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Examples Explanations For The Law of Torts Examples Explanations Series 5th Edition Ebook PDF
Examples Explanations For The Law of Torts Examples Explanations Series 5th Edition Ebook PDF
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I dedicate this book to my wife, Annie
Contents
Preface to Students
Acknowledgments
Special Notice
Index
Preface to Students
This book is based on the common sense premise that students encountering
complex legal issues for the first time will appreciate a book that provides
clear, straightforward introductions to these issues, together with examples
that illustrate how these principles apply in typical cases.
I have good reason to believe that this premise is valid. Some years ago, I
wrote a book on civil procedure, entitled Civil Procedure: Examples and
Explanations, which uses the same approach. The book has been widely used
in law schools across the country. Not only do many faculty members assign
or recommend it, but many students have found their way to the book on their
own or on the recommendation of other students who have found the
approach helpful.
Each chapter of this book includes a brief introduction to the topic,
followed by a set of examples that apply the concepts to particular fact
situations. After the examples, I have included my analysis of each example.
Unlike the typical questions found in the casebooks, which are often either
too hard to answer or downright unanswerable, the examples here tend to
start with the basics and move on to more sophisticated variations. If you
study the readings for your Torts class and the introductions in this book, you
should be able to respond effectively to most of the examples. Trying your
hand at them and comparing your analysis to mine should help to deepen
your understanding of the concepts and your ability to think critically about
legal issues in general. It may also help to convince you that you are capable
of learning the law, a type of feedback that law school seldom seems to
provide.
You will also want to use the book to review the course toward the end of
the year. Most casebooks contain representative cases and provocative
questions and notes, but they do not explain the state of the law or provide
much context for the issues raised. Reading these chapters and reviewing the
examples should help you to test your understanding of the topics covered
and fill in the gaps left by your casebook.
The last part of the book includes three chapters that will be particularly
helpful in preparing for exams. The first chapter explains the type of analysis
that law professors are looking for on a Torts essay exam (or any other first-
year exam, for that matter). The second analyzes common mistakes students
make in taking essay exams. The third includes several exam questions, with
sample answers and some comments on strategy. Law exams are quite
different from others you’ve taken. These chapters will help you to
understand the analytical approach that most law professors want to see in the
merry month of May.
Like every author, I hope that this book will go through many more
editions. If you have comments or suggestions for improvement, drop me a
note at Suffolk University Law School, 120 Tremont Street, Boston, MA
02108. Or, send me an e-mail at jglannon@suffolk.edu.
January 2020
Joseph W. Glannon
Acknowledgments
For several frequently cited treatises, I have used shortened forms after the
initial citation to the work. These are as follows: Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick,
The Law of Torts, cited as Dobbs’ Law of Torts; Harper, James & Gray, The
Law of Torts (2d ed. 1986), cited as Harper, James & Gray; Prosser and
Keeton, The Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984), cited as Prosser & Keeton; Minzer,
Nates, eds., Damages in Tort Actions, cited as Minzer, Nates; Schwartz,
Comparative Negligence, cited as Schwartz; and Speiser, Recovery for
Wrongful Death and Injury, cited as Speiser.
INTRODUCTION
The primitive world must have been a fairly scary place. Our ancestors had to
cope not only with the awesome forces of nature, impossible to predict or
control, but also with another unpredictable danger — other human beings.
Doubtless, one of the primary reasons they decided to become “civilized”
was to ensure physical security from each other.
Medieval England, from which our tort law evolved, sought to deter
physical aggression through a criminal remedy, the “appeal of felony,” for
physical assaults and other invasions of personal interests. Harper, James &
Gray, The Law of Torts §3.1 (3d ed. 1996). If the defendant was found guilty,
she would be fined; that is, she would have to pay a sum of money or forfeit
her goods to the crown. The appeal of felony helped to enforce the King’s
peace, but it did nothing to compensate the injured victim for her injury.
Over time, the English courts also developed civil tort remedies to
compensate victims of physical aggression. This tort remedy differed
according to the nature of the defendant’s invasion. For example, the tort of
battery authorized damages for deliberate, unwanted contacts with the
plaintiff’s person. Assault allowed recovery for placing the plaintiff in fear of
an unwanted contact. False imprisonment was the remedy for unwarranted
restraints on the plaintiff’s freedom of movement. This chapter examines the
action of battery, that most basic of tort remedies for invasion of the most
basic of personal rights, the right to freedom from unwanted bodily contact.
