Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Progress in Nuclear Energy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/pnucene

Development of integrated dose assessment program for accident analysis of LILW

managed in temporary storage facility
Min Ho Ahn a, *, Kun Jai Lee a, b, Seung Young Jeong b
a
Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 335 Gwahak-ro, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon 305-701, Republic of Korea
b
Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, 34 Gwahak-ro, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon 305-338, Republic of Korea

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: In this study a program, INDACþþ, was developed to conduct accident analysis on low and intermediate
Received 5 February 2010 level waste (LILW) managed in a temporary storage facility (TSF). In order to conduct this work, a variety
Received in revised form of parameters were considered such as risk factor, radionuclide inventory, atmospheric dispersion factor
25 June 2010
(c/Q), dose conversion factor, and so on. The main risk factors leading to arbitrary accidents were
Accepted 25 June 2010
developed by the master logic diagram (MLD) method based on a fault tree analysis (FTA). The dose to
curie (DTC) method was used to calculate the radionuclide inventory. Then, the release rates with respect
to the type of wastes and radionuclides were considered in order to evaluate the amount of radionuclides
Keywords:
Master logic diagram
released by the risk factors. Furthermore, the atmospheric dispersion factor (c/Q) was calculated by the
Radionuclide inventory PAVAN code based on various models and assumptions suggested in the U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145.
Atmospheric dispersion factor The dose assessments for arbitrary accidents originating in the TSF for LILW management are conducted
Dose assessment by considering the external exposure dose by radioactive plume and the internal exposure dose by
Temporary storage facility breathing. Synthesizing many parameters, the INDACþþ, which is an integrated dose assessment code
LILW package for normal reaction operation and for accident analysis of LILW managed in the TSF, was
developed using Visual C# in Microsoft Visual Studio.NET 2003. Furthermore, the INDACþþ can calculate
the radiological risk with regard to the main risk factors for workers and the public.
Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Nuclear facilities can release radionuclides to the atmosphere
under routine operating conditions and through unintentional
events. As a result, people who live and work around nuclear
facilities could be exposed to radiation from a number of
pathways: external exposure because of direct radiation from
radionuclides in the plume or deposited on the ground and
internal exposure because of inhalation of radionuclides in the
air or ingestion of foods or other materials (e.g., soil) that have
been contaminated by radioactive materials (Till and Grogan,
2008). Therefore, the Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (NERP)
is responsible for the protection of workers and the public in the
vicinity of nuclear power plants (NPPs) (Cheng et al., 2008). In
order to know exposure dose resulting from release of radio-
active materials under normal reactor operation, INDAC, which is
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ82 42 350 3858; fax: þ82 42 350 3810.
E-mail address: daniel-holy@kaist.ac.kr (M.H. Ahn).
the integrated dose assessment code package for KINS, has
already been developed and is currently used by the regulator
(KINS, 2000). However, this code cannot cover arbitrary acci-
dents related to low and intermediate level waste (LILW)
management in temporary storage facilities (TSF). In Korea,
especially, the period of temporary storage of LILW has been
relatively longer than that of other countries. Therefore, there
could be risk with respect to a variety of arbitrary accidents
originating in the TSF at each reactor site (Ahn et al., 2010).
The main objective of this study is to develop an integrated dose
assessment program for routine operating condition and for acci-
dent analysis of LILW managed in the TSF. In order to conduct this
work, a variety of parameters were considered such as risk factor,
radionuclide inventory, atmospheric dispersion factor (c/Q), dose
conversion factor, and so on. The main risk factors leading to
arbitrary accidents were developed by the master logic diagram
(MLD) method based on a fault tree analysis (FTA). Fire and the
dropping of drums were considered as the main risk factors in this
study. Then, the release rates with respect to the type of wastes and
radionuclides were considered to evaluate the amount of radio-
nuclides released by the risk factors. Furthermore, the atmospheric

