Aquinas’ Balancing Act:

Balancing the Soul Between the Realms of Matter and Pure Spirit
Gyula Klima
(Fordham University)
Abstract
In this paper, I will primarily argue for the consistency of Aquinas’ conception, according to which
the human soul, uniquely in God’s creation, is both the inherent, material, substantial form of the
human body, and the subsistent immaterial substance underlying the immaterial operations of its
immaterial, rational powers, namely, intellect and will. In this discussion, I will point out that
typical challenges to Aquinas’ conception usually rely on semantic or ontological assumptions that
can plausibly be denied in Aquinas’ own conceptual framework. Since the issue of consistency
merely assumes the less than self-evident claim of the immateriality of the human intellect, I will
also provide a brief sketch of what I take to be Aquinas’ most promising proof of this claim.

1. Introduction
In this paper, I am going to argue that Aquinas’ conception of the ontological status of the human
soul involves one of his typical “balancing acts” that his admirers love him for and his detractors
hate him for. Being a humble admirer of Aquinas, I will attempt to show here that Aquinas is
successful in balancing the human soul on what he construes as a razor-sharp line separating the
realms of matter and pure spirit, running right across our very being. Putting the point less
figuratively, I will argue for the consistency of Aquinas’ conception, according to which the human
soul, uniquely in God’s creation, is both the inherent, material, substantial form of the human body,
and the subsistent immaterial substance underlying the immaterial operations of its immaterial,
rational powers, namely, intellect and will. But putting the point this way, the case may appear
hopeless. How can one and the same entity be both material and immaterial, both inherent in matter
and a subsistent, immaterial form?

2. The problem of consistency

In fact, even Aquinas’ contemporaries would have found this question unanswerable. As Siger of
Brabant famously argued:
“Praeterea, alia est ratio essendi formae materialis et compositi seu formae per se subsistentis.
Ratio enim essendi formae materialis est secundum quam est aliquid aliud, ut ratio compositionis
est secundum quam habet esse compositum, et ratio figurae secundum quam habet esse figuratum;
unde ratio essendi formae materialis est quod sit unita alii. Ratio autem essendi compositi vel
formae liberatae a materia est quod sit ens per se et separate, non unum ens cum alio. Ex hoc sic
arguitur. Cum cessat ratio essendi alicuius, ipsum corrumpitur et non est; sed cum separatur forma
materialis a materia, cessat eius ratio essendi, ut ex praedictis apparet; nulla igitur forma cuius
separatio a materia non est sua corruptio est materialis. Sed separatio animae intellectivae a corpore
et materia non est eius corruptio. Ergo non habet esse unitum ad materiam. Et declaratur ratio in
exemplo. Cum ligna, lapides et lateres in domo cessant esse composita a forma compositionis
eorum, cessat esse compositio; et cum secundum figuram cessat aliquid figuratum esse, cessat esse

1
figura. Et similiter est de forma substantiali ad illud cuius est forma, quod, cum secundum eam
cessat esse materia, cessat esse formae materialis, licet notius sit in accidentali forma quam
substantiali. Et sunt istae rationes essendi, qua aliquid habet esse unite ad materiam et qua aliquid
habet rationem subsistentis per se et separate, oppositae adeo quod eidem inesse non possunt. Unde
anima intellectiva non potest habere rationem per se subsistentis et, cum hoc, unum facere cum
materia et corpore in essendo.”
“The ratio essendi [mode of being] of a material form is different from the ratio essendi of a
composite substance or of a subsistent form. For the ratio essendi of a material form is that of
something on account of which [secundum quam] something else is, just as the ratio of
composition is that it is something on account of which a composite thing is [composite], and the
ratio of shape is that it is something on account of which a thing is thus and so shaped; therefore,
the ratio essendi of a material form is that it is united with something else. But the ratio essendi
of a composite substance or of a form that is free from matter is that it is a being per se and
separately, not one being with something else. From this we argue as follows. When the ratio
essendi of something ceases to be, then it is destroyed and is not; but when a material form is
separated from matter, then its ratio essendi ceases to be, as is clear from what has been said;
therefore, no form whose separation from matter is not its corruption is a material form. But the
separation of the intellective soul from the body and matter is not its corruption. Therefore, it does
not have being united with matter. And the reasoning is clarified by means of examples. When the
timbers, stones, and bricks in a house cease to be composed on account of their form of
composition, the composition ceases to be; and when something ceases to be thus and so shaped
on account of its shape, that shape ceases to be. And the case is similar with the substantial form,
with respect to that of which it is the form; for when matter ceases to be actual on account of this
form, then this material form ceases to be, although this is better known in connection with an
accidental form than in connection with the substantial form. And these rationes essendi, that on
account of which something is united with matter and that on account of which something is a per
se and separately subsisting being, are opposite to such an extent that they cannot belong to one
and the same thing. Therefore, the intellective soul cannot have the ratio of a per se subsisting
being and, at the same time, constitute with matter and the body a thing that is one in being.”1
To deal with Siger’s challenge, we should first clarify what it means for Aquinas to say that the
intellective soul is immaterial. Clearly, this claim cannot mean that the intellective soul does not
have matter as its integral part, because that would not distinguish it from any other form, for no
form has matter as its integral part. But this claim cannot mean either that the soul does not exist
in matter, for the intellective soul is not a separate substance. On the contrary, it is the substantial
form of the human body. Indeed, that the soul is the substantial form of the body means that the
act of being of the soul is the same act as the act of being of the body, which is nothing but the life
of the human being. But this seems to go directly against the claim that the intellective soul can
possibly survive the body, since if the act of being of the soul is the life of the human being, then

1
SIGER OF BRABANT, Quaestiones in tertium de anima, ed. B. Bazàn, Peeters: Louvain, 1972, 79-80, ll.43-66. In the
translation, I provided ‘mode of being’ as a translation of ratio essendi, which is certainly the primarily intended sense
of the phrase here. But I should note that the phrase just as strongly carries the sense of raison d’être, which certainly
added to the plausibility of Siger’s argument both for himself and for his intended audience, especially in the crucial
sentence: “Cum cessat ratio essendi alicuius, ipsum corrumpitur et non est”. As we shall see, Aquinas’ answer
questions precisely the plausibility of this claim, arguing that just because the soul ceases to be in a certain way, i.e.,
as inherent, it does not mean that it cannot continue to be in the same act of being in another way, i.e., as subsistent.

