The Eighteenth Century in Indian History: From

the Perspective of Darkness and Financial

Progress
RAJAT KANTI SATPATHI

Student of Bankura University

Department of History,

Purandarpur, Bankura University, Bankura

Abstract: The fall of the Mughal Empire and the next eighteenth-century crisis is a
much-discussed topic in Indian history. The decline of the noble Mughal Empire began
before the eyes of the brilliant Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, and the process of decline
accelerated under his successors in the eighteenth century. For the readers of history,
therefore, the decline of the Mughal Empire and the crisis of the eighteenth century are
a great problem. Many learned Indian and foreign historians have tried their best to
solve this difficult problem with basic research, but there is disagreement among them,
and it is quite natural phenomenon that there are should be the chances of long-lasting
debates.

Keywords: - Mughal Empire, Eighteenth Century, Jaigirdar, Mansabdar, Mansabdari

System, Jaigirdari System, Ijaradari System, Jaat, Sawar, Tankha Jaigir, Watan Jaigir,
Jama, Hasil, Jaigirdari Crisis, Khalisha Land, Nawabi, Kasba, Mughal Court,
Khudkasht, feudalism, Capitalism, Fitna,

TRADITIONAL VIEWS: -
From the book Fall of Mughal Empire written by Acharya Jadunath Sarkar, we first learn
about the Mughal crisis of the seventeenth century which caused the downfall of the
Mughal Empire. Dr. Sarkar had tried to explain this massive breakdown by Aurangzeb's
religious and Deccan policies and his later lack of qualified successors and foreign
invasions.¹ Historian T.G.P Spare argued that there was no dearth of capable men in
eighteenth century India such as Syed Brothers, Nizam-ul-Mulk, Abdus Samad, Zakaria
Khan, Murshid Quli Khan etc. but they were actively busy with their own interests, so
they had no headache about Mughal crisis. Therefore, the cause of degradation should
not look for in the weakness of individuals but in the weakness of the whole Mughal
institution.²
Historian J.F Richards, describes the Mughal state as a military state whose central
administration was dominated by the emperor and the aristocracy. Akbar organized this
aristocracy through the Mansabdari System. The posts of Jaat and Sawar were part of
this system, by which the pay and rank of Mansabdars were depended. Besides, those
who got the right to collect land revenue from any part of the state as per the approval of
the emperor, were called Jagirdars. There was one type of Jagir which was transferable
called Tankha Jagir and which Jagir was not transferable was called Watan Jagir.³
Historian M.N Pearson, states that the Mughal emperor himself handled appointment,
promotion, and dismissal of the Mansabdars, so the elite were loyal to the emperor. The
stability of the empire rested on a relationship of personal loyalty between the emperor
and the ruling class, which was called patron-consumer relationship.⁴

M. Athar Ali states that the entire Mughal administrative system was highly dependent
on the emperor. On the other hand, the Mughal statesmen adopted an imperialist policy
to increase the amount of land that could be distributed to grant Jagirs. Again, the
Mughal Aristocracy was also divided into different classes, the later inclusion of the
Deccan Aristocracy increased mutual antagonism among them which led to the
emergence of rank conflicts among the aristocracy and rifts in their loyalty to the
emperor. On the other hand, as a result of continuous hostilities, the resources of the
empire continued to decrease.⁵

According to J. A. Kaiser, since the division of elites was mainly based on rank, conflict
arose only when there was a difference in the enjoyment of wealth. When the wealth of
the empire was dwindling, the difference between the Jama (holdings) and Hasil
(collected revenue) from the Jagir, created a crisis in the Jagirdari System, when the
amount of revenue deposits form Jagir was decreasing day by day and the amount of
distributable land among the Jagirdars was also decreasing. On the other hand,
increasing numbers of Jagirdar led to a competition between them for a limited number
of seats which intensified the conflict. The unequal distribution of Jagirs and the
unbalanced concentration of wealth in the hands of fistful Mansabdars, were roughly
the essence of the Jagirdari Crisis.⁶

