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Norzaifizy Bin Khalid Nordin V Murphy Sarawak Oil Co. Ltd. (2019) ILJU 00190
Norzaifizy Bin Khalid Nordin V Murphy Sarawak Oil Co. Ltd. (2019) ILJU 00190
Norzaifizy Bin Khalid Nordin V Murphy Sarawak Oil Co. Ltd. (2019) ILJU 00190
BETWEEN
AND
Reference:
Resources under Section 20(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (Act 177) arising
out of the dismissal of Norzaifizy bin Khalid Nordin (hereinafter called “the
CASE NO: 26(3)/4-643/16
Claimant”) by Murphy Sarawak Oil Co. Ltd. (hereinafter called “the Company”)
on 31.08.2015.
AWARD
[1] This is a Ministerial reference to the Industrial Court under section 20 (3) of
the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (Act 177) for an award in respect of the dismissal
of Norzaifizy bin Khalid Nordin (“the Claimant”) by Murphy Sarawak Oil Co.
Ltd. on 31.08.2015.
[2] The hearing of the case commenced on 21 May 2018 and was duly completed
March 2019, while the Claimant’s solicitors filed their Submissions on 11 March 2019.
Both the Company’s solicitors and the Claimant’s solicitors filed their Submissions-in-
Reply on 24 April 2019. The Company’s solicitors filed their Further Written
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CASE NO: 26(3)/4-643/16
BRIEF FACTS
[4] The Claimant commenced employment as a Senior Rotating Engineer, with the
Company on 1 May 2008, on a fixed-term contract for two years. The contract was
extended for a year from 1 May 2010 and then for two years from 1 May 2011.
[5] The Claimant was promoted to the position of Lead Facilities Specialist (LFS)
from 1 June 2011 and he was made a permanent employee effective on 1 May
2012.
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[6] The Company issued a Notice of Retrenchment dated 14 August 2015 and
informed the Claimant that his last day of employment shall be 31 August 2015. The
Dear Norzaifizy,
NOTICE OF RETRENCHMENT
Murphy Sarawak Oil Co. Ltd (“Murphy”) has been suffering a severe decline in
profits and reduction in business since Q4 2014 due to the significant drop in the
oil price worldwide.
As you are aware, Murphy has undertaken several cost cutting measures in the
past 7 months. However, this has proven to be insufficient.
After much consideration, Murphy has decided to scale down its operations in
Malaysia and recognize its business and resources to sustain through the current
market conditions.
It is with much regret that we have to implement the decision to release you from
our employment. We hereby give you 2 months’ salary in-lieu of notice effective
from September 1, 2015. Therefore, your last day of employment shall be on
August 31, 2015. Your insurance coverage (Hospitalization & Surgical) will be
extended up to 30th October 2015. In the event of hospitalization, please state
below details during admission:
We understand that this decision may cause you difficulties. Therefore, to help
alleviate these difficulties, Murphy will be paying you retrenchment benefits as
particularized in the attached statement.
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Should you need further clarification of the above, please do not hesitate to
contact Siti Nafisah Jamaludin, Senior Manager, Human Resource &
Administration.
You are to surrender all Murphy’s property of whatever kind and whether tangible
or intangible (including, without limitation, all correspondence, documents,
specifications, paper, USB sticks or other software median and any confidential
information and intellectual property) in your possession and under your control
on your last working day on August 14, 2015. You also agree you have not kept
and will not keep copies or extracts of such property in any form whatsoever.
The Company will be happy to provide a reference letter to you and give you any
assistance you require in preparing your curriculum vitae. In addition, the
Company has appointed a career transition consultant that will help and support
you as you make the transition from Murphy. In the event that you require their
services or need counselling, please let us know and we will make the necessary
arrangements.
The Company would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your
contributions and dedication shown throughout your employment with us and we
wish you the very best in your future endeavours.
Yours sincerely,
MURPHY SARAWAK OIL CO. LTD.
HARRY J HOWARD
Vice President, Malaysia
[7] The Claimant wrote a letter dated 24 November 2015 to seek an explanation for
Dear Sir,
With reference to the matter above, I would like to state that my dismissal on 1st
September on the grounds of economic retrenchment was unfair and
unwarranted and the manner the company treated me during my dismissal has
caused me severe emotional distress and embarrassment.
