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Sociobiology The New Synthesis Twenty Fifth Anniversary Edition 2nd Edition Ebook PDF
Sociobiology The New Synthesis Twenty Fifth Anniversary Edition 2nd Edition Ebook PDF
The sequel in this reasoning is contained in the book before you. Presented
in this new release by Harvard University Press, it remains unchanged from
the original. It provides verbatim the first effort to systematize the consilient
links between termites and chimpanzees, the goal suggested in The Insect
Societies, but it goes further, and extends the effort to human beings.
The response to Sociobiology: The New Synthesis in 1975 and the years
immediately following was dramatically mixed. I think it fair to say that the
zoology in the book, making up all but the first and last of its 27 chapters,
was favorably received. The influence of this portion grew steadily, so much
so that in a 1989 poll the officers and fellows of the international Animal
Behavior Society rated Sociobiology the most important book on animal
behavior of all time, edging out even Darwin’s 1872 classic, The Expression
of the Emotions in Man and Animals. By integrating the discoveries of many
investigators into a single framework of cause-and-effect theory, it helped to
change the study of animal behavior into a discipline connected broadly to
mainstream evolutionary biology.
The brief segment of Sociobiology that addresses human behavior,
comprising 30 out of the 575 total pages, was less well received. It ignited the
most tumultuous academic controversy of the 1970s, one that spilled out of
biology into the social sciences and humanities. The story has been told many
times and many ways, including the account in my memoir, Naturalist, where
I tried hard to maintain a decent sense of balance; and it will bear only a brief
commentary here.
Although the large amount of commotion may suggest otherwise, adverse
critics made up only a small minority of those who published reviews of
Sociobiology. But they were very vocal and effective at the time. They were
scandalized by what they saw as two grievous flaws. The first is
inappropriate reductionism, in this case the proposal that human social
behavior is ultimately reducible to biology. The second perceived flaw is
genetic determinism, the belief that human nature is rooted in our genes.
It made little difference to those who chose to read the book this way that
reductionism is the primary cutting tool of science, or that Sociobiology
stresses not only reductionism but also synthesis and holism. It also mattered
not at all that sociobiological explanations were never strictly reductionist,
but interactionist. No serious scholar would think that human behavior is
controlled the way animal instinct is, without the intervention of culture. In
the interactionist view held by virtually all who study the subject, genomics
biases mental development but cannot abolish culture. To suggest that I held
such views, and it was suggested frequently, was to erect a straw man—to
fabricate false testimony for rhetorical purposes.
Who were the critics, and why were they so offended? Their rank included
the last of the Marxist intellectuals, most prominently represented by Stephen
Jay Gould and Richard C. Lewontin. They disliked the idea, to put it mildly,
that human nature could have any genetic basis at all. They championed the
opposing view that the developing human brain is a tabula rasa. The only
human nature, they said, is an indefinitely flexible mind. Theirs was the
standard political position taken by Marxists from the late 1920s forward: the
ideal political economy is socialism, and the tabula rasa mind of people can
be fitted to it. A mind arising from a genetic human nature might not prove
conformable. Since socialism is the supreme good to be sought, a tabula rasa
it must be. As Lewontin, Steven Rose, and Leon J. Kamin frankly expressed
the matter in Not in Our Genes (1984): “We share a commitment to the
prospect of the creation of a more socially just—a socialist—society. And we
recognize that a critical science is an integral part of the struggle to create that
society, just as we also believe that the social function of much of today’s
science is to hinder the creation of that society by acting to preserve the
interests of the dominant class, gender, and race.”
That was in 1984—an apposite Orwellian date. The argument for a
political test of scientific knowledge lost its strength with the collapse of
world socialism and the end of the Cold War. To my knowledge it has not
been heard since.
