Agcaoili, Gabrielle Kirstin C. // Alonzo, Lawrence Dwight A. // Fernandez, Laubrey Ella G.

Garcia, Estrelita C. // Go, Krystal Faith // Monserrat, Joshua I.

Antonio Y. Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of The House of Representatives and Jose Ong, Jr.
G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991

FACTS:
Respondent’s (Jose Ong) citizenship is being questioned after running in the May 1987 Congressional
Election, in which he won. Respondent’s father (Jose Ong Chuan) was born in China in 1905, brought by
his father to Samar in the year 1915, grew up in Samar and had a family with 8 children which included
respondent. After the father’s filing with the Court of First Instance of an application for Naturalization on
February 15, 1954, he was declared by the CFI a Filipino citizen a year after and eventually received his
certificate of naturalization after he took his Oath of Allegiance.

The respondent, who throughout his life resided in different areas in the county and established his life in
the country, ran and won the Congressional Election in the 2nd district of Samar. A complaint filed with
the HRET, citing that the respondent is not a natural-born citizen rendering him unqualified to run for
public office, was dismissed and ruled in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and qualifies him to run for a
public office.

RULING:
Yes he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

The Court explained that Art. IV, Sec. 1, Par. 3 and Sec. 2 apply not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987, but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at
the time of her marriage.

Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status
to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship.

However, to expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age
is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was
his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine
(9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution
would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship in spite of
his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
 Agcaoili, Gabrielle Kirstin C. // Alonzo, Lawrence Dwight A. // Fernandez, Laubrey Ella G.
Garcia, Estrelita C. // Go, Krystal Faith // Monserrat, Joshua I.

Antonio Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Teodoro Cruz
G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

FACTS:
Cruz was a natural-born citizen back when the fundamental law was the 1935 Constitution. In 1985, he
enlisted in the US Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the US, which made him into a
naturalized US citizen and, pursuant to CA 63, made him lose his Filipino citizenship. In 1994, Cruz
reacquired Filipino citizenship through RA 2630. He ran for and was elected as a House Representative
in the 1998 elections. The quo warranto case filed by petitioner with the HRET against Cruz on the
ground that he is not a natural-born citizen was eventually dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz has validly reacquired Filipino citizenship under RA 2630 and is consequently
deemed to be a natural-born citizen.

RULING:
Yes. CA 63 stipulates that citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen by naturalization, repatriation
or direct act of Congress.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality and, pursuant to RA 2630, simply consists
of taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person resides or last resided. The said oath of allegiance must contain a renunciation
of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with RA 2630, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.
 Agcaoili, Gabrielle Kirstin C. // Alonzo, Lawrence Dwight A. // Fernandez, Laubrey Ella G.
Garcia, Estrelita C. // Go, Krystal Faith // Monserrat, Joshua I.

Edison So vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner Edison So, aged 20, filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, on February 28, 2002. Petitioner
testified and attempted to prove that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
become a citizen of the Philippines, and presented 2 witnesses. The RTC granted the petition on June 4,
2003, however, the decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). The CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the petition for naturalization without
prejudice, on the grounds that petitioner failed to comply with the age requirement of the law and that his
witnesses were not credible.

ISSUE: Whether or not the So’s petition for naturalization may be granted pursuant to RA 9139.

RULING:
Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by
naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization
pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by
Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.

Petitioner’s contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should possess are those
provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473 is barren of merit. Petitioner
applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time of the filing of his petition, administrative
naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available. Consequently, his application should be
governed by C.A. No. 473. There is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended
to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A.
No. 473, the law stands and the qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are maintained.

Petitioner’s witnesses did not testify on his specific acts; they did not elaborate on his traits. Their
testimonies do not convince the Court that they personally know the petitioner well and are therefore in a
position to vouch for his qualifications. As correctly found by the CA, the witnesses’ testimonies
consisted mainly of general statements in answer to the leading questions propounded by his counsel. In
sum, petitioner’s witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough. Their testimonies do not
satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed
by law.

Petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of naturalization law. For
this reason, the Court affirms the decision of the CA, denying the petition for naturalization without
prejudice. Admission to citizenship is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully
qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law.
 Agcaoili, Gabrielle Kirstin C. // Alonzo, Lawrence Dwight A. // Fernandez, Laubrey Ella G.
Garcia, Estrelita C. // Go, Krystal Faith // Monserrat, Joshua I.

Renato David vs. Editha Agbay

G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

FACTS:
Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and bought a lot in Tambong,
Gloria, Oriental Mindoro, which they subsequently came to know that the portion where they built their
house is public land.

Petitioner filed his application at the Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land and
was assured by a Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) officer that he could
declare himself as a Filipino despite being a naturalized Canadian citizen at that time. Private respondent
Editha A. Agbay filed a complaint for falsification of public documents and that he is disqualified to own
a land.

Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. 9225)
only after his MLA application.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of RA 9225

RULING:
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he
belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he
was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the
time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the
governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was
among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act,
the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned.
 Agcaoili, Gabrielle Kirstin C. // Alonzo, Lawrence Dwight A. // Fernandez, Laubrey Ella G.
Garcia, Estrelita C. // Go, Krystal Faith // Monserrat, Joshua I.