0149-1970/$ e see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.pnucene.2010.06.004
838 M.H. Ahn et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849

Fig. 1. Failure when moving radioactive waste drums to the transfer system.

dispersion factor (c/Q) was calculated by the PAVAN code based on
various models and assumptions suggested in the U.S. NRC Regu-
latory Guide 1.145 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982, 1983).
Synthesizing the above parameters, the INDACþþ, which is the
integrated dose assessment code package for normal reaction
operation and for accident analysis of LILW managed in the TSF, was
developed using Visual C# in Microsoft Visual Studio.NET 2003.
2. Consideration of the parameters for dose assessments
2.1. Risk factor
2.1.1. Initiating event analysis
Generally, initiating event analysis has been used to identify
potential risks such as accident sequence analysis of probabilistic

Fig. 2. Failure when transferring the drums to the TSF.

 M.H. Ahn et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849
Fig. 3. Failure when lifting and managing the drums at the TSF.
safety analysis (PSA) in NPPs. For analytical convenience, the
initiating events are usually categorized as either internal or
external events. Internal events occur within the process, and
include such things as operational errors, equipment failures, or
loss of protective system. On the other hand, external events are
initiated outside the process or facility; thus, an operational error or
a failure of a piece of equipment is an internal event, while earth-
quakes, fires, floods, or aircraft impacts are external events (EPRI,
2004; Jung et al., 2003).
A logical evaluation was considered in order to derive the
initiating events through the FTA, which is the logic model used in
the PSA with regard to NPPs. Logical evaluation was conducted with
the methodology called MLD, which is in the form of a fault tree.
2.1.2. Master logic diagram
The MLD is a basic method of identifying initiating events. This
method is based on the FTA but does not have that method’s formal
mathematical properties (Papazoglou and Aneziris, 2003).
Furthermore, the FTA is expressed in logical symbols with regard to
all cases in which the experimental targets cannot be used
anymore. Once a system failure is defined by the top event in the
fault tree, a variety of pathways related to system failure can be
deductively pursued.
In this study, the three accident branches were considered to
develop the initiating events: failure when moving radioactive
waste drums to the transfer system (vehicles), failure when trans-
ferring the drums to the TSF, and failure when lifting and managing
the drums at the TSF. Furthermore, each accident branch was
divided into three kinds of failure conditions: failure induced by
mechanical conditions, failure induced by thermal conditions, and
failure induced by both mechanical and thermal conditions.
839
Fig. 1 shows the representative initiating events with regard to
failure when moving radioactive waste drums to the transfer
system. Also, Fig. 2 shows those with respect to failure when
transferring the drums to the TSF. Then, Fig. 3 shows those
regarding failure when lifting and managing the drums at the TSF.
2.1.3. Establishment of the initiating event
Through filtering and grouping of all initiating events derived by
the MLD method, we can suggest the main initiating events leading
to arbitrary accidents, which are fire and the dropping of drums.
Namely, two kinds of initiating events could be understood as the
main risk factors originating in the TSF for LILW management.
Furthermore, the risk factor with respect to the dropping of drums
could be expressed with two criteria: lifting failure and worker’s
error due to piling too many drums on a vehicle and errors caused
by an unskilled worker. Fig. 4 (a) shows the risk factor resulting
from the dropping of drums managed in the TSF. Then, the risk
factor with regard to fire could be represented in both the gas
generation due to the dropping of drums and collision with some
objects and fire initiated within transport vehicle or due to pres-
ence of combustive materials in the TSF. Fig. 4 (b) also shows the
risk factor with respect to the fire.
2.2. Radionuclide inventory
In order to conduct dose assessment for accident analysis of
LILW managed in the TSF, we first calculated radionuclide inventory
with respect to accidental events originating from the main risk
factors. The dose to curies conversion (DTC) method was used in
order to calculate the radionuclide inventory. The source terms
considered for the dose evaluation were the following 13
840 M.H. Ahn et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849

Table 3
Flammability multiplier factor with respect to type of waste.