It seems as though this ought to be a very short chapter. Even the law,
with its tendency to overanalyze, can only complicate a seemingly simple
matter so much. And battery seems like a simple matter. Jones hits Smith:
She has invaded Smith’s right to freedom from physical aggression and
should be liable for any resulting injuries. All that is left to decide is how
much Jones should pay.
Sometimes it is that simple, but often it is not. Jones may have bumped
into Smith because Lopez pushed her, or she may have collided with Smith
while jumping out of the way of an oncoming car. Perhaps she pushed Smith
in order to prevent the car from hitting her, or while thrashing around in an
epileptic seizure. Each of these cases involves an unauthorized contact with
Smith, but Jones should not be required to compensate Smith for such
blameless — or even helpful — invasions of Smith’s physical autonomy.
Since the courts have refused to condemn all unwanted contacts, they
have struggled to craft a definition of battery that limits recovery to those
types of contacts the law seeks to prevent. Most courts define battery as the
intentional infliction of a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the
plaintiff. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §13. Under this definition the
defendant must act, her act must be intentional (in the restricted sense
peculiar to tort law), the act must cause a contact with the victim, and the
intended contact must be either harmful or offensive to the victim. These
requirements are discussed in detail below.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §8A. This definition lets Chu off the hook in
the bus case, since her act was not intentional in the intentional tort sense.
She did not act for the purpose of hitting Munoz, nor was she substantially
certain that she would. The contact resulted instead from her failure to take
proper precautions (such as looking where she was going) to avoid hitting
Munoz. Chu may be liable for negligence, but she has not committed a
battery.
Indeed, the purpose of the intent requirement is to confine intentional tort
liability to cases in which the defendant acts with a higher level of culpability
than mere carelessness: where she acts with a purpose, or with knowledge
that the act will cause harmful or offensive contact to the victim. If Chu
pushed Munoz to get her out of the way, she would meet this intent
requirement, since she would be substantially certain that Munoz would find
such a contact offensive. She would also meet the intent requirement if she
pushed her to embarrass her in front of a friend — an offensive contact — or
to cause her to fall in front of a car, an obviously harmful one.
The intent requirement in the Restatement is disjunctive; that is, it is met
either by a purpose to cause the tortious contact or substantial certainty that
such a contact will result. Suppose, for example, that Smith heaves a stone at
her enemy Jones, though she thinks Jones is probably beyond her range. She
is not substantially certain that she will hit Jones, but she acts with the desire
to do so. This satisfies the intent requirement; if the stone hits Jones, Smith
has committed battery.
Under this definition, an actor can possess tortious intent even though she
bears the victim no ill will whatsoever. If Chu sees Jones walking along the
street below and deliberately throws a bucket of water on her from a second-
story window, it is no defense that she was simply emptying the scrub bucket
and did not mean to offend Jones. In intentional tort terms, she intends those
contacts that she is substantially certain will occur, as well as those she
desires to see happen. Indeed, a battery can be committed with the best of
motives. In Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc., 82 A.2d
458 (1951), for example, the defendant’s employee attempted to set the
plaintiff’s broken arm, against her protests. While the employee was only
trying to help, he knew (because the victim told him so) that she found the
contact unwelcome, and consequently met the intent requirement for battery.
TRANSFERRED INTENT
Although intentional tort law requires a very specific type of intent, that
standard may be met if the actor intends to commit a battery on one person
and actually inflicts one on somebody else. Suppose, for example, that Chu
throws a rock at Smith, hoping to hit her, but her aim is bad and she hits
Lopez instead. Chu would argue that she cannot be held liable to Lopez, since
she had no intent to hit her — she was aiming at Smith.
Although Chu had no tortious intent toward Lopez in this example, she
did have tortious intent toward Smith. In such cases, courts hold that the
tortious intent to hit Smith transfers to Lopez. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§16(2). Thus, where the actor tries to batter one person and actually causes a
harmful or offensive contact to another, she will be liable to the actual victim.
Obviously, transferred intent is a legal fiction created to achieve a
sensible result despite lack of intent toward the person actually contacted.
