Collector of Customs vs.

Villaluz

FACTS:
In the years 1971 to 1973, six separate cases were filed with the respondent Judge of the
Circuit Criminal Court. In the six cases, 2 were filed in violation of Section 3602 of R.A 1937 by
not declaring all the objects found in their baggage in the Baggage Declaration Entry (GR Nos.
34038 and 34243), 1 was in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (GR No. 36376), 2 were in violation
of R.A. 3019 or commonly known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (38688 and
39625), and 1 was for estafa (40031). In these six cases, the Judge of Circuit Criminal Court
conducted preliminary examination and investigation. “Petitions for certiorari with preliminary
injunction” were filed, “impugning the order of the Judge on the ground that the Judge has no
power to conduct a preliminary investigation.” The Judge argued that Circuit Criminal Courts
have the power and authority to conduct preliminary examinations and investigations.
However, in the first case, which was filed by Customes against Makapugay, the respondent
Judge dismissed “the case with prejudice and ordering the return of the amount of P2,280.00,
his passport, one box of air-conditioning evaporator only, as well as the forfeiture of forty
cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and five bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch
Whiskey.”

ISSUE:
Does the Circuit Criminal Court possess the power and authority to conduct preliminary
examinations and investigations?

RULING:
Yes. The Circuit Criminal Court can conduct preliminary examinations and investigation. SC
stated the main purposes of creating the Circuit Criminal Court which are to “alleviate the
burden of the Court of First Instance and to accelerate the disposition of cases”, so it is only
logical that the authority of the judges of the First Instance is likewise conferred to the judges
of the Circuit Criminal Court. Moreover, the power and the authority of the judges of the
Circuit Criminal Court to conduct preliminary investigation is confirmed in R.A. 6425, Section
39 “which confers the Court of First Instance, circuit Criminal Courts and Juvenile Domestic
Relations Courts concurrent original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable thereunder…”
Lastly, aside from the purposes of the creation of the Criminal Circuit Court, it is also the duty
within the scope of the office (Section 3, Art. 3, 1935 Constitution; Section 3, Art. 4, 1973
Constitution), “to conduct the examination to determine probable cause before the issuance
of the warrant of arrest” Included the clause “to determine probable cause” is the preliminary
examination and investigation. Therefore, the SC ruled that the petitions and the writs of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining orders are dismissed and lifted, and in the order of
the Judge to dismiss the criminal case with prejudice and the return of the of the articles
seized by the Customs
 People v. Pomar (46 Phil. 440)

Summary:
Defendant Pomar is the manager and person in charge of a tobacco factory. One of the
employees of the said factory, Macaria Fajardo got pregnant and was then granted vacation
leave. However, Pomar refused to pay her P80 to which she was entitled as her regular wages.
A complaint was then filed against Pomar for violating Act No. 3071.
The Court ruled that Section 13 of the Act is unconstitutional and void, in that it violates a
person’s liberty to contract. Although this liberty must yield to the common good, the law
creates a term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are,
therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. The right to liberty includes the right to enter
into contracts and to terminate contracts.
Doctrine:
The right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by
the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. Liberty includes not only the right to
labor, but to refuse to labor, and, consequently, the right to contract to labor or for labor, and
to terminate such contracts, and to refuse to make such contracts.
Facts:
October 26, 1923 – defendant Pomar was accused at the CFI Manila of violating Section 13 in
connection with Section 15 of Act No. 3071
August 27, 1923 – Pomar, who is the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela (a
tobacco factory) then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and refuse to pay
Macaria Fajardo (pregnant) P80 to which she was entitled as her regular wages corresponding
to thirty days before and thirty days after her delivery and confinement which took place on
August 12, 1923
At trial, Pomar admitted all of the allegations in the complaint and contended that the
provisions of Act No. 3071 were illegal, unconstitutional and void[1]
[1] See Notes for the text of Sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071
Issues Ratio:
WoN the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 are a reasonable and lawful exercise
of the police power of the state - No. The provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 are
unconstitutional and void, in that they violate and are contrary to the provisions of the first
paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of the United States.
In determining whether a particular law promulgated under the police power of the state is, in
fact, within said power, it becomes necessary, first, to determine what that power is, its limits
and scope.
Section 13 of Act No. 3071 was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed
police power, with the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers.
 This is required in the interest of social justice for whose and freedom of contract may
lawfully be subjected to restraint.
 The liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, is not
absolute. That liberty must frequently yield to the common good.
HOWEVER, Section 13 creates a term or condition in every contract made by every person,
firm, or corporation with any woman who may, during the course of her employment, become
pregnant
 Failure to include in said contract the terms fixed by the law, makes the employer
criminally liable and subject to a fine and imprisonment.
 Therefore, the law has deprived, every person, firm or corporation owning or managing
a place of labor of his right to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms as
he and the employee may agree upon.
 The law creates a term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such
persons are, therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. The constitution guarantees
to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract.
It has been decided in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual,
protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution.
 The right to liberty includes the right to enter into contracts and to terminate contracts.
 Liberty includes not only the right to labor, but to refuse to labor, and, consequently,
the right to contract to labor or for labor, and to terminate such contracts, and to refuse
to make such contracts.
Civil Code Article 1255: The contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public
policy
Dispositive:
Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby
dismissed, and the defendant is hereby discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de
oficio. So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Other Notes:
Section 13 of Act No. 3071:
"Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any
description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be
pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after confinement:
Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause, under the
penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months counted
from the day of her discharge."