IFL Flammability fc Example of

tendency waste forms
0 Flammable 1.0 Combustible trash
1 Burns if heat 0.05 Dewatered resins, unsolidified filter
supplied
2 Low flammability 0.0025 Dewatered sludge, materials
solidified in polymer
3 Nonflammable 0.000125 Activated metals, liquids and other
materials solidified in cement

NRC (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 2008). The fC

value could be calculated via the following experimental equation:

fC ¼ 10ISC (1)
where fC indicates the operational dispersibility factor and ISC
denotes the scatter subindex. Tables 1 and 2 show the release rates
with respect to each radionuclide and type of waste (Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 1986).
For evaluation of the amount of radionuclides released by fire,
the flammability multiplier factor (fF) was used with the release
rate. The following experimental equation was considered to derive
the fF value:

fF ¼ 20IFL (2)
where fF indicates the flammability multiplier factor and IFL
denotes the flammability subindex. Table 3 shows the flammability
tendency according to the type of waste (Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 1986).

2.3. Atmospheric dispersion factor (c/Q)

Fig. 4. The main risk factors (a) for the dropping of drums, (b) for fire.

In this study the atmospheric dispersion factor was calculated

by the U.S. NRC computer program PAVAN (Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 1982). Generally, PAVAN code has been used to esti-
mate relative ground-level air concentrations (c/Q) for potential
Table 1
accidental release of radioactive materials from nuclear facilities.
Release rates with respect to radionuclides.
This program is based on various models and assumptions sug-
Radionuclide Multiplier gested in the U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145, “Atmospheric
3
H 0.9 Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Consequence Assess-
14
C 0.75 ments at Nuclear Power Plants.” In the case of ground-level release,
99
Tc 0.038
129 the c/Q values are evaluated via the following equations (Nuclear
I 0.038
Particulates (non-volatile nuclides) 0.019 Regulatory Commission, 1983):

c 1
ðx; i; jÞ ¼
 (3)
Q Uijð10Þ psyj ðxÞszj ðxÞ þ A=2
radionuclides: 3H, 14C, 55Fe, 58Co, 60Co, 59Ni, 63Ni, 90Sr, 94Nb, 99Tc,
129 137
I, Cs, and 144Ce, as indicated in Notice 2008-65 mandated by
c 1
the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (2008). And ðx; i; jÞ ¼
 (4)
then, the release rates with respect to the type of wastes and Q Uijð10Þ 3psyj ðxÞszj ðxÞ
radionuclides were considered to evaluate the amount of radio-
nuclides released by the dropping of drums. Particularly, we used c 1
ðx; i; jÞ ¼
 (5)
the operational dispersibility factor (fC) for considering the release Q Uijð10Þ pMij ðxÞsyj ðxÞszj ðxÞ
rate of the dropping of drums, suggested in a document by the U.S.
where i is the grade of wind speed, j is the level of atmospheric
stability, x is the distance (m), c/Q is the atmospheric dispersion
Table 2
Operational dispersibility factor with respect to type of waste. factor (s/m3), Uij(10) is the wind speed measured at a height of 10 m
(m/s), syj(x) is a horizontal dispersion coefficient (m), szj(x) is
ISC Dispersion fc Example of waste
tendency forms
a vertical dispersion coefficient (m), A is the cross section of the
facility, and Mij(x) is a horizontal vortex factor.
0 Severe 1.0 Dewatered sludge ash, dirt, and other
miscellaneous powder Based on the models in the U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145,
1 Moderate 0.1 Trash, dewatered resins PAVAN code provides the c/Q values as functions of wind direction for
2 Slight to moderate 0.01 Waste solidified in cement various time periods, using a meteorological joint frequency distri-
3 Low 0.001 Waste solidified using vinyl ester bution (JFD) of wind direction and wind speed by atmospheric
styrene, sealed sources
stability (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982; Hwang et al., 2004).
 M.H. Ahn et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849 841

Fig. 5. Flowchart of integrated dose assessment program for accident analysis (INDACþþ).