The rationale for the doctrine is that the tortfeasor’s act is just as culpable
when her aim is bad as when it is good; it would be unconscionable if she
were exonerated just because she hit the wrong person. Under transferred
intent, she will be liable whether she hits her intended victim or someone
else.
The transferred intent fiction also allows recovery where the actor
attempts one intentional tort but causes another. If, for example, Chu tries to
hit Smith with a hammer but misses, placing Smith in fear of a harmful
contact but not actually causing one, her intent to commit a battery suffices to
hold her liable for assault. Conversely, if she tries to frighten Lopez by
shooting near her, but the bullet hits her instead, she will be liable for battery
even though she intended to commit an assault instead.
Examples
2. When Romeo gets out of the car to apologize, Thibault yells, “What’s
the idea?” and gives him a push. Romeo slips on a patch of ice, hits his
head on one of the mag wheels of his Trans Am, and suffers a serious
concussion. Is Thibault liable for Romeo’s injuries?
3. Romeo and Juliet are an item, “going steady” as they said when I was in
high school. Romeo comes up to Juliet in the school parking lot on
Monday morning and gives her a hug, as he is accustomed to doing each
morning. Unfortunately, Juliet is standing on a patch of ice and Romeo’s
embrace causes her to fall and fracture her arm. Is Romeo liable for
battery?
No Offense Intended?
7. Romeo considers himself irresistible. He is accustomed to flirting with
the girls at will. He comes up to Ophelia, a new student, on her first day
in the school and, by way of introduction, gives her a hug. She sues him
for battery. Is he liable?
8. Romeo is a sprinter on the track team. At the first meet of the season, he
is nosed out by Mercutio, the star of the visiting team. In a burst of good
sportsmanship, he goes over to Mercutio, slaps him heartily on the back,
and says “great run, Mercutio!” Mercutio, who, it turns out, is very
sensitive about being touched by strangers, reacts with rage at the
contact. Is Romeo liable for battery?
9. Romeo and Mercutio meet again at the regional finals. This time Romeo
ends up the victor. After the race, he turns to Mercutio on the track,
punches his shoulder playfully and says, “Well, Mercutio, turnabout is
fair play!” The humorless Mercutio sues him for battery. Is he liable this
time?
10. Romeo races Mercutio again in the state finals, and loses. Infuriated, he
takes his track shoes and hurls them into the crowded stands. They hit
Polonius, causing facial lacerations. Can Polonius sue Romeo for
battery?
Star-Crossed Lovers
11. Alas, poor Romeo. He still holds a candle for Juliet, and she won’t even
talk to him anymore. He finds her asleep at one of the carrels in the
school library. A confirmed romantic, he slips up to her and kisses her
on the cheek. Malvolio, the school sneak, later tells Juliet.
a. Upset, she heads for court. Battery?
b. You have recently passed the bar and hung out your own shingle.
Juliet brings her sneaky-kiss case to you and asks you to sue Romeo
for her. Would you take the case?
c. Assume Romeo had kissed the sleeping Juliet while they were still
going together. However, Juliet does not find out about it until after
they have broken up. Can she sue him for battery?
Explanations
2. Although Thibault is justly angry with Romeo, that does not give him a
license to retaliate against him. He has intentionally inflicted a contact
that Romeo will find offensive, and perhaps harmful as well, and he is
liable to him for battery.
But is he liable for the unanticipated and unintended concussion? As
in the Brutus example in the introduction, Thibault is fully liable for all
harm resulting from the battery. Although he had no intent — as that
term is used in either the Restatement or everyday life — to cause
Romeo’s concussion, he did intend to push him. Since he committed a
battery by doing so, he is liable for all the resulting injuries, even
unexpected ones.
This rule, that a defendant who commits an intentional tort is liable
for all the resulting harm, does not apply in negligence cases. Under
negligence law, liability is limited to the foreseeable consequences of
the defendant’s act. See Chapter 12. However, because intentional torts
are deemed more culpable, the courts generally hold the defendant liable
for all the ensuing consequences, foreseeable or otherwise. This rule
imposes very severe damages on Thibault for what seems like a
relatively innocuous act — but it didn’t turn out to be innocuous, did it?
The Solomons of tort law have concluded that the loss in such cases
should fall on the actor rather than the victim.2
For an extreme example of this, see Baker v. Shymkiv, 451 N.E.2d
811 (Ohio 1983), in which a defendant’s trespass to land (an intentional
tort) led to an argument with the owner. During the argument, the owner
had a fatal heart attack. The trespasser was held liable for it as a
consequence of the intentional tort.
