
FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE FOR APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS FOR OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENCIES.

(4) A SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS BELL SHALL SPECIFY THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED, AND
SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY FUNDS ACTUALLY AVAILABLE AS CERTIFIED BY THE NATIONAL TREASURER,
OR TO BE RAISED BY A CORRESPONDING REVENUE PROPOSAL THEREIN.

(5) NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED AUTHORIZING ANY TRANSFER OF APPROPRIATIONS; HOWEVER, THE
PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE HEADS OF CONSTITUTIONAL

COMMISSIONS MAY, BY LAW, BE AUTHORIZED TO AUGMENT ANY ITEM IN THE

GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES FROM SAVINGS IN OTHER ITEMS
OF THEIR RESPECTIVE APPROPRIAT IONS.

(6) DISCRETIONARY FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR PARTICULAR OFFICIALS SHALL BE DISBURSED

ONLY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES TO BE

SUPPORTED BY APPROPRIATE VOUCHERS AND SUBJECT TO SUCH GUIDELINES AS MAY BE

PRESCRIBED BY LAW.

CONGRES8.

(7) IF, BY THE END OF ANY FISCAL YEAR, THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE FAILED TO PASS THE
GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL FOR THE ENSUING FISCAL YEAR, THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS
LAW FOR THE PRECEDING

FISCAL YEAR SHALL BE DEEMED REENACTED AND SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE AND EFFECT UNTIL THE
GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL IS PASSED BY THE
Q. How is the general appropriations bill prepared? A. See Section 24 and Section 25(1).

Q. What is the rule on "riders" in the general appropriations bill? A. See Section 25(2).

Q. The Appropriation Act forFY 1956-57 contained the following provision: "after the approval of this
Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be
called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of five consecutive years." Is
the provision valid?

A. No. The provision violates the rule on "riders." Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517 (July 30,1975).

Q. May Congress treat appropriations for Congress itself differently from those for others?

A. See Section 25(3).

Q. What are the rules on special appropriations? A. See Section 25(4).

Q. To what extent may Congress allow transfer of funds? A. See Section 25(5);

Q. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 ofP.D. 1177 says: "The President shall have the authority to transfer any
fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the executive
department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment." Valid?

A. No. Commenting on the constitutional text, the Court said that the provision is intended "to afford
the heads of the diffe

rent branches of the government and those of the Constitutional Commissions considerable flexibility in
the use of public funds and resources" but that the leeway granted was limited. "The purpose of
augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in

the appropriation of t he government branch or constitutional body." Pointing

out that P.D. 1177 empowered the President "to indiscriminately transfer

funds . . . without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are

actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken," the Court

declared the law unconstitutional. Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987).
NOTE: The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds under this provision is exclusive. Hence,
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces may not be given such authority. Likewise, individual members of
Congress may not be given such authority and must seek approval from the Speaker or the Senate
President if these latter have been authorized by law. Philippine Constitutional Association v. Enriquez,
235

SCRA 506,544 (1994).

Q. What is the rule on discretionary funds?

A. See Section 25(6).

Q. On what budget does the government operate when Congress fails to approve a general
appropriation bill?

A. See Section 25(7).

SEC. 26. (1) EVERY BILL PASSED BY THE CONGRESS SHALL EMBRAC E ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH
SHALL BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF.

(2) NO BILL PASSED BY EITHER HOUSE SHALL BECOME A LAW UNLESS IT HAS PASSED THREE READINGS
ON SEPARATE DAYS, AND PRINTED COPIES THEREOF IN ITS FINAL FORM HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED

TO ITS MEMBERS THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE, EXCEPT WHEN THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES TO THE
NECESSITY OF ITS IMMEDIATE ENACTMENT TO MEET A PUBLIC CALAMITY OR EMERGENCY. UPON THE
LAST READING

OF A BILL, NO AMENDMENT THERETO SHALL BE ALLOWED, AND THE VOTE

THEREON SHALL BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, AND THE YEAS AND

NAYS ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL.