2
it seems that the end of the life of the human being should be the end of the act of being of the
soul, that is, with the death of the human being the soul should perish as well.
It is at this point that Aquinas’ discussion of how the immaterial act of thinking pertains to the
intellective soul as its proper act (and to the whole human being because of the soul) becomes
crucial. For the immaterial act of thinking, because it is immaterial, cannot be directly an act of
the composite substance (or any of its quantitative parts, such as an organ, say, the brain).
Therefore, it must have as its immediate subject an entity which itself does not contain matter as
its integral part. This, according to Aquinas, is the intellective soul. However, if the soul is the
immediate subject of an act that is not at the same time an act of any part of the body, which
therefore is the soul’s proper act, then the soul must have subsistent being, according to Aquinas’
principle that properly speaking only subsistent beings can have their proper acts. So, the soul must
have a subsistent act of being. But it cannot have any other act of being, so this subsistent act of
being is also the soul’s inherent act of being, its act of informing the body. Indeed, this act is also
the subsistent act of the whole composite, since there is only one substantial act of being in any
one composite substance, which is also the act of being of any of its essential parts. What remains,
then, is that there can be only one substantial act of being in a human being, which pertains both
to the composite and to its substantial parts. However, it pertains to the whole and to the parts in
different senses, and to one part, namely, to the intellective soul in two of these senses at once. But
is that possible? After all, didn’t Siger’s argument just establish that the inherent vs. subsistent
rationes essendi are opposites to such an extent that they cannot possibly belong to the same thing?

3. A bit of Thomistic semantics

To answer this question, we need to delve a little bit deeper into Aquinas’ conception of how our
words are related to the things they signify, i.e., his semantics. For Aquinas, a concrete common
term such as ‘man’, ‘ox’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’ is true of whatever it is true of because it has in actuality
whatever it signifies in the thing it is true of. For instance, the term ‘man’ is true of me, because
what it signifies, human nature, is in actuality in me, and the same goes for any other actually
existing human person, but not, say, for this dog or that ox, which do not have this nature in
actuality (indeed, probably not even in potentiality, but we need not get into that issue here).
Likewise, the term ‘runs’ signifies the act of running, which is presently in potentiality in me,
because I can run, but I am not running.
This point is simple, and well-known among medieval scholars, so I do not want to dwell too much
on it. Just for the sake of generalization and clarification of my terminology, let me say that I will
refer to what a common term signifies in an individual, whatever it is that, provided it is actual,
makes the term in question true of that individual, as the significate of that term in that individual.
And when the term is true of that individual, so that the term can be used to refer to that individual
in a true, assertoric, affirmative categorical proposition, I will call the individual in question a
suppositum of that term, in line with the well-known medieval terminology. Finally, let me say
that if a term may have different (distinct) significata in different (or even the same) supposita,
then the term has different significations. For instance, the term ‘bat’ in one sense signifies the
nature of certain flying mammals, while in another sense it signifies the property of certain
properly shaped implements on account of which they can be used as baseball bats. Clearly, even
without knowing precisely what these different significata are in different individuals, we know
that whatever has the one does not have the other, because whatever is a bat in the first sense is

3
alive, and whatever is a bat in the second sense is not; so, we know that these significata cannot
coincide in any single suppositum, i.e., nothing can be a bat in both senses at the same time.
Yet, it is perfectly possible for an equivocal term, i.e., one that has different, unrelated
significations, to have its distinct significata in one and the same of its supposita: after all, one can
be a bachelor in the sense of being an unmarried male and also in the sense of holding a BA. Again,
the same goes for analogical terms, i.e., ones that have different, but not unrelated significations.
For instance, in one sense, according to one of its significations, the term ‘healthy’ signifies the
health of a living being, on account of which it is in good health. In another, related sense, the
same term signifies the healthiness of something that is apt to cause the good health of a living
thing (i.e., the living thing’s health in the first sense). But of course, there is nothing impossible in
the claim that one and the same thing can be healthy in both senses, namely, because it is both
healthy in the first sense and in the second sense as well. After all, a healthy cabbage happily sitting
on the ground is in good health, and yet it is also healthy in the second sense, because it is apt to
cause the health of the goat that eats it. Indeed, one might even suggest that the cabbage is healthy
for the goat precisely on account of its being in good health (a sick, rotten cabbage probably not
doing much good for the health of the goat); so it is one and the same health of the cabbage that
makes it healthy in both senses: it is one and the same significate of the term in the cabbage the
actuality of which makes the term ‘healthy’ true of it in both of its significations.2

4. Aquinas’ “semantic” solution

However, viewed from this perspective, at least semantically speaking, there should be nothing
impossible in the claim that one and the same term that has different significations can have one
significate in one of its supposita, but such that this significate belongs to two of its different
significations at the same time. Now, this is precisely the case here. As Aquinas says:
“Respondeo. Dicendum, quod esse dupliciter dicitur, ut patet per Philosophum in V Metaph., et in
quadam glossa Origenis super Principium Ioan. Uno modo, secundum quod est copula verbalis
significans compositionem cuiuslibet enuntiationis quam anima facit: unde hoc esse non est aliquid
in rerum natura, sed tantum in actu animae componentis et dividentis. Et sic esse attribuitur omni
ei de quo potest propositio formari, sive sit ens, sive privatio entis; dicimus enim caecitatem esse.
Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in quantum est ens, idest quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in
rerum natura. Et sic esse non attribuitur nisi rebus ipsis quae in decem generibus continentur; unde
ens a tali esse dictum per decem genera dividitur. Sed hoc esse attribuitur alicui dupliciter. Uno
modo ut sicut ei quod proprie et vere habet esse vel est. Et sic attribuitur soli substantiae per se
subsistenti: unde quod vere est, dicitur substantia in I Physic.. Omnia vero quae non per se
subsistunt, sed in alio et cum alio, sive sint accidentia sive formae substantiales aut quaelibet
partes, non habent esse ita ut ipsa vere sint, sed attribuitur eis esse alio modo, idest ut quo aliquid
est; sicut albedo dicitur esse, non quia ipsa in se subsistat, sed quia ea aliquid habet esse album.