4. Poor Romeo; he was only trying to help. Maybe he even was helpful.
But he still committed a battery.
In analyzing battery cases, it is important to distinguish between
intent and motive. The motive for Romeo’s act was honorable, but he
still intended to cause a contact to Juliet that he knew she would find
offensive, because she told him so. The elements of battery do not
include acting from a malicious motive, nor will a virtuous motive
prevent liability if those elements are present. The plaintiff has the right
to decide for herself which contacts are beneficial; she need not submit
to the prodding of any Romeo who wishes to be gallant. Juliet may
prefer the higher risk of slipping to the touch of the klutzy and out-of-
favor Romeo. That decision is hers, not his. Where Romeo substitutes
his judgment for hers, he is liable for battery.
Because of the fundamental value placed on physical self-
determination, courts have held defendants liable for battery, even
though their motives were pure and their contacts beneficial. The classic
example is Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905), in which a
doctor was held liable for battery when he operated on the plaintiff’s left
ear after the plaintiff had consented to surgery only on the right.
Although the left ear was diseased, and the surgery was successful, the
court concluded that the doctor had violated the patient’s “right to
complete immunity of his person from physical interference of others. . .
.” Id. at 16.
This instruction tells the jury to find the intent requirement met if
Romeo acted with either of the states of mind required for an
intentional tort.
6. If desire can make a battery, Romeo has surely committed one, since he
fervently hoped Thibault would fall in, and was delighted when he did.
And we know that Romeo need not directly touch Thibault to batter
him: Contact with the trench suffices to meet the contact requirement.
And certainly Thibault found the contact both harmful and offensive.
But Romeo is still not liable to Thibault. He has not done anything to
cause the contact. To incur liability, he must act; he must inflict the
contact, not simply hope for it. This contact results from the acts of
others, not Romeo.
No Offense Intended?
7. Obviously, Romeo is of the opinion that no woman in her right mind
would object to his attentions. However, the question is not whether
Romeo finds his conduct offensive. It is not even whether Romeo thinks
that Ophelia will. As the introduction points out, the question Romeo
must ponder before his dalliance with Ophelia is whether the reasonable
person in Ophelia’s circumstances would find it offensive. The answer
to that question is almost certainly “yes.” Most teenagers don’t like
being hugged by strangers, even attractive strangers.
So, offensiveness is determined by an objective test — whether the
contact would be offensive to the reasonable person in the victim’s
circumstances. But isn’t it true, even if Romeo’s hug is “offensive”
under this definition, that Romeo must intend an offensive contact, not
just cause one? And, if Romeo genuinely believed that the new girl in
school would welcome his attention, how can he be said to have
intended an offensive contact?
Very likely Romeo will be held liable, even if he is too conceited to
realize that this contact is offensive under the Restatement definition; the
law will attribute to him an understanding of what the reasonable person
finds offensive. Otherwise, he could avoid liability based on his
testimony that he didn’t think it would be offensive. Such a test would
allow social boors to escape liability simply because they have poor
judgment — or lie about what they understood — even though they
inflict unwanted contacts on others.
There is some authority suggesting that an actor commits battery by
intentionally causing a contact that turns out to be harmful or offensive,
even if the actor did not intend it to be either. This “single intent” theory
(that is, that the only intent needed is the intent to make the contact) is
approved in White v. University of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108 (Idaho 1990);
but see White v. Munoz, 999 P.2d 814 (CO. 2014) (en banc) (rejecting
the single intent theory). See generally K. Simons, A Restatement
(Third) of Intentional Torts? 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 1061, 1070 (2006). The
draft Third Restatement of Torts explores this “single intent” approach
in great detail, and comes down in support of it. Restatement of the Law
Third: Intentional Torts to Persons (Tentative Draft No. 1) §102 cmt. b
and Reporter’s Note.3 Your Humble Author is troubled by the “single
intent” approach, because it would impose liability on an actor who
made a contact that was not intended to cause either harm or offense.