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Ever since my unfair dismissal, I have been asking the following questions:
At the point of where the company unfairly decided to dismiss me, there
were altogether 8 project engineers including myself involved in Sarawak
Projects (for both Green Field and Brown Field Project). Yet, I alone was
selected for the company arbitrary “Mutual Separation Scheme”.
Since I joined the company in 2008, I have been involved either directly or
indirectly with most of the projects in Sarawak Development (GOPA,
GOPB, MEPA, SEPA, BORF, Patricia, Serendah, South Acis, BORF
Compressors Replacement) and my work performance has been excellent
as demonstrated by the annual performance reviews and performance
bonuses that the company had awarded to me. The company even asked
me to assume more responsibilities in 2012 by promoting me to Lead
Facilities Specialist in 2012 in recognition of my good performances.
Even with any reduction in work volume in the Project Department, the
company did not make any engagement or have any discussion with me at
all to distribute the work still available in the Project department.
If economic downturn was the reason for the retrenchment, the company
at the onset of the oil price decline (2 – 3 months prior to dismissing me),
instead of reducing the head count, see fit to even extend the contract of
a few other project engineers who were on contract basis despite the
foreseeable reduction in work volume.
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CASE NO: 26(3)/4-643/16
In fact, in the week prior to the company dismissing me, there was even a
reshuffle of project engineers due to an internal vacancy and the company
blatantly ignored to offer me to fill up the vacancy despite of me being
more than qualified for it and instead the internal vacancy involved project
engineers who is a contract staff/foreigner and has served the company
for less duration.
3. What other profiling criteria has the company employed for the “Mutual
Retrenchment Scheme”
While the company in all likelihood will not be bankrupt in the foreseeable
future. The company unfair action will caused me and my family utter
financial destruction.
It is self-evident that the company has acted unfairly and did not follow
proper procedure in retrenching me under the pretext of economic
downturn. As such I am asking for my unfair dismissal to be reversed and
for my immediate reinstatement to my previous work position with no loss
in benefits whatsoever.
Thank you,
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[8] At all material time, the Claimant was working in the Sarawak Development
Department as an LFS. His last-drawn salary was RM 33,537.00 plus a cost of living
[9] The Company paid a total sum of RM 266,766.03 to the Claimant, which
9.1 RM 70, 474.00 for two months in lieu of his contractual notice;
(COBD-1, p. 167)
[10] The Company is involved in the upstream oil and gas sector in Malaysia and is
[11] The company avers that oil prices worldwide dropped significantly from
[12] The company avers that on or around April 2015, the Company decided to
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attempt to ensure its survival and sustainability. Line Managers and Heads of
Departments were told by the Company’s management to select roles that had
[13] The Company contends that via email communications from 9 July 2014 the
Company had informed all employees about organizational changes being made due
to the reduction in business activities and profitability. The Company avers that there
was a need to reduce staffing levels both in North America as well as in South East
[14] The Company contends that it had to carry out the retrenchment exercise in
order to dispense with its excess manpower and reduce its manpower costs.
[15] The company avers that the Claimant could not be redeployed to any other
15.1 The other ongoing and future projects did not require a Rotating Equipment
Specialist; and/or
15.2 There were no vacancies in the Company which required an employee with
the Claimant’s skills, especially since the Company had frozen recruitment.
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CASE NO: 26(3)/4-643/16
[16] The Claimant contends that the Company’s action is tainted with mala fide and
[17] The Company avers that the alleged re-organisation or restructuring exercise
was an act to remove the Claimant from his employment and it was not a genuine
exercise.
[18] The Claimant contends that the Company failed to adhere to the principle of
Last in and First Out (LIFO) in retrenching the Claimant. Further, the Company has
[19] The Claimant avers that at the time of the retrenchment, there were eight
persons carrying our project engineering work in the Company, including the
Claimant. Of the eight persons, the Claimant was the longest-serving and was a
permanent staff.