J.F Rechards states that the Jagirdari Crisis was somewhat artificial and resulted from
Aurangzeb's misguided policies. On the one hand, he was increasing the amount of
Khalisha Land and on the other hand, after the annexation of Bijapur and Golconda,
Aurangzeb spent his all collected wealth from there, on the military sector, instead of
distributing it among the Mansabdars,⁷
so this crisis did not arise due to lack of resources. But the income from the Deccan
was decreasing, Professor Satish Chandra therefore, showed Deccan as a deficit area,
so it is doubtful how looted resources from Bijapur's and Golconda would have met the
deficit, but the Jagirdars competed for good land, and each tried to draw the attention of
the emperor into their fold, so factionalism became a courtly feature. However, many
Khalisha Lands have been converted into Jagir, but the problem has not been resolved.
As a result, corruption crept into the administration, it became difficult to keep track of
whether the Mansabdars were properly holding the posts of Jaats and Sawar’, the
military was weakened as a result, and the elites became enthusiastic about the
creation of independent states. Professor Satish Chandra has discussed the subject in
detail in his book, “Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court”, but according to Satish
Chandra, this factionalism of the elite class never took the form of violent conflict
beyond the boundaries of the Mughal Court.⁸

At the end of the 17th and 18th centuries, when the inherent weaknesses and
contradictions of the Mughal ruling class, the bearers of Mughal power, became
apparent, the Mughal State had to face another major problem, namely the repeated
revolts against the Mughal central power in different parts of the empire, which had to
be dealt with. The Mughal State no longer had the ability to deal with these rebellions.
The dissatisfaction of the peasant society and the lower-level native leaders, i.e., small
and large Zamindars, against the Mughal state structure was the greatest. Hence, these
revolts were led by various levels of Zamindars, and groups of oppressed peasants.
Various attempts have been made to explain these revolts, sometimes as political
reasons and sometimes as a reaction to Aurangzeb's wrong religious policies, but the
root cause of the revolts was social inequality and conflict.⁹

According to Tapan Roychowdhury and Irfan Habib, the land revenue system was
developed during the Mughal era with an understanding of leaving minimum resources
in the hands of the peasant. The rest of the revenue was collected by the Mughal State,
but the fact that the peasants had nothing left in their hand it is not true, because the
condition of the established and settled cultivators was always good. The oppressed
were mainly the small cultivators i.e., Khudkasht those who did not have tenure rights
and who did not have a fixed abode. The peasants had ethno-religious closeness with
the Zamindars, which in turn was the source of the Zamindars power, without their
cooperation Mughal administration in remote areas could not have functioned.¹⁰
The oppression of Jagirdars during the Mughal era created discontent among the
peasantry as the Jagirdars tried to extract the maximum surplus from the land without
making any effort to improve the condition of land and the peasants due to their
frequent transfers. Avoiding the influence of administrative supervision, they prevented
their transfer and started exploiting by building strong bases in their own areas.¹¹

Besides, when the Ijaradari System was introduced in the empire, the demand for
revenue exceeded the level of production and put hands on the farmer's own minimum
food resources, which resulted peasant revolts in later Mughal India. There are many
references to this in Ain-e-Akbari.¹²

But the main cause of these revolts was the lack of organization. Subsequently caste
and religion led to the revolution in divided peasant society from time to time. Professor
Gautam Bhadra has discussed all these resistance movements in detail in his book.¹³

So, we saw two sides of the main crisis, on the one hand, the weakness and infighting of
the Mughal ruling class, the mainstay of the Mughal central power, and on the other
hand, the repeated revolts of the peasant society in various parts of the empire against
the central power under increasing pressure, which destroyed the unity of the Mughal
Empire. Unfortunately, the social class, themerchants, whose interests were
inextricably linked to imperial cohesion and the efficiency of the central administration,
always remained a minority, politically weak and dependent upon the ruling classes.
Merchants never played an effective political role during the Mughal period, and the
Mughal State did not care much about merchant interests nor had little to do with it. The
weakness of the agricultural economy in the 18th century may have been overcome by
the expansion of trade and industry, but the rulers did not show enthusiasm in this
regard, and as a result, the field for the rise of capitalist economy was not ready. It is
clear from Asim Dasgupta's research that, political upheavals in various guises
disrupted coastal maritime trade and society. Indian Sea Merchants gradually retreated
to the Europeans, but their dominance in regional Inland Trade continued for a while,
but the Mughal Empire collapsed under its internal strife as the ruling class failed to
focus on acquiring commercial resources, on the other hand the standard of foreign
English merchants has turned into a scepter.¹⁴