Q. What is the nature and purpose of the rule on title and subject of bills?

A. The requirement that "Every bill embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof' is mandatory and not directory and compliance with it is essential to the validity

of legislation. An early decision explained the purpose of this limitation on legislative power thus:
The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision are
well known. Legislative assemblies, for the dispatch of business, often pass bills by their titles only
without requiring them to be read. A specious title sometimes covers legislation which, if its real
character had been disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the
legislature is one of the purposes this provision was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this
provision the title of a statute was often no indication of its subject or contents.

An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same
statute of such things as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of
the statute all the advocates of each, thus often securing the passage of several measures no one of
which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up in his review of the authorities
defining the objects of this provision: 'It may therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose of this
provision was: First, to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation, second, to prevent surprise or
fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and
which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly
appraise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the
subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard
thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.' Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883, 891
(1920).

Q. How must the rule be interpreted, liberally or strictly?

A. Liberally. The rule "should be given a practical rather than technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject." Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 73
Phil. 288, 291 (1941).

Q. A bill is passed entitled "An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act Numbered One Thousand
One Hundred Ninety-Nine, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines." The bill
contained a provision authorizing the Secretary of Justice to mediate tenancy disputes through a
tenancy mediation division. Valid?

A. Yes. Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962).

Q. The title of R.A. 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means of Increasing the Highway Special Fund." It is
contended that, since the purpose of the bill is to increase the highway fund, the provision in Section 5
which creates an exemption and thus does not contribute to an increase is alien to the subject of the
law and is therefore unconstitutional. Decide.
A. The purpose of the constitutional provision requiring unity of content and expression of the content
in the title is to prevent duplicity of subject and surprise upon the legislators and the public. Clearly, the
provision for exemption comes under the general subject expressed in the title. Insular Lumber Co. v.
Court of Tax Appeals, 104 SCRA 710,

716-7 (L-31137, May 29,1981).

Q. A bill is passed entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Norte." The proposed municipality, however, included some barrios outside Lanao del Norte. Valid?

A. A divided Supreme Court declared the law invalid for insufficiency of title. Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21
SCRA 496 (1967).

Q. P.D. No. 1987 is entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board." Section 10 thereof
imposes a 30% tax on gross receipts on video transactions. Is this a "rider?"

A. The requirement that eveiy bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title
is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve. Such is the case here. Taxation is sufficiently related to the regulation of the video industry. Tio
v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151

SCRA 208 (1987).

NOTE: The title "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining Its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for the Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected
Therewith" was found to be sufficiently broad to cover the removal of the franking privileges of the
judiciary. Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993). [But the provision on the franking
privileges of the judiciary was declared unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.] Similarly, the title
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" was
deemed to include the resulting conversion of such city into a congressional district in compliance with
Article VI, Section

5(3) of the Constitution. Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106,110111 (1994).

Also Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702, March

16,1995.
NOTE: RA 9369 is challenged misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial
provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. But the constitutional requirement
that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The requirement is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which
the statute seeks to achieve. RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled "An Act Amending Republic Act No.
8436, Entitled 'An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in
the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral
Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the
Purpose Batas Pambansa Big. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No.

7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefore and

For Other Purposes."* This is wide-covering enough. Banat v. Comelec,

G.R. No. 177508, August 7,2009.

Q. How many times must a bill be brought before Congress before it becomes a law?

A. See Section 26(2).

SEC. 27. (1) EVERY BILL PASSED BY THE CONGRESS SHALL, BEFORE IT BECOMES A LAW, BE
PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT. IF HE APPROVES

THE SAME, HE SHALL SIGN IT; OTHERWISE, HE SHALL VETO IT AND RETURN THE SAME WITH HIS
OBJECTIONS TO THE HOUSE WHERE IT ORIGINATE D, WHICH SHALL ENTER THE OBJECTIONS AT

LARGE IN ITS JOURNA L AND PROCEED TO RECONSIDE R IT. IF, AFTER SUCH RECONSIDE RAT I O N ,
TWO- THIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF SUCH HOUSE SHALL AGREE TO PASS THE BILL, IT SHALL BE
SENT, TOGETHER WITH THE OBJECTIONS, TO THE OTHER

HOUSE BY WHICH IT SHALL LIKEWISE BE RECONSIDERED, AND IF APPROVED

BY TWO-THIRD S OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THAT HOUSE, IT SHALL BECOME A LAW. IN ALL SUC H
CASES, THE VOTES OF EACH HOUSE SHALL BE DETERMINE D BY YEAS OR NAYS, AND THE NA ME S
OF THE MEMBERS VOTING FOR OR AGAINST SHALL BE ENTERED IN ITS JOURNAL. THE PRESID E
NT

SHALL COMMUNICA TE HIS VETO OF ANY BILL TO THE HOUSE WHERE IT ORIGINATE D WIT H IN
THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF RECEIPT THEREOF; OTHERWISE, IT SHALL BECOME A LAW AS IF HE
HAD SIGNED IT.

