POLICE POWER cases

Taxicab Operators vs. The Board of Transportation

GR L-59234, 30 September 1982

FACTS:

To insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances and in order that the
commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, the Board of Transportation
(BOT) issued Memorandum Circular phasing out the old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to OT
circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing
Circular formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration
as public conveyances. The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace
Transportation filed a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order", to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BOT and
Memorandum Circular of the BLT.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate
the petitioners' constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law.

RULING:

On Equal Protection of the Law: The law being enforced in Metro Manila only and was directed solely
towards the taxi industry does not violate their right to equal protection of the law for the traffic
conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the
equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. The State, in the exercise, of its police
power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of
society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando
"the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". In so
far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it
need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be
accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of
classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on
substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal
means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same
treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the
foregoing criteria.

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional
infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear,
categorical and undeniable. Hence, the Writs prayed for are denied and was dismissed.
 LOZANO v MARTINEZ
G.R. NO. L-63419Dec. 18, 1986

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the
Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these
petitions for decision.

Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict
between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended
that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be
imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP
22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the
drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is
the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than
a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.

ISSUE:

WON enactment of BP 22 repugnant of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt and
therefore is an invalid exercise of police power.

RULING:

NO. police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times.
There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty.
For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-
impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. Whether the police power may
override the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to
address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it.

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. The deleterious effects of issuing worthless checks on
the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.

The SC finds that the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION vs. SAN DIEGO
(G.R. No. 89572) December 21, 1989

FACTS

Roberto Rey San Diego is a Zoology graduate of the University of the East who wanted to pursue
medical studies. However, he had taken the NMAT for a total of three (3) times already and failed in
each try. When he tried to take the NMAT the fourth time, his application was denied based on MECS
Order No. 12, s. 1972, which institutionalized the three-flunk rule, or that any college graduate who
has failed the NMAT for three times is no longer eligible to take it.

San Diego filed a petition before the RTC of Valenzuela to challenge the three-flunk rule, saying that
the same was a violation of his academic freedom and his right to have quality education. In his
amended petition, he said the rule was violative of due process and equal protection.

San Diego was allowed to take the NMAT a fourth time subject to the outcome of his petition.

Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of RTC Valenzuela granted his petition and declared the three-flunk
rule invalid.

Hence, the instant petition by DECS.

ISSUE:

Whether the three-flunk rule is a legitimate exercise of police power.

RULING

YES. The NMAT is a constitutionally sanctioned measure intended to limit the admission to medical
schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education.

It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The three-
flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the
intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is
the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right
to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the
closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to
harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used
at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while
also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
 EMINENT DOMAIN

American Print Works v. Lawrence

23 N.J.L. 590

FACTS:

The mayor of New York was sued for damages by the owner of a building which
he had ordered blasted to prevent the spread of fire in 1853. The plaintiff contended that the action is
one of expropriation for which he was
entitled to payment of just compensation.

ISSUE:

WON the action of the mayor is considered as expropriation.

HELD:

The US Supreme Court declared in part that the destruction of the property in question does
not come under the right of eminent domain, but under the right of necessity, of self-
preservation. The right of eminent domain is a public right; it arises from the laws of society and is
vested in the state or its grantee, acting under the right and power of the state, or benefit of the state,
or those acting under it.

The right of necessity arises under the laws of society or society itself. It is the right of self-
defense, of self-preservation, whether applied to persons or to property. It is a private right
vested in every individual, and with which the right of the state or state necessity has nothing to do.

In the case at bar, the petitioner cannot claim just compensation because the destruction is not a form
of taking contemplated in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. However, he can recover
indemnification for damages from those who benefited.
 CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA
40 Phil. 349 (1919)

FACTS:

The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the
conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public
improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within
their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes
were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable
loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments
that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of
land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation.
Thus, the same filed an appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

HELD:

The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal
corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the
courts have the right to inquire to.
 National Power Corporation VS Aguirre-Paderanga
464 Scra 481 (2005)

FACTS:

The Court of Appeals Decision dated June 6, 2002, as well as its Resolution dated August 30, 2002,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25 which granted the
complaint for expropriation filed by herein petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) against herein
respondents "Petrona Dilao et al." are being assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
To implement its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, the NPC filed on March 19, 1996 before the
Regional Trial Court of Danao City a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land situated at Baring
and Cantumog, Carmen, Cebu against Dilao and siblings, and Enriquez. The complaint covers 7,281
square meters of land co-owned Petrona O. Dilao (Dilao) and siblings, and 7,879 square meters of
land owned by Estefania Enriquez (Enriquez). A day after the complaint was filed or on March 20,
1996, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the lands. Dilao
filed her Answer with Counterclaim on April 19, 1996. Enriquez did not. On May 9, 1996, Branch 25 of
the RTC Danao, issued an Order granting NPC’s motion for the issuance of writ of possession. It then
appointed a Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the just compensation for right-of-way easement being expropriated is proper.