In the 1970s, when the human sociobiology controversy still waxed hot,
however, the Old Marxists were joined and greatly strengthened by members
of the New Left in a second objection, this time centered on social justice. If
genes prescribe human nature, they said, then it follows that ineradicable
differences in personality and ability also might exist. Such a possibility
cannot be tolerated. At least, its discussion cannot be tolerated, said the
critics, because it tilts thinking onto a slippery slope down which humankind
easily descends to racism, sexism, class oppression, colonialism, and—
perhaps worst of all—capitalism! As the century closes, this dispute has been
settled. Genetically based variation in individual personality and intelligence
has been conclusively demonstrated, although statistical racial differences, if
any, remain unproven. At the same time, all of the projected evils except
capitalism have begun to diminish worldwide. None of the change can be
ascribed to human behavioral genetics or sociobiology. Capitalism may yet
fall—who can predict history?—but, given the overwhelming evidence at
hand, the hereditary framework of human nature seems permanently secure.
Among many social scientists and humanities scholars a deeper and less
ideological source of skepticism was expressed, and remains. It is based on
the belief that culture is the sole artisan of the human mind. This perception is
also a tabula rasa hypothesis that denies biology, or at least simply ignores
biology. It too is being replaced by acceptance of the interaction of biology
and culture as the determinant of mental development.
Overall, there is a tendency as the century closes to accept that Homo
sapiens is an ascendant primate, and that biology matters.
The path is not smooth, however. The slowness with which human
sociobiology (nowadays also called evolutionary psychology) has spread is
due not merely to ideology and inertia, but also and more fundamentally to
the traditional divide between the great branches of learning. Since the early
nineteenth century it has been generally assumed that the natural sciences, the
social sciences, and the humanities are epistemologically disjunct from one
another, requiring different vocabularies, modes of analysis, and rules of
validation. The perceived dividing line is essentially the same as that between
the scientific and literary cultures defined by C. P. Snow in 1959. It still
fragments the intellectual landscape.
The solution to the problem now evident is the recognition that the line
between the great branches of learning is not a line at all, but instead a broad,
mostly unexplored domain awaiting cooperative exploration from both sides.
Four borderland disciplines are expanding into this domain from the natural
sciences side:
Cognitive neuroscience, also known as the brain sciences, maps brain
activity with increasingly fine resolution in space and time. Neural pathways,
some correlated with complex and sophisticated patterns of thought, can now
be traced. Mental disorders are routinely diagnosed by this means, and the
effects of drugs and hormone surges can be assessed almost directly.
Neuroscientists are able to construct replicas of mental activity that, while
still grossly incomplete, go far beyond the philosophical speculations of the
past. They can then coordinate these with experiments and models from
cognitive psychology, thus drawing down on independent reservoirs from yet
another discipline bridging the natural and social sciences. As a result, one of
the major gaps of the intellectual terrain, that between body and mind, may
soon be closed.
In human genetics, with base pair sequences and genetic maps far
advanced and near completion, a direct approach to the heredity of human
behavior has opened up. A total genomics, which includes the molecular
steps of epigenesis and the norms of reaction in gene-environment
interaction, is still far off. But the technical means to attain it are being
developed. A large portion of research in molecular and cellular biology is
devoted to that very end. The implications for consilience are profound: each
advance in neuropsychological genomics narrows the mind-body gap still
further.
Where cognitive neuroscience aims to explain how the brains of animals
and humans work, and genetics how heredity works, evolutionary biology
aims to explain why brains work, or more precisely, in light of natural
selection theory, what adaptations if any led to the assembly of their
respective parts and processes. During the past 25 years an impressive body
of ethnographic data has been marshaled to test adaptation hypotheses,
especially those emanating from kin-selection and ecological optimization
models. Much of the research, conducted by both biologists and social
scientists, has been reported in the journals Behavioral Ecology and
Sociobiology, Evolution and Human Behavior (formerly Ethology and
Sociobiology), Human Nature, the Journal of Social and Biological
Structures, and others, as well as in excellent summary collections such as
The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture
(Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, eds., 1992) and
Human Nature: A Critical Reader (Laura Betzig, ed., 1997).
As a result we now possess a much clearer understanding of ethnicity, kin
classification, bridewealth, marriage customs, incest taboos, and other staples
of the human sciences. New models of conflict and cooperation, extending
from Robert L. Trivers’ original parent-offspring conflict theory of the 1970s
and from ingenious applications of game theory, have been applied fruitfully
to developmental psychology and an astonishing diversity of other fields—
embryology, for example, pediatrics, and the study of genomic imprinting.
Comparisons with the social behavior of the nonhuman primates, now a
major concern of biological anthropology, have proven valuable in the
analysis of human behavioral phenomena that are cryptic or complex.
