Nuclear Engineering and Design 415 (2023) 112743

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Nuclear Engineering and Design

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/nucengdes

Preliminary design of the suppressive containment system based

on HPR1000
Xiangjie Qi a, Fangxiaozhi Yu b, Zhaoming Meng a, *, Zhongning Sun a, *, Nan Zhang a, Zehua Guo a
a
Heilongjiang Provincial Key Laboratory of Nuclear Power System & Equipment, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin, 150001, China
b
China Nuclear Power Engineering Co., Ltd, Beijing, 100840, China

A B S T R A C T

The current HPR1000 has a high construction cost and weak economic competitiveness due to its complex system and large containment. This study proposes a
conceptual design of an advanced containment system based on HPR1000, which aims at reducing the construction cost of nuclear power plants without reducing
their safety. In the design, the In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) and spray system were discarded, and the space of the double containment
vessel was used to create an annular cavity pool (ACP). The transient pressurization in the containment caused in the early stages of the accident can be quickly
suppressed by ACP instead of the traditional large-volume suppression concept. And due to the significant condensation of steam within the ACP water, the
transportation of air into the ACP results in a reduction in the air mass fraction in the vicinity of the passive containment heat removal system (PCHR) located within
the containment structure. This phenomenon subsequently leads to an enhancement in heat transfer performance. In addition, ACP also serves as the water source for
the safety injection system, the reactor cavity water injection system, and the core replacement system. Compared with HPR1000, the system of the preliminary
design has been greatly simplified, and the size of the containment vessel has been reduced by nearly 47%. The simulation of the large-break loss-of-coolant accident
(LBLOCA) scenario has been conducted to examine the response of the containment system, specifically focusing on the performance of the safety injection system
and suppression system. The results show that the integrity of the containment and core was ensured throughout the accident, and there was a safety margin.

1. Introduction AP1000 is composed of an inner steel containment and an outer concrete

Nuclear power has become one of the cleanest sources of energy in
many countries due to its advantages, such as low resource consump­
tion, low environmental impact, and strong supply capacity. For nuclear
power plants, containment is the last barrier to prevent radioactive
leakage. Following the occurrence of the Fukushima nuclear incident in
Japan (IAEA Review Team, 2011), nations have implemented more
stringent regulations for the secure utilization of nuclear energy.
Consequently, the development of better containment systems has
emerged as an inexorable trajectory.
The evolutionary progression of nuclear power plants is traditionally
categorized into four distinct generations (Şahin, 2021; Wang et al.,
2022). The current mainstream nuclear power plants are GEN II and
GEN III. In order to meet the needs of safety protection, researchers from
different countries have developed diverse types of reactor containment
systems (Schulz, 2006; Cheng et al., 2000; Byong Guk Jeon, 2014; Wang
et al., 2020). The safety mechanisms of the AP1000 have been duly
validated, and currently, there are four nuclear power reactors under
operation in China (Sutharshan et al., 2011). The containment of
shield. The annular space between the two containments is exposed to
the external environment. Under the combined effect of natural con­
vection of air and evaporation of liquid film, the decay heat is carried
away to the atmosphere (Zhou et al., 2023). However, in this system, the
presence of a high cooling tank outside the containment adversely af­
fects the seismic design of the containment and the system is not suitable
for the containment of concrete materials. For the containment structure
similar to the AP1000, a containment air cooling system has been pro­
posed by the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) in Germany (Cheng
et al., 2000). The annular space between the double containments is
exposed to the outside environment through the air inlet below the
containment and the vent at the top of the containment. The cooling
system eliminates the need for cooling water only relying on air con­
vection and radiation heat transfer to heat the air in the annular space,
thereby removing the heat from the containment after the accident.
However, due to the disparity in specific heat between air and cooling
water, the system necessitates a greater surface area of steel confinement
in comparison to the AP1000 containment cooling system to possess an
equivalent heat transfer capacity. A hypothetical Passive Containment