Ruling:

There are two stages in every act of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts involved in the suit. The second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken.” The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before the commissioners
would be final. In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the transmission
lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives
private respondents of its ordinary use. It cannot be opposed that NPC’s complaint merely involves a
simple case of mere passage of transmission lines over Dilao et. Al’s sproperty. Aside from the
actual damage done to the property traversed by the transmission lines, the agricultural and
economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property is unquestionably restricted and
perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to the occupant’s life and limb.

The appeal sought by NPC does not stand on both procedural and substantive grounds. The just
compensation recommended, which was approved by the trial court, to be just and reasonable
compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao and her siblings.
 REPUBLIC VS. CASTELLVI
GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974

FACTS:

After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947
refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the
assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the
contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the
disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee
because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain,
namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a
momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied
the property as lessee

.
RULING:

No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for
more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5)
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of lease.
 TAXATION

ANGELES UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION VS. CITY OF ANGELES

G.R. No. 189999 June 27, 2012 675 SCRA 359 689 Phil. 623

FACTS:

Angeles University Foundation is a non-stock non-profit educational institution. It applied for a

building permit for the construction of an 11-storey building of the Angeles University Foundation
Medical Center in the main campus and renovation of a school building located at Mirasol Village
which will be used as a school dormitory. The Local Government assessed petitioner and required it
to pay building permit and other fees such as locational clearance fees and real property tax on its
real property occupied by informal settlers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is exempt from payment of building permit fee and real property taxes.

RULING:

No. Petitioner is not exempted in the payment of building permit fee and real property tax
because:

1. Building fee is not a tax but an imposition pursuant to the regulatory powers of the LGUs to
which petitioner is not exempted from; and

2. It is not exempted from property tax because it was being occupied by informal settler, it is
not actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
 CITY OF MANILA vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Respondent paid the local business tax only as a manufacturers as it was expressly exempted from
the business tax under a different section and which applied to businesses subject to excise, VAT or
percentage tax under the Tax Code. The City of Manila subsequently amended the ordinance by
deleting the provision exempting businesses under the latter section if they have already paid taxes
under a different section in the ordinance. This amending ordinance was later declared by the
Supreme Court null and void. Respondent then filed a protest on the ground of double taxation. RTC
decided in favor of Respondent and the decision was received by Petitioner on April 20, 2007. On
May 4, 2007, Petitioner filed with the CTA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review
asking for a 15-day extension or until May 20, 2007 within which to file its Petition. A second Motion
for Extension was filed on May 18, 2007, this time asking for a 10-day extension to file the Petition.
Petitioner finally filed the Petition on May 30, 2007 even if the CTA had earlier issued a resolution
dismissing the case for failure to timely file the Petition.

ISSUES:

Does the enforcement of the latter section of the tax ordinance constitute double taxation?

HELD:

YES. There is indeed double taxation if respondent is subjected to the taxes under both
Sections 14 and 21 of the tax ordinance since these are being imposed: (1) on the same
subject matter — the privilege of doing business in the City of Manila; (2) for the same purpose —
to make persons conducting business within the City of Manila contribute to city revenues; (3) by the
same taxing authority — petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the same taxing jurisdiction — within
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods — per calendar year;
and (6) of the same kind or character — a local business tax imposed on gross sales or receipts of
the business.
 PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA
[95 PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954]

FACTS:

Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law
authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a
municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-
payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city
to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having
already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the
tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid
and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize what
amounts to double taxation.

Held:

The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion
may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for the
courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside
from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of political
departments. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed
by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing
inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by
both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with
regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
 LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES VS QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 144104 June 29

FACTS:

Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from
real property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital
building. Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The request was denied,
and a petition hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-
LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable
institution, is exempted from real property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA
dismissed the petition and the decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals of Quezon City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.

RULING:

Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for
its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.

The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes only.
This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160, which provides that in order to be
entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable
institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt
from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.
 DUE PROCESS

VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG

G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978

FACTS:

Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila Mayor
Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be
employed within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The
permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the said
Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-
useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost
of registration and that it fails to prescribe’ any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor,
thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of
Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ord 6537.

HELD:

The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not laydown any criterion or
standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Hence an undue delegation of power.
Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails
to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay
it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it
is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being
collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or
whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila
who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the
people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines
as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The
shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens.
 IMBONG VS OCHOA

FACTS:

Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known
as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of
society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce,
the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention. A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing
the constitutionality of RH Law

ISSUE:

WON RH Law violates the right to health.

HELD:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article
II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no
doubt about it.

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is
that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization. The clear and
unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that
laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word "
primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the
primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization
in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.
 ICHONG V. HERNANDEZ

FACTS:

The petitioners sought the annulment of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law on the ground among
others that it denied due process for depriving them of a legitimate means of livelihood.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held the law to be a valid exercise of the police power. Noting that the retail trade
was at that time controlled by aliens, it ruled that the State was entitled to take adequate steps to
relax the foreign stranglehold on a vital artery of the national economy.