2
Note, however, that the example need not be true in order to illustrate the point. We do not need to know what the
significata of the term ‘healthy’ in this cabbage or in any other thing in its two significations are, and whether they
are actually identical in this cabbage or not; it is enough if we know that their identification is not prima facie
impossible, just as we know that the significata of the term ‘bat’ in its two significations discussed cannot be identical
in any of the term’s supposita in either of these two significations, because their identification in any single thing
would lead to a contradiction. But this is precisely the strength of this “semantic approach”: we do not need to know
much about the nature of things “in advance” in order to draw out some implications concerning them from what we
understand from the meanings of the terms by which we are talking about them.

4
Esse ergo proprie et vere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti. Huic autem attribuitur esse
duplex. Unum scilicet esse resultans ex his ex quibus eius unitas integratur, quod proprium est esse
suppositi substantiale. Aliud esse est supposito attributum praeter ea quae integrant ipsum, quod
est esse superadditum, scilicet accidentale; ut esse album attribuitur Socrati cum dicitur: Socrates
est albus.”
“… being [esse] is said to be the act of a being [ens] insofar as it is a being, that is, that on account
of which something is denominated as a being in the nature of things. And being in this way is
attributed only to the things themselves which are contained in the ten categories, whence 'being'
[ens] predicated on account of such an act of being [esse] is divided by the ten categories. But this
act of being [esse] is attributed to something in two ways. In one way as to that which [quod]
properly and truly has being or is. And thus, it is attributed only to a per se subsisting substance;
whence that which truly is is said to be a substance in bk. 1. of the Physics. All those [things],
however, which do not subsist per se, but in others and with others, whether they are accidents or
substantial forms or any sorts of parts, do not have being [esse] so that they themselves would truly
be, but being [esse] is attributed to them in another way, namely, as to that by which [quo]
something is; as a whiteness is said to be, not that it itself would subsist in itself, but because it is
on account of [this whiteness] that something has it that it is white. Being [esse], therefore, is
properly and truly attributed only to a per se subsisting thing. To this, however, two kinds of being
are attributed. The one is that results from those from which its unity is integrated, which is the
proper substantial being of a suppositum. Another being is attributed to a suppositum besides those
that integrate it, which is an additional being, namely, accidental being; as being white is attributed
to Socrates when it is said: Socrates is white.”3
The predicate ens in the sense in which it signifies the act of being of its subsistent supposita (ut
quod est) signifies the act of being of this human being, and of that horse, and of that tree, etc. In
the same sense, however, it does not signify the act of being of the form of that tree, nor that of
that horse, etc. But according to Aquinas’ claim it does signify the act of being of the soul of this
human being in this sense. However, in another sense, namely, in the sense in which it signifies
the act of being of substantial forms (ut quo aliquid est), it signifies the act of being of the form of
the tree and that of the form of the horse as well as that of the soul of the human being.4 Indeed,
this understanding of Aquinas’ point also shows at once how it is possible for the human soul to
cease to be a being in one sense, without ceasing to be in another at a certain time, i.e., how it is
possible for the human soul to cease to be the inherent form of the human body without thereby
ceasing to be. This is exactly how Aquinas’ doctrine of the subsistent existence of the soul supports
his claim of the soul’s immortality, while preserving its genuinely “monistic” substantial unity
with the body in their single act of being.
To put the point even more simply, we can say that the subsistent act of being of the human soul
is merely contingently identical with the inherent act of being of the soul as the form of the body.
Still, this does not mean that the soul is merely accidentally a form of the human being, precisely

3
Quaestiones Quodlibetales 9, 2, 2, in corp.
4
To put the point formally, if we denote the significate of a predicate P in an entity u at a time t as SGT(P)(u)(t), it is
easy to see that if P has two significations, SGT1 and SGT2, then there is nothing impossible in the claim that
SGT1(P)(u)(t) = SGT2(P)(u)(t). Thus, it is quite possible that SGT1(‘being’)(this soul)(t) = SGT2(‘being’)(this
soul)(t). For more detail on this point, see the Appendix.

5
because its act of being is nothing but the substantial act of being of the human being.5 So, the
soul’s being is both subsistent and inherent, however, it is only contingently inherent, while the
same act of being is still the subsistent act of the complete human being, who loses this act of being
precisely when the soul ceases to be inherent, yet, without ceasing to be, absolutely speaking.
Thus, it seems we have a clear “semantic” solution to the problem: if we properly understand what
it means to say that the human soul, and the human soul alone, is both an inherent and a subsistent
being, then, pace Siger (and others),6 there is nothing prima facie impossible in the claim that the
human soul is an ens in both senses. However, this is precisely the claim that the human soul has
being in both senses, namely, both ut quo aliquid est and ut quod est. Therefore, there is nothing
impossible in the claim that the soul should have its act of being in both senses, as long as it informs
the body, while it ceases to have it in one of these senses when it ceases to inform the body, still,
without ceasing to be, absolutely speaking, on account of keeping the same act of being in the
other sense. Indeed, this is precisely what the immateriality of the soul should consist in for
Aquinas: its ability to continue to exist without informing the body, i.e., to have an act of being
that it shares with the body as its substantial form, but which it can retain as its own, when it is no
longer the body’s substantial form. And the reason why it can have its act of being in this way,
unlike any other form that actually informs matter, is that it has some acts, namely, the acts of
understanding (and acts of the will), which it does not communicate with the body, i.e., which are
its own alone.