* Corresponding authors at: Heilongjiang Provincial Key Laboratory of Nuclear Power System & Equipment, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin, 150001,
China.
E-mail addresses: mengzhaoming@hrbeu.edu.cn (Z. Meng), sunzhongning@hrbeu.edu.cn (Z. Sun).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nucengdes.2023.112743
Received 9 August 2023; Received in revised form 10 October 2023; Accepted 3 November 2023
Available online 7 November 2023
0029-5493/© 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
X. Qi et al.
Cooling System (PCCS) was developed for APR+ (Byong Guk Jeon,
2014). Based on the APR + PCCS design (Bae et al., 2012; Choi et al.,
2010), the optimization of the decay heat removal rate is achieved
through the incorporation of Air Holdup Tanks (AHT). These tanks are
composed of a separate compartment situated above the IRWST and are
connected to the containment-free space through vent lines. This hybrid
cooling system uses a variety of heat removal methods, which on the one
hand increase the heat removal capacity of the system, on the other hand
increase the investment in the construction and daily maintenance of the
system. And it is difficult to find a suitable location in the shell to add a
sufficient volume of AHT. In addition, hydrogen safety is a crucial aspect
of nuclear power plant safety. Numerous researchers from academia and
industry have experimental research (Malet et al., 2005; Gupta et al.,
2015) and numerical analyses (Li et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018; Studer
et al., 2020) on a large scale to investigate hydrogen behavior and its
mitigation in the containment of nuclear power plants.
The HPR1000, independently developed by CNNC, adopts a double-
layer containment and a safety design concept combining active and
passive (Xing et al., 2016; Ji et al., 2021), which greatly improves the
safety of the nuclear power system, while the complex system and large
containment make its construction cost high. This paper proposes an
advanced containment system based on the HPR1000 that achieves both
high safety and low cost by setting an ACP and integrating existing se­
curity systems. Finally, the simulation of the LBLOCA is conducted
through the utilization of an accident analysis program. The subsequent
responses of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV), ACP, and containment
are then examined and analyzed.
Fig. 1. Schematics for suggested containment system.
2
Nuclear Engineering and Design 415 (2023) 112743
2. Description on a new containment system based on HPR1000
The present HPR1000 utilizes a double-layer containment, and the
IRWST is placed at the bottom of the containment. In case of a loss of
coolant accident (LOCA), the pumps extract water from IRWST to pro­
vide direct vessel injection, while sprays located in the upper portion of
the containment system distribute water for the purpose of steam
condensation. And the late heat removal mainly relies on the passive
containment heat removal system through natural circulation (Sun
et al., 2021; Sun et al., 2020). The suggested containment system intends
to eliminate the IRWST and spray systems. The space between the inner
and outer containment is used to construct the ACP, and based on the
ACP, the pressure suppression system (PSS), passive safety injection
system (PSIS), passive cavity injection, and cooling system (PCIS) are set
up. In order to cooperate with the PSIS, the original Automatic
Depressurization System (ADS) is adjusted, and the opening condition of
the valve associated with the level of the Core Make-up Tank (CMT) is
added. The schematic diagram of the suggested containment system is
given in Fig. 1. In addition, the containment system preserves the PCHR
and the accumulators (ACC) of HPR1000, in which the PCHR can play a
role in long-term heat removal after the accident. And the accumulators
can operate without external intervention and reliably maintain the core
flooded during the initial phase of LOCA.
The gas space and water space of the ACP are interconnected with
the containment via the pressure release line and the pressure sup­
pression line, respectively. Among them, the pressure suppression line is
equipped with a check valve. Vacuum release valves are installed on the
pressure relief pipeline, which is designed to prevent negative pressure
in the containment. And during the refueling process of the plant, the
X. Qi et al.
ACP provides cooling water.
The PSIS is comprised of three main components: the passive high
pressure safety injection system (PHSIS), accumulators, and the passive
low pressure safety injection system (PLSIS). Among them, the PHSIS