(2) THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO VETO ANY

PARTICULA R ITEM OR ITEMS IN AN APPROPRIAT ION, REVENUE, OR TARIFF BILL, BUT THE VET O
SHALL NQT AFFECT THE ITEM OR ITEMS TO WHICH HE DOES NOT OBJECT.

262 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees.

15-16

A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

Q. What steps are needed before a bill finally becomes a law?

A. Two steps are required before a bill finally becomes a law.

First, it must be approved by Congress. The legislative action

required of Congress is a positive act; there is no enactment of

law by legislative inaction. Miller v. Mardo, 2 SCRA 398,908-9

(1961). Second, it must be approved by the President. Approval

by the President may be by positive act or by inaction. "The

President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House

where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt

thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it."

Q. When does the Constitution require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a
House has to vote?

A. (1) upon the last and third readings of a bill [Art. VI, §26(2)];

(2) at the request of one -fifth of the Members present [Art. VI,

§16(4)]; and (3) in repassing a bill over the veto of the President

[Art. VI, §27(1)]. Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August

14,1997, 277 SCRA 268.

Q. If the version approved by the Senate is different from that approved by the House of
Representatives, how are the differences reconciled?

A. In a bicameral system bills are independently processed by

both Houses of Congress. It is not unusual that the final version

approved by one House differs from what has been approved by the other. The "conference
committee," consisting of members

nominated from both Houses, is an extra-constitutional creation of Congress whose function is to

propose to Congress ways of reconciling conflicting provisions found in the Senate version and in the
House version of a bill.

Q. What is the extent of the powers of a conference committee?

A. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA at 666-672, [affirmed on reconsideration October 30,
1995], the Court

held. Following US practice, that amendments germane to the

purpose of the bill could be introduced even if these were not in either original bill.

Moreover, the Court said: "Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the
conference committee met in executive sessions. Often the only way to reach agree- ment on conflicting
provisions is to meet behind closed doors,

with only the conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made."

Q. If a bill is vetoed by the President, may it still become a law?

A. Yes. "If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass
the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by w hich it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In
all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal."

Q. May the President approve some part or parts of a bill and veto the rest?
A. As a general rule, if the President disapproves a bill approved by Congress, he should veto the entire
bill. He is not allowed to veto separate items of

a bill. It is only in the case of appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills that

he is authorized to exercise item-veto.

Q. What is the effect of an invalid veto?

A. It is without effect, i.e., it is as if the President did not act on the bill at all.

Hence, the bill becomes a law by executive inaction. Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 (1964).

Q. Section 42 of H.B. 17839 which became R.A. 6110 imposed a caterer's tax on various operators of
restaurants. President Marcos, however, vetoed the portion of Section 42 which imposed a 20% caterers
tax on restaurants operated by hotels, motels, and rest houses. It is contended that the veto was invalid
since item veto refers to a veto of an entire section and not portions of a section. Decide.

A. The veto was valid. "An Htem' in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a
particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 47421, May 14,1990.

Q. The General Appropriations Act of 1989 contained the following provision:

Section 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations

Disapproved and/or Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the President . . .
which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be

restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An
item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall be deemed to
have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided in this act.

The General appropriations Act for 1990 contained the following provision:

Sec. 16. Use of Savings. — . . . Provided, that no item of appropriation recommended by the President in
the Budget. .. which has been disapproved or reduced by Congress shall be restored or increased by the
use of appropriations authorized for other purposes in this Act by augmentation. An item of
appropriation for any purpose shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no
corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act.
Exercising the power of "item veto" the President vetoed the similar provisions for the reason that they
violate "Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, this Section would nullify" the
"constitutional and statutory authority" of the President to augment items from savings. The President
added that "this provision is inconsistent with Section 12 and other similar provisions of this General
Appropriations Act."