REVISIONIST VIEWS: -

However, the studies of Muzaffar Alam, Chris Bailey and others on the crisis of the
Mughal Empire and the political structure of the eighteenth century against the
traditional historical practice have found different statements. Muzaffar Alam in his
“Crisis of Empire in North India: Awadh and Punjab and Chris Bailey in his book “Ruler's
Townsmen and Bazaar: North Indian Society at the Age of British Expansion”, have
suggested that the Mughal crisis or decline in the eighteenth century was not general
but spatial. During the eighteen century, agricultural production or yield increased in
Awadh and Punjab region by eighty to ninety percent, new cities were built in Eastern
India, Rohilkhand, etc. We can see trade and agriculture were expanded, besides the
decline of the region like Delhi or West Coast or Gujarat, along with the prosperity of
Eastern India or the Doab region. Muzaffar Alam has tried to understand this crisis
through the interrelation between the Centre and Subah. The struggle between the old
Amirs or Khanzads and newly growing Amirs at the court of Delhi was quite intense. In
this struggle, the Aristocracy that were knocked out of the court sought a place in the
different provinces.¹⁵

On the other hand, the expansion of agriculture in places like Varanasi led to the
emergence of a number of riotous local strongmen like Balwant Singh and Mansaram,
with these new groups, Amirs like Sadat Khan or Murshid Quli Khan, formed effective
relationships and founded the new Nawabi. Dr.Alam has skillfully written the story of
Nawabi development and non-development, but the contrast between imperial policy
and practice was in the context of provincial governance where the Nawabs entered
into agreements with local Zamindars to receive regular revenue through leases.
Therefore, the Nawabs were able to build an effective political structure within their
growing economy in a limited area. This task was no longer possible for the Mughal
Court, so the relationship of central power with regional and local power became
shaky.¹⁶

Andre Wink tries to capture the Mughal Crisis through the concept of Fitna or chaos.
According to him there is a tendency of Fitna or chaos or decentralization within the
political structure. Again, through Fitna control, the central structure is born. In the
main political structure, the fall of the Mughals and the rise of the Marathas were only a
one-way shift in balance because Bajirao and Mahadaji Shinde could not go far beyond
the framework of the Mughal Empire. Therefore, there was no big break in the Mughal
structure from that point of view.¹⁷

We have yet to see such a strong statement against all these interpretations. The logic
of Irfan Habib or Athar Ali's answers is old-fashioned, with no particular sign of new
data. First of all, they have raised various questions regarding the use of documents by
previous scholars. Dr. Alam failed to grasp the fact that the increase in Jama(deposits)
and Hasil (gains) was artificially arranged in view of increased prices. According to
them, the idea of evaluating the records of the 'law' with the records of the eighteenth
century is shaky and now no longer reasonable. Second, even if some growth rates are
recognized, there is no strong evidence that those growths can negate the overall loss
rate in relative terms. Thirdly, the impact of the destruction of the infrastructure of the
Mughal State cannot be underestimated. The extent of warfare and plunder turned into
truly extensively observed withinside the eighteenth century. These studies only
question the continuity of the same framework. Those sophisticated researchers aim to
disprove the theory that colonial rule caused widespread disintegration of native
societies.¹⁸ According to Bailey or Wink, the East India Company was part of the various
tensions of eighteenth-century Indian politics; the Grant of Diwani was the result of that
politics.

CONCLUSION: -

In eighteenth-century debates, the primal debate between the presuppositionalist and

the finalist appears at times to be fruitless. The decline of the Mughal State in the 18th
century and the resulting disasters probably not unrealistic. Again, we also know that an
image of the Mughal State was somehow active in the consciousness of the country's
society. Otherwise, his symbolic presence would not have been so strong in the Great
Revolt of 1857. So, the collapse of the state does not necessarily mean the total
collapse of society, while in full sympathy with such a theory, we would be wrong to
ignore the political failure and decline of the Mughal state and its burgeoning influence
in the eighteenth century. But after that the question should be arranged in a different
way. Different people of the country’s society, depending on the place and time, deal
with crisis in different ways. Even in times of general crisis, any party, group, or some
(community) can have one’s harvest month, is another’s complete devastation.