The Third Restatement draft acknowledges that this imposes “a modest
degree of strict liability.” Id. at §102, Reporters’ Note §b. Romeo would
be liable in this example under either a “single intent” or “dual intent”
approach.4
8. Romeo has again acted with good intentions, but we saw in Example 4
that good intentions will not negate a battery if the elements of the tort
are established. However, those elements are not met here, since Romeo
has no reason to believe that his slap will be offensive to a reasonable
person under these circumstances: Congratulatory hugs and slaps are
common among athletes on such occasions.
The requirement that the contact “offen[d] a reasonable sense of
personal dignity” (Restatement (Second) of Torts §19) allows actors to
make contacts with others that the ordinary person will not find
offensive, without fear of a suit for battery. This requirement places the
burden on the party with unusual sensibilities, such as Mercutio, to
inform people of his susceptibility. Until he does, those who interact
with Mercutio are protected if they conform to generally accepted
standards of behavior.
If actors were liable to hypersensitive plaintiffs for generally
accepted contacts like this, many everyday interactions would entail the
risk of liability. Under that rule, Romeo could be sued for tapping a
stranger on the shoulder to tell her she had dropped her umbrella, or
brushing past a fellow passenger on the subway. To avoid liability, he
would have to avoid all contact. The world might be a marginally safer
place for the hypersensitive, but a great deal of spontaneity would be
sacrificed.
9. This example is like the last, except that here Romeo is aware before he
acts that Mercutio is sensitive to physical contacts, even those generally
accepted by others. The issue is whether the actor is liable for contacts
that are not offensive under the Restatement’s “reasonable-sense-of-
personal-dignity” standard, but which the actor knows will be offensive
to a particular hypersensitive individual.
The Second Restatement declined to take a position on whether there
should be liability in a case like this, but the draft Third Restatement
guardedly approves it if the actor knows that the contact is “highly
offensive to the other’s unusually sensitive sense of personal dignity.”
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons (Tentative
Draft No. 1) § 103(b). Surely the values underlying battery support
liability in this case: The purpose of battery is to protect individuals
from unwanted intrusions on physical security. Where an actor knows
that another accepts contacts that others would find offensive (for
example, friends who routinely engage in rough horseplay), his actual
knowledge protects him, despite the objective standard usually applied.
Conversely, where he knows that another rejects contacts others would
tolerate, that knowledge, not the objective standard, should govern his
liability. Here Romeo knows this intrusion will be offensive to
Mercutio, and he ought to avoid it, even if others would accept the
contact.
10. Romeo will doubtless argue that he had no intent, in the battery sense of
the term, to hit Polonius. He did not desire to hit him, nor did he know to
a substantial certainty that he would hit him — the shoes could have hit
anyone.
Clearly, this is an anemic defense. As long as Romeo knew to a
substantial certainty that the shoes would hit someone, he knew his act
would cause a harmful or offensive contact to the person of another. It
should not negate the tort that his act had a large number of potential
victims. If that were the case, a terrorist who threw a bomb onto the
mezzanine at O’Hare Airport would not be liable to the strangers he
injured, since he couldn’t be sure which ones would be hurt, and wished
no ill will to any one of them in particular.
This is not really a case of transferred intent. It is not a situation in
which he threw at a specific victim and hit another instead. Rather, it is a
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DANCE ON STILTS AT THE GIRLS’ UNYAGO, NIUCHI
I see increasing reason to believe that the view formed some time
back as to the origin of the Makonde bush is the correct one. I have
no doubt that it is not a natural product, but the result of human
occupation. Those parts of the high country where man—as a very
slight amount of practice enables the eye to perceive at once—has not
yet penetrated with axe and hoe, are still occupied by a splendid
timber forest quite able to sustain a comparison with our mixed
forests in Germany. But wherever man has once built his hut or tilled
his field, this horrible bush springs up. Every phase of this process
may be seen in the course of a couple of hours’ walk along the main
road. From the bush to right or left, one hears the sound of the axe—
not from one spot only, but from several directions at once. A few
steps further on, we can see what is taking place. The brush has been
cut down and piled up in heaps to the height of a yard or more,
between which the trunks of the large trees stand up like the last
pillars of a magnificent ruined building. These, too, present a
melancholy spectacle: the destructive Makonde have ringed them—
cut a broad strip of bark all round to ensure their dying off—and also
piled up pyramids of brush round them. Father and son, mother and
son-in-law, are chopping away perseveringly in the background—too
busy, almost, to look round at the white stranger, who usually excites
so much interest. If you pass by the same place a week later, the piles
of brushwood have disappeared and a thick layer of ashes has taken
the place of the green forest. The large trees stretch their
smouldering trunks and branches in dumb accusation to heaven—if
they have not already fallen and been more or less reduced to ashes,
perhaps only showing as a white stripe on the dark ground.