5. An objection to Aquinas’ “semantic” solution, solved by some more semantics

However, this latter claim, namely, that the soul can have the acts of understanding as its own
alone, can also be challenged on the grounds of Aquinas’ above-mentioned principle according to
which actiones sunt suppositorum, that is to say, that only subsistent entities can properly be said
to perform actions. They have their active principles by which they perform those actions, i.e.,
which are instrumental in performing those actions, but the actions are properly attributed only to
the suppositum, and not to the active principle. As Aquinas says:
“Actiones autem sunt suppositorum et totorum, non autem, proprie loquendo, partium et
formarum, seu potentiarum, non enim proprie dicitur quod manus percutiat, sed homo per manum;
neque proprie dicitur quod calor calefaciat, sed ignis per calorem.”

5
Cf. Quaestio disputata de anima, a. 1 ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet anima habeat esse completum
non tamen sequitur quod corpus ei accidentaliter uniatur; tum quia illud idem esse quod est animae communicat
corpori, ut sit unum esse totius compositi; tum etiam quia etsi possit per se subsistere, non tamen habet speciem
completam, sed corpus advenit ei ad completionem speciei.” So, the soul is still essentially the substantial form of a
human being.
6
Cf. Cross, R. “Is Aquinas’ Proof for the Indestructibility of the Soul Successful?” British Journal for the History of
Philosophy 5(1997), pp. 1-20; Cross, R. “Aquinas and the Mind-Body Problem”, in: J. Haldane (ed.) Mind,
Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytic Traditions, University of Notre Dame Press: South Bend, IN,
2002, 36-53; Rozemond, M. 1998. Descartes’s Dualism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, 148-149.

6
“Actions pertain to supposita and to wholes, but, strictly speaking, not to [their] parts or to [their]
forms. For one cannot properly say that a hand hits, but rather that a man does with his hand, nor
can one properly say that heat heats, but rather that fire heats by its heat.”7
Nevertheless, Aquinas also insists against Averroes that what performs the activity of thinking is
the human person. But the whole human person constituted from body and soul cannot be
identified with his or her soul, since, as Aquinas would put it: nulla pars integralis praedicatur de
suo toto – an integral part cannot be predicated of its whole; that is to say, any predication to the
effect that this person is his or her soul has to be false. However, according to Aquinas’ doctrine
of the immortality of the human soul, the reason on the basis of which we can conclude that the
intellective soul survives the death of a human person is that the intellective soul has an immaterial
act, namely, thinking, which is an act of the intellective soul alone that it does not communicate
with the body. Therefore, it is unclear how Aquinas can reconcile his doctrine of the immortality
of the intellective soul, which requires the attribution of the immaterial act of thinking to this soul,
with his insistence against Averroes that it is not this soul that does the thinking, but rather the
whole human person by means of his or her soul.
Aquinas’ answer to this problem should be that since the soul is an essential part of this composite
substance, any act that belongs to this part alone denominates the whole of which it is a part in
accordance with the common rule concerning the denomination of a whole from its part. The
common rule recognized by medieval logicians dealing with the fallacy of secundum quid et
simpliciter is that a whole is properly denominated by any attribute of its part which can apply
only to the part in question. For example, if Socrates’ hair is blond or curly, then Socrates is
properly denominated blond or curly, since the terms ‘blond’ or ‘curly’ can only apply to his hair.
By contrast, if his hair is black, Socrates cannot on that account properly be denominated black,
for the attribute ‘black’ could also denominate his whole body. In the same way, if walking is an
action that strictly speaking can only belong to the legs, then we also have to say that, precisely
for this reason, when the legs of a person do the walking, then the whole person is walking. By
contrast, since swinging can belong both to the arm and to the whole body of a person, one cannot
properly be said to be swinging just on account of swinging an arm. Likewise, since blinking can
only be performed with the eyes, it is the whole person who is said to be blinking on account of
blinking the eyes. Again, if it is only the eyes of a person that can see, and no other part, then,
precisely for this reason, the whole person is said to see on account of his or her eyesight.8
So, if strictly speaking only the intellective soul does the activity of thinking, and this soul alone
can do it, then, as long as the soul is a part of the whole human being, the whole human being is
also properly denominated by this act. Therefore, if it is true that only the intellective soul thinks
and only the intellective soul of a human person can do the thinking, then, since the soul is a part
of the human person, indeed, an essential part, it is precisely for this reason that we have to say
that the human person thinks, at least, as long as he or she has his or her soul.

7
“Actiones autem sunt suppositorum et totorum, non autem, proprie loquendo, partium et formarum, seu potentiarum,
non enim proprie dicitur quod manus percutiat, sed homo per manum; neque proprie dicitur quod calor calefaciat, sed
ignis per calorem.” Summa Theologiae 1-2, 58, 2
8
The rule was interpreted as covering all sorts of integral wholes, and was widely used by theologians in explaining
what sorts of attributes could apply to Christ on account of his two natures. For discussion and references, see KLIMA,
G. “Libellus pro Sapiente: A Criticism of Allan Bäck's Argument against St. Thomas Aquinas’ Theory of the
Incarnation”, The New Scholasticism, 58(1984), 207-219.

7
However, when the soul gets separated from the body of the person in question, this means that
the act of being of this person comes to an end. Nevertheless, this need not mean that the soul’s
act of being should come to an end. What this means is only that the act of being in question ceases
to be the act of being of the composite and it also ceases to be the soul’s in the sense in which it
belonged to it as to the form of the body. But the same act of being can still belong to the soul in
the sense in which it belonged to it as to a subsistent being. Therefore, the soul can continue in its
life, and can continue its operation that belonged to it as its own, but no longer in connection with
the body.
Thus, Aquinas’ account is at least possible (while its actual truth of course hinges primarily on the
truth of his claim of the immateriality of thinking). But this is all we needed to establish that he
can consistently maintain a position that qualifies as a strong substance-monism (as opposed to
substance-dualism), still, without collapsing into the simple (indeed, Aquinas could claim, simple-
minded) substance-monism of materialism.