The strong point of Bailey's research is that different groups of middle-class society
such as Tenants, Baniyas, Town Traders, Village Gentry, intermediate Zamindars etc.,
were able to consolidate their power in the eighteenth century. They were able to appear
in front of the foot lamp only on the degradation of the upper class Mansabdars. During
this crisis, someone succeeds, and someone or faces lose. Again, the concept of crisis
is not one-dimensional; there are thousands of contemporary pieces of evidence in
Urdu literature. A special significance of the research on the eighteenth century is that
the contradictions become very clear because of various protests; we see different
existences, hear different voices in the broken lines of different levels of society. It may
be futile to try to find any harmony among these tones. On the contrary, many of those
voices may be dull and stupid. Moreover, in those tones may lie the source of some
other possibilities, which may have been forced to distort under the pressure of
circumstances. The significance of Muzaffar's or Bailey's research lies in finding the
potential or nature of various dimensions. We want to measure 'crisis' in some specific
criteria, we used to tug of war on about whether economic degradation is more or less.
During that tug-of-war, decisions were made entirely through colonial information
bases, with terms and arguments on each side of the debate borrowing from the same
information base.

In their discussion of Indian feudalism, Irfan Habib, Harbans Mukhia and Ram Saran
Sharma, have judge the economic model according to European experiences.
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to mention the experience of European history in the
context of the discussion. For historical reasons, we are often forced to use European
concepts, such as 'Renaissance' or 'Humanism', as a general category for various
theories. Nevertheless, what is important to note is how these concepts are being
applied in the discussion. Mukhia's has started the main discussion with the aim of
finding out whether the characteristics of European feudalism are present in Indian
society. Moreover, at the heart of that discussion is the question of the existence of free
peasants or slaves in India. According to him, the Indian farmer is economically
independent. Indian peasant control over the agricultural production process was the
main characteristic of pre-colonial Indian society. This feature remained constant from
the post-Mauryan period to the end of the Mughal period. Professor Mukhia’s discussion
focuses on one aspect, namely the role of the primary producer or farmer in the
production process. The characteristic uniformity of the production system from the
Maurya to the Mughal period does not mean that there was no change in class
relations.¹⁹

According to Irfan Habib, the question of feudalism should be analyzed from a

transitional perspective. Feudalism is pre-capitalist. Again, the medieval Indian society
is pre-colonial. Feudalism is the mere pre-history of capitalism. On the other hand,
Habib’s also showed the symptoms of feudalism, tried to match them with his analysis
of Indian society, and tentatively showed pre-colonial India as the Medieval Indian
System. Habib's also accepted the trend of capital accumulation as a precedent for
capitalist development and that symptom dominated his discussion. In his various
articles, Habib's main aim is to find possibilities of Capitalist Development in Mughal
economy. According to him, the result of the destruction of the medieval Indian system
was contrary to the European experience. Capital investment in India has not developed
properly in a capitalistic manner because of diverse reasons.²⁰
In second half of the 19th century, we notice seeds of a few capitalist improvements in
India because of colonial rule. Although there is a stark difference in the presentation of
information and argumentation, there is no fundamental difference in the historical
consciousness between Habib's and historians such as Bailey and their groups. They
are busy searching for the foundation of colonialism, to bring out the old tunes in its
newest offerings. As a result, they make charts of the incidents of communal conflict
even in the pre-colonial period, identify various commodity production initiatives, and
trace the early signs of capitalism. In their eyes, whatever was possible in the
eighteenth century, be it the Kasba or various intermediaries or bureaucrat, was fully
developed in colonial India in the nineteenth century. Hence, there is a great difference
in inclination, decision, or temperament, but in knowledge, one side is the partner of the
other. Mughal economy, feudalism are all manifestations of some kind of transition for
both sides; both parties judge symptoms based on the list, European experience being
the only perspective. Few historians emphasize the change, few emphasize the
continuity, and some may view colonial India as good or bad. However, those good or
bad symptoms are also the same. Those who argue for continuity also forget that the
presence of signs does not mean that the same tradition continues. A sign carries a
different meaning in each context. The same sign can have a different meaning in a
different context. Judging by the presence or absence of a symptom is whether the
observation has changed. As there were rich merchants in the Mughal era, it was also
during the company period. It may be seen that the power of some Indian businessmen
was unbroken in colonial India. Still the worlds of these two traders are not the same in
a social sense because the relationship of colonial society is different. Moreland
provides an excellent discussion of how the meaning of the word 'Diwan', introduced
during the Mughal period, changed in colonial society. It is important to judge the overall
relationship of a structure at various levels. Otherwise, one often falls prey to
abstractionism or objectivism. It is then possible to shift the focus of the debate. The
main original does not find a new path but becomes burdensome.