Sociobiology is a flourishing discipline in zoology, but its ultimately
greatest importance will surely be the furtherance of consilience among the
great branches of learning. Why is this conjunction important? Because it
offers the prospect of characterizing human nature with greater objectivity
and precision, an exactitude that is the key to self-understanding. The
intuitive grasp of human nature has been the substance of the creative arts. It
is the ultimate underpinning of the social sciences and a beckoning mystery
to the natural sciences. To grasp human nature objectively, to explore it to the
depths scientifically, and to comprehend its ramifications by cause-and-effect
explanations leading from biology into culture, would be to approach if not
attain the grail of scholarship, and to fulfill the dreams of the Enlightenment.
The objective meaning of human nature is attainable in the borderland
disciplines. We have come to understand that human nature is not the genes
that prescribe it. Nor is it the cultural universals, such as the incest taboos and
rites of passage, which are its products. Rather, human nature is the
epigenetic rules, the inherited regularities of mental development. These rules
are the genetic biases in the way our senses perceive the world, the symbolic
coding by which our brains represent the world, the options we open to
ourselves, and the responses we find easiest and most rewarding to make. In
ways that are being clarified at the physiological and even in a few cases the
genetic level, the epigenetic rules alter the way we see and intrinsically
classify color. They cause us to evaluate the aesthetics of artistic design
according to elementary abstract shapes and the degree of complexity. They
lead us differentially to acquire fears and phobias concerning dangers in the
ancient environment of humanity (such as snakes and heights), to
communicate with certain facial expressions and forms of body language, to
bond with infants, to bond conjugally, and so on across a wide spread of
categories in behavior and thought. Most of these rules are evidently very
ancient, dating back millions of years in mammalian ancestry. Others, like the
ontogenetic steps of linguistic development in children, are uniquely human
and probably only hundreds of thousands of years old.
The epigenetic rules have been the subject of many studies during the past
quarter century in biology and the social sciences, reviewed for example in
my extended essays On Human Nature (1978) and Consilience: The Unity of
Knowledge (1998), as well as in The Adapted Mind, edited by Jerome L.
Barkow et al. (1992). This body of work makes it evident that in the creation
of human nature, genetic evolution and cultural evolution have together
produced a closely interwoven product. We are only beginning to obtain a
glimmer of how the process works. We know that cultural evolution is biased
substantially by biology, and that biological evolution of the brain, especially
the neocortex, has occurred in a social context. But the principles and the
details are the great challenge in the emerging borderland disciplines just
described. The exact process of gene-culture coevolution is the central
problem of the social sciences and much of the humanities, and it is one of
the great remaining problems of the natural sciences. Solving it is the obvious
means by which the great branches of learning can be foundationally united.
Finally, during the past quarter century another discipline to which I have
devoted a good part of my life, conservation biology, has been tied more
closely to human sociobiology. Human nature—the epigenetic rules—did not
originate in cities and croplands, which are too recent in human history to
have driven significant amounts of genetic evolution. They arose in natural
environments, especially the savannas and transitional woodlands of Africa,
where Homo sapiens and its antecedents evolved over hundreds of thousands
of years. What we call the natural environment or wilderness today was home
then—the environment that cradled humanity. Before agriculture the lives of
people depended on their intimate familiarity with wild biodiversity, both the
surrounding ecosystems and the plants and animals composing them.
The link was, on a scale of evolutionary time, abruptly weakened by the
invention and spread of agriculture and then nearly erased by the implosion
of a large part of the agricultural population into the cities during the
industrial and postindustrial revolutions. As global culture advanced into the
new, technoscientific age, human nature stayed back in the Paleolithic era.
Hence the ambivalent stance taken by modern Homo sapiens to the natural
environment. Natural environments are cherished at the same time they are
subdued and converted. The ideal planet for the human psyche seems to be
one that offers an endless expanse of fertile, unoccupied wilderness to be
churned up for the production of more people. But Earth is finite, and its still
exponentially growing human population is rapidly running out of productive
land for conversion. Clearly humanity must find a way simultaneously to
stabilize its population and to attain a universal decent standard of living
while preserving as much of Earth’s natural environment and biodiversity as
possible.