6. Another objection to the “semantic” solution, solved by some mereology and

type theory
Not so fast, one may object, though. This vaunted “semantic” solution still seems to commit
Aquinas to something like substance dualism. After all, the solution claims that the human soul is
a being not only in the sense in which a form is but also in the same sense in which the composite
of form and matter is. But whenever x and y are both F in the same sense and x is not identical
with y, then they constitute two F’s, not one. Therefore, if the human soul and the human being
whose soul it is are beings in the same sense, then there are two beings here in the same sense, not
one, which seems to be a classic case of substance dualism.9
However, this objection is fallacious, because it relies on a principle that easily leads to paradox.
For clearly, the principle as quoted is valid only if the variables it uses are of the same type, ranging
over items of the same type. But just because the items in question are F in the same sense, that
may not guarantee that they are of the same type.10 After all, just because the halves, thirds or
quarters of a cake are all parts of the same cake in the same sense, you cannot add them up and say
that the two halves and three thirds and four quarters of the cake add up to nine parts altogether,
because if based on the divisions just listed you would promise to hand out nine slices, then you
would run out of cake after handing out the first two halves, leaving the remaining seven promised
slices undelivered. Indeed, you cannot say either that because the cake mentally carved up in two
halves is a whole cake and the totally intact cake you don’t even think about cutting up is another
whole cake (because it is undivided even mentally, and what is divided cannot be the same as what
is undivided, as someone might wistfully think); therefore, you have two cakes.11

9
I owe thanks to Therese Scarpelli Cory and Francis Feingold for bringing up informal versions of the same objection
in Rome, Italy and Ave Maria, FL, respectively, after my presentations of earlier drafts of this paper.
10
See Russell’s paradox in set theory or the analogous impredicable paradox in logic, which both result from lumping
together items under the same common term, such as ‘set’ or ‘property’, and both demand some type theory for their
solution.
11
For more on this, see KLIMA, G. “There is More Than One Way to Slice a Cake: Comments on ‘Multiplex
Composition and The Prospects for Substantial Unity’”, in Klima, G. and Hall, A. (eds.) Hylomorphism and
Mereology, PSMLM, vol. 15, Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne, 2018, 22-29.

8
Furthermore, by the same token, you could “prove” that a finite line section is equal in length to
an infinite line. For the section has two halves, and three thirds, etc., which are line sections in the
same sense as the original. But the original is infinitely divisible, so it contains infinitely many
finite line sections. But infinitely many finite line sections add up to an infinite line; ergo, etc. Of
course, you can always map a finite line onto an infinite one on account of the equal (continuum)
cardinality of their points. But that just goes to show that this equal cardinality is not the same as
the equality of lengths, which could be “magically” generated by adding up the infinity of finite
lines contained in a finite line.
In general, whenever we are counting units together, we have to keep in mind that the process of
counting, i.e., adding up units to yield a number of units, presupposes a principle of division and
identification of the units to be added together. After all, unum est ens indivisum, what is one, a
unit, is an undivided being, and any divisible unit can be divided in any old ways to yield some
sub-units, which, however, are not on a par with the unit of which they are the sub-units.12 So, if
the units are of different orders or types, carved out based on different principles of division and
identification, we cannot just add them up to yield a number of items without further ado.13 As
Aquinas himself succinctly put it: pars non ponit in numerum contra totum – the part does not
constitute a number with the whole.14 Therefore, even if the human soul is a being in the same
sense as the whole human being, of which it is an essential part, sharing with it the same undivided
act of being, the soul and the human being still do not constitute two beings in the same sense, but
one being, one substance, of which the soul is a substantial part.

7. A metaphysical objection to the “semantic” solution

However, even if Aquinas’ “semantic” solution can in this way be maintained with a bit more
semantics and mereology, Siger may still be unimpressed. After all, he can rightfully claim that
this “semantic” solution simply begs the question against him. Just because it is logically possible
in general that a term that has two meanings can apply to the same thing in both its meanings (just
as someone can be a bachelor both because he is unmarried and has a BA degree), it doesn’t mean
that any particular term’s two meanings are actually compatible, so that it can indeed be applied
to the same thing in both meanings. Suppose we had a term in our language ‘gred’, which in one
sense would mean the same as ‘green’ and in another would mean the same as ‘red’. Just because
‘healthy’ can apply to the same thing in two of its senses (as it does to a cabbage in the previous
example), it doesn’t mean ‘gred’ can apply to anything in both of its senses, simply because those
senses pick out metaphysically incompatible properties, namely, the property of being red and the
property of being green, which nothing can have both at the same time all over its surface (to refer
back to a famous example of early analytic philosophy). So, the “semantic” solution presented
earlier simply begs the question against Siger by assuming that the two senses of being, namely,
inherent being and subsistent being, are not metaphysically incompatible, which is precisely what
Siger claims.

12
For more on this, see KLIMA, G. (2000) “Aquinas on One and Many”, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica
Medievale, 11(2000), 195-215.
13
Otherwise we could end up with the story of the facetious job applicant boasting about the hundreds of books he
authored, on the basis that his thesis was printed in two hundred copies, or with the story of Geach’s cheeky schoolboy
listing at the request of his teacher five animals they saw in the zoo thusly: zebra, giraffe, and three monkeys, etc.,
etc., the examples could be multiplied ad nauseam.
14
Contra impugnantes, pars 2 cap. 2 ad 3.