[20] The Company avers that some fixed term employees were still carrying out
project engineering work and were not terminated while the Claimant, a permanent
[21] The Claimant avers that the Company did not or failed to take into account the
length of service, the status of the Claimant as a permanent staff and being a local,
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[22] The Claimant contends that he has more skills and capabilities than other
persons carrying out project engineering works. The Claimant contends that the
retrenchment was without just cause or excuse and is in breach of the principles of
[23] As a matter of general requirements, the retrenchment exercise must fulfil the
following requirements:
1) There was a legal basis and justification in carrying out the reorganisation
or restructuring;
Selection Criteria
[24] According to the Company’s Amended Rejoinder, the Company selected the
24.1 The Claimant’s job scope as a Lead Facility specialist (LFS) was reduced
significantly due the decline in business since year 2014. As a result, the
Claimant did not have much work to attend to and his position became
redundant;
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24.2 The Claimant was the only person holding the position of LFS whose area of
24.3 At the Claimant’s level, there was no other vacancy in other departments in
[25] The Company contends that there were four phases in the retrenchment
exercise. The Claimant was retrenched during the first phase, where a total of 12
employees were retrenched due to redundancy. The Company has also admitted
that there was no other reason other than redundancy in removing the Claimant
from his employment. The Claimant was not retrenched due to poor performance or
disciplinary issues.
[26] The Company summarised its reasons for the retrenchment as follows:
26.1 It has a legal basis to carry out the retrenchment as there has been a severe
26.2 It has satisfied all the legal requirements to carry out the retrenchment
exercise and has sufficiently complied with the guidelines set out in the Code
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26.3 It had exercise a fair and proper selection criteria and was fully justified in
26.4 The Company had paid the Claimant retrenchment benefits in accordance
26.6 There was no victimization as there were 11 other employees who were
retrenched during the first phase of the retrenchment exercise, together with
the Claimant.
Decline in Profitability
[27] There was an admission by the Claimant [see Amended Rejoinder para 20 (i)]
that there was indeed a decline in profitability. From the evidence adduced, this
Court is satisfied that there was a decline in profitability. However, the decline is not
sufficient to render the Company being unable to continue with its operations and to
continue to pay the wages of its employees who are employed locally. In fact, this
Court finds that there is a dearth of evidence to show that the decline in profitability
would have rendered the Company to be in such dire financial straits as to affect its
core business. It may be true that the retrenchments may have helped the Company
to stem its financial woes and to reduce costs, but there is no evidence to suggest
that the retrenchments actually save the Company from going belly-up.
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[28] The Code provides that prior to a retrenchment exercise, the employer should
take positive steps to avert or minimise reductions of work force by the adoption of
retirement benefits.
This Court shall take cognizance of the Code of Conduct but recognises that the
Code has no legal force, see Equant Integration Services Sdn Bhd (In
The Company has adequately explained that it has complied with the Code since it
has given notice to all the employees and it has indeed paid the Claimant
retrenchment benefits. The Company has not shown that it has fully complied with
both the spirit and text of the Code but since the Code has no legal effect, this Court
is of the opinion that the Company has adequately complied with the Code, although
not entirely.
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[29] It is the Company’s case that the Company had carried out the retrenchment
selection process by adopting its own standard selection criteria in selecting the
employees to be retrenched. COW-2 and COW-3 had given evidence in this regard.
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[30] It is unfortunate that the instruction from the Senior Vice President to the Line
Managers was not in writing. COW-2 admitted that the instruction was verbal in
nature.
[31] The lack of documentation goes against the Company’s assertion about the
retrenchment exercise and the selection criteria applied. A proper metric or detailed
evaluation document and process would have helped the Company to justify the
[32] The selection criteria as applied to the Claimant should have been
COW-2 was not personally involved in the selection process, the witness was not
able to provide proof in writing that the Claimant’s job scope and functions were no
Q : During the selection process, did you use any comparison data
comprises the other staff in the same Department?
A : No.
YA : You don’t have the data in writing or you did some comparison?
A : Yes, I did.
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YA : Did you make any comparison? Which you may not have reduced in
writing.
A : I did, but I don’t have the data in writing.
[34] While being cross-examined on what the criteria were in selecting the
Q : Do you know what are the criteria that were used or employed by
the Company to select the Claimant to retrench?
A : Yes.
Q : So the only criterion that the Company used to select the Claimant
is the skill set? Am I right based on your answer.
A : I would say no.
Q : So these are the selection criteria that were used by the Company
whereby the Claimant was selected to be retrenched, am I right?
A : Yes.
Q : Are all these in writing? That these are the selection criteria that we
used?
A : I don’t believe all are in writing.
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[35] COW-1 gave evidence on how the Claimant was selected for retrenchment as
follows:
Project known as Serendah. The Serendah and Patricia Projects were ending and
the Claimant’s role in these projects had ceased. Just prior to his retrenchment,
the Claimant was also working on a project known as the East Cluster
Development. However, the Company had made a decision to defer the project
until 2021 as it was not economically feasible for the Company to continue with
the project based on projected oil prices and the capital cost of the project.