The Solicitor General further argues that the matter is a political question and that at any rate Section 55
is a "rider."

The petitioners on the contrary argue that (1) the provision in issue is not an "item" subject to separate
veto but a "provision" which she cannot veto without vetoing the entire bill; (2) power of "item veto"
does not include the power to veto a condition without vetoing the entire provision; (3) the power of
augmentation has to be provided by Congress and may therefore be restricted by Congress.

Decide.

A. 1. This is a justiciable question. In involves interpretation of the

Constitution.

2; The power to augment lies dormant until authorized by law. And since the grant of the power of
augmentation is not an act of appropriation, it has no. place in an appropriation act. But since there is
already a separate law authorizing augmentation, the new provision to that extent restricts the
authority of other departments already granted. [Implicit in this argument is that therefore, if the
power of augmentation is to be taken back or restricted, it should be in a separate law.]

3. A condition in an appropriation bill may not vetoed without vetoing the item to which it is attached.
Bolinao Electronics v.Valencia,

11 SCRA 486 (1964).

4. "Provision" and "item" in budgetary legislation are different.

An "item" is "an indivisible some of money dedicated to a stated

purpose" and not "some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill."
Neither Section 55 nor Section 16 fits the definition of an "Item." In fact the disapproved items do not
appear on

the face of the bill.

5. Neither is it, however, an allowable "provision" because it does not relate to any particular
appropriation in the bill. It refers to items which do not appear on the bill. TQ that extent therefore it is
a rider.
6. Neither is it a condition in the budgetary sense because it does riot refer to any specific item. It is
more in the nature of a general provision which should be contained in a separate law. Gonzales v.
Macaraig, Jr., G.R. No. 87636, November 19,1990.

Q. What is the doctrine of "inappropriate provisions?"

A. Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990), marks the Court's acceptance of what eventually
would be referred to as the "doctrine of inappropriate provisions." What the doctrine says is that a
provision that

is constitutionally inappropriate for an appropriation bill may be singled out for veto even if it is not an
appropriation or revenue "item." In essence what this means is that the President may veto "riders" in
an appropriation bill.

Q. What is the meaning of "executive impoundment?"

A- Another way of exercising executive veto is through what is called "impoundment." Impoundment
simply means refusal of the President to spend funds already allocated by Congress for a specific
purpose. There is no provision in the Constitution on the subject. Impoundment came up also in
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez. To the amount appropriated by Congress for the
compensation and separation benefits of members of CAFGU was attached a provision that "it shall be
used for the compensation of CAFGlFs including the payment of their separation benefit not exceeding
one (1) year subsistence allowance for the 11,000 members who will be deactivated in 1994." 235 SCRA
at 544. The President did not veto the provision but said instead in his veto message that the
implementation of the provision would be subject to his prior approval taking into consideration the
peace and ordersitua- tion in the affected localities.

Those who challenged the veto contended that the provision already effectively required the
deactivation of the CAFGLTs and that the President had no choice but to implement the law. The
President on the other hand justified his impoundment of the provision on the basis of his Commander-
in-Chief powers and on the dangerous argument that the duty to implement the law includes the duty
to desist from implementing it when implementation would prejudice public interest. As Justice Roberto
Concepcion pointed out in an earlier case, "after all we still live under a rule of law." Gonzalez v.
Hechanova, G.R. No. 21897 (October 26,1963).

The Supreme Court, however, has heretofore refrained from passing judgment on the constitutionality
of "impoundment" The Court, however, found in the doctrine on "inappropriate provision" a way out of
having to decide whether impoundment was legal. It said that a provision for the disband- ment of the
CAFGU should be in a separate bill.
Q. May the publication of laws prior to their effectivity be dispensed with?

A. No. Publication in every case is indispensable. Total omission of publication would be a denial of due
process in that the people would not know what laws to obey. Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986).

SEC. 28. (1) THE RULE OF TAXATION SHALL BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE. THE

CONGRESS SHALL EVOLVE A PROGRESSIVE SYSTEM OF TAXATION.