9
8. A Thomistic metaphysical solution
However, we might ask just what this mysterious, non-linguistic, metaphysical incompatibility is
supposed to consist in. Obviously, being non-linguistic, it is non-conventional; so, this
incompatibility has to do with the nature of the things signified by our terms, rather than with the
signification or the mode of signification of the terms involved, which are, in fact, presupposed in
a metaphysical or scientific investigation of the nature of the things thus and so signified by our
words. So, let us use our best available knowledge about the nature of the things signified by our
terms ‘red’ and ‘green’ in the primary sense of these terms, namely, the red and green colors of
opaque bodies.15 Combining modern physical optics with the Aristotelian-Thomistic language of
powers and acts, I believe it would be fair to say that these colors are the powers of these opaque
bodies that enable them to selectively reflect light in distinct parts of the visible spectrum, the acts
of which would be the acts of selectively reflecting the incident white light. Supposing this is an
at least tolerable characterization of the nature of these surface-colors, it seems to be clear why we
should say that these two colors are incompatible. They are incompatible, because their acts are
contraries: no selectively reflective surface can reflect light in two distinct parts of the visible
spectrum, because then the reflected light would have to have two distinct wavelengths, etc.
Obviously, this is just a very sketchy, ad hoc explanation of what might be an instance of some
non-semantic, non-conventional, metaphysical incompatibility, but it is sufficient to illustrate the
point. Since, in general, we know powers through their acts, and through their powers we know
the natures determining these powers, and so also the modes of being determined by these natures,
perhaps, we can at least plausibly generalize even on the basis of this sketchy example that powers
are incompatible or are contraries, if and only if their acts are contraries.
But what are the relevant acts and the corresponding powers determined by the intellective soul?
Clearly, the acts in question must be thinking, on account of the intellect, and living on account of
the vegetative and sensitive powers enlivening or vivifying the human body. However, vivification
and thinking are obviously not contraries, if the same thing can live and think, which is precisely
what you, reading these words, are doing right now. Therefore, the powers that enable us to think
and to live are not contraries. However, by analogy with the previous principle concerning acts
and powers, only those modes of being are contraries that are determined by a nature that
determines contrary powers. But since the powers that enable us to think and to live, are not
contrary powers, as we have just established, the modes of being determined by the nature
determining these powers are not contraries either. Therefore, pace Siger, there is no metaphysical
incompatibility between the intellective soul’s being both inherent and subsistent, that is, having
its being both in the mode of an inherent form and in the mode of a subsistent entity, a subsistent
form.

9. The Immateriality of the Intellect

To be sure, all this presupposes that the intellect is indeed the immaterial power of the human soul,
directly inhering in it, without inhering in the soul/body composite or in its matter. So, let me
sketch here briefly what I take to be Aquinas’ most promising argument for this claim. As I have

15
Here I want to disregard other uses of these color terms in which we can talk about the colors of semi-transparent
objects, such as colored pieces of glass, or the colors of light beams, or the colors of diffuse objects (such as smoke
or fog) lit up by such light beams.

10
argued in earlier papers, I believe Aquinas’ argument that I dubbed “the argument from the
universality of concepts” can work even for us, provided we understand it well.16
The gist of the argument can be stated simply as the following modus tollens:
1. If a representation is material in its being, then its mode of representation is singular
2. The mode of representation of some intellectual concepts is not singular, but universal
3. Therefore, some intellectual concepts are not material in their being
From which we can further conclude that
4. The underlying subject of these concepts, the intellect, is not material
Since we obviously do have universal concepts, which in their mode of representation are not
singular, the burden of the argument is mainly carried by its far from self-evident first premise.
Why would the material existence of a representation prevent it from representing in a universal
manner? After all, the very words on this page are visible, material entities, yet some of them
obviously represent what they are about in a universal manner.
However, it should also be clear that our visible (or if uttered, audible) universal words owe their
universality to the universal mode of representation of our concepts they express (or are imposed
on and subordinated to, if we want to use the technical jargon of medieval logic). So, the
implication in question should clearly be restricted to non-conventional, natural representations,
produced by the natural, causal processes of sensation, perception, memory, abstraction, etc., in
the natural process of receiving, storing, and further processing sensory information, streaming in
through our senses.
Therefore, what may serve as the justification for the implication in question is not some self-
evident logical necessity (such that the negation of the consequent with the antecedent would yield
a logical contradiction), but rather the natural necessity of these causal processes, of which,
however, we (or just I) may not know enough. Nevertheless, looking at them from the perspective
of the Aristotelian hylomorphist theory of perception (as Aquinas did) may still lend some
plausibility to the claim that, by natural necessity, if such naturally generated cognitive
representations are material, then their mode of representation is singular.
For we can ask: What is it that accounts for the singular mode of representation of sensory
representations? The obvious answer seems to be that a representation is singular on account of
carrying information about this individual qua this individual, as opposed to any other. So, the
representation in question is singular, because it carries singularly distinctive information. But this
singularly distinctive information is due precisely to the material, spatiotemporal features of the
thing represented, encoded by the corresponding material, spatiotemporal features of the
representation produced by the natural causal impact of the thing represented.

16
KLIMA, G. (2001) “Aquinas’ Proofs of the Immateriality of the Intellect”, Proceedings of the Society for Medieval
Logic and Metaphysics, in Klima, G. and Hall, A. (eds.), The Immateriality of the Human Mind, the Semantics of
Analogy, and the Conceivability of God, Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, Vol. 1,
Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne, 2011, 25-38. See also Bob Pasnau’s comments and my
rejoinder in the same volume, on pages 39-38 and 49-60, respectively. For a more recent defense of the same argument,
see KLIMA, G. (2015) “Universality and Immateriality”, Acta Philosophica, 24(2015), 31-42.