Conservation, I have long believed, is ultimately an ethical issue. Moral
precepts in turn must be based on a sound, objective knowledge of human
nature. In 1984 I combined my two intellectual passions, sociobiology and
the study of biodiversity, in the book Biophilia (Harvard University Press).
Its central argument was that the epigenetic rules of mental development are
likely to include deep adaptive responses to the natural environment. This
theme was largely speculation. There was no organized discipline of
ecological psychology that addressed such a hypothesis. Still, plenty of
evidence pointed to its validity. In Biophilia I reviewed information then
newly provided by Gordon Orians that points to innately preferred habitation
(on a prominence overlooking a savanna and body of water), the remarkable
influence of snakes and serpent images on culture, and other mental
predispositions likely to have been adaptive during the evolution of the
human brain.
Since 1984 the evidence favoring biophilia has grown stronger, but the
subject is still in its infancy and few principles have been definitively
established (see The Biophilia Hypothesis, Stephen R. Kellert and Edward O.
Wilson, eds., Island Press, 1993). I am persuaded that as the need to stabilize
and protect the environment grows more urgent in the coming decades, the
linking of the two natures—human nature and wild Nature—will become a
central intellectual concern.
December 1999
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Acknowledgments
Modern sociobiology is being created by gifted investigators who work
primarily in population biology, invertebrate zoology, including entomology
especially, and vertebrate zoology. Because my training and research
experience were fortuitously in the first two subjects and there was some
momentum left from writing The Insect Societies, I decided to/learn enough
about vertebrates to attempt a general synthesis. The generosity which
experts in this third field showed me, patiently guiding me through films and
publications, correcting my errors, and offering the kind of enthusiastic
encouragement usually reserved for promising undergraduate students, is a
testament to the communality of science.
My new colleagues also critically read most of the chapters in early draft.
The remaining portions were reviewed by population biologists and
anthropologists. I am especially grateful to Robert L. Trivers for reading most
of the book and discussing it with me from the time of its conception. Others
who reviewed portions of the manuscript, with the chapter numbers listed
after their names, are Ivan Chase (13), Irven DeVore (27), John F. Eisenberg
(23, 24, 25, 26), Richard D. Estes (24), Robert Fagen (1–5, 7), Madhav
Gadgil (1–5), Robert A. Hinde (7), Bert Hölldobler (8–13), F. Clark Howell
(27), Sarah Blaffer Hrdy (1–13, 15–16, 27), Alison Jolly (26), A. Ross
Kiester (7, 11–13), Bruce R. Levin (4, 5), Peter R. Marler (7), Ernst Mayr
(11–13), Donald W. Pfaff (11), Katherine Ralls (15), Jon Seger (1–6, 8–13,
27), W. John Smith (8–10), Robert M. Woollacott (19), James Weinrich (1–5,
8–13), and Amotz Zahavi (5).
Illustrations, unpublished manuscripts, and technical advice were supplied
by R. D. Alexander, Herbert Bloch, S. A. Boorman, Jack Bradbury, F. H.
Bronson, W. L. Brown, Francine and P. A. Buckley, Noam Chomsky,
Malcolm Coe, P. A. Corning, Iain Douglas-Hamilton, Mary Jane West
Eberhard, John F. Eisenberg, R. D. Estes, O. R. Floody, Charles Galt,
Valerius Geist, Peter Haas, W. J. Hamilton III, Bert Hölldobler, Sarah Hrdy,
Alison Jolly, J. H. Kaufmann, M. H. A. Keenleyside, A. R. Kiester, Hans
Kummer, J. A. Kurland, M. R. Lein, B. R. Levin, P. R. Levitt, P. R. Marler,
Ernst Mayr, G. M. McKay, D. B. Means, A. J. Meyerriecks, Martin
Moynihan, R. A. Paynter, Jr., D. W. Pfaff, W. P. Porter, Katherine Ralls,
Lynn Riddiford, P. S. Rodman, L. L. Rogers, Thelma E. Rowell, W. E.
Schevill, N. G. Smith, Judy A. Stamps, R. L. Trivers, J. W. Truman, F. R.
Walther, Peter Weygoldt, W. Wickler, R. H. Wiley, E. N. Wilmsen, E. E.