(2) THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO

FIX WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS, AND SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS AS IT
MAY

IMPOSE, TARIFF RATES, IMPORT AND EXPORT QUOTAS, TONNAGE AND WHARFA GE DUES, AND

OTHER DUTIES OR IMPOSTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM OF

THE GOVERNMENT.

(3) CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES AND PARSONAGES OR

CONVENT S APPURTENA NT THERETO, MOSQUE S, NON-PROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LAND S,

BUILDINGS, AND IMPROVEMENT S ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY, AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS,

CHARITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION.

(4) NO LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EXEMPTION SHALL BE PASSED WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF A
MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF

THE CONGRESS.

Q. What is the purpose of the power to tax?

A. The obvious, primary, and specific purpose of the power to tax is to raise revenue. However, from the
earliest days of the history of the power of taxation, the power to tax has been recognized as an
instrument of national economic and social policy. It has, for instance, been used as an instrument for
the extermination of undesirable activities and enterprises. In the celebrated words of Justice Marshall,
the power to tax involves the power to destroy. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat,

316, 431 (U.S. 1819).

The power to tax has also been used as a tool for regulation. For the purpose of regulating property, the
State can choose to exercise its police power or its power to tax. "It is beyond serious question that a tax
does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the
activities taxed . . . The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negligible, ... or
the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary . . United States v. Sanchez, 340

U.S. 42,44 (1950).

Another aspect of the power to tax is what the United States Supreme Court has characterized as "the
power to keep alive." This is the foundation for the imposition of tariffs designed for the
encouragement and protection of locally produced goods against competition from imports. "The
enactment and enforcement of a number of customs revenue laws drawn with a m otive of maintaining
a system of protection, since the revenue law of 1789, are matters of history . . . whatever we may think
of the wisdom of a protection policy." Hampton and Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,412 (1928).

Q. What is the general limit on the power to tax?

A. The power to tax exists for the general welfare. Hence implicit in the power

is the limitation that it should be exercised only fora public purpose. In the words of Loan Association v.
Topeka, 20 Wall, 655, 664 (U.S. 1875), "To lay, with one hand, the power of the government on the
property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private
enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms
of law and is called taxation."

"The power to tax 'is an attribute of sovereignty.' In fact, it is the strongest of all the powers of
government. But for all its plenitude, the power to tax is not unconfined as there are restrictions.
Adversely affecting as it does property rights, both due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution may properly be invoked to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue measure. If it were
otherwise, there would be truth to the 1903 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that

'the power to tax involves the power to destroy.' The web of unreality

spun from Marshall's famous dictum was brushed away by one stroke

of Mr. Justice Holmes' pen, thus: The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.' 'So
it is in the Philippines.' Sison, Jr. v.

Ancheta, 130 SCRA 655 (1984); Obillos, Jr. v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 139 SCRA 439 (1985).

"In the same vein, the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it
finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it cam be shown to amount to
confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power (Sison v. Ancheta, supra)." Reyes v.
Almanzor, 196 SCRA 322 (1989).

Q. What are the specific limits on the power to tax? A. See Section 28.

Q. When is taxation "uniform and equitable?"

A. The concept of uniformity of taxation is derived from Article I, Section 8, of the United States
Constitution which prescribes that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the
Unites States." It will thus be seen that whereas the American provision whence the Philippine rule
derived has reference to "duties, imposts, and excises," that is, to indirect taxes, the Philippine
requirement of uniformity applies to taxation in general. Philippine jurisprudence, however, from its
earliest days has interpreted "uniformity" in the Philippine Constitution in the same way as "uniformity"
in the American Constitution. In the words of Churchill v. Conception, 34 Phil. 969, 976-7 (1916),
"uniformity" in the Constitution does "not signify an intrinsic, but simply a geographical uniformity . . . A
tax is uniform, within the Constitutional requirement, when it operates with the same force and effect in
every place where the subject of it is found."

Moreover, the requirement of "uniformity" has been interpreted by Philippine jurisprudence as

equivalent to the requirement of valid classification under the equal protection clause. Pepsi Cola
Bottling Co. v. City ofButuan, 24 SCRA 789, 795-96 (1968).

The word "equitable" seems to add nothing except by way of emphasis.

