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1 - Colonial Legacy 2
1 - Colonial Legacy 2
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DISCUSSION
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DISCUSSION ξ
Chart 1: National
Chart 1: National Income
Income 1900-46 1900-46
(Rs million (Rs
at 1938-39 million at 1938-39 Prices) India's emergence in distinct discourses that agreed on the
Prices)
i4,ooo the way described point that the British Empire impover
~HB and quantified above ished India by transferring surplus from
10,000
cannot be explained India to Britain via factor payments
by textbook theories (called drain) and by destroying indige
8,000
of late development, nous industry to promote British exports
■ Economic moderni- (called deindustrialisation). There were
H sation needed capi- factor payments no doubt, and there was
■ tal and certain kinds some decline of industry. But these do
of skills, which were not explain the broad pattern of eco
Primarysector
Primary sector Government
Government Private
Private non-agriculture Scarce and expen- nomic change. There Was Overall
non-agriculture
Basedonondata
Based data
in SinSivasubramonian,
S Sivasubramonian,
NationalNational
Income ofIncome
India in of
theIndia m the
Twentieth Twentieth
Century, Century, SlVe in îçth Century growth, not decline, of non-agricultural
New Delhi: oxford university Press, 2000. India. How these enterprise despite drain and deindustri
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000.
enterprise much greater than in the late obstacles were overcome is a puzzle that alisation. What was called drain was
20th century. Modern capitalistic enter- theorists of late development have not dominated by payment for skills that
prise gained from the open economy, by tried to solve. Followers of Alexander Gers- contributed to capitalistic enterprise,
accessing scarce skilled services more chenkron, who have coined phrases like Further, in my story, drain and deindus
cheaply and more easily than otherwise, "developmental state" tend to be fixated trialisation cannot explain Indian pov
Openness delivered growth impulses by on the activist government. For many of erty, because these processes cannot
reducing transaction costs in knowhow. them world history is the history of the explain why land yield was low and
And the import of new skills and knowl- South Korean state. They have not at- stagnant. The colonial state failed, not
edge was funded by the commodity tempted to explain the origins of Indian because it maintained an open economy,
trade surplus. industrialisation, behind which the state but because it chose to remain small,
If manufacturing industry and urban had little direct contribution, in a seri- which made it incapable of delivering an
services were the areas most touched by ous way. Marxists have missed noticing agricultural revolution, if at the tax
commodity and factor market intégra- the counter-intuitive nature of colonial payer's expense.
tion, agricultural productivity, being set India's emergence. My story of factor At a broader level, the left-nationalist
by geographical conditions and there- market integration explains both the critique of colonial economy stemmed
fore less responsive to imported skills, emergence as well as why the growth from a fixation with industrialisation
did not change. Raising land yield in a impulse was restricted to the port and, in turn, from an implicit belief that
monsoon tropical region was a problem cities mainly. the British model of economic moderni
that did not have a solution until the I do not find anything in Banerjee et al sation was the universal model for the
Green Revolution of the 1960s. In turn, that disputes the three stylised facts that rest of the world to follow. Economic
the Green Revolution succeeded in rais- my story builds upon. In turn, their use historians have steadily discarded that
ing productivity of land thanks not only of facts I find naïve. For example, they Anglocentrism, and moved closer to a
to new knowledge, but also to massive cite Paul Bairoch's finding that India view first articulated by Simon Kuznets
subsidisation of inputs by the state. It made 20% of world manufacturing out- that the defining feature of "modern"
needed a large state willing to cross- put in 1800 and 2% of it in 1900, and economic growth was acceleration in
subsidise agriculture with taxes charged suggest that this indicates changing productivity, with or without industrial
on non-agricultural incomes. The Empire specialisation, perhaps an Indian decline, isation. Kuznets thought that the devel
was constrained by its own ideological It does nothing of the sort. All that this opment and spread of knowledge were
biases to remain a small state and avoid statistics says is that world gdp grew important factors behind the accelera
fiscal innovations. four-fold between 1820 and 1913, led tion in productivity. Roy (2015) suggests
Openness as such was nothing new in by huge increase in industrial produc- that modern economic growth did hap
India, as Banerjee et al rightly point out. tivity in Western Europe and North pen in India, but in areas where trade
But the scale of factor and commodity America, and the rest of the world fell costs were low, and which were moreo
movements was many times larger in behind in productivity growth. The rest ver exposed to factor movements and a
the 19th century world than in periods of the world included colonies like India cosmopolitan milieu,
before. And an open border to skills in and free countries like China. If the The view that openness and cosmo
the 19th century meant access to a dif- world became divided between rich and politanism were good things led me to
ferent level of capability than in times poor between these years, colonial say that the retreat from cosmopolitan
before, because of the scientific and agency cannot be inferred from these ism after 1947 was bad for Indian devel
technological revolution that was under percentages.2 opment. Banerjee et al suggest that the
way in the more recent times. What was Roy (2015) a critique of? My 1950s and the 1960s were good times for
Why do I emphasise openness and factor target was a body of ideas that I desig- foreign firms in India. I think they are
movements so much? I do so because nated "left-nationalist," meaning two wrong. It is true that many multinational
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DISCUSSION
companies came in. But that was not The truth is that the post-independence The small quantity of research in eco