Williams, and D. S. Wilson.
Kathleen M. Horton assisted closely in bibliographic research, checked
many technical details, and typed the manuscript through two intricate drafts.
Nancy Clemente edited the manuscript, providing many helpful suggestions
concerning organization and exposition.
Sarah Landry executed the drawings of animal societies presented in
Chapters 20–27. In the case of the vertebrate species, her compositions are
among the first to represent entire societies, in the correct demographic
proportions, with as many social interactions displayed as can plausibly be
included in one scene. In order to make the drawings as accurate as possible,
we sought and were generously given the help of the following biologists
who had conducted research on the sociobiology of the individual species:
Robert T. Bakker (reconstruction of the appearance and possible social
behavior of dinosaurs), Brian Bertram (lions), Iain Douglas-Hamilton
(African elephants), Richard D. Estes (wild dogs, wildebeest), F Clark
Howell (reconstructions of primitive man and the Pleistocene mammal
fauna), Alison Jolly (ring-tailed lemurs), James Malcolm (wild dogs), John
H. Kauf-mann (whip-tailed wallabies), Hans Kummer (hamadryas baboons),
George B. Schaller (gorillas), and Glen E. Woolfenden (Florida scrub jays).
Elso S. Barghoorn, Leslie A. Garay, and Rolla M. Tryon added advice on the
depiction of the surrounding vegetation. Other drawings in this book were
executed by Joshua B. Clark, and most of the graphs and diagrams by
William G. Minty.
Certain passages have been taken with little or no change from The Insect
Societies, by E. O. Wilson (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1971); these include short portions of Chapters 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, and
17 in the present book as well as a substantial portion of Chapter 20, which
presents a brief review of the social insects. Other excerpts have been taken
from A Primer of Population Biology, by E. O. Wilson and W. H. Bossert
(Sinauer Associates, 1971), and Life on Earth, by E. O. Wilson et al. (Sinauer
Associates, 1973). Pages 106–117 come from my article “Group Selection
and Its Significance for Ecology” (BioScience, vol. 23, pp. 631–638, 1973),
copyright © 1973 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Other
passages have been adapted from various of my articles in Bulletin of the
Entomological Society of America (vol. 19, pp. 20–22, 1973); Science (vol.
163, p. 1184, 1969; vol. 179, p. 466, 1973; copyright © 1969, 1973, by the
American Association for the Advancement of Science); Scientific American
(vol. 227, pp. 53–54, 1972); Chemical Ecology (E. Sondheimer and J. B.
Simeone, eds., Academic Press, 1970); Man and Beast: Comparative Social
Behavior (J. F. Eisenberg and W. S. Dillon, eds., Smithsonian Institution
Press, 1970). The quotations from the Bhagavad-Gita are taken from the
Peter Pauper Press translation. The editors and publishers are thanked for
their permission to reproduce these excerpts.
I wish further to thank the following agencies and individuals for
permission to reproduce materials for which they hold the copyright:
Academic Press, Inc.; Aldine Publishing Company; American Association
for the Advancement of Science, representing Science; American Midland
Naturalist; American Zoologist; Annual Reviews, Inc.; Associated University
Presses, Inc., representing Bucknell University Press; Balliere Tindall, Ltd.;
Professor George W. Barlow; Blackwell Scientific Publications, Ltd.; E. J.
Brill Co.; Cambridge University Press; Dr. M. J. Coe; Cooper Ornithological
Society, representing The Condor; American Society of Ichthyologists and
Herpetologists, representing Copeia; Deutsche Ornithologen-Gesellschaft,
representing Journal für Ornithologie; Dr. Iain Douglas-Hamilton (Ph.D.