Fig. 6. Radionuclide inventory module.

842 M.H. Ahn et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849

Fig. 7. (a) Wind rose evaluation module, (b) Atmospheric dispersion factor module.
 M.H. Ahn et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849 843

Fig. 8. Dose assessment and risk module.

The calculations of the c/Q value are based on the theory that
materials released to the atmospheric will be normally distrib-
uted (Gaussian) about the plume centerline. A straight-line
trajectory is assumed between the point of release and all
distances for which the c/Q values are calculated (Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 1983; Hwang et al., 2004). Especially,
using the cross section of the facility (A), building wake effect
was considered to prevent underestimation by assumption of
a straight-line trajectory of the plume. Also, using the horizontal
vortex factor (Mij(x)), the meandering effect was considered to
prevent overestimation by assumption of a straight-line trajectory
of the plume.

Fig. 9. Radionuclide inventory released to environment due to the dropping of drums.

844 M.H. Ahn et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849
Fig. 10. Radionuclide inventory released to environment due to fire.
2.4. Dose assessment modeling
According to the above parameters, we conducted dose assessment
modeling with respect to accident analysis of LILW managed in the TSF.
In contrast with routine operating conditions, the short time exposure
pathways resulting from radioactive materials released into the envi-
ronment due to arbitrary accidents originating from LILW managed in
the TSF can generally be derived with the external exposure from the
radioactive plume and the internal exposure from breathing (Hwang
et al., 2004). In this study, the internal and external exposure dose
assessments were estimated
 with the following equations:
X 1 c evaluating the exposure dose that resulted from releasing radio-
Dp ¼ Qi DFPi
3600 Q active materials under normal reactor operations (KINS, 2000). This
i
X c 
Db ¼ Qi Bri DFHi
Q
i management. Furthermore, the INDACþþ can calculate the radio-
where Dp is the external exposure dose from the radioactive plume
(mSv), i is radionuclides, c/Qi is the atmospheric dispersion factor
(s/m3), Qi is the amount of radionuclide released (Bq), DFPi is the
dose conversion factor for external exposure (mSv/h per Bq/m3), Db
is the internal exposure dose from breathing (mSv), Bri is the
breathing rate (m3/s), and DFHi is the dose conversion factor for
internal exposure (mSv/Bq).
Especially, the final dose assessment can be conducted in terms
of the effective dose for workers and the public, considering the
release rates of the radionuclides.
3. Development of integrated dose assessment program for
accident analysis
Synthesizing many parameters, the INDACþþ, which is an
integrated dose assessment code package for normal reactor
operations and for accident analysis of LILW managed in the TSF,
was developed using Visual C# in Microsoft Visual Studio.NET
2003. Furthermore, the program developed in this study was based
on the circumstances of the graphical user interface (GUI) to allow
for user-friendly features. Fig. 5 shows the flowchart of integrated
dose assessment program for accident analysis of LILW managed in
the TSF. This program could be divided into four modules as
follows:
 Radionuclide inventory module
 Wind rose evaluation module
 Atmospheric dispersion factor module
 Dose assessment and risk module
Especially, this program was linked with a module called INDAC,
(6)
means that the developed program in this study can be more useful
for all users because the INDAC cannot conduct dose assessment
(7) with respect to arbitrary accidents originating in the TSF for LILW
logical risk with regard to the main risk factors for workers and the
public.
Fig. 6 shows the main window for the radionuclide inventory
module. In this module, we can consider a variety of information
such as the type of drum, radionuclide inventory, physical form of
radionuclide, release rate, and so on. Fig. 7 (a) shows the wind rose
evaluation module. We can easily predict the main wind direction
and wind speed through the meteorological data in this module.
Furthermore, Fig. 7(b) shows the atmospheric dispersion factor
module based on the various models and assumptions suggested in
the PAVAN code and U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145, respectively
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982, 1983). Fig. 8 shows the dose
assessment and risk module. The dose assessments for arbitrary
accidents originating in the TSF for LILW management are con-
ducted by considering the external exposure dose from the radio-
active plume and the internal exposure dose from breathing. Also,
the risk values are derived by a variety of risk factors referred to in
the International Commission on Radiological Protection Publica-
tion 60 (ICRP) (International Commission on Radiological
Protection, 1990).
 M.H. Ahn et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849 845