11
Consider the following scenario: you have two identical looking eggs in your visual field.17 If the
two were miraculously made to be located in the same place, there would be no way for you to tell
them apart just by looking. But what allows you to distinguish one from the other in a natural
scenario is that one is to your left, impacting a certain area of your retina, and the other is to your
right, impacting another area. So, what accounts for the singularity of these retinal images is that
they encode singularizing information about their singular objects by means of their own material,
spatiotemporal features.
Now consider another, somewhat similar scenario. Only one of the objects in your visual field is
a real egg, the other is a marble egg, which is, however, indistinguishable to you in its visible
qualities (shape, color) from the real egg. Indeed, if a supernatural trickster (or a crafty human one)
were to swap them so you would not notice the change, you would not know which one is to your
left or to your right. But of course, even if after the swap you would not be able to reidentify them,
you would still see each in its singularity, as distinct from one another.
Furthermore, if you were to take a snapshot of each, and would feed the pictures into a computer
and would cut out their backgrounds that distinguished them in your visual field, so that the
resulting pictures are visually indistinguishable, indeed, pixel by pixel looking exactly the same,
you would still have singular visual representations of each, distinguishable at least by the
metadata of the resulting files, such as their time and date stamps and geotags. But even if you
were to strip the files of these metadata, the resulting files would still be the representations only
of their singular objects, simply based on their, at least in principle, traceable causal histories, each
leading back to their singular objects they indifferently, yet still singularly represent, and not
universally, in the way our genuinely universal concept of eggs represent all eggs to the exclusion
of marble eggs, and our universal concept of marble eggs represents all marble eggs to the
exclusion of real eggs.
Furthermore, the resulting image files would not even be the universal representations of oval
shape in general, in the way our concept of oval shape represents all oval shapes of all sizes and
diameters; rather, these would be just singular representations of instances of that universal
concept, exhibiting the dimensions of the singulars they represent. Indeed, a truly universal
representation would be stripped not only of the “metadata” of a singular representation carrying
information about its causal history, perhaps inaccessible to the cognitive subject that has it, but it
would also have to be different in its per se information content directly accessible to and processed
by the subject.
Whatever we can see, sensorily (as opposed to intellectually) remember, imagine, expect, or dream
about would have to be something under this or that particular set of dimensions, because all these
things can only be under such particular dimensions. For instance, if I draw, see, remember or
merely imagine a triangle, it has to be (drawn, seen, remembered, imagined as) either isosceles
(including equilateral) or scalene, because any triangle has to have either at least one pair of equal
sides or none. And no matter how indistinctly I may remember it or imagine it, as long as its image
is materially processed by my sensory powers it will still be just the representation of that particular
triangle, because it only carries information about that triangle from which it derived through a
material causal chain.

17
I took the idea of two eggs from NICHOLAS ORESME, Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima, III, q. 14,
421.

12
By contrast, when I use it intellectually to illustrate the theorem about the sum of its internal angles,
I think of it and of any other possible triangle, without thinking that it is isosceles and without
thinking that it is scalene, using my truly universal concept of triangles applying to all possible
triangles, whether isosceles or scalene.
Note here that despite possible appearances to the contrary, the intended contrast here between a
merely indifferently representing, yet still singular, material sensory image and a truly universal
representation, a universal intellectual concept does not beg the question. The distinction is drawn
not in terms of how each is derived, but strictly in terms of the information they carry. But the
claim is that the materially derived material image is still singularly representing the singular
object from which it is derived through a material causal chain, whereas the truly universal
representation has a radically different content, and to yield that content, a different kind of process
is required.18
So, what would it take to get that truly universal representation, as opposed to the indifferent, yet
still singular snapshots? Apparently, a new agent, operating outside the material causal chains
yielding only singular representations, the sort of agent Aristotle referred to as the agent intellect,
operating on all singular (no matter how indifferent) sensory representations, the phantasms
(whatever neural structures or patterns realize them), to produce the first genuine universal
representations, the intelligible species, to be deposited in the potential intellect, which (once
activated by these species) is capable of forming our universal concepts to be used in our universal
judgments and reasonings.
But couldn’t the agent intellect and the potential intellect (which are just the same human intellect
described in its different functions) still be material, while performing these functions?
Well, can these functions, namely, abstraction, concept formation, judgment formation and
reasoning still be realized in the same material medium (say, the brain) as the processing of
incoming sensory information? As we could see, operating on their material carriers, the originally
singular representations can be rendered more and more indifferent, by stripping them of more and
more explicit or implicit singularizing information, giving them the semblance of universal
representations. Yet, by this simple process of mere loss of information (which of course takes
place along with the other operations of synthesizing, storing, recombining and collating these
sensory representations in the common sense, sensory memory, fantasy and the cogitative power,
respectively), they are rendered just more and more non-distinctive, yet not genuinely universal.
Genuine, naturally produced universal representations, namely, the intelligible species, are
produced by abstraction, which is not only a process of losing distinctive, singularizing
information, but at the same time it is the process of gaining universal information carried by all
singular representations of the same kind, so that these universal representations cover also

18
Cf. KLIMA, G. “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/universals-medieval/>.
For more discussion of the distinction between a merely indifferently representing singular and a truly universal
representation, designed to counter Buridan’s “indifference objection” to Aquinas’ argument, see KLIMA, G.
“Indifference vs. Universality of Mental Representation in Ockham, Buridan, and Aquinas”, in Amerini, F. – Marrone,
F. – Porro, P. (eds.) Later Medieval Perspectives on Intentionality (Quaestio 10/2010), Brepols Publishers/Pagina soc.
Coop., Turnhout/Bari, 2010, 99-110, and KLIMA, G. “Intentionality and Mental Content in Aquinas, Ockham, and
Buridan”, Amerini, F. – Cesalli, L. Universals in the Fourteenth Century, Scuola Normale Superiore: Pisa, Italy, 2017,
65-88.

