Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Theorization
Theorization
Theorization
Collaborate with your teammates in order to answer each of the following items
from the textbook. Show all necessary solutions.
PLAYERS STRATEGIES
c. Express this game in extensive form, assuming that the warden makes his/her
decision first and the prisoner knows the warden's decision when he/she chooses
the strategy.
Therefore Nash Equilibria on playing strategies for (Z,Y) and (Y,Z). Player A to
player 1 and player B to player .
3. ITEMS #11-12 ON PAGE 220 ****NOTE: Don't forget to answer item #12.
#11 The following payoff table involves two players, each of whom has
three possible moves:
L M N
L 30, 15 45, 35 55, 25
M 25, 35 20, 20 30, 50
N 15, 35 35, 40 15, 15
FOR PLAYER A
Because Player B's decision determines Player A best course of action, Player A
lacks a dominant strategy.
FOR PLAYER B
If player A chooses L : 45>20>35
If player A chooses M : 35>50>25
If player A chooses N : 40>15>15
c. Are there Nash equilibria? If so, determine how many and state which strategies.
In order to locate Nash equilibria, we must search for strategy pairs in which,
considering the other player's strategy, neither party has an incentive to alone
depart.
Let's analyze the possible pairs of strategies:
Since there is a motivation for at least one participant in each pair to switch to a
different strategy in order to receive a larger payout, neither of these partnerships
is a Nash equilibrium .Therefore, this game does have 1 Nash Equilibria.
L M N
L 30, 15 45, 35 55, 25
M 25, 35 20, 20 30, 50
N 15, 35 35, 40 15, 15
(M,L) is the Nash equilibrium of the game since 45,35 is higher than L and N
4. Consider the table on item #11, page 220. Solve for the maximin strategy of
each player. Does this game have a maximin solution? Justify your
answer.
Player 2
L2 M2 N2
Player L1 30, 15 45, 35 55, 25
1 M1 25, 35 20, 20 30, 50
N1 15, 35 35, 40 15, 15
Highlighted in red are the worst payoffs for Player 1 per move.
Player 2
L2 M2 N2
Player L1 30, 15 45, 35 55, 25
1 M1 25, 35 20, 20 30, 50
N1 15, 35 35, 40 15, 15
Highlighted in red are the worst payoffs for Player 2 per move.
Player 2
L2 M2 N2
Player L1 30, 15 45, 35 55, 25
1 M1 25, 35 20, 20 30, 50
N1 15, 35 35, 40 15, 15
The maximin solution for the game is (L1, M2), which grants Player 1 45, and Player 2
35. This assures that the players can still get the maximum payoff among the worst
possible moves.
5. Item #24 on page 224 (Show your solution that would explain how you
arrived at your final answer.)
In this game, there are two players: A and B. A represents the first payoff value,
and B represents the second payoff value. To achieve subgame perfect
equilibrium, player A should first choose path A1, then player B should choose
path B2. Player A should then choose path A7, followed by player B choosing
path B8.
This solution was arrived at by solving the subgames by choosing the highest
payoff in the resulting paths, and moving backwards. Elimination of the paths that
result in the lowest payoff is what eventually leads to a path to the highest
payoffs.