consists of the Core Make-up Tank and corresponding pipelines. The
CMT is suggested as a method to achieve a comprehensive approach to
reactor shutdown. This is accomplished by introducing borated water
into the reactor (Wang et al., 2013). For this project design, the CMT
facilitates the injection of coolant into the RPV downcomer, while also
supplying a restricted gravity-fed source of makeup water to the primary
system during its functioning. The connection between the RPV down­
comer and the system in question is established by the Direct Vessel
Injection (DVI) line. The system is designed to be tripped by a valve that
responds to the low-low pressure (11.76 MPa) signal of the vessel. As the
source of PLSIS, the ACP is higher than the core. When the primary
pressure is reduced to a certain degree, the water in the ACP is injected
into the core by gravity. The function of accumulators is to propel
borated water by means of pressurized nitrogen gas. The purpose of
these accumulators is to provide the reactor with borated water at
moderate pressure levels during the depressurization phase, specifically
in the case of a LOCA. The water level in the containment is high enough
to flood the reactor core after the injection system has injected all the
cooling water into the RPV. The cooling water in the containment is
injected into the RPV by gravity through the water injection line to
achieve long-term cooling of the core.
The PCIS is suitable for dealing with serious accidents. After an ac­
cident, the operator turned on the cavity water injection system when
the core outlet temperature reached 923.15 K. The cooling water in the
ACP is injected into the annular flow channel between the RPV and the
thermal insulation layer by gravity, and gradually inundates the lower
head to cool the outer surface of the pressure vessel in a passive way.
Containment size is closely related to plant construction costs and
safety. The containment volumes of the Gen-II nuclear power M310, the
typical Gen-III nuclear power AP1000 and HPR1000 are, respectively,
about 49000 m3,59181 m3,86000 m3 (Estévez-Albuja et al., 2021; Xing
et al., 2021). In order to make this scheme more inclusive, the free
volume of the containment system in this study is set at 49000 m3. The
volume of the ACP is limited by the size of the double containment ring
chamber. The distance between internal and external containment refers
to HPR1000. So, in this suggested containment system, the volume of
the containment ring cavity is about 11000 m3. The ACP is used as the
water source for the PSIS, the PCIS, and the refueling of the reactor core,
and 3000 m3 of water is conservatively charged. Considering that the
pipeline occupies a part of the volume, the ACP gas space volume is
conservatively selected as 7000 m3. The main parameters of the newly
designed containment system are listed in Table 1.
Compared with the original structure of HPR1000, the main ex­
pected advantages of the new scheme are as follows:
1. An ACP is installed between the two layers of containment, which
does not occupy additional space in the containment and can respond to
the rapid boost of the containment in a timely and reliable manner.
2. The size of the containment has been significantly reduced. This
system’s free volume of containment is only 57 % of HPR1000.
3. The ACP can be used as the water source for the PSS, the PLSIS,
The PCIS, and the refueling system, reducing the water consumption of
the safety system by about 1700 m3.
4. The heat transfer performance of the PCHR has been enhanced.
5. The spray system and IRWST are eliminated, and the reactor safety
Table 1
The main parameters of new designed containment system.
Parameters Unit Values
Containment free volume m3 49,000
ACP water capacity m3 3000
ACP gas space volume m3 7000
3
Nuclear Engineering and Design 415 (2023) 112743
injection system (RSI) and the CIS are simplified.
3. Model construction
In this study, HPR1000 was used as the prototype for program
modeling of the reactor loop. Fig. 2 illustrates the numerical model of
the advanced containment system based on HPR1000. As depicted in
Fig. 2, the major system of the reactor has three interconnected closed
circuits, with each primary circuit primarily comprising the main
coolant pipe (cold pipe section and heat pipe section), the main coolant
pumps, the accumulators and a steam generator. Pressurizer is linked to
the hot leg circuit in order to regulate and safeguard the pressure of the
primary loop system. The pressurizer is located in loop A. Due to loop B
and C are completely symmetric, only the node diagram of loop A and
loop B is displayed in Fig. 2.