13
singulars of the same kind we have not experienced, of which we have no singular representations
at all.
What is needed for this is an agent outside the causal chains of merely manipulating the material
carriers of singular information (rendered singular by their material causal histories), which is
outside of these causal chains in the sense that it is capable of grasping that common, intelligible
content that applies to a potential infinity of entities of the same kind, never represented as such
by any of the representations of singulars but carried by them all. This is why the resulting truly
universal representation cannot be material: it cannot have this information content resulting from
the further material manipulation of the material carriers of singular information, which are
singular precisely because of their material causal histories.
To be sure, all this is offered not as an “airtight proof” demonstrating its conclusion more
geometrico, rather it is offered as a “persuasion” (persuasio) as the scholastics would have it, for
the plausibility of the thesis with the proper understanding, highlighting the relevant
considerations.

10. Conclusion: The Thomistic balance between dualism and materialism, and the
real distinction thesis
But then, if the thesis obtains, then the human soul must be the subsistent entity underlying the
immaterial intellect and its immaterial acts as their subject, yet, at the same time, it must be the
inherent entity whereby it actualizes the human body, endowing it with a specifically human,
rational life.
However, Siger may still not be satisfied. After all, he very clearly articulated that an inherent form
cannot be a subsistent form, given that an inherent form is by its own nature inherent: for it to be
is to inhere, essentially; therefore, once it ceases to inhere, it ceases to be, which is precisely what
Aquinas would not concede concerning the intellective soul.
However, and this is probably the ultimate ground for Aquinas’ and Siger’s conflicting intuitions
on the issue, if the act of being of a form is not of the nature or essence of the form, but is distinct
from the form itself, then nothing necessitates in the nature of the form that it should determine for
itself an exclusively inherent act of being. If the form by its nature is inherent, and the form is the
same item as its act of being, then its act of being must be inherent, too; so, for the form to cease
to inhere is for it to cease to be a form, and so to cease to be, absolutely speaking. By contrast, if
the act of being of the form is not the same item as the form itself, then the form, on account of its
inherence, determines for itself its act of being as inherent, and yet on account of sustaining its
own power with its own acts in the way a substance, a subsistent entity does, it also determines the
same act of being as subsistent. But then, ceasing to inhere in the body, it is only one way in which
it possesses its act of being that has to go, but not its act of being itself. Indeed, the form does not
have to undergo any essential change, it remains the same essence,19 holding on to its act of being
in the other mode, namely, in its subsistent being, in which it can persist without further ado.

19
Quodlibet X, q. 3 a. 2 ad 4. Ad quartum ergo dicendum, quod anima secundum suam essentiam est forma corporis,
nec destructo corpore destruitur anima quantum ad id secundum quod est forma, sed solum desinit esse forma
<corporis> in actu.

14
As Aquinas often quotes Aristotle, formae rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus variantur species
per unitatis additionem vel subtractionem (the forms of things are like numbers, among which the
addition or subtraction of a unit changes their species).20 If we deny Aquinas’ (and Avicenna’s)
thesis of the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures, like Siger did, then we are
committed to the radical and intransgressible divide between inherent, that is, material, and
subsistent, that is, purely spiritual forms. If a material form is simply identified as material structure
(à la Jaworski or Koslicki) or the configuration of matter (à la Stump), and the nature of such a
form is not taken to be distinct from its being, then Siger must be right, because then a change in
the mode of being of a form is a change in its nature, which is of course a way to its destruction
(since then it cannot persist as the same thing, having the same nature). However, with Aquinas’
real distinction thesis, and the more refined logical nuances it affords, it is at least metaphysically
possible to balance the human soul on a razor thin line between the realms of matter and pure
spirit, indeed, in such a way that it can cross this line without ever changing its essence: once in
death, and then again, in the miracle of the resurrection.

20
De potentia, q. 10 a. 5 co. Cf. De virtutibus, q. 5 a. 3 co. “Philosophus dicit in VIII Metaph. quod species rerum
sunt sicut numeri, in quibus unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem.” De unione Verbi, a. 1 co. “species rerum sint
sicut numeri, in quibus addita vel subtracta unitate variant speciem, ut dicitur in VIII Metaph.” Sentencia De sensu,
tract. 1 l. 10 n. 9. “Formae autem substantiales rerum sunt sicut numeri, ut dicitur octavo Metaphysicorum.”

15
Appendix
A Formal Reconstruction of Aquinas’ “Semantic Solution”

General semantic framework

SGT(P)(u)(t)Î WÈ{0}; W¹ Æ, 0ÏW; A(t)Í W; T ¹ Æ

|Ps| f,t =1 iff SGT(P)(f(s))(t)Î A(t), where tÎT, f(s)ÎW

The case of the human soul

If at time t this man and this tree are alive, but at t’ they are dead, then the following propositions
hold (in the first argument-place of SGT, ‘quo’ and ‘quod’ are the “sense-indicators”, merely
distinguishing the two signification functions assigned to the same term ‘ens’; I might as well
use indices):

SGT(‘quo’)(‘ens’)(tree soul)(t) Î A(t)

SGT(‘quo’)(‘ens’)(human soul)(t) Î A(t)

SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’)(tree soul)(t) = 0

SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’)(tree)(t) Î A(t)

SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’)(man)(t) Î A(t)

SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’)(human soul)(t) Î A(t)

SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’)(human soul)(t) = SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’)(man)(t) = SGT(‘quo’)(‘ens’)(human

soul)(t) = SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’)(human soul)(t’) ¹ SGT(‘quo’)(‘ens’)(human soul)(t’) =
SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’)(man)(t’) = 0

SGT(‘quo’)(‘ens’)(tree soul)(t) = SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’)(tree)(t) ¹

SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’)(tree soul)(t) = SGT(‘quo’)(‘ens’)(tree soul)(t’) =
SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’)(tree)(t’) = SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’)(tree soul)(t’) = 0

SGT(‘quod’)(‘ens’) ¹ SGT(‘quo’)(‘ens’)

The term ‘ens’ has two senses, two distinct significations, yet, these two significations coincide in
human souls, which are beings in both senses. However, these souls can cease to be beings in one
sense, without ceasing to be beings in the other. This is what it means for the soul to have its being
contingently identical with the being of the man whose soul it is, without, however, being
accidental to the man.

16