[36] Had the selection criteria being more objective and transparent, and
applicable to all employees, at least within the same job scope, it would have been
easier to have an objective assessment of the criteria and how they were applied.
For a Company that has a large organisational structure and support, it was not
acceptable that there was no documentation generated. For this Court to make an
evaluation of the criteria applied, it would be helpful had the Company produced a
witness or decision maker who could have set out the criteria in an organised
manner and inform this Court as to their application, in respect of the Claimant here.
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[37] It is the opinion of this Court, that the Claimant was not consulted nor
informed on how he was selected to be retrenched. The selection criteria were not
documented, not transparent nor fair or easily understood by the Claimant. The
[38] It must also be noted that as a permanent staff member, the Claimant’s role
in the Company cannot and should not be dependent on any one project being
[39] The Claimant was not able to rebut that the benefits that were paid to him
were either not according to the terms of his employment or inadequate as a matter
of law and practice. As such this Court shall take the view that the retrenchment
benefits were in line with the terms and conditions of the Claimant’s employment.
[40] The Company argues that the LIFO principle was not applicable to the
Claimant. If this is so, the Company must be able to justify its own selection criteria
and the processes involved to show why their own selection criteria have been
applied and that the Claimant was selected based on those criteria.
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[41] In Firex Sdn Bhd v Cik Ng Shoo Wa [1990] 1 ILR 226, the Industrial Court
held: -
Mr Chandran, Learned Counsel for the Claimant had submitted vigorously that on
the evidence adduced in Court, the Company had obviously breached the principle
aforesaid. This issue was taken up by Mr Sivabalah, Learned Counsel for the
Company. Before I examine the evidence, it is perhaps appropriate to say
something about the principle in question. In Award No. 16/68: Sharikat Estern
Smelting Bhd v Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-pekerja Perusahaan
Peleboran Logam Sa-Malaya, the Court had said:
This principle was further exemplified in Award No. 27/28: National Union of
Cinema & Amusement Workers v Shaw Computer & Management
Services Sdn Bhd wherein the Court said inter alia:
[42] In Dynacraft Industries Sdn Bhd v Kamaruddin bin Kana Mohd Sharif
& Ors [2012] 6 MLJ 453, the Federal Court held, at p.459:
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retrenched; but there can be no doubt that the ordinary industrial rule of
retrenchment is ‘first come, last go’ and where other things are equal, this rule
has to be followed by the employer in effecting retrenchment.
Continuing his submission, learned counsel said the LIFO principle mandated that
in a retrenchment exercise, the employer has to take into account the duration of
service of the employee in the category within the establishment which was
undergoing a retrenchment exercise. In essence it required the employer to select
the more junior employee in a particular category to be retrenched first. Learned
counsel contended that in applying the LIFO principle, for the purpose of giving
consideration to length of service, it was only the actual service with the employer
and not service with another entity which was relevant. In support he quoted OP
Malhotra in The Law of Industrial Disputes, Vol 2, (6th Ed), where the learned
author said:
The words ‘last person to be employed in that category’, point to the actual
date of employment of the retrenched workman. This is illustrated by the
decision of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Assn of Planters v
Industrial Tribunal. A workman, John, who was working as a head-clerk in
an industrial establishment resigned from his job and his resignation was
accepted by the employer. After a period of about four months, John was again
re-employed and the period of break in his service was condoned under the
terms of agreement. During the period of John’s break in service, another clerk,
George, was employed. Subsequently, on a question arising regarding the
relative seniority in service of John and George, for the purpose of applying the
principle of ‘last come, first go’, it was held that John’s service as against
George’s must be counted as from the date of his re-appointment.
[43] It is pertinent to see how the Industrial Court adopts and explains the LIFO
principle. In Malaysia Shipyard & Engineering Sdn Bhd v Mukhtiar Singh &
16 Ors., Johor Bharu [1991] ILR 626, the Court held, at p 629: -
This principle is of course well established in industrial law. It has been said that
in effecting retrenchment, an employer should comply with the LIFO principle
unless there are sound and valid reasons for departure: see Kesatuan
Kakitangan Ladang-ladang Seluruh Tanah Malaya v Kumpulan Guthrie
Sdn Bhd (Award No. 5/70); Sharikat Obsorne and Chapel Sdn Bhd v
Kesatuan Kakitangan Perusahaan Lombong (Award No. 9/71). Now the
evidence clearly shows that the company had principle. The question is whether
or not there were sound and valid reasons for such a departure in this case.