NOTE: The obvious primary and specific purpose of the power to tax is to raise revenue. However, it may
also be used to regulate. But Philippine jurisprudence frowns on the notion of the power to tax as the
power to destroy because taxation must not be oppressive. See e.g., Obillos, Jr. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 139 SCRA 436, 439 (1985). Indeed the notion of equitable taxation excludes
oppressiveness. As Tan v. del Rosario, Jr., 237 SCRA 324, 332 (1994), says, "Of course, where a tax
measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of property, courts will
not hesitate to strike it down, for, despite all its plenitude, the power to tax cannot override
constitutional prescriptions."

Regarding uniformity of taxation, Tan v. del Rosario, 237

SCRA 324 (1994), put it thus: it means that 1) the standards that
are used therefore are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the

categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3)

the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future

conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all

those belonging to the same class.

Q. Respondents presented an exhaustive study on the tax rates levied on the jewelry industry by
different Asian countries in order to convince the court that, relative to its neighbors, the tax rates
impose d on jewelry in the Philippines was oppressive and confiscatory. Decide.

A. The Court "cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates of other countries should be used as a
yardstick in determining what may be the proper subjects of taxation in our own country. It should be
pointed out that the aforementioned taxes and duties, the State, acting through the legislative and
executive branches, is exercising its sovereign prerogative. It is inherent in the power to tax that the
State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that

'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe
no constitutional limitation.'" Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, G.R. No. 119252,

August 18,1997,277 SCRA 617,631-32 (citing Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil.

148 [1955]; Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 [1984]; Kapatiran

ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA

371 [1988]; Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 249 SCRA 628 [1995]).

Q. What is a "progressive system of taxation?"

A. A tax system is progressive when the rate increases as the tax base increases. The explicit mention of
progressive taxation in the Constitution reflects the wish of the Commission that the legislature should
use the power of taxation as an instrument for a more equitable distribution of wealth.

Q. May the power to tax be delegated?

A. Yes, under the conditions laid down in Section 28(2). This delegation of the taxation power by the
legislative to the executive is authorized by the Constitution itself. At the same time, the Constitution
also grants the delegating authority (Congress) the right to impose restrictions and limitations on the
taxation power delegated to the President. The restrictions and limitations imposed by Congress take on
the mantle of a constitutional command, which the executive branch is obliged to observe. Southern
Cross v. Philippine Cement, G.R. No. 158540, July

8,2004.

Q. May tax exemptions be created by statute?

A. Yes, under the condition laid down in Section 28(4). Q. Are there constitutionally created tax
exemptions? A. Yes, in Section 28(3), and Article XIV, Section 4(3 & 4).

Q. What kind of tax exemption is created in Section 28(3)?

A. The exemption is only for taxes assessed as property taxes, as contradistinguished from excise taxes.
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292, 295 (1965).

Q. Compare the exemption for"lands, buildings, and improvements" under the 1935 Constitution with
that under the new Constitution.

A. "Under the 1935 Constitution: 'Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, build

ings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.' The present Constitution has added: 'charitable institutions, mosques, and non-
profit cemeteries' and required that for the exemption of'lands, buildings, and improvements,' they
should not only be

'exclusively' but also 'actually' and 'directly used for re ligious,

charitable, or educational purposes . . . There must be proof

therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and

improvements for religious or charitable [or educational] purposes

to be exempt from taxation... Province of Abra v. Hernando and

Roman Catholic Bishop, 107 SCRA 104, 108-9 (L-49336, August

31,1981).

Q. The Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippines, Inc. ("YMCA") — established as "a welfare,
educational and charitable non-profit corporation" — derived income from rentals of its real property.
Claiming tax exemption, it argues that:

1) Article VI, §8(3) exempts "charitable institutions" from payment not only of property taxes but also
of income tax from any source;

2) Article XIV, §4(3) applies because YMCA is "a non-stock, non-profit educational institution whose
revenues and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt
from taxes on its properties and income." Decide.

A. 1) This provision covers property taxes only. YMCA is "exempt from the payment of property tax, but
not income tax on the rentals from its property."

2) YMCA is not an educational institution within the purview of Article XIV. Neither did it submit proof of
the amount of the income that was actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
Commission of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124043, October 14,1998, pp. 17-18,20.