Fig. 11. Meteorological characteristics at Kori NPP; wind rose (a) for spring, (b) for summer, (c) for fall, (d) for winter, and (e) for total period.

4. Case study for accident analysis of LILW managed
in the TSF
4.1. Parameters for the case study
In the case study, seven waste streams were considered in
evaluating the radionuclide inventory: the general DAW (200 L),
the shielded DAW (200 L), concentrated waste solidified by
cement (200 L), concentrated waste stabilized by paraffin (200 L),
general spent resin (200 L), spent resin solidified by cement
(200 L), and general spent filter (200 L). Furthermore, the evalu-
ation of the radionuclide inventory was only conducted with
respect to the waste stream packaged in the DOT-17H (200 L), the
representative drum used in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Then,
320 drums, which were produced in the mid-1990s and stored in
the second TSF at the Kori NPP, were used to conduct the final
dose assessment for workers and the public originating from the
main risk factors.
846 M.H. Ahn et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849

Fig. 12. (a) Atmospheric dispersion factor considering downwind direction, (b) Atmospheric dispersion factor considering all directions.

Table 4
Effective dose resulting from the dropping of drums for workers.

Waste stream DAW (general, 200 L) DAW (shielded, 200 L) Concentrated waste (general, 200 L) Spent resin (general, 200 L)
3
Radionuclide H 1.05 E11 2.62 E12 5.71 E11 2.32 E13
14
C 2.13 E14 5.36 E15 9.81 E15 2.46 E12
55
Fe 2.71 E14 6.64 E15 3.56 E16 2.16 E12
58
Co 2.77 E41 5.13 E42 1.24 E42 5.36 E40
60
Co 4.90 E12 1.22 E12 8.36 E14 3.26 E10
59
Ni 4.00 E14 1.00 E14 6.59 E16 2.27 E12
63
Ni 5.99 E13 1.51 E13 4.48 E14 5.63 E10
90
Sr 7.64 E13 1.92 E13 2.10 E15 2.07 E11
94
Nb 6.79 E13 1.70 E13 9.07 E16 1.69 E13
99
Tc 6.60 E14 1.66 E14 9.15 E14 2.22 E13
129
I 8.70 E12 2.19 E12 3.32 E13 1.07 E10
137
Cs 3.71 E12 9.35 E13 2.36 E13 1.11 E09
144
Ce 1.12 E18 2.61 E19 5.47 E21 3.96 E18
Total activity 3.00 E11 7.52 E12 5.79 E11 2.13 E09

Table 5
Effective dose resulting from the dropping of drums for the public.

Waste stream DAW (general, 200 L) DAW (shielded, 200 L) Concentrated waste (general, 200 L) Spent resin (general, 200 L)
3
Radionuclide H 1.26 E13 3.15 E14 6.85 E13 2.79 E15
14
C 2.44 E16 6.14 E17 1.12 E16 2.82 E14
55
Fe 3.34 E16 8.18 E17 4.39 E18 2.67 E14
58
Co 3.53 E43 6.55 E44 1.58 E44 6.83 E42
60
Co 6.13 E14 1.52 E14 1.04 E15 4.07 E12
59
Ni 0.00 Eþ00 0.00 Eþ00 0.00 Eþ00 0.00 Eþ00
63
Ni 7.85 E15 1.98 E15 5.86 E16 7.38 E12
90
Sr 1.07 E19 2.69 E20 2.94 E22 2.91 E18
94
Nb 8.95 E15 2.25 E15 1.20 E17 2.23 E15
99
Tc 8.12 E16 2.05 E16 1.13 E15 2.73 E15
129
I 8.71 E19 2.19 E19 3.33 E20 1.08 E17
137
Cs 4.27 E14 1.08 E14 2.72 E15 1.27 E11
144
Ce 1.42 E20 3.32 E21 6.95 E23 5.03 E20
Total activity 2.48 E113 6.21 E14 6.91 E13 2.42 E11
 M.H. Ahn et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849 847