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From the evidence as a whole, the company’s position is abundantly clear namely
that it had opted to apply a selection criteria devised by itself. I find that this
selection criteria in exhibit C5 reasonable in all the circumstances. In my view, the
company had adduced sufficiently sound and valid reasons for departing from
complying with the LIFO principle.
[45] In our present case, the Company had also abandoned the principle of LIFO
In the case of Sarawak Shell Bhd v Ismail Sahat & Ors [2002] 2 ILR 371, Mr
Lim Heng Seng, of the Labour Office, Miri, held that where the Company is to
depart from LIFO and to adopt is own selection process instead, the employer has to
show sound and valid reasons for doing so. The Labour Office held at pp 382 and
383: -
Learned counsel for the company submitted that the Industrial Relations Act,
1967 does not contain any provision requiring the employer to comply with LIFO
when undertaking a retrenchment exercise. He pointed out that LIFO is not a
principle that originated from Malaysia. It was a principle adopted from s. 25G of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 of India. Learned counsel for the company
goes on to submit that the LIFO rule is not the only selection criterion that can
be adopted when effecting retrenchment. He next contends that the LIFO
principle is not an immutable principle written in stone that cannot be departed
from the court is not expected to slavishly follow it. He further submits that the
code of conduct was followed in all material aspects and that the company was
entitled to adopt its own selection criteria in place of the LIFO rule. The
formulation of the selection criteria was made in full consultation with the unions
and employees’ representatives. Furthermore, almost all the other measures set
out in the code of conduct to be taken by the employer when a retrenchment
becomes necessary, such as early warnings, consultations and alternative
employment, were complied with by the company.
Notwithstanding the fact the explicit statutory expressions of the LIFO rule is to
be found in Indian industrial relations legislation, the principle has a long history
in Malaysian industrial jurisprudence. If its domestic provenance and relevance
needs to be justified, all that needs to be said is that the criteria in the agreed
practices to code pertaining to consideration for length of service set out in art.
22(b) must logically find its expression in the LIFO principle.
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The court is statutorily obliged to act according to broad concepts of equity and
good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to legal
form. Additionally, the court is empowered to take into account codes of conduct
mutually arrived at bye employer and employer organisations approved by the
relevant minister. Left to determine retrenchment cases with the above general
principles, the court has translated the criteria pertaining to length of service
into the LIFO principle and applied the same in many cases that have come
before it. The many facets of the LIFO rule are indeed sourced from the
industrial jurisprudence of other jurisdictions contained in legislation and the
case law of India and other common law countries. The Malaysian cases are
replete with references to textbooks and case authorities from India and
England. That alone, however, is not reason to reject the rule.
[46] Mr Lim also considered the submissions concerning whether a Company may
adopt its own selection criteria in place of the LIFO rule, and held, at p 383: -
In support of his submission that the company may adopt its own selection
criteria in place of the LIFO rule, learned counsel referred inter alia, to the case of
Malaysian Shipyard & Engineering Sdn Bhd, Johor Bahru v. Mukhtiar
Singh and Ors [1991] 1 ILR 626. The employer had adopted its own selection
criteria based on age, performance, medical records and disciplinary records in
place of LIFO when undertaking its retrenchment exercise. In that case, the
Industrial Court examined the various criteria and found them to be reasonable
having regard to the objective inter alia of achieving efficiency of operations. The
Court held thus:
From the evidence as a whole the Company’s position is abundantly clear namely
that it had adopted a selection criteria devised by itself. I find the selection
criteria in exh. C5 was reasonable in all the circumstances. In my view the
Company had adduced sufficiently sound and valid reasons for departing from
complying with the LIFO principle. Having regard therefore to the evidence, facts
and the law, the Company has established on a balance of probabilities that the
dismissals of the claimants by way of retrenchment were made with just cause or
excuse.
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The court agrees with the submission of learned counsel for the company on the
non-rigidity of the LIFO principle. There are ample authorities that decide that an
employer may for sound and valid reason depart from strictly applying the LIFO
principle. Apart from the Malaysian Shipyard & Engineering (supra), the
cases of departure from the LIFO principle appear to occur in the context of the
retention of one or few particular employees by way of an exception to the
general application of the LIFO principle in a retrenchment exercise conducted by
an employer. Such departures are justified on the basis of the ability,
compatibility, suitability and efficiency of junior officers who were retained in
preference to other senior officers due to the specific need or interests of the
employer. The onus is cast of the employer to justify the same preferably,
because of the considerations of reliability and the issue of proof, by reference to
the recorded history of the said officers. Unlike the Malaysian Shipyard &
Engineering case, they do not involve retrenchment exercises where the LIFO
principle is cast aside as it is considered to be wholly inappropriate and in lieu
thereof a specially structured selection criteria is adopted.