Jose B. Aznar vs. Commission on Elections and Emilio Osmeña

G.R. No. 83829, May 25, 1990

FACTS:
On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar filed a petition for disqualification against Osmeña, who
filed a certificate of candidacy for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province on November 19, 1987, on the
ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. He
provided a certification stating that Osmeña is an American and is a holder of an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence.

Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D.
Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine Passport; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and
has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the
Philippines since 1965.

COMELEC proclaimed Osmeña as provincial governor, having obtained the highest votes.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña is a Filipino citizen qualified to run for a public office.

RULING:
Yes. While the petition for disqualification was filed out of time, in violation of the relevant provision
under the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), the Court deemed it as a matter of public interest to ascertain
Osmena’s citizenship and qualification.
Petitioner’s contention is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. He failed to present direct
proof that Osmena had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63. In concluding that the private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of
the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that the private respondent was
issued an alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the
respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to
the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws."

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not
a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern us here.

Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he
has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. He possesses both
nationalities or citizenships. There can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no
renunciation
 Agcaoili, Gabrielle Kirstin C. // Alonzo, Lawrence Dwight A. // Fernandez, Laubrey Ella G.
Garcia, Estrelita C. // Go, Krystal Faith // Monserrat, Joshua I.

Cirilo R. Valles vs. Commission on Elections and Rosalind Ybasco Lopez

G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000

FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Western Australia, to spouses Telesforo Ybasco, a
Filipino citizen, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, Lopez left Australia, settled in the
Philippines and was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, on June 27, 1952.

In 1992, 1995 and 1998, she ran for elective positions, which were all assailed before the COMELEC to
question her citizenship. The petitions were dismissed.

The COMELEC’s findings show that Lopez had renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15,
1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian
passport canceled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Lopez is a Filipino citizen allowed to run for a public office.
RULING:
Yes. Pursuant to the principle of jus sanguinis, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. Additionally, in accordance with Sec. 4 of CA No. 473, she is ipso jure a Filipino
having married a Filipino. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting in her possession of dual citizenship.

The Court ruled that an application for an Alien Certificate of Registration was not tantamount to
renunciation of Philippine citizenship. The mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was
a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship.

The Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance.
The phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in the Local Gov’t Code or R.A. No. 7160 must be understood as referring
to ‘dual allegiance’, as referred to under Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Furthermore, it was ruled that
for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification
as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino
citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in
1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
 Agcaoili, Gabrielle Kirstin C. // Alonzo, Lawrence Dwight A. // Fernandez, Laubrey Ella G.
Garcia, Estrelita C. // Go, Krystal Faith // Monserrat, Joshua I.

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC

GR No. 221697, March 8, 2016

FACTS:
Grace Poe, who was discovered as a foundling in Iloilo, adopted and grew up in the Philippines and, later
on, became a naturalized American citizen, came back to the country on May 24, 2005 and took her Oath
of Allegiance to the Philippines in accordance with RA 9225 – Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act. Before assuming her post as MTRCB Chairperson, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
of Allegiance to the United States of American and Renunciation of American Citizenship before a notary
public. Subsequently, she executed before the Vice Consul of the US Embassy in Manila an
Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States. On Oct. 15, 2015, she filed her
COC for the Presidency. After cases against her were filed before the COMELEC, alleging that she had
made material misrepresentations with regard to her citizenship and period of residency, COMELEC
concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of presidency.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Grace Poe made false representations in her COC for Presidency with regard to her
citizenship.

RULING:
The burden of proof was on private respondents to show that the petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner’s admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her. As a matter of law,
foundlings are, as a class, natural-born citizens. While the Constitution's enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of
silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent
of the framers. Indeed, a perusal of the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention show that the
framers intended foundlings to be covered under the provision on citizenship.

Foundlings are deemed citizens under international law. Foundlings, according to rules of int’l law (e.g.
1966 Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), follow the nationality of the place where they were
found. All of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings
were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their
own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized
and a member of the community of nations. Under the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of
international law form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption) and this Court's Rules on Adoption
expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who
could be adopted. Domestic laws on adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted. Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will
have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. Moreover, it has been pointed out that the DFA issues
 Agcaoili, Gabrielle Kirstin C. // Alonzo, Lawrence Dwight A. // Fernandez, Laubrey Ella G.
Garcia, Estrelita C. // Go, Krystal Faith // Monserrat, Joshua I.
passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive
department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Having established that Grace Poe’s original Filipino citizenship status, based on the facts of her
background, was that of a natural-born, it then follows that she has re-acquired her original citizenship
status via RA 9225, which is a repatriation statute. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality, i.e., whether natural-born or naturalized.
 Agcaoili, Gabrielle Kirstin C. // Alonzo, Lawrence Dwight A. // Fernandez, Laubrey Ella G.
Garcia, Estrelita C. // Go, Krystal Faith // Monserrat, Joshua I.

Loida Nicholas-Lewis vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioners possess dual citizenship (Filipino and American) and are successful applicants for recognition
of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225, which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage.
Petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" to the May 2004 National
and Local Election. However, they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that,
according to a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs, they have yet no right to vote in
such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voters under R.A. 9189.

RULING:
The Court held that those who retain or re‑acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
the Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the
system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189, as well as the expansion of the scope of
that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the
right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the
terms adverted to in the following wise:

"Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise
their right to vote;

"Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under
this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;