Section 15 of Act No. 3071:

"Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by
a fine of not less than fifty pesos nor more than two hundred and fifty, or by imprisonment for
not less than ten days nor more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.
"In the case of firms or corporations, the presidents, directors or managers thereof or, in their
default, the persons acting in their stead, shall be criminally responsible for each violation of
the provisions of this Act."
 Lambino vs COMELEC G.R. No. 174153

FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2
and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections
1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and

HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal.
The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The
framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a
petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition”
only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper
that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a
copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
 Imbong v.COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; 25 SCRA 28 September 11, 1970

FACTS:
Petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both interested in running as candidates
for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, filed separate but related petitions questioning
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates.
On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional
Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from
each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen.
On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4
amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention
"shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts
according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative
district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as
those required of members of the House of Representatives."
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular
provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong
impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the
same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Sections 2, 4, 5 and par. 1 of 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 are valid provisions?
2. W/N the Congress has the authority to call for a constitutional convention?
3. W/N it has the power to enact the implementing rules while acting as legislative body?

HELD:
1. Sections 2, 4, 5 and par. 1 of 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 are valid provisions.
a.) Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates:
Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or
impliedly require such apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of
population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may
constitutionally allocate one delegate for, each congressional district or for each province, for
reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention.
b.) The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132:
The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees,
whether elective or appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as
well as officers and employees of corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned
from the date of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this
Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an application of and in consonance
with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a
denial of due process or of the equal protection of the law.
c.) Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is a valid provision:
The challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the
right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.
The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise
constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is
germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class.
d) Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of
due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association.
It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic
constitutional rights themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a
valid infringement of the aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.
2. Yes. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a
convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled
but voting separately.
3. Yes. Implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of
its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by
necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the
constitution, they are valid.
RESOLUTION:
WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs.
2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional.
 DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift term
limits of elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and
supervise said people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition
is: “Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for
the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of
Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted
to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the
country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al
moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition
properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.b. Republic Act
No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates
matter of people’s initiative was left to some future law.c. COMELEC has no power to provide
rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative. Only Congress is authorized by the
Constitution to pass the implementing law.d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to
the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a
revision.e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for people’s
initiative.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to the Constitution but,
as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein
was a delayed afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to
amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions
of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to
the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national
and local laws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not
accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it
is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope of the
initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which only
Congress can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution
which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1]
Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the
President; [3] Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local governments; and [5]
Delegation to administrative bodies.

COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In every case
of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid
only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300

Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under Republic Act
No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely
intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned
proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.

DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full
compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Without the
required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires
jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of
paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on
12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda
to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and
resources.
 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito
78 Phil 1

FACTS:

This is a petitioner for prohibition to prevent the congressional resolution proposing an

amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto.
Petitioners are 8 senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance,
the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. Petitioners allege that the resolution is
contrary to the Constitution. The 3 petitioner senators and 8 representatives have been
proclaimed by a majority vote of the Comelec as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The 3 senators were suspended by the
Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress due to alleged irregularities in
their election. The 8 representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the
lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, although they had not been
formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when
the petition was filed. Consequently, the 3 senators and 8 representatives did not take part in
the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the
computation of the necessary ¾ vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If the petitioners had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary ¾ vote in either House of
Congress.
Respondents argue that the Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts
of the enrolled bill/resolution.
Petitioners contend that respondents are confusing jurisdiction (substantive law) with
conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution (evidence and practice).

ISSUE:

WON the Court can take cognizance of the issue.

WON the resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

RULING:

No. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provisions. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within
the meaning of political question. However, in Coleman v. Miller, the efficacy of ratification by
state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question
and hence not justiciable. If a ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal
which leads to ratification has to be a political question. There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by Congress. If a political question
conslusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the “enrolled bill” rule born of that respect.
Yes. Section 313 of the Code of Civil procedure, as amended by Act No. 220, provides two
methods of proving legislative proceedings:
By the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or copies certified by the clerk or
secretary or printed by their order; and
In case of acts of the Legislature, a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries
thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
In US v. Pons, the Court looked into the journals because those were the documents offered in
evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was
placed before the Court; and it had not been shown that if that had been done, this Court
would not have held the copy conclusive proof of the due enactment of the law.
Even if both journals and an authenticate copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of
the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment
theory, for the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the 2 ways specified in
Section 313 of The Code of Civil Procedure. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the 2 documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if
discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit
provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.”