The employer discharges the onus of justifying his departure from the LIFO
principle by adducing substantive and reliable evidence of the grounds or reasons
justifying a departure from the LIFO principle. The approach in this type of case,
which for the sake of brevity will be referred to as “the usual case”, is seen in the
case of Syarikat Osborne & Chappel Sdn Bhd. v Kesatuan Kakitangan
Perusahaan Lombong [1970-1972] MLLR, the court held:
After an examination of all the facts before it, the Court is of the view that the
Management Company has failed to adduce substantive and reliable evidence
showing the inefficiency and the unreliability of Lopez and Pereira and,
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The usual type of cases where the employer justifies a departure from the LIFO
principle as an exception rather than as a general policy decision in the
formulation of its selection criteria will have the effect that the senior employer
who had been performing satisfactorily and without taint of misconduct will be
assured against redundancy short of specific, sound and valid reasons justifying
the retention of a particular junior employee. This legitimate expectation to
security of tenure in the context of retrenchments arising from redundancies has
long been recognised in the industrial jurisprudence of Malaysia.
Having said that the court reiterates that the court will have to be satisfied that
the employer had not only a sound and valid reason for the said departure but
also, following the general approach taken by the court in Malaysian Shipyard &
Engineering, that the selection criteria is reasonable and that the implementation
of the selection process in accordance with the selection criteria adopted is fair. In
this regard and in the context of the Agreed Practices annexed to the code, the
issue of reasonableness is not one that is left to be decided on undefined
parameters. Employers ought to take into account the various matters specified in
the Agreed Practices and in particular to be anxious to give heed to the emphasis
expressed in art. 22(b) on the necessity for the adoption and application of
objective criteria in the said procedure and the concern the there should be a
consultative approach when the selection criteria is being formulated. As has been
observed previously by this court, the specification of the need to apply objective
criteria for selection is a disavowal of subjectivity in the selection process.
Selection of employees for retrenchment by management based on the latter’s
subjective views of an employee is fraught with the dangers of arbitrariness,
victimisation and unfair labour practice which are wholly unacceptable in good
industrial relations practice (see Mamut Copper Mining v Chau Fook Kong @
Leonard and Ors [1997] 2 ILR 625).
[48] In our present case, this Court is of the opinion that the Company’s selection
criteria were not transparent nor codified for the Claimant to understand and
appreciate and were unreasonable, considering that the Claimant was already a
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[49] In trying to depart from the LIFO rule, it was for the Company to discharge
the onus of justifying the departure by adducing substantive and reliable evidence of
[50] The ability, compatibility, suitability and efficiency of the Claimant were not
dealt with in detail except for the fact that the Company insisted that the Claimant
did not possess a degree and thus could not be considered as an “engineer”. From
the documents presented to this Court, it was amply shown that the Claimant had
been employed in a capacity that the Company thought he was capable of. The fact
that his initial contracts were extended and that he was made a permanent
employee (from as far back as 1 May 2012) showed that the Claimant was
“rotation equipment” and not project engineering, are not factors that would
determine whether his role was a surplus role and he should be selected for
retrenchment. At the end of the day, the selection criteria should not judge him in
how the Company should interpret his role but whether the selection criteria were
Victimization
[51] The Claimant had submitted that he was victimised. In contrast, the
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[52] The Claimant considered himself to be a Project Engineer and had worked in
the Patricia Project and East Cluster Project in such a position. In his testimony, the
Claimant testified that there were eight Project Engineers, including himself, at the
Q : Were any of these seven (7) staff performing the duties and
responsibilities of a Project Engineer senior to you?
A : The local staff are all my junior. However, the Expat staff, Steve
Spencer, could have been employed at the same time as me in year
2008, but at the time of my retrenchment, he was still a contract
employee whereas I was a permanent staff.
[53] Although the Company had strenuously tried to show that the Claimant, being
a diploma holder, was not considered an “engineer”, there was little doubt that the
Claimant had considered himself as one of the Project Engineers and he was
Q : The Company’s witnesses had testified that you were given the
duties and responsibilities of a Project Engineer as an exposure.