Normal operation of the reactor: Within the primary circuit, the
reactor core is traversed by a coolant that effectively absorbs the heat
generated by the core’s reactions, thereby causing an increase in the
temperature of the coolant. Then, the heated coolant is pumped into the
steam generator (SG) and then conveyed from the primary water to the
secondary coolant via the U-shaped heat transfer tubes. Ultimately, the
main coolant pump facilitates the return of the primary coolant to the
reactor pressure vessel, establishing the closed primary circuit. Within
the secondary circuit, a portion of the feed water undergoes a process of
heat absorption from the primary side, afterwards transforming into
steam. Subsequently, the gaseous phase proceeds into the steam conduit
after traversing the drying apparatus. The steam enters the turbine
through the steam pipe, which then promotes the steam turbines to
work.
As depicted in Fig. 2, the reactor core, PCHR, newly designed ACP,
PSIS, and PCIS were also simulated in detail. The model incorporates a
control system that enables the activation of the appropriate safety
measures based on pertinent signals from the reactor. What’s more, the
red area in Fig. 2 simulates the occurrence of a breach accident through
the control system. At some point, the flow path between control bodies
240 and 250 is cut off, and the flow path from control bodies 240 and
250 to 800 is opened at the same time. In this way, the occurrence of the
double-ended shear accident can be simulated.
4. Result analysis and discussion
4.1. Steady analysis
To validate the precision of the numerical model created, we employ
the program to obtain stable results. In the context of steady analysis, the
input parameters and boundary conditions are assumed to remain con­
stant during the analysis. The steady-state analysis starts at − 1000 s and
ends at 0 s. In addition, the transient calculation starts at 0 s, and the
initial state of the transient calculation is determined by the final state of
the steady analysis.
The important parameters of the calculation results are compared to
the matching design value of HPR1000. Fig. 3 displays the variation of
pressurizer pressure and SG outlet pressure. After a short period of
fluctuation, the calculated data becomes stable. Among them, it is
observed that the pressure within the pressurizer remains constant at a
value of 15.5 MPa, whereas the outlet pressure of the steam generator
(SG) remains steady at 6.9 MPa. The calculated pressurizer pressure and
SG outlet pressure exhibit conformity with the design values. Fig. 4
depicts the variations in temperature observed at both the intake and
outflow points of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV). Based on the in­
formation shown in Fig. 4, it can be observed that the temperatures of
the RPV inlet and outflow exhibit a consistent value of 568.35 K and
604.25 K, respectively. The computed values of the inlet and outlet
temperatures of the RPV exhibit consistency with the values specified in
the design, with a variance of less than 0.66 %.
Fig. 5 presents the fluctuations in the volume flow rate of the primary
X. Qi et al.
Fig. 2. Numerical model of the advanced containment system.
circuit and the steam production of the steam generator. The volume
flow rate of the primary circuit remains constant at 2317.6 m3⋅h− 1,
while the mass flow rate of vapor created in the steam generator remains
unchanged at 552.7 kg⋅s− 1. Table 2 (Sui et al., 2018; Sui et al., 2017)
displays a comprehensive comparison of the important parameters
during steady analysis. As can be seen from Table 2, the deviation be­
tween the calculated values and the design values is very small. The
findings indicate that the stable analysis calculations align closely with
the designated value of HPR1000.
4
Nuclear Engineering and Design 415 (2023) 112743
4.2. Analysis of transients during the LBLOCA disaster
The fundamental principle underlying the design of nuclear power
plants involves the examination and analysis of potential accident sce­
narios that are representative of typical conditions encountered during
the operation of such facilities. The occurrence of a significant loss of
coolant accident (LOCA) is commonly considered design-based event in
the context of nuclear power plants (NPP). The LBLOCA is defined as a
breach at the pressure boundary of the reactor coolant system with a
break equivalent diameter ranging from 152 mm to a double-ended
guillotine break. After the accident, cooling water in the loop quickly
sprayed into the containment, resulting in a rapid rise in pressure. The
X. Qi et al. Nuclear Engineering and Design 415 (2023) 112743