Q. Because the beneficial use of a piece of property was donated to SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER
COLLEGE, tax exempti on was sought. Proper?

A, No. There is no showing that the same are "actually, directly and exclusively" used either for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes. Hence, tax exemption cannot be claimed. Systems Plus Computer
College v. Caloocan City, G.R. No. 146382, August 7, 2003

Q. The former camp John Hay was declared a special economic zone. On that basis it claimed tax
exemption. Proper?

A. While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and success of SEZs, free
trade zones and the like, the grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The tax
exemption under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same by
the President to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein. John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v.
Lim, G.R. No. 119775, October 24,2003.

Q. The Lung Center alleges that a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds are exclusively used for charity
patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients. The petitioner
contends that it is a charitable institution and, as such, is exempt from real property taxes.
A. We hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the elements
which should be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes, its
constitution and by -laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the actual work performed, the
character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use and occupation of
the properties. However, those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not
exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
purposes. Lung Center v. Quezon City, G.R. No.

144104, June 29, 2004.

NOTE: In Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) v. Fertiphil Corp, G.R. No.

166006, March 14, 2008, the Court had occasion to review the validity

of LOI1465, a martial rule product, which imposed a ten peso capital

contribution for the sale of each bag of fertilizer "until adequate capital

is raised to make PPI viable." PPI was a private corporation. Clearly,

therefore, the imposition was for private benefit and not for a public

purpose and therefore invalid. The Court also found that, even if seen

as an exercise of police power, the imposition would still be invalid for

not being for a public purpose.

SEC. 29. (1) No MONEY SHALL BE PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY EXCEPT IN PURSUA NCE OF AN
APPROPRIATION MADE BY LAW.

(2) NO PUBLIC MONE Y OR PROPE RT Y SHALL BE APPROPRIATE D, APPLIED, PAID, OR EMPLOYED,

DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, FOR THE USE, BENEFIT, OR SUPPORT OF ANY SECT, CHURCH, DENOMINATION,
SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR OF ANY PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER, OR
OTHER RELIGIOUS TEACHER OR DIGNITARY AS SUCH, EXCE PT WHEN SUCH PRIEST, PREACHER,
MINISTER, OR DIGNITARY IS ASSIGNED TO THE ARMED FORC E S , OR TO ANY PENAL INSTITUTION,
OR GOVERNMENT ORPHANAGE OR LEPROSARIUM.

(3) ALL MONEY COLLECTED ON ANY TAX LEVIED FOR A SPECIAL PURPOSE SHALL BE TREATED AS A
SPECIAL FUND AND PAID OUT FOR SUCH PURPOSE ONLY. IF THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH A SPECIAL
FUND WAS CREATED HAS BEEN FULFILLED OR ABANDONED, THE BALANCE, IF ANY, SHALL BE
TRANSFERRED TO THE GENERAL FUNDS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

Q. Who has control of the expenditure of public funds?

A. Congress. "No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law."

Q. It is argued that the automatic reappropriation law for servicing foreign debts is invalid because it
does not appropriate a fixed amount and is therefore an undue delegation of legislative power. Decide.

A The amount is fixed by the parameters of the law itself which requires the simple act of looking into
the books of the Treasure. Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, G.R. No. 9457, April 22,1991.

Q. What are the limits on this power of Congress?

A. The specific limits are those found in Section 29(2). Aside from the explicit limitations, there is also
the all important implicit limitation that public money can be appropriated only for a public purpose.
This limitation arises from the relation between the power to spend and the power to tax. "The right of
the legislature to appropriate public funds is correlative with its right to tax, and, under the
constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes... no appropriation of state funds
can be made for other than a public purpose." 81 CJS p. 1147.

Q. The sum of 85,000 pesos is appropriated by Congress for a feeder road running through a private
subdivision and over property owned by a private individual. Subsequently, the feeder road is donated
to the government. Is the appropriation valid?

A No, because it is not for a public purpose. The subsequent donation of the road did not validate the
law because the validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its approval,
and not upon events occurring or acts performed subsequently. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,
110 Phil. 331-346 (1960).