because the government was particularly growth in India owed in a large meas- nomic history emanating from Indian
friendly, but the multinationals wanted ure to taxpayer's money spent on agri- universities and published in interna
to jump the tariff wall and sell goods cultural inputs and low productivity tional journals shows how badly,
to Indians. It is also true that many tech- projects, whereas the free market growth Banerjee et al do not go quite as far as
nical collaborations were signed in these was based on commercial and corporate that, but stay close to the moralistic
years. This was because approved tech- profits. The latter was a more sustain- approach. They intend to expose "the
nical collaboration agreement was more able pathway. role of ideology in economic history
or less the only way that technology Where did the aggressive cocktail writing." They then criticise me for impli
was allowed to come in. It was increas- of xenophobia and statism in India come citly denying "the possibility of any inter
ingly difficult, almost impossible, to buy from? The answer lies in a misreading pretation or narrative of Indian economic
machines and hire engineers, managers of the colonial Indian economic history, history serving imperial imperatives"
or scientists from the world market, which This brings me to the issue of histo- (p 124). I have nowhere denied that
was easy enough to do around 1900. I riography. history can and did serve the Empire
cannot assess their aggregate data when it existed. Nor can anything that
because these come from dated sources. Historiography Roy (2015) said be construed as an eco
As far as I know, foreign direct invest- One of my complaints against the Indian nomic history serving the imperial im
ment as a proportion of capital stock was Marxists is that they do not want to con- perative, whatever that phrase means,
nearer 10% before World War 11, dropped duct an honest debate on economic My article said that openness and cos
sharply to 2% after independence history. Consider the following example, mopolitanism delivered good economic
(Twomey 2000: 118), remained depre- The Empire was many things at once—it results. That does not amount to saying
ssed, and regained the interwar level was a despotic rule and it was an agent that the lack of liberty under the Empire
around 2002 or 2003. There is plenty of of economic globalisation. My view is was either necessary or benign. Freedom
evidence showing that British firms were that the open economy during colonial of enterprise and the freedom to choose
disturbed by the new tax laws, capital times had more benefits than has been governments are two distinct qualities
controls, and forced Indianisation of acknowledged, and that Indian poverty of a political economy, and economists
management. There was attrition of cannot be attributed to openness. This still have not finished understanding
capital and loss of value of tangible and position does not, and does not need to, whether or not there is any stable and
intangible assets of a large number of comment on whether colonialism as a universal relationship between them at
exporting British firms after they were political system was either good or bad. all. To reiterate, Roy (2015) simply made a
taken over and mismanaged by incom- Critics of my work on economic history, case for openness. That case has nothing
petent and often corrupt Indian business however, label me (as a person I sup- to do with being for or against the
houses. This particular cost of state fail- pose) as "neo-colonial" and an "apolo- Empire as a political system. That politi
ure has never been properly assessed. gist of colonialism" (Bagchi 2010 and cal debate ended a very long time ago.
I called the ideological package that Mukherjee 2010). There is a subterfuge And in any case it does not matter to
led to a retreat from cosmopolitanism here. To someone who has not read my what I was doing.
"economic nationalism." Banerjee et al work, the labels will give the impression I hope I have made my position clear,
criticise this approach on the ground that that I defend despotic rules, which is a But I cannot quite place where Banerjee
protectionism has a strong and proven terrible thing to do. Having captured the et al come from. They say that they are
case, even within economic history. In- moral high ground, the Marxist critics using my article as "a point of entry."
deed it has. That argument does not af- win the intellectual argument even before Point of entry into what? It is certainly
feet my case that free factor markets it has begun. But if abusive personal not economic history in the way my pro
helped India's economic modernisation, labels are a good battle strategy, they fessional colleagues understand it. Reas
Furthermore, nationalism was much are a conversation-stopper. And as such, suringly for me, among the historiogra
more than protectionism; it consisted the strategy has served research badly, phies they seem to disapprove of, there
of a regulatory state, closure of factor
markets, and raising tariffs so high as to EPW Index
hurt exports. That particular mix did not
exist in the 19th century world. Econo An author-title index for EPW has been prepared for the years from 1968 to 2012. The PDFs of the
mists glibly justify that mix by saying Index have been uploaded, year-wise, on the EPW website. Visitors can download the Index for
that gdp growth rate was higher in the all the years from the site. (The Index for a few years is yet to be prepared and will be uploaded
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is New Institutional Economics, as well there may be useful stuff here. But col- Banks Ease of DoingBank's Ease of
Business Doinghttp://
index, Business Index, http://
r t, I,·, j ι ι ι · ι ι ■ , ι·· r www.weforum.org/reports/global-competi
www.weforum.org/reports/global-competi
as a range of recently published books lectively this reference list is as far away tiveness-report-2014-15, https://www globa
tiveness-report-2014-15, https://www.globa
politics, it makes a thesis that, in the reflection and rethinking. But I also Bagchi, Amiya (2010):Bagchi,
Colonialism andColonialism
Amiya (2010): Development,
and Development,
have a selection bias issue that they Roy, Tirthankar (2015): "The Economic
Roy, Tirthankar Legacies
(2015): "The of of
Economic Legacies
Colonial Rule in India: Another Look," Economic
either do not see or do not acknowledge,
NOTES notes & political Weekly, 50(15), pp
& Political 51-59.
Weekly, 50(15), pp 51-59.
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