Table 2
Comparison of important parameters during steady-state analysis.
Name Unit Design Calculate Deviation
values values

Reactor Rated Output Power MW 3050 3050 –

Pressurizer Pressure MPa 15.5 15.5 –
Steam Generator Outlet MPa 6.80 6.90 1.47 %
Pressure
RPV Inlet Temperature K 564.65 568.35 0.66 %
RPV Outlet Temperature K 603.95 604.25 0.05 %
1
Steam Production of Steam Kg⋅s− 566.67 552.7 2.47 %
Generator
Volume Flow Rate of Primary m3/h 22,840 23,176 1.47 %
Circuit
(Single loop and cold
section temperature)

LBLOCA is the most serious type of water loss accident.

Fig. 3. Pressurizer and SG outlet pressure variation versus time.
Fig. 4. Temperature variation at the RPV inlet and outlet versus time.
The present study selects the LBLOCA as the postulated transient
scenario in order to validate the performance of the advanced contain­
ment system. The main assumptions during the transient are shown in
Table 3.
The inadvertent opening of LBLOCA by double-end shear fracture of
the pipeline is assumed to occur at 0 s. Then the rapid loss of coolant and
the rapid drop in pressure caused the reactor to shut down. As the
pressure of the primary circuit continues to decrease, the high-head
safety injection starts, and the accumulators and the low-head safety
injection start successively. The containment pressure continues to rise,
and when the pressure exceeds 240 kPa, the PCHR starts with a delay of
100 s. The PCHR continuously transfers heat from the containment to
the tank, which is the main heat trap in the containment during the long
period of the accident.
Fig. 6 presents the comparison of containment pressure with
different containment systems. Currently, the free volume of HPR1000
containment is about 86,000 m3. It can be seen that in this case, if the
HPR1000 containment is directly reduced to 49,000 m3, the contain­
ment will generate overpressure. About 100 s after the accident, the
containment pressure of HPR1000 (49000 m3) exceeded its design
pressure. What is more, the peak pressure exceeds the design pressure by
90 kPa. For an advanced containment system, whose containment free
volume is also 49,000 m3, the peak pressure is only 450 kPa (absolute
pressure), which is still redundant from the design pressure. This shows
that the ACP in the new scheme has efficient suppression abilities.
Figs. 7 to 12 display the temporal profiles of the pertinent thermal
hydraulic parameters. Fig. 7 illustrates the temporal progression of the
pressure within the containment and the ACP. According to the accident
process, the pressure response in the containment is divided into three
stages: spraying, reflooding, and the long-term core cooling phase. In the
spraying stage, the initial pressures of the containment and ACP are both
0.1 MPa. Following the release of coolant inventory into the contain­
ment, the pressure within the confinement experiences a quick increase,
reaching its initial peak pressure of 441 kPa. The mixed gas in the
containment flows into the ACP through the suppressor tube, the steam
is condensed in the water, and the non-condensing gas is stored in the
ACP gas space. As a result, ACP pressure also continues to rise. In the

Table 3
Assumptions during the transient.
number Assumptions

1 Considering the measurement error of 2 %, the initial power is 1.02 times

Fig. 5. Variation of volume flow rate of primary circuit and steam production
of steam generator vs. time.
the rated power.
2 The reactor average temperature was overestimated by 2.2 K.
3 The reactor average pressure was overestimated by 2.1 bar.
4 The coolant volume in the primary circuit is assumed to be 103 % of the
volume in the cold state.
5 The ACC from the ruptured loop of the pipeline drains directly into the
containment.

5
X. Qi et al. Nuclear Engineering and Design 415 (2023) 112743

Fig. 6. Comparison of containment pressure with different containment system Fig. 9. Fuel central and cladding surface temperature variations versus time.
vs. time.

Fig. 10. Variation of non-condensable gas content in the ACP and containment
Fig. 7. Variations in containment and ACP pressures as a function of time. versus time.

Fig. 11. Air mass fraction variation in containment free space versus time.
Fig. 8. PRV water level variation versus time.