This work of destruction is carried out by the Makonde alike on the
virgin forest and on the bush which has sprung up on sites already
cultivated and deserted. In the second case they are saved the trouble
of burning the large trees, these being entirely absent in the
secondary bush.
After burning this piece of forest ground and loosening it with the
hoe, the native sows his corn and plants his vegetables. All over the
country, he goes in for bed-culture, which requires, and, in fact,
receives, the most careful attention. Weeds are nowhere tolerated in
the south of German East Africa. The crops may fail on the plains,
where droughts are frequent, but never on the plateau with its
abundant rains and heavy dews. Its fortunate inhabitants even have
the satisfaction of seeing the proud Wayao and Wamakua working
for them as labourers, driven by hunger to serve where they were
accustomed to rule.
But the light, sandy soil is soon exhausted, and would yield no
harvest the second year if cultivated twice running. This fact has
been familiar to the native for ages; consequently he provides in
time, and, while his crop is growing, prepares the next plot with axe
and firebrand. Next year he plants this with his various crops and
lets the first piece lie fallow. For a short time it remains waste and
desolate; then nature steps in to repair the destruction wrought by
man; a thousand new growths spring out of the exhausted soil, and
even the old stumps put forth fresh shoots. Next year the new growth
is up to one’s knees, and in a few years more it is that terrible,
impenetrable bush, which maintains its position till the black
occupier of the land has made the round of all the available sites and
come back to his starting point.
The Makonde are, body and soul, so to speak, one with this bush.
According to my Yao informants, indeed, their name means nothing
else but “bush people.” Their own tradition says that they have been
settled up here for a very long time, but to my surprise they laid great
stress on an original immigration. Their old homes were in the
south-east, near Mikindani and the mouth of the Rovuma, whence
their peaceful forefathers were driven by the continual raids of the
Sakalavas from Madagascar and the warlike Shirazis[47] of the coast,
to take refuge on the almost inaccessible plateau. I have studied
African ethnology for twenty years, but the fact that changes of
population in this apparently quiet and peaceable corner of the earth
could have been occasioned by outside enterprises taking place on
the high seas, was completely new to me. It is, no doubt, however,
correct.
The charming tribal legend of the Makonde—besides informing us
of other interesting matters—explains why they have to live in the
thickest of the bush and a long way from the edge of the plateau,
instead of making their permanent homes beside the purling brooks
and springs of the low country.
“The place where the tribe originated is Mahuta, on the southern
side of the plateau towards the Rovuma, where of old time there was
nothing but thick bush. Out of this bush came a man who never
washed himself or shaved his head, and who ate and drank but little.
He went out and made a human figure from the wood of a tree
growing in the open country, which he took home to his abode in the
bush and there set it upright. In the night this image came to life and
was a woman. The man and woman went down together to the
Rovuma to wash themselves. Here the woman gave birth to a still-
born child. They left that place and passed over the high land into the
valley of the Mbemkuru, where the woman had another child, which
was also born dead. Then they returned to the high bush country of
Mahuta, where the third child was born, which lived and grew up. In
course of time, the couple had many more children, and called
themselves Wamatanda. These were the ancestral stock of the
Makonde, also called Wamakonde,[48] i.e., aborigines. Their
forefather, the man from the bush, gave his children the command to
bury their dead upright, in memory of the mother of their race who
was cut out of wood and awoke to life when standing upright. He also
warned them against settling in the valleys and near large streams,
for sickness and death dwelt there. They were to make it a rule to
have their huts at least an hour’s walk from the nearest watering-
place; then their children would thrive and escape illness.”
The explanation of the name Makonde given by my informants is
somewhat different from that contained in the above legend, which I
extract from a little book (small, but packed with information), by
Pater Adams, entitled Lindi und sein Hinterland. Otherwise, my
results agree exactly with the statements of the legend. Washing?