Table 6 general spent resin was high compared to that of other waste
Effective dose resulting from fire for workers. streams. The activity of concentrated waste solidified by cement
Waste stream DAW DAW Concentrated Spent resin was the lowest. However, the radionuclide inventory resulting from
(general, (shielded, waste (general, (general, fire with regard to the DAW (general) was relatively higher than
200 L) 200 L) 200 L) 200 L) that resulting from the dropping of drums. Then, the waste stream
Radionuclide 3H 1.05 E10 3.28 E14 7.13 E13 1.16 E13 solidified by cement, such as concentrated waste and spent resin,
14
C 2.13 E13 6.70 E17 1.23 E16 1.23 E12
55 had low activity when the radionuclide was released due to fire.
Fe 2.71 E13 8.29 E17 4.45 E18 1.08 E12
58
Co 2.77 E40 6.42 E44 1.55 E44 2.68 E40 In the case of the atmospheric dispersion factor (c/Q) for
60
Co 4.90 E11 1.52 E14 1.05 E15 1.63 E10 workers and the public, we first collected all meteorological data
59
Ni 4.00 E13 1.26 E16 8.24 E18 1.14 E12 observed at the height of 10-meter at the meteorological tower of
63
Ni 5.99 E12 1.89 E15 5.60 E16 2.82 E10 the Kori NPP from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2007. According
90
Sr 7.64 E12 2.40 E15 2.62 E17 1.04 E11
94
Nb 6.79 E12 2.13 E15 1.13 E17 8.44 E14
to the analysis of the meteorological data, the main wind direction
99
Tc 6.60 E13 2.08 E16 1.14 E15 1.11 E13 was west and the atmospheric stability was generally unstable.
129
I 8.70 E11 2.73 E14 4.16 E15 5.37 E11 Fig. 11(a)e(d) shows the wind roses for each season by analyzing
137
Cs 3.71 E11 1.17 E14 2.95 E15 5.53 E10 the meteorological data at the Kori NPP. Fig. 11(e) presents data for
144
Ce 1.12 E17 3.26 E21 6.83 E23 1.98 E18
the total period. Then, Fig. 12(a) shows the c/Q value considering
Total activity 3.00 E10 9.40 E14 7.24 E13 1.07 E09
the downwind direction based on the U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide
1.145. In contrast, Fig. 12(b) shows the c/Q value considering all
4.2. Result and discussion directions. Generally, the c/Q value considering the downwind
direction was relatively high compared to that considering all
Fig. 9 shows radionuclide inventory released to the environment directions. However, if the meteorological conditions are changing
due to the dropping of drums. The radionuclide inventory of to a bad condition (high frequency), the c/Q value shows obvious
general spent resin was relatively high compared to that of other differences in the range between 87% and 97%. Then, the distance of
waste streams. The activity of concentrated waste solidified by the c/Q value for workers was set at 50 m so as to include all
cement was the lowest. Fig. 10 shows the radionuclide inventory workers around the second TSF at the Kori NPP; the distance for the
released to environment due to fire. The radionuclide inventory of public was also established as 700 m, which reflects the restricted