What is your response to this?
A : It’s not true because I had been performing the duties from June
2011 until I was retrenched, which is about four (4) years,
therefore, the Company’s evidence that I was just performing it as
an exposure does not make sense.
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[54] The Claimant had testified that of the eight persons performing project
engineering functions in the Company, he had served the longest period. This was
not rebutted by the Company. The Claimant had also testified that he was a
permanent employee, and a local, and these facts were also unrebutted.
Q : Why do you say that the Company’s act of retrenching you is not
justified?
[55] The Company on the other hand did not show any evidence that the other
Project Engineers were more qualified than the Claimant to be retained or that
the Claimant could not perform the roles that they were performing. The
Company did not show that as a non-degree holder, the Claimant was less
qualified or less able to carry out his duties. In fact, throughout his career with
the Company, the Company had never made his lack of a degree as an issue.
[56] Admittedly the Claimant is outside the purview of the Employment Act 1955
(Act 265), but this Court is also guided by the spirit behind s 60N, which states:
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BURDEN OF PROOF
[57] The burden lies on the Company to show that a case for retrenchment has
been made out and if so, whether the retrenchment was made bona fide.
Claimant’s retrenchment which is akin to a dismissal was with just cause and excuse,
see Telekom Malaysia Kawasan Utara v Krishnan Kutty Sanguni Nair &
In our view the passage quoted from Administrative Lawby H.W.R. Wade &
C.F. Forsyth offers the clearest statement on the standard of proof required,
that is the civil standard based on the balance of probabilities, which is flexible,
so that the degree of probability required is proportionate to the nature of
gravity of the issue. But, again, if we may add, these are not “passwords” that
the failure to use them or if some other words are used, the decision is
automatically rendered bad in law. The Industrial Court should be allowed to
discharge its functions as it was intended to be by statute. The Industrial Court
should be more flexible to enable it to regulate the relations between
employers and workmen and to prevent and settle differences and disputes
arising from their relationship. That is what it is meant to be.
[59] In deciding whether the dismissal was without just cause this Court merely had
to consider whether on the evidence produced before it, there were reasonable
grounds to dismiss the Claimant. This court recognises that a retrenchment exercise
is the prerogative of the Company and in determining whether the exercise of the
management prerogative was bona fide, this Court will examine the reasons put
[60] The burden of proof, as in all dismissal cases, lies with the Company, see
Food Specialities (M) Sdn Bhd v Esa bin Haji Mohamad [1989] 1 ILR 502.
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[61] This Court shall also act according to equity, good conscience and the
substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal form, as per
[62] In the Federal Court case of Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Seh Yen [1995]
4 CLJ 449, the Federal Court held that the function of the Industrial Court in
2) Whether the proven misconduct constitutes just cause or excuse for the
dismissal.
[63] Similarly, in the case of Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong
Assurance Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 753, the Federal Court
On the authorities, we were of the view that the main and only function of the
Industrial Court in dealing with a reference under s 20 of the Act (unless
otherwise lawfully provided by the terms of the reference) is to determine
whether the misconduct or irregularities complained of by the management as
grounds of dismissal were in fact committed by the workman, and if so,
whether such grounds constitute just cause or excuse for the dismissal.
[64] In this case, there was no question about any misconduct or any under-
performance issues.
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[65] Accordingly, this Court holds that the dismissal was without just cause and
excuse.
REMEDY
[66] This is not a suitable case for a reinstatement. The rightful remedy in this
[67] The Claimant was unable to obtain permanent employment after his
retrenchment and was only able to receive income for two months.
[68] The Claimant’s joined the Company on 1 May 2008 and his last-drawn salary
[69] The Claimant’s claim for punitive and/or exemplary and/or aggravated
exercise, in four phases, was with an ulterior motive, targeted specifically at the
Court’s opinion that the Industrial Court has very limited discretion in awarding such
damages.
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[70] Taking into account the Claimant’s current situation and also taking into
account that he received income for only two months, this Court makes the following
order:
COMPENSATION IN LIEU OF
RM 35,237.00 x 11 = RM 387,607.00
REINSTATEMENT
DEDUCT
[71] The total nett sum payable of RM 931,291.97, less any statutory deductions, is
to be paid to the Claimant, through his solicitors within 30 days from the date of
-signed-
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