Hapana—there is no such thing. Why should they do so? As it is, the
supply of water scarcely suffices for cooking and drinking; other
people do not wash, so why should the Makonde distinguish himself
by such needless eccentricity? As for shaving the head, the short,
woolly crop scarcely needs it,[49] so the second ancestral precept is
likewise easy enough to follow. Beyond this, however, there is
nothing ridiculous in the ancestor’s advice. I have obtained from
various local artists a fairly large number of figures carved in wood,
ranging from fifteen to twenty-three inches in height, and
representing women belonging to the great group of the Mavia,
Makonde, and Matambwe tribes. The carving is remarkably well
done and renders the female type with great accuracy, especially the
keloid ornamentation, to be described later on. As to the object and
meaning of their works the sculptors either could or (more probably)
would tell me nothing, and I was forced to content myself with the
scanty information vouchsafed by one man, who said that the figures
were merely intended to represent the nembo—the artificial
deformations of pelele, ear-discs, and keloids. The legend recorded
by Pater Adams places these figures in a new light. They must surely
be more than mere dolls; and we may even venture to assume that
they are—though the majority of present-day Makonde are probably
unaware of the fact—representations of the tribal ancestress.
The references in the legend to the descent from Mahuta to the
Rovuma, and to a journey across the highlands into the Mbekuru
valley, undoubtedly indicate the previous history of the tribe, the
travels of the ancestral pair typifying the migrations of their
descendants. The descent to the neighbouring Rovuma valley, with
its extraordinary fertility and great abundance of game, is intelligible
at a glance—but the crossing of the Lukuledi depression, the ascent
to the Rondo Plateau and the descent to the Mbemkuru, also lie
within the bounds of probability, for all these districts have exactly
the same character as the extreme south. Now, however, comes a
point of especial interest for our bacteriological age. The primitive
Makonde did not enjoy their lives in the marshy river-valleys.
Disease raged among them, and many died. It was only after they
had returned to their original home near Mahuta, that the health
conditions of these people improved. We are very apt to think of the
African as a stupid person whose ignorance of nature is only equalled
by his fear of it, and who looks on all mishaps as caused by evil
spirits and malignant natural powers. It is much more correct to
assume in this case that the people very early learnt to distinguish
districts infested with malaria from those where it is absent.
This knowledge is crystallized in the
ancestral warning against settling in the
valleys and near the great waters, the
dwelling-places of disease and death. At the
same time, for security against the hostile
Mavia south of the Rovuma, it was enacted
that every settlement must be not less than a
certain distance from the southern edge of the
plateau. Such in fact is their mode of life at the
present day. It is not such a bad one, and
certainly they are both safer and more
comfortable than the Makua, the recent
intruders from the south, who have made USUAL METHOD OF
good their footing on the western edge of the CLOSING HUT-DOOR
plateau, extending over a fairly wide belt of
country. Neither Makua nor Makonde show in their dwellings
anything of the size and comeliness of the Yao houses in the plain,
especially at Masasi, Chingulungulu and Zuza’s. Jumbe Chauro, a
Makonde hamlet not far from Newala, on the road to Mahuta, is the
most important settlement of the tribe I have yet seen, and has fairly
spacious huts. But how slovenly is their construction compared with
the palatial residences of the elephant-hunters living in the plain.
The roofs are still more untidy than in the general run of huts during
the dry season, the walls show here and there the scanty beginnings
or the lamentable remains of the mud plastering, and the interior is a
veritable dog-kennel; dirt, dust and disorder everywhere. A few huts
only show any attempt at division into rooms, and this consists
merely of very roughly-made bamboo partitions. In one point alone
have I noticed any indication of progress—in the method of fastening
the door. Houses all over the south are secured in a simple but
ingenious manner. The door consists of a set of stout pieces of wood
or bamboo, tied with bark-string to two cross-pieces, and moving in
two grooves round one of the door-posts, so as to open inwards. If
the owner wishes to leave home, he takes two logs as thick as a man’s
upper arm and about a yard long. One of these is placed obliquely
against the middle of the door from the inside, so as to form an angle
of from 60° to 75° with the ground. He then places the second piece
horizontally across the first, pressing it downward with all his might.
It is kept in place by two strong posts planted in the ground a few
inches inside the door. This fastening is absolutely safe, but of course
cannot be applied to both doors at once, otherwise how could the
owner leave or enter his house? I have not yet succeeded in finding
out how the back door is fastened.