thesis, Oxford University); Dowden, Hutchinson and Ross, Inc.; Duke
University Press and the Ecological Society of America, representing
Ecology; Dr. Mary Jane West Eberhard; Professor Thomas Eisner; Evolution;
Dr. W. Faber; W. H. Freeman and Company, representing Scientific
American; Gustav Fischer Verlag; Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.,
including representation for Psychosomatic Medicine; Dr. Charles S. Henry;
the Herpetologists’ League, representing Herpetologica; Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, Inc.; Dr. J. A. R. A. M. van Hooff; Houghton Mifflin Company;
Indiana University Press; Journal of Mammalogy; Dr. Heinrich Kutter;
Professor James E. Lloyd; Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc.; Professor
Peter Marler; McGraw-Hill Book Company; Masson et Cie, representing
Insectes Sociaux; Dr. L. David Mech; Methuen and Co., Ltd.; Museum of
Zoology, University of Michigan; Dr. Eugene L. Nakamura; Nature, for
Macmillan (Journals), Ltd.; Professor Charles Noirot; Pergamon Press, Inc.;
Professor Donald W. Pfaff; Professor Daniel Otte; Plenum Publishing
Corporation; The Quarterly Review of Biology; Dr. Katherine Rails; Random
House, Inc.; Professor Carl W. Rettenmeyer; the Royal Society, London;
Science Journal; Dr. Neal G. Smith; Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.; Dr.
Robert Stumper; University of California Press; The University of Chicago
Press, including representation of The American Naturalist; Walter de
Gruyter and Co.; Dr. Peter Weygoldt; Professor W. Wickler; John Wiley and
Sons, Inc.; Worth Publishers, Inc.; The Zoological Society of London,
representing Journal of Zoology; Zoologischer Garten Köln
(Aktiengesellschaft).
Finally, much of my personal research reported in the book has been
supported continuously by the National Science Foundation during the past
sixteen years. It is fair to say that I would not have reached the point from
which a synthesis could be attempted if it had not been for this generous
public support.
E. O. W.
Cambridge, Massachusetts
October 1974
Contents
Part I Social Evolution
11 Aggression
Aggression and Competition
The Mechanisms of Competition
The Limits of Aggression
The Proximate Causes of Aggression
Human Aggression
16 Parental Care
The Ecology of Parental Care
Parent-Offspring Conflict
Parental Care and Social Evolution in the Insects
Parental Care and Social Evolution in the Primates
Other Animal Ontogenies
Alloparental Care
Adoption
17 Social Symbioses
Social Commensalism
Social Mutualism
Parabiosis
Mixed Species Groups in Vertebrates
Trophic Parasitism
Xenobiosis
Temporary Social Parasitism in Insects
Brood Parasitism in Birds
Slavery in Ants
Inquilinism in Ants
The General Occurrence of Social Parasitism in Insects
Breaking the Code
22 The Birds
The Crotophaginae
The Jays
25 The Carnivores
The Black Bear (Ursus americanus)
The Coati (Nasua narica)
The Lion (Panthera leo)
Wolves and Dogs (Canidae)
Glossary
Bibliography
Index
Arjuna to Lord Although these are my enemies, whose wits are
Krishna: overthrown by greed, see not the guilt of
destroying a family, see not the treason to friends,
yet how, O Troubler of the Folk, shall we with
clear sight not see the sin of destroying a family?
Figure 1-2 A subjective conception of the relative number of ideas in various disciplines in and
adjacent to behavioral biology to the present time and as it might be in the future.
I see increasing reason to believe that the view formed some time
back as to the origin of the Makonde bush is the correct one. I have
no doubt that it is not a natural product, but the result of human
occupation. Those parts of the high country where man—as a very
slight amount of practice enables the eye to perceive at once—has not
yet penetrated with axe and hoe, are still occupied by a splendid
timber forest quite able to sustain a comparison with our mixed
forests in Germany. But wherever man has once built his hut or tilled
his field, this horrible bush springs up. Every phase of this process
may be seen in the course of a couple of hours’ walk along the main
road. From the bush to right or left, one hears the sound of the axe—
not from one spot only, but from several directions at once. A few
steps further on, we can see what is taking place. The brush has been
cut down and piled up in heaps to the height of a yard or more,
between which the trunks of the large trees stand up like the last
pillars of a magnificent ruined building. These, too, present a
melancholy spectacle: the destructive Makonde have ringed them—
cut a broad strip of bark all round to ensure their dying off—and also
piled up pyramids of brush round them. Father and son, mother and
son-in-law, are chopping away perseveringly in the background—too
busy, almost, to look round at the white stranger, who usually excites
so much interest. If you pass by the same place a week later, the piles
of brushwood have disappeared and a thick layer of ashes has taken
the place of the green forest. The large trees stretch their
smouldering trunks and branches in dumb accusation to heaven—if
they have not already fallen and been more or less reduced to ashes,
perhaps only showing as a white stripe on the dark ground.