Table 7
Effective dose resulting from fire for the public

Waste stream DAW (general, 200 L) DAW (shielded, 200 L) Concentrated waste (general, 200 L) Spent resin (general, 200 L)
3
Radionuclide H 1.26 E12 3.94 E16 8.57 E15 1.39 E15
14
C 2.44 E15 7.68 E19 1.40 E18 1.41 E14
55
Fe 3.34 E15 1.02 E18 5.49 E20 1.33 E14
58
Co 3.53 E42 8.18 E46 1.97 E46 3.42 E42
60
Co 6.13 E13 1.90 E16 1.31 E17 2.04 E12
59
Ni 0.00 Eþ00 0.00 Eþ00 0.00 Eþ00 0.00 Eþ00
63
Ni 7.85 E14 2.47 E17 7.33 E18 3.69 E12
90
Sr 1.07 E18 3.37 E22 3.67 E24 1.45 E18
94
Nb 8.95 E14 2.81 E17 1.50 E19 1.11 E15
99
Tc 8.12 E15 2.56 E18 1.41 E17 1.37 E15
129
I 8.71 E18 2.74 E21 4.16 E22 5.38 E18
137
Cs 4.27 E13 1.35 E16 3.39 E17 6.36 E12
144
Ce 1.42 E19 4.14 E23 8.69 E25 2.52 E20
Total activity 2.48 E12 7.76 E16 8.64 E15 1.21 E11