REFERENCES: -

1) Sarkar, J. N, Fall of the Mughal Empire, 1932-50, 4th Vols, Calcutta: M.C. Sarkar &
Sons.

2) Spear, T. G. P, Twilight of the Mughals, 1973, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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1993,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. P-282.

4) Pearson, M. N, Sivaji and the decline of the Mughal empire, 1976, Journal of Asian
Studies 35 (2): P- 221-35.

5) Athar, Ali, M, Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb, 1966, Bombay: Asia Publishing
House.

6) Qaisar, A. J, Distribution of the revenue resources of the Mughal empire among the
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8) Chandra, Satish, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1973, Bombay: People’s
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9) Chandra, Satish,Mughal Religious Policies: The Rajput’s and the Deccan, 1993, New
Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.

10) Roychaudhuri. Tapan, The state and the economy: The Mughal India. In The
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Tapan Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib, 1982, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, P-
172-93.

11 ) Habib, Irfan, The Agrarian System of Mughal India. London, 1963, Asia Publishing
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13 ) Bhadra, Goutam, Mughal Juge Krisi Arthaniti O Krisak-Bidroho, Subarnarekha

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14 ) Das Gupta, Asin, Merchants of Maritime India, 1500-1800, Hardback, 1994,

Routledge, London.

See also

Das Gupta, Asin and M.N Pearson ed. 1987, India and the Indian Ocean, Calcutta.

Das Gupta, Asin, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, c.1700-1750,
1979,Wiesbaden: Steiner.

Das Gupta, Asin, Malabar in Asian Trade, 1740-1800, 1967, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.

15) Alam, M, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and Punjab, 1707-48,
1986, Delhi, Oxford University Press. P-134-55.

16 ) Bayly,,C. A, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazars: North Indian Society in the Age of British
Expansion, 1770-1870, 1983, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Eighteenth Century Maratha Swarajya, 1986, Cambridge, P- 27, 34, 31-33, 154.

18 ) Ali, M. Athar, The Eighteenth Century- an interpretation, The Indian Historical

Review, 1986, Vol-V, Nos-1-2

See Also

Ali, M. Athar, Recent Theories of Eighteenth Century India, Indian Historical Review, July
1980- Jan 1987, XIII, Nos-2

Habib, Irfan, The Peasant in Indian History, Social Scientist, 11. 3. 1983.
Habib, Irfan, “Classifying Pre-Colonial India”, Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 23. Jan.-
April 1985.

Habib, Irfan, “Processes of Accumulation in Pre-Colonial and Colonial India”. Indian

Historical Review, vol. X, July 1984-Jan 1985, No. 1-2.

Habib, Irfan and Tapan Roy Choudhuri ed, The Cambridge Economic History of India,
vol. 1, 1200-1750, 1984,New Delhi.

19 ) Mukhia Harbans, “Was there Feudalism in Indian History?” Presidential Address,

Proceedings, Indian History Congress, Waltair, 1979, fire, Journal of Peasant Studies.

20 ) Habib, Irfan, Potentialities of Capitalistic Development in the Economy of Mughal

India. Published 1 March 1969, The Journal Of Economic History, The Task of Economic
History, Vol-29, No- 1, P-32-78