This work of destruction is carried out by the Makonde alike on the
virgin forest and on the bush which has sprung up on sites already
cultivated and deserted. In the second case they are saved the trouble
of burning the large trees, these being entirely absent in the
secondary bush.
After burning this piece of forest ground and loosening it with the
hoe, the native sows his corn and plants his vegetables. All over the
country, he goes in for bed-culture, which requires, and, in fact,
receives, the most careful attention. Weeds are nowhere tolerated in
the south of German East Africa. The crops may fail on the plains,
where droughts are frequent, but never on the plateau with its
abundant rains and heavy dews. Its fortunate inhabitants even have
the satisfaction of seeing the proud Wayao and Wamakua working
for them as labourers, driven by hunger to serve where they were
accustomed to rule.
But the light, sandy soil is soon exhausted, and would yield no
harvest the second year if cultivated twice running. This fact has
been familiar to the native for ages; consequently he provides in
time, and, while his crop is growing, prepares the next plot with axe
and firebrand. Next year he plants this with his various crops and
lets the first piece lie fallow. For a short time it remains waste and
desolate; then nature steps in to repair the destruction wrought by
man; a thousand new growths spring out of the exhausted soil, and
even the old stumps put forth fresh shoots. Next year the new growth
is up to one’s knees, and in a few years more it is that terrible,
impenetrable bush, which maintains its position till the black
occupier of the land has made the round of all the available sites and
come back to his starting point.
The Makonde are, body and soul, so to speak, one with this bush.
According to my Yao informants, indeed, their name means nothing
else but “bush people.” Their own tradition says that they have been
settled up here for a very long time, but to my surprise they laid great
stress on an original immigration. Their old homes were in the
south-east, near Mikindani and the mouth of the Rovuma, whence
their peaceful forefathers were driven by the continual raids of the
Sakalavas from Madagascar and the warlike Shirazis[47] of the coast,
to take refuge on the almost inaccessible plateau. I have studied
African ethnology for twenty years, but the fact that changes of
population in this apparently quiet and peaceable corner of the earth
could have been occasioned by outside enterprises taking place on
the high seas, was completely new to me. It is, no doubt, however,
correct.
The charming tribal legend of the Makonde—besides informing us
of other interesting matters—explains why they have to live in the
thickest of the bush and a long way from the edge of the plateau,
instead of making their permanent homes beside the purling brooks
and springs of the low country.
“The place where the tribe originated is Mahuta, on the southern
side of the plateau towards the Rovuma, where of old time there was
nothing but thick bush. Out of this bush came a man who never
washed himself or shaved his head, and who ate and drank but little.
He went out and made a human figure from the wood of a tree
growing in the open country, which he took home to his abode in the
bush and there set it upright. In the night this image came to life and
was a woman. The man and woman went down together to the
Rovuma to wash themselves. Here the woman gave birth to a still-
born child. They left that place and passed over the high land into the
valley of the Mbemkuru, where the woman had another child, which
was also born dead. Then they returned to the high bush country of
Mahuta, where the third child was born, which lived and grew up. In
course of time, the couple had many more children, and called
themselves Wamatanda. These were the ancestral stock of the
Makonde, also called Wamakonde,[48] i.e., aborigines. Their
forefather, the man from the bush, gave his children the command to
bury their dead upright, in memory of the mother of their race who
was cut out of wood and awoke to life when standing upright. He also
warned them against settling in the valleys and near large streams,
for sickness and death dwelt there. They were to make it a rule to
have their huts at least an hour’s walk from the nearest watering-
place; then their children would thrive and escape illness.”
The explanation of the name Makonde given by my informants is
somewhat different from that contained in the above legend, which I
extract from a little book (small, but packed with information), by
Pater Adams, entitled Lindi und sein Hinterland. Otherwise, my
results agree exactly with the statements of the legend. Washing?