Fig. 13. Effective dose on all drums with regard to each waste stream for workers.
848 M.H. Ahn et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849
Fig. 14. Effective dose on all drums with regard to each waste stream for the public.
area boundary with respect to the Kori NPP. For a design-based
accident in a reactor facility site, generally, the larger c/Q value
must be selected between the c/Q value of the 95 percentile and the
max c/Q value. However, the c/Q value with respect to the TSF
could be used with the c/Q value of the 50th percentile in order to
prevent conservative result (Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
1983). Considering the c/Q value corresponding to the 50th
percentile, the c/Q value was chosen to be 2.35 E3 s/m3 for
workers and 2.82 E5 s/m3 for the public.
After considering all conditions for accident analysis of LILW
managed in the TSF at the Kori NPP, the dose assessments were
conducted in terms of the effective dose for workers and the public.
Furthermore, this case study progressed with a drum whose surface
dose was the highest with respect to each waste stream stored in
the second TSF at the Kori NPP. Then, the waste streams for dose
assessment were limited to four kinds: the general DAW, the
shielded DAW, concentrated waste solidified by cement, and
general spent resin. Table 4 shows the effective dose resulting from
the dropping of drums for workers. Table 5 shows the effective dose
resulting from the dropping of drums for the public. Table 6 shows
the effective dose resulting from fire for workers. Table 7 shows the
effective dose resulting from fire for the public. Then, Figs. 13 and 14
show the value of effective dose on all drums used in the case study
with regard to each waste stream for workers and the public,
respectively. Especially, the value of the effective dose of the
general spent resin was the highest regardless of the main risk
factor. The effective dose of the concentrated waste solidified by
cement was the lowest. Furthermore, through the case study we
were able to determine that the value of the effective dose with
respect to each waste stream for workers was about a hundred
times higher than that for the public. In addition, we determine one
thing that the value of the effective dose resulting from fire with
regard to the DAW (general) was relatively higher than that
resulting from the dropping of drums. This discrepancy might be
due to the integrity of DWA (general) on fire.
5. Conclusion
In this study, a program, INDACþþ, was developed to conduct
accident analysis of LILW managed in the TSF. In order to conduct
this work, a variety of parameters were considered such as risk
factors, radionuclide inventory, atmospheric dispersion factor (c/Q),
dose conversion factor, and so on. The main risk factors leading to
arbitrary accidents were developed by the MLD method based on the
FTA. Fire and the dropping of drums were considered as the main
risk factors in this study. The DTC method was used to calculate the
radionuclide inventory. Then, the release rates with respect to
the type of wastes and radionuclides were considered to evaluate
the amount of radionuclides released by the risk factors. Further-
more, the atmospheric dispersion factor (c/Q) was calculated by the
PAVAN code based on various models and assumptions suggested in
the U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145 (Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 1982, 1983). Especially, using the cross section of the
facility, the building wake effect was considered to prevent under-
estimation by assumption of a straight-line trajectory of the plume.
Using the horizontal vortex factor, the meandering effect was also
considered to prevent overestimation by assumption of a straight-
line trajectory of the plume. The dose assessments of the arbitrary
accidents originating in the TSF for LILW management are con-
ducted by considering the external exposure dose from the radio-
active plume and the internal exposure dose from breathing.
Synthesizing many parameters, the INDACþþ, which is the
integrated dose assessment code package for normal reaction
operation and for accident analysis of LILW managed in the TSF, was
developed using Visual C# in Microsoft Visual Studio.NET 2003.
Especially, this program was linked with a module called INDAC,
evaluating the exposure dose that resulted from releasing radio-
active materials under normal reactor operations. This means that
the INDACþþ can be more useful for all users because the INDAC
cannot conduct dose assessment with respect to arbitrary accidents
originating in the TSF for LILW management. Furthermore, the
INDACþþ can calculate radiological risk with regard to the main
risk factors for workers and the public.
Acknowledgements
This study was funded by the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety
and was partially supported by the Brain Korea 21 project of the
Korean Ministry of Education, Science and Technology.
References
Ahn, M.H., Lee, K.J., Choi, K.W., 2010. Dose Assessment on Arbitrary Accidents
originating in the Temporary Storage Facility for LILW Management. Progress in
Nuclear Energy 52, 206e213.
Cheng, Y.H., Shih, C., Jiang, S.C., Weng, T.I., 2008. Development of accident dose
consequences simulation software for nuclear emergency response applica-
tions. Annals of Nuclear Energy 35, 917e926.
 M.H. Ahn et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 52 (2010) 837e849
EPRI, 2004. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of Bolted Storage Casks: Updated
Quantification and Analysis Report, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI),
Technical Report 1009691.
Hwang, W.T., et al., 2004. Basic Document for the Fundamental Emergency Planning
Zone of the HANARO Facilities, KAERI/TR-2831/2004, Korea Atomic Energy
Research Institute.
International Commission on Radiological Protection, 1990. ICRP Publication 60:
1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological
Protection, Elsevier.
Jung, W.D., Lee, Y.H., Hwang, M.J., Han, S.H., Jang, S.C., Kang, D.I., Park, J.H., Yang, J.O.,
Kim, T.O., Ha, J.J., Jin., Y.H., 2003. Procedure for Conducting Probabilistic Safety
Assessment-Level 1 Full Power Internal Event Analysis, Korea Atomic Energy
Research Institute (KAERI), KAERI/TR-2548/2003.
KINS, 2000. Development of Methodology for Radiological Emergency and Envi-
ronmental Assessment: ODCM Guideline and INDAC User Manual, KINS/GR-
199. Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety.
849
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 2008. Acceptance Criteria for Low
and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste, Notice No. 2008-65, Republic of
Korea.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982. PAVAN: An Atmospheric Dispersion Program
for Evaluating Design-basis Accidental Releases of Radioactive Materials from
Nuclear Power Stations, NUREG/CR-2858 PNL-4413.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1983, Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential
Accident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. NRC Regula-
tory Guide 1.145 (Rev.01).
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1986. Update of Part 61Impacts Analysis Meth-
odology Volume 1: Methodology Report, NUREG/CR-4370 Vol. 1.
Papazoglou, I.A., Aneziris, O.N., 2003. Mater logic diagram: method for hazard and
initiating event identification in process plants. Journal of Hazardous Materials
A97, 11e30.
Till, J.E., Grogan, H.A., 2008. Radiological Risk Assessment and Environmental
Analysis. Oxford University Press, New York.