6
X. Qi et al.
Fig. 12. Variation of water temperature and liquid level in ACP vs. time.
reflooding stage, the containment pressure begins to fall due to a large
decrease in the release of coolant inventory. The PCHR starts running at
this stage. At the beginning of the long-term core cooling phase, the
containment pressure increases to the second peak pressure of 450 kPa
because of a small increase in the release of mass energy. Then, PCHR
heat removal is established, the release of mass energy continues to
decrease, and the containment pressure decreases smoothly. The tran­
sient event resulted in a maximum containment pressure of approxi­
mately 0.45 MPa, which falls below the designated containment design
pressure of 0.52 MPa.
Fig. 8 depicts the temporal progression of the liquid level within the
core. And Fig. 9 shows the fuel cladding temperature and fuel central
temperature. As shown in Fig. 8, the level of the RCV began to drop after
the LBLOCA. At the 9 s, the upper part of the core begins to burn dry. The
core can only dissipate heat by radiating it to the surrounding structure.
As a result, the fuel temperature and the cladding temperature began to
rise rapidly (as shown in Fig. 9). Then the water level gradually began to
rise as a result of the injection system. In the later stage of LBLOC, the
water level within the vessel reaches around 6.9 m, above the active core
outlet (6.8 m). Therefore, the active core is covered during the long-term
cooling phase of the accident. As the core was flooded, its temperature
began to drop. The maximum fuel cladding temperature (fuel central
temperature) reached during the transient is about 1389 K, which is
below the peak temperature (1477 K) in the embrittlement guideline for
comparison. And the maximum temperature reached in the fuel center,
1426 K, is similarly lower than its melting temperature (2990 K). So the
reactor core can be kept in safe conditions at all times during the
accident.
An important function of the ACP is that it can draw and store air
from containment-free space. Fig. 10 illustrates the presence of non-
condensable gas within the air cleaning and purification (ACP) system
and the containment area. The transfer of non-condensable gas in the
containment to ACP is divided into two stages: the first stage is before
the 2000 s; the second stage is from the 3000 s to 200000 s. The whole
process transferred 15260 kg of non-condensible gas, accounting for
about one-third of the total original gas in the containment. Fig. 11
shows the air mass fraction in containment-free space for the HPR1000
and advanced containment system. For HPR1000, the air fraction was
maintained at about 0.4. And the heat transfer coefficient of PCHR, as
determined by SU’s correlation (Su et al., 2013), is found to be 1.4 kW/
m2 K at P = 0.5 MPa and Tcontainment − Twall = 30 K. In the context of the
suppressive containment system, the air fraction and its related heat
transfer coefficient are observed to be 0.3 and 1.9 kW/m2 K, respec­
tively. As a result, the use of ACP in the suppressive containment system
considerably enhances the efficiency of PCHR.
7
Nuclear Engineering and Design 415 (2023) 112743
Under accident conditions, ACP can perform both pressure sup­
pression and injection safety functions. The ACP water temperature and
liquid level as a function of time are presented in Fig. 12. After the ac­
cident, ACP condensed hot steam from the containment, and the water
temperature began to rise continuously. When the cooling water in the
ACP is injected into the core (2000 s), the water temperature has risen
from 313.15 K to 321.15 K. From the sufficient cooling of the core
(Fig. 9), it can be seen that a small increase in water temperature has
little effect on the performance of the injection system. In addition, with
the operation of the low-pressure safety injection system, the ACP level
will gradually decrease. In the process of non-condensible gas transfer, it
was found that ACP played a function of pressure suppression from 0 to
2000 s. Before the 2000 s, the liquid level of ACP did not decrease much
and could still flood the outlet of the suppressor pipe. The results show
that ACP can successfully perform both injection and suppression
functions.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, a preliminary containment design has been developed
for the HPR1000. The suppression system is set based on the ACP, and
the arrangement of the systems, such as the safety injection system and
the CIS, is optimized. The proposed advanced containment system has
been tested against a LBLOCA. Based on the aforementioned analytical
analysis, it is possible to derive the following concrete results:
1. Compared with HPR1000, the system and equipment of the con­
ceptual design have been greatly simplified. The size of the
containment vessel has been reduced by nearly 47 %, and the overall
water capacity in the vessel has been reduced by about 1,700 m3. The
construction cost of a nuclear power unit is significantly influenced
by the containment structure, which constitutes a substantial amount
of the overall expenses. Consequently, enhancing the economic
viability of the unit can be achieved by reducing the dimensions of
the containment.
2. Under the conditions of a LBLOCA, all of the passive safety systems
that have been designed demonstrate efficient and successful oper­
ation, ensuring the continuous safety of the reactor.
3. The ACP can store a large amount of non-condensable gas inside the
containment, so that the PCHR heat transfer capacity is enhanced as
expected. Under the specified conditions of P = 0.5 MPa and Tcon­
tainment − Twall = 30 K, it can be observed that the PCHR heat transfer
coefficient of the new containment system proposed in this paper is
nearly 35.7 % higher than that of HPR1000.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Xiangjie Qi: Writing – review & editing. Fangxiaozhi Yu: Investi­
gation. Zhaoming Meng: Methodology. Zhongning Sun: Funding
acquisition. Nan Zhang: . Zehua Guo: Conceptualization.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Data availability
The data that has been used is confidential.
Acknowledgments
This work is financed by National Key R&D Program of China
(2020YFB1901404). The authors would like to express their apprecia­
tion for this.
X. Qi et al. Nuclear Engineering and Design 415 (2023) 112743

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