Hapana—there is no such thing. Why should they do so? As it is, the
supply of water scarcely suffices for cooking and drinking; other
people do not wash, so why should the Makonde distinguish himself
by such needless eccentricity? As for shaving the head, the short,
woolly crop scarcely needs it,[49] so the second ancestral precept is
likewise easy enough to follow. Beyond this, however, there is
nothing ridiculous in the ancestor’s advice. I have obtained from
various local artists a fairly large number of figures carved in wood,
ranging from fifteen to twenty-three inches in height, and
representing women belonging to the great group of the Mavia,
Makonde, and Matambwe tribes. The carving is remarkably well
done and renders the female type with great accuracy, especially the
keloid ornamentation, to be described later on. As to the object and
meaning of their works the sculptors either could or (more probably)
would tell me nothing, and I was forced to content myself with the
scanty information vouchsafed by one man, who said that the figures
were merely intended to represent the nembo—the artificial
deformations of pelele, ear-discs, and keloids. The legend recorded
by Pater Adams places these figures in a new light. They must surely
be more than mere dolls; and we may even venture to assume that
they are—though the majority of present-day Makonde are probably
unaware of the fact—representations of the tribal ancestress.
The references in the legend to the descent from Mahuta to the
Rovuma, and to a journey across the highlands into the Mbekuru
valley, undoubtedly indicate the previous history of the tribe, the
travels of the ancestral pair typifying the migrations of their
descendants. The descent to the neighbouring Rovuma valley, with
its extraordinary fertility and great abundance of game, is intelligible
at a glance—but the crossing of the Lukuledi depression, the ascent
to the Rondo Plateau and the descent to the Mbemkuru, also lie
within the bounds of probability, for all these districts have exactly
the same character as the extreme south. Now, however, comes a
point of especial interest for our bacteriological age. The primitive
Makonde did not enjoy their lives in the marshy river-valleys.
Disease raged among them, and many died. It was only after they
had returned to their original home near Mahuta, that the health
conditions of these people improved. We are very apt to think of the
African as a stupid person whose ignorance of nature is only equalled
by his fear of it, and who looks on all mishaps as caused by evil
spirits and malignant natural powers. It is much more correct to
assume in this case that the people very early learnt to distinguish
districts infested with malaria from those where it is absent.
This knowledge is crystallized in the
ancestral warning against settling in the
valleys and near the great waters, the
dwelling-places of disease and death. At the
same time, for security against the hostile
Mavia south of the Rovuma, it was enacted
that every settlement must be not less than a
certain distance from the southern edge of the
plateau. Such in fact is their mode of life at the
present day. It is not such a bad one, and
certainly they are both safer and more
comfortable than the Makua, the recent
intruders from the south, who have made USUAL METHOD OF
good their footing on the western edge of the CLOSING HUT-DOOR
plateau, extending over a fairly wide belt of
country. Neither Makua nor Makonde show in their dwellings
anything of the size and comeliness of the Yao houses in the plain,
especially at Masasi, Chingulungulu and Zuza’s. Jumbe Chauro, a
Makonde hamlet not far from Newala, on the road to Mahuta, is the
most important settlement of the tribe I have yet seen, and has fairly
spacious huts. But how slovenly is their construction compared with
the palatial residences of the elephant-hunters living in the plain.
The roofs are still more untidy than in the general run of huts during
the dry season, the walls show here and there the scanty beginnings
or the lamentable remains of the mud plastering, and the interior is a
veritable dog-kennel; dirt, dust and disorder everywhere. A few huts
only show any attempt at division into rooms, and this consists
merely of very roughly-made bamboo partitions. In one point alone
have I noticed any indication of progress—in the method of fastening
the door. Houses all over the south are secured in a simple but
ingenious manner. The door consists of a set of stout pieces of wood
or bamboo, tied with bark-string to two cross-pieces, and moving in
two grooves round one of the door-posts, so as to open inwards. If
the owner wishes to leave home, he takes two logs as thick as a man’s
upper arm and about a yard long. One of these is placed obliquely
against the middle of the door from the inside, so as to form an angle
of from 60° to 75° with the ground. He then places the second piece
horizontally across the first, pressing it downward with all his might.
It is kept in place by two strong posts planted in the ground a few
inches inside the door. This fastening is absolutely safe, but of course
cannot be applied to both doors at once, otherwise how could the
owner leave or enter his house? I have not yet succeeded in finding
out how the back door is fastened.