Justice Labrador declared: "The disputed law is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the
desired legislative objective—to free the national economy from alien control and dominance. If
political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is
nonetheless legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race and country." "The law
is reasonable," he continued. "It is made prospective and recognizes the rights and privileges of those
already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar
recognition is accorded associations of aliens," which were allowed a ten-year period of grace within
which to wind up their affairs in the retail trade and transfer to other businesses.
 TAÑADA VS TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 24 April 1985

FACTS:
Petitioners Lorenzo Tañada and others files a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent Juan Tuvera,
et.al. to publish in the Official Gazette various presidential decrees, letters of instruction, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation, and administrative orders issued by
the Office of the President. They invoke the constitutional right of the people to be informed, as well
as the principle that laws are valid and enforceable after their publication in the Official Gazette.
The Respondent opposed the petition by contending that the publication in the Official Gazette is not
a sine qua non requirements for the effectivity of the laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates. The presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date
they are to take effect considering that Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect
as well when otherwise provided. Thus, the publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for
their effectivity.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the publication in the Official Gazette is required in order to for the presidential
issuances to become valid and effective.
2. Whether or not non-publication shall render the presidential issuances invalid and ineffective even
though they have been enforced or implemented prior to their publication.

RULING:
1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. In fact, Commonwealth Act 638 provides that laws shall be published in the Official
Gazette. Such publication is important because there shall be no basis for the application of the Latin
maxim, “ignoratia legis non excusat”, without such notice and publication, especially when the law-
making process is not made in public.
Further, the word “shall” in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 imposes upon the Respondent an
imperative duty to enforce the right of the people to be informed of the matters of public concern. The
publication of all presidential issuances of public nature or general applicability is mandated by law.
Such publication is a requirement of due process whereby a person may be bound by law only when
he is first officially and specifically informed of its contents.
2. NO. The Court ruled that the implementation or enforcement of presidential decrees prior to the
publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The Court ordered the Respondents to PUBLISH in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application. Non-publication shall render such issuances as having no
binding force and effect.

Rationale:
 Due Process and the Right to Information.
 Presumption that every person knows the law.
 VINTA MARITIME COMPANY V NLRC
G.R. No. 113911 January 23, 1998

Facts:

Leonides Basconsillo, private respondent, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration IPOEA) for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co. Inc. and Elkano Ship
Management, Inc. petitioners alleged that Leonides was dismissed for his gross negligence and
incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay.
The POEA ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the
POEA. Likewise, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent is illegally dismissed.

Held:

The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is apparent. For an employee’s dismissal to
be valid, (1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (2) the employee must be afforded due
process. Petitioners allege that private respondent was dismissed because of his incompetence,
enumerating incidents in proof thereof. However, this is contradicted by private respondent’s
seaman’s book which states that his discharge was due to an emergency leave. Moreover, his
alleged incompetence is belied by the remarks made by petitioners in the same book that private
respondent’s services were “highly recommended” and that his conduct and ability were rated “very
good “. Petitioners’ allegation that such remark and ratings were given to private respondent as an
accommodation for future employment fails to persuade. The Court cannot consent to such an
accommodation, even if the allegation were true, as it is a blatant misrepresentation. It cannot
exculpate petitioners based on such misrepresentation. When petitioners issued the accommodation,
they must have known its possible repercussions.
Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice and hearing. Before the
employee can be dismissed under Art. 282, the Code requires the service of a written notice
containing a statement of the cause/s of termination and giving said employee ample opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself. A notice of termination in writing is further required if the employee’s
dismissal is decided upon. The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs
the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss. The twin requirements of notice and hearing
constitute the essential elements of due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated
without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty.
Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of their employment where the employment is for a definite period. Conformably,
the administrator and the NLRC properly awarded private respondent salaries for the period of the
effectivity of his contract.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The challenged decision and resolution are affirmed.
 JAVIER VS COMELEC
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 144 SCRA 194

FACTS:

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the
Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism,
intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress,
threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.”
COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the
Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the
canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7,
1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner
without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the
proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made
before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed
out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further,
Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that
it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down.
The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of
Javier’s death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD:

The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen. The SC has repeatedly and
consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable
imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties
that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that
when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the
judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise
they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his
action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade
of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which
the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared
script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all
the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the
pertinent law.
 MUÑOZ VS. YABUT, JR.

FACTS:
In G.R. No. 142676, Muñoz is seeking the reversal, annulment, and setting aside of the Decision of
the CA which affirmed the Orders of RTC Branch 88 of Quezon City. The RTC dismissed the Civil
Case, the forcible entry case instituted by Muñoz against Atty. Yabut and Samuel Go Chan before the
MeTC Branch 33 of Quezon City; and nullified the MeTC Order granting Muñoz's prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which restored possession of the subject
property to Muñoz.

In G.R. No. 146718, Muñoz is praying for the reversal, setting aside, and nullification of the CA, which
affirmed the Orders of the RTC Branch 95 denying Muñoz's Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and
Application for Surrender of the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297 against respondents BPI
and the spouses Samuel Go Chan and spouses Chan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the decision of the RTC.

HELD:
In Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, 42 we described an action for reconveyance as follows:
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has been
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. Although the decree is recognized
as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free
from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary
courts of justice and not with the land registration court. Reconveyance is always available as long as
the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be
annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The notice of
lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real
owner.

The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land
registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and
their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A judgment directing a party to deliver
possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for
declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real
action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the
right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.

No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case
are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution
can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only
real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of
execution issued pursuant thereto.