Q. Are not "pork barrel" provisions in the annual budget a violation of separation of powers in that it
allow s members of Congress to perform the executive function of spending money appropriated?
274 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sec. 17

A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

A. The controversy over the Countrywide Development Fund of

1994, which is the deodorized appellation of the traditional "pork

barrel," was resolved by the Court in a manner which might be

described as tongue-in-cheek. The General Appropriation Act set aside an amount to be used for
"infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities, and
credit facilities

to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by officials concerned." The "officials concerned"
were all Representatives, Senators and the Vice-President who were each allocated an amount. The law
was challenged on the ground that the authority given to the enumerated officials to propose and
identify projects and activities was an encroachment into legislative power. In upholding the validity of
the law, the Court said that Congress itself had specified the uses of the fund and that the power given
to the enumerated officials was merely recommendatory to the President who could approve or
disapprove the recommendation. The Court praised the scheme as "imaginative" and "innovative!"
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235

SCRA 506, 521-523 (1994).

NOTE: The origin of the name may be traced to a degrading ritual to which slaves were subjected. At a
fixed day and hour, a barrel stuffed with pork would be rolled out and a multitude of black slaves,
herded together in a strategic corner of the ranch or plantation, would cast their famished bodies into
the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well- fed
master. Bernas, "From Pork Barrel to Bronze Caskets," Today, January 30,1994.

NOTE: Oil Price Stabilization Fund. - In Osmefia v. Orbos, 220 SCRA

703 (1993), part of the controversy was whether the money that went

into the Oil Price Stabilization Fund [OPSF] was tax money levied for a

special purpose. As set up by law, it was a "trust fund" which derived

funding from four sources: (1) from increase in the tax collection from ad valorem taxes on oil products;
(2) from any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government

corporations; (3) from additional amounts imposed by the Board of Energy on petroleum products; (4)
from peso savings resulting from the fluctuation of the peso against currencies used for the importation
of crude oil and petroleum products. The question centered on whether the additional amounts
imposed by the Board of Energy was a tax. The Court answered: "What is here involved is not so much
the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional
amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the
overriding consideration is [not to raise revenue but] to enable the delegate to act with expediency in
carrying out the objectives of the law [to protect consumers from constant fluctuation of oil prices]
which are embraced by the police power of the State."

SEC. 30. No LAW SHALL BE PASSED INCREASING THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT AS PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUT IO N WITHOUT ITS ADVICE AND CONCURRENCE.

Q. My Congress increase the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?

A. Yes, but only with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court itself.

The purpose of this new rule is to prevent the overburdening of the

Supreme Court.

Q. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides that all administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Valid?

A. No, it expands the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and consent.
Consequently, "and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi- judicial
agencies in the 1997

Revised Rule of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provision of Rule 43." Fabian v.
Desierto, G.R. No.

129742, September 16,1998.

SEC. 31. No LAW GRANTING A TITLE OF ROYALTY OR NOBILITY SHALL BE ENACTED.

Q. What is the reason for prohibiting the State from granting titles of royalty or nobility?

A. The Federalist (No. 84), speaking of the importance of the prohibition against titles of nobility in the
Federal Constitution, says: "This may truly be denominated the cornerstone of republican government;
for so long
as they are excluded there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that
of the people."

This provision was in the Bill of Rights of both the 1935 and 1973

Constitutions.

SEC. 32. THE CONGRESS SHALL, AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, PROVID E FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM, AND THE EXCEPTIONS THEREFROM, WHEREBY THE PEOPLE CAN DIRECTLY PROPOSE
AND ENACT

LAWS OR APPROVE OR REJECT ANY ACT OR LAW OR PART THEREOF PASSED BY THE CONGRESS OR
LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY AFTER THE REGISTRATION OF A PETITION THEREFOR SIGNED BY AT LEAST
TEN PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PER CENTUM OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF.

Q. Does Congress have the exclusive right to pass national legislation?

A. No. Section 32 has introduced the concept of "initiative and referendum" whereby the people
themselves can legislate. The enabling law is R.A.

6735, the Initiative and Referendum Law.

The first case to come under this implementing law involved local

"initiative and referendum." Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 237

SCRA 279 (1994), upheld the validity of the procedure prescribed by the

Local Government Code for local initiative and referendum.

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